§ 4. On Fear

Notion. Not with every absolute force, but with conditional force, or force according to something, is fear connected as an ordinary effect. It is defined: a trepidation of mind on account of an imminent or future danger (L. 1. D. IV, 2). Therefore force and fear are customarily treated conjointly. Harm in one's own goods is equated with personal danger, proportion being observed.

Division. Fear is divided: 1. From its degree or quality: into fear disturbing the use of reason, which takes away the voluntary; and into fear not disturbing it, which gives place to deliberation and consent. The motive of this latter is flight from an apprehended danger or harm. This latter again is divided into grave fear, which absolutely, that is, with the nature of the evil considered, or relatively, that is, with attention to the age, sex, and disposition of the person, is accustomed vehemently to affect the mind; and into light fear, which is the dread of a slight danger, or even of a great one, but one not probably impending. Fear absolutely grave is said to fall upon a constant man.

Reverential fear, or the fear of displeasing a father or Superior, or of offending him, is in itself light; but easily, from added circumstances of threats, importunate prayers, long-lasting enmities which are foreseen as future, it is converted into grave fear. Controversies about the nature of reverential fear are to be explained by confused notions rather than by the objective obscurity of the thing.

2. From its cause, fear is divided into fear from within and fear from without, according as it has a cause interior or exterior to the one fearing. But a necessary exterior cause, such as a fire or shipwreck, is practically assimilated to an interior cause.

Fear inflicted by an exterior free cause is again distinguished as just or unjust: it is just if, with attention to the matter and the manner, the one inflicting fear has used his right; unjust, if, at least by reason of the manner, he has violated justice. Thus one who, after receiving an offense, threatens the offender with a lawsuit and legitimate penalties inflicts just fear; one who threatens grave private vengeance acts unjustly by reason of the manner.

Sometimes, moreover, it must be considered whether fear was or was not inflicted in order to extort consent to some certain thing.

I. Influence on the voluntary. Omitting fear by which reason is disturbed, those things which are done from fear are voluntary simply, and for the most part involuntary according to something. They are voluntary simply, because deliberation is not lacking; for the most part they are involuntary according to something, because what is done from fear alone is not of itself lovable, indeed it brings sadness. Yet other reasons besides fear can accede, on account of which the action becomes pleasing; and the very reason of fear can require that every involuntary element be excluded. Thus sorrow for sins which is elicited from fear of divine vengeance virtually excludes every affection for sin. For while affection for sin remains, divine vengeance remains to be feared.

II. How it operates. Fear also can operate beyond its own power as an impulsive cause, provided powers are supplied from elsewhere. Thus, although an act of charity is not contained in the power of fear, a man can be moved by fear to accept the grace of an act of charity.

III. The guilt of one acting from fear. He who has acted badly from grave fear sins less, yet gravely, while there remains a grave obligation which, because of fear, is placed after another consideration; and even in the external forum he is judged more or less worthy of pardon. In canon 2205, §§ 2 and 3, these principles are established: "Fear... grave fear, even only relatively grave... for the most part completely takes away the delict, if the question is of merely ecclesiastical laws. But if the act is intrinsically evil (1), or tends toward contempt of the faith (2) or of ecclesiastical authority (3), or toward harm of souls (4), the causes of which in § 2 diminish indeed the imputability of the delict, but do not take it away." The agent will always be excused, however, if the law by the words "if he shall have presumed" or similar words requires the fully voluntary (c. 2229, 2°).

Wherefore, with attention to fear, the judge will temper the penalty (canon 2218); and grave fear will excuse from penalties latae sententiae, unless, however, "the delict tends toward contempt of the faith or of ecclesiastical authority, or toward public harm of souls" (2229, 3°).

IV. Acts invalid from fear. By law, at least positive law, several acts done from fear become invalid:

a) "Invalid... is a marriage entered upon because of force or grave fear inflicted from without and unjustly, from which, in order that one may free himself, he is compelled to choose marriage" (c. 1087 § 1°);

b) "They are invalidly admitted to the novitiate... who enter religion induced by force, by grave fear..., or whom the Superior receives induced in the same manner" (c. 542, 1);

c) For the validity of any religious profession it is required that... "4° the profession be emitted without force or grave fear..." (c. 572 § 1);

d) "A vow emitted from grave and unjust fear is null by the law itself" (c. 1307 § 3);

e) "A renunciation made because of grave unjust fear inflicted... is void by the law itself" (c. 185). There it is a question of the renunciation of an office; and the same holds concerning the renunciation of a benefice.

V. Although an oath extorted through grave fear and sacred ordination accepted because of fear are said to be valid, nevertheless an oath "can be relaxed by an ecclesiastical Superior" (c. 1317); and he who, after he received a sacred order coerced by grave fear, has not ratified the ordination once the fear has been removed, has contracted no obligation of celibacy and of the canonical hours, and will obtain from the judge that he be reduced to the lay state (c. 214, § 1).

Finally this general rule is established: "Acts placed from grave fear unjustly inflicted... are valid, unless something else is provided by law; but they can, according to the norm of cc. 1684-1689, be rescinded by sentence of the judge, whether at the petition of the injured party, or ex officio" (c. 103, § 2).

N.B. Concerning the individual cases in which acts are weakened, at least by positive law, on account of grave fear, a more distinct treatment will be given in its own place.

By the name "phobias" commonly are meant fears vain in themselves, by which not a few persons today are struck and are impeded from various acts. They are vain, however, insofar as they exist beyond the merit of the cause, or even without a cause. These "phobias" are accustomed to arise in a physically weaker subject through the occasion of some fact, accident, or narration by which he has been greatly moved. In act they are not rarely invincible, and then they will excuse from sins of omission. Prudent psychotherapy, which for the most part will not be too direct or violent, must be applied to remove them, diminish them, or at least restrain them lest they become worse.

But it will be more useful by wise education to render the mind immune from them beforehand. Therefore parents will take care that by no tales are children led or disposed to vain fears; they will forbid them books or spectacles by which the phantasy is excessively excited; indeed they will provoke them to a certain moderate boldness. And in our own case, we ourselves will strongly attack the first beginnings of excessive fear, and will neglect nothing in order that we may rather make little of present evils, lay aside every "egoism," or excessive solicitude for one's own body and one's own advantage, and acquire for ourselves strength of mind. Cf. the things usefully written by several authors concerning the formation of the will.

This must be held as a principle: It is placed in our hand whether we undergo or shake off the yoke of physical evil. If we undergo it, we shall be unhappy and often morally impotent; if we shake it off, we shall be morally free and shall preserve happiness intact.

In a religious matter also, if certain terrors, yet to be inspired by true arguments and not others, can be useful in act, habitual terror is harmful. Indeed we are commanded to fear God, but with filial fear which is combined with the spirit of adoption of sons, in which we cry "Abba," Father (Rom. 8, 15).