Chapter — Bucceroni, Institutions of Moral Theology
V. On Violation of Secret
What is a secret, and how manyfold is it? A secret in general is called whatever is hidden. As pertains to the present question, a secret is: some hidden thing revealed to someone, or known in any way, with the burden of silence. - A threefold secret is distinguished: natural, promised, committed. A natural secret exists if by chance you know something which you cannot reveal without the just sorrow or damage of another. It is promised if by a gratuitous promise you promise another that you will reveal to no one a thing which you already knew or of which you receive knowledge; or by an onerous promise of revealing the thing to no one, another manifests it to you under this condition. Finally it is committed when you reveal a matter to another for the sake of counsel or help, with this express or tacit condition, of revealing it to no one. L. 970.; St. Thomas, Quodl. 12, a. 21.
How does a natural secret oblige? - In a grave matter it obliges of itself under grave sin, and indeed for the most part from justice, sometimes from charity alone, unless a just cause excuses. The reason is that from the revelation of the secret damage to neighbor follows for the most part, and he has the right not to be injured without just cause. Moreover, he is affected with just sorrow who, as if deprived of his own thing, is deprived of a secret without just cause. Without just cause; for a natural secret obliges insofar as in that case justice or charity obliges; when this obligation ceases from a just cause, the obligation of the secret will cease. L. 970.
How does a promised secret oblige? - It obliges of itself gravely or lightly, according as someone by promise willed to oblige himself --- gravely and from justice in grave matter; or lightly and from mere fidelity, which from its genus is light. The reason is that the aforesaid obligation arises spontaneously from the promise made. Wherefore a gratuitously promised secret regularly does not oblige with grave inconvenience; whether an onerous one obliges even with grave inconvenience depends on the intention of the one exacting it and of the one promising it, and on the damage of each. With very grave damage it regularly does not oblige, unless someone expressly promised it in such a way; and it is licit that he extorted it by injury, if nevertheless from the revelation the other would not undergo the same damage. Cf. 987.; Ithur. Cas. 37, n. 2, 5, 6.; L. 970.
How does a committed secret oblige? It obliges of itself under grave sin from justice, and indeed more strictly than a merely natural secret, and also than a promised one. The reason is that besides the natural obligation, there urges also an obligation from onerous contract; for another would not commit knowledge of the matter to you unless he received from you a promise of secrecy. Moreover, in miserable affairs also to snatch away counsel and help is dreadful and publicly ruinous. Hence by civil law also it is prohibited to reveal a committed secret, and magistrates are forbidden to question about those things which by reason of the office one exercises, e.g., of pastor, advocate, etc., have been entrusted to someone. C. I. Proc. poen. 288.; C. G. poen. 378.
Note: There are several and grave theologians who probably defend that it is not mortal to reveal a grave matter committed under secret to one or another upright person under the same secret, provided it is not disclosed to whom especially he who committed the secret wished it concealed; since the matter can still be called secret in those circumstances. Yet this is not so easily to be permitted in practice. For so great is the talkativeness of men that a secret can scarcely stop with one. By an oath furnished, officials of the Roman curia are held to keeping secret; administrators, consultors, cardinals of the Sacred Congregations of the Holy Office, of the Index, of the Consistory; synodal examiners and pastor-consultors; examiners of books and writings of the Servants of God; and administrators of any order in the Roman curia. Ord. serv. in R. C. after Const. Sapienti Consilio. Secret is to be kept in designating those who are proposed for Episcopal Sees in the United States of North America. S. C. Consistor. 2 July 1910. The secret to be kept in designating persons for episcopal sees is extended to all dioceses and provinces in which the same or a similar form of designation obtains as in the United States of North America. S. C. Cons. 28 Apr. 1911.
Deputies for discipline and deputies for economy of the new major Roman Seminary at the Lateran, and of the minor Seminary at the Vatican, according to C. In praecipuis of Pius X, 28 June 1913, are obliged under grave sin to keep secret from office concerning business discussed and concluded in the deputation. S. C. Cons. 30 Oct. 1913. Public agents before the Sacred Congregations are held to keeping secret from office. C. Sapienti consilio, Reg. Gener. after C. cap. 9. Those who violate the secret which is called of the Holy Office cannot be absolved except by the Supreme Pontiff, the Cardinal Penitentiary himself excluded, from the reserved excommunication to the same Supreme Pontiff which they incur. Ord. serv. in R. C. Norm. pecul. c. 7, a. 2, n. 4.
The print's appendix has more on this paragraph: Power of the Sacred College. (ed.)
Whether from violation of a secret an obligation of restitution arises? He who by revealing another's secret sinned mortally is held from justice and under grave obligation to repair the grave damage of another. The reason is that it is unjust damaging. Cf. 1358.
Whether it is ever licit to explore and reveal a secret? - It is licit to explore and reveal a natural, promised, and committed secret: 1. From the rightly presumed consent of him whose interest it is that the secret be concealed; for then there is no injury of anyone's right. 2. If the matter has already been spread abroad from another source; for then it ceases to be secret. 3. If damage to the republic is going to follow from the secret. The reason is that private good ought to yield to the common good, and therefore there can be no obligation of procuring a private good against common damage. And for the same reason, if common damage would follow from revelation of a secret, one is held rather to undergo death and any torments whatever than to reveal the secret. 4. Regularly, if from the observation of the secret grave damage would come to you or to him to whom the secret pertains, or to another innocent person. The reason is that naturally no obligation can be given against the order of charity; nor is anyone by his promise and contract presumed to have obliged himself to such a burden, that he keep a secret even with his own grave damage, unless from the circumstances this certainly appears and the thing itself requires it. 5. If there is question especially of a committed secret concerning a truly grave matter, a committed secret does not cease in the private damage of someone, even if very grave; but it does cease in the grave damage of him to whom the secret has been committed; in grave spiritual damage of the very one committing it, e.g., if he wishes to marry his spurious daughter; in damage of another which threatens him from the very one committing the secret, as if a girl attempts to procure abortion and kill the fetus. The reason of the first assertion is that it still more concerns the public good that this secret be kept than that the private damage of another, even very grave, be impeded.
The reason of the second assertion is that otherwise, in the 1st case, you will scarcely find anyone who would wish to give counsel or help in straits of this kind, which likewise would be pernicious to the public good; in the 2nd and 3rd, the promise of secrecy would be illicit. 6. Finally, someone can use knowledge of a secret for his own advantage as if his own thing, although he extorted the secret not without injury to another, if nevertheless this is done without another's unjust damage, and he does that which otherwise by his own right he could have done. L. 570, 971.; l. 4, n. 49.; l. 6, n. 698.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 70, a. 1 ad 1, 2.; Laym. l. 3, tr. 3, p. 2, c. 5, n. 2.; Lugo de Iust. et Iur. d. 14, n. 142.; d. 38, n. 37 seqq.; Ithur. l. c. n. 8-10, 11, 28, 29, 30-34, 37, 38.; Appendix n. 4, 19, 22, 23.; La Croix l. 2, p. 2, n. 1231.
Whether someone is held to manifest a secret to a judge legitimately questioning? - Resp. Affirmatively, if there is question of a merely natural secret; because the obligation of obedience to be furnished to a judge legitimately questioning on account of the common good is stronger than that of impeding damage to a private person by observation of a secret; and in any case, since it is legitimately inflicted by a judge, there will be no injury of another's right. - Resp. Affirmatively also if there is question of a secret simply promised; because by the promise you obliged yourself only to that which you could licitly furnish.
But you could not promise against obedience owed to a judge or superior; because, when you knew the crime, you had already contracted a natural obligation of manifesting it, if the judge or superior required this. Therefore the subsequent promise of secrecy could not destroy the prior obligation. Resp. Negatively of itself, if there is question of a secret promised by pact and onerous promise.
The reason is that, as St. Thomas says, 2. 2, q. 70, a. 1 ad 2, "to keep faith is of natural right: but nothing can be commanded to a man against that which is of natural right." - Indeed, when an onerous contract intervenes, it is altogether of natural right to keep the faith given. - Resp. Likewise negatively, of itself, if there is question of a committed secret. The reason is that the common good itself demands that, from fear of such revelation, men not be deprived of the advantage of seeking necessary counsel or help, which certainly they would never require unless they were certain of the secret to be kept. Therefore the common good itself demands that, as long as the one committing the secret can licitly keep his secret, he retains the right that the other not betray it. Hence one can answer a judge questioning: I do not know, understanding internally, in such a way that I ought to manifest it; although, with an oath interposed, he is compelled to give testimony. S. Poenit. 21 Aug. 1830. Of itself; for otherwise it is if the case is one in which someone can and is held to reveal the secret, as for instance if heresies, conspiracies, robberies are to be restrained. - L. 970.; Ithur. l. c. n. 13, 25.; Append. n. 10, 11, 12.; St. Thomas, Quodl. 1, a. 15, 16.; Lugo d. 14, n. 135, 141.; Gur. 437.
Whether you can reveal a secret if you promised to keep it even with loss of life? Resp. Affirmatively, if the common good requires it, because a promise made against the common good is null. Resp. Negatively, if there is question of your own damage simply grave, and the other is placed in the same peril; because it is better to keep this secret promised by a special contract. - Resp. Likewise negatively, more probably, if there is question of your extreme damage, and the other would be cast into the same danger, or at least a very grave one, because you have expressly renounced your right, nor is it illicit in the case to omit the preservation of life in order to keep a promise. But it is altogether necessary that the business to be kept secret be of very grave moment. Otherwise the promise would be prodigal, which we are not held to keep. Yet St. Liguori 971 says the opposite is sufficiently probable, because it is licit for no one to squander his own life and postpone it to another's.
Ithur. l. c. n. 30.
Whether he sins gravely who opens or reads another's letters? Resp. Affirmatively, of itself, or from its genus. The reason is that by natural right and the right of nations there is an obligation of leaving the secrets of letters uninjured; otherwise human commerce would be ruined. - Except the following cases: 1. If there is tacit or presumed consent of him who writes, or of him to whom the letters are sent. 2. If it is known or presumed that the letters contain matters of light moment. 3. If it is done from a just cause, e.g., for averting public or private damage, provided one has the right of opening the letters for warding off that evil, and does not read more than is necessary for this end. 4. If the letters are opened from levity or from some inadvertence. L. 1. 5, n. 70.; H. A. 5.; Lugo Resp. Mor. l. 5, d. 10.
Note: Until the letter is delivered to him to whom it has been sent, it still pertains to the sender, who will be able to recall it to himself. That the secret be preserved, writings to be transmitted to the Holy See which contain secrets ought to be closed. S. C. Consist. 25 Nov. 1908. From C. L. 575, letters sent cannot be published without the permission of the author or of him who represents him, except in the case that they are to be added to some process. Violation of the secret of letters is prohibited by grave penalties in Civil Law. C. I. Poen. 159-164.
Resolutions: To gather letters torn into small pieces, to join the various parts together, and to read them, is not licit with justice saved. For someone tore the letter apart in this way so that it could not be read. L. 1. 5, n. 70. "Thus a Prince can open letters not only of enemies, but also of others, which in time of war come from places bordering enemies. Likewise public ministers, as often as they judge it necessary for the public good.... And this proceeds not only for a Prince and ministers, but also for private persons....
A religious Superior licitly opens and reads the letters of his subjects, provided they are not sent to a higher superior, or to one whom the statutes exempt, nor come from him, either from the statute or custom of the religion, or from probable suspicion that they contain something evil." L. 1. 5, n. 70. Thus also in colleges and seminaries the superior, by reason of a more special vigilance to be observed, can open the letters of students, unless they are sent to other higher superiors or received from them, or unless there is question of a secret of conscience or of a family secret; for then it suffices that the superior know that the letters are truly directed to the higher superior, to the spiritual director, or to the parents, or received from them.
Gousset 1090. - Struggl 56. III.; Ithur. l. c. n. 26 seqq.; Ferraris v. Litterae n. 9, 10. In the Norms of the S. C. EE. and RR. for Religious Institutes, art. 179, 180, it is said: Letters to be sent by Sisters, and those sent to them, are to be handed to the local superioresses, who will be able to read them at their discretion. Let them use this faculty with the moderation of prudence and charity, the secret being kept. From any inspection of superioresses are excepted letters to be sent to the moderator general, or provincial, and their councilors or assistants, to the Bishop and to the S. C. EE. and RR., or those given by these to the Sisters.