V. On the Capital Vices

What are the capital vices? - "Vices are called capital from which others arise, chiefly according to the account of final cause.... Accordingly, therefore, those vices are called capital whose ends have certain primary accounts of moving the appetite; and, according to the distinction of these accounts, the capital vices are distinguished." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 84, a. 4; 2. 2. q. 118, a. 7. "But it is not required that a capital vice always be a mortal sin, because even from a venial sin a mortal one can arise, insofar namely as the venial disposes to the mortal." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 132, a. 4 ad 3. The capital vices are numbered as seven: Pride, Avarice, Lust, Envy, Gluttony, Anger, Acedia. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 84, a. 4; q. 34, a. 5.

What is pride? "Pride is named from this, that someone by will tends above that which he is." Whence it is clear that it is a sin. Insofar as it is an inordinate appetite of one's own excellence, it is a special sin. But insofar as all vices can arise from it, because to one's own excellence "there can be ordered everything which someone inordinately desires"; and because "man through pride contemns the divine law, by which he is prohibited from sinning," it has a certain generality, or is a general sin. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 162, aa. 1, 2, 7, 8. - Hence the same Holy Doctor, 2. 2. q. 132, a. 4; q. 162, a. 8, posits pride not as a capital vice, but as the queen of all vices; and he posits vainglory as the capital vice, which arises immediately from it.

Commonly, however, pride is constituted as a capital vice. Pride by its genus is a mortal sin. For "pride is opposed to humility. But humility properly regards the subjection of man to God. Hence, on the contrary, pride properly regards the defect of this subjection, according namely as someone exalts himself above what is fixed for him according to the divine rule or measure.... But it is manifest that this very thing, namely not to be subject to God, has the account of mortal sin; for this is to be turned away from God." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 162, a. 5.

"And therefore to be turned away from God and his precepts, which is as a consequence in other sins, per se pertains to pride, whose act is contempt of God." S. Th. l. c., a. 6. Moreover, when the aforesaid aversion and contempt cease, and there is had only a certain inordinate movement toward one's own excellence, by willing to excel above equals, pride is had only improperly so called, and it is venial, unless it is done with notable contempt of others, by taking pleasure in their abasement before oneself. But there would be no disorder if someone wished from an honorable motive to excel above inferiors. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 77, aa. 4, 5; q. 84, a. 2; L. 65.

What are the daughters of pride and vainglory? "Those vices which of themselves are apt to be ordered to the end of some capital vice are called its daughters." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 132, a. 5. The daughters of pride are three: 1. Presumption, which is an inordinate appetite of undertaking something above one's powers. It is commonly only venial. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 130, a. 1; q. 134, a. 2 ad 4; q. 21, a. 4. Nevertheless it becomes mortal if it brings grave harm, e.g., if someone presumes to obtain ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the office of physician, etc., without due knowledge. But insofar as presumption is a special sin, opposed to theological hope, it is always a mortal sin, unless imperfection of act excuses. 2. Ambition, which is the inordinate appetite of dignity and honor not owed, or in an undue way and by an undue means. It is per se a venial sin. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 131, a. 1. But it becomes mortal by reason of the matter from which; or by reason of the means by which; or by reason of the end for which honor is sought; or by reason of the harm which is inflicted on one's neighbor. 3. Vainglory, namely the desire of empty glory, whose end is the inordinate manifestation of one's own excellence, whether true or fictitious. It is per se a venial sin. It is often mortal per accidens, as was just said concerning ambition. But to perform even sacred things on account of vainglory, e.g., to preach, does not exceed venial sin. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 132, aa. 3, 4; q. 162, a. 7; L. 66. Pusillanimity corresponds by opposition to the three daughters of pride, by which someone, distrusting himself too much, refuses honors, glory, or an office for which he is worthy. It is venial from its genus; and it becomes mortal if you refuse that to which you are bound under mortal sin. L. 67.

Moreover, the daughters of vainglory, which St. Thomas constitutes as a capital vice, are assigned thus by the same Holy Doctor, 2. 2. q. 132, a. 5. A man can tend to the manifestation of his own excellence in two ways: "in one way directly, either by words, and thus there is boasting; or by deeds, and thus, if they are true things having some admiration, there is presumption of novelties, which men are accustomed to admire more; but if they are false, thus there is hypocrisy. In another way someone strives to manifest his own excellence indirectly, by showing himself not to be less than another, and this in four ways. First indeed as to the intellect, and thus there is pertinacity, by which a man cleaves too much to his own opinion, being unwilling to believe a better opinion. Second as to the will, and thus there is discord, while he does not wish to depart from his own will so that he may agree with others. Third as to speech, and thus there is contention, when another by words quarrels noisily against another. Fourth as to deed, and thus there is disobedience, namely while someone does not wish to execute the precept of a superior." And thus these vices are fittingly called the daughters of vainglory.

Boasting is a certain vain proclamation of one's own excellence, and is per se venial if it is concerning good things; and it can be grave per accidens. If it is concerning lightly evil things, it is likewise per se light, grave per accidens, if, for example, it proceeds from a grave cause against God or neighbor. But if it is concerning gravely evil things, it is grave, because the approval of a work has the same species as the work, which therefore must be expressed in confession, at least when complacency concerning the same sin was joined with the boasting. At least when, etc.; because, if it was without that complacency, many hold that it is not necessarily to be explained. For any boasting concerning mortal sin, abstraction made from complacency in it, is of the same species, namely that someone glories in this, that he has offended God. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 112; L. 26, 66, 67; l. 3, n. 426; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 266 seqq.

Presumption of novelties, which is also called ostentation, if those deeds have nothing of admiration, is also per se venial. And thus it is light to be dressed in foreign garments, or to adorn oneself too much from lightness of mind, vanity, etc.; but grave if it is such as notably to corrupt morals. L. 66, 67. Presumption of novelties can be in opinions, in a mode of speaking, in a mode of acting, etc.

Hypocrisy, by which someone "does not care to have holiness, but only to appear holy... is a mortal sin.... To simulate holiness from which one is deficient through mortal sin... is not always a mortal sin, but sometimes venial," according as it happens to oppose charity or not. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 111, a. 4. Likewise to simulate improbitity is a sin, and can be mortal. S. Th. ibid., a. 1; L. 66, 67.

Pertinacity. "Someone is called pertinacious who is imprudently holding, as if wholly tenacious." Hence pertinacity is opposed to perseverance; for the persevering person persists in his own opinion "according as he ought"; but the pertinacious person perseveres in it "more than he ought." And therefore it is a sin because of excess. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 138, a. 2.

Discord is a dissent of wills concerning the good which we ought to will from charity. Moreover, since certain goods can be owed to one's neighbor not only from charity, but also from justice, discord and dissent from the rendering of similar goods is opposed both to charity and to justice. Discord is per se from its genus a mortal sin. For it directly repugns to charity. But per accidens it can become venial, from the smallness of the owed good in the rendering of which we do not wish to consent. Indeed, sometimes it will be no sin, if it arises, namely, from a probable judgment, from which one person judges this, another that, for the honor of God and the utility of neighbor, and if the mode of dissenting is not opposed to charity. - Struggl, tr. 4, q. 5, n. 38; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 37.

Contention is the impugnation of truth with confidence of shouting. Contention is from its genus a mortal sin. The reason: because by charity we ought to will and communicate to others truth necessary or useful for the salvation of the soul, or even of the body; and therefore to impugn it, and to wish to defeat it, is opposed to the virtue of charity, and is from its genus a mortal sin. - Struggl, tr. 4, q. 5, n. 39; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 38.

Disobedience, properly and speaking per se, or formal disobedience, is had only when "someone contemns a precept, because moral acts have their species from the end. But when he does something against a precept, not on account of contempt of the precept, it is disobedience only materially, but formally pertains to another species of sin," according to various motives, e.g., to the species of theft, homicide, etc. Therefore disobedience by its nature is a grave sin. For not to obey the precepts of God and of Superiors is contrary to charity. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 105, a. 1.

What is avarice? Avarice is the inordinate appetite of temporal goods. An inordinate appetite, by being unwilling rather to lose them than God; by denying alms to the poor when the obligation of charity urges; by unjustly desiring others' things; by loving or desiring riches too much, or by taking too much delight in them. Too much, beyond due measure, namely by acquiring or retaining them according as they are necessary for life, according to one's own condition. Avarice, insofar as it is precisely opposed to the virtue of liberality, is from its genus only a venial sin. Nevertheless it can become mortal in three ways: 1. Against charity toward oneself, by constituting the last end in riches, or by transgressing the precepts of God rather than suffer loss in temporal goods. 2. Against charity toward neighbor, by not helping him when constituted in grave necessity, etc. 3. Against justice, by taking what belongs to another, etc. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 84, a. 1; 2. 2. q. 118; L. 68.

Liberality is the virtue by which we use well all those external goods which have been granted to us for our sustenance. There is a twofold use of exterior goods, one toward oneself, another toward others. And therefore it pertains to liberality that on account of immoderate love of money someone not be impeded from fitting expenditures, nor from fitting gifts. But to give pertains most of all to liberality, since this is more perfect than to receive, or to spend upon oneself. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 117, aa. 1, 4. As avarice, so also prodigality is opposed to liberality, both according to excess in giving, and according to defect in retaining and acquiring. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 118, 119.

What are the daughters of avarice? - They are the following: 1. Hardening of heart, against mercy, by not compassionating the needy and poor, by reproaching them, by demanding debts too harshly when the debtor is not able to pay, etc. By this one can sometimes sin mortally, when the precept of almsgiving or charity urges, and nevertheless from such hardness he is not helped. L. 69. 2. Disquiet of heart, i.e., a vehement and inordinate application of the mind to acquiring or conserving riches, with empty and vain fear lest they not be acquired or lest they be lost. It is mortal when it withdraws from spiritual things or other things to which we are obliged by grave precept, or induces superfluous fear, and from this distrust toward God. It is venial if it is concerning a good matter, but at an undue time or place, e.g., concerning family, harvest, vintage, when someone is in church, or should be free for God. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 55, a. 6; L. 69.

3. Violence, namely the usurpation of another's thing by force. It is mortal if it concerns a grave thing, or inflicts grave force. L. 69. 4. Fallacy, or deceit in words; it can be mortal by reason of the end or of the means. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 55, a. 4; L. 69. 5. Perjury, if confirmation by oath is added. 6. Fraud, or deceit in deed. It is mortal from its genus; and it occurs in many ways in contracts. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 55, a. 5; L. 69. - 7. Betrayal, which is deception against faith given or owed, to the harm of another. It is mortal from its genus. It occurs in almost three ways: 1. concerning persons, in which way Judas betrayed Christ; 2. concerning things, as if you show to the enemy the manner of taking a fortress, or show to a robber money, clothing, etc., that has been hidden; 3. concerning a secret, either by revealing one committed to oneself, or by reading others' letters. But if this is in a grave matter, it is per se mortal. L. 69; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 118, a. 8; q. 55, a. 8.

What is lust? - Lust, which is opposed to chastity, is the inordinate appetite of a venereal thing. Inordinate; venereal things are ordered to the generation of offspring, and they are had licitly only in marriage. Therefore those things are inordinate which are not ordered either to generation or to this in marriage. Lust is grave by its whole genus if it is deliberate and directly willed. Hence it does not admit smallness of matter. For the use of venereal things by its nature has been instituted for the conservation of the human race, which is a great good of men, and an external good of God; consequently he who abuses it gravely offends God, and injures human society. If it is deliberate and directly willed; for if deliberation and willing are concerned only with its cause, then smallness of matter can be given in this matter. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 153; L. 71. Cf. here 37 seqq.

What are the daughters of lust? - They are eight, four on the part of the intellect, and four on the part of the will. 1. Blindness of mind, when someone is so addicted to shamefulness that he does not think of heavenly things. 2. Precipitation, by which someone from the same cause acts without counsel. - 3. Inconsideration, when he offends in the manner, acting inconsiderately in things which are unbecoming to his state or person. 4. Inconstancy, when someone from the same affection of pleasures quickly falls away from pious purposes. 5. Love of self; for the lascivious man on account of pleasures makes himself, not God, the end of his actions. 6. Hatred of God; for the lascivious man is accustomed to abhor divine things, indeed God himself, as the avenger of sins. - 7.

Affection for the present age; because love of carnal pleasures so affects the mind that at times it would be prepared even to renounce eternal blessedness, if it were permitted always to enjoy present things. - 8. Horror of the future age, when one immersed in pleasures inordinately fears death, and, unwilling to think about it, strives to prolong life by illicit means, etc. - The first four are mortal when some precept of God gravely obliging is omitted. But if they are concerned only with the matter of lust, they are not sins distinct in species; otherwise, however, if other precepts are violated. The latter four, if there is full consent of the will, are per se mortal and distinct in species; from indeliberation or another imperfection of acts they are often venial. L. 71; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 15; q. 46; q. 53, a. 6; q. 153, a. 5.

What is envy? Envy is sadness concerning the good of another, insofar as it is diminutive of one's own glory. - Moreover, in five ways can someone be saddened concerning the good of another: 1. When someone is saddened concerning the good of another absolutely, because it is the good of the neighbor; and properly this is hatred of enmity, or simply hatred or aversion of the person to whom we will evil, insofar as it is his evil; and this indeed from its genus is mortal. 2. When someone is saddened concerning the good of neighbor relatively, because he fears some evil from him; and properly this is fear, which will be licit unless it is inordinate, e.g., if he fears evil is to be inflicted on himself or on others unjustly. 3. When someone is saddened concerning the good of another because he thinks the same person unworthy of such good; and this is indignation or abomination, which is not a sin; nevertheless it will be a sin, and indeed mortal, if it either accuses God's providence, and is blasphemy, or if it so affects that it leads men to imitate evil. 4. When someone is saddened concerning the good of neighbor, not because the neighbor has it, but because he himself lacks the same, and this is not envy, but emulation or zeal, which, if it concerns honorable good, is praiseworthy; but if it concerns temporal goods, sometimes it is venial, as if the good is disproportionate to the one grieving, such as it would be if a peasant grieved that he is not a king. 5. If someone grieves that another equal to himself, or not greatly unequal, grows in glory and excellence, so that thereby he becomes superior to him, and he apprehends the very increase of glory and excellence as an impediment to his own good and as an evil to himself, insofar as it is diminutive of his own glory and excellence; and this is envy properly so called. For he is called envious because he is not seeing, since he cannot see the goods of another without sadness. Equal or not greatly unequal, because the good of those who greatly excel us is not usually apprehended as diminishing our excellence and glory. The goods of another, especially those in which there is glory, and in which men love to be honored and to be in good opinion.

Envy is mortal from its genus, Gal. 5:21. For it is directly against charity, which rejoices concerning the good of neighbor, which envy desires destroyed or grieves is not destroyed. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 36; L. 72. "Pride alone and envy are purely spiritual sins, which can belong to demons." S. Th. 1 p., q. 63, a. 2 ad 2.

What are the daughters of envy? - They are hatred of neighbor, whispering, detraction, exultation in the adversities of neighbor, and affliction in his prosperities. These are mortal from their genus, since directly against charity. Whispering is speech by which, without cause, something is reported to one person concerning another, which indeed of itself is apt to break the friendship of both; and the detractor is therefore bound to restore and reconcile that friendship. It is mortal from its genus both against charity and against justice. Detraction also is both against charity and against justice. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 36, a. 4 ad 3; q. 34, a. 6; q. 74; L. 72.

What is gluttony? - Gluttony is opposed to abstinence, and is the inordinate appetite of food and drink. Inordinate, namely if food and drink harms health; for their proximate end is the conservation of life and health, according to necessity and fittingness. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 141, a. 6. According to necessity, of body and mind; according to fittingness, and thus it will not be inordinate to prepare a sumptuous banquet to celebrate a feast, to honor friends. Inordinate furthermore, if it is not taken fittingly. And this disorder is committed in five ways: 1. if you eat before the time; 2. if things are too exquisite; 3. if more than is right; 4. if voraciously; 5. if too delicately.

Gluttony from its genus is a venial sin, because it is not gravely opposed to charity toward God or neighbor. It can become mortal under multiple respects: 1. Against charity toward God, by constituting one's end and blessedness in it. 2. Against charity toward oneself, by reason of grave harm of soul or body, if someone, for example, thereby becomes unfit for functions which he is bound under mortal sin to fulfill, or notably harms health. 3. Against charity toward neighbor, against piety and justice, as happens when nobles given over to gluttony gravely oppress subjects, dissipate goods necessary for the family, contract debts which they are unequal to paying. 4. By reason of scandal, if a cleric, for example, publicly indulges in feasting and drinking bouts. 5. When on account of gluttony someone transgresses the precepts of the Church, e.g., by eating flesh-meat on a day of abstinence, by eating several times in a day to satiety on a fast day, by not hearing Mass on a Sunday because of feasting. 6. By reason of perfect drunkenness, concerning which something will be said immediately. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 148; L. 73; E. M.

Resolves: "To eat or drink up to vomiting is probably only venial from its genus, unless there is scandal (namely grave), or notable harm to health, as they more commonly say.... But those who voluntarily vomit what they have taken, so that they may eat and drink again, are scarcely excused from mortal sin; for this seems to involve great deformity. Thus probably." L. 73. And indeed others probably deny this, because there is had there only avidity of delight in foods, which from its genus is venial, unless another species of sin accedes. But there is scarcely doubt that it is licit by eating or drinking or otherwise to bring about vomiting, if it is judged to be healthful. For then it has the account of medicine. It is judged mortal to feed on human flesh and blood, both because it is against the piety owed to the dead, and because it is against the instinct of nature, unless it is done for the sake of medicine, or another just cause, e.g., extreme hunger. Laymann, l. 3, s. 4, n. 3; Diana, tr. 5, de Scand., r. 76.

What are the daughters of gluttony? - They are the following, which from their genus are venial, but become mortal when they are gravely opposed to another virtue; namely, on the part of the soul: 1. dullness of mind or stupidity, born from crapulence, concerning the consideration of spiritual goods; 2. inept joy, which moves to shameful acts; 3. much-speaking; 4. scurrility in words and gestures; 5. on the part of the body, uncleanness, vomiting, and emission of seed. S. Th. l. c., a. 6; q. 15; L. 74.

What is drunkenness? - The malice of drunkenness is in the voluntary privation, by an artificial, unnatural, and violent mode through immoderate intoxicating drink, of the use of reason, not merely negatively, as in sleep, but contrarily through the disturbance of reason. "Drunkenness is a mortal sin, because according to this man willingly and knowingly deprives himself of the use of reason, by which he operates according to virtue and avoids sins; and thus he sins mortally by committing himself to danger of sinning. Hence drunkenness, speaking per se, is a mortal sin." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 150, a. 2; 1. 2. q. 88, a. 5 ad 1; Gal. 5:21; L. 75. Drunkenness is opposed to the virtue of sobriety, whose office is to apply measure "concerning drink, not any whatsoever, but that which by its smokiness is naturally apt to disturb the head, as wine, and everything which can intoxicate." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 149, a. 1. Alcoholism pertains to drunkenness. By alcoholism is signified drunkenness produced by alcoholic drinks, abuse of alcoholic drinks, and the grave effects produced by abuse of this sort. But since these effects, gravely harmful to health, are produced gradually, it is difficult practically to define when, by this reason, the sin begins to be grave.

332 bis. Note: The promise (the pledge), which is customary in America and other regions, of abstinence from every intoxicating drink, of itself brings no obligation under grave or under light sin. For it is a certain simple purpose, and the declaration made of it, of not drinking wine and other alcoholic drinks. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that it can also be made under sin. But societies which are established for extirpating the vice of drunkenness are greatly to be praised.

Resolves: If someone knowingly and willingly takes so great a draught of wine as is apt to intoxicate, he is in no way excused from mortal sin, although before he is deprived of his senses he gives himself over to sleep, by which he may escape the effect of the wine; because that drink is already intrinsically evil, since of itself it is already apt to deprive man of the use of reason, and it is per accidens that he himself is deprived of the senses through sleep. Nor indeed in sleep does he have the proximate power for the use of reason. He does not sin mortally who from drinking wine does not totally lose the use of reason, although the mind is disturbed, yet so that he is able to discern between good and evil, as theologians commonly say. Theologians also commonly add that drunkenness is not mortal if it deprives one of reason for a little time. But La-Croix says that a long time seems to be one hour, and that it is licit, in order to avert pain, sadness, and melancholy, to drink up to hilarity, as also to propose a toast to someone's health, or to foster the union of friends and charity. La-Croix, l. 5, nn. 314, 317, 327; L. 75, 78.

Is it licit, in order to drive away illness, to take drink, if drunkenness is foreseen to follow from it? R. More probably affirmatively, if the drink is taken to correct depraved qualities; for then the privation of reason follows per accidens and indirectly, and therefore can licitly be permitted. But if the drink is taken in order directly to procure drunkenness or privation of reason, St. Alphonsus and others deny it, because to deprive oneself of the proximate faculty of the use of reason is intrinsically evil; but Busemb. and others affirm it, relying chiefly on the authority of St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 88, a. 5 ad 1, where he says: "For that man, without necessity, should render himself incapable of using reason, by which man is ordered to God and avoids many occurring sins, from the pleasure of wine alone, is expressly contrary to virtue." Note "without necessity, from the pleasure of wine alone." Therefore, if necessity is present, and not from the pleasure of wine, it is not contrary to virtue. Laymann, l. 2, s. 4, n. 5; La-Croix, l. 5, nn. 310, 311, 312, 313; Struggl 25; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 150, a. 2 ad 3; L. 76.

Is it licit for someone to intoxicate himself in order to avoid death, which otherwise is threatened to him unless he becomes drunk? - The first opinion, more probable according to St. Alphonsus, denies it, because to deprive oneself directly of the proximate power of using reason is intrinsically evil. But since here the danger of death is from without, that immoderate drink up to drunkenness cannot here be had as a cause producing two effects. Therefore the intoxication would be directly intended and willed. The second opinion, which Lessius and Pal. hold with Busemb., and which Laymann and others think probable, affirms it, because the privation of reason is not here intended, but only permitted; for the excess of wine is assumed not with the intention of making oneself drunk, nor without necessity, from the pleasure of wine alone, which would certainly be intrinsically evil, but as a means for fleeing death. - La-Croix, l. 5, n. 321; Struggl 25; L. 76.

Is drunkenness licit for undergoing a surgical operation? - The first opinion, which St. Alphonsus, 76, and others hold, denies it, because in this case drunkenness would be directly intended, or the privation of reason, which is intrinsically evil, as a means of removing the pain of the senses. But the second opinion affirms it. 1. Because privation of the use of reason at least for a brief time, and from a grave cause, does not seem intrinsically evil. 2. Because drink is not directly given for causing the privation of reason, but for the sleep of the senses; and therefore drunkenness follows indirectly per accidens. For neither does the sleep of the senses proceed from privation of reason, but from relaxation and dulling of the nerves; and from the sleep of the senses proceeds privation of the use of reason. Gur. Baller. 182.

Therefore in no way is to be condemned the use of other medicines whose primary power is to bring on sleep, or to make the nerves numb, such as opium and the inhalation of ether. Antonelli, vol. 1, p. 2, de 5 Praec., c. 6; La-Croix, l. 5, n. 314. Chloroform: Its use is licit for lessening or preventing pains in a surgical operation, in difficult childbirth, and even in ordinary childbirth, since the danger which some affirm would arise to mother and child does not in reality exist. Morphine: Taken in great quantity it causes death; in small quantity, it produces sleep of the senses and privation of the use of reason; in smallest quantity, it is useful for calming the nerves and for restoring strength. Injections, for lessening pains, if they are done sometimes and in small quantity, are not illicit. In great pains they provide true relief. But if they are used repeatedly, and in greater quantity, they gravely harm bodily health, and consequently are illicit. Cocaine: Insofar as it is used for lessening pains, if it is done with due moderation, and no grave danger afterward is present either to health or even to life, it is licit per se.

Is it licit to induce someone to drunkenness, so that he may be impeded from a graver evil, e.g., from committing sacrilege or homicide? - The first opinion affirms it, because this is to diminish an evil which otherwise cannot be impeded. "That which is contrary to reason has more of the account of evil than that which removes the use of reason for an hour."

S. Th. 2. 2. q. 150, a. 3 ad 2. The second opinion distinguishes, and says that it is licit to induce another to material drunkenness, i.e., when the other becomes drunk without sin, for instance by setting before him very strong or medicated wine, because then on the one hand he does not sin, and on the other the harm of drunkenness is permitted in order to avoid a graver harm of others. But they say it is not licit to induce him to formal drunkenness, namely with his own sin, since this is intrinsically evil, and therefore never to be permitted. But the third opinion grants neither, because, since such a person is in no way thinking about wine, to induce him positively to drunkenness is accordingly evil. "Nevertheless, these things notwithstanding," St. Alphonsus, 77, concludes, "the first opinion seems sufficiently probable to me and to other learned men consulted by me, whether the drunkenness is material or formal, on account of the reason already brought forward, because it is licit to induce another to a lesser evil, so that he may be impeded from a greater." Namely then it is not to counsel evil, but good, that is, the choice of the lesser evil.

Is it licit to intoxicate someone so that he may reveal secrets? Struggl, 25, has these things: "It is licit materially to intoxicate another... for eliciting secrets which the other is bound to manifest; but if this were done to elicit secrets which the other could manifest with a good conscience, yet is not bound to manifest, an injury would be done to him, because he is reasonably unwilling against such intoxication and such a mode of eliciting secrets. This is true a fortiori when the other cannot manifest similar secrets with a good conscience." La-Croix has the same, l. 5, nn. 328, 329.

Does someone sin gravely by inducing a madman into drunkenness? R. Negatively per se, because a fool, as already deprived of the use of reason, cannot any longer be deprived of the use of reason. Per se, because if a fool after excessive drink is accustomed to do shameful things, or to break out into blasphemies, and the one who induces him to drink knows this, the latter will sin gravely against the natural law; because the fool violates it materially, since he is subject to it in first act. Elbel 679-681.

Are evils committed in drunkenness imputable? - R. Negatively, if they were not foreseen at least in confusion, as is clear; affirmatively, if they were foreseen at least in confusion, at least evils of deed, as again is clear from what has been said. At least evils of deed; for injurious words, or even contumelious deeds, probably are not imputable if they are uttered against men, since according to common estimation they are judged to inflict no injury and contumely; otherwise, however, if they are uttered against God, as blasphemies, etc., because even that material utterance alone of blasphemies, voluntary in the cause, tends to the diminution of divine honor. Nevertheless St. Alphonsus, 78, does not dare to call the contrary opinion of the Salmanticenses improbable. - But since blasphemy uttered in drunkenness does not have in itself the true nature of blasphemy, although it was foreseen, it is not subject to reservation and censure, if perhaps there is any. - Likewise obscene words, by reason of the scandal of others, are also imputable as sin if they are foreseen. - L. 2, 78; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 76, a. 4; Ithur., Cas. 30; Sanch., in dec., l. 1, c. 16, n. 42 seqq.; C. B. 827; C. A. 1307; C. I. 1151; C. L. 2361.

What is anger? Anger is an inordinate appetite of revenge.

This disorder can occur in two ways: 1. On the part of the mode of being angry, as, for example, if you are too much inflamed inwardly, or outwardly reveal anger too much through signs. - 2. On the part of the object, as, if you desire revenge for a cause plainly unjust, or greater than is just, e.g., by wishing death to an enemy who has not deserved it, or revenge to be executed by one's own authority, or finally, although the revenge is just, nevertheless you do not desire it as just, but as satisfying your malevolent mind. If revenge is desired in an ordered way, there is no sin of anger, as when superiors are angry at the faults of subjects, and punish them, or avenge them. Anger inordinate in the first way mentioned before is from its genus a venial sin; nevertheless it can become mortal by accident, on account of the violation of another virtue, e.g., religion, piety, charity, etc., as if blasphemy, malediction, or scandal is added; and also, if a movement of the soul of this sort is truly vehement and deliberate. Anger inordinate in the second way is from its genus mortal, because it is directly against charity and justice, Gal. 5:20. - S. Th. 1. 2. q. 88, a. 5 ad 1; 2. 2. q. 108, 158; L. 79.

What are the daughters of anger? - Some are from the heart: 1. Indignation, which is an inordinate affection from the fact that someone reckons himself treated unworthily by such a person. It is commonly venial. Indeed, if it proceeds from a just judgment of reason, it is nothing. Nevertheless it could be mortal if it increased up to deliberate hatred and grave contempt of the person. 2. Swelling of mind, by which someone morosely thinks out diverse ways of revenge, and by those thoughts puffs up his mind. What kind of sin it is must be judged from the quality of the revenge which is thought out. - Some are in the mouth: 1. Shouting, when an angry person raises his voice, pouring forth many things inordinately and confusedly. It is commonly venial, unless something else is added. 2. Blasphemy against God, and it is mortal. 3. Contumely against men, by which someone casts some evil upon his neighbor, with the intention of dishonoring him. 4. Malediction, by which someone wishes and imprecates evil upon another, under the account of evil. - Some are in deed, as quarrels, fights, seditions, wounds. "Quarrels, by which are understood all harms which are inflicted in deed on neighbors from anger." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 158, a. 7. When "someone intends to harm another, with the latter knowing and resisting, this is imported under the name of quarrel." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 42, a. 1. Quarrels, if they do not exceed measure, as also slight fights, are venial; otherwise, if they progress to seditions, wounds, killings. And these are commonly mortal sins on the part of the one beginning the quarrel; for the other can defend himself with the moderation of blameless defense. L. 80, 83; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 40, 41, 42.

Contumely: From its genus it is mortal. It is only venial if it is small, or only material without the mind of dishonoring, provided that no notable injury to the neighbor's honor follows. And thus many parents are excused at least from mortal sin when they call their children asses, etc.; likewise women, children, and men of the lowest sort, burdening one another with insults, because, since credit is not given to them, honor is not gravely injured. Nor indeed is it a sin if it is done with the mind of correcting, humbling, or for another reason. And thus a superior can cast forth some word otherwise contumelious. Yet in this one can sin if the mode of due correction is exceeded, or the subject is more gravely dishonored than he deserved. Likewise, if for the sake of a joke, through fitting recreation, light defects are cast forth, it is pleasantness, according to S. Th. 2. 2. q. 72, a. 2, provided the other is not saddened, nor moved to anger. Contumely is also done by deed, both indirectly, as if you trample or burn the image or letters of another, etc., and directly, as if you beat an honorable man with a club, set horns at his door, or represent something which injures the honor of another.

To this belongs mocking, derision, and ridicule, when it is done by signs, as by wrinkling the nose, stretching out the lips, etc., intending the neighbor's confusion; and if this is grave, or at least the neighbor is gravely saddened by it, they are mortal. - Concerning these things note that one who has injured another's honor by contumely is bound to restore it, even if reputation has not been injured. But this can be done either through an honorable and friendly greeting, or an invitation to table, or a petition for pardon, sometimes even on bended knees and before witnesses, according as the injury was grave. It is not necessary to explain in confession the varied quality of mortal contumely. L. 81, 82. "Malediction, of which we now speak, is that by which evil is pronounced against someone either by commanding or by wishing. But to will, or by command to move toward, the evil of another, according to itself repugns to charity, by which we love our neighbor; and so according to its genus it is a mortal sin, and so much the graver, the more we are bound to love and revere the person whom we curse.... Nevertheless it happens that a word of malediction uttered is a venial sin, either because of the smallness of the evil which one imprecates upon another by cursing, or also because of the affection of the one who utters the words of malediction, while from a light movement, or jest, or from some surreption, he utters such words, because sins of words are weighed especially from the affection." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 76, a. 3; L. 83.

What is acedia? Acedia, or weariness of soul, can be used in two ways: 1. Generally, for every weariness of soul and slackening in the exercise of virtues, because some labor is joined to it. "Acedia is a certain sadness by which man is rendered slow toward spiritual acts because of bodily labor." S. Th. 1 p., q. 63, a. 2 ad 2. 2. Specially, for sadness and weariness concerning divine friendship, because it must be preserved through laborious exercises of virtues; and thus someone does not care for that friendship. Acedia taken in the first way is then finally a mortal sin when therefore a work forbidden under mortal sin is done. Acedia taken in the second way is of itself mortal, because it repugns to the charity of God. "Acedia is not a mental withdrawal from any spiritual good whatsoever, but from the divine good, to which the mind must adhere of necessity. Hence if someone is saddened by this, that someone compels him to fulfill works of virtue which he is not bound to do, it is not the sin of acedia, but when he is saddened in those things which are incumbent upon him to be done for God." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 35, a. 3 ad 2; q. 35; L. 84; E. M.

What are the daughters of acedia? - They are the following: 1. Malice, namely a special malice by which, by reason of sadness to be fled, someone hates and detests spiritual goods, and would wish them not to exist, or by which he is sorry that he has done well or fulfilled that to which he was bound, or by which he contemns a benefit of God, e.g., by desiring not to have been born, or not to have known Christ, etc. It is mortal from its genus. - 2. Pusillanimity, by which someone flees those things which are arduous and which fall under counsels. 3. Torpor, by which someone flees those things which pertain to common justice, or precepts, and does good things without due fervor.

4. Rancor, by which those who induce to spiritual things are wearisome; whence rancor is a certain indignation. 5. Wandering of mind, by which someone in the exercise of spiritual things wanders toward exterior illicit delights, whether by thought, and it is called curiosity; or by speech, and it is called verbosity; or by bodily restlessness, and it is called restlessness, which are commonly venial. 6. Despair of salvation, which is flight from the end itself, and mortal. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 20, a. 4; q. 35; L. 84.