XXXII. When Restitution is to be Made

When is restitution to be made? - As regards any debts whatever, generally restitution must be made as soon as it can be done without grave inconvenience. For natural right requires that you not retain another's thing, when the owner is reasonably unwilling, not even for a short time. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 62, a. 8. Hence 1. he who culpably and notably defers restitution remains in continuous sin, and cannot be absolved. Moreover, if damages come to the owner from delay of restitution, he is held to compensate them. 2. If someone, having the intention of restoring, defers for some short time without grave inconvenience of the owner, he is not easily to be condemned of mortal sin, indeed not even of venial sin, if there is some cause for deferring, e.g., hope of a more convenient occasion, etc. L. 678, 679.; H. A. 104, 105. 3. He who would wish to restore by parts, when he can easily restore the whole, would not be absolved, namely when the matter is grave; because the owner also in this is reasonably unwilling. The same must be said of him who, when he could restore during the course of life, nevertheless defers until death; or who, placed in danger of death, without sufficient reason would cast upon his heirs the obligation of restoring his goods; unless perhaps there is question of restitution of uncertain goods. L. 679, 681 seqq.; C. A. 1415.; C. I. 1246.; C. B. 266, 271.

Whether, as regards debts from injury, damages arising from delay of restitution are to be compensated? - As regards debts from injury, generally all damages which have followed from delay are to be compensated. For one contracting debt by injury takes upon himself the burden of compensating damages of this kind. - But whether extraordinary damages also must be compensated, or those which do not necessarily follow from delay of restitution, is controverted. It seems probably to be denied, because these damages could not have been foreseen even confusedly, and therefore cannot be imputed. Vogler 426.; C. B. 286, 287. Cf. here 1453.

What of time as regards debts from contract? As regards debts from contract, generally one must stand by the conditions placed on the contract concerning time, or concerning other circumstances, unless it is prudently presumed that the will of the other contracting party is different. L. 678. Hence 1. restitution, or rather payment, must be made at the time about which it was expressly or tacitly agreed. - 2. The debtor can anticipate, if the term assigned for payment is in his favor, as ordinarily is accustomed to happen; but otherwise if the same term tends to the utility of the creditor, as, e.g., in the furnishing of money with profit to be received. - 3. If the term has not been fixed, according to the opinion of many the debtor can without sin, at least grave sin, generally wait until he is admonished by the creditor, unless nevertheless the latter takes damage from this, or does not dare admonish out of fear, or omits admonition from forgetfulness or impotence. C. A. 1417, 1418.

Whether a debtor deferring restitution from a just cause is held to render to the creditor legal interest, ceasing profit, emerging damage? It is controverted. The first opinion denies it, if the debt is from contract; because then the debtor is not the unjust and culpable cause of that damage, for he is not in culpable delay; but it affirms if from delict, "because then the first unjust acceptance truly was the culpable cause of the damage." Yet this damage also ought to have been foreseen at least confusedly. The second opinion denies it even in this second case, because "the damage then does not come to the creditor from that first unjust acceptance, but from the later retention, which is done justly." L. 680, 704. But this retention is always culpable in the cause. C. A. 1333, 1334, 1336. Cf. C. G. 1151, 1153.; Gousset in h. a.; C. B. 284 seqq.