XX. On Reparation of Injustice

How is injustice repaired? Injustice or injury inflicted on another is repaired through restitution. Restitution is the rendering of another's thing, or the compensation of damage unjustly inflicted. This definition, as is clear, comprehends not only restitution of mutuum, commodatum, deposit, and pledge, where no violation of another's right preceded, but also restitution from actions in which violation of another's right preceded. - Therefore restitution differs from satisfaction in this: that satisfaction is compensation of offense or personal injury through some service, or request for pardon, or some other fine or penalty; but restitution is rendering of a real right, or compensation of real injury. C. A. 1323; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 62, aa. 1, 5; L. 547. Cf. here n. 1287.

Whether the obligation of restitution arises from any violation whatever of justice? The obligation of restoring of itself does not arise from violation of distributive or legal justice, but from violation damaging commutative justice alone. The first part is proved, because through violation of distributive or legal justice, precisely as such, the right of property in a thing or to a thing is not injured, or no damage is inflicted on another; therefore from violation of distributive or legal justice, precisely as such, no obligation of real restitution arises. For neither violation of justice regards a good which is in some way at least one's own or proper, of which another is despoiled or deprived, as can be seen in the unequal distribution, e.g., of common goods, which do not pertain to individuals but to the community, and are to be assigned to individuals; likewise in defrauding fines which are owed by individuals and are to be paid to the community from the precept of law. Moreover, by transgression of distributive or legal justice there is indeed sin against such kinds of justice, but there is no precept of repairing that transgression, since it is now impossible that one has not sinned. There can indeed only be a new other obligation to be fulfilled, at another time, on another occasion. And thus if on Sunday you did not hear Mass, there will indeed be again an obligation to hear Mass for the following Sunday, but the obligation of the preceding Sunday has now entirely ceased. - The second part is proved, because restitution strictly such is compensation of damage unjustly inflicted; but real damage is inflicted only when the right of property, and commutative justice, is injured; which regards equality of things, and consequently the good which is one's own or proper to another, namely that each one have what is his. Hence the obligation always perseveres until you give to another his right. Therefore. Hence St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 62, a. 1, says: "To restore seems to be nothing other than to set someone again in the possession or ownership of his own thing." But since "to preserve justice is of necessity of salvation, it follows that to restore that which has been unjustly taken from someone is of necessity of salvation." St. Thomas, ib., a. 2; L. 547; C. L. 2356, 2361 ff.

Resolutions: A superior is not bound to restitution if he distributes the offices of society to those less worthy, because he does not violate the strict right of the more worthy person, nor of the community, which cannot demand anything else except that the unworthy be kept away from offices. But it is otherwise if in a competition the superior preferred the less worthy to the more worthy, because in a competition, speaking of itself, a pact intervenes, from which strict right belongs to the more worthy person. A superior who distributes merely honorific dignities, whether to the less worthy or even to the unworthy, is not bound to restitution, because he deprived no one of his right, although he sinned because of acceptance of persons. One guilty of damage is not held if he denies his crime lest goods be extorted from him; nor is he held who carries out prohibited merchandise against the command of the laws, although from this their price increases. L. 547; l. 4, n. 107; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 63.

Whether the obligation of restitution ever arises from violation of distributive and legal justice? From violation of distributive and legal justice accidentally, and because of connected commutative justice, an obligation of restoring can arise. It is proved, for from violation of either of those kinds of justice real damage to a third party can arise, which by reason of office could and ought to have been avoided; and therefore an obligation arises at the same time of repairing that damage. But this obligation arises because of connected commutative justice; since in that case someone is guilty not only of the common good omitted, to which distributive and legal justice incline, but also of a violated contract, or quasi-contract, by which, in assuming the office, he implicitly obliged himself to prevent damages to subjects or others. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 62, a. 7; q. 66, a. 8.

Resolutions: An unjust distributor of public offices is held to nothing toward the worthy person passed over, because he violated no strict right of his. Nevertheless he is certainly held toward society and toward private persons concerning all damages, arising therefrom both to society and to private persons. St. Thomas, l.c. A magistrate who prevents someone from competing for a prize, or forbids the prize to be adjudged to him who surpassed the others in the contest, is held concerning damage. - A magistrate likewise is held concerning damage who afflicts someone with an unjust penalty, if damage follows from it. A magistrate is also held concerning damage who burdens someone with taxes beyond his resources. Gousset 671, 1001; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 66, a. 8. Speaking of themselves, those who do not pay just tributes and tolls are bound to restitution, since they are owed from legal justice, which is intimately connected in this matter with commutative justice, by the very fact that someone is part of society, and a right has been acquired by society by force of the law itself of exacting tributes and tolls, so that its necessary expenses to be made may be compensated, if they are actually demanded and their payment is denied. Hence the Roman Catechism, 10, affirms that those not paying tributes and tolls are guilty of theft and rapacity. Gousset 671, 999. Cf. 232.

Whether one unable to restore from goods of the same order is bound to restore from goods of a different order? Resp. Negatively, more probably. The reason is that restitution is replacement into the former state; and justice gives to each his own, not something else. Yet others probably affirm, because one who cannot render the same thing ought to render that which he can. But this follows from equity of right, not from strict justice. For he owes not this, but another thing. Hence through vindicative justice it can be imposed by a judge or superior that someone for injury concerning one genus of goods furnish something in goods of another order; more probably, however, by reason of penalty only, not by reason of justice. Moreover, the injured person has the right of denouncing before the Judge the one from whom he received injury, and therefore of accepting money from that one so that he may omit denunciation. Thus, e.g., a woman violently oppressed by someone can summon the violator before the judge, C. I. Poen. 38, or exact money from the scoundrel so that she may renounce her right. C. A. 1326, 1329, 1330, 1413; C. B. 842; L. 627, 1000; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 62, a. 2, ad 1.

Whether restitution made by one civilly incapable is valid? - By positive law, the payment of a thing owed is not valid if it was made by him who was not proprietor of the thing, or was incapable of alienating. Thus according to C. I. 1240; C. G. 1238; C. H. 1160; and according to C. A. 1421, if the debt was not yet liquid. But a payment of this kind, made by one incapable of alienating, although subject to rescission, is not declared invalid by full right. Nor does it seem that there is place for rescission even in the external forum, if the thing owed is certain and the day has arrived. But by natural law there can be no doubt about the validity of a payment owed, made, e.g., by a minor, by a wife, by an interdicted person.

From what does the obligation of restitution proximately arise? The obligation of restitution broadly accepted remotely arises from an obligation contracted by commutative justice and from violation of commutative justice; but it can proximately arise from the following heads: 1. From the unjust taking of another's thing: such taking injures another's right, and therefore the injured right must be repaired. 2. From another's thing possessed, formally or equivalently existing, and not yet legitimately prescribed: although another's thing was not unjustly accepted, nevertheless another's thing possessed and not yet prescribed is always its owner's, and must be rendered to him. 3.

From the fact that someone has been made richer unjustly from another's thing: if he has been made unjustly richer, another's right has been injured; but an injured right requires reparation. 4. From unjust damaging: he who brings damage to another injures his right. 5. From contract or quasi-contract: contracts have the force of private law; and therefore they oblige one to render to the contracting co-party his right. 6. From law or from juridical sentence: law or the sentence of a judge has the force of obliging in conscience. 7. From unjust cooperation: he who unjustly cooperates in an unjust action, by his cooperation truly injures another's right. L. 534, 547, 548, 711, 927; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 62, aa. 1, 2, 4, 6, 7; q. 66, a. 6.