II. On Contrition

What is contrition and how many kinds are there? - Contrition is sorrow of soul and detestation concerning sin committed, with the purpose of not sinning thereafter. Sorrow is displeasure and bitterness of soul; detestation is reprobation and condemnation of sin. Trent, sess. 14, C. 4; St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 85, a. 1, ad 3; Suppl., q. 1, a. 1. - One is perfect from the special motive of charity, and is customarily called contrition simply; another is imperfect from another motive, e.g., from consideration of the foulness of sin, from fear of hell and punishments, etc., and is customarily called attrition. Trent, ibid. - L. 435, 436; St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 87, a. 1; E. M.

What is the necessity of contrition? - Contrition, either perfect with the desire of the sacrament, or imperfect with the sacrament itself, is altogether necessary to the sinner by necessity of means for obtaining justification and salvation. But that desire is implicit in contrition itself, from the very institution of the sacrament of penance and the obligation of confessing sins; nor must it necessarily be explicit. Trent, sess. 14, C. 1, 4; sess. 6, C. 6, 14; St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 87, a. 1; L. 434. It is necessary besides by necessity of divine precept at some time in life, Luke 13:3, 5, and at the point of death, on account of the precept of obtaining the last end. L. 437. "Speaking of itself, a sinner delaying penance outside danger of death probably does not commit a special sin. The reason is that affirmative precepts, as St. Thomas teaches in 4 d. 17, q. 3, a. 1, q. 4, must have a determined time in which they must be fulfilled; but nowhere is it established what time is determined for satisfying this precept of contrition. Hence the same holy Doctor, 2. 2, q. 14, a. 2, said that final impenitence is not a special sin, in these words: impenitence, not indeed in that mode in which it means permanence in sin until death..., in this way would not be a special sin, but a certain circumstance of sin, etc. Nevertheless that is indeed to be understood apart from a positive precept; for from the precept of annual Confession, prescribed by the Church, each person without doubt is bound to penance at least once in the year." L. 437. Wherefore the precept of penance does not oblige immediately after mortal sin has been committed.

But by accident the aforesaid precept obliges when another precept urges which cannot be fulfilled without contrition, e.g., when one guilty of grave sin is about to receive or administer a sacrament; as often as the sacrament of penance is received even for the sake of devotion. - Likewise when someone, existing in mortal sin, would defer penance for a notable time. The reason is clear from what St. Thomas teaches, 1. 2, q. 109, a. 8, where he says: "Without justifying grace, that one remain for a long time without mortal sin cannot be." "But what this notable time is, the doctors greatly disagree." L. 437. Concina and others think it is a week; St. Alphonsus in the cited place and others think it is a month; others a trimester, others six months, others a year. The more common opinion, as Palaus says, de Poenit., d. un., p. 3, n. 9, admits at least that delay which the precept of the Church also admits concerning annual Confession; St. Alphonsus there also attributes this doctrine to St. Thomas, 4 d. 17, q. 3, a. 1, q. 4, although he himself "does not altogether acquiesce." Cf. Laymann, c. 2, n. 6; L., l. 6, n. 473; St. Thomas, Quodl. 1, a. 11. - Besides, as the same St. Alphonsus has it in the cited place, "sinners, especially the uneducated, can for the most part, indeed almost always, be excused from this sin of delayed penance on account of inadvertence." Cf. Lugo, d. 15, nn. 55, 56; Suarez, d. 15, s. 6, nn. 7, 8; d. 35, s. 3, n. 10.

What are the qualities of contrition? - Contrition 1. must be altogether true and real, not supposed; altogether formal, but virtual suffices, even for venials. Trent, sess. 14, C. 4; L. 443, 449.

2. It must be supernatural, even for venials, because it is part of the sacrament and a positive disposition for supernatural grace. But it must be supernatural not only because elicited with the help of grace, but also, at least in some way, on the part of the motive. The reason is that, as Lugo says, d. 5, n. 141, "for every justification, even in the sacrament, there is required a conversion of man to God, at least imperfect." But since that conversion is to God as supernatural end, hence that motive, at least considered inadequately, must be supernatural, proposed not by the light of natural reason, but by the light of faith. Busemb. 433; L. 440; Suarez, d. 20, s. 2. This is openly established from Trent, sess. 14, C. 4, where, after it had recounted among other motives the fear of hell and punishments, which seemed especially to be known by the natural light of reason, it immediately adduces the example of the Ninevites, whose object was certainly manifested not by natural reason but by the light of faith.

3. It must be appretiatively supreme, even for venial sins; that is, so that one detests sin more than every other evil, whence the sinner is prepared in soul to lose and suffer all things rather than commit sin. - Contrition and sorrow must be supreme not in the sensitive part, but in the will, insofar as by the soul's judgment and estimation sin is held as graver than any other evil, which the will therefore turns away from and rejects before other evils. - It is not required that a formal comparison be set up in the appreciation between various evils and sin, which someone would indeed do foolishly. St. Thomas, Quodl. 1, a. 9; L. 433.

Nor indeed must contrition be supreme intensively, since intensity is something merely accidental. Lugo, d. 5, nn. 84-87; L. 441, 442; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 5, a. 3; 2. 2, q. 24, a. 12; q. 45, a. 4. - Nor likewise is any duration of time required, because this too is something merely accidental. L. 433.

4. It must be universal, if it is a question of grave sins, but by no means if of venial sins. The first reason is that the remission of mortal sins is made through the infusion of sanctifying grace, which is incompatible with any mortal sin whatever. But it suffices that contrition be universal from a universal motive, nor are individual acts of sorrow required for each individual sin. For then one virtually detests each of his individual sins. Otherwise one could not be cleansed from hidden sins through universal sorrow. Trent, sess. 14, C. 5; L. 438; St. Thomas, de Verit., q. 29, a. 5, ad 4; 4 d. 17, q. 2, a. 3, q. 5, ad 2. The second reason is that since sanctifying grace is not incompatible with venial sin, one can be remitted without another. "Hence it suffices to repent and purpose concerning only one venial sin, since venials are not necessary matter, but only sufficient matter. But Lugo, d. 14 from n. 138, etc., says that it also suffices if someone grieves for each one in particular.... La-Croix, 913, etc., also rightly says that someone can well grieve for deliberate venials and purpose to avoid all of them; but concerning semi-deliberate ones it suffices to grieve that he committed them, and in the future to wish to attend to avoiding them insofar as human frailty permits. And these things are according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 87, a. 1, ad 1." L. 449; Lugo, Resp. Mor., l. 1, D. 29; E. M.

Wherefore contrition or attrition is also necessary as regards the remission of venial sins. St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 87, aa. 1, 2, 3. And lest efficacy be altogether taken away from the sacrament of penance as regards the remission of venial sins, it seems that one must say that outside the sacrament, for the remission of graver venials, a more perfect attrition is required, and for lighter ones a less perfect attrition; but in the sacrament of baptism, extreme unction, and penance, a lesser attrition is required. - Suarez, d. 11, s. 3; Lugo, s. 9, n. 28.

Must the contrition required for the sacrament of penance also be vocal? - It must indeed be sensible, but by no means necessarily vocal. The first reason is that it is part of the sacrament. The second reason is that otherwise dying persons unable to speak, although they give other signs of contrition, could not be absolved, which is against common practice and doctrine and against the Roman Ritual. - But it becomes sufficiently sensible by the very sorrowful Confession of sins, by the petition or expectation of absolution, and by other signs. - L. 445; H. A., tr. 16, n. 20.

Must contrition precede Confession? - It must certainly precede absolution, or at least coexist with it; it surely does not suffice that it follow absolution, since one who has not yet detested sins neither deserves nor can be loosed from the bond of sins. Trent, sess. 14, C. 4. - For the validity of the sacrament, sorrow need not necessarily precede accusation. The reason is that all things required for the sacrament are present, provided sorrow precedes absolution; nor can a precept be proved of placing sorrow for sins before Confession. Lugo, Suarez, and others more commonly, against others. Besides, when other theologians require a sorrowful Confession, and therefore say that sorrow must precede, they seem to demand nothing else than that the Confession not be a mere narration of sins, but an accusation of oneself in order to obtain absolution.

The Roman Ritual, de Sacram. poenit., favors this, where it is said: "having heard the Confession, the confessor will strive with efficacious words to lead him to sorrow," etc. From this the Ritual seems to suppose that sorrow elicited after Confession suffices well. Thus St. Alphonsus, 445. - Nevertheless the same St. Alphonsus, H. A., tr. 16, n. 20, says that the other opinion is probable and therefore to be followed in practice; and he adds: "But they commonly agree... that it suffices if, after the acts of sorrow, the penitent again says, I accuse myself of all the sins confessed."

But the same holy Doctor himself had previously handed down the first opinion in earlier editions of the Moral Work and of the Italian edition of the Homo Apostolicus; afterward, however, in later editions of the Moral Work, he changed it. - Ithur., Cas. 11, n. 4, says: "That sorrow is sufficient for the sacrament of penance seems to me certain, even if it does not precede Confession, provided it follows Confession and together with Confession is ordered to absolution; and this the very sense of the faithful and the practice of confessors sufficiently teach. It is founded on this: although the whole prior narration of sins, preceding sorrow in time, had not yet had the complete nature of accusation, nevertheless, afterwards informed by subsequent contrition, and thus subjected to the keys by the penitent both asking for and expecting absolution, it is sufficiently completed in the nature of sacramental accusation." E. M.

Through what space of time does an act of sorrow morally endure for validly receiving the sacrament? - Suarez, d. 20, s. 4, n. 29, and others judge that sorrow suffices which preceded Confession by a long time, provided it has not been retracted. For since such sorrow virtually perseveres in the flight from sin and in the very Confession which is made for preserving the state of grace, there seems to be no reason why such sorrow should be held insufficient. And Ballerinius seems to adhere to this opinion, Gur. Baller. 448. Cf. Lugo, d. 14, nn. 35, 50. - But others, such as Cardenas, in prop. 2 of Innocent XI, p. 65, n. 88, etc., say that sorrow preceding by one day suffices; for since Confession is the effect of that sorrow, sorrow virtually perseveres. Roncaglia, c. 3, q. 2, r. 2, agrees, even if sorrow preceded by several days, provided it virtually perseveres in some means, for example if the penitent, by force of the sorrow conceived, has persisted in frequent prayer, flight from occasions, penances, etc. L. 446. Gury 447 also agrees, even if sorrow preceded by one or several days, provided it was elicited from the intention of Confession and was not retracted by another sin. - D'Annibale, ed. 3, p. 3, n. 315.

In order that sorrow be apt matter, must it be elicited from or with the intention of Confession? - Several affirm it, and St. Alphonsus says this opinion is probable and more safely to be followed. But Lugo, d. 14, nn. 37-40, and others deny it; Tamburini thinks this probable, St. Alphonsus himself, 447, more probable, and Ballerinius, Gur. Baller. 447, as certain. The reason is both that, from Trent, sess. 14, C. 4, that attrition is said to dispose for obtaining grace in the sacrament which excludes the will to sin with hope of pardon, all of which is verified in our case; and that then sorrow, although it was not ordered to Confession by an antecedent relation, is nevertheless ordered by a concomitant relation from this, that then sorrow is still verified as being laid open through Confession.

Is a new act of sorrow required for receiving a new absolution when the penitent immediately after absolution confesses a mortal sin omitted from forgetfulness? - The first opinion denies it, because the prior contrition certainly perseveres, and since it was universal it extended to all sins, even those omitted from forgetfulness; and it can well serve for another form of absolution. Nor otherwise is it required that contrition be explicitly ordered to the sacrament. Besides, once a new accusation has been made, it is already sufficiently ordered. Indeed there seems to be sorrow, in some way explicit, in the act of accusing that sin. For when vocal Confession is repeated, at least virtually the sorrow of the preceding Confession is repeated, still persevering morally and virtually. - The second opinion affirms it, because through absolution the judgment has been completed; therefore if a new absolution is to be imparted, new proximate matter is required; and although sorrow perseveres in itself, it nevertheless does not persevere in order to absolution. - St. Alphonsus, 448, speaking of this second opinion, says: "Since it is probable, indeed more probable, Croix and Concina say that it must altogether be followed in practice; at least I judge that the safer opinion must be held." But of the first he says: "It is more common, and Lugo, Anacletus, Viva with Perez, Henriquez, and the common opinion, Roncaglia who calls it morally certain, Sporer, Elbel who thinks it most probable with Gobat, Dicastillo, Henriquez, Bosco, etc., likewise apud Croix, Leander, Salas, Escobar, and Moya, who says it is undoubted among all, hold this." But for it Lugo says, d. 14, n. 27, "common practice also stands," which Dicastillo also testifies, de Sacr., tr. 8, disp. 6, dub. 22, n. 160, and Diana, t. 1, tr. 3, r. 95, n. 3, and many other grave theologians adhere to it absolutely. Fr. Gury, 448, says the second opinion rests on a light foundation.

But Ballerinius there says that "neither authority nor any solid reason supports the same second opinion," but that the first "can be held in practice as very safe." D'Annibale, ed. 3, p. 3, n. 315, says, "To me, if you wish to confess something forgotten, the first opinion seems truer, because this is contained, as in the same Confession, so also in the same sorrow; if you confess the same things again, the other opinion seems truer, because it is a new Confession, which in no way pertains to the prior one." But although it is a new Confession, nevertheless virtually persevering sorrow can well suffice for it. For as it suffices for the new Confession of a forgotten sin, so it can well suffice for the new Confession of sins already accused. - Elbel 75.

Does one sin who confesses some venial sin without sorrow? - If he opens this very defect of sorrow and purpose to the confessor, then the priest must not absolve from such a sin, nor should the penitent say it for this end, namely as matter of the sacrament, since in fact it cannot be such. Yet it can licitly be said either for humility, or for counsel, or for excitation to true penance. - If he opens a venial sin for which he does not grieve, like the others, as matter of absolution, "then," says Suarez, d. 39, s. 6, n. 7, "many think it is a mortal sin....

But although it cannot be denied that this is some fault, nevertheless I do not judge it mortal, because the matter of such fault is light; because the defect of that sorrow or purpose of itself and by its nature is not contrary to grace and justification, which is the primary effect of this sacrament signified by the form..., nor even does it impede the remission of other venial sins, concerning which a true accusation capable of true absolution is made, notwithstanding the obstacle of some venial sin." Cf. Lugo, d. 14, n. 48. Besides, even that light fault of which Suarez speaks will often be absent, either because the penitent does not advert to this defect of sorrow or to the disorder of the same defect, or because all displeasure is rarely absent, although it is not sufficiently efficacious; in this matter it is often difficult to avoid deception. - To approach the sacrament with light matter, without any sorrow, is grave, on account of the grave irreverence inflicted upon the sacrament by frustrating it of its effect, whether from grave or light matter. Lugo, d. 14, n. 108 ff.; L. 449.

Does fearful attrition, or attrition conceived from fear of hell, suffice for justification in the sacrament of penance? - Resp. In the affirmative, provided it is truly supernatural, absolutely efficacious, and only materially servile, not formally or servilely servile. The reason is: 1. because attrition of this kind is a true conversion to God and a true aversion from sin; 2. because this is clearly drawn from Trent, sess. 14, C. 4, where it says that attrition conceived from fear of hell and punishments is honest and disposes the sinner for obtaining justification in the sacrament of penance. And this is certain and common among the doctors. - But attrition is called servilely servile when someone indeed grieves over sin and wishes to avoid it because of the punishments which he knows are to be inflicted by God, yet he would still be ready to sin if those punishments did not exist. But it is called simply servile when someone abstains from sin indeed because of fear of punishments, yet is not so disposed that he would wish to sin if those punishments did not exist. The former is evil, not because it is fear of punishments, but because of the depraved disposition of soul. - L. 440, 442; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 19; q. 225; Quodl. 4, a. 10; 4 d. 22, q. 2, a. 1, q. 3; E. M.

Whether attrition suffices for the sacrament of penance when conceived from fear of the punishments of this life, insofar as they are inflicted by God as avenger of sins? - The first opinion denies it. The reason is that Trent, sess. 14, C. 4, speaks conjointly of fear of punishments and of hell, when it teaches that "sorrow conceived from fear of hell and punishments" suffices, taking both for the same thing. For the punishment of mortal sin is eternal, and the sinner must fear this. The second opinion affirms it. The reason is that the particle and is to be taken disjunctively in the obvious sense, understanding hell for hell, Matt. 10:28, and punishments for temporal punishments, whether of Purgatory or of this life. This is confirmed by the example of the Ninevites, which Trent itself adduces, sess. 14, C. 4. St. Alphonsus, 443, says this second opinion is more probable, but that the first is not lacking its own probability, at least extrinsic; hence he concludes: "I think the safer one must be observed in practice." But others call the second opinion most probable, La-Croix 884; others morally certain, Elbel 59; others altogether certain, and Ballerinius seems to adhere to these, Gur. Baller. 452.

Insofar as they are inflicted by God as avenger of sins. For the aforesaid punishments must always be considered with relation to God as punisher of sins. Contrition sufficient for the sacrament cannot exist without relation to God.

Does attrition from fear of the punishments of Purgatory suffice for venial sins? - Resp. In the affirmative, with the very common and morally certain opinion; because all the reasons adduced above for the sufficiency of attrition from fear of hell are valid here also. Gur. 452.

Does attrition suffice for the sacrament of penance if it is conceived from the foulness of sin? - Resp. In the affirmative. Trent, sess. 14, C. 4.

But this foulness, the motive of sacramental attrition, is that which offends the eyes of God; which defiles the soul by deforming in it the image and likeness of God; which is known by faith; by no means, however, that which is contained in infamy among men, and which naturally belongs to vice, since it offends the order of right reason and is proposed merely by natural reason. The reason is that attrition must not be sorrow for sin in any manner whatever, but with some respect to God, the supernatural end of man; for there must be a certain conversion to God, at least imperfect. - Lugo, d. 5, n. 140 ff.; Suarez, d. 20, s. 2, n. 10; E. M.

Can there be a valid but unformed sacrament of penance because of a defect of sufficient sorrow? - There can be a twofold case: 1. When someone guilty of a double sin, from invincible forgetfulness, grieves over one only because of its special foulness, and confesses this alone. 2. When someone, from invincible ignorance, would believe that it is not a mortal sin to approach the sacrament without sorrow for all, while nevertheless sorrow was present for some sin because of its special foulness, e.g., because it is against justice, against chastity, etc., but not because it is simply an offense and injury against God. - Moreover the first opinion holds that such a sacrament is valid and formed, because the penitent places no obstacle to grace. The second opinion holds that it is not only unformed but invalid, because the sorrow is insufficient. The third opinion holds that it is valid but unformed: valid, because no essential part of the sacrament is lacking; unformed, because one mortal sin cannot be remitted without another, and the other cannot be remitted because sorrow is lacking. The first opinion seems true to D'Annibale, ed. 3, p. 3, n. 312; the third is more probable to St. Alphonsus, 444. - If contrition sufficient for the sacrament cannot exist without relation to God offended and with the purpose of not sinning thereafter, it certainly does not appear how it can be so particular that it is not at least virtually universal. Nor indeed does it appear how someone could with sincere soul detest the specific foulness of sin without also detesting the generic foulness. - Nor indeed does it appear how, according to what the Council of Trent has about the parts of this sacrament, sess. 14, C. 2, 3, it can still be an essential part of the sacrament with confession without contrition, as St. Thomas explicitly has it, Suppl., q. 9, a. 1, or with attrition, but not sufficient for grace, as others have it. Moreover this question is raised for this reason: that it may be known whether the penitent is bound again to confess the sins which he has already confessed, which indeed is doubtful in this variety of opinions. - Lugo, d. 14, n. 65 ff.; Resp. Mor., l. 1, d. 29; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 9, a. 1; 4 d. 17, q. 3, a. 4, q. 1.

Is one who at the point of death has received the sacrament of penance with attrition bound besides to elicit an act of contrition? - The first opinion affirms it, and Suarez, d. 14, s. 6, n. 18, Sanchez, in Dec., t. 1, l. 1, c. 1, n. 34, etc., hold this. The reason is that at the time of such great necessity safer means for salvation are to be chosen. The second opinion denies it, and Lugo, d. 7, n. 263, Laymann, c. 11, n. 7, etc., hold this. The reason is that there is only an obligation, whether in the time of life or in the time of death, of choosing safe means, not safer ones. But from Trent, sess. 14, C. 4, it is certain that attrition suffices in the sacrament for obtaining grace. L. 440. - Each opinion, says St. Alphonsus, 437, is probable; but the first is altogether to be counseled, which is evident of itself, since it is a question of the supreme business of salvation. The holy Doctor adds besides that the first must be altogether followed, because of another reason, namely because of the obligation of eliciting then an act of charity. But since this obligation too is disputed, namely for a man already justified through the sacrament, who already has sanctifying grace and habitual charity, a certain obligation does not seem to be imposed. - Gur. Baller. 445.

In order to obtain grace in the sacrament of penance, besides sorrow are explicit acts of faith and hope also required? - Resp. In the negative. The reason is that it cannot be proved by any probable argument that these acts are explicitly required. Besides, a penitent eliciting an act of sorrow also in some way explicitly and in exercise elicits these acts, although not reflectively; because then without doubt he believes in exercise, and hopes that through the sacrament of penance, in virtue of the merits of Christ, his sins are to be remitted. - L. 439; E. M.

For obtaining justification in the sacrament of penance with attrition, is the beginning of love also required? - Resp. In the negative, if by the beginning of love is understood some degree of perfect charity, by which God is loved above all things. The reason is that for rightly receiving the sacrament there is not necessarily prerequired an act which outside the sacrament essentially justifies. But an act of charity, and therefore "sorrow which suffices for the nature of contrition, however small it may be, deletes every guilt," as St. Thomas says, q. 5, a. 3. Therefore. St. Alphonsus, 440, says this is morally certain. - But it can and must be conceded that some beginning of love is required, insofar as attrition, in order to dispose for the sacrament, must exclude, as Trent speaks, the will to sin; and as St. Thomas says, 2. 2, q. 17, a. 8, "someone is introduced to loving God through this, that fearing to be punished by him he ceases from sin." - And here it must be noted that contrition not only remits guilt and eternal punishment, but also, if very intense and perfect, can abolish every punishment; yet from its own nature it does not necessarily have this efficacy. - Trent, sess. 6, C. 6, 14, c. 30; sess. 14, C. 8, c. 12; E. M.