II. On Detraction

What is detraction; what is calumny? - Detraction is: the hidden and unjust violation of another's reputation. Hidden, i.e., in the absence of the other from whom reputation is taken. Hidden; for if it is manifest, it is contumely. Of another's, for he who injures his own ordinarily is not unjust, since he is its owner. But reputation is the public opinion about the excellence of another.

Violation of reputation can be done in various ways: 1. Positively, if a false crime is imposed, if a true crime is amplified, if a hidden one is manifested, if a good work is taken in a sinister way. 2. Negatively, namely by denying the good works of neighbor, or by diminishing them, or even sometimes by being silent when others are praising, or by praising coldly. If reputation is taken from someone by opening a true crime, it is called simple detraction; if by imputing a false one, it is called calumny, which is graver and differs in species from simple detraction, because it adds to detraction a lie damaging to neighbor. Yet this diverse species, "precisely insofar as it is against truthfulness, is not mortal malice, and therefore does not bring a diverse mortal species necessarily to be explained in Confession." Lugo d. 14, n. 36. Detraction differs from whispering, which is a word sowing discord among friends. Yet whispering agrees with detraction on the part of the matter, because each says evil about neighbor; but it differs in species on the part of the end, because whispering moreover intends the dissolution of friendship. And therefore it is from its genus mortal, of a species diverse from and graver than detraction; hence it is to be expressed in Confession. Prov. 6:16, 19.; Eccli. 28:15.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 74, a. 2.; L. 966.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 73, a. 1.; E. M.

What kind of sin is detraction? - Detraction is a sin opposed to justice and from its genus grave. This is proved, because it is opposed to the right which another has to his reputation, or good name, by the lack of which a man is impeded from doing many good things; therefore it is a sin opposed to justice and, from its generic concept, mortal. 1 Cor. 6:10. Moreover detraction of itself is worse than theft, just as reputation is better than money, according to that saying of Prov. 22:1: A good name is better than many riches. And Eccli. 41:15: Have care for a good name, for this will remain for you more than a thousand precious and great treasures. - That calumny is opposed to justice is manifest. For since the crime is false, someone is in peaceful and legitimate possession of his reputation.

But as regards detraction there is difficulty; yet it is clear from this, that as long as the crime is not public, since reputation is not something consisting in the truth of the thing, but in the opinion of men, one is still in peaceful and legitimate possession of his reputation, of which he is despoiled through detraction. - But the same is always a sin in species, whatever the person may be from whom reputation is taken, because the reputation of a man is not distinguished into species; whatever the sin may be in which someone takes reputation from another; and whether in one thing or in several; because always it is one and the same thing which is injured by all these, namely estimation: hence in Confession it is not necessary to explain from whom and in what someone took reputation. L. 966, 967.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 33, a. 7 c., q. 73, a. 2.; E. M.

Whether it is grave to reveal the natural defects of another? To reveal another's natural defects, speaking of itself, is not a mortal sin. This is proved, because such defects are inculpable and ordinarily known to many; and therefore to reveal them is not usually gravely harmful to reputation. Thus it is not usually gravely harmful to reputation if someone says that another is ignorant, imprudent, etc.; nor if he says that another is one-eyed, lame, hunchbacked, etc. Speaking of itself; for if from the revelation of some natural defect another would suffer damage, or be gravely saddened, the revealer would sin gravely against justice or charity, unless he had a just cause for manifesting such a natural defect to someone. L. 967.

Note: The same must be said, generally speaking, of all those moral defects which, although without sin and without crime, can nevertheless render a person less worthy of honor; and the same must be said of merely civil defects in the same case, e.g., if someone says of an honorable girl that she suffered violence, or of an honorable and grave man that he exercised the butcher's trade.

Whether it is grave to reveal another's light sin? - To reveal another's venial sin, or to speak about sins by general words, speaking of itself, is not a mortal sin. This is proved, because in many things we all offend; and therefore to reveal another's venial sin, or sins by general words, from which it cannot be gathered that another has sinned mortally, is not usually gravely harmful to reputation. Speaking of itself; for the condition of some person can be such that in him even venial sins are judged to be of great moment; e.g., if it is said of a grave and religious man that he is mendacious, or lies frequently; or if certain sins are reported about some religious community by words even only general, e.g., I know many things about it which charity forbids me to disclose, etc.; or if so many things are said, although not individually grave, that the reputation of some person established in conspicuous dignity is notably injured, even if this is done over a long time. L. 997.

Whether it is always grave to reveal another's grave sin? - To reveal another's mortal sin is a mortal sin when on account of it he suffers grave detriment to reputation, but not when he suffers only slight detriment. The reason as regards the 1st part is clear of itself. The reason as regards the 2nd part is that certain mortal sins are so frequently committed by persons of a certain condition that they are now almost presupposed concerning them; and therefore to report a certain mortal sin about a person of like condition diminishes his reputation little; as, e.g., if it is said of a soldier that he committed a duel or seduced a girl. It would be the same if someone revealed a delict about which another is accustomed to boast, or one of the same reason, or species, concerning which he was already publicly defamed before. - L. 967.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 73, a. 2, 3.

Resolutions: It is inferred that he does not sin mortally who reports another's grave crime, if he is of so low a condition and authority that he can prudently persuade himself that those hearing will not believe him. The reason for this is that such a person does not cause in the hearers a firm judgment concerning another's crime, but at most some light suspicion. But if the detraction is atrocious, even to excite only suspicion is grave. He does not sin mortally who narrates to a friend an injury inflicted on himself by someone, in order that he may receive some consolation from him, and by the complaint set forth may lessen the bitterness of the pain.

The special reason for this is that it would be too difficult if someone had to digest a grave injury in silence, and under grave obligation could not report it even to a friend for the sake of consolation. There is a certain collision of rights; nor is the reputation of another properly and strictly injured. Hence servants disclosing to someone injuries inflicted by masters, wives by husbands, sons by a father, religious by a prelate, only for the sake of mitigating pain, are excused at least from mortal sin. L. 973.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 73, a. 3.; 1. 2, q. 38, a. 2. Cf. 1494, 1496. It is not mortal to speak ill of someone unknown or indeterminate, if such is not the case that infamy redounds upon others known and determinate.

Thus, e.g., he sins who detracts from a religious order, or names a monastery in which someone committed a grave hidden sin. For this gravely harms such an order or monastery. They make exception if there is question of some large order, and it is not of stricter observance, since in any large place there are almost always some unruly men. L. 978. It is not a sin against justice, at least not a mortal one, to ask the cause of someone's captivity or to speak about it; for just as the captivity is public, so also the cause seems to have been made public. L. 974. To defame a dead person is less grave than a living one, since he no longer needs reputation for living and working rightly for the utility of others; nevertheless it can still be mortal and obliging to restitution, because no one wholly dies, and the estimation of the dead often pertains to the living.

And scandal can also easily be had from the publication of a thing hitherto unknown. Nor does the reason avail against this that if you do not narrate that evil deed, others will narrate it. The fact that others do an illicit thing cannot make it licit for you. L. 978. Cf. here 1493, 1494. To call back into memory crimes already given over to oblivion is grave of itself against justice, since it takes away recovered estimation. But constantly to renew the memory of crimes which have not yet been given over to oblivion is grave of itself against charity, since this, without just cause, as is supposed, affects neighbor with grave sorrow.

Whether calumny or detraction is ever licit? - It is never licit to place a false crime upon another, as is clear from propositions 44 and 45 condemned by Innocent XI. Yet for a just cause it is licit to manifest another's hidden crime, even with loss of his reputation; because sometimes the public or private good requires this, and then the right of neighbor to preserving reputation is overcome by a stronger right. L. 972.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 69, a. 2.; E. M.

For what causes is it licit to reveal another's crime? - The causes on account of which another's crime can licitly be revealed, indeed sometimes even ought to be, are the following: 1. The notable utility of the revealer himself, e.g., for asking counsel or help in a grave matter, with any affection toward detraction nevertheless excluded. 2. The utility of the delinquent, namely for his instruction or correction, etc. 3. Public utility, as for impeding evils threatening the republic or religion or some community. 4. Grave utility also private, whether of those hearing or of others, e.g., that they may be freed from evils, damages, or inconveniences certainly or probably going to occur. The reason of these things is that then one manifesting the sins of another injures neither justice nor charity. He does not injure justice, because neighbor does not have so strict a right to his reputation that others are obliged to cover the truth when its manifestation is necessary for avoiding grave damage, whether one's own or that of others, to which others also have a right. Hence a collision of rights occurs. The good of others altogether prevails over the good of one's own reputation, which is a false reputation. Nor does he injure charity, because charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience; and just as you are not held to impede the damage of your neighbor, even if great, with grave damage to yourself, so neither in the case are you held to conceal the hidden crime of neighbor.

L. 968.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 73, a. 2.; Lugo d. 14, n. 97, 112, 113.; Gousset 1070.

Resolutions: If someone unjustly injures your reputation, either by calumny or by simple detraction, by denouncing your altogether hidden delict, and you cannot defend it or recover it by another way than by diminishing his reputation also, this is licit, provided you do not say false things, and only insofar as is necessary for preserving your reputation, and you do not injure more than you are injured, with your person and the other person's compared. L. 972. It is licit to defame another in order to avoid grave torments, if the crime is true; because you do no injury to another, since you have the right of revealing it in necessity; but it is not licit if the crime is false, because it would be a pernicious lie. L. 982.

You also licitly diminish someone's reputation if the estimation falsely conceived of his doctrine and probity is pernicious to others, provided there is no other more suitable reason for impeding the evil, and the damage which is feared for neighbor is greater than, or at least equal to, the damage which would come to the other from the manifestation of his defect or crime. Less. 968. Indeed, according to Lugo d. 14, n. 112, neither excess nor equality of your damage or that of others is required, "provided the damage which you fear for yourself or others is not slight, but grave and notable." Thus also St. Alphonsus 968. For the correction of the delinquent himself, it is licit secretly to reveal hidden delicts to parents, prelates, teachers, masters. It is also licit by reason of avoiding damage to manifest to some master that a servant is a thief, that a maidservant admits a lover at home when the master is absent.

Whether it is mortal to reveal another's grave sin, which gravely dishonors him, to one prudent and discreet man, with special malice excluded? The first opinion, more common and more probable, says that one sins gravely, unless inadvertence or great levity excuses. The reason is 1. because injury of reputation even before one grave person is judged grave, as is clear from rash judgment, which of itself is grave. 2. Because often men bear more painfully that they are injured before one grave person than before three or four others. Indeed it is grave to be held as good or as evil by a grave man. The second probable opinion denies it. The reason is that since reputation consists in the common estimation of men, he is not judged absolutely defamed who has lost his good name only before one or another. But the parity of rash judgment does not stand, because in it there is the imposition of a false crime; and in the case at issue, the naked manifestation of a true crime. Except unless one reveals it to him from whom the guilty person most and before all others would wish to be hidden, and it gravely concerns him that it not be revealed to that person. Cf. n. 1481.; L. 973.; St. Thomas, Quodl. 11, a. 13 ad 3.

Whether another's hidden crime can be revealed by also narrating the penance performed? Resp. Negatively. For that manifestation of the delict is not equally compensated by the subsequent penance. For always a certain sinister opinion is introduced into others. - L. 974.

Whether it is grave to manifest a hidden grave sin of a certain person, who is already defamed by another known grave sin? Resp. Affirmatively of itself, if the sins are disparate among themselves. For one infamous in one genus of vice has not lost the right of reputation as regards other virtues. But negatively if they are connected among themselves and one implies the other, because then the infamy is not notably increased. Yet it must not be denied that it can be a grave sin to manifest even a crime committed by someone a second time, because again grave detriment is inflicted on his reputation; as if someone says of another, of whom it is known that he committed theft only once, that he stole again. L. 976.; H. A. 14.

Whether, in order to avoid grave damage of your own, you can reveal the hidden crime of another, if you received the knowledge unjustly through force or fraud, for instance by opening letters, etc.? These are St. Alphonsus's words, 969: "In this question there are several opinions. But among these so various ones, the opinion of Lugo pleases me more. This great theologian teaches that you cannot, generally speaking, use that knowledge unjustly received with the damage of another for escaping any damage whatever of your own. The reason is that the unjust action by which you received the secret obliges you to restoring all damages about to come to neighbor on account of it. Only then do Lugo etc. rightly admit that you can manifest the crime: 1. If the revelation were necessary for the common good of the republic. 2. If the other were held from justice to reveal the secret, for repairing your damage. 3. If he were unjustly vexing you."

Whether a public crime can be revealed to those ignorant of it? Resp. Affirmatively, because this seems to be neither against justice nor against charity, whether it is public by publicity of law or by publicity of fact. L. 974.

Whether a crime public in one place can be revealed in another place, where it is unknown? - Resp. More probably affirmatively of itself, at least without grave sin, if there is question of a neighboring place, or of a place where it is easily and shortly to be made public. The reason is that a reputation shortly and necessarily to be lost is of no or certainly of no great estimation, and morally speaking, it has already been cast away. Except, however, unless someone is going to suffer grave damage from it. - If there is question of places to which the divulgation is not going to arrive, or not except after a long time, one must distinguish.

As regards notoriety of law, or through the sentence of a judge, it is not against justice, because when the judge publicly condemns someone, he intends to despoil the guilty person of reputation, so that he may be everywhere an example to the rest. Nor more probably is it against charity, at least gravely, because it greatly contributes to the common good that the sentence be spread everywhere, so that the punishment may be more efficacious, and the guilty person may be known also by the inhabitants of a remote region, who could have business to transact with him. L. 974. As regards notoriety of fact, or through the mere knowledge of many, it is controverted. The first, very probable opinion says that it is not of itself illicit, because one sins neither against justice nor against charity, at least gravely, provided there is question of crimes which render a man pernicious. The reason is that infamy, from whatever source it has arisen, simply takes away good estimation; and it conduces to the public good that wicked men be known, so that all can beware of them. L. 974.; H. A. 12.; In Retr. n. 12. The second opinion, on the contrary, says that it is a sin both against justice and against charity. Against justice indeed, because one defamed in one place has not lost the right to reputation in another remote place, to which the reputation of the crime is not shortly going to arrive; therefore he does injury to him who defames him there. Moreover, as infamy begins by the fact of divulgation, so it ceases by the fact of silence. Against charity, because the one defaming harms neighbor in a grave thing, or in reputation, which elsewhere he continues to possess without injury to anyone; nor at least always is there any necessity of the public good for the crimes of others to be spread more widely; indeed it concerns public tranquility and order, and the delinquent, namely that he may more easily be amended, that hidden crimes not be spread abroad without just cause, and that crimes already spread abroad not be published more and more.

Note: From St. Alphonsus, H. A. 12: "A delict published in one monastery cannot be called absolutely public; hence it cannot be manifested elsewhere, and not even in another monastery of the same Order, which would have frequent communication with that one." From the same holy Doctor, l. c. 13: "A delict of someone public at one time cannot be published at another time, in which it has become hidden, without grave fault, at least against charity, unless the delict were public not only by notoriety of fact, but also by notoriety of law, i.e., through sentence of a judge, or confession of the accused in court." Yet this does not prevent public delicts from being narrated in public histories for the public good, for preserving the truth of facts, for instilling horror of vice, for commending divine mercy, etc. Cf. n. 1492.; Lugo d. 14, n. 87.

When can a crime or fact be called public or notorious? - It is called altogether public or famous when it has become known to the greater part of the community or city, town, village, etc. It is called simply public or notorious when it has become known to so many persons that it cannot be hidden by any evasion, and it is morally impossible that it not come into the knowledge of the community. But it is very difficult to determine the knowledge of how many persons is required that a crime ought to be judged public. Theologians have assigned various rules according to the various number of persons who compose the community. According to the more common opinion a crime can be called public if fifteen know it from a community of one hundred persons; or twenty of diverse families in a community of a thousand persons; or forty dispersed in a town of five thousand persons. Thus St. Liguori 975. But, as Billuart better says, de Iust. diss. 15, art. 2, § 5, this is remitted to the judgment of a prudent man, who, with attention to the number of the community, the talkativeness of men, and other circumstances, judges whether it is possible that the matter remain secret. - L. 11 App. n. 33.; l. 6, n. 593, 1111.; l. 7, n. 76, 78.

Whether one who merely reports another's grave sins heard from others sins gravely, e.g., if he says: It is reported, they narrate, I heard this or that about such a person? He sins gravely against charity and justice if he reports it in such a way that others are more likely and deservedly going to believe it, e.g., if he asserts that he heard the things which he narrates from a trustworthy person, because then he furnishes a sufficient cause of believing evil; otherwise, if probably no faith is given to the words, because no infamy will arise from it. But he will much more easily sin gravely by reporting, even as merely doubtful, another's enormous sin, e.g., of heresy, sodomy, etc.; because the mere suspicion of these enormous crimes greatly defames. He sins gravely against charity if he reports things heard before those who will probably believe them from levity or malice of their own; because each one is held under grave obligation from charity to remove the occasion of another's damage, when he easily can. Yet he does not seem to sin against justice, because he is not the efficacious cause of the damage. L. 977, 978.; Billuart ib. art. 2, § 4.

How does one hearing detraction sin? - He who efficaciously induces another to detract certainly sins gravely not only against justice, but also against charity. The reason is that he is not only the unjust cause of further detriment to the reputation of him from whom reputation is taken, but also of the further sin of the detractor. Therefore, with respect to the first he sins against justice, with respect to the latter against charity on account of scandal and cooperation. - He sins gravely against charity, as regards him from whom reputation is taken, who rejoices in grave detraction done by another, because he rejoices in the grave damage of neighbor.

Except if he rejoiced only in the hearing of a new or curious thing, but not in the detraction itself. He also sins against charity as regards the one detracting; for he furnishes to him the occasion of consummating the exterior sin. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 73, a. 4. A superior, in the spiritual order, sins against charity if he does not impede detraction insofar as he conveniently can, even if he does not rejoice in it; because a special obligation is incumbent on him of correcting the detractor, or of meeting the damage of the defamed subject.

But more probably he does not sin against justice: 1. the superior of the detractor, because he is not held to watch over the good of another not subject to him; 2. the superior of the defamed person, because it is not incumbent on him from justice to attend to the temporal good of the subject. L. 979. Yet the superior of the detractor "is not excused from grave fault against charity, and also against justice, if he is a Bishop or pastor and does not correct, because these are held from justice to correcting subjects."

L. 580.; Struggl 40. It is the office of the civil magistrate also to protect our estimation; but with the order of law observed, and therefore regularly at the instance of the party. A private person is for the most part excused either altogether or at least from grave sin if he does not impede detraction, whether from shame or fear or from some negligence, even if he conveniently can, provided he does not rejoice in it, nor does another damage besides infamy accrue.

The reason is that in this matter it often cannot be established that correction is going to profit; indeed often it is dangerous, and it can deservedly be feared lest the detraction rather be increased or prolonged. Likewise someone is excused at least from grave sin if he is silent because he does not know whether the things which the detractor reports are hidden. But those are excused even from venial sin who, when they advert to detraction, depart, break off the conversation, or turn away the face and show themselves sad, according to that saying of Prov. 25:24: A sad face dissipates the detracting tongue. Yet he will not be without some fault if he can easily apply efficacious correction. "And therefore it is turned into fault for him if he does not resist when he can resist, for the same reason by which someone is held to lift up the ass of another lying under a burden, as is prescribed in Deut. 22." St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 73, a. 4.; L. 980, 981.

What obligation of restitution is present in the detractor? - The detractor is held from justice, as much as can be done: 1. to repair the reputation unjustly taken away; 2. to compensate all temporal damages arising from the defamation and in some way foreseen. The reason for the first is that through the taking away of reputation a damaging injury has been inflicted; for the right which each one has to reputation cannot be taken away by private authority: therefore, since restitution of a good unjustly taken away is necessary, on that account that injury must be repaired. The reason for the second is that all damages arising from detraction are to be attributed to the detractor as their efficacious cause, whether the crime revealed is false or true, since in either case the detractor has unjustly injured reputation. The obligation of restoring reputation is personal. But the obligation of repairing damages which have arisen from defamation is real, and therefore passes to heirs. - L. 613, 991, 994, 995, 996.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 62, a. 2, q. 73, a. 2.; C. B. 824.; C. L. 2389, 2390.

How is reputation to be restored? Restitution of reputation is to be made in one way by a calumniator, and in another by a simple detractor. Hence 1. the calumniator is held to retract what was said, and indeed of itself even with loss of his own reputation, if reparation cannot be made otherwise; the reason is that the condition of the innocent is better than that of the guilty, and he ought to impute to his own malice whatever he is going to suffer on that account. 2. A simple detractor cannot retract what was said, because thus he would lie; but in another way, as much as is in him, he ought to restore reputation, by saying, e.g., that he spoke badly, that he erred, or something similar; for not only those err who depart from truth, but also those who depart from rectitude, according to that saying of Prov. 14:22: They err who work evil. But often that mode does not suffice among intelligent and crafty persons, who rather gather from these formulas that the crime is true which is not openly asserted to be false. Therefore then the detractor, by being silent about what was said, ought, when the occasion is given, with dexterity and truth, to praise and honor him from whom he took reputation. L. 992.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 62, a. 2 ad 2, q. 73, a. 2.

Whether someone ought to restore reputation even with inconvenience to himself? - He who, by injuring another's reputation, sinned only venially, is not held to restore the same with grave inconvenience to himself. But he who sinned mortally is held to restore the same even with grave inconvenience, yet one proportionate to the damage of the other. The 1st reason is that from only light and venial fault, in the simple damaging of neighbor, there cannot arise a grave obligation, and under mortal sin, of restitution in the forum of conscience, at least from justice. Yet if he who sinned venially in detracting from half-full advertence can conveniently restore reputation in a grave matter, he is held from charity and from justice under mortal sin to restore this; for charity obliges gravely to avert the grave evil of neighbor even if someone is in no way the cause of it; and justice obliges gravely that our action not continue gravely to influence the damage of neighbor. The 2nd reason is that such a one is held to restore reputation from justice, and on account of preceding mortal fault; but an obligation from justice and from mortal fault and in a grave matter obliges with grave inconvenience. The 3rd reason is that if the evil which the detractor would have to suffer is of a higher order, or in the same order is by far notably greater than the evil which the innocently defamed person ought to suffer, the defamer could, in the order of charity, prefer his own greater good to the lesser good of the innocent, as theologians commonly note. Yet if direct restitution of reputation by retraction of words cannot be made, or is not expedient, at least indirect restitution is to be made, by praising, honoring the injured person, etc. L. 994.

Whether one defaming is held to restore reputation also before those who received the crime revealed by him mediately? - Resp. Affirmatively, if he violated reputation before hearers whom he foresaw would easily spread the infamy. The reason is that then he himself was the first and efficacious cause of the damage. But with secondary causes failing, the first cause always remains obligated. But otherwise he is not held; rather those are held who afterward detracted before others. L. 991.

What are the causes excusing from restitution of reputation? The following are commonly admitted: 1. If the delict which you revealed to one or several has become public by another way, or if reputation has been repaired in another way, e.g., through sentence of a judge, etc. 2. If it is prudently judged that the memory of the crime has been erased by oblivion through the course of time. 3. If restitution of reputation cannot be made without danger to life; because life is a good of a higher order than reputation; likewise if restitution of reputation is of far much less value than the loss which the defamer would have to suffer, e.g., if he were an honored man and especially very useful to the public good or religion. 4.

If reparation is morally impossible on account of too great distance of places or other special difficulties, which are found especially in the reparation of simple detraction; e.g., if those who heard the detractor cannot be recalled from a preoccupied opinion. 5. If it is judged that no faith was given by the hearers to the detraction, as happens more often when detraction is done in the heat of anger. 6. If the defamed person has expressly or tacitly remitted the obligation, provided he can remit it; indeed sometimes presumed condonation suffices. But he cannot remit it when from his infamy there follows scandal, or damage either common or of his own, etc.; e.g., if there is question of the infamy of a priest, etc. L. 997, 998, 1003.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 73, a. 4 ad 1.

Whether you are excused from restitution of reputation if the injured person also violated your reputation and does not wish to restore? - Navarrus, Sporer, and certain others deny it; but it must more probably be affirmed with St. Alphonsus 999, because you are not held to render his right to another if he refuses to render yours to you. "Equal delicts are dissolved by mutual compensation." L. 40. de Sol. matr.

Whether you are held to compensate reputation by money if you cannot restore it? - Resp. More probably at least negatively, because justice obliges only to rendering what was taken away, or an equivalent; but money was not taken away through detraction; nor is it itself equivalent to reputation, since it is of another order.

L. 1000.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 62, a. 2.

What is to be done if it is doubtful whether the defamation has been given over to oblivion? - These are St. Alphonsus's words, 998: "Retraction of itself brings infamy on the one retracting; hence, when there is doubt about the oblivion of the defamation, it does not seem that someone is held to suffer certain damage in order to repair the uncertain damage of neighbor. And although the injury inflicted is certain, and therefore possesses, nevertheless, because restitution is not owed on account of injury alone, but on account of damage truly inflicted, as we say with St. Thomas, there does not seem to be an obligation of repairing doubtful damage with certain damage of the one restoring, unless when only the danger of another's infamy in some case would be esteemed more than the certain infamy, or damage, of the detractor." Add that if the defamation has truly been given over to oblivion, the defamed person certainly prefers that its memory not be recalled further.