Section — Bucceroni, Institutions of Moral Theology
On Devotion
To n. 451. -
"Devotion seems to be nothing other than a certain will of promptly handing oneself over to those things which pertain to the service of God." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 82, a. 1. "The extrinsic and principal cause of devotion is God.... But the intrinsic cause on our part must be meditation or contemplation ... of divine goodness and ... of our own defects." S. Th. l. c. a. 3. The effect of devotion per se and principally is spiritual joy; consequently, however, and accidentally, also sadness, which is according to God. S. Th. l. c. a. 4. Devotion is indeed a special act of the will. But it is also in some way a general act, insofar as "it is found in diverse genera of acts ... as the motion of the mover is found in the motions of mobile things." S. Th. l. c. a. 1 ad 2. Devotion likewise pertains to a special virtue, namely to the virtue of religion, and is its internal and first and most important act. S. Th. l. c. a. 2. Therefore devotion is rightly distinguished from sensible sweetness and taste, which can be had in spiritual exercises and is very useful to the interior spiritual life. Wherefore the doctrine of the Pietists is to be rejected, and likewise several propositions of Michael de Molinos concerning sensible devotion already condemned by the Church are to be condemned.
Devotion, concerning which the whole thesis turns, is defined by the Angelic Doctor: a certain will of promptly handing oneself over to those things which pertain to the service of God.
2, q. 82, a. 1. For devotion is said from devoting; whence those are called devout who in some way devote themselves to God, so that they subject themselves totally to Him. In Exod. 21, 21 it is said that the multitude of the children of Israel offered firstfruits to the Lord with a mind most prompt and devout. S. Th. id. Therefore devotion is the offering and handing over of oneself.
But this offering and handing over of oneself cannot be done except by that faculty which exercises command over the other faculties, and also over itself, namely so that it may move itself into the end or into God, and move the other powers of the soul, and direct their acts, into the end or God. But this faculty is not the intellect, but the will. Therefore devotion is a certain will.
To offer and hand oneself over to God can be done in two ways. Someone can be offered and handed over immediately to God, by adhering to Him through a certain union of spirit, according to that saying, 1 Cor. 6, 17: He who adheres to God is one spirit. And this offering and handing over of oneself pertains to charity. Likewise someone can be offered and handed over to God, not by this immediate union of the soul with God, but by offering and handing himself over to the works of divine worship. And this other offering and handing over of oneself pertains to devotion. But divine worship necessarily and essentially includes the service and servitude of God.
Aptly St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 81, a. 3 ad 2: "It must be said that by the same act man serves God and worships Him; for worship regards the excellence of God, to whom reverence is owed; but service regards the subjection of man, who from his condition is obliged to show reverence to God. And to these two pertain all acts which are attributed to religion, because through all of them man testifies to divine excellence and his own subjection to God, either by offering something to Him, or also by assuming something divine."
Therefore devotion is a certain will of handing oneself over to those things which pertain to the service of God. But in this definition of devotion the adverb promptly is added: a certain will of promptly handing oneself over to those things which pertain to the service of God. Wherefore it signifies neither a simple will, nor only the mode of this will; but it signifies both at once, both the quality and the act, namely the quality in such an act, the act affected by such a quality. Promptness excludes delay; delay is accustomed to arise from difficulties, and can also arise from a more remiss will. Therefore the aforesaid promptness consists in a will that is absolute, efficacious, complete, namely actually conquering every obstacle, every fear, every hesitation. Hence by this promptness interior devotion is manifested. And without this promptness of will, true and perfect devotion cannot be had. Therefore devotion, as has already been said, does not signify just any will, but a will so affected that it is prompt. Those are called devoted to some superior, to some friend, who are dedicated to him by a will so affected that they are prompt for him. "Hence in the usage of the Church devotion has been appropriated to those who are so affected toward God that they hold themselves prompt for God and for those things which are God's. And for this reason devotion has been led down to an act of this sort of will, by which man exhibits himself prompt for divine worship." Cajetan, in 2. 2, q. 82, a. 1.
Promptness of the will of this sort practically has as companion fervor of the will, which is nothing other than intensity and vehemence of affection.
Hence the word devotion has been transferred to signify several other things, which in reality are intimately connected with devotion. By devotion sometimes is signified the quality of a pious act, posited with promptness and fervor. In this sense prayer is called devout, meditation devout, namely one that is made with an attentive mind, a humble gesture of the body, in a place separated from all tumult.
Pious acts themselves, or exercises of piety, are not rarely called devout exercises, devotions, by denomination from devotion, because they are the matter about which devotion turns.
And the very manner of acting is accustomed to be called the devout life, namely when it is occupied especially with those pious exercises by which devotion is begotten and nourished; whence also such persons are called devout persons, or simply devout. And the Church generally calls women the devout feminine sex. Such persons indeed are called devout by Italians and by the French. The Spaniards also call them beatas.
This Spanish expression is not without its reason. For the effect of devotion is a certain spiritual joy, which is a certain heavenly gladness and a certain heavenly blessedness of the soul. And sometimes this spiritual joy also is accustomed to be called devotion.
There exists a twofold cause of devotion: one extrinsic, the other intrinsic. The extrinsic is the grace of God. The intrinsic is meditation, consideration, and study of divine things.
It is worthwhile to hear the Angelic Doctor: "It must be said that the extrinsic and principal cause of devotion is God, concerning whom Ambrose says ... 'God calls those whom He deigns; and whom He wills He makes religious
; and if He had willed, He would have made the Samaritans devout from being undevout.' But the intrinsic cause on our part must be meditation or contemplation. For it has been said that devotion is a certain act of the will for this, that man promptly hand himself over to divine service. But every act of the will proceeds from some consideration, because the understood good is the object of the will.... And therefore it is necessary that meditation be the cause of devotion, insofar as by meditation man conceives that he should hand himself over to divine service. To this indeed a twofold consideration induces him: one, indeed, which is on the part of divine goodness and His benefits, according to that saying, Ps. 72, 27: It is good for me to adhere to God, and to put my hope in the Lord God; and this consideration excites love, which is the proximate cause of devotion. But the other is on the part of man considering his own defects, from which he needs to lean upon God, according to that saying, Ps. 120, 1: I have lifted up my eyes to the mountains, whence help will come to me: my help is from the Lord, who made heaven and earth; and this consideration excludes presumption, by which someone is impeded from subjecting himself to God, while he leans upon his own power."
Rightly and deservedly, therefore, very many propositions of Michael de Molinos have been condemned as erroneous, almost all of which are reduced to the first and second; by which it is asserted that, for the internal life, man must annihilate his powers; do nothing; bear himself merely passively. Those who neglect to think upon the Divinity, and who in the consideration and meditation of divine things are affected with tedium and are carried away by the thought of other things, just as they lack devotion, so they also lack the effect of devotion. Nor certainly can an argument of progress in the spiritual life be drawn from this, as the thing is in reality evident per se. Nevertheless it was very obscure to Molinos, who did not hesitate to assert in propositions 28 and 29: "Tedium concerning spiritual things is good.... When the internal soul is disgusted with discourses concerning God and the virtues, and remains cold, feeling no fervor in itself, it is a good sign."
Nor consequently can what the same Molinos asserts in proposition 64 be a wonder, since it is a natural consequence of the principle established. "The theologian," he says, "has less disposition than a rude man for the state of the contemplative; first, because he does not have faith so pure; second, because he is not so humble; third, because he does not so care for his own salvation; fourth, because he has his head stuffed with phantasms, species, opinions, and speculations, and the true light cannot enter into it."
But if those things which are of the Divinity are according to themselves most exciting to love, and consequently to devotion, because God is to be loved above all things, the science of the Divinity per se increases devotion; and therefore the theologian and the learned man and anyone who strives to penetrate divine goodness and divine benefits with intimate knowledge is also greatly helped by that science toward conceiving devotion. But if science is the occasion that man trust in himself, and does not perfectly subject that science to God, and therefore does not totally hand himself over to God, hence it is that it sometimes occasionally impedes devotion; and then "in simple persons and women devotion abounds, by repressing elation." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 82, a. 3 ad 2. Aptly Cajetan on this place: "That which removes an impediment is posited as the occasional cause of motion, as ... one who removes an obstacle from water is the cause of its flow; so simple persons and women have in themselves the cause of devotion, namely because they do not have the impediment to devotion, that is, swelling concerning themselves. And because God gives grace to those who do not place an obstacle, therefore the Church calls the feminine sex devout. Therefore the science of doctors is not at fault, nor is womanly imperfection in praise; but the abuse of science in magnifying oneself, and the right use of imperfection in not elevating oneself; than which the right use of perfection would be far better."
Now then, if contemplation truly is the cause of devotion, it must be that those things which are of higher contemplation excite devotion more. Yet frequently greater devotion is excited from the consideration of the Passion and Death and other mysteries of the life of Christ than from the consideration of the divine perfections and of His own infinite greatness. Therefore it does not seem true that contemplation is the per se and proper cause of devotion.
But this difficulty is easily solved. For those things which are of the Divinity are, according to themselves, most exciting to love, and consequently to devotion; but it is from the weakness of the human mind that, just as it needs to be led by the hand to the knowledge of divine things, so also to love, through certain sensible things known to us, among which the principal is the Humanity of Jesus Christ the Savior. In the Preface of the Mass for the Nativity of the Lord, which is one of those nine which Pope Pelagius II, in the Decrees de Consecr. dist. 1, cap. Invenimus, commends as consecrated by ancient usage, it is said: That while we know God visibly, through this we may be snatched up into the love of invisible things. And therefore those things which pertain to the Humanity of Christ, by way of a certain leading by the hand, most greatly excite devotion, although devotion consists principally about those things which are of the divinity. -
Therefore the consideration of all those things which are in some way known to excite the love of God causes devotion; but the consideration of any things whatever that do not pertain to this, but distract the mind from them, impedes devotion. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 82, a. 3 ad 1, ad 2. Moreover it follows from what has been said that for all religious and spiritual persons there should be daily meditations of this sort concerning divine goodness, charity, mercy, concerning our infirmity and misery, by which devotion and consequently other virtues are begotten. Cajetan, in loc. cit.
But from this it does not follow that devotion is only toward God and that there is no devotion toward the Most Blessed Virgin Mary, toward the Angels, toward the Saints. For devotion indeed per se and principally is toward God; but it is also toward others, though in order to God. "It must be said," says St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 82, a. 2 ad 3, "that the devotion which is had toward the saints of God, dead or living, is not terminated at them, but passes over into God, insofar, namely, as in the ministers of God we venerate God."
From the cause of devotion let us now advance a step to the effect of devotion. -
The proper effect of devotion is a certain heavenly gladness, and a certain heavenly blessedness. Nevertheless this spiritual joy, in this life, is not separated from spiritual sadness: the former follows devotion first, principally, and per se; the latter follows devotion only secondarily and accidentally.
- "For it has been said that devotion proceeds from a twofold consideration. Principally indeed from the consideration of divine goodness, because this consideration pertains as it were to the term of the motion of the will handing itself over to God; and from this consideration delight indeed follows per se, according to that saying, Ps. 76, 4: I remembered God and was delighted; but accidentally this consideration causes a certain sadness in those who do not yet fully enjoy God, according to that saying, Ps. 41, 3: My soul has thirsted for God, the living fountain; and afterward it follows: my tears have been my breads, etc. But secondarily devotion is caused, as has been said, from the consideration of one's own defects; for this consideration pertains to the term from which man recedes by the motion of the devout will, namely so that he may not exist in himself, but subject himself to God. But this consideration has itself conversely to the first: for per se indeed it is apt to cause sadness, by thinking again upon one's own defects; but accidentally joy, namely on account of the hope of divine assistance. And thus it is clear that delight follows devotion first and per se; but secondarily and accidentally, sadness, which is according to God." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 82, a. 4.
- Therefore the spirit, which on the one hand is troubled because of the defects of the present life, on the other hand is also delighted from the consideration of divine goodness, and from the hope of divine help. S. Th. l. c. ad 2. Nor indeed is this spiritual joy impeded by the fact that in devotion some break forth into tears. Tears come not only from sadness, but also from a certain tenderness of affection, especially when something delightful is considered, with an admixture of something sad: just as men are accustomed to weep from an affection of piety when they recover sons or dear friends whom they had thought themselves to have lost. Thus Gen. 45, 14, Joseph, embracing Benjamin his brother, wept amid the embraces; and also, Tob. 11, 14, after the return of the younger Tobias, his father and mother, kissing him, weep for joy. And in this way tears proceed from devotion. And this not rarely happens to pious and devout souls in the consideration of the Passion of Christ. In it there is something which saddens, namely human defect, for the removal of which Christ had to suffer; and there is something which gladdens, namely the kindness of God toward us, which provided for us concerning such liberation. S. Th. l. c. a. 4 ad 1, ad 2, ad 3. -
Hence Cajetan concludes on this article: "that those are not devout persons who, commonly sad and wild, do not know how to converse with others except by being disturbed or dissolved. For devout persons are cheerful, joyful in their own soul, not only from the principal cause, but also from the secondary cause, namely from the consideration of their own defects. For their sadness is according to God, and is accompanied by joy, according to that saying of Augustine: Let him grieve, and rejoice over his grief. On account of which we read concerning the Saints that they were joyful and cheerful; and deservedly so, as beginning on earth the heavenly conversation."
The aforesaid spiritual joy not only brings with itself facility in the exercise of spiritual things, but even proceeds further, all the way to a certain sensible sweetness, by which devout persons perform those things which regard the worship of God. Nevertheless devotion is in no way to be confused with this sensible sweetness and delight. Devotion is a human, virtuous, and meritorious act, and therefore is in our power. The aforesaid facility, sweetness, delight, do not depend on our will. They arise and remain in the special grace of the Holy Spirit, touching us, preventing us, exciting us; and then bodily disposition also helps us to conceive and perceive it. Hence it happens that man now operates without any difficulty and with interior taste, now operates with difficulty and with tedium. The absence of sweetness and facility of this sort does not diminish the merit of the will constantly persisting in its devotion, but rather increases it. Yet the same sweetness and facility and taste, which is perceived from devout exercises, is the occasion of greater merit. For acts, in the aforesaid exercises, are elicited more intensely, are continued for a longer time, and are repeated with greater frequency.
From this whole last observation it is clear what is to be thought concerning those Protestants who are called Pietists. Rejecting every discourse and understanding of the things of our faith, they give themselves wholly to a certain hidden and unknown sense of devotion, and they labor to excite that within themselves, without the foundation of true faith, without true knowledge of divine things. Vain piety is not true piety, because it is without a solid foundation. A holy life, a spiritual life, a Christian life, cannot exist without true faith. But the just man lives by faith. Rom. 1, 17.
The falsity of the doctrine of Molinos in this matter is also clear. For Michael de Molinos rejected every sensible sweetness and taste in the spiritual life, from which consequently he removed every sensible means for procuring devotion. And thus proposition 27 of the following tenor was condemned: "He who desires and embraces sensible devotion does not desire nor seek God, but himself; and he acts badly, when he desires it and tries to have it, who walks by the internal way, both in sacred places and on solemn days." Likewise proposition 30 was condemned, which has itself thus: "Everything sensible which we experience in the spiritual life is abominable, filthy, and unclean." Likewise proposition 33 was condemned, sounding thus: "The soul which proceeds by this internal way acts badly if on solemn days it wishes by some particular effort to excite within itself some devout sense: since for internal souls all days are equal, all are festive. And the same is said concerning sacred places, because for souls of this sort all places are equal." But how fitting sensible means are for conciliating for us true and solid devotion is well clear from the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius of Loyola; indeed it is a most shining thing from the whole liturgy of the Church.
Having explained the nature of devotion from its intrinsic nature, from its causes, from its effects, it remains that we examine whether it is truly a special act of the will, and of what virtue it is the act. It is indeed a special act of the will; for it has a special object, well distinct from any other, namely promptly to do those things which pertain to divine worship; and the will thus prompt and prepared for doing whatever things regard the service and servitude of God is properly devotion. Will, that is, an act, and simply an act of the will, that is, an act of the will of man offering himself to God both for worshiping Him and for serving Him; which act per se involves no oath, no promise, and no vow; and externally it is explained by words, when man says to God with heart and mouth: I hand myself wholly over to Your service, to Your divine service.
From this notion it becomes manifest that devotion, although formally it is a special act, nevertheless can also in some true sense be called a universal act, namely virtually or causally, because it moves to all acts of homage and service of God. It moreover imposes a mode of acting devoutly upon other acts. For the mover imposes the mode on the motion of the movable. But the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts, and the will, insofar as it is of the end, moves itself to those things which are for the end. And therefore, since devotion is an act of the will of man offering himself to God for serving Him, who is the ultimate end, it follows that devotion imposes a mode on human acts, whether they are acts of the will itself concerning those things which are for the end, or also acts of the other powers which are moved by the will." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 82, a. 1 ad 1.
As devotion is a special act of the will, so it is a special act of the virtue of religion. There are not lacking those who regard devotion rather as an affection of religion than as a special act of religion. What that affection of religion is, which is not an act of religion, those who affirm this certainly are persuaded that they understand. But we confess that we do not understand. Wherefore, with the common doctrine, which is the doctrine of St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 81, a. 7, q. 82, proemium and art. 2, which is thus concluded: "And thus it is clear that devotion is an act of religion," we also thus conclude.
And indeed to operate those things which pertain to divine worship or service properly pertains to religion. But to the same virtue pertains to operate something, to will to operate it, and to have a prompt will for doing it, because the object of both acts is the same. On account of which the Philosopher says, Eth. l. 5, cap. 1, around the beginning: Justice is that by which men will and work just things. Therefore to the same virtue of religion pertains having a prompt will for executing those things which regard divine worship or service, which is to be devout.
But that it is an internal act of religion is deduced from its own intrinsic nature, since it is the prompt will itself of devoting oneself wholly to divine service. But that it is the first and most important act of religion is clear from the very nature of religion. The office of the virtue of religion is to testify to man's subjection toward God, insofar as He is the first principle and lord of all. Whence, according to the diversity of those things which are subjected to God by man through religion, diverse are the acts of religion. Now the first and more excellent good of all man's goods is the spiritual good of the mind, and this is especially subjected to God through acts of devotion and prayer, which therefore are the most important. But devotion informs all acts of religion, furnishing them the mode of performing them devoutly. Therefore there can be no doubt that it is the first and most important of all acts of religion.