Article II. On Blasphemy

299. • Definition. Blasphemy is speech injurious to God ¹. Speech, however, can be made not only by an explicit word, but in some sense also by the mind and by deed. If it is a question, however, of reservation or of the other penalties inflicted on blasphemy, only the spoken is properly understood.

¹ Some, with St. Thomas (2. 2. q. 13. art. 1), hold that it belongs to the notion of blasphemy that it state something false about God. Others require merely that it contain some contumely; and others reconcile these with the first, because whoever despises God in words by that very act declares God to be contemptible, which is certainly false. However this may be, lest the Author's definition extend too widely, the word injurious is to be understood of contumely. Hence Suarez (De Relig. Tr. 5, Lib. 1, Cap. 4, n. 1): Blasphemy is a word of malediction, reproach, or contumely against God. And others: It is speech against God or sacred things by way of contumely.

Division. Blasphemy is distinguished first of all

1. Into direct, or indirect, according as the dishonoring of God either is directly and formally intended by the blasphemer, or, though not intended, some contumely against God is nevertheless contained in his words or gestures ².

² Laymann (Lib. 4, Tr. 10, Cap. 6, n. 12) affirms that the direct will of dishonoring God is a circumstance to be expressed in confession. For which opinion St. Alphonsus (Lib. 3, n. 126) adds Lessius, and indeed says that it is the common opinion, citing the Salmanticenses (Tr. 21, Cap. 3, n. 123); and Scavini too follows St. Alphonsus (Tract. 5, Disp. 3, Cap. 2, art. 2, q. 3).

But the case of Laymann and Lessius is one thing, that of the Salmanticenses another. For the former assert it led by the opinion of the necessity of confessing certain merely aggravating circumstances; whence Laymann refers the reader to (Lib. 1, Tr. 2, Cap. 10, n. 3), where he teaches this: whereas the Salmanticenses say it of the case in which, on account of hatred of God or heresy, another species of sin accrues. Since therefore, even in the opinion of St. Alphonsus, the necessity of confessing merely aggravating circumstances is none in itself, and the doctrine of the Salmanticenses is not to the point, it is plain that the opinion which says that the circumstance of direct blasphemy must be expressed rests on no solid foundation.

** This Note too displeases the VV., and (Pag. 918) they contend that St. Alphonsus rightly cited the Authors alleged by him. But the VV. themselves (ibid.) admit that St. Alphonsus (Lib. 3, n. 126) holds the same as Busembaum. Now Busembaum says indeed that the circumstance of direct blasphemy must be expressed, but he omits why he affirms it, and merely alleges Laymann (Lib. 4, Tr. 10, Cap. 6, n. 12). But the reason adduced there by Laymann is: because this circumstance aggravates intimately, and increases the contempt and dishonoring of God, in which the essential malice of blasphemy consists. Therefore both Laymann and Busembaum say that that circumstance must be expressed only because it is an aggravating circumstance. But St. Alphonsus, as the VV. will have it, teaches that it is to be expressed because it changes the species. Therefore they must admit that neither Busembaum nor Laymann stands for the opinion of St. Alphonsus.

The VV. insist, saying that Laymann adds this: Then also because such a perverse intention often comes from hatred, at least of abomination, toward God, which is a sin specifically distinct from blasphemy. - Resp. Laymann continues thus: But because it does not always come from hatred, but sometimes only from anger, weariness, or despair. Hence thus: Laymann teaches that a distinct species accrues to blasphemy uttered with a formal and direct intention of dishonoring God only when it comes from hatred; but Laymann denies that such blasphemy always comes from hatred. Therefore in formal blasphemy considered in itself he does not recognize a distinct species.

As to the Salmanticenses, the VV. (l. c.) have this: St. Alphonsus with the best right alleges the Salmanticenses, since they teach with the common opinion that blasphemies proceeding from hatred of God are of a species different from other blasphemies. - Resp. The question now is not whether a new species is added from hatred of God, but whether direct blasphemy contains in itself a species different from other blasphemies. A new species accrues to blasphemy also from heresy: whence the Salmanticenses write there thus: It is answered by saying that heretical blasphemies, and those proceeding from hatred of God, are of a species different from other blasphemies. The reason of the first part is, because heretical blasphemy has heresy joined to it... and is opposed to faith... The reason of the second part is, because hatred of God is opposed to charity. Now just as you would absurdly say that direct blasphemy is in itself always of a different species because heresy sometimes accrues, so the same is badly concluded because it can sometimes be joined with hatred of God.

Finally, as regards Lessius, the VV. (l. c.) note that Lessius concludes in these words: Hence there is no doubt that this is to be disclosed in Confession as a peculiar species, in which the malice itself is directly willed. - Resp. The sense of Lessius is that that circumstance must be disclosed, as a peculiar species must be disclosed; not, however, that it must be disclosed because the circumstance itself brings a new species. And this is made manifest by a double reason: 1. because the reason applied by Lessius is confined to this, that that affection is incomparably worse, because in a higher way it is malice in act, because it is incomparably worse to do an injury to someone with the affection of harming... But these indicate not a change of species, but a mere increase of malice within the same species. 2. Because, as Lessius says, this is the most formal blasphemy. But it is absurd that formal blasphemy should differ in species from the common notion of blasphemy. Therefore.

Hence, however, we must proceed to the conclusion, which is the head of the matter. For here it is a question of the obligation of confessing some circumstance. But obligations, unless they are certainly established, are not to be asserted. Now in the present case, so far are we from having arguments that induce certitude, that we have not even reasons effective for producing some probability. Therefore.

2. Into immediate, or mediate, according as it affects God Himself immediately, or only mediately, namely by dishonoring the Saints ³ or sacred things with words.

³ Whatever some have disputed, contending that blasphemy against the Saints differs in species from blasphemy against God (see Lugo, De Poenit. Disp. 16, n. 279-280), it can be held probable with St. Alphonsus (Lib. 3, n. 132) that in reality it does not differ in species, and therefore that there is no obligation of declaring in confession whether the blasphemous words were uttered against God or against the Mother of God, or against the Saints or the Angels. And this indeed contributes much to practice; for it frees the Confessor and the penitent at once from the necessity of inquiring how often one has sinned by blaspheming against God, how often against the Saints, since all these can more expeditiously be gathered together in one sum.

3. Into heretical, imprecatory, and merely reproachful, according as it contains heresy, or imprecation, or mere contumely.

Principles. - I. Every formal and deliberate blasphemy, whether it be direct or indirect, immediate or mediate, is a mortal sin ex toto genere suo. The reason is, because any contumely against God is a grave injury inflicted on the divine Majesty. - Hence Lev. 24. 16: The man that curseth his God shall bear his sin: and he that blasphemeth the name of the Lord, dying let him die. - Hence also St. Jerome, on Isaias, bk. 7, ch. 18, says: Nothing is more horrible than blasphemy, which setteth its mouth against the Most High. - And St. Thomas says, 2. 2. q. 13. art. 3: Every sin compared with blasphemy is lighter. - It can, however, become venial from imperfection of the act, namely from defect of advertence, or of perfect consent.

II. For blasphemy perfect by reason of the act, an express and explicit intention of dishonoring God is not necessary, but an implicit one suffices, namely when someone with advertence utters things which contain a real contumely against God, even in jest or in anger against creatures. The reason is, because from these there follows a grave dishonoring of God, though an indirect one; for a grave irreverence against God is committed when words contumelious to Him are employed for jest ⁴, or to express anger. - Reuter, On blasphemy, n. 442.

⁴ Reuter, from whom the Author brings these things, thus delimits the doctrine on blasphemy uttered in jest (P. II, Tr. V, De Blasphemia, n. 442): Blasphemy is grave..... 5. If someone says blasphemous words in jest, where among the hearers a dishonoring of God is joined to them. The grave guilt will therefore be absent when that sense is lacking among the hearers.

III. Those words are to be held blasphemous in themselves which, from common apprehension, or from the usage of the country or region, or from a derisive or angry manner of speaking, or from other circumstances, contain a dishonoring of God; which, although in themselves they do not sound like blasphemy, are yet held as blasphemous from common apprehension. - Reuter, ibid. ⁵.

⁵ The Author perhaps has in view what Reuter (l. c., n. 441) has concerning those who with mockery, reproach, or contumely name the death of Christ, His blood, wounds, sacraments, etc.; of which we spoke above in the note to n. 296. Nevertheless, where it is a question not of mockery, reproach, etc., but only of an apprehension by which words in reality not blasphemous are by error thought blasphemous, the grave obligation must certainly be recalled to mind by which, in the opinion of all, Confessors are bound to recall the faithful who sin from an erroneous conscience from their pernicious error. Rather, therefore, than attack these words as blasphemous, let Confessors teach that there is no blasphemy in them, lest otherwise, namely from a false zeal, as we have said several times already, they build for hell.

300. Resolves. - 1. According to some it is blasphemy to say: May death destroy you, or the blood of God; may the Sacraments destroy you. But more truly these seem to be merely imprecatory words. It is blasphemy, however, to spit toward heaven, to gnash the teeth at it, to say that one wishes to do something against God's will, and the like.

2. It is blasphemy to say: God has entirely forgotten me: Why did God create me? - Except, however, if these things are uttered in a human manner of speaking from levity, or to show the gravity of grief or weariness, as very often happens. But those are never to be excused from grave sin who advertently and seriously say: - God is unjust. - God unjustly burdens me with tribulations. - Unjustly He permits the wicked to be happy in the world. - Voit, n. 519.

3. Those do not sin gravely who, carried away by anger or some passion, utter words of blasphemy not adverting to their meaning ⁶.

⁶ So St. Thomas (2. 2. q. 13. art. 2. ad 3): Blasphemy can proceed without deliberation, by surprise, in two ways. In one way, that someone does not advert that what he says is blasphemy: which can happen when someone suddenly, from some passion, bursts into imagined words whose meaning he does not consider; and then it is a venial sin, and does not properly have the nature of blasphemy. These things can bring it about that the opinion be set aside which St. Alphonsus (Lib. 3, n. 127) attributes to Giordanini (Istruzione per li novelli Confessori), namely that there is always present some advertence to the malice of the blasphemy.

** It could hardly have seemed credible; yet this too has happened, that the VV. (Pag. 256-260) found matter for writing through eight columns against this very brief Note, in which, besides, the opinion is attributed to another rather than to St. Alphonsus, who, the VV. advise (and this matters nothing), is Giuseppe Iorio, not Giordanini.

Accordingly (Pag. 257) they complain, 1. that the passage of St. Thomas is brought forward not entire, but torn from its context. - Resp. St. Thomas had objected to himself: Sins which are committed without deliberation are not mortal.... But blasphemy sometimes proceeds without deliberation. Therefore it is not always a mortal sin. And he answers by distinguishing whether advertence to the blasphemy is lacking or present. The first case, which was to the point, is faithfully set out in the Note. Of the other case St. Thomas adds: In another way, when he adverts that it is blasphemy, considering the meaning of the words: and then he is not excused from mortal sin. And these things were omitted because, as is plain, they were not to the point, nor was it the Author's aim to heap up useless things to increase the bulk of the book. What is there in this that can rightly be found fault with?

2. The VV. add (Pag. 257) that in the text of St. Alphonsus the word ALWAYS is to be understood of things which happen ordinarily and commonly. - Resp. If they themselves contend that the word ALWAYS cannot be understood there as ALWAYS, then ALWAYS is less aptly said there. For the rest, why then do they attack the Note, which merely notes that that ALWAYS does not agree with the doctrine of St. Thomas?

3. The VV. (Pag. 257-258) wish to reconcile St. Alphonsus with St. Thomas, because St. Thomas does not discuss the habituated, but those who by surprise burst into imagined words without consideration. St. Alphonsus, however, agrees with St. Thomas that someone from anger may not advert to the malice of blasphemy; but he deals chiefly with the habituated, of whom he writes (Prax. Conf. Cap. 2, n. 31): Finally I add with a certain learned Author (Giordanini) that blasphemers are not excused from grave sin on the ground that, because of the force of the bad habit or a vehement commotion of mind from anger, they did not advert to what they were saying; for these badly habituated persons, although they have a knowledge less vivid than others who have not contracted the use of blaspheming, nevertheless ALWAYS have that ACTUAL knowledge sufficient for this, that the act be deliberate and gravely sinful. - Resp. 1. St. Thomas discusses generally those who from some passion burst into imagined words whose meaning they do not consider. But this happens also to the habituated; indeed, as is plain of itself, much more easily and frequently to the habituated than to others. Therefore some reconciliation is sought here in vain. - 2. The passage of St. Alphonsus of which the Note speaks (Lib. 3, n. 127) embraces both the habituated and the non-habituated. Behold the words of the holy Doctor: Some DD. say that these (blasphemers) SOMETIMES, on account of the impulse of anger or of the habit contracted, can blaspheme without advertence. But I think with the Author cited (Iorio) that in blaspheming there is ALWAYS some at least confused advertence to the malice of that utterance. Therefore, 1. since St. Alphonsus opposes his ALWAYS to the SOMETIMES of the other DD., it cannot be so understood, as the VV. contend, that it means ordinarily; for ordinarily admits an exception sometimes. Therefore, 2. it is false that St. Alphonsus admits exceptions as regards the non-habituated. - Resp. 3. But then a further task remains for the VV., namely that, if they cannot reconcile St. Alphonsus with St. Thomas, they at least reconcile St. Alphonsus with St. Alphonsus. For the VV. themselves (Pag. 258) bring forward these words of the holy Doctor (De Act. Hum. n. 24): Nor should the Confessor easily believe a penitent who excuses himself... for having blasphemed... without advertence... as from habit: for if he has not striven to root out that habit by applying some remedies, then he is voluntary in cause when he blasphemes..., and therefore is not excused from fault: but otherwise if, diligence having been applied, he blasphemes inadvertently. Hence thus: 1. this last one he excuses from fault, if he blasphemes from habit, because he blasphemes inadvertently; 2. the first he does not excuse from fault, because the blasphemy is voluntary in cause, and this supposes that actual knowledge was lacking, because otherwise it would be voluntary in act. Therefore the holy Doctor too teaches that the habituated blaspheme inadvertently.

But what may seem more astonishing, the VV. themselves, as if to strengthen that opinion of St. Alphonsus about advertence, which is to be thought always present in the habituated, bring forward (Pag. 259) the opinion of many, as they say, grave Doctors, who teach that the habituated person who does not care about amendment... sins mortally as often as he utters blasphemous words, although without any advertence. Do they thus prove or confirm the aforesaid opinion of St. Alphonsus (from the Praxis Confess. Cap. 2, n. 31), that they ALWAYS have that ACTUAL knowledge sufficient for this, that the act be deliberate and gravely sinful?

Nor those who, from an inveterate habit of blaspheming now retracted, break out indeliberately into such words ⁷.

⁷ That the Confessor may judge rightly of blasphemies (and say the same of the other vices of the tongue) uttered inadvertently and by force of habit, he must apply the principles which are commonly handed down (in the Treatise on Human Acts) concerning sins in cause. Namely, although these words uttered inadvertently are held and called sins, nevertheless one does not then sin when he pours them forth from his mouth materially and without advertence; for no act without deliberation can of itself have the nature of fault; but since they are sins in cause, the guilt is incurred then, when the cause is placed. It is useless, therefore, to inquire of the penitent the number of these sins, or material acts; for the whole guilt of these is in the cause; and this guilt is neither increased nor diminished by the greater or smaller number of the acts following afterward, but is to be estimated from the foresight of the effects which was present when the cause was placed. (See Laymann, Lib. 1, Tr. 2, Cap. 3, n. 6.)

But what is this cause, in which the guilt resides? Some take refuge in the origin of the habit, and find a twofold or aggravated malice in the preceding frequentation of acts from which the habit grew. So Laymann (l. c.); who, however, aptly warns that for this it is needed that, while one blasphemes, he advert that by this he is engendering that habit in himself. - But in practice you will scarcely find that men adverted to this, especially if they contracted the habit from boyhood; moreover, even if someone adverts to the danger, yet since he has no purpose of frequenting the acts, indeed promises himself that otherwise he will not blaspheme, you will hardly find this guilt.

Yet although guilt should be lacking on this side, it is certainly had in this, that one neglects to amend the habit, which he is bound under grave obligation to remove; and this negligence indeed suffices for the acts to be indirectly voluntary, as all the effects of an omission are voluntary to us, namely when we do not remove a cause which we are bound to remove. And thus it is plain how the guilt of the habit is voluntary, although advertence and guilt were lacking in contracting the habit itself.

From these things, however, it is easy to pass judgment on these matters. For either the blasphemies are not uttered indeliberately (for the habit does not bring it about that all the acts are indeliberate), and then they have guilt in themselves, as being voluntary in themselves.

But when they are plainly indeliberate, it will happen that they are wholly excused from sin, if one seriously strives to take away the habit. The reason is, because they have no guilt in themselves, as we have said, but can have it only in cause. Now the cause is understood either as the former frequentation of acts whence the habit was induced, and this guilt has already been taken away by retractation or penance; or the cause is understood as an indirect one, namely the negligence of removing the habit, and this likewise is absent, since we suppose the man to be seriously intent on removing the habit. And these things indeed are to be inculcated on the penitent; for they are wont to add great courage for undertaking the extirpation of the vice.

But if the penitent either altogether refuses amendment of the habit, or does not indeed refuse, but meanwhile neglects to apply sufficient care or effort to it: in the first case he is incapable of absolution, as one who voluntarily remains in the state of sin, just as one who will not either restore another's goods or leave an occasion; but in the other case the DD. advise that it is expedient that absolution be discreetly deferred, so that the penitent may shake off his sloth and be in some way moved to apply effort and care effectively. Discreetly, I say; for if absolution cannot conveniently be deferred, and otherwise sufficient signs appear of a serious will to amend the bad habit, he can be absolved, as also when the delay does not seem likely to profit for taking away the bad habit. But of these things more fully where we treat of the Sacrament of Penance.

Meanwhile note that it can be decided only with difficulty when the guilt of negligence is grave in those who indeed retract the cause and apply some effort, which, however, is not always intense.

4. He does not sin gravely who pronounces words in themselves indeed blasphemous, but halved or corrupted, so that he does not attend to their true sense; for example, he who says in French: Jarnidié! mortdié! ventredié! morbleu! For these no longer have the nature of blasphemy ⁸. - St. Lig., n. 125. - Bouvier, On the 2nd precept, art. 1.

⁸ Indeed, the effort to twist, mutilate, and in any way corrupt the pronunciation of words which otherwise would sound like blasphemy shows a detestation of blasphemy. And since the common people, when struck by a vehement feeling, especially of anger, with the greatest difficulty refrain from some emphatic expression, it is certainly more advisable to suggest to them some harmless way of signifying that heat than to demand silence.

301. Questions. - Q. 1. Whether these French expressions are blasphemous: NOM DE DIEU! NOM DE NOMS! MILLE NOMS! SACRÉ NOM! with nothing added, etc.?

Resp. No, in itself, even if they are uttered in anger, unless the anger is directed against God Himself, or unless there is a blasphemous intention ⁹, which is mostly absent. For these words contain no blasphemy in themselves. They will therefore be only venial, on account of the vain use of the name of God; but if the name of God is used in the formulas neither explicitly nor implicitly, they will in themselves lack all fault. - Bouvier, ibid.

⁹ Those are certainly to be called too morose who unseasonably busy themselves in fishing out and searching for blasphemy, which in the words is none, in the intention.

A fortiori, those rude expressions so frequently used among our country people, which begin with the letters B. F. M. or J.-F., etc., will not be blasphemies, even if the word sacré is placed before them, for example Sacré B., Sacré M., or if this word is joined to other rude nouns. Indeed these are in themselves free of fault, unless they go against charity toward the neighbor, as happens when such words are uttered for the sake of abuse. - So commonly. - Bouvier, ibid.

302. • Q. 2. Whether the French expression S. NOM DE D. is blasphemy?

Resp. Yes, in itself, or by reason of the common acceptance of the words. For such expressions, in the sense of the faithful, are contumelious against God. For there is no one moderately pious who does not shudder on hearing them. Indeed those who use this expression do in fact act from contempt of the Most Holy Name of God, at least implicitly, just as if they said: Cursed be the Name of God.

Nor may you say that these words contain no blasphemy in themselves, because in the obvious sense they really signify blessed be the Name of God. For they bear both senses, the one from the genuine signification of the words, the other from the general acceptance of men. Indeed they are never used by the pious faithful for honoring God, but are always heard by them with horror and indignation, while on the contrary they are constantly used by the impious for cursing Him.

This expression is held as blasphemous by Vernier, On the 2nd precept of the Decalogue. - Rousselot, in the additions to the Theology of Saettler, ibid. - Collationes Anicienses (Conférences du Puy), On the virtue of Religion, p. 2, c. 1. - The Most Illustrious D. D. Parisis, Bishop of Langres (now of Arras), in a Pastoral Letter for the pious sodality to be erected for the destruction of blasphemy. Bouvier also inclines to this opinion, On the 2nd precept of the Decalogue, c. 1.

303. • Many others, however, do not apprehend the nature of blasphemy in this manner of speaking in itself ¹⁰, unless a blasphemous intention, explicit or at least implicit, intervenes. - So Gousset, t. 1, n. 460. - D. Valentin, Examens raisonnés sur les Commandements.

¹⁰ And indeed with the same sense of horror with which pious men in France are affected by the aforesaid words, the pious faithful elsewhere are wont to be affected when they hear the body of God, the blood of Christ, etc. used in anger; and here the sense of the faithful certainly proves that something is present by which one sins against God. But whether from this horror of the faithful the species of the sin further should or even can be determined, whether it is irreverence toward the name of God or sacred things, or blasphemy, or heresy, whether there is a contempt proper to contumely or a contempt merely detracting from reverence, others will not easily admit. Indeed, even if the common people called these forms of words blasphemies, it would conclude nothing whatever, since it is established that by the name of blasphemy, in a vague notion, the common people designate not only any words against God, but also those which are in no way directed against God, of which the Author spoke in the preceding number; but otherwise it is right that Theologians should not seek out and learn these things from the common people, but the common people from Theologians.

I have said, in itself. For in practice not all who utter such words are to be convicted of mortal sin. For it is certain, experience bearing witness, that not a few, especially the uneducated, do not apprehend grave malice in them ¹¹. Let the Confessor therefore attend above all to the various circumstances of the penitents. However that may be, he must with due prudence strive to destroy this bad habit in the penitents entirely, as far as it can be done.

¹¹ Since these things are so, whether it was a prudent counsel on the part of the more recent writers whom the Author named a little before, that they should with strenuous effort persuade the faithful that there is altogether blasphemy in those words which in themselves are in reality not blasphemous, and moreover for this end should with exquisite subtlety have attached to the words a sense of which the common people had perhaps never thought, and should have tried to search out the blasphemy, which they did not find in the words, at least in an intention even merely implicit, let wiser men judge. This indeed is most certain, that neither the glory and honor of God nor the salvation of souls is well provided for by this, that the conscience of a grave crime is instilled in the faithful beyond necessity. For although perhaps it is thus obtained that someone sometimes refrains from that form of words, yet certainly by this gain the grave offense of our God and the grave ruin of souls, which are wholly owed to this saying, as to a new snare unseasonably thrown on someone, are in no way compensated.

304. • Q. 3. Whether it is blasphemy to curse creatures?

Resp. Distinguish. It is blasphemy to curse creatures with relation to God, for example the rains, the winds, as commanded by God, or with the word of God added; likewise to curse a creature which of itself has a special relation to God, for example our soul, the Catholic Faith, heaven, and the like. But it is otherwise, as nearly always happens, if indignation is directed against creatures without relation to God. - So commonly. - St. Lig., n. 128.

Q. 4. Whether it is blasphemy to curse the whole world?

Resp. St. Lig. affirms it, because just as to swear by creatures, in which the divine attributes shine forth more, is a true oath, so to curse these very things is true blasphemy, because in them God is indirectly contemned. - St. Alphonsus, n. 129. - In reality, however, such a meaning scarcely tends to occur to the mind of the one uttering these things.

305. Q. 5. Whether it is blasphemy to curse the dead?

Resp. It is denied, unless the mind is specifically directed to the souls in purgatory; because the dead in general do not have a special relation with God ¹². - St. Alphonsus, n. 130.

¹² The character of this malediction is in reality to cast reproach upon the living, and to attack them with insults, not truly to imprecate evils upon the dead or to affect them with injury.