II. On the Specific Distinction of Sins

Whence is the specific distinction of sins to be derived? St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18, a. 2; q. 72, a. 1, 4, 6, 9, etc., teaches that it is to be derived from the object, because sin is a human act; and a human act takes its species from the object, and from the different aspect of the same object. And thus homicide, detraction, theft differ in species, because life, reputation, and a thing are goods which differ in species among themselves.

S. Th. de Malo, q. 2, a. 7. - Scotus, on the contrary, in 2 D. 37, q. 1, n. 9, thinks that it is to be derived from the virtue which is injured, and from the mode, whether opposite or merely different, by which the virtue is injured; because sin formally consists in the privation of the rectitude of the opposite virtue. But every privation is specified by the form opposed to it. And thus heresy, fornication, theft, are sins distinct in species, because they are opposed to virtues distinct in species: faith, chastity, justice. Presumption and despair, omission of the love of God and hatred of God, are distinguished in species, because the former injure hope in a contrary mode, the latter charity by defect and by excess. Detraction, calumny, theft, adultery, homicide, likewise differ in species among themselves, because they injure justice in a different mode. Likewise perjury, violation of vow, blasphemy, although they are against the same virtue of religion, nevertheless are diverse in species, because they are opposed to it in a different mode.

The one opinion is not opposed to the other, for sin is both: a human act and a privation, a human act materially, a privation formally. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 72, a. 1, 6. Wherefore one opinion perfects the other, and it can be said that sin is proximately specified from the rectitude or honorableness of the virtue to which it is opposed, remotely and fundamentally from the object. Laymann, l. 1, tr. 3, c. 2, n. 2. But both opinions fall back into nearly the same thing: "for virtues are distinguished in species according to objects." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 72, a. 1, ad 2. Whence the same St. Thomas, 2 D. 42, q. 2, a. 2, q. 1, ad 1, says: "Therefore it must be said that the division of sin into its essential species is through the opposite of virtue, because it must be according to the object, from which sin and virtue are specified." For the matter is the same "about which virtue operates rightly, and the opposed vices recede from rectitude." S. Th. 2. 2, Prologue.

Cf. 1. 2. q. 71, a. 1; q. 72, a. 4, 8. But then there is had either a different object, or a different aspect of the same object; or a different virtue, or a different mode of injuring the same virtue, which bear before themselves a new moral species of sin, when these exhibit before themselves a special order of reason, or a special agreement or disagreement with right reason, namely when from this there is had a special reason why something is morally good or evil. "Wherever a different motive occurs, inclining the intention to sinning, there is a different species of sin." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 72, a. 8, 9; q. 71, a. 2; q. 79, a. 2, ad 3; 2. 2. q. 154, a. 11; L. 30, 31, 32.

Can there be a multiple species of one sin? - R. Affirmatively, since circumstances can be present to the object which change, or rather multiply, the species. And thus he who, bound by a vow of chastity, sins with a married blood relative commits four sins, diverse in species: against chastity, religion, piety, and justice. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 73, a. 7.

Are several sins distinguished in species from different precepts concerning the same thing? - When positive laws command or prohibit something, they constitute the act in that virtue with a view to which they command or prohibit it. Wherefore the transgression of the law is attributed to the vice opposed to that virtue. But this happens in four ways: 1. When they command or forbid something indifferent with a view to some special virtue, as, e.g., to abstain from servile works on a feast day with a view to religion; whence not to abstain from them is irreligiosity; to observe the natural fast by reason of due reverence toward the Most Holy Eucharist, whence not to observe it is sacrilege. - 2. When they command or prohibit an act of some special virtue or vice with a view to the same virtue, as to be present at Mass on a feast day with a view to religion, whence to be absent is likewise a species of irreligiosity; ecclesiastical fast with a view to temperance, whence to break it pertains to intemperance; marriage not to be entered with blood relatives, relatives by affinity, adoptive relatives, with a view to piety, whence to marry those persons is incest. - 3. When they command or prohibit an act of some special virtue or vice with a view to another virtue; whence he who steals a thing of the church, or strikes a cleric, from the intrinsic nature of the act itself, or by natural law, injures justice; but from the extrinsic law of the Church, he besides offends religion. Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 139; L. l. 1, n. 167; l. 6, n. 808. 4. If law commands or forbids something with a view to no special virtue, e.g., not to read proscribed books, that which is done according to that law looks to the virtue of obedience; that which is done against it pertains to the vice of disobedience. Of obedience, namely broadly taken, because in the proper signification of obedience its object is precepts, not laws; these are properly the object of legal justice.

Now, if various precepts all look to the same virtue, and are distinguished only on the part of the legislators, as in theft, which is prohibited by natural, divine, canonical, and civil law, they by no means induce a specific distinction of sins; because diversity of legislators does not make the precept formally diverse, but only materially. It is otherwise, however, if the precepts are distinguished on the part of the object itself, namely on the part of the proximate motive of the precept itself; because then diverse virtues are injured, as if someone were to break a fast commanded by the Church, and to which he had also bound himself by vow; for then he would injure temperance, from which the Church commands fast, and religion, from which God commands vows to be observed. L. 33; l. 1, n. 167; l. 4, n. 145; Lugo, l. c., n. 144 ff.

Resolves: Diverse causes by which some precept is imposed do not change the species of sin, nor increase sins in number. Hence, although by one and the same virtue of religion, with the precept of the Church acceding, both one who possesses a benefice and one who is constituted in sacred orders are obligated to the canonical hours, nevertheless a priest, for example, who has a parochial benefice commits one sin by not reciting the canonical hours. Likewise a religious priest who acts shamefully commits one sin of sacrilege besides the sin against chastity, although he is held to chastity both as priest and as religious. L. 33; l. 3, n. 455; l. 4, n. 145; l. 6, n. 808.

Note: He who sins from culpable ignorance, or because he acts while doubting, and he who sins in the cause, admits a sin of that species whose danger he undergoes and at least confusedly foresees; for each implicitly and, as it were, consequently wills it. Sanch., de Matr., l. 11, d. 41, n. 7. "Acts concomitant with omission, such as playing, eating, while, e.g., Mass is omitted, are not sinful unless they are the cause of the omission, for instance when play is the cause of omitting Mass.... But then the influencing acts put on the same malice of the omission, not a diverse one.... Wherefore it then suffices only to confess the omission. But if the action which is the cause of the omission is also a grave sin, namely if someone omits Mass in order to steal, the theft can be said in confession separately from the omission of Mass, because then the theft is only an aggravating cause, not one changing the species." L. 9, 60.