On the Response of the Holy Office Concerning Craniotomy

To n. 742 ff. -

1. The doubt having been proposed by the Archbishop of Lyons: "Whether it can safely be taught in Catholic schools that the surgical operation which they call Craniotomy is lawful, namely when, if it is omitted, the mother and infant are going to perish, but if it is admitted, the mother is to be saved while the infant perishes?", the S. C. U. I. on 28 May 1884 responded: "All things having been weighed long and maturely, with account also taken of those things which, in this matter, were written by expert Catholic men and transmitted by Your Eminence to this Congregation, they judged that it must be answered: It cannot safely be taught. Which response, our Most Holy Lord fully confirmed." Immediately when a response of this sort of the Holy Office was published, doubt began concerning its value, namely whether it in reality settled the controversy and truly condemned the opinion concerning the lawfulness of that surgical operation. For there were not lacking, nor are lacking, grave theologians who thought and still think that that decree has no other value except merely disciplinary, and does not render improbable the opposite opinion concerning the lawfulness of craniotomy. Wisely, they say, the S. C. judged that it should be responded thus, both because each opinion is not without its own probability, and especially because in practice abuse would perhaps happen very frequently. At another time perhaps it will become probable which now is held as improbable or as slightly probable. For slight or light probability is more than sufficient, so that it can be said of an opinion of this sort, especially when the matter concerns so great harm to a third party: it cannot safely be taught. Therefore it will not be displeasing to students of moral matters briefly to weigh the force of the aforesaid decree.

2. The preceding Response can be declared by a twofold consideration, extrinsic and intrinsic. Let us begin from the first. A similar question was proposed to the S. R. U. I. concerning Ontologism, namely: "whether the following propositions can safely be handed down": there follow seven noted propositions concerning Ontologism. The Sacred Congregation, Wednesday, 18 Sept. 1861, wrote back: "The Eminent and Reverend Lords, with the vote of the Lord Consultors having been had beforehand, after maturely weighing all and each of the propositions enunciated above, responded to the proposed doubt: Negatively," namely: that they cannot safely be handed down.

3. By this decree theologians and philosophers themselves understood a true condemnation and proscription of the doctrine. Wherefore those who defended Ontologism attempted to show that in those seven condemned propositions there was not contained the doctrine of Ontologism which they themselves were defending, but another doctrine well diverse. Cf. the little work of the most learned philosopher and theologian Joseph Kleutgen, L'Ontologismo e le sette tesi censurate dalla Sacra Inquisizione, Rome, with the types of the "Civilta Cattolica," 1867, p. 10 ff.

4. Nor only did private and public Professors interpret that decree in this way, but also the Roman Congregations themselves understood that decree in this sense, namely of true condemnation and proscription. These things are read in the decree transmitted by His Eminence Cardinal Patrizi to His Eminence the Cardinal Archbishop of Mechelen concerning the philosophical books of G. C. Ubaghs, dean doctor in the University of Leuven. "Moreover, what already, as from my letters given to the individual Bishops in Belgium on 11 Oct. 1864, the aforesaid Cardinals had reserved to themselves to do, they undertook to examine other doctrines which are contained in the more recent editions of the works of the same author. And indeed they had to perceive that in those books doctrines fully similar to some of the seven propositions are handed down ... which the Supreme Congregation of the Holy Office on 18 Sept. 1861 judged could not safely be handed down; ... hence it will be altogether necessary that not only those books and those similar to them be kept away from the Catholic University and from all schools, but also," etc. Rome, 2 Mar. 1866. Cf. the cited little work, p. 84 ff.

5. After the decree reported in the preceding number, new doubts arose on the part of the defenders of Traditionalism and Ontologism. For they said that the decisions given were disciplinary, not doctrinal; that they could not teach, but could keep in heart, those things which before were handed down; and that these were still probable and lawful. When these things had been denounced to the Supreme Pontiff by His Eminence the Cardinal Archbishop of Mechelen and the other Bishops of Belgium, in letters given 1 Aug. 1866^†, His Eminence Patrizi, in the name of the Most Holy Father, wrote these things back to them: "In the letters ... given to the Most Holy Pius IX, judgment is sought from the Apostolic See concerning certain doubts raised ... about the responses of the sacred Congregations of the Holy Office and of the Index, sanctioned by the authority of the Supreme Pontiff both in the year 1864 and in this year 1866. But these are not such doubts as require a new interpretation and declaration of a matter already defined; for to dissolve these thoroughly, there is more than enough through the very responses of the Sacred Congregations. Indeed, it was heard not without wonder that doubts of this sort had been proposed.... Now Catholic men, but much more ecclesiastics, have this duty, that they subject themselves fully, perfectly, and absolutely to the decrees of the Holy See, with contentions removed from the middle which would obstruct the sincerity of assent." Rome, 30 Aug. 1866. Cf. the cited little work, p. 86-89.

6. After the preceding letter had been received, His Eminence the Cardinal Archbishop of Mechelen and the other Bishops of Belgium, on 17 Dec. 1866, gave letters to the Rector and Professors of the University of Leuven, in which, speaking of the resolution of both Congregations, of the Holy Office and of the Index, of 2 March 1866, cf. above n. 5, they assert these things: "These decisions are so clear that the cause is to be regarded as definitively decided. But we know that the most firm will of the Most Holy Lord is that, errors having been removed, all think the same. Therefore, so that all dissensions may remain extinguished forever, and in a question long agitated and now defined nothing may remain to be wished for or awaited, we send the formula of letters to be subscribed by all who either handed down the reproved doctrines, or in some way adhered to the same." But in the formula it is said: "I subject myself fully, perfectly, and absolutely to the Decisions of the Holy Apostolic See of the day 2 March and 30 August of this year 1866, cf. above n. 4, 5, and from my soul I acquiesce. And therefore from my heart I reprove and reject any doctrine opposed," etc. Cf. the cited little work, p. 90, 91.

7. Retraction of Ontologism, by force of the condemnation pronounced by the Holy Office, was required from Rev. D. Ugonin, when he was proposed for the Episcopate. This was the formula of retraction: "Since I, the undersigned, have received from His Eminence and Most Reverend Lord Archbishop of Myra, Apostolic Nuncio in France, that the doctrine which I set forth in my philosophical work on Ontologism (Etudes philosophiques, Ontologie) is disapproved by the Holy Apostolic See, as one which especially, whether explicitly or implicitly, favors those propositions which the S. R. and U. I. decreed in the year 1861 cannot safely be handed down; I myself, with no delay interposed, freely and spontaneously declare that I hold and disapprove the aforesaid doctrine in exactly the same way as the Holy See judged, as deviating more or less from the sound principles of philosophy; and at the same time I promise that, as far as is in me, I will take care in the future that it no longer be handed down in schools. Given at Paris on 13 Oct. 1866." The cited little work, n. 15. Cf. also the Letter of Leo XIII, Litteris ad te, 1 June 1889, concerning the forty Propositions of Rosmini condemned by the Holy Office.

8. Therefore if craniotomy was condemned by the Holy Office in the same way as Ontologism was condemned, if parity stands for both condemnations, certainly it appears how great is the force of that juridical censure concerning craniotomy, it cannot safely be taught. Nor indeed may it be objected that proscriptions and decisions intervened not once, but several times, against Ontologism on the part of the Sacred Congregations and of the Holy See itself, which has not yet been had against craniotomy. For those repeated proscriptions and decisions do nothing other than inculcate and confirm that first condemnation of the Holy Office on 18 Sept. 1861, by force of which His Eminence Cardinal Patrizi, in his Letter and Decree of 2 March 1866, pronounces books infected by that doctrine to be kept away from the University of Leuven and from all schools; and the Most Reverend Bishops of Belgium regard the cause as definitively decided; and the cause was also concerning Ontologism; and, errors having been removed, they exhort all to subscribe to sound doctrines. But that Decision of 28 May 1884 was again confirmed by the Holy Office on 19 Aug. 1889^†. Cf. Enchirid. Moral., ed. 4, p. 99.

9. Let us now make a step to the intrinsic consideration of the matter. That is called safe which is without danger. Therefore an opinion which cannot safely be taught is an opinion which cannot be taught without danger. And thus in the cited Decree of 2 March 1866, given through His Eminence Patrizi, after it had been affirmed that in the philosophical books of G. C. Ubaghs "doctrines plainly similar to some of the seven propositions are handed down ... which the Supreme Congregation of the Holy Office on 18 Sept. 1861 judged could not safely be handed down," it is then said that in the same books doctrines or opinions are found which cannot be handed down without danger.

10. Now this danger is danger of error, if we wish to understand the aforesaid decision of the Holy Office in its proper and obvious sense. For it is said that it cannot safely be taught, and danger in teaching some opinion properly and in the obvious sense is nothing other than danger of error. Wherefore that Decree is not merely a certain disciplinary prohibition of teaching or handing down that opinion in public schools or even private schools; but it is a true doctrinal judgment concerning the truth and falsity of the same opinion, which consequently can no longer be handed down in all schools, but must be kept altogether away from them.

11. Nor indeed should it be said that this danger is to be understood from the subject matter, which is a certain practical matter. For the matter with which it is concerned is practical and most practical, but it is a matter not regarding ecclesiastical and positive discipline, but regards morals and touches the natural law itself. Wherefore from consideration of the subject matter it does not follow that that decree is merely disciplinary, but that it is doctrinal in the matter of morals. For that decree involves this in other words: that opinion concerning craniotomy cannot be taught without danger of error in the matter of morals. Nor should one press by saying that it can very well happen that that opinion cannot safely be taught, even speaking speculatively, because practically someone could easily abuse it, by applying it badly to practical cases, and by not rightly distinguishing the cases in which it can lawfully be given to execution from the cases in which this is altogether illicit. This insistence is not valid; for this confusion of a case of lawful application and a case of illicit application is impossible, and therefore that danger is not this danger, of badly applying the aforesaid opinion practically, and of confusing case with case. Truly the opinion concerning craniotomy in the abstract, considered according to itself and generally, was not condemned; but the opinion concerning craniotomy in the concrete, according to determinate circumstances, and considered in particular, was condemned. For the question proposed, which the Sacred Congregation resolved by its decision, is not: "Whether it can safely be taught in Catholic schools that the surgical operation which they call Craniotomy is lawful," thus generally, but in that peculiar and determinate case concerning which there was question and controversy among theologians, "namely when, if it is omitted, the mother and son are going to perish; but if it is admitted, the mother is to be saved while the infant perishes." Certainly in this case the doctrine concerning craniotomy is declared dangerous. Therefore the very application to the determinate case is declared a dangerous doctrine; it cannot safely be taught. Therefore that danger is not the danger of practical abuse, the danger of illicit application, but is the danger of error in the opinion enunciating the lawfulness of craniotomy in that aforesaid case.

12. But it is still objected that the aforesaid opinion could well be called not safe, although determined to that peculiar case concerning which there was question, on account of the very practical danger of discerning the case of true necessity: namely that, if craniotomy is omitted, the mother and son truly are going to perish, but if it is admitted, the mother truly is to be saved while the infant perishes. This cannot reasonably be objected. For that case of necessity is supposed certain in that proposition concerning the lawfulness of craniotomy. Only in such a hypothesis was the question being made by Theologians and proposed to the Sacred Congregation, and the Sacred Congregation certainly understood it in this sense; for it says in its Response, "with account also taken of those things which, in this matter, were written by expert Catholic men and transmitted by Your Eminence to this Congregation." Besides, this objection would then have force, when in reality that case of necessity would be difficult to know; but where the matter concerns craniotomy the matter is most clear and subject to no difficulty, unless the Surgeon is wholly stupid, which is per accidens and is not attended to in the condemnation of a general proposition. For the matter is considered per se.

13. One danger is intrinsic, another extrinsic; likewise one is proximate, another remote. The danger of error in asserting the lawfulness of craniotomy cannot be from a circumstance extrinsic to craniotomy itself, insofar as it is employed in such circumstances of things as render it illicit. For, as was just observed, the lawfulness of craniotomy in general is not condemned, but the lawfulness of craniotomy in the aforesaid circumstance of the death of the mother and son if that operation is omitted, and of the safety of the mother and death of the son if it is done. Now if any circumstance can be imagined which could render craniotomy lawful, certainly it is no other than the one just enunciated, when without that operation neither mother nor son is saved, but with it employed, the son is not constituted in a worse condition and the mother is saved. But the Holy Office, in this very case, declares that it is dangerous to teach the lawfulness of craniotomy. Therefore the danger of error is intrinsic to craniotomy itself, namely because it is the direct killing of an innocent. The danger of error is intrinsic to the very complex, that is, to craniotomy clothed with the aforesaid circumstance; for in that complex craniotomy remains with its whole nature, which is by no means changed by that most favorable circumstance. Now if the danger of error is intrinsic, namely by force of craniotomy itself, that danger of error consequently cannot be remote, but is proximate and most proximate; for nothing is more proximate to some thing than its intrinsic and intimate nature. Therefore the lawfulness of craniotomy cannot be taught without proximate and intrinsic danger of error.

14. An action which is a danger of sin is an action distinct from the very action of sin, and it is sin not properly and strictly speaking by reason of itself, but by reason of that action sinful in itself with which it is connected. Likewise an opinion containing danger of error is an opinion distinct from another certain and unshaken doctrine against which that opinion contains the danger of erring, and thus it is connected with it insofar as it is opposed to it. Therefore generally, and speaking per se, an opinion which cannot safely be taught, or which contains danger of error, is an opinion which, although in itself it is not error, nevertheless is connected with error; at least insofar as of itself and in the obvious sense, and not per accidens from mere lack of consideration, it labors under equivocation between error and truth in such a way that it easily turns toward error rather than toward truth, and he who adheres to it is judged indeed to embrace error, not truth. Yet when, from the subject matter, a proposition is so determined that no way lies open to truth, although it is defined merely as not safe, and by reason of the note or censure itself cannot be held except as merely dangerous, or containing danger of error, nevertheless consequently that proposition is to be held as error, namely by reason of legitimate deduction. And hence it is easily explained why, although those seven propositions of Ontologism were not marked with another censure than that they cannot safely be handed down, nevertheless in the Schools they were commonly held as altogether improbable after that Decision of the Holy Office. The same seems to happen in our case. For no true sense can be imagined, since in the most favorable case itself it is said that it cannot safely be taught. Wherefore it does not appear how craniotomy can still be probably defended.

15. That adverb safely can be declared in another way; but the conclusion is almost the same. That adverb can be resolved into an adjective, and then the understood substantive is to be sought. Now this substantive, which can be thought of more favorably in the present matter, is conscience; so that it cannot safely be taught is the same as it cannot be taught with a safe conscience. This interpretation, which pertains especially to a moral and practical matter, seems altogether to agree with the decision of the Holy Office of which we treat; for in it the matter concerns a moral and practical thing. Now in Moral matters, that opinion is called safe in the merely speculative order which someone can hold in mind and externally teach to others without danger and fear of erring against some certain law or precept. In our case that certain and unshaken law is the law, Thou shalt not kill. Wherefore that craniotomy cannot safely be taught in that case set forth above is the same as that craniotomy cannot be taught without danger and fear of error against the law, Thou shalt not kill. But this danger and fear of error would then, on the part of the thing, remain a mere danger of error and would not consequently become error, if a case could be given in which in reality the law Thou shalt not kill would not be broken. But this case cannot be given. For if this case were given, it would be no other than the proposed case itself. But that proposed case would then, on the part of the thing, remain a mere danger of error and would not become error directly against that law Thou shalt not kill, since it would not already be ultimately determined by every favorable circumstance, and could still be determined further. Therefore, although by force of the condemnation that opinion is only a not safe doctrine, nevertheless in reality by force of the matter that opinion becomes altogether improbable.

16. But someone will ask why then the Holy Office negatively said that opinion was not safe, and did not positively say that it was erroneous, if not safe is in reality the same as erroneous? First it is answered: it did not say this, because this was not being asked, but that; and the Sacred Congregations respond to proposed doubts with customary formulas, nor in their brief responses are they accustomed to make a treatment of the matter in question, so as to set it forth and explain it. Secondly it is answered: although the not safe opinion in our case, by reason of the matter, by legitimate conclusion, falls back in reality into an erroneous or false opinion, nevertheless that theological censure, not safe, is not the same as another censure: erroneous or error, which is a far graver censure. We contend the former, not the latter. But we say erroneous or false, also to narrow the signification of error, since strictly speaking error and false are not the same.

"From Augustine in the Enchiridion, cap. 17, and Contra Academicos, cap. 4, to err is nothing other than to approve true things as false, or false things as true. In this signification error is nothing other than a false proposition, and thus it can be found not only in the matter of faith or Theology, but also in any natural or human matter whatever; but according to the common manner of speaking, error, as though by antonomasia, in each matter is accustomed to signify not any false judgment whatever, but, by a certain exaggeration, that which is more evidently or more certainly false." Suarez, De Fide, D. 19, S. 2, n. 11. Hence the same Suarez, discoursing concerning an erroneous proposition, insofar as it is distinguished from a heretical one in theological censures, says that it is one "which is opposed to a truth certain by theological certainty, which does not attain the certainty of faith; because in no way is it immediately revealed, as is supposed; but it is a conclusion evidently inferred from one proposition of faith and another evident by the natural light.... A proposition contrary to such a proposition does not attain the grade of a heretical proposition, because it does not have the highest opposition to a proposition of faith, such as an immediate one is. But that it is erroneous is manifest, because after a heretical proposition, it has the highest repugnance with the truth of faith, namely mediate, through evident inference." l. c. n. 14. The doctrine of Cardinal Lugo is the same, De Fide, D. 20, S. 3, n. 73: "The word error, taken most broadly, can be attributed to any false proposition in any matter; for he who believes the false as true errs from the true and is deceived. Commonly, however, that word is accustomed to be restricted to the false which is opposed not only to the true, but to the evident, or certain, which among all is commonly known certainly. Nor is any false opinion in Philosophy called error, but one which is opposed to a doctrine certain and received as such among philosophers. Wherefore in Theology only that is called error which is opposed to some certain truth which among Catholics and Theologians is held as certain." But insofar as error is a special censure below heresy, according to the same Lugo, "error properly is that which is opposed not immediately, but only mediately to the doctrine of faith, insofar as it immediately denies a proposition which is not of faith, but only a theological conclusion, evidently deduced from one proposition of faith and another evident by the light of nature." l. c. n. 78.

17. Wherefore if that censure, it cannot safely be taught, is taken altogether properly and strictly by reason of itself, according to the general rule of interpreting condemned propositions, the aforesaid opinion concerning craniotomy is a dangerous opinion, which namely cannot be taught without danger of error; but consequently it is also a dangerous opinion, which cannot be reduced to practice without danger of sin. But if the censure, it cannot safely be taught, is considered in the subject matter, that same opinion concerning craniotomy is simply false, and in this sense it can also be called not safe, dangerous, in the true and proper sense; for it contains an intrinsic and proximate danger of denying an evident, certain, and universally received truth, namely Thou shalt not kill.

18. The doctrine set forth in the present Commentary can be confirmed by another Response of the Holy Office, 14 Aug. 1889, which was published after the present Commentary had been issued. It is of the following tenor: "In Catholic schools it cannot safely be taught that the surgical operation which they call craniotomy is lawful, as was declared on 28 May 1884, nor any surgical operation directly killing of the fetus, or of the mother bearing it."

19. Lastly it must be noted that if craniotomy cannot safely be taught, neither can direct procurement of abortion be safely taught in the same circumstances. This follows by legitimate reasoning. For first, the arguments by which craniotomy was defended are the same as the arguments by which direct procurement of abortion is defended. Besides, it matters little whether the infant's head is cut apart or compressed, or the infant is infected with poison, or an immature fetus, by mere ejection from the maternal womb, directly and per se is deprived of the natural element altogether necessary to him for life. It is indeed the same thing to kill a man by iron, by poison, or by throwing him into fire or immersing him in water.