VI. On the Law of Taxes

Whether and how do the laws of taxes oblige in conscience? A tax is called that which is paid to the State as necessary for the common expenses of the commonwealth. It is direct if it is imposed directly on persons, by reason of their immovable goods, movable goods, and the exercise of some business, art, or profession. It is indirect if it is imposed directly not on the person but on a certain thing, on account of the change of its owners, as in successions, or on account of its transport from region to region, or on account of its trade, manufacture, sale, or use. Wherefore those things which are paid even to public administrations for transporting letters from place to place, for journeys of persons on railways, etc., do not have the nature of taxes; and they are to be paid by force of the contract entered into with the public administration, and consequently from commutative justice.

The laws of taxes, speaking in themselves, are moral laws, or commanding in conscience: those, namely, which are enacted by legitimate authority, from a just cause of the common good, of the support and dignity of the Prince, and with due proportion observed, so that they do not exceed the moral capacity of subjects, and so that, e.g., the poor are not burdened as the rich, for thus the former would sustain a far greater burden than the latter. Lugo, de Iust. et Iur., d. 36, n. 25, 26. Indeed laws of this sort command an act of natural justice, namely of legal justice, only defining and determining it; by which both the Prince and subjects are held, each for his own part, to contribute the necessary supports to society. Wherefore this natural justice commands subjects to furnish to the superior, having care of the community, those things which are necessary for having this care; it likewise commands strangers that they ought to compensate the harms which they inflict on another society by the export and sale of goods; it commands both subjects and strangers that they ought to compensate the necessary expenses in the construction and keeping of roads, bridges, etc., which they enjoy. Rom. 13:5-7. Hence the aforesaid legal justice is intimately connected with commutative justice.

Whence it is that defrauding taxes, at least speaking in itself, brings an obligation of restitution, as Gousset expressly has, 671, 999. And the Roman Catechism, 10, counts it among robberies: "In this crime of rapacity are included those who do not pay, or who divert and transfer to themselves, the customs, taxes, tithes, and the rest of this kind which are owed to the Prelates of the Church and to Magistrates." Nevertheless, since collectors of these taxes are publicly constituted, this seems to be the mind of legislators, that the payment of taxes is not considered due unless it is demanded. By no means, however, are lies and frauds thereby permitted for not paying, and for deceiving the collectors. Likewise, since a grave penalty is imposed on those not paying, many and grave doctors generally hold the laws concerning taxes as merely penal laws. But from this it does not follow that someone ought not to pay just taxes when the time established by law has arrived, or when they are legitimately sought by collectors; but it follows only that unless observance of the law is urged, or unless they are legitimately sought, he is not indeed held in conscience to pay them, and he is held to undergo the penalty if he is discovered not to have paid the tax and the penalty is imposed. Wherefore someone sins only then when, a tax owed by law not having been paid, or a duty not having been paid, as regards taxes sought by collectors, he would afterward be unwilling to pay the fine and undergo the penalty.

And this opinion is also confirmed by common practice and persuasion, namely that these laws do not oblige in conscience to paying taxes spontaneously. Therefore, while at least doubt remains concerning the obligation, no one seems even from this head to be troubled, if he has not paid taxes at the time established by law, or taxes not yet sought by collectors; indeed even if, as regards these latter, someone merely eludes the vigilance of collectors, by hiding things or not declaring them, namely lest they demand payment, as even timorous persons are accustomed to do, or by declaring a lesser value of things in order to diminish the tax; provided nevertheless that lies and frauds are absent, which are always illicit, and that at least the just lowest price of the things is declared. L. l. 3, n. 614, 617; H. A. tr. 10, n. 81; S. Th. Quodl. 2, a. 8; Quodl. 6, a. 10; Lugo, de Iust. et Iur., d. 36, s. 4; Lessius, de Iust. et Iur., l. 2, c. 33; Ithur., Cas. 2; Struggl, 32; Elbel 303-306; Kenrick, tr. 6, c. 3, n. 20-22-25.

Resolves: The following are to be condemned: 1. Those who violently resist ministers exacting customs; for these sin against obedience: "He who resists power resists the ordinance of God." Rom. 13:2. They also sin against legal justice; for the law which regards taxes, even if it is held as merely penal, nevertheless grants to governors a certain right to exact the fine if subjects are discovered in fraud. - 2. Those who by right and wrong practice defrauding as a kind of commerce, and with the intention also of resisting, wander armed day and night. For men of this sort become rebellious citizens and most pernicious to society. 3. Those who, although they never resist, nor have the intention of resisting, nevertheless with every zeal and effort devote themselves to the art of measuring and defrauding, and have it as a kind of profession of life. These besides are not rarely exposed to dangers of temporal goods and of life and soul. Moreover, it is altogether one thing sometimes not to declare or to hide one's things, lest the tax be demanded; another thing to practice the art of defrauding taxes, which is certainly prohibited, since this is altogether harmful to society, both on account of the defrauding of taxes itself, and on account of many other delicts which are naturally joined with it.

All these incur forfeiture, Dig. l. 39, t. 4. Forfeiture in law is that which, on account of tax not paid, or declaration before the tax collectors omitted, is claimed for the fisc, cosa devoluta al fisco, confiscated. Likewise the very adjudication to the fisc is confiscation.

Do officials sin against justice whenever they do not exact a just tax? - R. Affirmatively, in itself generally, and indeed gravely in grave matter. The reason is clear, since they have obligated themselves to watch properly, and diligently to exact taxes otherwise just. Wherefore, if they fail in their office, they are held to restitution toward the Prince, or the commonwealth. Generally, because according to many, officials appointed for exacting customs are not always to be condemned when at times they act more benignly in a light matter, chiefly with the poor, or even with those who otherwise pay diligently; because in such a case the Prince himself is reasonably presumed to remit. "Besides, if tax collectors detect defrauders, and merely dissemble the fine, they are probably not held to repair this. The reason of this is: because tax collectors by force of their office are held only to exact the tax for the good of the Prince, but not to enrich him through fines. Besides, a fine from another source is not owed before the sentence of a judge, nor does the fisc have a right to the fine before this. Hence even guards paid to observe lest tolls be avoided through hidden passages, if by their fault they allow passage, are held from justice to repair the loss of the toll, but not of the fine." Struggl, 30. Others, however, affirm that they must also repair the fine, because by omitting denunciation, to which by reason of office they are held, they are the cause why the fisc does not exact that to which it has a right. Cf. 1394.

But those are to be condemned who corrupt by unjust means officials appointed for exacting customs, lest they perform their office by exacting a tax otherwise just; for they sin at least by cooperating in the sin of these officials, and they are held to restitution. Luke 3:12, 13; L. l. 3, n. 583, 614-617; l. 4, n. 237; Struggl, 32; Gousset, 1000.