Article III: On Sacrilege

I. Notions. 1. Historically, sacrilege, already among the pagans, was first said of theft of a sacred thing, by which the sanctity which ought to have protected the thing kept by the temple, by the church, was violated. Hence sacrilege occurs by every and only action by which a sanctity publicly protected, as such, is violated.

2. Therefore broadly sacrilege is any sin against the virtue of religion; strictly it is the violation of a sacred thing, or such irreverence committed toward a sacred thing or person as specially conflicts with its sanctity.

3. Sacrilege supposes a sacred thing or person, i.e., one dedicated to divine worship. A deputation of this kind requires a public institution either of God or of the Church. For no thing can be called sacred unless all must hold and treat it as sacred. This demands the use of jurisdiction or public power. In the New Testament, God Himself or Christ made some things sacred, i.e., the Sacraments; but ecclesiastical power made others. The sanctity whose origin is divine is more intrinsic, so that the corresponding violations can be estimated more from the very nature of the thing. For sacrilege further supposes an action directly opposed to the quality which has been put into the thing in order to the worship of God, or which is done against that which, under the same relation, has been prescribed positively or negatively. Therefore many things, we do not say all, depend upon the positive determination of the Church. Thus, why it is sacrilege to strike a priest, but not to calumniate him, no ratio "a priori" can be given: it is so because it has thus been established by the Church, so that the person is reckoned sacred in himself, not in his reputation.

II. Division. By the ancient division received in the canons prior to the Code, sacrilege is distinguished as personal, by which a sacred person is violated; local, by which a sacred place; real, by which sacred things are violated.

But is this division formal and ultimate? St. Thomas, 2, 2, q. 99, art. 3, seems to estimate it as formal, because a diverse ratio of sanctity formally exists in persons, in places, and in things. Cajetan, on this place, declares this with sufficient hesitation in this way: the sanctity of a person alone is formal and absolute; the sanctity of a place proceeds from the fact that it is containing of persons, or because it is deputed to sacred actions to be performed there; the sanctity of things, however, is relative, insofar as either they make holy, for instance the sacraments, or they are ordered to holy persons. - But why the sanctity of a place should be shown to be formally diverse from the sanctity of things under such a respect does not really appear, and seems capable of being safely denied, so that the threefold genus is reduced to a twofold genus.

Moreover, a probable opinion holds this specification as ultimate, so that if, in the declaration of sin, the circumstance of sacrilege has been omitted, the defect can be supplied by saying: I committed personal or real sacrilege. - Certainly in examples of sacrilege, for example in unworthy communion and in the profanation of a sacred vessel, great diversities are found, so that you would say with enough difficulty that they are of one genus. Yet the diversity is rather in the action than in the formal violation of sanctity. But in a sacrilegious abuse of the Eucharist, violation of absolute sanctity seems to concur with relative sanctity. Wherefore because of the twofold ratio of sacrilege, this violation will have to be accused. In other actions, another species will often concur. Thus he who contemptuously tramples an image will also be guilty of blasphemy; he who has stolen a sacred thing will at the same time be unjust.

Suarez, Rel., Tr. 3, L. 3, c. 1, n. 6-8, denies that any ratio of this partition can be given, and thinks formal distinctions are rather to be repeated from the mode in which a sacred thing is constituted and by which that sanctity is violated. Nevertheless, in c. 5 he adheres to the common opinion, especially because of ecclesiastical laws. Yet if a sacred place is violated as another sacred thing, as if you destroy a temple as you could break sacred vessels, then, according to Suarez, l. c. n. 7, it would be the same sacrilege.

Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 383, observe that sacrilegious deeds are accused in practice in such a way that anxiety about specification need not be had.

It will also help to have noted this, in order that we may acquire a more distinct notion of sacrileges: the sanctity of a person is more partial; the sanctity of a place is more extrinsic and of positive law (while now the whole consecrated temple is of the same sanctity, and a place is not reputed sacred because of the reserved Eucharist, could not the law have declared holy a space of a certain extension around the tabernacle?); the sanctity of a thing can be so total that every profane use is held as sacrilegious. Moreover, the very right of the Church in sacred places or things is wholly sacred, so that every violation of the Church's right is to be called sacrilegious.

III. Gravity. No one doubts that sacrilege is grave of its genus. Yet, because not God Himself in Himself but some creature is violated, slight matter is had: concerning this the faithful, especially boys and adolescents, are to be opportunely admonished, lest, struck by the terror of the name, they hold everything, for example a small theft of money offered in church, as grave and dare not accuse it.

IV. Cases of sacrilege. In a general ratio, a mode of treating a sacred person, place, or thing which flows from contempt of the sacred quality is sacrilegious. It remains now that we consider the actions which, done in themselves or even from a diverse intention, are to be condemned of sacrilege.

1. Personal sacrilege is committed: a) by a real injury inflicted upon a cleric or religious of either sex (c. 119); b) by the lustful pleasure of a cleric constituted in major order, or of a person who is bound by a public vow of chastity (cf. cc. 132, 1308, §1).

A real injury, since it embraces all exterior actions which by deeds, not words, are injurious to body, to liberty, or to dignity, contains blows, which are punished in c. 2343, and which by some, for example by Arregui, n. 194, are presented as a distinct ratio of sacrilege. Cf. Wernz, Ius Decr., t. 2, nn. 163-165.

Because of lustful pleasure, both the sacred person and the accomplice contract the malice of sacrilege. And according to the common opinion, internal sins also are to be noted with sacrilege.

This sacrilege requires carnal delight of the sacred person. Wherefore a sacred person who, without his own lust, persuades a non-sacred person to a carnal sin is not sacrilegious. On the contrary, a non-sacred person who persuades a sacred person to lust is sacrilegious. If both persons are sacred, a twofold sacrilege will have to be declared. Cf. De castitate, n. 314.

Since sacrilege supposes a sacred person, and no one can make himself sacred by a private vow, violation of a private vow of chastity cannot be sacrilegious. Cf. Wernz, Ius decr. VI, n. 335. Yet the authority of St. Alph., L. 3, n. 47, brings it about that many still acknowledge probable sacrilege in every violation of a vow of chastity. Cf. Ferreres, I, 372; Arregui, n. 194. This opinion brings this advantage: that a layman, a religious, and a priest can accuse a carnal sin in the same way by adding: I have a vow of chastity.

What is certain is that the lust of a priest who is at the same time a religious makes one sacrilege, since formally the same sanctity has been induced under a twofold title.

c) Violation of the privilege of forum, insofar as that still has force, was also thought to be sacrilegious. The same is defended today, for example by Ferreres, I, 372; Arregui, n. 194; Gen., I, 289, although the note of sacrilege is not mentioned in can. 2341, by which the privilege of forum is sanctioned.

2. Local sacrilege supposes a sacred place. From c. 1154, those places are sacred which by consecration or blessing are deputed to divine worship or to the burial of the faithful; i.e., a church or oratory endowed with public blessing and a blessed cemetery.

a) It is committed principally by actions which the Church has prohibited as specially repugnant to the sanctity of the place. Such are actions by which a sacred place is violated, i.e., the crime of homicide, under which name here suicide also must be understood; injurious and grave shedding of blood; - impious and sordid uses; - burial of an infidel or of an excommunicated person after condemnatory or declaratory sentence (c. 1172).

Although just killing, for example the execution of a capital sentence, cannot constitute the crime of homicide, as we have noted in Epitome, II, 489, 2, b, nevertheless it will scarcely fail to be an impious use by which a sacred place is violated.

Furthermore, a sacred place is not violated except through an act that is certain, notorious, and placed in the sacred place itself; it does not suffice that it be done in the sacristy.

Less than personal or real sacrilege, local sacrilege seems to us to cohere with the very nature of things, so that it must be known from the definition of the Church. Wherefore, although several, for example Gury-Ball., I, 286; Lehmk., I, 526; Arregui, n. 191, speak more severely, we think no other actions are to be held as sacrileges on account of repugnance with the sanctity of the place, unless by canonical definition they violate the sacred place per se. Therefore we approve the formula of Wernz, t. 6, n. 335: "Local sacrilege is committed: 1. by crimes in the Church by which the sacred place is polluted." - And in reality, since sacrilege is defined as violation of a sacred thing, and the Code enumerates the actions by which a sacred place is violated, what else should we think of adding? Wherefore voluntary emission of human seed, unless from the adjuncts it ends in a sordid and impious use of the church, does not now seem to be held as local sacrilege.

b) From prior law they hold that local sacrilege is also committed by violation of the immunity or exemption of the church from civil authority and jurisdiction. For the sacred right of the Church is violated. As is plain, that rule does not fall upon acts which in the region where they are done are practically tolerated, for instance the exaction of taxes.

c) And likewise they speak of violation of the tempered right of asylum, which c. 1179, limited to a church or public oratory, thus defines: "The church enjoys the right of asylum, so that the guilty who have fled to it are not to be taken away from there, unless necessity urges, without the assent of the Ordinary or at least of the rector of the church." The right of asylum, as it previously was, is explained by Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 419-422.

Profane acts will be sacrilegious if they are impious or sordid uses.

Although the destruction of a church is of itself sacrilegious, nevertheless in war it is lawful to attack a church which is to enemies in place of a fortress. Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 423.

3. Real sacrilege is committed: a) by unworthy reception, handling, and administration of the sacraments. An impious abuse of the Eucharist is also opposed to the office of latria; and special penalties, chiefly excommunication most specially reserved to the Holy See, are decreed by c. 2320 against him who has thrown away the consecrated species or has taken them away or retained them for an evil end.

The turpitude of carnal sin brings it about that he who voluntarily pollutes himself shortly after communion, within half an hour, or when vested for celebrating sacred rite; or who sins carnally while he carries the Eucharist or celebrates Mass, is judged guilty of sacrilege according to the common estimation.

b) By profanation of sacred vessels and instruments, which are customarily at least blessed.

c) By violation or unworthy treatment of sacred images and relics; by abuse of Sacred Scripture, for example to establish heresies or filthy things.

d) By theft of a sacred thing or of a thing which had been handed over to the church to be kept. Wherefore they call sacrilegious one who steals a sacred thing from a sacred place, a sacred thing (ecclesiastical goods) from a non-sacred place, or a non-sacred thing (a deposit, money kept in church) from a sacred place. This last, not inelegantly, several ascribe to local sacrilege.

Therefore note that not every theft in a church is sacrilegious, but it is required that the thing taken by theft pertain in some way to the church, at least as kept there. Cf. Lugo, Paen., d. 16, n. 476.

Various corollaries or scholia. 1. Not every violation of ecclesiastical goods is sacrilegious, but of those goods which are deputed to divine worship, insofar as they pertain to building and adorning churches, to sacred ceremonies, or to sustaining the ministers of the church as such. Not to hand over legacies left to the Church, or not to pay owed tithes, is not sacrilege, because they are not yet in the possession of the Church. To steal an ecclesiastical revenue already received by a priest is not sacrilege, because it has already come into his private dominion. But it will be sacrilege to usurp an ecclesiastical benefice, to steal Mass stipends not yet distributed, or common goods destined to feed religious. Cf. St. Alph., l. 3, n. 42; Ball.-Palm., II, n. 428. Lehmk., I, 523, is more severe.

2. Titius, bound by a vow of chastity, if he contracts marriage, is sacrilegious, because he receives a sacrament unworthily; at the same time he sins against religion insofar as he violates his vow. Moreover, whoever knowingly contracts marriage with a diriment impediment is sacrilegious insofar as he invalidates a sacrament.

3. Since a Greek priest is not consecrated to the worship of God by a vow of continence, his carnal sin contains an aggravating circumstance, but not the specific malice of sacrilege. Cf. Ball.-Palm., II, n. 391, from Tamburini, in Decalogum, L. 2, c. 6, §3, n. 3-5.

4. To use sacred books or sacred images for sordid uses, several, to whom Lehmk., I, 524, adheres, estimate as sacrilege. We think this is true, at least when they are whole, but not when they have been sufficiently destroyed by tearing. Nor will this be grave unless contempt is added. Moreover, those things are sacred which are destined to pious use.

5. Abuse of Sacred Scripture for pleasantries that are not filthy is sacrilegious; yet one does not sin gravely. Indeed, every irreverence can sometimes be absent, as if the occasion of the pleasantry is less the sacred text than the common version; for example if "the congregation of bulls among the cows of the peoples" is set forth as the most ancient congregation.

6. Omission itself, when it contains irreverence toward a sacred thing, takes on the ratio of sacrilege: as if you allow things which look proximately to the sacrifice to be very unclean, if you celebrate without sacred vestments. Lehmk., I, 522, 3; Ball.-Palm., etc.

7. Of itself, a sin committed on a feast day is not sacrilegious, although it is increased by an aggravating circumstance. Yet in a Christian society, certain actions peculiarly repugnant to the sanctity of the day can take on that malice, as if you disturb the sacred mourning of Good Friday by public games. A contemptuous intention can brand other actions, for example certain banquets, with this note.

Concerning the touch of sacred furnishings. the Code states these things in c. 1306, §1: "Care must be taken that the chalice with the paten, and, before washing, the purificators, palls, and corporals which have been used in the sacrifice of the Mass, not be touched except by clerics or by those who have custody of them." Understand touch by the bare hand. This canon permits tonsured clerics and even lay sacristans; this was the custom of several places. And a just cause excuses the venial fault of this contact; wherefore sacred vessels which must be handed over to a craftsman to be repaired are not to be execrated (S. R. C. 20 Apr. 1822: Decr. auth. n. 2620, and tom. IV, p. 223).

The prohibition does not affect merely blessed vessels, such as a ciborium after purification. While they contain the sacred species it would be mortal, without necessity, not merely to touch but to handle the sacred vessels.

The same canon, §2, adds: "Let purificators, palls, and corporals used in the sacrifice of the Mass not be handed over to be washed by lay persons, even religious, unless they have first been washed by a cleric constituted in major orders; moreover, let the water of the first washing be put into the sacrarium, or, if this is lacking, into the fire." These things also are a light precept. If a sacrarium and availability of fire are lacking, the water seems able to be put into a similar place, for example into the foundations of a chapel, into a cemetery.

Concerning the profane use of sacred furnishings. 1. By a general edict, c. 1296, §1, forbids sacred furnishings to be used for profane uses; and this urges more with respect to furnishings which must be blessed or consecrated and are used in public worship. As long as such a furnishing retains its consecration or blessing, to use it for common and profane use would be sacrilege. Moreover, that which has been used for indecorous uses or exposed to public sale actually loses its blessing or consecration (c. 1305, §1).

The principle itself is set forth in c. 1150: "Consecrated things or things blessed by constitutive blessing are to be treated reverently and are not to be used for profane or improper use, even if they are in the ownership of private persons."

2. A constitutive blessing of a sacred thing is distinguished from an invocative blessing, for instance of a house, ship, or animal, which in no way impedes the profane uses of the thing. Nor is every profane use of a sacred thing excluded with the same severity. Certainly to use blessed things indifferently for sacred and profane uses savors of a certain contempt to be blamed venially. But, on some occasion or for some cause, to drink blessed water (acqua santa) to quench thirst, to light a blessed candle for carrying out a profane work at night, to drive away flies with a blessed branch, to fill the room of a sick person with the odor of blessed incense, will not be a sin.

3. It will also more easily be lawful to use non-blessed things which mediately serve the sacred ministry, carpets, candlesticks, a basin, indeed also a towel, for weddings or for common honest use.

4. Sacred things wholly changed so that they have been reduced to common matter, for example sacred vessels by the melting of the metal, can be used for every use.

The ancient canons, c. Ligna, 37, and Altaris, 38, Consecr. D. 1, forbade that certain woods of a consecrated church be destined to any utility other than sacred utility. Today, however, c. 1187 permits that the church itself which can no longer in any way be used for divine worship, if every access to repairing it is cut off, be reduced by the Ordinary himself to a profane but not sordid use.

5. Concerning sacred things, for instance priestly vestments, which have merely lost their blessing, there is not, or has not been, one opinion. Some recognize light sacrilege in profane use: St. Alph. 1.3.41; D'Ann. III, 16, notes 36 and 37; others speak doubtfully: thus Lehmk. I, 524; others judge it probable that today the rigor has been so tempered that, setting aside contempt or scandal, such things can be converted without sin into profane use. Wherefore it is lawful that, as the stones, wood, and remaining matter of a destroyed church are sold at auction for any uses whatever, sacred vestments consumed by use, with their form nevertheless changed, receive a civil or profane utility. Thus C. Gennari, Consult. can. ed. 2, II, p. 201-205, who confirms his opinion by the opinion of the Roman liturgical academy.

The action of the confessor must be such that he introduce no vain scruples, but, on the other hand, prudently inculcate reverence for every sacred or blessed thing, and not allow pious usages to perish which, although they are not strictly prescribed, nevertheless proceed from veneration of divine worship.

Penal sanctions. The delict ¹ of sacrilege must be punished by the Ordinary according to the gravity of the fault by the general canon 2325, "without prejudice to the penalties established by law against" certain "sacrileges."

Special penalties. a) The penalty of excommunication most specially reserved to the Holy See is established against him "who has thrown away the consecrated species or taken them away or retained them for an evil end" (c. 2320). Besides, he is suspected of heresy, infamous by the law itself, and a cleric besides is to be deposed. - To throw away is not simply to place outside the ciborium or pyx, even with the intention of stealing the sacred vessel, but to scatter with contempt, either from the vile place where, or from the mode in which. - To take away, to retain for an evil end: this is to carry with oneself or keep at one's own place for an evil end of impious, lustful abuse, etc. - Since retention completes the taking away, he who takes away and retains is guilty of only one delict. - This delict is in no way committed by him who, lest he complete a sacrilegious communion, draws the host from his mouth and treats it reverently until he can restore it.

b) Violation of a church or cemetery is said to be punishable by interdict from entrance into the church (Th. mor. III, 913) and by other fitting penalties by the Ordinary (c. 2329).

c) Real injury against the Supreme Pontiff is punished by excommunication latae sententiae most specially reserved, and the guilty person is by the fact itself to be avoided; against the person of a Cardinal, Legate of the Supreme Pontiff, Patriarch, Archbishop, Bishop even titular, by excommunication latae sententiae specially reserved to the Holy See; against other clerics or religious of either sex, by excommunication reserved to the proper Ordinary.

For lay or non-exempt religious, the Ordinary is the Bishop or quasi-bishop of the place (c. 2343).

d) Violation of the privilege of forum (III, 12), completed by a daring act, c. 2341, according to the grade of the cleric, is punished either by excommunication specially or simply reserved to the Holy See, or by suspension from office reserved to the Ordinary if the guilty person is a cleric, or by penalties ferendae sententiae, if he is a layman (III, 12; 916, 8; 919, 5; 924, II).

e) The marriage which clerics in sacred orders or solemnly professed religious presume to attempt, even only civilly, and the persons who presume to attempt marriage with them even only civilly, is punished by excommunication latae sententiae simply reserved to the Holy See. If it concerns those professed of perpetual simple vows who presume to contract marriage even only civilly, or the persons who contract with them, the excommunication latae sententiae is reserved to the Ordinary (c. 2388) III, 137.

f) He who, not being a priest, simulates the celebration of Mass or receives sacramental confession, is punished by excommunication latae sententiae specially reserved to the Holy See, besides deposition ferendae sententiae if he has been a cleric. If he is a layman, let him be deprived of pension or office and be punished by other proportionate penalties (c. 2322).

g) Those usurping or retaining, by themselves or through others, goods and rights pertaining to the Roman Church are subject to excommunication latae sententiae specially reserved to the Holy See, besides penalties ferendae sententiae against clerics (c. 2345). - Those presuming, by themselves or through others, to convert and usurp ecclesiastical goods of any kind for their own uses, or to impede lest their fruits or revenues be received by those to whom they pertain by law, are excommunicated by excommunication simply reserved to the Holy See, from which they cannot be absolved as long as the injustice has not been wholly repaired, or such reparation seriously promised, if reparation is actually impossible. Besides, a patron by the fact itself is deprived of his patronage (c. 2346). Other penalties ferendae sententiae are added. - Those omitting, when it is required, the Apostolic beneplacitum for alienating ecclesiastical goods are punished by excommunication latae sententiae reserved to no one. Other penalties are added against those alienating illegitimately. Cf. Theol. mor. III, 923; Epitome Iuris can. III, 547.

¹ A delict is "an external violation of a penal law, done with evil deceit" (D'Ann., in C. J. [OCR uncertain: Sftih.], n. 6).