Annulment, dispensation and commutation of vows

233. Declarations. Dispensation is the remission of the obligation of a vow made in the name of God. Dispensation immediately touches the effect of the vow, or the obligation.

a. By force of a vow, man has contracted an obligation before God, from which he cannot be loosed except by him who has received power for this from God. Now that the Church has the power of dispensing in vows is deduced from the general concession of loosing all bonds: whatsoever you shall loose,¹ therefore also the bond of divine or natural law, whose existence nevertheless depends upon the human will, as in vows and oaths.² The Church herself has always used this power.

b. Dispensation differs from irritation: alpha. because for dispensation the power of jurisdiction is required; for irritation dominative power suffices; beta. because dispensation is made in the name of God, but irritation is made in the proper name of the one irritating; gamma. because for valid dispensation a just cause is required, but not likewise for irritation; delta. because irritation can be made even when the one vowing is unwilling, but dispensation when the one vowing is unwilling is null, because he imposed the obligation upon himself; epsilon. because dispensation immediately touches the effect of the vow, but irritation touches either the act of vowing or the matter of the vow.

¹ Matt. 18:18.

² Cf. De principiis^9, n. 181.

234. Requisites for dispensing. 1. For validly dispensing in vows a just cause is required; for the one dispensing does not act in his own name, but in the name of God, who is not judged to have given the power of dispensing without a legitimate cause; therefore he who dispenses without a cause effects nothing.

a. He who doubts whether a cause for dispensing is present cannot dispense; he who doubts whether the cause for dispensing is sufficient validly and licitly dispenses.

b. If someone in good faith dispenses, thinking that a cause for dispensing is present, and afterward knows that none was present, the dispensation is invalid; if someone in good faith dispenses, thinking that the cause for dispensing is sufficient, and afterward knows that it was not sufficient, the dispensation is valid.

c. From the use which the Church observes, some commutation is customarily joined to dispensation; and this indeed ordinarily must be done when there is question of relaxing a vow made with full deliberation, but especially when the cause for dispensing does not seem to be sufficient.

235. 2. For validly and licitly dispensing there is required and sufficient a moderately grave cause, which nevertheless ought to be the graver the more excellent the vow is.

The just causes of dispensing, according to St. Alphonsus, are the following:

a. The good of the Church or the common good of the republic or family, or the progress of the one vowing.

b. Danger of transgression because of the particular indisposition of the one vowing or because of the common fragility of men.

c. Great difficulty in execution, whether it was foreseen or not foreseen.

d. If the one vowing is vexed by great scruples.

e. If the vow was made rashly, namely with too much facility or without mature deliberation. For this reason, in the vows of impubescent persons, without another cause, dispensation can be given absolutely without commutation.

f. If the vow was made because of fear, whether arising from an external cause or from an internal cause: for in this case vows are usually made immaturely, and therefore dispensation can be given in them without commutation.¹

¹ St. Alphonsus, n. 252 ff.

236. Whether a vow made for the benefit of a third party can be dispensed.

a. If a gratuitous promise made in favor of a third party, even a determinate third party, has not yet been accepted, it certainly can be dispensed: for the promisor is held to give the thing promised only by reason of the vow; but he can be dispensed from the vow.

From these things it is clear that dispensation can be given in vows made for the relief of the dead, since the promise has been accepted by God alone.

b. If the promise has been accepted by the other, it cannot be dispensed: for in this case the one vowing is obligated not only toward God by force of the vow, but also by force of the promise toward the man, who by accepting the promise has acquired a right to the thing promised; but this right cannot be remitted without the consent of the one accepting.

alpha. Yet if the vow in this case was made principally in honor of God and only secondarily in favor of the third party, it probably can be dispensed even without his consent, provided there is question of a gratuitous promise: for with the remission of the vow, probably the right of the man also falls, since the accessory follows the principal. Nevertheless, dispensation cannot be given if the promise made to the man is principal and the vow secondary, or if each is equally principal.

beta. But if the promise is not gratuitous, but onerous and mutual, as happens in the vow and oath of perseverance which is made in some congregations, dispensation cannot be given without the consent of the congregation, even if the vow is made principally in honor of God: for the vow follows the nature of the contract to which it is annexed; but a contract cannot be dissolved without mutual consent.

237. Who can dispense. Only ecclesiastical superiors who have spiritual jurisdiction in the external forum have the ordinary power of dispensing; others cannot dispense except by a power delegated by those who have ordinary power. Therefore, by ordinary power, there can dispense:

1. The supreme pontiff in all vows of all the faithful. Therefore he can dispense: a. not only in the solemn vow of chastity which is annexed to sacred order, but b. also in solemn religious profession; and in fact he has already often dispensed in each case.

Concerning the practice of the Church in dispensing in solemn vows, these things are to be noted.

a. As to the solemn vow of chastity: alpha. subdeacons and deacons, with a cause of the common good of the Church or kingdom intervening, have often been dispensed for entering marriage, yet with this condition, that they abstain from every exercise of order; beta. but no example exists of a dispensation (publicly) conceded to a priest for contracting marriage; yet there are several examples of dispensation conceded to priests for convalidating a marriage invalidly contracted, with every exercise of orders nevertheless removed. Thus there were dispensed both priests who, in the time of the English schism, and priests who, in the time of the French Revolution, had attempted marriage.

b. As regards religious vows, full dispensation indeed has been given from the vow of poverty and obedience, but no example exists of full dispensation from the vow of chastity. For dispensation is restricted either in such a way that the dispensed person can pass to another order, in which only the vow of conjugal chastity is made, and can enter only one marriage; or in such a way that he can return to the world, but is held to enter only one marriage and to observe conjugal chastity from vow.¹

2. Bishops and abbots having episcopal jurisdiction in all vows of their subjects, except vows reserved to the supreme pontiff.

a. They have the power of dispensing in vows by force of their office, which office indeed demands that they be able to dispense in those things which frequently occur. Legates and apostolic nuncios also have this in their own province; vicars capitular, when the see is vacant. Archbishops cannot dispense the subjects of their suffragans in vows, not even when they visit some diocese.

b. Parish priests, because of defect of jurisdiction in the external forum, lack the faculty of dispensing in vows, nor do they have it from custom, as they have it with respect to feasts and fasts.

3. A regular superior in non-reserved vows of his subjects, if he is exempt; but a non-exempt regular superior cannot dispense, because the prelate of non-exempt persons is properly the bishop.

In non-reserved vows of novices made either in the world or in the novitiate, both their own bishop and the regular superior can dispense. The former indeed, because novices before profession are not yet altogether exempt from episcopal jurisdiction; the latter, because he possesses jurisdiction over them.

4. Regular confessors by delegated power from special privilege can dispense in non-reserved vows of the faithful, whether within or outside confession, whether they are the ordinary confessors of those vowing or are not.

a. All concede that regular confessors can commute the vows of the faithful by dispensing; most attribute to them also the power of simply dispensing, from the privilege granted by Julius II to the Canons Regular of the Most Holy Savior and by Leo X to the Camaldolese Hermits, which through communication of privileges passed also to other regular confessors. The privilege consists in this, that regular confessors can dispense with any of the faithful in all vows in which bishops by ordinary power can dispense with their subjects.²

b. Any confessor (having the privilege of dispensing in vows and of commuting the same) can do this even outside confession, unless in the document of delegation the power is restricted to the forum of penance, because this power of itself pertains to the external forum, nor is it anywhere prescribed generally that the dispensation be made in confession.

¹ Cf. Scavini, Theologia moralis universa^2 (Mediolani: Oliva, 1890), II, n. 224; Archiv fur k. Kirchenrecht 1889, I, p. 329 ff.

² Cf. Piat, Praelectiones iuris regularis (Tornaci: Casterman, 1890), II, p. 504.

238. On reserved vows. 1. Vows reserved to the supreme pontiff, besides religious profession and the vow of clerical chastity, are these five:

a. a vow of perfect and perpetual chastity;

b. a vow of entering religion approved by the Church;

This vow can be made in two ways: either simply of entering religion, or additionally of professing or persevering in it. Yet since entrance into religion for undergoing the probation of the novitiate of itself tends toward profession, he who explicitly vows entrance implicitly vows also profession and perseverance. Now the vow reserved to the pope is the vow of entering religion, whether by this vow entrance into religion in general is promised, or entrance into a determinate order or into a determinate monastery.

c. a vow of Roman pilgrimage to the thresholds of the apostles;

d. a vow of Hierosolymitan pilgrimage to the sepulcher of the Lord;

e. a vow of Compostellan pilgrimage to the relics of St. James.

Therefore in the general faculty of dispensing in all vows these reserved vows are not comprehended, unless express mention of them is made.

alpha. From recent Roman law there are also reserved to the pontiff the simple religious vows made before solemn profession,¹ and those which are made in more recent congregations approved by the Apostolic See, whether these vows are perpetual or temporary. For vows made in religion have the character of an onerous contract, from which there arises a right acquired for a third party, which can be taken away only by the supreme pontiff.

beta. In the body of law the reservation of these five vows is not established, but is supposed; wherefore it seems to have been introduced by use and custom.²

2. Since reservation, as being odious, is of strict interpretation:

a. The vow of not marrying is not reserved, nor the vow of virginity, nor the vow of not sinning against chastity, nor the vow of conjugal chastity, nor the vow of temporary chastity even if perfect, nor the vow of receiving sacred orders, because it is not a vow of chastity but a vow of assuming a state to which the vow of chastity is annexed; likewise, the vow of entering an institute in which only simple vows are made is not reserved.

b. These five reserved vows themselves are not reserved if they are not perfect, that is, obligating under grave obligation; if they are not perfectly free (made without all fear, even light fear), absolute, that is, neither conditioned (I shall enter religion if I escape unharmed) nor disjunctive concerning reserved and non-reserved matter (either of fasting or of religion), and certain.

c. They are reserved only as to substance, not likewise as to circumstances; thus he who vowed to enter a stricter religion can be dispensed by the bishop or by another having privilege, so that he may enter a milder one.

¹ S. C. Ep. et Reg., 12 Jan. 1858, which at the same time declared that these simple vows are dissolved in the act of dismissal, so that, dismissal having been given, the professed become by that very fact free from every bond and obligation of these vows.

² C. Etsi dominici 5, De poenit. et remiss., Extrav. com. (V. 6).

239. Dispensation in reserved vows. Nevertheless, bishops can dispense in reserved vows when necessity urges, namely when in delay there is danger of grave harm, whether spiritual or temporal, and the supreme pontiff cannot be approached at once.

a. If a bishop dispensed in a doubtful reserved vow, which afterward is known by the one vowing to have been certain, a new pontifical dispensation is not necessary: for since a doubtful vow is not reserved, it has already been dissolved by the bishop.

b. Whether bishops, when necessity urges, dispense by ordinary power or from presumed license is certainly not established; but since it is probable that this is done by ordinary power, the power of dispensing in reserved vows when necessity urges probably also belongs to regular confessors, as those who can dispense in those vows in which bishops dispense by ordinary power.¹

c. The power of dispensing in reserved vows is customarily granted by the supreme pontiff only on this condition, that the vow be commuted into other works of penance. Now these works enjoined by the one dispensing have the character and obligation of a vow, yet not of a reserved vow, which can be taken away by any confessor having the power of dispensing in vows.

d. Whether an oath of chastity or of religion is reserved just as a vow. - It is not reserved if the one swearing intends to obligate himself by oath alone: for the obligation of an oath is not reserved; but if the one swearing intends to obligate himself by a double bond, both of oath and of vow, that is, if he willed to make a vow and to confirm the vow by oath, the vow certainly is reserved, but not the oath. This formula, I promise, I vow, and I swear, from the common acceptance of men contains only an oath.

¹ Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 3, n. 258; on the contrary Kirchberg, l. c., n. 151. What regular confessors can do with respect to married persons who have made a vow of perpetual chastity, see De sexto praecepto etc.^11, n. 101.

240. Declarations. 1. Commutation is the substitution of another work in place of that which had been promised, with the same obligation.

Dispensation differs from commutation in this, that by dispensation the obligation of the vow is removed, but by commutation it is transferred into another matter.

2. This commutation can be made into a better work, into an equal one, and into a lesser one; then it can be made by proper or ecclesiastical authority.

That work is called better which here and now, all things considered, is more pleasing to God; but that is judged more pleasing to God which, according to place, time, and disposition of the one vowing, is more suitable to his salvation. Thus he who promised to give alms to a determinate poor man can give it to another more needy man, provided the former has not accepted the promise.

241. Who can commute vows. 1. Into an evidently better work commutation can be made even by the proper authority of the one vowing: for that which, all things considered, is better, is also more pleasing to God and without doubt is accepted by Him. But these must be excepted: a. reserved vows, which cannot be commuted except into the religious state; b. the vow of passing to a stricter religion, which, because of the prohibition of the Church, cannot be commuted by proper authority;¹ c. vows made for the benefit of a third party and accepted by him, which cannot be commuted without his consent.

2. Into an evidently equal work, a vow probably can also be commuted by proper authority; but because of the great difficulty of substituting a truly equal work, it must be advised that commutation not be made by proper authority, unless the work which is substituted is at least probably better.

Those who affirm use this argument: since the substituted matter is equal, it is equally pleasing and acceptable to God; but the usefulness of the one vowing is increased, since he will furnish this new matter more gladly and more fervently. Those who deny argue thus: the matter considered in itself and the substituted matter are indeed equal; but once the promise has been made, it is more pleasing to God if the one vowing furnishes the thing to which he obligated himself than if he substitutes another.

3. But into a lesser work commutation certainly cannot be made by proper authority: for for this some dispensation is required, which cannot be made without ecclesiastical authority.

¹ C. Licet 18, De regular. (III. 31).

242. Required conditions. 1. For validly commuting vows, legitimate power and a just cause are required.

a. He who has the power of dispensing in vows, whether ordinary or delegated, can commute them even into a lesser work: for he to whom the greater is lawful, the lesser is also lawful. He who has only the power of commuting cannot commute vows except into a morally equal work, or into one a little less good: for in commutation which is made into a lesser work something of dispensation is contained.¹

A perpetual work can be commuted into an equivalent temporal work, a personal work into a real one, and conversely. But commutation cannot be made into commanded works.

b. A vow can be commuted into a better thing even without cause; into an equal thing, at least licitly, only for some cause, but a light cause suffices (for example, greater devotion of the one vowing, less danger of transgression); but into a lesser thing it can validly be commuted only for a graver cause, which nevertheless need not be as great as is required for dispensation.

2. Once commutation has been made, it is always lawful for the one vowing to return to the first work, whether the commutation was made by his own authority or by another's authority, whether into a lesser or equal or even better work: for commutation is a favor, which the one vowing is not held to use. And if commutation has been made several times into diverse works, the one vowing can choose any one of them.

3. If the work into which the vow was commuted becomes impossible: a. he is not held to return to the first work when the commutation was made by ecclesiastical authority, even if by the fault of the one vowing the work has become impossible: for by commutation the prior obligation is utterly extinguished, so that it no longer revives; b. he ought to return to the first work if the commutation was made by proper authority, because in this case the obligation is not extinguished before the fulfillment of the substituted work.

¹ S. Poenitent., 1 Nov. 1899. A distinction must be made between the faculty of simply commuting vows, the faculty of commuting vows by dispensing, and the faculty of dispensing by commuting.

The annulment of a vow may be direct or indirect, By direct annulment the obligation of a vow is altogether removed by one who has authority over the will of the person who took the vow. For those who are placed in such a state of dependency on their superiors cannot undertake any absolute obligation; they can only bind themselves conditionally, supposing that their superior consents. If he does not consent, the obligation falls to the ground (Can. 1312).

By indirect annulment the obligation is suspended by one who has authority over the matter of the vow. For it is not just that an obligation should be undertaken which interferes with the rights of someone else. And so if a servant took a vow to hear Mass every morning, her mistress, whose rights are infringed thereby, might suspend the obligation of the vow as long as the servant remains with her, for no service is rendered to God by injuring a fellow-creature. When the term of service expired, the obligation of the vow would revive.

The annulment of a vow will be valid even when it is done without just cause and against the will of the subject, for even then a condition is wanting on which the validity of the vow depended. It will be lawful as well, if there be a reasonable cause, which need not necessarily be a very serious one.

All religious superiors can directly annul the vows taken by their subjects after their religious profession, and indirectly the vows taken by them previously, as far as they prejudice religious discipline or the rights of superiors. The vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience—the essential vows of religion by the taking of which a person becomes a religious—cannot be annulled; for it is only by them that religious superiors receive their authority over the wills of their subjects, and authority is powerless against its own source.

Parents can directly annul the vows of their children taken before the age of puberty, when children become independent of the authority of their parents in matters relating to the service of God. They can indirectly annul the vows of their adult children as long as they continue to live with them.

A husband can directly annul the vows of his wife taken after marriage, and indirectly those taken previously. A wife can annul the vows of her husband only indirectly, as far as they prejudice her rights.

A dispensation from a vow is a remission of the vow made in the name of God for a just cause by one who has spiritual jurisdiction in the external forum. The Church has always understood that the power to dispense vows is contained in the authority granted by our Lord to his Church.¹ She exercises this power in the name of God, not arbitrarily, but for just cause, which is required not merely for the lawfulness, but also for the validity of the act. As examples of a just and sufficient cause theologians give the following: the public good or the private spiritual advantage of him who is dispensed; unusual difficulty in the observance of the vow; the fact that the vow was taken without sufficient deliberation or in immature age.

The power of dispensing vows belongs to the public authority granted by God to the Church in order that she may rule and legislate for her people. It does not belong to the power of remitting sins which is exercised in the sacrament of Penance. All ecclesiastical prelates, then, who exercise jurisdiction in the external forum in their own name can dispense from vows, except in so far as their authority has been limited by a superior. Other ecclesiastics can only dispense from vows by delegated authority and according to its terms and conditions, (a) The Pope can for just cause dispense any of the faithful from any vow.

(b) For a good reason and provided that the dispensation does not injure the rights of others, local Ordinaries can dispense their subjects and also strangers from private vows which are not reserved to the Holy See. The only private vows which are now reserved to the Holy See are a vow of perfect and perpetual chastity and a vow of entering into a religion of solemn vows, if they were taken absolutely and after the completion of the eighteenth year of age (Can. 1309, 1313).

(c) Prelates of Religious Orders have quasi-episcopal jurisdiction over their own subjects, and as a general rule have the same power over these as a Bishop has over his subjects. Besides, they receive by their privileges ample delegated authority to dispense not only their own subjects, but seculars and lay people as well. The privileges granted to the respective Orders should be consulted concerning this special authority and the conditions of its exercise.

(d) Parish priests and confessors have no jurisdiction in the external forum, and can only dispense from vows by delegated authority. They should consult their faculties to know what powers they have received from their Bishop, When a vow has been made in favour of a third person and accepted by him, such a vow cannot lawfully be dispensed without his consent, otherwise justice would be violated. And so, although a Bishop has power to dispense members of diocesan congregations from the vows of religion, he cannot do this lawfully without the knowledge and consent of the superiors of the Order.² The religious vows of congregations which have in any way been approved by the Holy See are reserved to the Pope.

The vow of chastity imposes a serious and arduous obligation which should not be undertaken without mature deliberation and knowledge of one’s own strength. A confessor should be slow to approve of such a vow being taken, especially if it is to be perpetual. When there is just cause for a dispensation being granted, it is the practice of the Church to commute, rather than altogether to dispense, a perpetual vow of chastity. This practice, though not of obligation, should be adhered to by those who have authority to dispense from this vow. It may be commuted into the obligation of receiving the sacraments at least once a month, saying the rosary every day, or other works of piety.

¹ Matt. xvin 18.

² Constitution of Leo XIII, Conditae, December 8, 1900.

A vow is commuted when another good work to be performed under the same obligation is substituted for that which was promised.

All who can dispense from a vow can also commute it, for the less is contained in the greater. It is obvious, however, that it must not be done to the injury of a third person. person who is under vow may commute it into some The good work which is evidently better than what was promised, for, as the rule of canon law has it, he does not violate his promise who changes it into something better (Can. 1314). He may also commute his vow into something that is of equal merit; but to avoid the danger of self-deception, and because it is not easy to say when good works are of equal merit, it is better to have recourse to one’s confessor. Special authority is required to commute a vow into something which is less good, for such a commutation is a sort of dispensation from the vow. In order that commutation into something which is less good may be lawful, a just cause is required, though less than is required for dispensation; probably, however, if there be no just cause the commutation will be valid, but the obligation will remain of supplying the deficiency as in human transactions. No special cause is required for commuting a vow into something which is evidently better; greater readiness in fulfilling one’s obligation will be a sufficient cause for commuting a vow into something of equal merit.

One whose vow has been commuted is always at liberty to return if he pleases to the observance of his vow, for the commutation was made in his favour, and he may renounce it.

When a vow has been commuted by competent authority its obligation is extinguished or transferred to the new work, and it does not revive even if the performance of the substituted good work is found to be impossible. On the contrary, when the substitution has been made by private authority, in case the performance of the substituted work is impossible, the original obligation revives.

A vow can cease both through intrinsic causes and through an extrinsic cause, that is, through an authority intervening. Cessation which occurs through intrinsic causes is customarily called simple cessation. But authority can intervene through irritation, suspension, dispensation, and commutation (can. 1311). We shall speak of each.

I. Notion. Suspension of a vow is relaxation of the obligation of a vow for a time, made by one who has power over the matter of the vow. By authors it is commonly called indirect irritation.

II. What the subject of the power is is clear from the notion, and is handed down in these words of can. 1312, § 2: "He who has power not indeed over the will of the one vowing, but over the matter of the vow, can suspend the obligation of the vow for so long as the fulfillment of the vow would bring prejudice to himself."

III. The extent of the power. The faculty of suspending vows extends to all vows which, and insofar as, prejudice the power or right of the one about to suspend; even to those which were emitted at a time when the aforesaid power or right did not yet have force, for example, if it is a question of novices, to vows emitted before the novitiate. Likewise the faculty extends to vows which the superior approved, unless by approving them he renounced the right to which the vow was prejudicial (St. Alphonsus, III, 242).

IV. The use of the power. As was said of irritation, so also suspension made without cause is valid; for everyone validly enforces his own right. It is, however, lightly illicit, insofar as another's progress is impeded without sufficient cause.

V. The effect of suspension is relaxation for a time of the obligation of the vow; namely, when the right of the one suspending ceases, it revives, unless in the meantime it has ceased from another cause (can. 1312, § 2).

Corollary. The following can suspend vows - besides those who can irritate them:

1. A father or the one acting in his place in administering the goods of children can suspend the real vows of pubescent children as long as they lack the right of administering their own goods; likewise their personal vows, insofar as they prejudice domestic governance. The same power belongs to the mother as to personal vows; likewise as to real vows, if she herself is tutor or curatrix (St. Alphonsus, III, 229, 230).

2. A husband can suspend the vows of the wife insofar as they prejudice the use of marriage, the education of offspring, or domestic governance; likewise the wife can suspend the vows of the husband which prejudice her rights (St. Alphonsus, III, 234, 235).

Corollary. If spouses by mutual consent have emitted a vow of chastity, and in such a way that each has ceded his or her own right, the husband can directly irritate the vow of the wife; but the wife, once freed from the vow, can indirectly irritate the vow of the husband (cf. St. Alphonsus, III, 239).

4. The Pope can suspend the vows of all the faithful, and the Bishop the vows of diocesan subjects, insofar as they are adverse to the ecclesiastical governance belonging to him.

5. Religious Superiors and Superioresses can suspend the vows of novices which prejudice probation and religious discipline (St. Alphonsus, IV, 55).

Note. Vows emitted before religious profession are suspended for as long as the one vowing remains in religion (can. 1315).

I. Notion. Dispensation of a vow is "the absolute condonation of the obligation of a vow, made in the name of God" (St. Alphonsus, III, 250). It is said made in the name of God, because the Church, in dispensing in vows, does not condone her own right, but God's; this she cannot do except in the name of God. The difference between irritation and dispensation consists especially in this, that one irritating acts in his own name, whereas one dispensing acts as taking the place of God and therefore as using vicarious power.

II. The existence of the power. That the Church can dispense in vows is clear from the tradition and perpetual practice of the Church. It is supported by these words of Christ: "Whatever you shall loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven";¹ likewise by reason, insofar as it is permissible to judge that a power so useful and almost necessary was granted by Christ to His Church.

¹ Matt. 16:19.

III. The extent of the power. The faculty of dispensing in vows, which belongs to the Church, extends to all vows, solemn as well as simple, public as well as private. Exceptions are those which were emitted for the benefit of a third party, as follows:

1. If the promise made to God, or the vow, is principally intended, the promise made to man follows the condition of the vow, and with the vow dissolved the promise falls.

2. If the promise made to man is principally intended, the vow follows the condition of the promise, and cannot be remitted unless the third party acquiesces. Likewise, if each promise is equally principally intended, the vow cannot be remitted without the consent of the third party. Except in each case if it is a question of the right of a third party which is subject to the supreme administration of the Supreme Pontiff, and therefore can be remitted by him even without the consent of the third party; as if a vow was emitted in favor of a religious institute (St. Alphonsus, II, 255; Homo Apostolicus, tr. 5, nn. 19, 41).

IV. The subject of the power is the Supreme Pontiff and those to whom the Church has communicated it. Moreover:

1. The Pope can dispense all the faithful from all vows to which, according to what was said under III, the power of dispensing, such as it is in the Church, extends.

2. From can. 1313, non-reserved vows can be dispensed for a just cause, provided the dispensation does not harm a right acquired by others:

a) The local Ordinary, as regards all his subjects and also travelers. Thus can. 1313, 1°: understand subjects wherever they dwell; travelers and those without domicile actually staying in his territory (can. 94, § 2; 201, § 3).

b) The Superior of an exempt clerical religion, as regards professed members, novices, or others living day and night in the religious house for the sake of service, education, hospitality, or infirm health.

c) Those to whom the Apostolic See has delegated the power of dispensing. Now regular confessors probably can, by delegated power, dispense in all vows and oaths of the faithful in which Bishops can do this by ordinary power, and indeed both within and outside confession. They probably enjoy this power by force of a privilege which, under the old law, probably belonged to them, and which probably has not been revoked. Hence at least the Church supplies (cf. St. Alphonsus, III, 256, 257).

Note 1. If the forum for which the power was given has not been expressed, the power is understood to have been granted for both forums (can. 202, § 3).

Note 2. Since dispensation is an act of voluntary jurisdiction, one who has the power of dispensing or commuting can use it even for himself (can. 201, § 3). Nevertheless no one can irritate his own vow.

V. The use of the power. 1. Dispensation in vows, in order to be valid, requires a just cause (can. 1313). The reason is that it contains the remission of another's right, that is, God's, who cannot be judged to have granted the faculty of remitting His right without cause (St. Alphonsus, III, 250). Dispensation given without cause is not valid, even if it was given in good faith; but dispensation granted with a just cause is valid, even if it was granted in bad faith (St. Alphonsus, III, 251).

2. Just causes are judged to be: 1. the common good, for example of the Church, the republic, or the family, or the greater progress of the one vowing; 2. danger of transgression, or at least notable difficulty, even if foreseen, or vexation by scruples in observing the vow; 3. lesser deliberation in vowing, as if the vow was emitted with too much facility, from fear, from anger, from sorrow, or in the time of prepuberty (St. Alphonsus, III, 250, 252, 253; cf. St. Thomas, In IV Sent., dist. 38, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 1, corp.).²

3. If the cause does not suffice, some commutation should be added. The same should be done in doubt whether the cause suffices; but the subject, once the matter has been sincerely set forth, should acquiesce in the one dispensing. Likewise, when a doubt has arisen after the dispensation was given, one can acquiesce in the dispensation; both because "then there is a presumption for the validity of the dispensation; and because... it would be a thing too exposed to scruples if men, after obtaining a dispensation, were bound to inquire about its validity" (St. Alphonsus, III, 251, 254).

¹ Cf. Damen, De irritatione et suspensione votorum.

² Cf. Innocent III, cap. Magnae, de voto, etc.

I. Notion. Commutation is the substitution of another honorable work, in place of that which had been promised by vow, under the same obligation (St. Alphonsus, III, 243). It can be made into something lesser, into something equal, and into something better.

II. Required power. Commutation into something lesser requires ecclesiastical power. For it is a partial remission of a divine debt; but remission of a divine debt belongs to the Church alone. Commutation into a better or equal good can be made by the one vowing himself (can. 1314); equality, however, should be taken morally, not mathematically (St. Alphonsus, III, 247).

III. The subject of the power is those who have the power of dispensing in vows (cited canon), according to the saying: He to whom the greater is permitted is surely permitted the lesser. Nevertheless it is not repugnant that only the power of commuting be granted, with the power of dispensing excluded.

IV. Use of the power. Commutation into something better does not require a cause. But commutation into something equal or lesser, in order to be made licitly, requires some cause, though a lesser one than dispensation; likewise commutation into something equal requires a lesser cause than commutation into something lesser. For it to be made into something equal or almost equal, a greater inclination toward it suffices (St. Alphonsus, III, 245).

Commutation into something lesser without a just cause is not only illicit, but also is not valid at least in this sense: insofar as it does not free completely from the debt; hence, supposing its validity, the defect certainly must be supplied. I said supposing its validity, because it is controverted whether or not it is valid in such a way that it suffices to supply the defect. Some affirm, because such a substitution among men is not judged invalid; therefore neither with respect to God, with whom matters are treated even more mildly. Others deny, because a partial dispensation, such as commutation into something lesser is, requires a just cause no less than full dispensation (St. Alphonsus, III, 245).

V. The effect of commutation. 1. After commutation has been made, it remains free to the one vowing to return to the prior matter, unless the commutation was made into a better good and the one vowing has bound himself to it by a new vow. The reason is that commutation has the character of a favor, which the one vowing is not bound to use, according to the saying: that which is granted for someone's favor is not to be turned back to his disadvantage¹ (St. Alphonsus, III, 248).

2. If the substituted matter becomes impossible, the one vowing is not bound to return to the prior matter if the commutation was made by ecclesiastical authority. The reason is that the prior obligation has been removed. Otherwise one must speak if the one vowing himself commuted his vow (St. Alphonsus, III, 249).

3. If a reserved vow has been commuted, the substituted matter does not seem reserved, because reservation regards only the matters designated by law.

¹ Reg. Iur. 61 in VI.

Twofold Dependence on the Will of Another.—Those who are not masters of their own acts are unable to vow on account of their subjection to or dependence on the will of another. There is a twofold dependence of this kind.

(a) There is a dependence of the will of the subject, as in the case of religious who have vowed obedience to their rule and superiors, and in the case of those who have not attained the age of puberty and who must be guided and ruled by their father or guardian. This dependence means, not that the subject must have the positive consent of the superior for every act, but that he must not will or do anything contrary to the just will of the superior.

(b) There is a dependence of the matter of the vow, when it is subject to the wishes of another person, as happens in the case of those who have obligations to others. Thus, a wife cannot make a vow of chastity without the consent of her husband, otherwise she infringes upon conjugal rights; a servant cannot make a vow to spend in visiting churches time for which he is paid; a son who lives with his parents and is not emancipated cannot vow to give his earnings in alms, for he owes them to his family.

The Validity of Vows Made by Subjects.—(a) If the vow is against the rights of another person, it is invalid without his consent. Thus, if a wife makes a vow of chastity without her husband’s consent, the vow obliges her to ask his consent, but it has no force if he refuses his consent.

(b) If the vow is against the subjection due another, it is invalid if he denies his consent. Thus, if a religious vows an act for which according to his rule permission must be sought, the vow has no actual force until the permission is obtained; if he vows an act that is good in itself, but absolutely forbidden in his rule (e.g., if a novice bound to remain in the cloister vowed to go on a pilgrimage), the vow is null, since it is better to keep the rule.

(c) If the vow is neither against the right of another nor against the subjection due, it seems that the vow is valid without the knowledge and consent of the superior. Thus, if a religious privately vows to do what is commanded in a particular law or rule, or what is counselled by his superiors, or what is good and not forbidden, the vow is valid until annulled by the superior; for, as was said in the previous paragraph, the subject is not bound to have the positive consent of his superior for all acts, and it is supposed now that the thing vowed is not detrimental to the rights of the superior or others.

Cessation of Vows.—Since a vow is a private law, it may cease, just as a law ceases in certain cases (see 500 sqq.). There are, therefore, two ways in which a vow ceases or ceases to oblige.

(a) The vow ceases from within, or from internal causes, when the matter of the vow has so changed as to be detrimental or useless, or the purpose of the vow is no longer served by the vow. For the nature of a vow is that it promotes a better good to the greater glory of God. It is clear also that a temporary vow ceases when the time limit fixed to it has expired, and that a conditional vow ceases if the condition is not fulfilled (e.g., one vows an alms of thanksgiving if one’s mother recovers from sickness, but she dies).

(b) The vow ceases from without, or from external causes, when it is removed or suspended by the authority of God to whom it was made (dispensation) or by the authority of one who has power over the will of the vower or over the matter of the vow (annulment), or even by the authority of the vower himself in so far as belongs to him the right to substitute some equal or better work for the work vowed (commutation).

Public vows do not cease from intrinsic causes, for this would be productive of many disadvantages to religious communities and to those who take vows in them. The chief cases in which private vows cease for internal reasons are as follows:

(a) They cease on a substantial change in the thing promised, for then the subject-matter has become morally different. There is a substantial change if the matter of the vow has become illicit (e.g., Titus vowed an alms to a beggar, but he learns that the beggar will use the alms to become drunk), or if it has become useless (e.g., Claudius vowed not to visit a certain house on account of the bad language used there, but the guilty parties have now moved away), or if it has become an obstacle to a greater good (e.g., Balbus vowed to go on a pilgrimage, but an epidemic has broken out and it is better for him to remain home and care for the sick), or if it has become impossible (e.g., Sempronius vowed to give an alms, but lost his money and cannot afford to keep the promise). Some also think there is a substantial change when circumstances are so different that, had the vower been able to foresee them, he would not have taken the vow.

(b) They cease on the disappearance of the principal reason that induced the vower to make his promise. Thus, if Caius vows a sum of money to an institution solely because it is poor and it becomes wealthy before he has fulfilled his vow, his obligation is at an end (see Canon 1311).

Annulment of Vows.—The annulment of a vow is made in two ways, directly and indirectly. A full treatment of this subject will be found in commentaries on Canons 1312, 499, 88, 89, 675, 501.

(a) Direct annulment is the operation of a person distinct from the vower which, by affecting immediately the vower’s act, recalls the vow and makes it of no force. Hence, this kind of annulment may be exercised by all those who have such private authority over the will of the vower as to be able either to confirm or to cancel his acts. Private authority over the will of another is contained in the paternal power of the father over his children, in the domestic power of the husband over his wife, and in the governing power of a religious superior over his subjects. The paternal power may be exercised to annul the vows of children (at least, of those who have not reached puberty), since these children are incompetent to decide for themselves. The governing power also may annul directly the private vows of professed subjects made after profession, since these subjects have made a quasi-contract of submission in this matter. The domestic power of the husband, according to some, cannot directly annul the post-matrimonial vows of the wife, since the wife is competent to direct herself in these affairs, and has made no engagement of subjection in their regard; but others argue that at least positive law (Num., xxx. 2-17; Eph., v. 24) gives the husband this authority. The paternal power in this matter is had, not only by the father, but also by those who take his place (such as the guardian or the mother); the governing power is had by religious superioresses, by immediate and other regular superiors, by bishops in reference to their non-exempt communities, and by the Pope in reference to all communities.

(b) Indirect annulment is the operation of a person distinct from the vower which, by affecting the matter or object of the vow, suspends the obligation produced by the vow. Hence, this kind of annulment may be exercised by all those who have a right over the matter of the vow, when and as long as the vow is prejudicial to their right. Thus, the Pope may annul a vow of any of the faithful that is detrimental to his rights or the rights of the Church; parents may annul the vows even of their children who have attained puberty, when these vows interfere with family order; religious superiors may annul the vows of novices that are harmful to religious discipline; husbands and wives may annul each other’s vows that trespass on conjugal rights; a master may annul a vow of his servant that keeps the servant from performing work due the master.

Reason Necessary for Annulment of a Vow.—Is a just reason necessary for annulment of a vow? (a) For validity it is not necessary that there be a just reason, since there is always the implicit condition in a vow: “unless the superior or other person whose consent is necessary refuses.” (b) For lawfulness it is necessary that there be a just reason, for it is not lawful to deprive God of honor promised Him, unless one has a good reason to do so (see Canon 1312). But the sin committed by one who annuls or who asks for annulment without sufficient reason does not regularly exceed a venial sin.

Differences between Direct and Indirect Annulment.—(a) Direct annulment extinguishes a vow, since it affects the act of vowing itself, and hence, if a father annuls the vow of his son who has not reached the age of fourteen, the vow ceases entirely. Indirect annulment, on the contrary, only suspends a vow, since it affects only the matter of the vow and this matter may be withdrawn from the power of him who annuls. Thus, if a master annulled the vow of his cook to hear Mass daily, the vow would revive when the cook took service elsewhere.

(b) He who has power to annul directly may exercise the power even though he granted permission for the vow, or promised not to annul it, or gave his approval to it; for he retains his power over his subject and may change his own decision. But he who has only indirect power of annulment more probably may not annul once he has given his permission or ratification to a vow; for his power is only over the matter of the vow, and this, after he has consented to its dedication to God, is no longer under his control.

Dispensation.—A dispensation is the relaxation of a vow granted in the name of God by one who has competent jurisdiction.

(a) It is a relaxation, that is, it removes the obligation (see 401). Thus, a dispensation differs from a mere declaration or interpretation that a law is not binding.

(b) It is a relaxation of the vow, that is, the dispensation, at least in modern practice, takes away not only the obligation but also the vow itself. It is not merely a suspension or a commutation, but a total removal of the vow.

(c) It is granted in the name of God; that is, the dispenser acting for God remits the promise that was made to God. Thus, a dispensation differs from an annulment, for the latter is made by the annuller in his own name on account of the authority he has over the will of the vower or over the matter of the vow.

(d) It is given by one who has competent jurisdiction, that is, public spiritual authority in the Church over the external forum. For, as a vow is an obligation to God, it cannot be removed without the act of those whom God has appointed as His representatives in spiritual matters. Here again a dispensation differs from an annulment, for the latter requires, not the power of jurisdiction, but only dominative or domestic power.

Reasons Sufficient for a Dispensation.—A dispensation is granted in the name of God, and therefore, unlike an annulment, it requires a just reason for its validity; for the remission of a religious promise cannot be satisfactory to God, unless there exists a justifying reason. A dispensation conceded for insufficient reasons is invalid, even though all the parties concerned were in good faith; but, in doubt, the presumption is that the reasons were sufficient. The reasons sufficient for a dispensation can be reduced to two classes: (a) the public good of the community or of the Church (e.g., if a person bound by vow leads a dissolute life to the scandal of the public); (b) the private good of the vower (e.g., if he finds the observance of the vow too difficult, if he took the vow without much deliberation or with such fear as is insufficient to nullify, see 2195, 2196).

Sinfulness of an Unnecessary Dispensation from Vows.—(a) The superior who grants the dispensation is guilty if he is certain that there is no sufficient reason for it, or if he doubts whether there is any reason for it. But he dispenses validly and lawfully, if he is certain that there is a reason for the dispensation, but doubts whether the reason is sufficient (see 407), Usually, a superior who has been asked for a dispensation should not be anxious about his right to give it, for the very insistence of the subject indicates that the vow has become harmful or useless.

(b) The subject is guilty if he asks for a dispensation while knowing that he has no right to ask for it, or if he uses it while knowing that there was manifestly no sufficient reason for it. But in case of doubt whether the reason was sufficient, the subject should be guided by the judgment of the superior, not by his own, for the decision belongs to the superior.

Persons Who Have the Power of Dispensation.—The Church has the power to dispense both public and private vows, for Our Lord gave this power when He said: “Whatsoever thou shalt loose upon earth, shall be loosed in heaven” (Matt., xvi. 19), and the power thus given has been exercised from the beginning (see 314). Those who have the power of dispensation are the following:

(a) the Pope, since he is the Vicar of Christ, has the fullness of dispensing power. He may dispense from every dispensable vow, solemn vows included, and there are certain vows from which he alone may dispense. The vows reserved to the Pope or his delegate are almost all public vows and the two private vows of perfect and perpetual chastity and of entrance into a Religious Order of solemn vows. The two latter vows are reserved, however, only when made absolutely and with perfect freedom by one who has completed his or her eighteenth year;

(b) local Ordinaries (and superiors with quasi-episcopal jurisdiction, such as regular prelates) can dispense from the non-reserved vows. In certain cases, such as urgent necessity or a doubtful vow, they can also dispense from the two private vows reserved to the Pope. These matters are treated more fully by canonists, especially in connection with Canons 258 and 1045. It is the common opinion that regular confessors who have the privileges of Mendicants can dispense, either in confession or outside of confession, from all non-reserved vows not made principally for the advantage of a third party and accepted by him. Parish-priests and other confessors may dispense from a vow of chastity discovered at the last moment when all preparations have been made for marriage (see Canon 1045).

Dispensation from Religious Vow of Chastity.—Does the Church dispense from the vow of chastity taken in religious profession or in the reception of Sacred Orders?

(a) There are no known examples of public dispensation of priestly celibacy for the sake of contracting marriage, but dispensations are granted from the religious vow of chastity.

(b) There have been cases in which subdeacons and deacons were permitted to marry for the sake of some common good of the Church or of a nation, and in which the marriages of priests were validated, as at the time of the Anglican Schism and of the French Revolution. But the clerics thus dispensed were forbidden the exercise of their clerical powers.

Dispensation from a Vow Made for the Benefit of a Third Party.—(a) If the promise is gratuitous and not yet accepted by the third party, the dispensation can be given; for in such a case the only obligation is one arising from the vow, and the Church can dispense from vows. Hence, if one vowed to have Masses said for the soul of a deceased person or to give alms to the poor without determining any particular persons, the vows can be dispensed.

(b) If the promise is gratuitous and accepted by the third party, but is made chiefly in honor of God and only secondarily for the benefit of the third party, it is probable that the dispensation can be given. For that which is secondary in the promise should follow that which is primary, and here the vow, which is the primary intention, is dispensable.

(c) If the promise is gratuitous and accepted, but the purpose to benefit the third party is not subordinate to the purpose to make a vow, or if the promise is onerous, the dispensation cannot regularly be given. The reason is that in these cases there is question not only of a vow but also of a contract, not only of an obligation to God but also of an obligation to man, and justice demands that the rights of a party to a contract be not taken away without his consent. Thus, a vow of stability made on entrance into a Congregation cannot be dispensed without the consent of the Congregation itself, for the vow was also a contract between the Congregation and the vower. There are exceptions, however, as when the third party renounces his right, or when the Pope, in virtue of his supreme authority over ecclesiastical goods or of his dominative authority, grants a dispensation for which there are just and sufficient reasons.

Persons Who May Be Dispensed from Vows.—(a) Dispensation may be granted to subjects and, in certain cases, even to non-subjects. Thus, a superior whose faculty is not restricted may dispense himself (see 403); but it is advisable that dispensation be always sought from another person on account of the danger of self-deception. A local Ordinary also has the power to dispense, not only his own subjects, but also outsiders who are in his territory (see Canon 1313).

(b) Dispensation may be given either in the confessional or outside of the confessional, unless the contrary is stipulated in the faculty. It is more suitable, however, that it be given in the confessional.

(e) Dispensation may not be granted except to those who are willing to accept it, and in this respect it differs from an annulment, which may be made even against the will of the vower. The reason for this is that the vower placed the obligation on himself freely (see 403). This holds at least as regards the dispensation of a private vow.

Commutation of Vows.—The commutation of a vow is the substitution of some good work for the one promised by vow with the transfer of the religious obligation to the new work. Commutation differs from annulment and dispensation, for these take away the obligation while commutation only changes the matter, the obligation of the vow remaining unchanged. Thus, if the vow to make a pilgrimage is commuted into prayers, one is no longer obliged to make the pilgrimage, but one is bound under vow to say the substituted prayers. The power of the Church to commute vows is clear from what was said above about the power of dispensation, for he who can do what is greater can also do what is less.

Kinds of Good Works that May Be Substituted for Vows.—(a) The good work can be a better work than the old one, that is, a work which, if not more difficult, is more pleasing to God and more spiritually advantageous to the vower. Hence, if one has vowed to give an alms to a poor stranger, the vow may be commuted, if the stranger has not accepted the promise, in favor of another stranger who is poorer or in favor of one’s father who is also poor.

(b) The good work may be a work equally good, that is, one which morally speaking has the same difficulty or spiritual value. Thus, one prayer may be exchanged for another of equal length, one alms for another of equal amount, one pilgrimage for another of equal distance. But equality is to be determined, not mathematically but morally, and hence one kind of work may be exchanged for another, one kind of vow for another, and it is not necessary that the works be of exactly the same worth. In fact, the new work, which objectively is only equal, is subjectively better, since it is more advantageous to the vower.

(c) The good work may be a work less good, that is, one which is clearly less difficult or meritorious, as when a Mass is commuted into a Rosary.

Persons Who Have Authority to Commute a Vow.—(a) The commutation of a non-reserved vow into something better or equally good may be made by the vower himself, if there are no rights of a third party to forbid this. For the ends of the original vow (viz., the honor of God and the spiritual welfare of the vower) are thus better or at least equally served. But ordinarily one should not commute one’s own vows, since for most persons it is not an easy matter to decide what is a better or an equal good. How many understand the respective rank of the virtues? And even if one does know, for example, that religion is better than temperance, one cannot decide from this alone that a Rosary is an equal or a better substitute for a fast. One who wishes commutation for his vow, therefore, should consult his confessor or another priest.

(b) The commutation of a vow into something less good can be granted only by the one who has a special faculty; for this kind of commutation partakes of the nature of a dispensation, inasmuch as it relaxes to some extent the original vow. Those who have the power of dispensing (e.g., regular confessors who have the privileges of Mendicants) have also the power of commuting; but those who have only the power of commuting may not change a vow into something that is of notably less value. A good rule to follow in commuting a vow into something less is that more frequent reception of the Sacraments be the substitute ordered. The limitations on dispensations by reason of the rights of third parties (see above 2236) apply also to commutations.

The Cause Required for Commutation of a Vow.—(a) For commutation into something better no cause is required, since the new work is its own justification. (b) For commutation into something of equal value, some cause is required, since it is a mark of inconstancy and therefore displeasing to God to give over one’s promises without good reason. But a light reason is sufficient, such as greater devotion or less danger of violating the vow. (c) For commutation into something of less value, a proportionate reason is necessary, not only for lawfulness, but also more probably for validity, since this kind of commutation is a partial dispensation. But the reason need not be so serious as that needed for a full dispensation.

Reversion to Original Vow.—The return to the original vow by one whose vow has been commuted is always lawful, and in certain cases may be obligatory.

(a) It is lawful, even though the vow was commuted into something better; for a commutation is a privilege, and there is no obligation of using a personal privilege (see 523). Some authors hold that this doctrine does not apply when the vower himself commuted his vow into something better, but the common opinion is that the principle of privilege applies to every case, and that one may even choose between different works if a vow has been commuted a number of times. Those who make vows should be on their guard, however, against frequent and needless changes, since inconstancy is harmful spiritually.

(b) The return to the original vow is obligatory according to some when the vower commuted his own vow to something better and the new matter has become impossible; for the effect of the commutation was not to extinguish the old vow at once, but to offer a satisfaction in its place, and hence when this satisfaction proves impossible the vow must be performed. Others deny this and maintain that the old vow is extinguished immediately, since one who commutes a former vow is immediately held under vow to the substituted work. All agree, however, that if the commutation is granted by authority, the old vow is extinguished and there is no duty to return to it if the substituted work becomes impossible, even though the impossibility is due to the vower’s own fault. Hence, if a pilgrimage is commuted into a fast and the vower through his carelessness becomes sick and unable to fast, there is no obligation either to make the pilgrimage or to fast. It should be noted, though, that private vows made before religious profession are suspended only so long as the vower remains in the institute he has joined, and hence, if he is dismissed or leaves, the vows revive (Canon 1315).

Duties of Confessors in Reference to Private Vows.—(a) A confessor should not readily permit penitents to take private vows, since a vow is a serious matter and should receive mature deliberation. A vow taken hastily in a fit of fervor will likely be soon repented of (see 2221). But if it seems that a penitent will be benefited by a vow, the confessor should give permission, though it will frequently be advisable to limit the duration of the vow at first to a month or a year or other fixed period.

(b) Nor should a confessor be easy in recommending commutations of private vows, lest those who have taken them be encouraged to make continual changes. On the other hand, if there is a good reason for a change (such as danger or difficulty in the old matter or greater devotion in the new matter), the confessor should not stand in the way of a commutation. Confessors who have not the faculties must have recourse to authority for dispensations and dispensative commutations, and the same course is advised for some difficult cases of annulment (e.g., when a husband and wife have made a mutual vow of continence).

How does a vow cease from within? - The obligation of a vow can cease from within and from without.

It ceases from within: 1. If the matter formerly possible becomes impossible, formerly honorable becomes shameful, formerly a better good becomes indifferent and an impediment of a greater good, by reason of the destruction of the thing itself, prohibition, and a new circumstance. For the obligation is extinguished if it falls into that case from which it could not begin. 2. If you change the vow into a work evidently better; for each person can do this even by himself, provided no special prohibition is present in the particular case. Cf. 623. 3. If the state of the thing is notably changed. "It is the common opinion," says St. Alphonsus, n. 226, cited by the Salmanticenses, "that in every promise, as also is a vow, a change of matter notable of itself takes away the obligation. The reason is that through the change the thing becomes diverse from that which was promised." Understand, "except the simple vow of chastity and of religion." L. l. 4, n. 50. 4. If the thing vowed has become useless for the intent, especially if it is more destructive of it. 5. If those conditions also so bear, which are understood in any vow whatever. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 3 ad 2. 6. If its final cause ceases; but otherwise if only an impulsive cause ceases. Cf. 566. 7. When the condition is not fulfilled, if the vow was conditioned; when the determinate time has elapsed, if the vow was affixed to a certain time. Cf. 590, 591. Struggl 32, 36; L. 225, 243.

Is that change sufficient of itself, even not notable, which nevertheless, if foreseen, one would not have emitted the vow? - The first opinion affirms, and St. Thomas expressly holds this; he teaches: "That frees from the obligation of a vow or oath which, if it had been known from the beginning, would have prevented them from being made"; 4 D. 38, q. 1, a. 3. The reason is that then the intention of obliging oneself is lacking, or it is so interpreted according to what was said in the preceding number, in the fifth place.

The second opinion denies, because, in order to exempt the one vowing from the obligation of the vow, attention must not be given to what he would have promised if he had remembered, but rather to what he actually promised. Now St. Alphonsus, n. 226, speaking of the first opinion, says: "This opinion seems to me not less probable, indeed perhaps more probable." And he hands it down as quasi-certain, l. 3, n. 720. Cf. here 563, 567, 575, 597, 3.

How does a vow cease from without? What is annulment, and of how many kinds is it? - A vow ceases from without through annulment, dispensation, commutation.

Annulment of a vow is its nullification or suspension made by him to whose dominative power the will of the one vowing, or the matter of the vow, is subject. It is 1. direct, if it falls directly upon the person or upon the will of the one vowing; 2. indirect, if it falls only upon the matter of the vow. In the former case the vow is altogether annihilated, nor does it afterwards revive any longer; but in the latter its obligation is only suspended as to matter subject to the power of another, and it revives when the one vowing has become perfectly his own master. Struggl 30, 31, 43.

What is direct annulment? - Since the dominion of anyone ought not to be violated, and any master can use his own liberty, hence, if the will of someone is subject to the dominative power of another, that one can directly annul, validly, all the vows of that subject, of whatever sort they are, emitted during the time of subjection, at his own pleasure, without any cause; that is, he can will and pronounce that those vows are null, so that in no case does the obligation afterwards revive. For this annulment is not the placing of some impediment to the execution of an act of the will, but the nullification of its value, on account of the implicit condition in the act itself: if he to whose power it pertains does not contradict; if it is not revoked by the superior. And this holds even if the vow is in favor of a third party, and perhaps accepted. This right comes from natural law, and also from positive law, by which legitimate dominative power over the will of another is given to someone. Dominative power is distinguished from jurisdiction in this, that the latter arises from the right of a public office, but the former from the right of a private office, whence it also is usually called economic power.

Schmalz., l. 1, t. 32, n. 4; Laym., de Leg., c. 5, n. 1; L. 227; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 57, a. 4; q. 88, aa. 8, 9; q. 189, a. 5; Suarez, de Relig., tr. 6, l. 6, cc. 6, 7; Bouix, de Iure Reg., v. 2, pp. 481-505; Ferraris, v. Votum, art. 3, n. 10 seqq.

Dominative power: It is the power of a master over his own things; and besides this, it is that power over persons which is similar to the aforesaid power over things; such as the power of a father over a son, who is something of the father, the power of a master over a slave, who is something of the master, and also the power of a regular prelate over his own religious, by force of religious profession, by which someone has consecrated and handed over himself wholly and totally to God in a religious Order. Therefore it is well distinguished from the power of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and from the power of jurisdiction properly such, and from the power which is properly called economic. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 57, a. 4; C. He. 331. And by force of this power the same St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 189, a. 5, grants that the vows of children can be annulled by parents.

What is indirect annulment? - If indeed not the will of the one vowing, but the matter of the vow is subject to someone, so that he has a right over it, that one can, by indirect annulment, suspend such a vow, at whatever time it was emitted, that is, suspend its obligation, insofar as prejudice is done to his right; and this from the law of nature teaching that no one can promise something to another to the prejudice of a third party. Hence the vow, when the state of things has changed, revives. But per accidens it can be extinguished, if the vow, for example, obliges for a certain time, and license is denied for that time, or the matter is prohibited. L. 241; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 8.

Can a superior annul vows if these have been ratified by him, or after the time of subjection has passed? - R. To the first: affirmatively, because he cannot take away from himself the power which he has over subjects. But, on the contrary, one who once annulled a vow, if afterwards he does not wish this, the vow is not therefore revalidated. The reason is that through annulment the vow is extinguished. But that an extinguished vow may revive, the repentance of the superior who annulled it contributes nothing; rather the will of the subject is required, who would again oblige himself by vow. L. 239.

R. To the second: Vows made in the time of subjection can still be annulled after that time, for example, when a son is now pubescent, and this, says St. Alphonsus, n. 238, is the more probable opinion. Moreover, Sanchez hands down a double rule in this matter, in Decal., l. 4, c. 30, nn. 7, 8. "The first is: When the power of the superior, during whose time the vow was emitted, is not altogether extinguished or altogether suspended, but remains as to some things, he can annul a vow emitted in the time of his subjection, even if that time has now passed; provided, after it has passed, it has not again been confirmed (understand confirmed, in such a way that he then knows the vows were infirm, as St. Alphonsus has, l. c.). The later rule is: When that power of the superior is altogether extinguished or altogether suspended, he cannot annul those vows."

Is some cause required for the annulment of vows? - To annul the vows of subjects without cause is of itself no sin, because they are judged to have been emitted under the condition of the superior's consent; whence obedience stands in place of cause. Of itself, because in practice it can with difficulty be excused from venial sin; for it would be an idle act, and the progress of another would be irrationally impeded. Nevertheless this commonly does not exceed venial sin. But any reasonable cause suffices for excusing from venial sin.

Suarez, de Relig., tr. 6, l. 6, c. 7, n. 16, warns that for annulling a lesser cause suffices than for dispensing. Hence, from the opinion of all, he infers that a subject who asks annulment of a vow from his Prelate, when he does not have a cause which would suffice for a just dispensation, does not sin, because, as he says, he uses his right, because the vow was not absolute, but conditioned, and through it he did not oblige himself to beware lest the condition be impeded, or not to take precautions that it not be posited, as is clear from the common manner of vowing. But he who feels the burdens of religion can, without sin, enjoy its advantages. Therefore, just as a Prelate does not sin by annulling, so neither does a subject by asking. L. 228; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 8.

Who can annul the vows of religious? - The Pope indeed can directly annul all vows of religious; and the Bishop can annul the vows of nuns subject to him. Moreover, besides the Pope, abbots, guardians, priors, and rectors, even secondary Prelates in the absence of the primary ones, and probably also abbesses, can directly annul the vows of religious, whatever they are, even internal vows, even those emitted under predecessors. Yet exception is made, besides the very vows of religious profession, cf. Trent, sess. 25, c. 1, de Reg., of the vow of passing to a stricter religion, as is established in C. Licet 18, de Regul. For from that profession arises the power of annulling. And because the accessory follows the principal, other vows annexed to profession are also excepted. The aforesaid vow not even the Pope can annul, insofar as he is supreme Prelate of the religious order, although not only the Pope, but also a regular Prelate, can dispense from it. C. Monacho 2, can. 20, q. 4; L. 233, 242; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 8; Struggl 37, 38; cf. here 616.

Of religious; the matter concerns religious of solemn vows. Superiors can annul the vows of religious of simple vows only indirectly. For by force of a solemn vow a religious no longer has to will and not to will; by force of a simple vow a religious is bound only to obey a superior legitimately commanding in the matter of the Rule and Constitutions. Can annul; therefore the vows are valid in themselves before they are annulled. L. 231, 233; S. C. EE. et RR., 28 Jun. 1901, n. 132, Normar.; Monit. Eccles., v. 16, pp. 367 seqq.

Nor is it valid to object against this that these Institutes are themselves also approved by the Holy See. They are indeed approved by the Holy See, but not as religious Institutes of solemn vows. They are approved only in an altogether inferior grade, namely as Institutes of simple vows, by which there is certainly not that perfect handing over of oneself and surrender of oneself, so that a religious is said to have neither to will nor not to will, as is expressly contained in C. Religiosus 2, de Testam., and ult. vol. in 6, C. Religiosi ult., de Sepult. in 6, C. Si Religiosus 27, de Elect. et elect. potest. From this, moreover, it is that the solemn vow of obedience so subjects the will of the one vowing to the Prelate that without his consent it is ineffective for contracting any civil or natural obligation through contract or any other mode. But the simple vow of obedience does not have such an effect, neither by force of its natural obligation alone, nor by force of the approval of the Church. For by force of this vow the religious only "assumes the obligation of obeying the precept of a legitimate superior, in those things which pertain directly or indirectly to the life of the Institute, that is, to the observance of the vows and Constitutions." Norm. S. C. EE. et RR., 28 Jun. 1901, art. 132. Now the obligation alone of obeying the precept of a Prelate, according to the Constitutions of the Institute, is not of itself sufficient to annul any will whatever of obliging oneself to another in matter not contrary to them. Cf. Suarez, de Relig., tr. 6, de Voto, l. 6, c. 7, n. 5; tr. 7, l. 13, nn. 4, 5; Congr. Gener. S. I. 1, Can. 22.

Note: A Prelate can licitly and validly annul the vow of a subject confirmed by an equal or inferior predecessor, but not by a superior. L. 239.

It is certain that the vows of religious are extinguished through solemn profession, as is had from C. Scripturae 4, de Voto: "He is not held guilty of a broken vow who is known to commute temporal service into the perpetual observance of religion." L. 237; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, aa. 8, 12. The same vows of religious are suspended through profession of simple vows; and therefore they revive if someone returns to the secular state. As to novices, regular Prelates can indirectly annul the personal vows of a novice when the execution of these prejudices the exercises of probation. But they cannot annul their real vows, because these do not prejudice the exercises of probation. Struggl 42.

Can a father, grandfather, or tutor annul the vows of children? - A father, or paternal grandfather in his absence, can directly annul any vows whatever of those below puberty, whether personal or real, even vows of chastity and religion, although the son is capable of deceit and the vow concerns castrense peculium, or quasi-castrense peculium, because at such an age perfect deliberation for so great an obligation is lacking. Therefore nature has provided for such a defect by furnishing parents the faculty of annulling such vows. In doubt whether a vow was emitted before or after puberty, the father can still annul it, because his power prevails.

But parents cannot annul the personal vows of pubescent children, for example of chastity, etc., except indirectly, that is, unless they prejudice domestic governance, as vows of pilgrimage, etc. Likewise they can well indirectly annul the real vows of pubescents in minority, because in it they lack the administration of goods. Except if the vow concerns castrense peculium, or quasi-castrense peculium; or if the son has gone out from paternal power.

What has been said about the father and grandfather must also be said about a tutor with respect to a ward, and about a curator with respect to a minor; and if there are several tutors or curators, each has the same power. C. Puella 2, c. 20, q. 2; L. 229, 242; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, aa. 8, 9.

Can a mother or grandmother also annul the vows of children? - A mother can annul the vows of children, the father being lacking, if she has been designated tutor or curator, and she can do what tutors and curators can do. But if she was not designated as tutor or curator, and the son lacks father and paternal grandfather, Sanchez, Suarez, etc., think that then the son is his own master. But the opposite, namely that in that case it falls to the mother, or even grandmother, to be tutor or curator, is held more probably by the Salmanticenses, Tamburini, etc., because it is reasonable that a mother or grandmother provide for a minor, and therefore she can well annul his vows as tutor or curator.

But Sanchez, Suarez, etc., deny that a mother can annul the vows of children when the father or tutor is present, and they say that the mother, and in the absence of the mother, the grandfather or grandmother on the mother's side, can annul only the vows of those below puberty when the father or tutor is lacking. But not less probably, the Salmanticenses, Roncaglia, etc., assert that the mother, even when the father is present and not contradicting, or the tutor, can annul all the vows of those below puberty, even vows of chastity and religion, and also the personal vows of pubescents which prejudice the governance of the house; but not real vows, whose administration pertains to the father or curator. The reason is that such power, although not civilly (by common law namely it belongs only to the father of the family), nevertheless naturally is also in the mother, to whom children are bound to obey, although with subordination to the father; so that the father can annul the vows of children when the mother contradicts, but not thus the mother when the father contradicts. By more recent laws, indeed, paternal power is in the father and mother, although it is exercised by the father alone. Inst. 1, l. 1, t. 9; C. I. 220; C. G. 371-373; C. H. 154; C. A. 143, 144, 147; C. B. 1627, 1634; L. 230; C. He. 273, 274; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, aa. 8, 9; Struggl 39, 40.

Note: It is owed to positive law, namely Canon Law and Common Law, that religious are most fully subject to their superiors, C. Monacho 2, c. 20, q. 4, and that parents can directly annul only the vows of children below puberty, but indirectly the vows of pubescent children. C. Puella 2, c. 20, q. 2. For by natural law no one is so subject to another that he depends upon him in all his actions; and that distinction between those below puberty and pubescents, as to children of a family, comes only from the aforesaid Law. This distinction between those below puberty and pubescents is passed over in more recent laws. Hence not improbably parents can directly annul all vows of children as long as they remain under paternal power. C. I. 120; C. G. 372;

C. A. 174; C. H. 154; C. B. 1626; C. L. 311; C. He. 14. L. 227, 232; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 8; D'Annib., ed. 4, p. 3, n. 206.

Can a husband annul the vows of his wife? - It is more probable that a husband can directly annul all vows of his wife, although they do not prejudice the use of marriage, or the education of offspring, or domestic governance. And the reason is both because the husband has dominion over the wife, and because it is very expedient for the peace of the family, for fostering mutual love, that the wife have her will totally dependent upon the husband, and thus the impulses of women be restrained. Therefore the husband can annul even vows of chastity and religion emitted by the wife, and to be executed after the death of the husband. But the husband cannot directly annul vows emitted by the wife before marriage, although he can well suspend their execution insofar as they prejudice his power. Num. 30:7, 9; Eph. 5:24; L. 234, 237; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 8; C. A. 91.

Can a wife annul the vows of her husband? - A wife cannot annul the vows of her husband unless they prejudice her, as a vow of a long pilgrimage, etc.; or even a vow of not asking the debt, as Sporer, Laymann, etc., more probably hold against Lessius, Sanchez, etc., because it would be very grave for the modesty of a wife to be forced always to ask. The doctors commonly teach that such vows are to be annulled; but rather they seem to be invalid, as concerning inept matter, as the Salmanticenses think. L. 235, 242; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 8.

Note: Spouses could also mutually annul a vow of continence emitted by mutual consent. This seems to follow from the power of the husband directly annulling the vows of the wife; from the power of the wife indirectly annulling the vows of the husband; and from the power of annulling vows even approved or ratified by oneself. St. Alphonsus, n. 236, denies this. Yet there is no lack of grave doctors who affirm it. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 8 ad 3; Sanch., l. 4, c. 32, n. 7; Suarez, l. 4, c. 6, n. 1; Gur. Baller. 331.

Can a master annul the vows of servants? - A master can annul any real vows whatever of servants or slaves, unless they have something of their own, and personal vows which prejudice the master, such as vows of religion, etc., but not of chastity, etc. Yet these vows of slaves and servants cannot be directly annulled by masters, but only indirectly, or they can be suspended for the time of servitude and service, insofar as they prejudice the services due. L. 240, 242; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 8.

Can a husband or Prelate directly annul the vows of a wife or religious concerning which it is doubted whether they were emitted before or after subjection? - The reason for doubting is that none of the aforesaid superiors can directly annul vows emitted before subjection, for example, before marriage, because the will of the one vowing was not then subject to him. Now St. Alphonsus, n. 237, denies. The reason is that the vows are certain, and the possession of the husband or Prelate is uncertain, because it is doubted whether the vows were emitted at the time when subjection began. But Suarez, Sanchez, and others affirm. The reason is that on the contrary, possession of the present will of the subject is certain, since it is certain that she is a wife, or that this one is a religious; but the exception as to those vows is doubtful. Therefore, until the exception is proved, namely that the vows were emitted before subjection, the certain possession of the superior prevails. Just as, by parity, a spouse doubting about the value of the marriage is bound to render the debt to the other asking, on account of his certain possession, as is had from C. Dominus, de Secund. nuptiis.

What is dispensation of a vow? - Dispensation of a vow is: the remission of a vow made in the name of God himself, for a just cause, by one having spiritual jurisdiction in the external forum.

Remission, by which is not understood a release from the obligation of natural law, but an action by which the Church in the name of God withdraws the matter from the vow. This is clear by the example of one who remits a promise made to himself; for he does not dispense in the natural law of standing by promises, but rescinds the contract by remitting its obligation. Moreover, that this faculty is in the Church is clear both from fact, since she has always used it, and from law, since this is expedient for the good of the faithful, and those words of Christ are general: Whatever you shall loose, etc.; but that it is in the Church alone is clear from the fact that this act is spiritual; therefore it must belong to spiritual power alone.

Made in the name of God; for since the Church does not dispense in her own law, but in God's, she can act in this only in the name of God himself. Hence the distinction between dispensation and annulment is clear. Dispensation falls upon a vow insofar as it depends upon God's acceptance. But annulment falls upon a vow insofar as it is quasi-conditioned, either on the side of the will of the one vowing, or on the side of the thing promised, subject to the power of the superior and dependent upon it. Annulment can be made against the will of the one vowing, and the superior by prohibiting the matter, or by resisting the obligation of the vow, removes the condition, namely of honesty, without which a vow cannot be valid. Dispensation, on the contrary, cannot be made against the will of the one vowing, because, since in a vow the obligation depends upon one's own will, by not accepting the dispensation someone as it were confirms the vow, or emits it again.

For a just cause; because an inferior, since he is a mere executor, cannot dispense in the law of a superior without a just proportionate cause; and if he acts, he acts invalidly, and sins, unless good faith excuses him.

By one having, etc.; for since this power is for the utility of the Church, and pertains to external governance, just as the power of making laws, whose nature the vow imitates, those cannot have this faculty of dispensing from a vow as their own unless they are strong in external jurisdiction. Besides, since a Prelate does not dispense except in the name of God, only a Prelate can dispense who bears God's place in the Church, who indeed is he who has exterior jurisdiction in it. Add that an accepted promise cannot be released unless he who accepted, or his representative, consents. L. 250; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, aa. 10, 12.

Who can dispense from vows, and with whom? - 1. The Pope with respect to all the faithful and all vows, even solemn vows. 2. A Bishop with respect to his own subjects, even travelers, in all vows not reserved to the Pope; but not a parish priest, because he has only jurisdiction of the internal forum. Nor indeed is such a faculty communicated to him by law or by custom. 3. Exempt regular Prelates with respect to their own religious and novices, as to vows which they made either in the world or even in the novitiate, except reserved vows. But non-exempt Prelates cannot dispense, nor abbesses, indeed not even penitentiaries nor vicars of the Bishop, unless the faculty is specially delegated to them. 4. By special privilege, all regular Confessors can dispense in non-reserved vows of the faithful, within or outside confession; nor indeed is it required that he be the ordinary Confessor of the one bound by vow. Other Confessors have no faculty in this matter unless it is communicated to them by the Pope or by the Bishop. 5. Legates a latere and Nuncios in the province committed to them have the same faculty; likewise a chapter, while the See is vacant, and abbots having episcopal jurisdiction. L. 256, 257, 262; S. Th. 4, d. 38, q. 1, a. 4, q. 1 ad 3; 2. 2, q. 88, aa. 9, 10, 11; Struggl 45, 46, 47; Diana, tr. 4, de Voto et Iuramento, r. 78; tr. 1, de Dubiis Regularium, rr. 274, 275.

Note: In the vows of religious their Prelates can dispense, even if the vows were emitted with their license; and even if it was a vow of passing to a stricter religion, if it is known to be more useful for the religious to remain in his own. A Bishop can dispense with his subjects in a vow of entering a stricter religion, the vow of religion as to substance being left intact, since in no law is such dispensation found to be reserved. Moreover, the faculty of dispensing can be delegated by the said Prelates even to a simple tonsured cleric. In the substantial vows of religion, or in those annexed to them, as in the vow of not eating meats, etc., which are usually emitted in some religions, no one can dispense except the Pontiff. Besides, in the vows of novices, if they are not reserved, dispensation can be made both by the Prelates of the religion and also by the proper Bishop. L. 257. Cf. here 604.

What are just causes of dispensation? - 1. The good of the Church, or the common good of the commonwealth, or of the family, or the progress of the one vowing. 2. Danger of transgression because of a particular indisposition of the one vowing, or because of the common frailty of men. 3. Great difficulty in execution, not only if it was not foreseen, but also if it was foreseen; both because then there is also danger of transgression, and because a thing is apprehended as much more difficult while execution is at hand than when it is deliberated; and even if such difficulty has arisen from the frailty of the one vowing. 4. If the one vowing is vexed by great scruples. 5.

If the vow was emitted immaturely, namely with too much ease, or from imperfect deliberation, or without perfect liberty. For this reason, in the vows of those below puberty, dispensation can be made absolutely without any commutation, without another cause. 6. If the vow was emitted because of light fear inflicted from without. C. Ad audientiam 4, de His quae, etc. 7. When imperfect deliberation or liberty in vowing proceeded from sadness, or from intrinsic fear of shipwreck, death, or another evil, because then vows are usually made immaturely, and therefore dispensation can be made in them without commutation. But if it were clear that mature deliberation was present, then some commutation should be mixed with the dispensation. Just as must also be done if the impulsive cause of the vow ceases. L. 250, 252, 253; Struggl 46, 47.

Can a superior dispense from vows made for the utility of a neighbor? - A vow, although gratuitous, if it was emitted for the utility of man alone, or principally for the utility of a third party, and that third party is determinate, for example, such a poor man, such a church, can in no way be dispensed, once it has been accepted by the poor man or by the rector of that church; for that poor man, that church acquires a true right, of which indeed it cannot be stripped without injury and without the consent of the party.

Although gratuitous; for much less could a mutual, onerous promise be dispensed, as happens in vows and oaths of perseverance which are made in some Congregations; for then they assume the nature of a contract, namely the Congregation obliges itself to sustain the subject, and he to serve, and Benedict XIV so declared in C. Convocatis, 25 Nov. 1749, § 32, which he confirmed by C. Inter praeteritos, 3 Dec. 1749, § 66. Yet the Supreme Pontiff can dispense from these vows of Religious Institutes. All religious vows, even simple and temporary, by present law and practice are reserved to the Holy See. Indeed even private vows of secular Congregations, or of persons not living in community and without habit, approved by the Holy See, are reserved to the same Holy See.

Or principally for the utility of a third party; for if it was emitted principally in honor of God, then the third party would not acquire a true right to the thing promised, except dependently on the will of God, which indeed can be relaxed. "Sporer, Viva, Fagundez, etc., say that it is sufficiently probable that such a vow can well be commuted by the authority of a Prelate or also by one's own authority even after acceptance." L. 255. But this which has been said concerning a vow must also be said concerning an oath principally emitted in honor of God, that it can be relaxed by the Bishop without the consent of the party.

If the third party is determinate; for a promise made to God alone of giving something, for example, to indeterminate poor persons, can always be dispensed and commuted. If it is accepted; for before acceptance a completed handing over is not had, and the very common opinion is that it can then be dispensed and commuted. L. 255, 276; Suarez, l. 6, c. 15, nn. 7, 8; Sanch., l. 4, c. 41, n. 15; cf. here 269.

What vows are reserved to the Pope? - By custom everywhere received and from Canon Law itself, besides the vows of religion and those annexed to them, are these five: 1. The vow of entering an approved religion. 2. The vow of perpetual and entire or total chastity. 3. The vow of pilgrimage to the sepulcher of the Lord in Jerusalem. 4. The vow of pilgrimage to the thresholds of the Apostles Peter and Paul. 5. The vow of pilgrimage to visit the relics of St. James of Compostela. Hence in a general concession of dispensing in all vows, those five vows are not comprehended, although they are not expressly excepted. The reason is that those things which are specially reserved require a special concession. R. 81, de R. I., in 6; Struggl 48; L. 258.

Note: This reservation, as being odious, must always be interpreted strictly, and therefore reservation is not had: 1. If they are not perfect by reason of the vow, for example, if they are emitted under light obligation. 2. If they are not perfect by reason of affection toward the thing promised, for example, if you make a disjunctive vow, say of religion or fasting; or if you make a vow of chastity under a condition, even when the condition has been fulfilled, or a vow of going to Rome to visit the sepulcher of St. Aloysius Gonzaga, or of going to Palestine to serve pilgrims, the sick, etc. 3. If they are not perfect by reason of liberty, for example, if they are emitted from fear, even light fear inflicted by another. 4. If they are not perfect by reason of matter, for example, a vow of not marrying, or a vow of chastity as to external acts only and not also as to internal acts, of a non-approved religion, or of a religion in which solemn vows are not made.

But although vows are reserved, nevertheless their circumstances are not reserved, for example, of making a pilgrimage by begging, of entering religion immediately, etc. Struggl 49 seqq.; L. 258, 261; cf. here 616. Bishops, and those having similar jurisdiction, can rightly dispense in reserved vows in urgent necessity, for instance if access to the Pope is not easy, and in delay there is danger of grave harm, either spiritual, as of violation of the vow, scandal, quarrels, or temporal, one's own or another's, namely grave infamy of a woman and similar things. The aforesaid faculty, which is probably granted to Bishops and to others to whom the power of dispensing in reserved vows has been communicated by them when necessity is urgent, is not granted to Confessors in the Jubilee who have from the Pope the faculty of dispensing in simple vows. But Mendicants have it. Moreover the aforesaid dispensation is not to be granted except insofar as necessity obliges; hence, if it is enough that the vow be suspended, it cannot be dispensed. Struggl 56; L. 258, l. 6, n. 987; Diana, tr. 1, de Dubiis Regular., r. 277.

A Bishop can dispense a spouse from a vow of perpetual chastity, emitted both before and after marriage, in order to asking the debt; because he can dispense from every impediment impeding the exercise of the conjugal act. Mendicant Confessors can do the same, and indeed both within and outside confession. L. 258, l. 6, nn. 986, 987. Although the faculty of dispensing from an oath is usually equated with, indeed associated with, the faculty of dispensing from a vow, nevertheless an oath of chastity, religion, etc., is not reserved. L. 259. Cf. 569.

What is commutation of a vow? - Commutation of a vow is: the substitution of one matter in the place of that which was promised by vow, made under the same obligation of the vow. But it can happen in a threefold way, namely into something better, into something equal, into something less. This faculty of commuting, however, like the faculty of dispensing, is understood without prejudice to a third party. For God does not hold ratified a dispensation or commutation unjust and injurious to another.

Who can commute vows? - He who has the power of dispensing in vows also has the power of commuting, because commutation is part of dispensation. R. 80, de R. I., in 6. Besides, according to R. 53, de R. I., in 6, "to whom what is greater is permitted, surely what is lesser is permitted," namely in the same genus. Yet he cannot dispense who has only the faculty of commuting, because the lesser does not contain what is greater. C. De peregrinationibus 1, C. Venientis 2, C. Magnae devotionis 7, de Vot.; Struggl 57; L. 246.

Can someone commute his own vow? - Anyone can by private authority, and without a special cause, commute his vow into a work evidently better, provided the Church has not prohibited this in the particular case; because while someone performs a work more perfect than the thing promised, by that very fact he observes what he had promised, since the perfect is eminently included in the more perfect. This is also clear from C. Pervenit 3, de Iureiurando. But that is judged better which conduces to the greater spiritual utility of the one vowing and to greater service of God.

Except, however, vows reserved to the Pope, unless the change is made into the religious state, as is established in C. Scripturae 4, de Voto. Except also unless the vow was made in favor of a third party, and the promise was accepted by him, because that commutation, which would be made with injury to another, cannot be pleasing to God. Except likewise penal vows, which are called preservative from sin, unless the future commutation is judged to be of such a sort that it restrains no less from committing sin than the prior matter of the vow. Pius IX, Encyclical Letter Gravibus Ecclesiae, 24 Dec. 1874, for the Jubilee of 1875.

Into a work evidently better. For he who emitted a vow cannot commute it by his own authority into a lesser good; for he must give to God whatever he promised. But whether he can change his vow into an equal good is controverted. The first opinion, more probable, denies from St. Thomas, "because commutation is a certain contract, which cannot be perfected without the consent of him who bears the place of God on earth, namely the Prelate." In 4 D. 38, q. 1, a. 4, q. 1. Then, because, the promise being supposed, it is judged to be more pleasing to God that the one vowing be faithful to him by performing rather the promised thing than another equal thing. Thus Sanchez, Cajetan, Covarruvias, Soto, etc. The second opinion, which Elbel, Tamburini, Sa, Bonacina, etc., hold, affirms. The reason is that God is presumed to accept a work equal as to substance, on account of divine benignity, at least so that the offering may be performed more cheerfully to him. Struggl 58; L. 243, 244, 536.

Can a priest delegated merely to commute vows commute them into a notably lesser work? - R. Negatively. The reason is that otherwise he would dispense in great part, and thus would exceed the faculty received. Yet the faculty of commuting vows is not to be interpreted so strictly that it is restricted to a work altogether equal; but it is to be taken in a broader sense, so that it sometimes extends itself to a lesser work. Otherwise it would be exposed to innumerable difficulties and scruples, since it is most difficult to find equality in things altogether disparate. Besides, commutation almost always must be made for the alleviation of him who has bound himself by vow. L. 247.

Merely to commute; but a faculty given of commuting vows by dispensing is not a faculty of dispensing absolutely, but is a faculty of commuting even into something less, and therefore of dispensing only in part. Otherwise it would be either a faculty simply of dispensing, or simply of commuting.

Is some cause required for commuting a vow into an equal or lesser work? - R. Affirmatively as to liceity, because otherwise a Prelate would use prodigally the power of commuting; and probably also as to validity, because the Prelate has a delegated faculty in this matter; for a delegate cannot validly dispense without a just cause. But commutation is a certain dispensation. Yet St. Alphonsus, n. 245, says that the opposite opinion is probable. The reason is that since there is no greater obligation toward men than that of supplying, so much more does this hold with God, with whom dealings are milder, or who deals more mildly with us.

Note: For commutation of a vow a lesser cause is required than for dispensation, because dispensation plainly frees from the obligation of a vow, while commutation substitutes another; and again a lesser cause is required for commuting into something equal than into something less. For the greater inclination of the person, or the lesser danger of transgressing the vow, suffices. L. 244.

After commutation has been made, is it licit to return to the first work? - R. Affirmatively, if the commutation was made into something less or equal, because the first work is equally pleasing to God, indeed it seems even more pleasing; and, more probably, even if it was made into something better, because commutation is made in favor of the one vowing. L. 248.

You will resolve: Although the one vowing has returned to the first work, nevertheless he can again return to the second substituted work. If commutation has been made several times into diverse works, the one vowing can choose whichever of them he prefers. L. 248.

Must you return to the first work if the second becomes impossible? - R. Negatively, if the change was made by the authority of another, even if it became impossible by your fault, because the prior obligation has been dissolved through the commutation itself.

R. Affirmatively, if you made the commutation according to your own judgment, because then the prior obligation is not dissolved, but is only supposed to be supplied by an equal or better one. L. 249; Gur. 335. But D'Annibale denies this, ed. 4, p. 3, nn. 201, 209, since by God's acceptance the prior obligation has been extinguished.

When a reserved vow has been commuted, does the substituted matter also remain reserved? - R. Negatively; thus commonly and more probably. The reason is that although the substituted matter has the same bond of the vow, nevertheless since it is by no means reserved in itself, it by no means draws with itself the reservation, which is attached only to the first matter. L. 260.

Does one having the faculty of commuting vows for others have it also for himself? - R. Affirmatively, as Sanchez, Bonacina, etc., commonly teach concerning the faculty of dispensing. L. 249, 256.

334. Commutation of a vow is the substitution of some work in place of the promised one. It can be made in a threefold way, namely into a better good, into an equal good, or into a lesser good.

Principles. I. Whoever has power, even simply delegated, of dispensing from vows, has by that very fact the faculty of commuting them; for he who can do more can also do less in the same genus. - But not conversely, because the greater power is not contained in the lesser. - St. Alphonsus, n. 246.

II. Anyone can, by private authority and without special cause, commute his vow into an evidently better work, provided the Church has not prohibited this in the particular case; because when someone performs a work more perfect than the thing promised, by that very fact he keeps what he had promised, since the perfect is included in the more perfect. This is clear also from canon law, c. 3, De Iureiurando. But that is judged better which conduces to the greater spiritual utility of the one vowing and to greater service of God. Nevertheless except vows reserved to the Pope, unless the change is made into the religious state. - St. Alphonsus, n. 243.

III. He who has emitted a vow cannot by his own authority commute it into a lesser good; for he must give God whatever he promised. - Thus all. - But whether he can change his vow into an equal good is disputed. Nevertheless the doctors commonly agree that this is lawful if the change is made into a certainly equal good, or probably a better good, although to avoid the danger of illusion it is always expedient that these things be done by the counsel of the confessor.

IV. A priest delegated merely to commute vows cannot commute them into a notably lesser work; because otherwise in great part he would dispense, and thus would exceed the faculty received. Yet the faculty of commuting vows is not to be interpreted so strictly that it is narrowed to an entirely equal work, but must be taken in a broader sense, so that it extends itself to a work somewhat lesser; otherwise it would be liable to innumerable difficulties and scruples, since it is very difficult to find equality in matters wholly disparate. Moreover commutation ought generally to be made for the relief of him who bound himself by vow. - St. Alphonsus, ibid., etc.

6. Trepidantius, doubting about a vow of perfect chastity emitted, seeks and obtains dispensation from the bishop. Then, weighing the matter better, he becomes altogether certain concerning the vow made.

Q. Must he seek dispensation again from the Supreme Pontiff?

R. Negatively. The reason: for a doubtful vow of chastity is not reserved. Therefore the bishop could dispense from it, who legitimately used the power which he had of dispensing in doubtful vows. "This," says Lugo, "seems to me most true: because otherwise the dispensation would have been vain; for dispensation is not made under the condition, if there was not a vow; but rather under the condition, if it was truly a vow; for if it was not a vow, it is not dispensable. Therefore, if the bishop can then dispense, he can remove the obligation, in the case in which it existed." De Poenit., d. 20, s. 2, n. 22. Cf. also Sanchez, who holds the same doctrine, In Decal., l. 4, c. 44, n. 3, 11; I. M. 620.

1002. 1. Notion. The commutation of a vow is the substitution of another work in place of that which had been promised, with the same obligation. Therefore in commutation the obligation of the vow is not relaxed, as in invalidation or dispensation, but, the bond of the vow remaining, the obligation contracted is transferred to another matter.

This commutation can be made in three ways: into a better work, into an equal work, into a less good work.

1003. 2. Conditions. For commutation two things are required: legitimate power and a just cause.

(A) Now (a) commutation into something better can be made even by the proper authority of the one vowing, unless a prescription of the Church or the good of a third party stands in the way; for what is better, that is, what contributes more, all things diligently considered, to the glory of God or the utility of the one vowing, includes in itself the less perfect, and without doubt is accepted by God.² But by the statute of the Church, reserved vows must be excepted, which cannot be commuted except into religious vows, and the vow of passing to a stricter religion. Likewise a vow in favor of a third party, accepted by him, cannot be commuted without his consent.

² Thus religious vows include the others in themselves, and therefore vows emitted in the world are extinguished by religious profession, or rather are commuted into it.

(b) Commutation into an equal work, according to the Code (can. 1314), does not require the intervention of a superior, but can be made by one's proper authority.

Thus an end is imposed on the controversy previously debated among theologians; and therefore we omit what we had written concerning this controversy.

Thus, for example, the daily recitation of the Rosary can be commuted into hearing Mass three or four times in the week; the fast of one day into one confession; the vow of a pilgrimage of one day into one fast, by applying the expenses of the pilgrimage to a pious work.

(c) Commutation into a lesser work, since it involves a true dispensation, cannot be made without the intervention of a superior. All those enjoy this faculty who have the power of dispensing, whether ordinary or delegated. - Those who have obtained only the power of commuting can use it for commuting vows into a morally equivalent work, or even into a work a little less good, but not into a notably lesser work.

1004. (B) As regards cause, a vow can be changed into something better without cause; into something equal, with a light cause, such as the greater devotion or utility of the one vowing; into something lesser, from a grave cause, which is required not only for liceity, but also for validity: this cause nevertheless can be less than that required for dispensation.

Moreover, once commutation has been made, it is licit to return to the first work, - even when this had been made into a better work, at least more probably: for commutation is a favor which no one is held to use. - Nevertheless, in practice inconstancy should carefully be avoided, which is found by no means rarely in pious women, and harms their progress not a little.

If the work into which the vow has been changed becomes impossible: (a) it is necessary to return to the first, if the commutation was made by one's own authority, because the obligation is not judged extinguished except by an equal or better work; (b) if the commutation was made by the authority of a superior, it is not necessary to return to the first work, because the prior obligation has been dissolved by the superior.

A vow ceases to bind when the time for which it was taken expires, or if a substantial change occurs in the object promised, or if a condition upon which the vow depends is not complied with, or its final cause fails, or, lastly, by irritation, dispensation, or commutation.¹

¹ C. I. C., can. 1311.

1. A vow ceases to oblige per cessationem if the circumstances under which, or the principal motive or purpose for which the vow was made (motivum principale), cease or change. An effect stops with its cause. Thus, if a person for whose recovery I vowed a pilgrimage, should die, or if I can not keep my promise because of changed conditions, or if circumstances supervene which at the outset would have prevented the vow from being taken, the obligation ceases.

In case of a conditional vow no obligation arises if the condition is not complied with. If it is complied with only in part, the obligation becomes modified accordingly.

Substantial error concerning the matter in- volved invalidates a vow, for a substantial mistake hinders consent of the will: consent is given to something which is not there, and hence there is no real consent.²

² Slater, A Manual of Moral Theol., Vol. I, p. 247.

2. Cessatio per irritationem or annulment is a declaration of nullity or suspension made by some one who has authority over the will of the vovens or the object of the vow.

An annulment is direct if the person who has made the vow is subject to the annulling authority, as a child to his parents, a religious to his superior, etc. “Those who are placed in such a state of dependency on their superiors cannot undertake any absolute obligation; they can only bind themselves conditionally, supposing that their superior consents. If he does not consent, the obligation falls to the ground.”³

³ IDEM, ibid., I, 251; cfr. Noldin, Summa Theol. Mor., II, pp. 241 sqq.

By indirect annulment the obligation can be suspended by any one who has authority over the matter of the vow; for, as the same author says, “it is not just that an obligation should be undertaken which interferes with the rights of some one else.”⁴

⁴ Slater, ibid., I, 252.

The vows of minor children, therefore, and those of religious, can be directly annulled, i. e., declared to be perpetually null and void, by their parents or superiors. The only exception is the vow whereby a religious has promised to enter a stricter order.

The vows of children who have attained majority but remain under the tutelage of their parents; the vows of spouses with regard to their marital rights and duties; the vows of ecclesiastical subjects in so far as they affect the personal or “real” rights of their superiors,—all these can be annulled indirectly, i. e., temporarily suspended.⁵ As soon as the person who has made a vow is able to dispose freely of the matter of the promise, the obligation takes effect.⁶

⁵ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, 324: “The obligation of a vow can cease: 1. From intrinsic causes, namely, by the cessation of the motivating cause, by a substantial change of the matter, and by physical or moral impossibility; 2. From extrinsic causes, namely, by annulment, dispensation, and commutation. . . . Annulment of a vow is its cancellation or suspension made by the one to whose power the will of the vower or the matter of the vow is subject. It is: 1. direct, if it falls directly upon the person of the vower; 2. indirect, if it falls only upon the matter of the vow.” Cfr. n. 325–327; also Noldin, Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 243.

⁶ H. Busembaum, S.J., Medulla Theol. Mor., l. III, tr. 2, c. 3, dub. 6, a. 2, n. 8: “Vows annulled only indirectly revive and oblige when they cease to prejudice another.”

To annul a vow arbitrarily, without sufficient reason, is valid but illicit.⁷

⁷ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 328: “Question: Can annulment be made without a cause? Answer: Yes as regards validity, because a master validly disposes of his own thing; but no as regards liceity, because spiritual progress is thus unreasonably impeded, etc.”

3. Cessatio per commutationem takes place when some other good work is substituted, under the same obligation, for a good work promised.⁸ To commute a vow validly and lawfully requires a just cause. The substituted good work may be better than the one originally promised, or of equal or less merit. The person who is under vow may commute it by his own authority into some good work which is evidently better than the one originally promised. This is called commutatio in melius. When there is doubt as to the quality of the good work substituted for the one promised, or when the latter turns out to be a work of merely equal (bonum aequale) or of less merit (minus bonum), the commutation must be made by the competent superior.⁹ But the self-chosen commutation of a vow into something which is of equal merit is morally permissible, and even in regard to the commutation of a vow into something relatively easier or of less value, the confessor should not decide adversely, since the value of the deed depends not so much upon the external good work actually performed, as upon the intention with which it is done and the intrinsic value of the work itself.¹⁰

⁸ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 332: “Commutation of a vow is the substitution of some work in place of the work promised. It can be made in three ways, namely: into a better good, into an equal good, or into a lesser good.” Cfr. Noldin, Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 251 sqq.

⁹ Gury, op. cit., I, n. 333: “Except vows reserved to the Pope, unless the change is made into the religious state.”—Ibid., n. 334: “One who has made a vow cannot commute it into a lesser good by his own authority, for he ought to give God whatever he promised. . . . Indeed, he cannot even change his vow into an equal good, because once the promise has been made, it is rightly deemed more pleasing to God that he perform the very thing promised out of fidelity than substitute another equal thing in its place according to his own judgment.”

¹⁰ Gury, op. cit., n. 334: “A priest delegated to commute vows cannot commute them into a notably lesser work, because otherwise he would dispense in great part and thus exceed the faculty received. Nevertheless, the faculty of commuting vows is not to be interpreted so strictly as to be restricted to a work altogether equal, but is to be accepted in a broad sense; otherwise it would be subject to innumerable difficulties and scruples, since it is most difficult to find equality in things altogether disparate. Moreover, the commutation ought to be made for the relief of the one who has bound himself by the vow.”

The rule, however, is that in all cases of com- mutation, even when the object of the vow is changed into some thing seemingly better than that originally promised, the individual should not follow his own opinion or inclination, but consult with his confessor or spiritual director.

A vow made on behalf of, and accepted by another, can be commuted only with that other’s consent.

One whose vow has been commuted is always free to return to his original promise (materia voti),¹¹ for the original good work is supposed to be better than, or of equal merit as, the one substituted therefor, and the commutation was a favor that may be freely renounced.¹²

¹¹ H. Busembaum, S.J., Medulla Theol. Mor., l. III, tr. 2, c. 3, dub. 7, n. 5: “If he whose vow has been changed should afterward prefer to fulfil the first work, he can do so, both because it is better or equal and because the change was made in his favor under the tacit condition, if it should please him.”

¹² St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. III, n. 248: “Although the vower has returned to the first work, he can nevertheless return again to the second work substituted. And furthermore, if commutation into different works has been made several times, the vower can choose whichever of them he prefers.” (Ed. Gaudé, I, 532).

When a vow has been commuted by ecclesiastical authority, its obligation is extinguished, or transferred to the new work, and does not revive even if the performance of the substituted good work is found to be impossible or useless. On the contrary, when the substitution has been made by private authority, and the performance of the substituted work is found to be impossible, the original obligation revives.¹³

¹³ H. Busembaum, S.J., Medulla, l. III, tr. 2, c. 3, dub. 7, n. 6: “If the matter or work of a vow legitimately commuted by a superior becomes impossible or indifferent, one is not bound to return to the former work, because the obligation has been extinguished.”—St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. III, n. 249: “Once a vow has been commuted, even if the substituted thing becomes impossible through the fault of the vower, or if he has not fulfilled it, he is not bound to the first thing; for example, a fast on a certain day was substituted for alms: if you then could not or would not fast, you sinned, but you are not bound to the alms, because through commutation the first obligation is extinguished. This does not hold, however, if the commutation is made by one’s own authority; for then, if the second work is not fulfilled, the first must be fulfilled, because the first obligation is not then extinguished, but is satisfied through a superabundant or at least equivalent fulfilment.”—Slater, A Manual of Mor. Theol., I, 256.

4. A vow ceases per dispensationem if it is condoned in the name of God by one who has spiritual jurisdiction in the external forum.¹⁴ Such a dispensation can be granted only by legitimate authority and for a just cause. As examples of a just and sufficient cause theologians give the following: the public good or the private spiritual advantage of him who is dispensed; unusual difficulty in the observance of the vow; the fact that the vow was taken with insufficient deliberation or at an immature age.¹⁵

¹⁴ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 328: “Dispensation from a vow is its absolute remission, made in the name of God by a legitimate superior.”—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 88, art. 10–12.—Slater, A Manual of Mor. Theol., I, 253.

¹⁵ Busembaum, Medulla Theol. Mor., l. III, tr. 2, c. 3, dub. 8, resp. 1: “For this [dispensation] to be valid, a just cause is required, such as, for example: 1. The good of the Church or the common good of the republic; 2. Notable difficulty in observing the vow; 3. Imperfection of the act, or the levity and facility from which the vow proceeded.”—Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 329: “For the validity of a dispensation a just cause is always required; because, since vows are made to God alone, a man cannot dispense from them except as a delegate; but a delegate cannot validly dispense without a sufficient reason.”—Cfr. St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. III, n. 250–253 (ed. Gaudé, I, 533); Noldin, Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 245 sqq.

Dispensation is a subject that properly belongs to Canon Law. We will only note that the Church claims and possesses the power of dispensing from vows;¹⁶ that she exercises this power through the Pope, the bishops, and the superiors of religious orders; and that parish priests and confessors have no jurisdiction in the external forum and, therefore, can dispense from vows by delegated authority only.

¹⁶ Wernz, Ius Decretalium, Vol. III, n. 584.

READINGS.—C. Kirchberg, De Voti Natura, pp. 93 sqq.—J. B. Wirthmüller, Die moralische Tugend der Religion, pp. 575 sqq.—F. A. Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. I, 6th ed., pp. 481 sqq.—J. B. Ferreres, S.J., Compendium Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 9th ed., pp. 283 sq.—Sabetti-Barrett, Comp. Theol. Mor., 27th ed., pp. 234 sqq.—J. B. Ferreres, S.J., Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 9th ed., pp. 279 sqq.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 239 sqq.—J. d’Annibale, Summula Theol. Mor., Vol. III, pp. 186 sqq.—E. Müller, Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 183 sqq.—A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, pp. 335 sqq.

I. Cessation from within. The obligation of a vow is taken away from within, not only by execution, but also by the extinction of the condition on which it depended, and by a mutation of the matter which becomes impeding of a good, or impossible, absolutely or morally. Cf. c. 1311.

An equivalent but not specific fulfillment of a condition does not suffice for the obligation, unless the intention of the one vowing carried something else. When the determinate thing which was promised perishes, another thing is not to be supplied ¹. But when the thing has been sold, generally the price is owed, because the one vowing is judged to have promised the thing with all its utility. Yet if a peculiar use, now impossible, was intended, for example of a mitre to be used by a bishop in a certain first solemnity, the obligation is taken away by sale of the mitre. But by voluntary sale against the vow he will sin. He who vowed something to be done at a certain time, when that time has passed, owes nothing, unless the time was added for urging the obligation; for example in a fast of thanksgiving.

A vow of a thing partially impossible obliges to the possible part, if the thing can and usually does conveniently be divided; otherwise it does not oblige. And the one vowing owes nothing who intended the whole by indivisibility, for example a church with a tower. Nor, if the principal part has become impossible, will the accessory parts remain: he who had determined to make an impeded pilgrimage in a hair-shirt does not have to wear the hair-shirt.

The vow also ceases when the final cause ceases, as was said concerning an oath.

¹ What if the promise was disjunctive: I shall give this or that, and either has perished? Although a disjunctive obligation does not of itself cease when one of the two remains possible, nevertheless it will often happen in vows that the loss of one of the two things renders the execution of the vow much more onerous, so that the obligation is thought to be taken away. Indeed many with St. Alphonsus himself, III, 224, admit that the vow always ceases if you have not yet chosen one of the two parts. Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, II, 620 and 651.

II. Cessation from without. From without, or by the intervention of ecclesiastical authority, a vow ceases by irritation, dispensation, and commutation.

1. Irritation of a vow is an act by which, with legitimate use of a power or right over the will of the one vowing, the vow is made void. In irritation, that general principle is applied: that one who is subject to the power of another cannot oblige himself validly by a vow, except insofar as this is not prejudicial to the right of the one to whom he is subject. Therefore the right of irritation belongs: to the father, with respect to children who are minors and not emancipated; to the tutor and mother, with respect to minors who are not emancipated; and probably also to paternal grandparents with respect to grandchildren who, lacking parents, remain under their power ¹. It belongs also to Superiors of religious, as to vows made after religious profession, excepting vows which are part of the religious profession and found the very faculty of irritating, and the vow of passing to a stricter religion: because that matter is withdrawn from the universal subjection of religious.

This faculty is not had with respect to novices. For c. 561, by which a novice is said to be subject to the power of the Master and Superiors, does not suffice for attributing that firm dominion which is required for irritation; and power under a higher law was denied. Cf. Suarez, De relig. Tr. 6, L. 6, c. 7, n. 11 and c. 11, n. 8; St. Alphonsus, l. 3, 233. The reason is that the power of irritating belongs to the Superior from the vow of obedience, which the novice lacks (Suarez, l. c.); nor can the private vow of a novice have the force of a religious vow and create a true Superior with dominative power ².

Does it belong to the husband with respect to the wife? The matter was controverted, nor did the Code settle the controversy. It depended on the way in which c. Noluit, C. XXXIII, q. 5, was to be interpreted. - This power affects all and only vows which were made during the time of subjection. But the fact that the one irritating consented to the vow does not stand in the way. If there is a right over the matter of the vow, the one irritating can suspend the obligation of the vow as long as the fulfillment of the vow brings prejudice to him (c. 1312). For the one vowing could not detract from the rights of another or strip himself of his own obligations. Wherefore this irritation can be used by a Superior and by the Master of novices with respect to novices.

¹ Why authors also mention the paternal grandfather we do not know. Cf. Arregui, n. 213; Genicot-Salsmans, I, 235.

² The case would be different of a religious passing over, who, from c. 635 §1, is bound to obey the Superiors and even the Master of novices also by reason of the vow of obedience. For although he can return to his former religion, this is in no way by a precarious title, such as that of other novices, but by the firm bond of obedience by which he is bound as a religious.

2. Dispensation of a vow. flows from the power which ecclesiastical authority has of relaxing, in the name of God, the debt on which is founded the application of the divine law which urges the fulfillment of a vow. This power is contained in the words: "Whatever you shall loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven" (Matt. 16, 19).

The faculty of dispensing non-reserved vows, provided that a right acquired by others is not injured, is conceded by canon 1313: 1) to local Ordinaries as to all their subjects, even pilgrims; 2) to the Superior (therefore also the local Superior) of an exempt clerical religion, as to professed religious, novices, or others equated in this matter by c. 514; 3) to others to whom the power of dispensing has been delegated by the Apostolic See.

Since dispensation is made in the name of God, it is always an act of an inferior, and therefore requires a just cause, such as, in this matter, besides the common good of the Church, of the state, of the family, the greater progress of the one vowing himself; danger of transgression, great difficulty of execution, great scruples in execution; the imperfection of the act which was effected inconsiderately.

Lest excessive scruples arise, authors judge valid the dispensation which is conceded in good faith with error concerning the sufficiency of the cause. The difficulty and inconveniences of retraction seem to complete the cause. Something else would have to be said if no cause had truly existed.

An acquired right, which an inferior to the Pope cannot take away, is had in vows in which a certain ratio of onerous contract intervenes, as in vows which are made in religion; it is had also in vows accepted by a third party and made principally for his utility. For if the honor of God was the principal cause of the obligation, the other did not acquire a right except dependently on God to whom the promise is to be kept. (Cf. St. Alphonsus, L. 3, 255; Lehmkuhl, I, 622.)

As c. 1309 itself insinuates, reservation is to be understood strictly. And therefore, in order that vows of chastity and of entering religion be reserved, they must be perfect by reason of the end, insofar as they are made from love of the work itself or virtue, and by reason of the object, insofar as the matter is had perfectly. The end is imperfect in vows made under a condition concerning the future (and this even after the condition has been fulfilled); in penal vows; in vows made from fear, even light fear.

Matter is lacking in vows under a light obligation, under a disjunctive obligation, unless each vow was reserved; in a vow of not marrying, of preserving virginity, if these are conceived as distinct from the vow of chastity, in a vow of temporary chastity.

By the new disposition of law, no vow is reserved of him who has not yet completed the eighteenth year of age.

Among those who are accustomed to be delegated by the Holy See are numbered confessors of mendicant Orders or of those similarly privileged, according to the concession and moderation of their Superiors; and the power can be exercised outside the Sacrament (St. Alphonsus, De privil., n. 109).

3. Commutation. is not, as dispensation is, an absolute condonation of a vow, but is the substitution of another honorable work in place of that which had been promised by vow.

"A work promised by a non-reserved vow can be commuted by the one vowing himself into a better or equal good; but into a lesser good by him to whom there is the power of dispensing according to the norm of c. 1313." These last words are added in order that they indicate the necessity of a just cause when a lesser work is substituted, and the caution to be observed of not injuring an acquired right. Commutation into a better work demands no cause. A light cause suffices that commutation be made into an equal work. Indeed, when this is done by authority of a Superior, a greater inclination to that work, a lesser danger of transgressing, suffice. And in doubt concerning equality, notable trouble in fulfilling the work suffices. That one may act more prudently, it is to be advised that commutation by one's own authority be done with the counsel of a confessor. "A better or equal good is that which, the circumstances having been considered, especially the condition of the one vowing, appears more or equally to conduce to the glory of God" (Arregui, n. 217). Therefore the absolute excellence of the work is not a sufficient criterion.

A faculty given of dispensing-commuting extends the faculty of commuting to some dispensation; a faculty of commuting-dispensing restricts the faculty of dispensing, since some work must be substituted.

Reserved vows, however, are excepted from the faculty of commuting just as from the faculty of dispensing.

For him whose vow has been commuted, it remains intact to return to the former work, since the commutation was made in his favor. But he does not have to return to it if the work commuted by authority has become impossible or useless.

When the cause does not seem sufficient for dispensing, the promised work can be partly dispensed, partly commuted.

N. B. If the obligation of the heir to the very real vow has passed and is of religion alone, whoever can dispense or commute the vow will be able to relax it; but if, from the testament of the one vowing, an obligation of justice has arisen, he alone will be able to take away the obligation who can condone pious legacies.

From c. 1315, by every religious profession vows emitted before are suspended as long as the one vowing remains in religion. Before the Code, all prior vows were taken away by solemn religious profession. Concerning simple profession nothing had been established in law. Therefore the present law is of greater extension but of milder efficacy.

But, just as before the Code, now also the religious will be able to commute all prior non-reserved vows into the profession, at least perpetual, or to obtain that they be authoritatively commuted into it.

Counsels concerning dispensation and commutation. 1. In the internal forum, it generally is better to mix dispensation with a certain commutation. 2. In prescribing commutations, care must be taken, without anxiety, that we preserve the intention of the one vowing and the spiritual utility of the prior work promised. Wherefore: 3. Although a work which the one vowing was already accustomed to do can juridically be imposed, this is regularly not to be done, because the intention of the one vowing was that he add something to his accustomed works. Except perhaps a vow, such as not marrying, by which mere permanence in a state already admitted is promised. Wherefore, binding to monthly confession already customarily being made will well supply such a vow. - 5. Commutation can be made into a work of a similar ratio, or into a work of a better ratio, according to the hierarchy of virtues, of which charity is queen. Thus more frequent Communion of itself surpasses simple abstinence. - 6. If the work has the ratio of remedy, a medicinal work is to be prescribed. Let fasting be converted, for example, into abstinence; - abstinence from meats into abstinence from wine, cider, use of tobacco, sweetmeats, with some prayer; - exterior penance, assumed for chastity, into suppression of dangerous reading (for example, of a love story), or of some worldly festivity. - 7. The difficulty to be avoided must also be attended to. If a distant pilgrimage has been promised, business or expenses can at times stand in the way of execution. If business, it will best be commuted into a nearer pilgrimage, with the monies that will be spared being given to the poor or to a pious work. If costs stand in the way, let a nearer pilgrimage be substituted, with a lesser alms or visitation of the poor added. - 8. Where a work has been promised merely as one of devotion, then these are almost commuted among themselves: a rosary, confession, communion, Mass, abstinence, fasting.

I. A vow,. 1. is "a deliberate and free promise, made to God, concerning a possible and better good" (c. 1307). A promise supposes the will of obligation; deliberation is necessary at least that which is required for sinning mortally, besides a capacity of estimation proportioned to the gravity of the thing. In order that it be wholly free, it must be immune from unjust fear and from error. And a vow vitiated by grave and unjust fear is null by the law itself, at least from c. 1307 §2. Probably null also is a vow which has been emitted from light but unjust fear alone. Error concerning the substance of the thing promised, concerning a condition so supposed that otherwise the vow would never have been emitted, concerning the final cause: makes the vow null. Indeed, in a merely individual vow, any error giving cause takes away the obligation; but a public vow is weakened only by substantial error. - A vow is made properly to God, but can be made in honor of the saints, when it has a cause in the honor rendered or desired for the saints. Besides, promises, approaching the obligation of a vow, can be made to the Blessed Virgin and to saints. - A vow can be made concerning only a good and one at least physically possible. And the good must be better, insofar as it is to be preferred to the voluntary omission of it, nor can the vow impede the faculty of doing what is better.

2. A vow is distinguished as absolute and conditioned, to which the penal is ascribed; real, personal, mixed; public and private; solemn and simple; private reserved and non-reserved. The relaxation of a public vow is defined by the legal regime. Reserved to the Holy See are private vows of perfect and perpetual chastity and of entering a religion of solemn vows, which were emitted absolutely and after the completed eighteenth year of age.

3. The reason for vowing proceeds from our inconstancy or mutability. Certain medicinal vows are to be advised, which, generally momentary, fortify petitions made to God; and vows which are fruitful seeds of good works.

By the faithful execution of vows, we praise and imitate the immovable sanctity of God.

II. 1. The nature of the obligation is of religion, by which we are forbidden to revoke an oblation made to God; its extension is gathered from the reasonable understanding of the formula applied, always inclining to more benign things; its force is demonstrated by the matter, unless someone, in private vows, has wished to lessen the obligation. According to the intention of the one vowing, matters coalesce or not. In a promised singular action, grave matter is thought to be that which, for the intended end, would be urged under grave obligation by divine or human law. But when a series of performances or actions is promised, coalescence is not to be urged as in the matter of justice; and several things must be distinguished according to that supreme rule of considering the gravity of the object from its intrinsic end, and of the parts from their relation to that end as to a whole. - He who doubts whether he has made a vow is presumed free; but he who, in a vow certainly emitted, doubts whether he was in possession of himself, is presumed to have been conscious. Yet if a positive reason makes probable a defect of deliberation, by a probable opinion he is excused from executing the vow.

2. Execution: a) When. A vow without a day must be fulfilled as soon as it conveniently can, yet in such a way that illicit delay does not become grave except because of danger of forgetfulness, inability, or notable diminution of the matter.

b) Through whom. A vow, as such, is always a strictly personal act. A personal vow can be fulfilled only by the one vowing; a real vow can also be fulfilled through another. A real vow, from c. 1310 §2, passes to heirs, who nevertheless, without a testament of the author or a right acquired by another, seem to be held by religion alone, not otherwise than the one vowing himself; cf. Quaest. de religione, n. 138. A vow of a community strictly and immediately obliges the Superior or those who vowed.

3. The violation of a vow differs specifically from sacrilege, and is graver than sacrilege or perjury, insofar as it more directly touches God. - Inconstancy itself in good purposes is not immune from light fault.

III. Cessation. A vow ceases from within by execution, by the removal of the condition or final cause, by a mutation of the matter which becomes impeding of a good or impossible. - From without it ceases: a) by irritation, or the use of a contrary right, which, with respect to a non-emancipated minor, the father, tutor, or mother has; the religious Superior has with respect to subjects for vows made after profession, and probably the husband with respect to the wife. These have a right over the person; wherefore they can validly irritate all vows, even internal and for future time, which were made during the time of subjection: this irritation is called direct. If the right falls upon the matter alone, the one irritating can merely suspend the obligation of the vow as long as the fulfillment of the vow would harm his right; - b) by dispensation, or full condonation, which, divinely conceded by the words "whatever you shall loose," always demands a just cause, whether of the public or private order, yet is judged valid if it was conceded in good faith with error concerning the sufficiency of the cause. However, an acquired right of a third party, only the Pope can take away, on account of a public cause. Non-reserved vows, by canon 1313 itself, can be dispensed by local Ordinaries, by the Superior of an exempt clerical religion, by others (for example confessors of mendicant Orders) to whom the Apostolic See has delegated the power. This also is not rarely extended to reserved vows; - c) by commutation, or substitution of another honorable work in place of that which had been promised by vow. A non-reserved vow can be commuted into a better or also equal work by the one vowing himself; into a lesser good, by him to whom the faculty of dispensing belongs. For him to whom the vow has been commuted, it remains intact to return to the former work. - Moreover, by religious profession all vows previously emitted are suspended, as long as the one vowing remains in religion (c. 1315); he can also commute the same into religious profession, at least perpetual. It is generally better to mix dispensation with a certain commutation.

409. Preliminary note. A vow can cease in two ways: 1. intrinsically, namely, a) from a change of matter or b) from the cessation of the end; 2. extrinsically, namely, through the intervention of legitimate authority; this indeed can occur a) through invalidation, b) through dispensation, and c) through commutation. The cessation of a vow, or at least of its obligation, through extrinsic authority will be treated in the following paragraphs; now the cessation of a vow intrinsically is to be treated briefly.

General rule. A (private) vow ceases intrinsically when so great a change has supervened either on the part of the person vowing or of the matter promised that, had it been present from the beginning, it certainly would have impeded the vow; or, as St. Thomas⁴⁰⁴ briefly says: "That which would impede a vow from being made if it were present also removes the obligation after the vow has been made."

The reason is that a private vow does not oblige beyond the intention of the person vowing. But the person vowing is deservedly presumed not to have wished to bind himself in the case in which a notable change should occur either on his own part or on the part of the matter. For every vow, since it concerns a better good, essentially requires suitable matter, concerning which there was discussion above in n. 399. Therefore, just as a vow is null if the matter was unsuitable from the beginning, so a vow ceases when matter previously suitable afterwards becomes unsuitable. St. Thomas⁴⁰⁵ writes to the point: "He who vows in a certain manner establishes for himself a law binding himself to something which is good in itself and in most cases. It can happen, however, that in some case it is either simply evil, or useless, or an impediment to a greater good; which is contrary to the nature of that which falls under a vow. And therefore it is necessary that in such a case it be determined that the vow is not to be observed."

⁴⁰⁴ IV, dist. 38, q. 1, sol. 1 ad 1.

⁴⁰⁵ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 10.

410. 1. On the part of the person vowing, a notable change causing the obligation of a vow to cease is present, e.g., in the following cases:

a) if a rich man vowed alms but afterwards himself becomes poor, he is now freed from the vow;

b) if someone vowed entrance into a monastery but afterwards falls into a grave and incurable illness, he is no longer bound by his vow;

c) if someone vowed to receive Communion on a stated day, but on this day broke the natural fast, he now neither can nor is bound to receive Communion without fasting;

d) if someone vowed to make a pilgrimage on a fixed day, but on that day he must altogether attend to his sick father, he is no longer bound to the vow.

One who before lacked temptations but now is agitated by most vehement temptations against chastity is not, however, freed from a vow of chastity made. For he could and ought to have foreseen this change.

2. On the part of the matter promised, a notable change is present, e.g., in the following cases:

a) if the matter becomes illicit, e.g., if someone promised by vow to give alms to a determined poor man whom he knows will now abuse the alms received in order to become drunk;

b) if the matter becomes impossible (physically or morally), e.g., if someone vowed the construction of a chapel in some place and the civil government strictly prohibits this construction;⁴⁰⁶

c) if the matter becomes useless relative to the principal end intended by the person vowing; e.g., if someone vowed a pilgrimage in order to recover the health of his father, he is no longer bound to the vow if the father has died in the meantime; or one who vowed not to enter some house because of a seductive girl dwelling there is now freed from the vow if that girl has died or dwells elsewhere. But if the matter has become useless relative to the secondary end intended by the person vowing, the vow does not cease. Hence, e.g., if someone vowed to give certain alms each week, and he who until now received those alms has died, the vow does not thereby cease, since the determined person of the poor man was not the principal but the secondary end of the vow.

Note. No public vow ceases because of intrinsic causes. Hence essential vows made in approved religious institutes and the vow of chastity in the reception of the subdiaconate do not cease because of a notable change on the part of the person vowing or on the part of the matter. The reason is that otherwise many inconveniences would arise both for the person vowing himself and for religious institutes. Moreover, if there is an urgent reason for obtaining a relaxation of vows of this kind, a legitimate dispensation can be obtained. It is evident of itself that temporary vows, whether private or public, cease when the time of the vows has elapsed.

⁴⁰⁶ Cf. the things said above in n. 399(b) concerning matter partly possible and partly impossible.

411. Definition. Invalidation of a vow is its annulment or suspension made by one who has dominative power⁴⁰⁷ over the will of the person vowing or at least over the matter of the vow. Invalidation, therefore, is an act of dominative power and not of jurisdiction. According as this dominative power is exercised either over the will of the person vowing or over the matter of the vow, a twofold invalidation is distinguished: the one direct, or properly so called, which is the annulment of a vow made by one who has dominative power over the will of the person vowing, e.g., by a father with respect to all the vows of his children before puberty; the other indirect, or improper, which is not the direct annulment of the vow but its suspension made by one who has dominative power over the matter of the vow. Thus a master can indirectly invalidate vows of servants which impede the service owed.

⁴⁰⁷ I.e., dominion (Verfügungsrecht).

412. Principle 1. Direct invalidation entirely extinguishes the vow; indirect invalidation, however, only suspends the obligation of the vow.

Thus from positive law,⁴⁰⁸ which, however, is founded upon natural law.

For direct invalidation dissolves the act itself of the vow and renders it, as it were, not done; but indirect invalidation does not touch the act itself of the vow (which consequently remains intact), but only the matter of the vow. But it can easily happen that this matter of the vow is afterwards withdrawn from the power of the one invalidating. Then, however, a vow thus indirectly invalidated revives again. Hence, e.g., if a father directly invalidated the vow of his son before puberty to enter a monastery, this vow is entirely extinguished; but if a master indirectly invalidated the vow of a maidservant who promised to assist at Mass daily, this vow revives after the maidservant leaves the service of her master.

⁴⁰⁸ Code of Canon Law, c. 1312.

413. Principle 2. For the valid invalidation (whether direct or indirect) of vows, no sufficient cause is required; but for lawful invalidation a sufficient cause is required.

All authors agree concerning the first part of this principle; for the vows of subjects always involve this tacit condition: unless my superior should contradict.⁴⁰⁹ But a superior can always validly exercise the power belonging to him. The other part of the principle was disputed. St. Antoninus,⁴¹⁰ Sylvester Prierias,⁴¹¹ Cajetan,⁴¹² Suarez,⁴¹³ the Salmanticenses,⁴¹⁴ etc., teach that a cause is not required even for lawful invalidation. The reason is that the vows of subjects are always made with the tacit condition of the superior's consent. But the superior is compelled by no right to furnish this consent, but can deny it according to his judgment; just as, if someone were to promise alms from the goods of another under the condition that the owner should give consent, the owner can freely deny this consent without any cause. On the contrary, Dominic Soto,⁴¹⁵ Sanchez,⁴¹⁶ Lessius,⁴¹⁷ Laymann,⁴¹⁸ and others teach that a cause is required for lawful invalidation, because otherwise the superior would impede without sufficient reason both the worship rendered to God through the vow and the utility of the subject arising from the fulfillment of the vow. This second opinion is now to be held, since the Code of Canon Law, c. 1312, § 1, establishes: "One who legitimately exercises dominative power over the will of the person vowing can render his vows invalid validly, and also lawfully for a just cause." All authors teach, however, that an unreasonable invalidation of a vow does not of itself exceed the measure of venial fault, but per accidens, e.g., if it causes grave harm or is done from contempt of religion, it is a grave sin.

Likewise, he who without sufficient reason seeks the invalidation of a vow from a competent superior sins only venially.⁴¹⁹

⁴⁰⁹ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 8 ad 1 and 2.

⁴¹⁰ S. theol. P. 2, tit. 11, c. 2.

⁴¹¹ Summa Summ., s.v. "vow," c. 4; but he does not speak so clearly.

⁴¹² Summula, s.v. "vow."

⁴¹³ In 3, disp. 4, sect. 2.

⁴¹⁴ Curs. theol. mor. tr. 17, c. 3, n. 31.

⁴¹⁵ De iure et iust. l. 7, q. 3, a. 1.

⁴¹⁶ In Decal. l. 4, c. 24, n. 13.

⁴¹⁷ De iust. et iure l. 2, c. 40, dub. 10.

⁴¹⁸ Theol. mor. l. 4, tr. 4, c. 7, n. 18.

⁴¹⁹ Cf. Billuart, De relig. diss. 4, a. 8, § 3.

414. Principle 3. One who has the power of directly invalidating some vow, even if he gave the subject permission to vow, or promised that he would not invalidate his vow, or finally expressly approved the vow made, can nevertheless afterwards invalidate this vow. But one who has only the power of indirectly invalidating, once permission or approval of the vow has been granted, can no longer invalidate it.

The reason for the first part is that, notwithstanding the permission given or the promise and approval made, the superior does not cease to govern the subject in all his acts and retains full dominion over the will of the subject. Therefore he can also use his power of invalidating the vow made, especially if a sufficient reason is present. This doctrine is confirmed by the fact that the successor of this superior can certainly invalidate that vow. And yet this successor does not have greater power than his predecessor.⁴²⁰ Concerning the other part, the older authors dispute at great length.⁴²¹ The proposed opinion seems to me more probable. For one who has only the power of indirectly invalidating vows cannot dispose of the will of the person vowing, but only of the matter of the vow. But he permitted this matter to be handed over to God through the vow of the subject. Therefore he can no longer make any disposition of this matter by revoking the vow made by the subject.⁴²²

⁴²⁰ Suarez (De voto c. 6, nn. 15ff.), Concina (In Decal. l. 4, diss. 3, c. 5, n. 6), and others indeed admit this doctrine if it concerns the power of a religious superior; but not if it concerns paternal power.

⁴²¹ Cf. Cajetan, Comm. in 2, 2, q. 88, a. 8.

⁴²² Cf. Billuart, De relig. diss. 4, a. 8, § 3.

415. Invalidation of a vow of conjugal chastity. From the things said follows the solution of a case proposed by St. Alphonsus:⁴²³ Two spouses, with mutual consent after marriage had been contracted, made a vow of continence. The husband, perceiving that there is a grave danger of incontinence in his wife, directly invalidates her vow by virtue of the dominative power which he is said to have over the will of his wife. After the wife has thus been freed from her vow, she has the right of seeking the debt from her husband. But since he is still bound by the vow of chastity, his wife indirectly invalidates his vow, and thus both spouses are no longer bound by the vow of continence made with mutual consent. St. Alphonsus favors the opinion of those who say that this manner of acting is lawful, yet he concludes in these words: "Since this opinion is against the common opinion, ... I leave it to the wise to determine." Gury-Ballerini⁴²⁴ calls this opinion safe. Likewise Lehmkuhl⁴²⁵ favors this opinion, yet adds: "Nevertheless I would counsel that, at least for greater caution, a dispensation also be sought afterwards." Unless there is grave danger in delay, this opinion does not seem able to be safely put into practice, since this manner of acting is a dangerous evasion of the vow and deception of God. For in this manner spouses could very easily free themselves mutually from every vow. Moreover, St. Augustine⁴²⁶ already writes concerning the same case to Ecdicia, who had made a vow of chastity with her husband: "For that which you both with equal consent had vowed to God, you both ought perseveringly to have rendered even unto the end." Add that authors commonly teach that in this case a dispensation from the vow is to be sought from legitimate authority. But it is not safe to act against the common opinion.

⁴²³ Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 239.

⁴²⁴ Comp. theol. mor. I, n. 331, at the end.

⁴²⁵ Theol. mor. I, n. 612.

⁴²⁶ Ep. 262 (199); Migne, Patr. lat. 33, 1078.

416. Who can directly invalidate vows?

Only he who has dominative power over the will itself of the person vowing, as was said above. Such dominative power is possessed by:

1. The Pope, bishops, and a religious superior (superioress), over professed religious.

For religious in their profession freely vowed obedience to legitimate superiors, and thus subjected themselves to them, so that they can perform no act without their express or at least tacit consent.

The Pope is the supreme superior of all professed religious and therefore has most perfect power over them. This power, however, extends only to those who have made the vow of obedience. Therefore it does not extend to novices not yet professed, and a fortiori not to ordinary faithful, whose vows the Pope can indeed dispense by virtue of his most perfect jurisdiction, but cannot invalidate, since he lacks dominative power over their wills.

Since, according to the present discipline, bishops are sometimes superiors properly so called of women religious, the same dominative power seems to belong to them, so that they can invalidate the private vows of such women subject to them in diocesan institutes.

Religious superiors who can invalidate the private vows of their professed subjects are the general, provincial, and local superior. Certain restrictions, however, are to be added: a) An inferior prelate cannot invalidate those vows of his subjects which have already been ratified by a superior prelate. b) A religious superior cannot invalidate a subject's vow of passing to a stricter religious institute. The reason is not only the positive statute of the Church,⁴²⁷ but also the liberty of choosing a state of life, especially a more perfect one. For just as no one can be prohibited from choosing the religious state, so neither is it lawful to impede a suitable person from choosing a stricter and more perfect religious state. Hence the Salmanticenses and Noldin⁴²⁸ deservedly teach that not even the Supreme Pontiff can invalidate a vow of passing to a more perfect religious state. c) A religious superior cannot invalidate the public vows of his subjects, such as the three essential vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience. The reason is that through such vows an onerous contract is entered between the religious and the institute. This contract cannot be dissolved by a superior, at least through his dominative power. d) Certain authors, such as Cajetan⁴²⁹ and Sylvester Prierias,⁴³⁰ teach that the private vows of religious which in no way disturb the governance of the superior, e.g., of saying no idle word, of making certain ejaculatory prayers, of exercising certain interior pious acts, etc., cannot in any way be invalidated, but can only be commuted by superiors, because the will of a religious is not totally subject to the superior, but only according to the profession of the Rule. Whatever may be the theoretical truth of this opinion, in practice a religious superior can, when a reasonable cause exists, invalidate at least indirectly absolutely all the vows of his subjects, because any private vow of a professed religious can at some time impede those things which the superior considers necessary for governance. Therefore St. Thomas⁴³¹ also says without any limitation: "Even if someone [a religious] can do something for an hour when he is not occupied with other things by the prelate, nevertheless, because no time is excepted in which the prelate cannot occupy him about something, no vow of a religious is firm unless it is made with the consent of the prelate."

Superioresses also can invalidate the vows of their professed subjects, because they have true dominative power, although they lack ecclesiastical jurisdiction properly so called.⁴³²

⁴²⁷ Cf. c. 18, X 3, 31.

⁴²⁸ De praeceptis n. 220. Salmanticenses, Curs. theol. mor. tr. 17, c. 3, n. 38; cf. also above, n. 398.

⁴²⁹ Comm. in 2, 2, q. 88, a. 8 and q. 104, a. 5.

⁴³⁰ Summa Summ., s.v. "vow," c. 3, q. 3.

⁴³¹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 8 ad 3.

⁴³² Certain theologians, such as Cardinal Gennari (Quest. can. n. 469) and Ojetti (Synopsis rer. mor. n. 2533, near the end), undeservedly think that the private vows of those simply professed cannot be directly invalidated by superiors. For superiors have dominative power over the will even of those simply professed (c. 501). But nothing further is required by the Code of Canon Law, c. 1312, § 1, for direct invalidation.

417. 2. A father can directly invalidate all vows made by his children before puberty.⁴³³

Puberty is considered to occur for males in the fourteenth year of age, but for females in the twelfth year of age.⁴³⁴ If the father is absent or consents, the same right belongs to the mother, guardian, and generally to all who succeed to the rights of the father.⁴³⁵ This paternal power of invalidating the vows of children is derived from several texts of the old canon law,⁴³⁶ and moreover is derived from natural law itself. For those before puberty at that tender age are customarily of weaker judgment and reason; and therefore it is considered equitable both in ecclesiastical law and in civil laws that all their acts be rescindable by the father or one acting in his place.

Concerning this paternal power, two things are to be noted: a) Vows made by one before puberty can be invalidated by the father not only during the child's prepuberty, but also afterwards, provided that the person vowing, having reached puberty, has not ratified them, and indeed by a new vow independent of the first vow. Thus the more common opinion.⁴³⁷ But for the person vowing to be considered to ratify his vow in this manner, it is necessary that he be conscious that the first vow is subject to invalidation and that he will to bind himself anew, just as if he had never been bound. Therefore it does not suffice that he either began to fulfill the prior vow or frequently renewed it. For this is to approve the prior infirm bond, not to undertake a new and firm one. b) Absolutely no vow made by one before puberty is excepted from the paternal power of invalidation. Hence a father can invalidate even reserved vows, e.g., a vow of entering an approved order.

Certain authors, such as Vermeersch,⁴³⁸ Génicot-Salsmans,⁴³⁹ and Arregui,⁴⁴⁰ think that the vows not only of those before puberty but also of unemancipated minors can be directly invalidated by the father or those acting in his place. The argument for this opinion drawn from the Code of Canon Law, c. 89, seems weak.

⁴³³ S. theol., l.c., a. 9.

⁴³⁴ Code of Canon Law, c. 88, § 2.

⁴³⁵ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 230.

⁴³⁶ Cf. c. 15, C. 22, q. 5; c. 14, C. 32, q. 2; c. 2, X 3, 33.

⁴³⁷ Cf. Billuart, De relig. diss. 4, a. 3, § 2.

⁴³⁸ Theol. mor. II, n. 224.

⁴³⁹ Theol. mor. I, n. 325.

⁴⁴⁰ Summarium n. 213.

418. 3. Whether a husband can directly invalidate all vows made by his wife during marriage is greatly disputed.

Many affirm it,⁴⁴¹ because the man is the head of the woman and therefore has dominative power over her will. The negative opinion, however, seems to be truer and more common, because the subjection of the wife arising from marriage extends only to matrimonial duties, but not to absolutely all her acts. Moreover, the right of the husband is sufficiently and completely preserved if the power of indirectly invalidating the vows of his wife belongs to him. But the arguments which are brought forward for the husband's power of directly invalidating all the vows of his wife are not convincing. For the text cited from Num. 30:7-16 is not so clear, and then it seems to contain only a judicial precept of the Old Law, which no longer obliges. Moreover, that complete subjection and dependence of the wife upon the husband is founded upon no law: not upon natural law, because women are endowed with greater firmness of judgment than those before puberty, and indeed sometimes surpass their husbands themselves in ability; not upon positive law, for no such law exists; finally, not upon the contract and bond of marriage, since these extend only to the use of the body and the administration of the family.⁴⁴² Therefore the vows of a wife can be invalidated by her husband only indirectly, i.e., by reason of their matter, insofar as they obstruct him in the use of marriage, the administration of the family, or the governance of household affairs, e.g., a wife's vow of continence, of many prayers, pilgrimages, mortifications, alms, etc. But those vows (whether personal or real) which in no way derogate from marital rights, such as, e.g., vows of certain prayers or of alms from free paraphernal goods, cannot be invalidated by the husband. A fortiori, the husband cannot invalidate the vows of his wife concerning things prescribed from another source, e.g., of hearing Mass on feast days, of not lying, etc.

⁴⁴¹ St. Alphonsus (l.c., n. 234) calls this opinion more probable and cites for it St. Thomas, Dominic Soto, Sanchez, Peter Ledesma, the Salmanticenses, and several others. Certainly, considered at first sight, the words of St. Thomas teach this opinion: "No vow of a religious is firm unless it is made with the consent of the prelate. Likewise neither is the vow of a girl living in the house, unless it is made with the consent of her father; nor of a wife, unless it is made with the consent of her husband" (S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 8 ad 3). But nevertheless commentators more commonly explain the Angelic Doctor as speaking here only of the indirect invalidation of the vows of a wife (cf. Billuart, l.c.).

⁴⁴² Cf. Billuart, l.c., § 2.

419. Who can indirectly invalidate vows?

Every superior who has power over the matter of the vow can indirectly invalidate the vows of subjects which injure his right. The reason is that a vow cannot injure the right of another, and no one can firmly promise something over which he does not have full dominion. Hence:

1. The Supreme Pontiff can indirectly invalidate any vows whatsoever of the faithful which prejudice his rights, and notably vows made concerning ecclesiastical goods, since he is the supreme administrator of ecclesiastical goods.

2. Parents can indirectly invalidate vows of their children who have reached puberty but are not yet exempt, which impede the free and lawful administration of the family, e.g., a vow of a distant pilgrimage.⁴⁴³

3. A religious superior can indirectly invalidate the vows of novices which impede the discipline of the novitiate. But private vows which a professed religious may have made before his profession are suspended and therefore indirectly invalidated by the law itself for as long as the person vowing remains in religion.⁴⁴⁴

4. A husband can indirectly invalidate all vows of his wife, even those made before marriage, which are opposed to his matrimonial rights, as was said above. The same applies to a wife with respect to the vows of her husband; e.g., a wife can indirectly invalidate a vow of her husband by which otherwise he would be incapable of rendering the conjugal debt.

5. A master or lord can indirectly invalidate vows of servants and subjects which obstruct the service owed or the obedience owed, e.g., of visiting a church daily.

⁴⁴³ Cf. S. theol., l.c., ad 2.

⁴⁴⁴ Code of Canon Law, c. 1315.

420. Definition. Dispensation can be defined: the relaxation of the obligation of a vow, made in the name of God by one having competent jurisdiction. From this definition appears the great difference between dispensation and invalidation. For:

1. Dispensation is made in the name of God, whereas invalidation is made in the name of the one invalidating.

2. Dispensation supposes jurisdiction exercised in the name of God; invalidation, however, requires no jurisdiction, but requires dominative power either over the will of the person vowing or over the thing promised by vow. Hence a woman having dominative power can indeed invalidate the vows of subjects, but can never dispense, as being without ecclesiastical jurisdiction.

3. A just cause is required for a valid dispensation, because dispensation is exercised in the name of God. But the just God cannot approve a dispensation granted without sufficient cause; for valid invalidation, however, no cause is required, as was said above, since anyone can use his dominative power even without cause.

4. The invalidation of a vow can be made against the will of the person vowing himself; but dispensation supposes the consent of him who made the vow, since he imposed upon himself the obligation of the vow. Thus at least if it concerns dispensation from a private vow.

All these things indeed are agreed among all, but it is not so agreed in what precisely the essence of dispensation consists, and whether a legitimate dispensation totally destroys the vow made, or only suspends its obligation.⁴⁴⁵ This indeed seems certain: dispensation is not a mere declaration or interpretation of the non-obligation of a vow. For such a declaration would either be doctrinal, and then it could be made by any prudent man without the power of jurisdiction being necessary, which is false; or it would be authentic, but in the style of the Roman Curia no indication of such an authentic declaration is found. According to modern practice, not only the obligation of the vow but also the vow itself is customarily removed through dispensation.

⁴⁴⁵ Gestaltung einer Ausnahme; cf. Stiegler, Dispensation etc. im Kirchenrecht I, Mainz 1901, 24 and 40.

421. Requisites for dispensing. For dispensing validly two things are required: a just cause and the faculty of dispensing.

1. A just cause is required both for the lawful and for the valid dispensation of a vow, as was already said.

For the one dispensing acts not in his own name (as does the one invalidating), but in the name of God. But a manifest injury would be inflicted upon God if that which had been promised to Him in a vow were not performed without sufficient reason or were removed through a frivolous dispensation. Hence both the one dispensing and the one dispensed sin by employing a dispensation without sufficient cause. The Angelic Doctor,⁴⁴⁶ however, notes that the one dispensed can and ought to acquiesce in the judgment of the dispensing superior concerning the sufficiency of the cause of dispensation (and not in his own judgment), because he himself does not act in the place of God, but the superior does. If, however, the cause of dispensation were evidently insufficient, the subject dispensed could not lawfully use the dispensation thus granted.⁴⁴⁷

What causes are sufficient for dispensing? Innocent III⁴⁴⁸ admonishes that three things are to be attended to in the dispensation of vows: 1. what is lawful according to equity; 2. what is becoming according to uprightness; 3. what is expedient according to utility. In ancient times dispensation (at least in greater vows) was not customarily granted except for public causes and the common good; but in our days all vows are dispensed even for a private cause and good. All causes for dispensing can be reduced to two classes, namely, to the utility of the Church or community and to the utility or necessity of the person vowing. Thus, e.g., a dispensation from a public vow of chastity and other religious vows is granted if a member of some religious institute, because of a dissolute life, causes scandal to the whole community. A dispensation is granted if the person vowing is in grave danger of transgressing the vow; if he suffers a great and unforeseen difficulty in observing the vow; if he is troubled by great scruples because of the vow made; if the vow was made without perfect deliberation or liberty, namely, precipitately or under the influence of fear, even light fear.⁴⁴⁹ Generally speaking, a superior ought not to be too tormented by scruples concerning the sufficiency of a cause for dispensing. For if a subject greatly insists upon obtaining a dispensation and cannot be turned away from petitioning for a dispensation, he is ordinarily already in grave danger of transgressing the vow, and therefore a sufficient cause for dispensing is present. Hence, according to the present discipline, even the Sacred Congregation of Religious grants religious a dispensation from vows if they seriously declare that they are incapable of living any longer in such an institute.

⁴⁴⁶ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 12 ad 2.

⁴⁴⁷ St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 251.

⁴⁴⁸ C. 5, X 3, 34.

⁴⁴⁹ St. Alphonsus, l.c., nn. 252-253.

422. 2. The faculty of dispensing from vows certainly belongs to the Church; this is established both from Sacred Scripture and from the perpetual practice of the Church.

Christ, speaking to Peter, said: "I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven. And whatsoever thou shalt loose upon earth, it shall be loosed also in heaven."⁴⁵⁰ Since these words are general, they must be understood concerning every bond which man can contract toward God. And in truth, just as in the name of God the Church can remit sins and the punishments of sins, although God has a strict right of exacting satisfaction and punishment for sins, so a fortiori the faculty of remitting for just causes an obligation arising from a vow belongs to the Church. This faculty of dispensing has also always been in use in the Church from the most ancient times. In the first centuries there did not indeed occur so many dispensations from vows, but the Holy Fathers knew them, which were sometimes called absolution or oikonomia.⁴⁵¹ But it would be rash and indeed heretical to assert that the Church for so many centuries had usurped for itself a power which does not belong to it.

In the Church this faculty of dispensing is exercised by: 1. the Supreme Pontiff with respect to all the Christian faithful; 2. the local Ordinary and the superior of an exempt clerical religious institute⁴⁵² with respect to their own subjects, yet with dependence upon the Supreme Pontiff and with certain limitations; 3. all who have legitimate delegation. Since the faculty of dispensing supposes not the power of orders but ecclesiastical jurisdiction, whoever is capable of ecclesiastical jurisdiction can also (at least by delegation) exercise the faculty of dispensing.

⁴⁵⁰ Matt. 16:19.

⁴⁵¹ Cf. Stiegler, l.c., 3ff.

⁴⁵² Code of Canon Law, c. 1313.

423. The Supreme Pontiff, having the most ample jurisdiction, also has the most ample faculty of dispensing from vows. Hence St. Thomas⁴⁵³ says: "Because the Supreme Pontiff acts fully in the place of Christ in the whole Church, he has the plenitude of the power of dispensing in all dispensable vows." Therefore the Angelic Doctor seems to suppose that not all vows are dispensable. And in truth there is a difficulty concerning how the Pope can dispense 1. from solemn vows; 2. from vows made for the utility of a third person.

Solemn religious vows consist in a certain consecration and are probably of divine law, as was said above in n. 391. For this reason, in the thirteenth century, the doctors (thinking that a thing once consecrated could no longer be desecrated if it remained intact) denied to the Supreme Pontiff the faculty of dispensing from solemn vows. Indeed, Innocent III himself,⁴⁵⁴ speaking of the dispensation of vows of this kind, wrote: "Nor should the abbot think that he can dispense with some monk concerning the possession of property; because the renunciation of property and the custody of chastity are so annexed to the monastic rule that not even the Supreme Pontiff can grant permission against it." St. Thomas,⁴⁵⁵ St. Raymond,⁴⁵⁶ St. Bonaventure,⁴⁵⁷ Blessed Albert the Great,⁴⁵⁸ and many others defend this opinion. Nevertheless, it is certain that the Supreme Pontiffs have often granted permission that religious of either sex, after solemn profession had been made, might lawfully and validly enter marriage. Indeed, Leo XIII⁴⁵⁹ gave a general faculty of dispensing with the dying who, notwithstanding solemn vows, attempted marriage; this faculty the Code of Canon Law, cc. 1043-1045, has further enlarged. But it is rash to assert that so many Supreme Pontiffs arrogated to themselves some power of dispensing which in no way belongs to them. Even before the times of St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, certain Supreme Pontiffs are said to have permitted marriage to solemnly professed religious; e.g., Celestine III permitted the nun Constance, daughter of Roger of Sicily, to marry Emperor Henry VI; Benedict IX is said to have made a similar concession to Casimir, King of Poland, and Ramiro, King of Aragon.⁴⁶⁰

Vows made in favor of some third person (whether physical or moral), e.g., a vow of giving alms to a determined person, not even the Supreme Pontiff can of himself dispense if that person has accepted the promise confirmed by the vow and is not subject to the dominative power of the Pope. The reason is that through such a dispensation the strict acquired right of the third party, and consequently natural law itself, would be injured. In the following cases, however, the Pope and his delegate can dispense even from vows made for the utility of a third party:

1. if that third party has freely renounced his right. This is evident of itself, since then no injury of a right is now present.

2. if that third party is a religious person or an ecclesiastical institute. For the Supreme Pontiff has full administration of ecclesiastical goods and consequently can, for sufficient reasons, dispose of the rights of all religious (professed) and ecclesiastical institutes.

3. if the promise was gratuitous and not yet accepted by that third person. For then there intervenes only the obligation of a vow and not of justice. But the Pope can dispense from the obligation of a vow. Hence, e.g., if someone vowed to give a stipend for one hundred Masses to be said for the relief of the dead, the Pope or his delegate can dispense from a vow of this kind, since acceptance of the vow cannot be made by the dead. The same applies if someone vowed to give one hundred marks to undetermined poor persons.⁴⁶¹

4. if the promise was gratuitous and principally in honor of God and only secondarily for the utility of a third person. Thus at least according to an opinion both intrinsically and extrinsically probable. The reason is that then the utility of one's neighbor is something secondary and accidental, which ought to follow the condition of the principal thing, namely, the vow, which is dispensable.⁴⁶²

From the things thus far said, it appears clearly that in practice scarcely any vow exists from which the Pope cannot grant a dispensation for a just cause.

⁴⁵³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 12 ad 3.

⁴⁵⁴ C. 6, X 3, 35.

⁴⁵⁵ S. theol., l.c., a. 11.

⁴⁵⁶ Summa l. 1, tit. 8, § 9.

⁴⁵⁷ IV, dist. 38, q. 3.

⁴⁵⁸ In IV, dist. 38, a. 18.

⁴⁵⁹ 20 Feb. 1888.

⁴⁶⁰ These dispensations are rejected as apocryphal by several authors; cf. Billuart, De relig. diss. 4, a. 9.

⁴⁶¹ Cf. Billuart, ib., a. 8, § 6.

⁴⁶² Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 255.

424. On vows reserved to the Supreme Pontiff. The Supreme Pontiff has reserved to himself the faculty of dispensing from several vows, which are:

1. Almost all public vows.

Such public vows are: a) all solemn vows made in religious orders and in the reception of the subdiaconate. Although the Supreme Pontiff has sometimes dispensed so that priests who had attempted an invalid marriage could convalidate the marriage, e.g., at the time of the English schism and the first French Revolution, nevertheless no example (publicly known) exists in which the Supreme Pontiff granted to a priest of the Latin rite that he could enter a new marriage. b) All simple vows made in religious institutes approved by the Holy See. It makes no difference whether these vows are perpetual or temporary. Hence, e.g., a member of such a religious institute having vows lasting for three or five years can be dispensed from these vows before the time of obligation has elapsed by no one except the Supreme Pontiff or his special delegate.⁴⁶³ But when someone having temporary simple vows (whether in an order in which solemn vows are made or in a religious congregation) is legitimately dismissed from religion by the superiors,⁴⁶⁴ his simple vows cease by that very fact.⁴⁶⁵ But when someone simply professed and having perpetual vows is legitimately dismissed, he is not by that very fact dispensed from his vows, but must still seek a special dispensation from the vows. Thus at least by common law, whatever may be the case concerning privileges granted to some particular institute.⁴⁶⁶

Note. Public vows are sometimes not reserved to the Holy See. For with an indult of secularization, which in religious institutes of diocesan right can also be granted by the local Ordinary, public religious vows cease by that very fact.⁴⁶⁷ Likewise with the dismissal of a religious who has pronounced temporary (but not perpetual) vows,⁴⁶⁸ as was already said.

2. Two private vows, namely: a) of perfect and perpetual chastity; b) of entering an approved religious institute with solemn vows, provided these two vows were made absolutely and after the completion of the eighteenth year of age.⁴⁶⁹

Since reservation, which is considered in canon law an odious matter, is of strict interpretation, these two vows do not fall under reservation unless they are perfect both on the part of the matter and of the manner.

The matter of the vow is considered perfect if precisely that which is reserved in the two vows was promised. Hence there do not fall under reservation: a vow of virginity, a vow of not marrying, a vow of temporary chastity, a vow of receiving holy orders, a vow of entering some religious institute with simple vows only. The reason is that all these vows are neither a vow of perfect chastity nor of entering religion with solemn vows. In practice a doubt not rarely arises whether a member of the faithful made a vow of perfect chastity or only of virginity. Then it must first be investigated whether the person vowing principally intended the celibate life or rather perfect chastity of body and mind. If the former, the vow is not reserved; if the latter, the vow is of perfect chastity and therefore reserved.

The manner of these vows is considered perfect when they were made absolutely and with perfect liberty. Hence reservation is not present:

a) if such a vow was made with a condition concerning a future contingent event, e.g., I vow entrance into the Franciscan religious institute if I recover health. But when a condition concerning a necessary future event, or concerning the past or present, was attached, the vow is only apparently conditional and therefore in truth is absolute once the condition has been verified. Hence, e.g., once the condition has been verified, the following vow is absolute and reserved: I vow perfect chastity if my father perished in this shipwreck.

b) if the vow was disjunctive or penal; e.g., I vow either entrance into religion or the reception of holy orders; if I contract the habit of drunkenness again, I vow entrance into the order of Trappists.

c) if the vow was made under the influence of fear, even light fear;⁴⁷⁰ e.g., a girl vowed entrance among the Poor Clares in order to avoid a marriage into which her parents wished to compel her under light fear.

d) if the person vowing expressly intended to impose upon himself only a light obligation. The reason is evident, since the violation of such a light obligation is a light sin, which cannot be the matter of reservation. Hence, if someone vowed under a light obligation perpetual chastity or entrance into religion, his vow is not reserved.

e) if the person vowing had not yet completed eighteen years of age.

Note. When these two vows have been commuted by legitimate authority into other pious works, the matter thus commuted no longer falls under reservation. Hence, e.g., if a girl, after making a vow of perfect chastity and obtaining a commutation of this vow, is bound to say the Rosary daily, any confessor having the privileges of the Mendicants can now for a reasonable cause dispense from this obligation of saying the Rosary.⁴⁷¹

⁴⁶³ Const. Conditae II; Normae, art. 112.

⁴⁶⁴ The manner of this dismissal was newly determined by the Code of Canon Law, c. 647.

⁴⁶⁵ Code of Canon Law, c. 648.

⁴⁶⁶ Ib., c. 669.

⁴⁶⁷ Ib., cc. 638 and 640.

⁴⁶⁸ Ib., c. 648 and c. 669, § 1.

⁴⁶⁹ Ib., c. 1309.

⁴⁷⁰ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 258.

⁴⁷¹ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 260.

425. The local Ordinary and other prelates having quasi-episcopal jurisdiction (such as the superiors of an exempt clerical religious institute for their subjects, even those not professed) can not only dispense for a just cause from all other non-reserved vows, but also from the two reserved private vows:

1. when there is an urgent necessity and recourse to the Supreme Pontiff is morally impossible.⁴⁷² Such a case can easily occur when all things are prepared for a marriage which cannot be deferred without great inconvenience, and it is discovered that one of those about to marry is bound by a vow of perfect chastity. Then the local Ordinary can dispense from the vow of chastity.⁴⁷³

2. when it concerns a vow of imperfect chastity (i.e., of not seeking the conjugal debt) made after marriage was contracted. The reason is that such a vow is not of complete chastity, since it cannot oblige one not to render the debt. But if it concerns a vow of perfect chastity, i.e., of neither seeking nor rendering the conjugal debt, a bishop cannot dispense by his own authority unless there is grave danger in delay.⁴⁷⁴ A spouse cannot make such a vow of perfect chastity unless a) with the consent of the other spouse; b) unless the other spouse has lost the right of seeking the debt, e.g., because of adultery committed.

3. when it concerns doubtful vows.

4. when they have special delegated faculties, as is sometimes customary in our times. Therefore a confessor lacking the faculty of dispensing from some vow better seeks this faculty through the diocesan bishop, who can almost always grant it.

Note. The local Ordinary can dispense from vows not only with his own subjects but also with travelers.⁴⁷⁵ But if he grants a dispensation by virtue of special faculties, attention is to be paid to the clauses which may exclude travelers from the dispensations to be granted.

⁴⁷² Cf. St. Alphonsus, l.c., n. 258.

⁴⁷³ Cf. ib., l. 6, n. 987, and Code of Canon Law, c. 1045.

⁴⁷⁴ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 986.

⁴⁷⁵ Code of Canon Law, c. 1313.

426. Regular confessors having the privileges of the Mendicants can dispense, either within or outside confession, from all vows. Reserved vows (cf. above, n. 424) are excepted, and moreover those made principally for the utility of a third party and accepted by him. Thus the most common opinion.⁴⁷⁶

This opinion is founded upon several privileges granted by the Supreme Pontiffs. Thus, e.g., Julius II granted to the regulars of St. Savior and the Olivetan monks "that those appointed to hear the confessions of secular persons may absolve them from each and every sin ... and commute vows made by them for the time being, in each and every case reserved to local Ordinaries, even by synodal or provincial constitutions, into other works of piety, and moreover dispense the same persons vowing from them."⁴⁷⁷ The same faculty was granted by the same Pontiff to other canons regular through the Constitution Inter ceteros; Leo X granted the same to the Camaldolese hermits.⁴⁷⁸ But because other Pontiffs, such as Benedict XIII⁴⁷⁹ and Leo XII,⁴⁸⁰ speak only of the faculty of commuting vows, certain authors (Billuart, Concina, Mocheggiani) deny to regular confessors the faculty of dispensing from vows. Let Concina be heard, who most vehemently of all asserts: "The opinion which grants to regulars the privilege of dispensing from all vows not reserved to the Supreme Pontiff is false."⁴⁸¹ Concina indeed concedes that very many authors teach the contrary, but too confidently adds: "Among so many authors I have found no one who seriously discusses the controversy; but one trusts in the authority of another, and as one bird follows other birds, some follow others; and finally all defend themselves by their multitude, as though multitude could patronize error." Certainly the multitude of authors alone cannot make error become truth, but it is rather rash to assert that among so many and such great authors no one seriously discussed the controversy. The common opinion teaching that regular confessors enjoy the faculty of dispensing from all vows, except vows both reserved and made principally for the utility of a third party, seems safe in practice. For Sixtus IV,⁴⁸² Julius II,⁴⁸³ Innocent VIII,⁴⁸⁴ and other Supreme Pontiffs simply grant this faculty of dispensing. These indults afterwards became "privileges confirmed by bull," since they were confirmed by the Supreme Pontiffs in special form or from certain knowledge. In such form, e.g., Gregory XIII⁴⁸⁵ confirmed all the privileges of the Franciscans. But if other Pontiffs grant regulars the faculty of commuting vows, it is in no way lawful to conclude from this that they denied or revoked the faculty of dispensing. For the word dispensing is not employed in one sense either in the old Corpus iuris or by older and modern canonists, as I proved elsewhere.⁴⁸⁶ Moreover, St. Alphonsus⁴⁸⁷ teaches without any hesitation that regular confessors can dispense from non-reserved vows. But in practice a confessor can always follow the opinions of St. Alphonsus which have not been expressly revoked by the Apostolic See.

G. Oesterle, O.S.B.,⁴⁸⁸ discusses this matter excellently and learnedly, and also vigorously rejects the opinion of the adversaries. Moreover, this controversy is of almost no practical value, since ordinarily in practice it is expedient not to dispense totally, i.e., to relax, but to commute the vow into an easier work. But all teach that regular confessors can commute non-reserved vows.

⁴⁷⁶ St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 257; Ferraris, Prompta Bibl., s.v. "vow," III, 77; Reiffenstuel, Ius can. l. 3, tit. 34, n. 39; Noldin, De praeceptis n. 237; Vermeersch, De relig. inst. n. 519 and Periodica V, 57ff.

⁴⁷⁷ Const. Etsi ad universos.

⁴⁷⁸ Const. Etsi a summo.

⁴⁷⁹ Const. Pretiosus.

⁴⁸⁰ Const. Plura inter.

⁴⁸¹ Theol. christ. l. 4, In Decal., diss. 3, c. 11, n. 16.

⁴⁸² In the indults both for the Minims, dated 27 May 1474, and for the Benedictines, dated 8 June 1476.

⁴⁸³ Cf. the text cited above.

⁴⁸⁴ In the indult for the Franciscans, 1487.

⁴⁸⁵ Const. Ex benigna, 21 March 1578.

⁴⁸⁶ Commersches Jahrbuch XXII, 605ff.

⁴⁸⁷ Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 257.

⁴⁸⁸ In Theologie und Glaube 1911, 389ff.

427. Whether regular confessors in a case of urgent necessity can dispense from a vow of perfect chastity with a view to contracting marriage was disputed by authors. But now, in a case in which all things are already prepared for the marriage and the marriage cannot be deferred without probable danger of grave evil until a dispensation is obtained from the local Ordinary, not only a regular confessor but any confessor (as also the pastor and the priest assisting at the marriage) can dispense from the vow of perfect chastity and other vows impeding marriage, provided that it concerns an occult case.⁴⁸⁹

Regular confessors can partially dispense from a vow of chastity, after marriage has already been contracted, so that the conjugal debt may be sought, when the other spouse made such a vow before marriage. But if such a marriage should be dissolved by the death of the other spouse or in another manner, the vow thus dispensed revives in the one who made it. Indeed, if one thus dispensed, during the marriage, were to commit a grave sin against chastity, e.g., pollution, adultery, etc., there would be a grave violation of the vow, and therefore not only the sin of lust itself but also the violation of the vow would have to be declared in confession.⁴⁹⁰

Pastors and other ordinary confessors have no power of dispensing from vows except a) from particular indults, or b) during a jubilee, or c) in the case indicated in the preceding number, namely, with a view to contracting marriage.

⁴⁸⁹ Code of Canon Law, c. 1045.

⁴⁹⁰ Cf. St. Alphonsus, l.c., and l. 3, n. 258.

428. Concerning the exercise of the faculty of dispensing, the following things are to be noted:

1. It is lawful to use this faculty both within and outside the tribunal of confession, unless, however, the contrary is expressly determined.

It is very fitting, however, that a dispensation ordinarily not be granted except in the confessional; hence special faculties of dispensing almost always customarily include this or a similar clause: "for the forum of conscience and in sacramental confession."

2. One who possesses a faculty of dispensing of this kind can also use it with himself, since it is an act of voluntary jurisdiction,⁴⁹¹ unless, however, it is prescribed that the dispensation be given in the tribunal of confession.

For no one can appear before himself in the tribunal of penance. In practice it is always better to seek the dispensation of a vow from another who has the power, since no one ought to be judge in his own cause and one is easily deceived concerning the sufficiency of the cause necessary for dispensation.

3. One who can dispense from vows can also dispense from sworn vows.

The reason is that an oath, as something accessory to the vow in this case, is dissolved with the dissolution of the vow.⁴⁹² But a promissory oath by itself alone is never reserved.⁴⁹³ This formula: "I promise, vow, and swear," is considered to contain only an oath and not a vow.

4. Bishops can dispense also from the vows of travelers, as was already said above in n. 425. Regular confessors likewise can dispense from the vows of travelers, because they act by delegation of the Roman Pontiff, to whom no member of the faithful is a traveler.⁴⁹⁴

5. In every dispensation that saying of Innocent III already cited above is to be attended to: "What is lawful according to equity, what is becoming according to uprightness, and what is expedient according to utility"; or, a vow is to be dispensed only when the honor of God is preserved and provision is made for the spiritual utility of the person vowing. The sufficient causes of dispensation were already discussed above in n. 421.

6. It is rarely expedient to remove the whole obligation of a vow by dispensation--this is expedient almost only with the scrupulous--but it is better to commute the vow, i.e., to impose some more suitable matter. For thus the person vowing does not lose the whole merit of the vow and acquires the new merit of obedience.

⁴⁹¹ Cf. ib., l. 3, n. 256.

⁴⁹² Cf. below, n. 454.

⁴⁹³ Hence St. Alphonsus (l.c., n. 250) teaches that an oath of perfect chastity or of entering religion, unless it includes a vow at the same time, is not reserved.

⁴⁹⁴ Thus Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. I, n. 620.

429. Definition. Commutation is the transfer of the obligation of a vow from one matter to another. Or, in other words: The commutation of a vow is the substitution of another good work in place of that which had been promised by vow, made under the same obligation of the vow. Commutation, therefore, is something less than dispensation, because in dispensation the obligation of the vow can be totally removed; but in commutation there remains at least a partial obligation of the vow, whose matter alone is changed and is often somewhat remitted or even increased. The commutation of vows can be made by one's own or by ecclesiastical authority, as will be said more fully below. This, however, is the difference among the powers of invalidating, dispensing from, and commuting vows: Invalidation requires no jurisdiction, but dominative power. Dispensation always requires jurisdiction. Commutation sometimes requires jurisdiction, but not always.

Distinction. A threefold commutation of a vow is distinguished, namely, into a better, equal, or lesser work.

A better work is not always that which is more difficult, but that which is more pleasing to God and accords more with the spiritual salvation of the person vowing. Thus, e.g., one who vowed alms to a determined poor man who has not yet accepted the promise can give the same alms to one who is poorer or to a poor relative, since this seems to be a work objectively better and more pleasing to God.

An equal work is considered to be that which presents almost the same difficulty of fulfillment, e.g., saying the Rosary or other prayers of almost the same duration.

A lesser work is that which evidently causes less difficulty; e.g., saying the Rosary is a lesser work than hearing Mass with devotion or making a pilgrimage.

430. Principle 1. The commutation of a non-reserved vow into a work either a) evidently better or b) equal can be made even by the own authority of the person vowing.⁴⁹⁵

The reason for the first part is that the end of a vow is a) the worship of God and b) the spiritual good of the person vowing. But by an evidently better work this twofold end is obtained more perfectly; therefore God is presumed to consent to such a change. Hence all vows whatsoever made before religious profession are suspended for as long as the person vowing remains in religion,⁴⁹⁶ because all other vows concern certain particular goods, whereas through religious profession a man dedicates his whole life to the service of God. But the particular is contained in the universal. Moreover, religious profession is regarded as a civil death. But just as all vows are extinguished by physical death, so also vows are suspended by the civil death of religious profession. Therefore Alexander III⁴⁹⁷ already established that he is not to be regarded as guilty of a broken vow who commutes a temporal service into the perpetual observance of religion.

It is said in the principle enunciated: into an evidently better work. This is to be understood not of a work merely objectively better and more excellent, but of that which, after all the objective and subjective circumstances of the person vowing have been considered, is better. In practice it is often difficult, not to say impossible, to determine by one's own authority which good is better between two proposed goods. Certainly one who vowed to give a silver chalice can fulfill that vow by giving a golden chalice; or one who promised one hundred marks by vow can give one thousand marks; or one who promised a fast of one day can fast for three days. All these things are evident of themselves; nevertheless, these are not commutations properly so called, but rather more abundant fulfillments of vows; and then the saying is true: The greater contains the lesser, and he does not break faith who commutes into something better. But commutation properly so called is present if the work promised is changed into another disparate work, e.g., a fast into alms or prayer. Then, however, in practice it seems scarcely ever lawful by one's own authority to commute one private vow into another. For no one can safely judge by his own authority which work is better both for himself and for the worship of God. E.g., prayer is a more perfect work than fasting, because the virtue of religion is more excellent than the virtue of temperance. But can someone by his own authority commute a vow of fasting on Saturday into the recitation of the Rosary? Therefore it is not only better but also safer not to make the commutation of a vow except through the authority of a confessor or an ecclesiastical superior. This doctrine indeed seems to be intimated by St. Thomas,⁴⁹⁸ who says: "In commutation there is a certain contract which cannot be completed without the consent of both parties; hence, since man through a vow obliges himself to God, a commutation of the vow cannot be made unless the consent of him who acts in the place of God on earth, namely, the prelate, intervenes, unless perhaps one vow is included in another."

The reason for the second part is a positive ecclesiastical law.⁴⁹⁹ Before the new Code of Canon Law, St. Alphonsus and many other theologians taught that the commutation of a vow into an equal work could not be made by the person vowing himself.

⁴⁹⁵ Code of Canon Law, c. 1314.

⁴⁹⁶ Ib., c. 1315.

⁴⁹⁷ C. 4, X 3, 34; cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 12 ad 1.

⁴⁹⁸ IV, dist. 38, q. 1, a. 4, solut. 4.

⁴⁹⁹ Code of Canon Law, c. 1314.

431. Note. The following are excluded from commutation made by one's own authority: 1. vows reserved to the Supreme Pontiff (unless, however, the commutation is made by entrance into religion); 2. vows made in favor of a third person (whether physical or moral), if these vows were accepted; 3. a vow of passing to a stricter religious institute.⁵⁰⁰ Concerning this last vow and its fulfillment, it is to be noted that, according to the present discipline of the Roman Curia, the permission of the Holy See is required for every passage of a professed religious to another religious institute.⁵⁰¹ But in ancient times any religious could by his own authority pass to another religious institute certainly stricter.

⁵⁰⁰ Thus c. 18, X 3, 31.

⁵⁰¹ Code of Canon Law, c. 632.

432. Principle 2. The commutation of a vow into a work certainly and notably lesser cannot be made validly and lawfully except by one who has a special faculty.

For such a commutation is a partial dispensation from the vow. But for every dispensation from vows a special faculty is required, as was said above in n. 423. But whoever has the power of dispensing from vows also has the power of commuting them into another lesser work. For Rule of Law 33 in VI° says: "He to whom what is greater is lawful, to him surely what is lesser is lawful." It is admitted by all that regular confessors (who have the privileges of the Mendicants) possess the faculty of commuting all non-reserved vows, as was already said.

433. Principle 3. For the commutation of a vow into a better work, no cause is required; for commutation into an equal work, a light cause is required; for commutation into a notably lesser work, a grave cause is required.

The reason for the first part is that it is always lawful to perform a work which is objectively and subjectively better, without another cause rendering it fitting being necessary. The reason for the second part is that to make such a change without cause would be mere inconstancy, certainly not pleasing to God. But a light cause suffices, e.g., greater devotion of the person vowing or less danger of transgressing the vow.⁵⁰² The reason for the third part is that such a commutation is a partial dispensation, for which a reasonable and grave cause is always necessary. So great a cause as is necessary for a total dispensation or abolition of the vow is not, however, required, as is evident of itself. It is disputed among authors whether a reasonable cause is required not only for the lawful but also for the valid commutation of a vow into a lesser work. St. Alphonsus calls both opinions, i.e., the affirmative and the negative, probable. The affirmative opinion, however, seems more probable, because St. Thomas⁵⁰³ deservedly requires a sufficient cause on equal grounds for dispensation and commutation. But just as God does not ratify a dispensation from a vow given without sufficient cause, so likewise He is not considered to approve a commutation frivolously given. But in a doubt whether the cause of commutation was sufficient or not, the Angelic Doctor⁵⁰⁴ teaches that a subject can and ought to acquiesce in the judgment of the one commuting.

⁵⁰² Cf. St. Alphonsus, l.c., n. 245.

⁵⁰³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 12 ad 2.

⁵⁰⁴ Ib.

434. Corollary 1. After a commutation has been made, it is always lawful for the person vowing to return to the first work, even if the commutation was made into something better. A fortiori this is lawful if the commutation was made into an equal or lesser work.

The reason is that commutation is a favor which no one is ordinarily bound to use, according to Rule of Law 51 in VI°: "That which is granted for the favor of someone is not to be turned to his detriment." Although certain authors limit this doctrine to the case in which the commutation was made by one having authority, and teach that the person vowing cannot return to the first work if he himself commuted his vow into an evidently better work, nevertheless St. Alphonsus⁵⁰⁵ deservedly rejects this limitation as unfounded and indeed concludes: "If commutation has been made several times into diverse works, the person vowing can choose whichever of them he prefers."

⁵⁰⁵ St. Alphonsus, l.c., n. 248.

435. Corollary 2. If the work into which the vow was commuted becomes impossible (even through the fault of the person vowing), the person vowing is not bound to return to the first work, provided the commutation was made by a confessor or by a legitimate ecclesiastical superior.

The reason is that through a commutation made by legitimate authority the prior obligation is entirely extinguished. Hence, e.g., if a vow of pilgrimage was legitimately commuted by a confessor into a fast to be performed on a certain day, and such a fast became impossible because of illness, the person vowing is now bound to nothing. Thus the common opinion.⁵⁰⁶ But when the vow was commuted by the own authority of the person vowing, then the obligation of the prior work does not seem to be entirely extinguished, and consequently, when the substituted work became impossible, the person vowing is bound to return to the prior work. Certain authors, however, teach⁵⁰⁷ that even then there is no strict obligation of returning to the first work, because the person vowing, whether by making or by accepting the commutation, implicitly vowed the substituted matter, and therefore the prior vow is extinguished. This opinion is certainly probable theoretically; but since it is not expedient to commute any vow by one's own authority (except by making religious profession), as was said above, therefore in practice one must not depart from the first opinion.

⁵⁰⁶ Cf. ib., n. 249.

⁵⁰⁷ Cf. Billuart, De relig. diss. 4, a. 8, § 6, Petes 4°.

737. Dispensation (ontslaging) is the condonation or relaxation, for a time or in perpetuity, of the debt contracted from a vow, granted by ecclesiastical authority in the name of God.

Christ granted to the Church the power of dispensing in the power of the keys (Mt. XVI, 19), as is clear from perpetual usage. There is not a dispensation in the natural law of keeping faith and standing by promises; but from the remission of the debt by God there arises a case in which that law is not applied.

Dispensation is an act of spiritual jurisdiction in the external forum, and therefore belongs to ecclesiastical authority alone; and indeed:

1. The Supreme Pontiff is able to dispense in every vow, yet not if it confirms a right acquired by a third party, unless the gratuitous promise is subordinated to the vow, because then the accessory follows the principal.

2. The local ordinary, with subjects and travelers, can dispense in all non-reserved vows, provided the dispensation does not injure a right acquired by a third party.

3. The superior of an exempt clerical religion can dispense, in non-reserved vows, with his subjects: professed, novices, and others dwelling with them according to the norm of canon 514, § 1; but abbesses and female superiors cannot.

4. By privilege, regular confessors of mendicant orders, and those who are assimilated to them in privileges, can dispense in non-reserved vows.

5. Others who are delegated to dispense by those who have ordinary power of dispensing, as happens in the time of Jubilee (can. 1313).

But parish priests and simple confessors cannot.

739. Commutation (omzetting, omwisseling) is the substitution of some honest work in place of the work promised, under the same obligation and bond of the vow, or the transfer of the obligation of a vow from one matter to another. It can be made into a good which, considering all the circumstances, is better both for God and for the one vowing; or into a morally or almost equal good; or into a lesser good.

Apart from reserved vows and those which confirm the right of a third party, vows can be commuted into a better or equal good by the one vowing himself, as has been conceded in the new law, or by a confessor with the consent of the one vowing; into a lesser good by those who have the power of dispensing, because this includes a partial dispensation (can. 1314).

The one vowing can ordinarily return to the first work, because the commutation is made for his utility; except the case in which he wished to oblige himself to a better thing by a new vow. But if the substituted work becomes impossible, he is not bound to return to the first if the commutation was made by the authority of a superior, because the latter absolutely removed the obligation concerning the prior matter and transferred it to the other, in which it has been extinguished by reason of impossibility; but he is bound to return if it was made by his own authority.

740. Observations. - 1. Irritation of a vow requires no jurisdiction, but direct irritation requires dominative power; dispensation always requires jurisdiction; commutation sometimes requires jurisdiction, but not always.

2. For the validity of irritation, whether direct or indirect, of vows made through dominative power, no cause is required; for liceity, a reasonable cause is required, by the lack of which a sin is committed which of itself is venial. But for the validity of indirect irritation of personal vows through the power of jurisdiction, that is, through the imposition of a precept, a just cause is required, though less than for dispensing: for a precept does not oblige unless it is reasonable.

For the validity of dispensation a grave cause is required, proportioned to the gravity of the vow, which nevertheless need not be sufficient for excusing: for God does not relax or change a vow without reason.

For commuting into a lesser good a just cause is required, proportioned to the gravity of the vow and to the diminution, but a lesser cause suffices than for dispensing completely; for commuting into an equal good a light cause suffices, for example, greater devotion, less danger of transgression; for commuting into an evidently better good the very excess of goodness suffices: for God prefers that which is better and accepts it as a superabundant fulfillment. A commutation made without sufficient reason or by one who does not have power does not seem valid; nevertheless some affirm that it is valid, provided the defect is supplied up to equality.

3. The causes are: a) on the part of the act, an imperfect, indiscreet, coerced mode of vowing, for example, if the vow was made from fear, fraud, anger, sadness, levity, by a non-pubescent child, etc.; b) on the part of the matter: 1. if it is more difficult; 2. if it is an occasion or cause of evil, for example, of spiritual ruin: thus a great danger of transgressing the vow from frailty; 3. if it impedes a greater spiritual good, as if it is an occasion of scruples; 4. if it impedes the common good of the Church, or of the republic, or of the community. Those causes ordinarily suffice for commuting into a lesser thing, rarely for dispensing totally.

In doubt whether the cause is sufficient, the superior can grant a dispensation if some utility is hoped for and no scandal is feared; and the one vowing can acquiesce in the judgment of the superior.

4. If the cause is manifestly insufficient, the dispensation is to be held invalid; in doubt it can be judged sufficient.

5. A simple confessor can only suggest commutation into a better or equal good.

A vow ceases by lapse of the time appointed for ending the obligation, by substantial change of the matter promised, by failure of the condition on which the vow depends or of its final cause, by irritation, dispensation, commutation (Can. 1311).

Dispensation of a vow is its absolute condonation, made in the name of God by a legitimate superior.

I Say 1st. Non-reserved vows can be dispensed for a just cause, provided that the dispensation does not injure a right acquired by others:

1st. The Ordinary of the place, as regards all his subjects and also pilgrims;

2nd. The Superior of an exempt clerical religion, as regards the persons who are enumerated in can. 514, § 1;

3rd. Those to whom the power of dispensing has been delegated by the Apostolic See (Can. 1313). - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 256. Canon 514 enumerates professed, novices, or others living day and night in a religious house by reason of service or education or hospitality or infirm health.

I Say 2nd. For the validity of dispensation, a just cause is always required, because since vows are made to God alone, man cannot dispense from them except as delegated; but a delegate cannot validly dispense without a just cause, as has been said in the tract on Laws, n. 101. Thus commonly with St. Alphonsus, n. 250.

Question 1. What are the just causes of dispensing in vows?

Response. The good of the Church, of society, of the family, and also of him who is bound by the vow; for example, if on account of the vow he is oppressed by scruples or grave temptations; if he experiences notable difficulty in fulfilling the vow; if the act of vowing was not perfectly deliberate, etc. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 252.

Question 2. In vows made for the utility of some third party, can a superior dispense without the consent of him in whose favor they were made?

Response. Affirmatively, if the vow was not accepted, as is clear of itself; indeed even if it was accepted, provided, however, that the vow is principally in honor of God, and the promise is not onerous, that is, imposes no burden which has already been accepted. The reason is that then God is the principal cause of the promise, and that third party in whose favor the vow was made, if he acquired any right, did not acquire it except dependently upon the good pleasure of God. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 254. Baller., note (a), p. 329.

Question 3. What vows are reserved to the Pope?

Response. Besides vows emitted in a religious community, the private vows reserved to the Apostolic See are only the vow of perfect and perpetual chastity and the vow of entering a religion of solemn vows, which have been emitted absolutely and after completion of the eighteenth year of age (Can. 1309). - But these are not reserved unless they are absolute, determinate, perfect by reason of matter and liberty. Therefore reservation does not obtain, 1st, if a vow is emitted from fear, even only light fear, unjustly inflicted; 2nd, if someone obliges himself to emit a reserved vow after ten years; 3rd, if the vow is conditional, even according to the more common opinion when the condition has been fulfilled, because a vow ought to be emitted from sole and perfect affection toward the promised thing; 4th, if the vow is penal, as, I vow to enter Religion if once I shall have become drunk; for the same reason as in a conditional vow; 5th, if it does not tend directly to the virtue to which the matter of the vow pertains; 6th, if the vow is disjunctive, as, I vow either to enter Religion or to fast for a month; 7th, if it is emitted with the mind of inducing only a light obligation. Besides, circumstances added to a vow are not reserved, as, I vow to enter Religion this year. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 258. - Lacroix, nn. 544 and following.

The vow of virginity or of mere integrity of the flesh and the vow not to marry are not reserved.

By whom and in what manner vows which are accustomed to be emitted in some diocesan institutes can be dispensed, you may see in Conc. Plen. Balt. III, n. 93.

Commutation of a vow is the substitution of some work in place of the one promised. It can be made in three ways, namely into a better good, into an equal good, into a lesser good.

I Say 1st. Whoever has the power, even simply delegated, of dispensing from vows has by that very fact the faculty of commuting them; for he who can do the greater can also do the lesser in the same genus. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 246.

I Say 2nd. A priest delegated for merely commuting vows cannot commute them into a notably lesser work, because otherwise he would in great part dispense, and thus would exceed the faculty received. It is said notably, because the faculty of commuting vows is not to be interpreted so strictly that it is confined to an entirely equal work, but is to be taken in a broader sense, so that it extends itself to a work somewhat lesser; for otherwise it would be liable to innumerable difficulties and scruples, since it is most difficult to find equality in things altogether disparate. Moreover, commutation ought to be made for the alleviation of him who has bound himself by vow. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 247.

I Say 3rd. He who emitted a vow cannot commute it into a lesser good by his own authority; for he ought to give to God whatever he promised. Nevertheless, even without a special cause, he can commute his vow into a work evidently better, because while someone performs a work more perfect than the thing promised, by that very fact he observes what he had promised, since the perfect is included in the more perfect. It is also clear from canon law, cap. 3, de Jurejurando. - But in this matter that work is judged better which conduces to the greater spiritual utility of the one vowing and to greater service of God. Yet except vows reserved to the Pope, unless the change is made into the religious state. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 243.

Thus canon 1314: The work promised by a non-reserved vow can be commuted into a better or equal good by the one vowing himself; but into a lesser good by him to whom there belongs the power of dispensing according to the norm of can. 1313.

Question 1. Is some cause required for a vow to be commuted into an equal work, or one a little lesser?

Response. Affirmatively, as regards liceity, because otherwise a delegate would commute prodigally, and would abuse the power of commuting. But as regards validity, the opinion denying this is called probable by St. Alphonsus. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 245.

Question 2. Once commutation has been made, is it licit to return to the first work?

Response. Affirmatively, if the commutation was made into a lesser or equal work, because the first work is equally pleasing to God; indeed even if it was made into a better work, because commutation is made in favor of the one vowing. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 248.

Question 3. Must you return to the first work if the second becomes impossible?

Response. Negatively, if the change was made by the authority of another, even if by your fault it became impossible, because the prior obligation has been dissolved by the commutation itself. But otherwise if you made the commutation by your own choice, because then the prior obligation is not dissolved, but is only supposed to be supplied by an equal or better one. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 249.

Question 4. When a reserved vow has been commuted, does the substituted matter also remain reserved?

Response. Negatively, more probably, because that matter which is substituted is not reserved of itself, although it has the same bond of vow. - St. Alphonsus, n. 260, and others commonly.

XXXIII. Question X. Is a vow not to seek a dispensation, commutation, or annulment valid? Response: There are two opposing opinions among authors. That such a vow is foolish, and null, is held by the first opinion, defended by Sotus (Bk. VIII, q. 1, art. 9, near the end), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 8, n. 21), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 34, q. 3), Bartolomé a San Fausto (Bk. I, Thesaurus, q. 85), Trullench (Bk. II, dub. 5, n. 10), Tamburini (Bk. III, ch. 5, §4, n. 8), and others — since this vow, taken absolutely, does not concern a better good, since it can sometimes be more useful to seek a dispensation than not to seek one. Indeed, never to seek a dispensation in any case whatsoever is, by its own kind, an evil thing. For evil arises from any defect whatsoever. Hence vows never to lend, never to stand surety, and the like, are invalid — since such absolute vows comprehend many cases in which it will be better to stand surety, to lend, to seek a dispensation, and likewise many other cases in which the opposite will be necessary. Wherefore, since evil arises from any defect whatsoever, the aforesaid vows have an object that is evil, not merely less good; and therefore they are null.

XXXV. Question XI. Can those who have made a vow not to seek a dispensation nonetheless seek a commutation or an annulment? Response: Sánchez and Trullench (loc. cit.) deny this, since one who excludes commutation excludes dispensation with even greater reason. The second opinion affirms this, defended by Prado (ch. 31, n. 65), Leander (q. 5), Tamburini (ch. 15, §4), and the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 1, §1, n. 9). The extension of an obligation is a matter of fact, entirely dependent on the will of the one vowing. If the one vowing has renounced the privilege of commutation, he is not thereby considered to have renounced dispensation as well, since he can separate one from the other. It is true that one who refuses commutation is prudently presumed also to refuse dispensation. But since it can also be the case, conversely, that the one vowing may deprive himself of the faculty of seeking commutation, while retaining the freedom to seek dispensation, the matter must therefore be gathered from the intention of the one vowing. For such circumstances can arise in which it would be advisable to obtain a dispensation, but not a commutation — though this does not happen frequently.

[Introductory remarks] We undertake to review many matters in this disputation, which we shall explain here briefly, since they have a complete connection with those things which are necessary in the following disputation. Which matters some will treat at greater length in the next Book, dissert. 8, ch. 4, on oaths. We shall dispatch them here as briefly as possible.

I. Those matters which pertain to the force, nature, and notion of dispensation, having been discussed in passing in the book on laws, you will find there. Wherefore, setting all these aside now, I propose immediately the little questions to be resolved, which pertain directly to our present undertaking.

II. Question I. Does the Church possess the faculty of dispensing from the obligation of vows, and of oaths? Response: All Catholics commonly say yes; and this is drawn from Matthew 16: "To thee I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven; whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth, it shall be bound...", and Matthew 18: "Amen I say to you, whatsoever you shall bind upon earth, shall be bound also in heaven..." Since these words are general, and indefinite, whoever should attempt to restrict them, and narrow them down to certain debts only, to be relaxed, would do so wrongly. This assertion is also established from the chapter "On pilgrims," "It is not," and the chapter "From much," on vows and the redemption of vows. That this is so, the Angelic Doctor confirms by this reasoning (II-II, q. 88, art. 10): "One who vows, in a certain way, establishes a law for himself, binding himself to something which is, in itself, and for the most part, good. It can nonetheless happen that, in some case, it may be either simply evil, or useless, or an impediment to a greater good — which is against the very notion of that which falls under a vow. And therefore it is necessary..." that it be determined, in such a case, that the vow is not to be kept. And if indeed it is determined absolutely that some vow is not to be kept, this is called dispensation from the vow; but if, instead of what was to be kept, something else is imposed, it is called commutation of the vow. Whence it is a lesser thing to commute a vow than to dispense from it. Each, however, consists in the power of the Church."*

III. Question II. To whom does the faculty of dispensing from the obligation of vows belong? Response: This power resides with the Prelates of the Church. Which the Angelic Doctor declares in these words (II-II, q. 88, art. 12): "A vow is a promise made to God concerning something that is acceptable to God. What, however, is acceptable to him to whom the promise is made, depends on his own judgment. The Prelate, however, bears the person of God in the Church; and therefore the authority of the Prelate is required in the commutation, or dispensation, of vows, so that it may be determined, in the person of God, what is acceptable to God — according to that saying (2 Corinthians 2): 'For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned any thing, for your sakes have I done it in the person of Christ.' And he says pointedly 'for your sakes,' because every dispensation sought from a Prelate ought to be sought for the benefit of the subjects. Since, then, vows are made in homage to God, it is plain that Prelates can relax such vows — for the Prelates bear the person of God. Moreover, since he who bears the person of Christ can remit whatever has been promised in homage to himself, it follows that God, whose place the Prelate holds, can [dispense].

IV. This power is spiritual, and of jurisdiction, not of order. Wherefore a Bishop-elect, though not yet marked with sacred orders, can dispense in vows, provided he is confirmed; for the faculty of relaxing vows pertains only to ordinary jurisdiction, and to ecclesiastical persons — since this power looks to the exterior governance, and government, of the Church.

V. Question III. What is dispensation from a vow? Response: According to the common definition, it is the removal of the bond of a vow, made in God's name by one having spiritual jurisdiction, in the external forum, for some reasonable cause. The definition is clear enough that it needs no explanation.

VI. Question IV. How is this removal of the bond effected? Response: Theologians commonly dispute how this removal of the bond occurs. Many contend that the Pontiff, and the other Prelates, relax the very divine and natural right — which occurs, they say, when a superior recognizes that a vow is firm and ratified, and obligates even in this particular case, but nonetheless, for a grave cause, rescinds and removes such an obligation resting on natural right. For Sánchez (Bk. IV, Summa, ch. 37, n. 19) maintains that dispensation in a vow is a true relaxation of natural and divine right, which the vow used to oblige by. Since, indeed, the faculty of dispensing has been granted to the Church by Christ the Lord, of relaxing, in truth, the obligation of natural and divine right, not by human will, but by dispensing in general, so that this right does not oblige; but in the particular occurring case, relaxing its obligation for a just cause. This manner of speaking seems to me harsh, and unpleasant. For if ecclesiastical power can truly relax divine natural right, why not also the bonds of the sacraments? Why not, indeed, dissolve marriage itself? Which does not sound well to pious ears.

VII. We must adhere, then, to the teaching, and to the modest and cautious manner of speaking, which the Angelic Doctor uses (II-II, q. 88, art. 10, ad 3): "It must be said that, just as by natural right, and by divine precept, man is bound to fulfill a vow, so too he is bound, by the same right, to obey the law or command of his superiors. When, however, a dispensation is made in some human law, it does not happen that a human law is not obeyed — which would be against the law of nature, and the divine command; but it happens that this which was law is not law in this case. So too, by the authority of a dispensing superior, it happens that this which was contained under the vow is not contained, insofar as it is determined, in this case, that this is not fitting matter for a vow. And therefore, when the Prelate of the Church dispenses in a vow, he does not dispense in the precept of natural or divine law; but he determines that which fell under the obligation of human deliberation, which could not foresee everything." This doctrine is more cautious, safer, and truer. For the Angelic Doctor speaks according to the sense of the Fathers and of the Church herself, which he grasped better and more excellently than many later Casuists and theologians. But more on this in its proper place.

VIII. Question V. One who possesses the faculty of dispensing from vows — can he also commute them? Response: Our discussion is not about those Prelates who are endowed with ordinary power in dispensing vows — since there is no difficulty concerning them: for it is established that all these can both dispense and commute vows. Since commutation is a lesser thing than dispensation, whoever can dispense can, by a stronger right, commute. Dispensation pertains only to delegates, who, by virtue of a privilege granted by a superior, are furnished with the faculty of dispensing — as when the Supreme Pontiff grants a bull, a jubilee, or some other indult, to ministers of the sacrament of penance, of dispensing in vows. Some deny that the faculty of commuting can be inferred from the grant of dispensing. Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 43, n. 4 and 5), Valentia (I-II, disp. 6, q. 6, punct. 7), Azor (Bk. XI, ch. 10, q. 4), and others. They are led to this opinion by the fact that these faculties are of different kinds, and thus one is altogether disparate from the other, and the one is in no way comprehended under the other. Whence they conclude that one who grants one does not, by that very fact, grant the other.

IX. The contrary opinion, however, is more common, and more probable — since the principle on which that opinion rests lacks truth. Dispensation, and commutation, look entirely to the same relaxation of a vow; although dispensation is broader than commutation itself. Whence, then, do they gather that these things are disparate, and of a different kind? No other diversity, indeed, intervenes between these two faculties, except that dispensation is superior, and extends more widely; commutation, however, is inferior, and more limited. For the rest, they are within the same kind of relaxing a vow, with this sole difference: that dispensation relaxes more, commutation less. Now, from the rule of law, 34: "What is more, contains what is less, though not vice versa" — it holds that when the greater is granted, the lesser is also contained under the same kind. And this opinion is taught by Sotus (Bk. VII, on justice, q. 4, art. 3), Prado (ch. 31, q. 15, n. 48), Raphael de la Torre (II-II, q. 88, disp. 1, n. 7), Castropalao (tract. 15, disp. 3, punct. 14, n. 4), Barbosa (on the power of the Bishop, Part II, alleg. 87, n. 11), Lessius (Bk. II, ch. 20, dub. 16, n. 103), Suárez (Bk. VI, ch. 12, n. 4), Layman (Bk. IV, tract. 4, ch. 8, n. 20), Diana (Part 5, tract. 5, misc. resol. 25), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 17, ch. 2, punct. 9, n. 11).

I. The dispensation of vows, which, as has been said, is a fruit not of order, but of spiritual jurisdiction, pertains to all, and only to, Prelates of the Church who have jurisdiction over subjects. Wherefore neither secular Princes, nor Abbesses, or Prioresses, nor Parish priests, nor simple Priests, possess the faculty of dispensing in vows — since they are not simply Prelates, nor do they have spiritual jurisdiction in the external forum.

II. This power can be delegated, or committed, to all Priests, and Clerics marked with the first tonsure, provided they are not married. For the power of dispensing is of jurisdiction, not of order. But because it is spiritual, and ecclesiastical, it can reside only in an ecclesiastical person. A Cleric adorned with the first tonsure is an ecclesiastical person; for he can indeed be made a Bishop's Vicar General, absolve from excommunication in the external forum, and inflict excommunication. A married Cleric, however, is not reckoned an ecclesiastical person, but only enjoys the privilege of the canon, under certain conditions, to be explained in their proper place; on this account this faculty of dispensing cannot be granted to a married Cleric, since the ecclesiastical laws can moderate, amplify, and restrict all these things according to the opportuneness of the times.

This power resides, first, and in general, in the Supreme Pontiff, as the supreme and universal Pastor of the Church, and as the Head, and Vicar of Christ, to whose office it is annexed by ordinary right; then, in Council, in the Pontiff's Nuncios with respect to a whole province or kingdom, in Archbishops, Bishops, in the Cathedral Chapter, the See being vacant, in those having quasi-episcopal jurisdiction, in the Supreme Pontiff's Grand Penitentiary, in Legates a latere, and can, for a reasonable cause. The Supreme Pontiff, however, can also, all things reserved, [do so] with respect to Abbots and all Prelates of Regulars, over their subjects.

III. All these possess, by ordinary right, with... their subjects, both personal and real vows, the reserved ones excepted, of which more below. Cardinal Protectors of Orders, however, cannot, by ordinary right, dispense in vows — since, as such, they do not have jurisdiction over designated subjects.

IV. The vows of a community can be dispensed by the Bishop, if a just cause occurs, if the discussion concerns those who made the vows in a solemn manner. Successors, however, who did not vow, but who are bound to the vow, not by force of the vow itself, as has been said above, but only by the precept and law of the Bishop, can be dispensed at the same Bishop's discretion. Wherefore neither those vowing, nor the people, can, without consulting the Bishop, exempt themselves by right from the vows or oaths of a community.

V. Question. Can one who has the power of granting a dispensation from a vow to others also apply this same privilege to himself? Response: Our discussion is about all those whom we have established can, by ordinary right, dispense in vows with their subjects — whether they can likewise dispense with themselves. It is agreed among all that the Supreme Pontiff can, since he has no superior to whom he might have recourse — so that, just as he chooses a confessor for himself for the absolution of sins, so too he might confer upon that same confessor the power of dispensing with him in vows. Concerning other Prelates, there is disagreement among theologians.

VI. The theologians of Salamanca (tract. 17, ch. 2, punct. 9, n. 79) maintain that any Prelates who can dispense with others can use this same privilege with themselves. For this opinion they praise Sánchez, Bonacina, Bartolomeo a San Fausto, Fagundez, Tamburini, Azor, Rodríguez, Trullench, and Francisco Suárez. The matter is not of such weight that I should examine all these authors. As for Suárez, whose authority I always hold in great regard, he not only does not defend this opinion, but, in express words, teaches the opposite in the very place cited by the theologians of Salamanca themselves — namely, Vol. II, on Religion, Bk. VI, on vows, ch. 11, n. 5, where he has this: "If, however, it is a regular Prior, Guardian, and the like, he is to be dispensed by the Provincial; the Provincial by the General, or Commissary, if he has one; and finally an inferior is to be dispensed by a superior: since a superior has jurisdiction over an inferior Prelate, and not the reverse, nor does the same one have it over himself. The supreme Prelate of a religious order, however, such as a General, is to be dispensed by the whole religious order, which is superior to him." Concerning Bishops, he writes this at the end of the preceding number: "Even if, therefore, the custom of Bishops extends such a faculty, they depend, by ordinary right, on the Pontiff in this dispensation — since they are subject to him in spiritual matters." Martínez de Prado too, whom the theologians of Salamanca allege in their own favor, supports this contrary opinion, when recourse to a superior is open — which the cited Trullench also affirms concerning Superiors of Regulars (Bk. II, ch. 2, dub. 38, n. 17). It is more probable to us, then, that all Prelates, in dispensations of vows, ought to have recourse to their respective superiors, as it is said — since no one is a judge in his own cause, nor can anyone truly and properly exercise jurisdiction over himself. The reasoning of the contrary opinion — that otherwise these Prelates would be of a worse condition than their subjects — is of no weight. Since both these Prelates, and their subjects, although of different rank, are equally subject to the laws in this manner. Wherefore, just as subjects must be dispensed by their immediate Prelates, so these Prelates must be dispensed by Prelates of a higher order.

I. Those things that are common to all subjects, which Regulars can dispense with their subjects — namely, the General throughout the whole Order, the Provincial throughout the whole province, and the superiors of houses throughout the whole family — need to be prefaced along with what Bishops can do with the subjects of their diocese. Since, compared to their own subjects, all these have quasi-episcopal jurisdiction; whence they can likewise delegate this same power. Just as, then, they can impose censures, and absolve from them, so too they can dispense in all vows, five excepted, over which they have no power. Indeed, the power over these five vows would be superfluous here: for the first two are in no way subject to Religious; but the vows of chastity, and of religious life, cannot be dispensed by Prelates, and would be null if attempted.

II. Question I. Can secular Prelates dispense in the vows of subjects made with the license of major Prelates? Response: It has been said above that Prelates cannot invalidate the vows of subjects made with their license, without cause, though several think otherwise. As to dispensation, however, there is no difficulty, that those Prelates who have granted the license themselves can dispense in the vows — since this does no detriment to the spiritual jurisdiction granted. Concerning vows made with the license of major Prelates, the opinion of theologians is not unified.

Some deny that an inferior Prelate can dispense in such vows. The common, and true, opinion affirms that he can — since, although the license granted by a superior Prelate withdraws the vow from the dominating power of the inferior Prelate (wherefore an inferior Prelate cannot invalidate it), it by no means withdraws it from the spiritual jurisdiction of the inferior Prelate; and consequently he can dispense in such a vow.

III. Question II. Can regular Prelates dispense with their Novices in vows? Response: The common opinion affirms this, a few authors denying it. Since regular Prelates have spiritual jurisdiction over their Novices: to govern and direct them pertains to the Prelates. Add to this that Novices enjoy the privileges of the religious order. The same power, however, resides also in the Bishop — since a Novice is not altogether exempt from episcopal jurisdiction, before he makes his profession. The Bishop of a Novice is that Bishop in whose diocese the Novice resides.

IV. Question III. Can regular Prelates dispense with their subjects in a vow of transferring to a stricter religious order? Response: It has been said above that this vow is not subject to the invalidation of Prelates. That a Prelate can dispense from it, however, is held by the common opinion, provided a reasonable cause is present — namely, that the Prelate dispensing prudently judges that his subject will more easily attain the perfection of his state in his own order, than if he should migrate to another religious order. A distinction is needed, however. Either the one vowing lives in a milder religious order, which nonetheless keeps its own profession exactly, and in this case the Prelate can, without doubt, dispense in the vow of transferring to a stricter order, when he prudently, and on solid grounds, judges that his subject will better attain evangelical perfection in his own religious order; or the religious order is not milder, but laxer, either in the observance of the Rule, or gravely collapsed. Let me explain the matter more clearly. In a position of grave relaxation, a Prelate cannot absolve a subject, this dispensation having been made, from the danger of withdrawing himself from the debt to which he is bound, of transgressing his own profession, and observing the laws in that Order where the observance of laws scarcely flourishes at all. Wherefore, granted that... the religious order in which the Prelate could place himself, so too, then, the Prelate is not able to dispense from the vow of transferring to a stricter order, or to another where the Rule prescribed. He can absolve him from the resolve, or debt, of not sinning; but he cannot free him from the debt of transferring to a stricter religious order — just as he cannot free him from the debt of restraining himself from sins.

V. Hence authors must be read cautiously who assert everywhere (as may be seen in the theologians of Salamanca, tract. 17, ch. 2, punct. 11, n. 91) that Prelates of Regulars can also dispense those who have made a vow of entering a stricter religious order, so that they may embrace a laxer one. For if the discussion concerns a laxer order — that is, one collapsed from regular discipline in substantial matters — their teaching is most false, since it is not even lawful for young men to enter such religious orders in the first place. The privileges of Eugene IV, which are commonly adduced, are apocryphal, nor do they pertain to the matter to which they are dragged.

VI. Neither in solemn vows, nor in vows which affect the very state proper to a religious order, and which are, as it were, singular prerogatives of such an Order, can Prelates dispense. Hence the vows of abstinence in the Order of the Minims, of restraining poverty in the Society of Jesus, of never seeking honors, of not soliciting dignities outside the religious order — which are made in certain Orders — can never be relaxed, or loosened, by Prelates. All this is common ground, such that scarcely anyone disagrees.

I. We undertake to handle an exceedingly tangled matter. The man who first called into dispute the moral question of whether Regulars have the faculty of dispensing in the vows of secular persons is not... Treatises on privileges reserved to the Supreme Pontiff, in which power to dispense ordinarily in all these matters an Episcopus can, by his own [jurisdiction, over his own subjects].

This opinion — namely, that Regulars can dispense in the aforesaid vows — is defended, as though set almost beyond all controversy, by the authors commonly to be cited: Sánchez (on the Decalogue, Bk. IV, ch. 43, n. 5), Rodríguez (Vol. I, Regular Questions, q. 63, art. 3), Miranda (Vol. I, q. 8, art. 3), Aragón (II-II, q. 88, art. 11, concl. 8), Ludovico López (Part 1, ch. 1), Sayr (Bk. VI, ch. 11, dub. 17), Lessius (Bk. II, ch. 2, dub. 5, n. 1), Tamburini (Bk. III, ch. 16, n. 46), Pellizzari (Manual of the Regular Rule, tract. 8, ch. 3), Fagundez (Bk. II, on the Decalogue, ch. 41, n. 11), Machado (Vol. IV, tract. 3, doc. 1, n. 1), Bartolomeo a San Fausto (Bk. III, Thesaurus, art. 95, in Clavis), Castropalao (tract. 15, disp. 2, punct. 13, n. 3), Trullench (Bk. II, q. 173), Candido (unique disp., dub. 1), John de la Cruz (Bk. II, ch. 6, dub. 8, concl. 2), Villalobos (Vol. II, tract. 34, diff. 29, n. 1), Mendo (disp. 26, on the crusade bull, ch. 2, n. 30), Bassaeus (s.v. Votum, 7, n. 10), Quintanadueñas (Vol. II, tract. 5, singul. 19, n. 2), Martín a San José (on the Rule of St. Francis), Diana (tract. 6, Part VI, resol. 50), Leander (tract. 2, disp. 3, sect. 3, and tract. 17, disp. 3, sect. 2, q. 135), Antonio a Spiritu Santo (in the Directorium of the Regular Rule, tract. 2, n. 80), Patritius Sporer (tract. 3, on the 2nd precept of the Decalogue, ch. 2, n. 30), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 17, ch. 2, punct. 11, n. 94), Vidal (on vows, inquiry 31, n. 77), La Croix (Bk. III, part 2, q. 130), Henrique a San Ignacio (Vol. II, Bk. X, ch. 28), Constantino Roncaglia (tract. 8, on the 2nd precept, ch. 4, q. 9, resol. 2), and other authors commonly.

II. They allege many privileges in confirmation of their own opinion. The first is that of Innocent VIII, who, they say, granted the Mendicants the power to dispense in all vows in which Bishops can, excepting vows of pilgrimage beyond two days' journey. Now two days' journey is twenty leagues, according to Rebuffi, on privileges, Scholastic Privilege 161. This privilege, says Leander, is reported by Rodríguez, Tomás Sánchez, Basilio of León, Tamburini, and other Doctors commonly. One would have believed that the aforesaid authors would report the words of the Bull itself, and the place where it is preserved. But they do not produce a single word of the Bull; rather, they merely cite it in exactly the same manner as Leander himself does. Rodríguez alone reports the words of certain bulls, from a compendium of the privileges of the Mendicants.

III. The second privilege is that of Martin V, who granted the Benedictines the power to dispense in all vows, even those reserved to the Bishop. Eugene IV granted this same thing to the Congregation of St. Justina, in the bull "Etsi quoslibet," etc., and to the Cistercians of the regular observance in the kingdom of Castile, in the bull "Commissum," 22, in Rodríguez. Leo X granted the same to the Benedictines of Monte Oliveto, and to the Camaldolese, in the bull "Etsi a summa." Paul III granted it to the Fathers of the Society, in the bull "Cum inter cunctas," 7, in Rodríguez — privileges which Gregory XIII also extended to sworn vows. Likewise Sixtus IV in the bull "Ad universalis," 12, and Paul IV in the bull "Ex clementi," 5, in Rodríguez and Cherubini.

IV. These privileges are reported by Henrique a San Ignacio, following other authors. This author has shown himself too easy in his accounts, and, with no examination undertaken beforehand, presents the aforesaid privileges to his readers just as they came to him from others. But all these are either suspect, not to say plainly apocryphal, or altogether diminished — that is, they do not grant the faculty of dispensing, but only of commuting vows. It is worth undertaking an examination of these.

V. As I have indicated, more recent theologians present the reported privileges as though subject to no doubt at all. The first, and almost the only ones, who brought them forward as documents, are Lezana, Martínez de Prado, and Passerini. Prado (Vol. II, ch. 31, on vows, q. 14, §2, n. 79) himself, having reported these privileges here, thus concludes: shown, suspected, apocryphal. Therefore, in a matter of such importance, I would prefer that this power be undoubted; or that it be established with such probability, that it could be practiced without scruple. In the meantime, I would advise that we make use only of the faculty of commuting vows, and abstain from the use of the power of dispensing in vows, which does not exist, or is not established with certain conjectures, except with limitations.

VI. This most learned, cautious, and prudent theologian, however, Leander charges with excessive scrupulosity, who, in disp. 17, q. 135, after reporting the bulls, cites the authors, and copies their words, and adds this: "But he is certainly too scrupulous about the probability of the opposite: for he trembles to fear where there is no fear, as will be evidently established." To dismiss further fears, then, he too gives a fairly lengthy account. But Prado insists that the fear about them is not sufficiently allayed for him. To this Leander responds thus: "But what, because it is not established for you concerning the truth of these bulls of the Pontiffs which are cited, must one abstain from the faculty of dispensing? This would be true, if it were not established even for other most learned men, most versed in the matter of privileges. But it is established, as we have seen. Let Prado, then, believe this — as I most gladly believe, and hold most firmly — that the said Regulars can dispense in all vows," etc.

VII. Anyone would be persuaded that Leander, speaking so confidently, had brought forward testimonies so clear that Prado, and all the others, would be compelled to give them full credence. And yet he offers nothing beyond citations of authors, who, mutually accepting each other's assertions on trust, produce a very large number of witnesses who, in a matter of fact, have no authority at all — although scarcely a single one shows that he has seriously examined the bulls himself... Scarcely one of these most learned men shows that he has seriously weighed the bulls himself; but one has cited the same things from another. Wherefore one need not much wonder at the audacity of Leander, who rebukes Prado for laboring, with a rare and pointless scrupulosity, to obscure all the privileges which the Mendicants enjoy concerning the dispensing of the vows of secular persons. It was Leander's task to shed some light, and to bring illumination, so as to dispel the darkness which Prado sought to cast over the privileges of the Mendicants. For that cloud of Casuists does not suffice to illustrate the truth of the matter, unless legitimate documents are produced that establish what is in dispute. But, setting aside these tedious trifles, let us come at once to the point, which alone suffices to make the matter clear.

VIII. Eugene IV, in the year 1436, in a constitution given at Bologna, whose beginning is "Etsi quoslibet," and which is found in the Cassinese Bullary of the Congregation of St. Benedict, and in the old Bullary of the Order of Preachers, granted this faculty to the reformed Monks in individual cases, according to the custom prescribed by the Rule: "Moreover, to commute all vows, and, in all matters, even those reserved to Ordinaries, whether by synodal or provincial constitutions, to dispense in every case — except censures, penalties, vows, and cases concerning which the Apostolic See ought rightly to be consulted." This privilege is what all the cited authors allege, to show that Regulars have the power of dispensing. And yet it is plain that Eugene IV grants only the faculty of commuting vows, and afterward, in reserved cases, of dispensing — as anyone reading the actual words of the cited constitution can confirm before his own healthy eyes. This Rodríguez himself openly admits (q. 63, art. 3), as do Lezana and Passerini, who examine the aforesaid words.

IX. Miranda was perhaps the first, as Passerini notes (Vol. II, q. 187, art. 3, inspect. 4), to amplify the aforesaid constitution. He says: "We are in a favorable matter; therefore the text is to be extended to dispensation." How feeble this reasoning is, no one fails to see. For, as the common axiom holds, bulls are worth only what they say. In another constitution, which the same Eugene IV granted to the same Benedictine Monks, whose beginning is "Regularem vitam" (9, in the Bullary of Cherubini), not a word is found that expresses the faculty of dispensing in vows, but only of dispensing in reserved cases. These are the words of the constitution: "And to dispense over all cases, except those sins and cases concerning which recourse must be had to their own Ordinaries by these same Confessors," etc. In this constitution, another constitution, "Etsi quoslibet," is also praised, and the same is more fully explained. It is evident, moreover, that the entire faculty granted is restricted to dispensing in cases, or censures — not so in vows.

X. Another privilege, they say, Eugene IV granted to the Benedictines of Valladolid, of dispensing in vows. Lezana says (Vol. I, ch. 19, n. 22) that it is not established whether this privilege was granted by some bull, or by a verbal decree. Passerini asserts that it was granted by a simple signature of a petition presented to the Pontiff. In the petition, however, this is found: "That they may lawfully and freely, by apostolic authority, dispense with them, and their [subjects], upon vows, even those reserved to the Bishop, and commute them into other works of piety, as often as it shall seem expedient to the devotion of the aforesaid persons." From this privilege nothing can be gathered in favor of the Mendicants. First, by Rodríguez's own admission, it is limited, and restricted to the Monastery of Valladolid, such that outside it vows can neither be commuted, nor dispensed, nor relaxed. For here is the restricting clause: "To the Confessors deputed, and appointed by the Prior, or President, of the Monastery of St. Benedict of Valladolid." Then, this privilege can be enjoyed only so long as they live according to the norm of regular observance, as Lezana (s.v. Votum, n. 22) and Passerini (n. 604) note. Whether it would be expedient to add a similar limitation to any privilege whatsoever, let others who are wiser judge.

XI. A similar privilege was granted by Sixtus IV in 1478 to the Vicar General of the reformed Congregation of the Order of Preachers in the kingdom of Castile. The constitution's beginning is "Sedes Apostolicae," to the Vicar General of the Order of Preachers, called of the Reformed. It is found in the recent Bullary of the Order, Vol. III. No faculty, however, is granted in this privilege of dispensing vows, but only of commuting them. Vows of pilgrimage, of abstinence, made by these faithful, which the local Ordinary, if present, could commute, and which the faithful themselves cannot conveniently fulfill, can, in the absence of the local Ordinary, be commuted into other works of piety. Then, as Passerini observes, at the urging of King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella of Castile and León, this privilege was granted only to the Vicar General of the reformed, or observant, Congregation, as they call it. This custom of granting ecclesiastical privileges only to Regulars observing the Rule strictly is prudent, reasonable, and just, and altogether consonant with the original purpose for which privileges are granted. For privileges were first granted for this reason: that Regulars, most exact observers of their own profession, might illuminate the Church by the sanctity of their lives, and by their zeal for the eternal salvation of their neighbors. If these merits altogether ceased; if, in place of regular observance, an excessive laxity of morals crept in in some cases; if, in place of zeal and solicitude for the care of souls' salvation, scandals arose to the offense of Christians — should not all privileges, by the same right by which they were granted, be revoked and suspended, so that at least the harassment might give understanding, and this penalty might render the path to reform less difficult? So we think, for our own slight part. For nothing do we say against the truth, but all things for it. But more on this at length in its proper place. Let us now return to our path.

XII. The privilege which they say was granted by Innocent VIII to the Order of Minors is of no authority at all — both because it is a mere verbal decree, as Rodríguez, Lezana, and Passerini admit (who notes that Miranda himself, q. 48, art. 3, does not make much of this privilege), and because it does not extend to vows, but only to all matters reserved to Bishops.

XIII. Paul III, in the privilege granted to the Society of Jesus, imparts only the faculty of commuting. The constitution's beginning is "Cum inter cunctas... whatever vows made through them for the time being" — to commute into other works of piety. Gregory XIII, in his constitution "Decet Romanum," extends this same faculty to the Society: "We extend the faculty of commuting vows, even sworn ones, granted by the Apostolic See, provided such a commutation is not made to another's prejudice."

XIV. The other privileges commonly alleged — those of Martin V and Julius II — prove nothing at all. For those who report the privilege of Martin V confirm nothing whatsoever, nor do they extend it to commutation. And they add that the faculty is elsewhere granted to Priests, without producing any document to show that it is authentic. It is unknown whether it is a constitution, or a verbal decree. Indeed, no words at all are produced from which it could be gathered what faculty is granted. That of Julius II is a verbal grant, and grants nothing new, as Passerini observes (n. 603), but extends the privilege of Eugene IV, granted to the Monastery of Valladolid, to the whole Congregation. Passerini concludes (n. 604): "The privilege of Eugene IV, whatever Bassaeus may say, is altogether very restricted, in favor of the Benedictines of Spain, and can pertain to at most four Confessors... and this privilege can pertain to those Fathers only so long as they live in regular observance. And because those to whom common privileges are communicated ought not to be of better condition than those to whom they were originally granted, as the Rota considered (decis. 177, n. 14, Part 9); therefore, insofar as other Regulars share in this privilege, they cannot use it except with those three limitations — namely, that they themselves be of the number of those three or four who have been deputed to this by the superiors of their houses, and that they dispense only with those who resort to, or are found in, their churches or houses, and insofar as these Confessors themselves observe regular observance." For under these limitations was this faculty of dispensing in vows delegated to those Monks... , as may be seen at length in the said privilege. Lezana too reports this (s.v. Votum, n. 22). But I suspect, besides this, that in the said privilege the faculty of dispensing, properly and strictly, is not granted at all, but only that of dispensing by way of commutation.

XV. I have chosen to report all this at length, so that the reader may gather from it how uncertain those privileges are which authors allege, so as to assert as certain that Regulars have the power of dispensing in all vows not reserved to the Pope. Out of so great a multitude of authors who are cited for this opinion, there is scarcely one who examines the privileges seriously and on his own initiative, and adduces reasons by which he actually establishes that the faculty of dispensing in all vows not reserved to the Apostolic See has really been granted by the Supreme Pontiffs.

XVI. The opinion which grants Regulars the privilege of dispensing in all vows not reserved to the Supreme Pontiff is false. And this opinion appears improbable and false enough, first from what we have said — since the power of jurisdiction in the relaxation of vows ought by no means to rest on doubtful and uncertain privileges, but on certain and authentic documents. But no certain and authentic documents have yet been produced in favor of this same opinion. It must, therefore, be judged false.

I. Question I. Who can make vows? Answer. Those who possess the use of reason, and have dominion over those things which they pledge to God. Wherefore the vows of minors, since they lack dominion, can be invalidated by their parents: nor are they firm except under the tacit condition that they please the parents.

II. Question II. Are vows made by Religious, without the Prelate's license, concerning an honorable matter which disturbs neither jurisdiction nor discipline, valid? Answer. Several deny it; but the more probable opinion affirms it, since they bring no detriment either to the jurisdiction of the Prelates, or to the discipline of the Order, and concern an honorable matter. Prelates can indeed invalidate these vows, once they have come to know of them. But subjects are not bound to manifest them; and so, as long as they remain hidden, they are valid, and those vowing are bound to execute them. But vows of Religious opposed either to the Rule or to the jurisdiction of Superiors are null. Similarly, vows made by Religious to give away in alms anything of the goods granted for their own use, without the license of the Prelates, are altogether null.

III. Question III. Can the Church make laws declaring certain persons unable to make vows? Answer. If the discourse be of solemn vows, which regard the public discipline of the Church, there is no difficulty. For it is plain from the Church's sanction that no monastic profession is valid if made before the completion of the sixteenth year. With respect to simple vows, even internal ones, the Church can prescribe certain conditions, which not being observed, the vows are null; and thus indirectly she can invalidate even internal promises. Bishops cannot, without consulting the supreme Pontiff, vow the abdication of their Episcopate, because such abdication is forbidden to them. Nor can they vow a pilgrimage beyond that interval during which they can rightly be absent from their Churches, without consulting the supreme Pontiff. Parish priests and Beneficiaries, bound by the tie of residence, can vow entrance into Religion without consulting the Bishop. But that the one vowing cannot enter Religion without consulting the Bishop, some grant. But this opinion is destitute of all foundation, since no law exists which prohibits this. Yet by the law of fittingness and courtesy, Parish priests ought to consult their own Bishop.

IV. Question IV. Does a vow cease when the moving cause ceases? Answer. One cause is moving, another impelling. The proximate moving cause ceasing, the vow ceases, as all commonly teach. Because, the final cause altogether ceasing, the matter of the vow ceases. This is plain by an example. You vowed alms to be given to such a poor man: this man has become rich: the end of the alms altogether ceases. The vow, therefore, also ceases. But the impelling cause ceasing, the vow does not cease.

V. Question V. Does a notable change of matter suffice to invalidate a vow? Answer. The common opinion affirms it, with St. Thomas, II-II, q. 110 [recte 88], article 3, ad 3, provided the change of matter be very grave. It is reckoned very grave when the state of the promised thing is varied. This change, moreover, must be evident and manifest. Hence, if, the vow having been made, there occurs in its execution a danger to life, or to honor, or a detriment of another matter of grave moment, the vow ceases.

VI. Supervening difficulties, which can be overcome in the execution of a vow, do not invalidate the vow, although, had the one vowing known of them, he would have abstained from the vow. Since there are few contracts in which grave difficulties do not afterwards occur, which, had they been foreseen, the contracts would not have been entered into.

VII. Question VI. Is some cause required for the invalidation of vows? Answer. Several affirm that no cause is required for the valid invalidation of vows. Invalidation, they say, is the removal of a vow made by one who possesses ruling power, such as fathers have over children, and Superiors over subject Religious. There is a twofold invalidation: one direct, which I have described; the other indirect, which regards the promised matter, and impedes its execution. The opinion which affirms that a cause is required for the invalidation of vows is very probable to me. For invalidation is an act of jurisdiction. An examination, then, ought to precede, so that this act may be judged fitting or not. Finally, he who acts honorably ought to be moved by some right end.

VIII. Question VII. Is the faculty of invalidating vows a matter of natural or of positive law? Answer. Several stand for positive law, saying that the solemn vows of Regulars are indissoluble only by ecclesiastical law. The contrary opinion is more probable to me, which St. Thomas defends, II-II, q. 189, and with him the graver Theologians. Children, by force of natural law, are subject to paternal power. Religious are subject to the will and dominion of their Prelates, by force of solemn profession, or the vow of obedience. Therefore, by natural and divine law, fathers and Superiors hold dominion over children and Religious; and by force of this dominion they can invalidate the vows of their subjects. There is added that although some law be only of ecclesiastical positive law, yet, that being posited, natural and divine law arises. The consecration of a chalice is a matter of ecclesiastical law. But that being posited, by divine law, reverence and homage are owed to the consecrated chalice.

IX. Question VIII. To whom does the power of invalidating vows belong? Answer. Some are Superiors who have ruling power, as parents over children, masters over servants, as has been said; others are those who possess the power of jurisdiction over those vowing. The supreme Pontiff can directly invalidate the vows of Regulars and Nuns, because he is the supreme Prelate of all Religious; likewise the vows of all Ecclesiastics which pertain to ecclesiastical benefices; but he can invalidate the vows of laymen only indirectly, by forbidding the matter.

X. Bishops can directly invalidate the vows of Nuns subject to them; but not of Nuns who are not subject to their jurisdiction, or of exempt Regulars; nay, nor of their own Clerics, and still less of Laymen. Only those, then, can directly invalidate vows who have what is called ruling power over those vowing. Thus the Prelates of Regulars can invalidate the vows of Religious, parents the vows of children, guardians the vows of wards, curators the vows of minors, masters the vows of slaves, husbands the vows of wives: because all these possess ruling power. A Superior can invalidate the vows of subjects, the subjects being unwilling.

XI. The Superiors of Regulars who can invalidate vows are the Generals throughout the whole Order, the Provincials throughout the whole Province, the Superiors of Convents or houses within them. Secondary Superiors, such as Vicars and Sub-priors, cannot invalidate the vows of subjects when the Prelates are present, but can when these Prelates are absent. Now they are not said to be absent when they leave the house to return the same day; but they are understood to be absent when they are away from the Convent for one or two natural days. Abbesses and Prioresses of Nuns can invalidate the vows of subject Nuns, just as Regular Prelates can invalidate the vows of their subjects. Regular Prelates cannot invalidate the vows of Novices before profession, because they have no ruling power over them.

XII. Question IX. Can parents invalidate the vows of minor children? Answer. The infancy of children begins from birth and ends at the completion of the seventh year. The age of wardship, or non-puberty, takes its beginning from the seventh year, and ends, in sons, at the completed fourteenth year; in daughters, likewise at the completed twelfth year. Puberty in women begins at the twelfth year, in men at the fourteenth, and, according to common law, has its end at the completed twenty-fifth year. Within this interval — from the twelfth and fourteenth years up to the twenty-fifth — both daughters and sons are called pubescent and minors, just as from the seventh year up to the twelfth and fourteenth they are called non-pubescent. Now the vows of non-pubescent sons and daughters, made after the use of reason, and so valid, parents can invalidate, whether they be personal vows, real, or mixed. But the vows of pubescent sons and daughters, which do not disturb domestic governance, parents cannot invalidate, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 88, art. 8, ad 2. But vows which disturb domestic governance, since they bring harm to paternal power, parents can invalidate. Vows of non-pubescent children once confirmed by the father cannot afterwards be invalidated by him.

XIII. Question X. Are the real vows of pubescent children subject to paternal invalidation? Answer. So long as children are of minor age, that is, within the time of puberty, they are subject to paternal administration, and can in no way dispose of paternal goods. Null, then, are their real vows by which they pledge paternal goods, the consent of parents not being added. Likewise of mixed vows, as to that part which is real. But the vows of pubescent children which concern castrensian goods cannot be invalidated by the father; nor vows concerning adventitious goods, whose administration the children have. But if the father has the administration of these goods, he can invalidate vows concerning them: because then the vows would be contrary to right administration.

XIV. Question XI. Can guardians and curators invalidate the vows of minors and wards? Answer. Guardians and curators can invalidate the vows of minors and wards in the same way that parents can rescind the vows of children, because they are reckoned as fathers, as it were. A curator given to a major on account of his fault of prodigality can invalidate real vows: because all administration, taken from the major, is subject to the curator's dominion.

XV. Question XII. Can a mother invalidate the vows of minor sons and daughters? Answer. While the father lives and is present, the mother lacks the power of invalidating the vows of sons and daughters: because the father alone is the head of the family, as the more common and more probable opinion teaches. The father having died, the grandfather, guardian, or curator succeeds, and while these exist, the mother cannot invalidate the vows of her children. But grandfathers, guardians, and curators being absent, and the father dead, then the mother can invalidate the vows of her minor children, since by natural law she has care of the children. But the mother of pubescent children cannot invalidate real vows, unless she has been instituted a curatrix. Parents, guardian, and curator being absent, a grandfather and grandmother can invalidate the vows of minor grandchildren: since they succeed in the place of parents. Masters of disciples, lords of servants, employers of hired men, cannot invalidate personal vows made in minority, as the more common opinion teaches.

XVI. Question XIII. Can a husband invalidate the vows made by his wife after marriage? Answer. A husband can invalidate those vows of his wife which concern things subject to his authority. For a wife is not subject to her husband in all things, but only in those which regard marriage, the governance of the family, the administration of goods, and the education of children. Therefore a husband can invalidate only those vows which disturb the aforesaid order; not others which in no way stand in the way of the things I have recounted. A contrary opinion grave and numerous Theologians defend — namely that a husband can invalidate all his wife's vows. This opinion, if the discourse be of real vows which wives can make concerning things and paraphernal goods, is false: for just as they can dispose of these goods without consulting their husbands...

so too they can make vows concerning them. Similarly a husband cannot invalidate his wife's vows of hearing Mass on feast days, of not lying, of not committing adultery, of making confession, and other things already commanded. Nor can a husband invalidate a vow which his wife made, without consulting him, of not asking the debt. Yet the wife would imprudently make this vow, since it diminishes conjugal benevolence and mutual love, at least indirectly. A husband cannot invalidate his wife's vows which he himself has once approved. Similarly, when by mutual consent they have vowed chastity, neither retains the power of withdrawing from the vow. Again, when both by mutual consent vow Religion, they can no longer invalidate such a vow, either by mutual consent or separately. Vows made by a wife before marriage, but to be fulfilled once marriage has been entered upon, a husband cannot invalidate, but can only suspend their execution, if they are absent from the conjugal duty. The same must be said of vows made during the time of a legitimate divorce. A wife too can invalidate her husband's vows which conflict with matrimonial right; just as she can invalidate a vow which her husband might make of adopting the habit of a Hermit or of some Religion, because such a wearing of the habit diminishes conjugal love, and paves the way to separation. A wife can also invalidate her husband's vows of a longer pilgrimage, except a vow of pilgrimage to Jerusalem made for a time on account of the public good. For then the wife is bound to keep continence for the sake of defending some public good, or recovering something lost. This cause being absent, vows are to be dissuaded in married persons which either indirectly oppose conjugal benevolence. Let married persons bear, with Christian patience and a reciprocal love of charity, the most heavy matrimonial yoke, and they will be holy Christians.

XVII. Question XIV. Can masters invalidate the vows of servants? Answer. Domestic servants must be distinguished from slaves. The former serve their masters by a paid agreement, and are their own masters, and can make vows, whose execution alone the masters can suspend, if they impede due domestic service. The latter, namely slaves properly so called, are chattels reduced to servitude, and enjoy no liberty as regards the bodily service to be rendered to their masters. The first opinion defends that masters can invalidate all the vows of slaves. The more probable opinion is that masters can invalidate all the vows of slaves which impede due servitude: since a master has the right that the offices of servitude be rendered to him by the slave. Therefore he can invalidate those things which derogate from this right. But they cannot invalidate vows of keeping the divine precepts, of chastity, of prayers, of giving alms from goods of which the slaves have dominion, nor other similar vows, which in no way impede due servitude.

XVIII. Question XV. Does the faculty of dispensing from the obligation of vows flourish in the Church? Answer. All Catholics say so, alleging Matthew 16: To thee I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven: whatsoever thou shalt loose upon earth, it shall be loosed also in heaven. Now this dispensation is the removal of the bond of a vow, made in God's name by one having spiritual jurisdiction in the external forum, for some reasonable cause. This notion of dispensation is by its own nature clear. How this dispensation is made, St. Thomas declares, II-II, q. 88, art. 10, ad 2. Those who can dispense can also commute vows.

XIX. Question XVI. To whom, by ordinary law, does the faculty of dispensing in vows belong? Answer. It belongs first to the supreme Pontiff, Pastor and Head of the universal Church, and Vicar of Christ on earth; then to a general Council, to the supreme Pontiff's Penitentiary, to Legates a latere, to pontifical Nuncios with respect to the whole Province or Kingdom, to Archbishops, Bishops, the cathedral Chapter with the see vacant, Abbots having quasi-episcopal jurisdiction, and all Prelates of Regulars with respect to their own subjects. All these can, by ordinary law, dispense their subjects in vows both personal and real, reserved vows excepted. Cardinal Protectors of Orders cannot, by ordinary law, dispense in vows. The vows of a Community can be dispensed by a Bishop, a just cause occurring.

XX. Question XVII. Those who impart dispensation from a vow to others — can they apply this same privilege to themselves? Answer. Concerning the supreme Pontiff there is no difficulty, since he has no superior from whom he could be dispensed. The Salmanticenses defend that any Prelates who can dispense others can use the same privilege upon themselves, and for their opinion cite Sanchez, Tamburini, Azor, Suárez, and others. The opposite opinion is more probable to me: because no one is a judge in his own cause; therefore these Prelates ought to have recourse to their own Superiors.

XXI. Question XVIII. Can Regular Prelates dispense their subjects in vows made with the license of greater Prelates? Answer. It has already been said that Regular Prelates can do what Bishops can do throughout their whole diocese — namely, the General throughout the whole Order, the Provincial throughout the whole Province, and the Superiors of houses throughout the whole family. To the question proposed some answer, denying this faculty to Prelates. But the common and true opinion teaches that in the case proposed Regular Prelates can dispense. Because although a license granted by a greater Prelate withdraws the vow made from the ruling power of the inferior Prelate, who cannot invalidate it, it does not thereby remove it from spiritual jurisdiction. Therefore the inferior Prelate can dispense from it. Regular Prelates can also dispense their own Novices.

XXII. Question XIX. Can Regular Confessors dispense secular men in vows? Answer. Almost all Casuists commonly affirm it, alleging several privileges; but in Tome 3 of the Christian Theology, book 4, dissertation 3, chapter 11, I made plain that privileges of this kind are fictitious and of no authority; and so that Regular Confessors can in no way dispense secular men from any vows whatsoever, whether reserved or not reserved. And this our opinion Passerini, Martínez de Prado, and Lezana teach, which in the place cited I confirmed by the authority of Benedict XIII, who in his constitution Pretiosus in conspectu Domini imparts to Confessors the faculty of commuting vows, but not of dispensing. Fr. O. P. wrangle over the word "relaxed" [relaxari] contained in the constitution. But I exploded this cavil in the place cited, where I showed that in a matter of jurisdiction, the safer part must be chosen.

XXIII. Question XX. What must be said of vows reserved to the Supreme Pontiff? Answer. The common opinion is that there are five vows reserved to the supreme Pontiff, namely the simple vow of perpetual continence, of Religion, and of a threefold pilgrimage — to Jerusalem, to Rome, and to Compostela. No other vow, besides these five, is reserved to the supreme Pontiff. Except, however, simple vows made in certain Religious Orders of not seeking, nor accepting, dignities. That these vows be reserved to the supreme Pontiff, they must be certain, express, absolute, and perfect. If there be doubt about them, they are not reserved. For this reservation, since it is odious, must be interpreted strictly. Wherefore if someone made one of these five vows with the express intention of binding himself only under venial sin, it would not be a perfect vow, and therefore not reserved either.

XXIV. Bishops, urgent necessity pressing, can dispense in vows of this kind — as when there is danger of violating the vow, of infamy, of scandal, or of another grave harm, either temporal or spiritual, if the dispensation is deferred. You violated a virgin while bound by a vow of chastity. For the reparation of her honor, marriage is necessary. Impediments are feared to be raised, if the marriage is deferred. In this and similar cases, Bishops can dispense, provided the imminent harms cannot be repaired in another way.

XXV. The Salmanticenses grant this same faculty of dispensing from reserved vows to Regular Prelates...

But this opinion is false: because even the privileges admitted, which are commonly alleged, and which we have rejected as apocryphal, grant Regular Prelates no faculty in reserved vows. These privileges being excluded, Regulars have no power even of commuting the vows of Seculars. A vow of not contracting marriage is not reserved, because it is not perfect in this kind. For it does not exclude fornication, pollution, and other acts contrary to chastity. By force of custom a Bishop can grant the faculty of asking the conjugal debt to one who, bound by a vow of chastity, has contracted marriage. A vow of an unapproved Religion is not reserved.

XXVI. Question XXI. How are the reserved vows of the threefold pilgrimage understood? Answer. They are reserved when they were made on account of a peculiar devotion toward the aforesaid places. These vows, made with some circumstance, remain whole and reserved when the circumstance is removed. You vowed a pilgrimage to Rome on foot: the Bishop can dispense in the circumstance of the journey on foot, but not in the vow of pilgrimage, which can be made by carriage. A disjunctive vow is not reserved before one part is chosen by the one vowing. You vowed Religion, or alms; chastity, or fasting, without having chosen either part. In this case a Bishop can dispense. But once a reserved part has been selected by the one vowing — say, perpetual chastity — then it seems to us more probable that it is reserved.

XXVII. These vows: "If I gamble, I vow chastity"; "If my father dies, I will enter Religion" — this second the authors commonly teach to be reserved, because the vow is in very deed absolute, and only expresses an apparent condition: namely, when my father dies, I will enter Religion. This other vow, and similar ones, once the condition is fulfilled, seem more probably to be reserved. Thus this is reserved: "I vow Religion, if I come off unharmed" — once the condition is fulfilled, not before. The opposite opinion the Salmanticenses defend at length, whose reasons I exploded in the place cited.

XXVIII. When the aforesaid five vows, on account of some condition attached, are not reserved, Regular Confessors can relax them by commuting, but not by dispensing, as has been said above. For "to relax" does not include "to dispense," as not a few falsely suppose. For when Pontiffs grant the faculty of dispensing, they expressly use the word "dispense." In the faculty granted of dispensing or commuting all vows, reserved vows are not understood, unless they are expressed.

XXIX. Question XXII. Is a reasonable cause required for a valid and licit dispensation? Answer. The power given to a dispenser is for edification, not for destruction, as the Councils, Canons, Fathers, and Theologians teach. Therefore a dispensation of a vow granted without a reasonable cause is not only illicit, but invalid, because it would be for the destruction, not the edification, of the Church. If it is doubted whether or not there is a cause for dispensing, then the Theologians commonly teach that dispensation has no place. For a vow is certain, and cannot be undone for an uncertain cause. But if some certain cause exists, and it is only doubted whether it is sufficient, then the common opinion teaches that dispensation can be granted. When a dispensation has been given in good faith both on the part of the one asking and on the part of the one granting, if you afterwards discover that the cause which each party judged legitimate at the time of the granting and the asking is false and null, what is to be done? The Salmanticenses, Sanchez, Tamburini, Leander, Sporer, Roncaglia, and others defend that the dispensation is valid. But the contrary opinion is more probable. For even the adversaries cited themselves confess that a just cause is required for valid dispensation. Therefore, as often as this cause is lacking, there is no dispensation. There was good faith both in the one asking and in the one granting; what follows from this? Only this follows: that these did not sin. Did good faith perhaps make a false cause become true? Far from it, you say. Therefore, a false cause existing, there is no dispensation. But it belongs to divine benignity to confirm and ratify what was asked and granted in good faith. Is this so indeed? Will divine benignity, then, confirm an error? This surely does not befit divine benignity. But souls are tortured with scruples, consciences are disturbed. These are trifles. Errors, fictions, and false interpretations do not settle consciences, do not uproot scruples; but the true observance of the Law brings tranquility.

XXX. Question XXIII. What are legitimate causes of dispensation? Answer. Three things must be noted: 1. what is lawful according to equity; 2. what is fitting according to honesty; 3. what is expedient according to utility. The graver the vow, the graver the causes required for dispensation, so that there be a fitting proportion between the vow to be relaxed and the cause of relaxation. Hence it is that in the aforesaid five vows dispensations are rarely granted, but the supreme Pontiffs themselves are wont to mix in something of commutation. Nor is it to be inferred from this that a dispensation is never to be granted; but only that it is to be granted when a legitimate cause occurs. Nor is an evident cause always required, since in moral matters it can often not be had. It suffices that a likely cause appear solid, so that, all things seriously weighed, it be judged expedient, both to the common good and to the honest advantage of the one vowing, that the vow be relaxed.

XXXI. The peculiar causes which can suffice for granting a dispensation are: doubt about the vow having been made, imperfect deliberation in vowing, the very great difficulty of its execution, a moral danger of frequently violating the vow on account of the fragility of the one bound by the vow, even a light fear unjustly inflicted to extort the vow.

XXXII. Imperfect deliberation either was so sudden and weak that it rendered the vow null, and the question ceases; or it was such that it rendered the vow valid, in which case it does not by itself suffice for a dispensation. But when perfect deliberation is doubted, and difficulty of execution is added, then there is room for dispensation. A vehement fear of shipwreck, of a most grave danger, can sometimes so disturb the mind that it impedes perfect deliberation, so that it can sometimes be a sufficient reason for granting a dispensation. Similarly, a most grave difficulty, not foreseen beforehand, but appearing entirely after the vow was made, can be a cause of dispensation. Tamburini, the Salmanticenses, and Sporer contend that even a foreseen difficulty suffices for dispensation; but this opinion is false to me. If to the difficulty is added a grave danger of violating the vow, then there can be room for dispensation. Doubt about a vow having been made is not a sufficient cause for dispensing, but only for commuting.

XXXIII. Question XXIV. What is the commutation of a vow, and who can commute vows? Answer. It is the exchange of one matter for another, under the same obligation of the vow. It differs from dispensation, which takes away the whole obligation, and from invalidation, which can be validly done even without cause. Commutation is an effect of spiritual jurisdiction. Anyone can increase, but not diminish, his own vows. You vowed a hundred gold pieces; you can give two hundred: because this is a more abundant payment, not a commutation. They dispute whether anyone can commute his own vows. Some affirm it; but St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and other ancient writers deny it. For commutation is an act of spiritual jurisdiction. Secular persons lack this spiritual jurisdiction; but ecclesiastical persons cannot exercise spiritual jurisdiction upon themselves; and therefore they cannot commute their own vows. The patrons of the opposite opinion gratuitously assert that this commutation is an act of prudence, not of spiritual jurisdiction: for in a true commutation the prior bond is rescinded, and another substituted. But the rescission of a contract is an act of jurisdiction. It is so, they say, when the commutation is not evidently for the better. Several of the adversaries confuse the state of the question. When...

the promised matter is increased, it is not commutation, but a more abundant payment. True commutation is when, in place of one matter — say a fast — another is substituted, such as alms. Now that jurisdiction is required for this exchange is evident. The adversaries concede this when the matter to be substituted is either inferior or equal: why not also when it is greater, and of a different kind? There is added that no one is a judge in his own cause; and men can with difficulty know what is more pleasing to God. Therefore promises must be stood by, which cannot be broken without falsehood, unless jurisdiction intervenes, which rescinds the bond of the contract. No one, then, can by his own authority commute the matter of his own vow into another matter of a different kind; but spiritual jurisdiction is necessary. Hence he who has vowed one Religion cannot, by his own authority, enter another.

XXXIV. Question XXV. In the commutation of vows, must an equality of matter be kept? Answer. Bonacina, Leander, Diana teach that vows can be commuted into a lesser matter; but the more common and more probable opinion defends that a moral equality must be kept. For commutation is indeed a contract: but in every contract equality must be kept, more or less according to the diversity of contracts. This equality is not to be taken arithmetically and mathematically, but morally — that is, as is prudently judged equivalent to the matter which was previously subject to the vow.

XXXV. Question XXVI. What cause is required for a licit and valid commutation? Answer. When the commutation is made into something evidently better, by a Prelate endowed with legitimate authority, all concede that no cause is required; and they add that the same must be said when the matter to be substituted is evidently equal, and probably better. But when the supreme Pontiff, in a Jubilee or in the Bull of the Crusade, or by some privilege, gives the faculty of commuting vows, no peculiar cause is required, but the execution of the works prescribed in the aforesaid Bulls suffices: because the supreme Pontiff imparts such a faculty for the common good of the whole Church. But when Prelates, by ordinary power, commute vows into matter of a different kind, some just cause is always required; yet a grave one is not always necessary, but sometimes a light one can suffice, that the commutation be licit: for when it is into equal matter, it is valid even if made without cause, though not licit; but if it is made into inferior matter without cause, it is both illicit and invalid, as the more probable opinion teaches. But a Prelate commuting vows without cause sins gravely, because he abuses the faculty granted to him.

XXXVI. Question XXVII. What must be said of the commutation of vows by force of a Jubilee, or of the Bull of the Crusade? Answer. In the Bull of the Jubilee a broader faculty is granted, namely of commuting vows of the threefold pilgrimage — to Rome, to Compostela, and to Jerusalem — and only vows of chastity and of Religion are excepted. In the Bull of the Crusade, besides these two vows, a vow of an overseas pilgrimage is also excepted. The two vows of chastity and of Religion, which are excepted in each Bull, are perfect and absolute. Wherefore vows of not marrying, of not fornicating, of conjugal chastity, of chastity for a limited time, are not excepted, nor vows made by deceit, fear, or error. This commutation can be made both within and outside of confession: because the privileges which grant the faculty of commuting vows do not bind this commutation to sacramental confession, unless Superiors decree otherwise. In this commutation the general rule must be kept: to commute either into something better, or into a good morally and prudently equal.

XXXVII. Question XXVIII. Can a vow of giving alms to such a Church, or to such a poor person, be commuted, after that party's acceptance, by virtue of a Jubilee, or of the Bull of the Crusade? Answer. To me the affirming opinion is false. Since either the poor person, or the Church, after the acceptance of a promise confirmed by a vow, acquires a right to the promised thing. But the aforesaid privileges do not grant the faculty of injuring justice. He who, after receiving the Jubilee, remembers some vow, can take care that it be commuted for him, because his forgetting of it was innocent. But once the year of the Bull of the Crusade has passed, the graces granted in it cannot be obtained. He who, at the beginning of the week of the Jubilee, has his vows commuted with a sincere intention of gaining the Jubilee, has the commutation stand, even if afterwards, through negligence or forgetfulness, he does not fulfill the works of the Jubilee. Since an obligation once extinguished does not revive. He who, at the time of the Jubilee, refuses to commute his vows without just cause, sins more or less according to the variety of circumstances.

XXXVIII. Question XXIX. Is a return to the former matter licit after a legitimate commutation has been made? Answer. If the commutation was made into a lesser obligation, and a dispensation was mixed in, the one vowing can return to the original matter, the substituted matter being abandoned: because no one is compelled to use a privilege of dispensation that favors him, as is commonly taught. But the Theologians dispute whether a return to the prior matter is free, when the commutation was made, by legitimate authority, into something better or equal. The Salmanticenses, Leander, Castropalao, Laymann, and others affirm it. Because, they say, the commutation is made in favor of the one vowing. The contrary opinion is more probable to me: since indeed the commutation is in favor of the one vowing precisely because the prior bond is removed and another substituted. Here the whole favor to the one vowing is concluded. Now when the one vowing has accepted the commutation, or the substituted burden, he has bound himself to it by the bond of Religion. Therefore he cannot free himself from this debt, especially when the commutation was made into something better, since he freely accepted this greater burden, and bound himself to it.

The End of the First Tome.

HITHERTO we have treated of the first way in which vows are removed, which is irritatio [annulment]. Now the second must be treated, which is dispensation. And indeed that this power exists in the Church is clear from that saying of Matth. 16, Whatsoever you shall bind, which words are universal, as D. Bonaventure notes in 4. d. 20. quaest. 5, and after him Sanchez lib. 4. summa, cap. 37. num. 3, where he proves the same from Ioan. 22, Feed, etc., where also D. Bonaventure.

IT MUST BE NOTED FIRST, from what was said in the tract. de legibus, d. 5. quaest. 14, with D. Bonaventure in the body, and Sanch. cap. 37, what the difference is between the dispensation of a vow and a declaration; for a declaration takes away no obligation of a vow; it only declares that the vow of itself does not bind in that event; as if someone vowed to fast on such a day, or to perform certain prayers, and the prelate declares that he is not bound because he is infirm; this does not take away the obligation but only explains that it ceases by reason of impotence. But a true dispensation is when, a just cause existing, the prelate takes away an obligation of the vow still existing; as if one should free someone beset by the burning goads of concupiscence from a vow of chastity which still endures: or if one having a law for the public good, having subjects under him for its execution, judges that for the time being it should not be commanded to be carried out.

THE FIRST opinion, which D. Bonaventure reports, is that the Church can properly dispense. This opinion is exceedingly celebrated, and is upheld by D. Thom. 4. d. 38. quaest. 1. art. 4. quaestiuncula prima, ibi, Richard. art. 9. quaest. 1, and d. 17. art. 2. quaest. 2. supplem. Gabr. 4. d. 38. quaest. 1. art. 1. Hostiensis in summa, tit. de voto, num. 16, and cap. Non est, num. 1, same title, ibi. Abbas num. 5. D. Antoninus 2. part. tit. 11. cap. 2. §. 9. Canus relect. de poenit. part. 5. Medina de Poenitentia Tract. de confess. quaestione de dispensatione super confessione revel. ad 2. Sotus lib. 1. de iustitia quaest. 7. art. 3, and lib. 7. quaest. 4. art. 1. Palac. 4. d. 38. d. 3. fol. 884. Suarez Tract. de voto, lib. 6. cap. 9. Toletus lib. 4. summae from cap. 18. Angles flor. 2. part. quaest. unic. de voto, art. 8. diff. 1. Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 10. Sayrus lib. 6. cap. 11. num. 9. Azorius Tom. 1. lib. 6. cap. 1. quaest. 4, and lib. 11. cap. 18. quaest. 5. Graffis s. p. p. decis. lib. 2. cap. 31. num. 18 and 20, and cap. 32. num. 2. Valentia 2. 2. d. 6. quaest. 6. p. 7. Lessius lib. 2. de iustitia, cap. 40. d. 12. num. 98. Petrus Ledesma 2. Tomo, Tract. 10. cap. 8. dub. 2. Henriquez lib. 8. de Eucharistia, cap. 13, and lib. 7. de Indulg. cap. 23. Vasquez prima 2. quaest. 97. art. 4. d. 178. num. 10. Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 12. Sanch. 2 lib. 4. summae, cap. 37. num. 5. Fagundez in secundum Praeceptum Decal. lib. 2. cap. 40. Tanner. d. 5. quaest. 6. dub. 6, citing many. Bassaeus, V. Votum 7, proclaims this to be of faith.

THE SECOND opinion denies that there is in the Church a power to dispense, but only to declare. So D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 10 in the body. Abul. cap. 30. Numer. quaest. 102 and 103. Caietanus in summa, verb. votum, cap. de dispens. Armilla verb. votum, num. 13. Gloss. cap. Non est, under the word Authoritate, de voto. Ibi Anton. num. 3. Cardin. cap. cum ad monast. num. unico de statu monach. Covarr. ac pactis 1. quaest. §. 3. num. 3. Ferrar. lib. 3. contra G. cap. 124, and Paludanus 4. d. 38. quaest. 4 art. 4. concl. 1. num. 38 sufficiently indicate it. D. Antoninus 2. part. tit. 11. cap. 2. §. 9. notab. 1. Sylvester verb. votum 4. quaest. 3. d. 3.

AS TO D. Bonaventure, he is adduced for this opinion loc. cit., but one must explain in what sense he upholds it: he himself, after stating the opposing opinion, puts forward this one, which he calls more reasonable and more secure, and because by it the conscience is more fully satisfied. And it is such that it is not a mere interpretation of the law, such as any learned man can make, but is a declaration of law. For since a vow is a good directed to the glory of God and the salvation of the one vowing, and looks to the good of the whole Church, therefore the Pontiff, who is the supreme judge, has the power of choosing from those goods the one which he has known to be better and more expedient for the Divine glory and the good of the Church; and consequently, even if the obligation, for example, of continence in a King, be in force; if the Pontiff judges it to be for the utility of the public Church that he marry and endeavor to obtain children for the preservation of peace, and this good be more certain than the evil that presses, namely that the King lack a successor, he can dispense; which in rigor is not to relax the law, but to declare, the true obligation remaining: But if the good arising from the dispensation is uncertain, he ought not take away a certain obligation, as S. Bonaventure notes. ad 2. Thus, then, the law, which is ordered to the greater good of the Church, is not relaxed, and this is also the opinion of D. Thomas, as I shall show.

This is the genuine opinion of S. Bonaventure, who defines it better than all others and avoids the difficulties, as we shall see.

I ASSERT with this opinion, first, that vows cannot be dispensed in the Church by relaxing the law.

THE FOUNDATION of D. Bonaventure is: Those things which are of natural Divine law cannot be dispensed by man: But a vow is of this kind: Therefore. The major is the axiom of all Theologians and Canonists, as Azorius notes, lib. 6. quaestio cited above, and Sanchez confesses it, num. 4. The minor is proved by S. Bonaventure, foundation first, from Psal. 75, Vow, and pay to the Lord your God. And since this law has always existed, as all confess, it follows that it is a natural law, not a positive one, as is gathered in the second foundation.

IT was led by this reasoning that S. Bonaventure, devoutly devoted to the authority of the Church, adapted his opinion. By this argument the adversaries are badly twisted about, and they sweat marvelously in rendering an account of this power.

RICHARDUS answers, 4. d. 38. art. 9. quaest. 1. Graffius p. p. decis. lib. 2. cap. 31. num. 8. and others cited with D. Bonaventure; whenever someone binds himself by vow or oath, he does so not absolutely, but saving what must be saved; and because the Pope is the supreme Pastor, upon whom rests the salvation of all the faithful, this condition is always understood in the one vowing: if the Pontiff wish it ratified.

YET this response is refuted by Azorius, loc. cit., and Sanchez, num. 7, because on this account the Pope could dissolve a vow and an oath without cause by a mere nod, which cannot be said, since a cause adequate to this is required. In this attack Azorius and Sanchez fall into the opinion of D. Bonaventure, while they confess that dispensation is not a proper relaxation of law, since a just cause is required, which is the end of every law, and while it remains, in a dispensation the law is not relaxed.

IT is indeed attacked by D. Bonaventure because this condition, thought up gratuitously, finds a foundation nowhere; for vows, which are offered, are offered most freely, as all proclaim, and one can offer what pleases God more. And this being the absolute counsel of the Lord,³, some condition is added to its execution without foundation, as Bassaeus also warns, verb. Votum 5. num. 2. ³ Editor's note: the print reads 'Et hoc sit Domini consilium absolutum', grammatically odd — perhaps 'Et hoc si sit' ('and if this be') ; rendered from context

THE SECOND response is that of Conar. cap. 2. in fine de testam. Graff. eodem num. 18. — a vow indeed as to its genus asserts an obligation of natural Divine law; yet the peculiar obligation of the vow is not of so strict a law, just as to obey human laws is of natural Divine law, yet no particular law binds by that law.

Against this Sanchez argues, first, because if the singular obligation were of human law, it could not be established by any private man, who has not the power of enacting a law. Indeed not even if he were a prince, who cannot bind himself by coercive force.

SECOND, because if the obligation were only human, a dispensation without cause would be valid. This is according to the mind of D. Bonaventure.

THE THIRD response is, that Divine law is not dispensed, because it does not happen that, the obligation toward God remaining, it is not observed; rather the obligation resulting from human will is taken away, which is a kind of human law; Just as when a superior dispenses in his own laws, he is not considered to dispense in the Divine law, which dictates that the laws of superiors be obeyed, so long as they retain their force, but by the dispensation he takes away from that law its binding force, which being removed, the Divine law is taken away indirectly by a certain consequence, and therefore he truly dispenses in the human law alone. So D. Thom. answers, 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 10. ad 1, and quaest. 89. art. 9. ad 1. Caietanus, same quaest. 88. art. 12. Abul., quaest. 102. in 30. Numer. Victoria, de potestate Papae, et Concilii, proposit. 1. ad 3. D. Anton., 2. part. tit. 11. cap. 2. §. 9. Sotus, lib. 10. de Iustitia, quaest. 4. art. 1. ad 2. Arag., 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 10. in fine. Valentia, puncto 2. d. 7. quaest. 4. p. 6, and l. 1. d. 6. quaest. 6. p. 7. Sayrus, lib. 6. cap. 11. Henriquez, lib. 7. de indulg. cap. 23. num. 5.

YET this response is refuted by Sanchez, num. 17, and Azorius, loc. cit., because the law of the vow is not human but Divine, as I showed above; otherwise it could be dispensed from by the one vowing, and a dispensation without cause would be valid, as in the example given of the Prelate dispensing in his own law.

BUT the adversaries are mistaken, because they consider the obligation of the vow as merely resulting from the act of vowing, as if the bond came from nowhere else; yet the bond comes from the natural precept of fidelity, and from the Divine, inasmuch as God is owed, by the natural and Divine precept, the rendering of what has been promised to him. Therefore it is only the application of the bond, which remains in its natural law, just as in ancient times the law of circumcision bound to the whole Judaic law, as the Apostle says, yet it did not bind any Gentile absolutely. And if he had freely accepted it, he was not for that reason bound to the Mosaic law merely by human law, because he had bound himself to it by human will, but he was bound by Divine law. So it is in the matter at hand.

IT IS CONFIRMED, because the obligation of a vow arises principally and completely from the acceptance of God, who has testified that he wills whatever we duly vow.

THE FOURTH response is that of Vasquez, num. 13, Lessius, num. 99, Suarez, num. 15, in the places cited — that in a vow the relaxation takes place through the remission of the promise, made by the Prelate in the name of God, by the faculty of remitting received from God himself; and therefore the Prelate, in the name of God, cedes the Divine right acquired by God through the vow. For the natural Divine law exacts the promise, so long as God himself does not cede his right by himself or through his Vicar; but here he cedes it, and therefore the Pope does not dispense in the natural Divine law, because God has already ceded to him his right in that matter: Just as if Peter were to cede a field promised to him by oath by Titius, he would not relax the natural Divine law prescribing that an oath be kept.

YET this response is refuted by Azorius, loc. cit., for whence is it established from Divine authority that this was granted to the Pontiff?

THEY ARE REFUTED by Sanchez, because this mode of dispensing by taking away the obligation, namely by ceding his own right, is not to dispense but to forgive or to cede the promise: Just as one who absolves from sins and remits them is not said to dispense in the debts owed to God, but to remit them.

SANCHEZ himself answers, num. 14, that natural Divine right is twofold: one arising from human will, as a vow: the other absolute: And indeed the Pontiff can dispense not only in the former, and thus in a vow, oath, etc., but even in some things of absolute natural Divine law, truly taking away the obligation by a true dispensation, as in Communion under both species in the most remote regions, where there is no wine, and in other cases which he pursues at length, lib. 8. de matrim. disp. 6. The same is answered by Cano, relec. 5. de Poenitentia p. 5. Medina, loc. cit. ad 2. Azorius, lib. 6. cited above. Petrus Ledesma, loc. cit. and others.

AGAINST this mode Suarez rises up, cap. 9. num. 9, from D. Bonavent. foundation 4. What is intrinsically evil is indispensable by God; but what is against a vow is intrinsically evil: Therefore. The major is certain. The minor is proved, because what is against natural law is intrinsically evil, and therefore indispensable, as to lie.

SANCHEZ answers that not all things which are against the law of nature are intrinsically evil to such a degree that they are never lawful, as to steal and to detain what belongs to another, which are lawful in necessity.

BUT in those cases the circumstances required for natural law to bind do not concur; yet when a dispensation is granted in a vow, those do concur — otherwise they would not have bound before the dispensation, and thus there would be no relaxation of law. But it is certain that all of them intervene there, namely the obligation of truth to be exhibited to God: And therefore, as it is intrinsically evil to lie, so it is intrinsically evil not to keep a promise made to God; for it is to lie to God, as S. Bonaventure rightly argues, loc. citato.

SANCHEZ answers that it is not as with lying, and in this his comparison stands, that just as to steal is not intrinsically so evil that it may never be lawful, so also not to observe a vow when some just cause intervenes; which, he says, although it does not suffice of itself to take away the obligation, yet suffices, he says, for Prelates to dispense by authority received from God.

BUT again he begs the question; for he is bound also to assign the parity in this, that as it is sometimes lawful to steal by reason of circumstances, so also by a just cause it should be lawful not to keep vows made to God, and thus the malice would cease on both sides; for if this is taken away by dispensation, it follows that it is still of itself evil against nature, and the burden of proof falls on him; by which reasoning, those things which are still intrinsically evil could be dispensed — and whence this power would be had, as Azorius argued.

THEREFORE S. Bonaventure explains it thus most excellently: all laws look to the common good, and particular laws to a particular good; and consequently, and often even directly and primarily, to the public good, over whose judgment the Pontiff presides, as Pastor of the whole Church, whose good it falls to him, by Divine power, to labor for; and therefore it belongs to him to judge what is more expedient for it. Therefore, when he wishes to dispense, there must be present such a cause as renders the dispensation just, as even the adversaries confess — which is a sign that what is just belongs intrinsically to the dispensation, and consequently enters into making what is dispensed validly done on this account, namely because provision must always be made for the greater good of the Church. And so when a dispensation is granted, the law of the vow is not relaxed, which must always look to the good of both the one vowing and the Church. But if for the one vowing, or for the Church, it were better in the Lord not to carry out the vow, for a grave cause bringing greater spiritual utility; then the law will not be relaxed, but it will be judged for the time being, according to the mind of God, that God does not will it to be done, or at least does not compel it. Which definition is not a simple declaration, such as a learned man would make, as Sanchez thinks, num. 5, but a judgment and definition, not of the measure of knowledge and prudence, but of jurisdiction, which is not granted to any learned man whatever. But even if we were to concede that it is an act of prudence, as Sanchez says we assert, still it would be ampler than the declaration of a learned man; for this looks to the providence of the Church, and consequently, while it is being made, indicates the power of jurisdiction for execution; for this belongs to God authoritatively, that he may render wholly secure the one with whom he dispenses.

SANCHEZ INSISTS, lib. 18. de matrimonio d. 6. num. 5. Thus to interpret laws belongs to the Legislator alone, or to his Superior, cap. inter de sent. excom. cap. ideo, 25. quaest. 1. cap. sicut enim 11. quaest. 3. leg. fin. ff. de legibus.

IT IS ANSWERED that this belongs to the Pontiff by Divine commission; for God entrusted to the Pontiff, in Peter, the sheep to be fed, Ioan. 22. Feed my sheep, etc.

BUT he himself argues against this, that even the power of dispensing belongs by Divine commission, since God does not fail the Church in necessary things; just as to Bishops, in a case of necessity, it has been given to dispense in Pontifical laws in some case of necessity, e. g. when the Pontiff cannot conveniently be approached; and just as the dispensation of inferiors in the law of a superior does not derogate from the authority of the superior, because it is done by his tacit commission; so this Pontifical dispensation does not derogate from the authority of God, since it is done not by the proper authority of the Pontiff, but by the tacit and most lawful, presumed commission of God.

IT IS CONFIRMED THUS: if the Pontiff, declaring that it is lawful in extreme necessity to steal or to kill an aggressor, were to use the word "I dispense," he would speak ineptly; so therefore in our case.

FOR INDEED Sanchez is bound to show where this faculty of relaxing a vow was given, nor is it sufficiently presumed, as Azorius well notes. For why do you presume that what was promised to God is not to be rendered to God? Nor is it similar with human laws, which do not bind with so much rigor as natural or Divine ones, as Sanchez himself often urges. Nor is the necessity the same, since provision is sufficiently made by that authoritative judgment by which it is decreed that it is thus fitting at that time not to fulfill so particular a law, by another will of God, which is not presumed but declared often and again, that the perfection of individuals may be intended and the progress of the Church. And as to the dispensations of Bishops, it is not ineptly held valid, because the mind of the Church and of the Pontiff is sufficiently expounded in their laws, lest it be wanting in necessities. Therefore in the article of death anyone can absolve from all reserved cases, which would be lawful even if it were not explicit in the laws or censures; but in our case this is not necessary; for that authoritative judgment suffices, from a cause which even the adversaries do not deny to be necessary for the dispensation to be valid. And so what Sanchez last says, that it is inept, is denied; for it is not a mere declaration, as in the case of theft or of blameless self-defense, but a juridical judgment.

THE SAME with D. Bonaventure D. Thomas thinks, and defines in the same way. Nor does Azorius himself rightly insist that by this means the vow is taken away, not by the benefit of Pontifical indulgence, but by the very interpretation of the law.

FOR IT IS ANSWERED that the obligation is not sufficiently taken away by a mere declaration, but by the authoritative providence of the Church, which resides in the Pontiff, as I said.

BUT STILL Sanchez objects, loc. cit. summa, num. 5, from cap. 4. de iureiurando: But it is chapter 18, where it is said: On which point a diligent inquirer could easily have seen that not so much the absolution of the oath was necessary as an interpretation to be required. Sanchez leans deeply on this text, because the Pontiff openly distinguishes that both could be granted, and says that absolution was ineptly sought, since in that case the oath did not bind; and therefore there was no need of absolution, but of a declaration.

YET this text profits the adversaries nothing; for there the Pontiff Innocent III had been asked by the King of the Aragonese to be absolved from the oath he had made to keep the coin that fell short of its due weight; for on that account the people had risen in revolt.

He replied: If you had been diligently investigated, you would indeed have seen that you ought rather to have inquired: whether it was valid, namely because, when you swore, you either knew or did not know the coin to be false; if you knew, the oath was illegitimate and invalid, because an oath is not a bond of iniquity. But if you believed it legitimate, the oath is to be kept, and that it be observed, you shall reduce the coin to its lawful weight. Nevertheless, if in making the oath you believed it diminished from the lawful weight, and your conscience pricks you, humbly confess your sin.

The Pontiff does not will that the definitive judicial declaration, according to the mind of D. Bonaventure, be distinct from absolution, but from that interpretation which was a mere declaration of whether it was valid or not, which depended on a multiple knowledge of circumstances, namely in what way, with what knowledge, with what mind the oath was made, which he had carried, wrapped up without due exposition, to the Pope. He therefore wishes to say: You ought to have proposed the fact, clothed with its circumstances, so that you might first know what kind this oath of yours was: whether it was valid or not; whether you were bound to confess it and be sacramentally absolved from it; for you swore wickedly and sinned, if you swore knowingly. But after you had learned that it was valid, you could have asked to be absolved, which I would have done — not indeed by merely interpreting whether the oath was valid or not; for that would be presupposed; but by exempting you from the authoritative judgment, if I had seen that it so suited the Church.

Caius, a priest formerly a regular, approaches Julius, a confessor of the same Order, to whom he lays open the scruples and anxieties of his conscience. For he said that he was troubled about the manner in which he had obtained dismissal from the Order. For, on account of various difficulties which he experienced, he lost love of his vocation and urgently sought dismissal; at first, however, the superiors exhorted him to persevere, but after repeated petitions they finally granted him dismissal. For some time he applied himself to the duties of a secular priest, and then, when he thought himself not safe in conscience, he hastened to Julius, formerly his confrère. Hence it is asked:

1. What kind of obligation arises from perpetual vows of religion?

2. Who can dispense from religious vows, and is a cause required?

3. If a fictitious cause is alleged, is the dispensation valid?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. What sort of obligation arises from the perpetual vows of religion?

By his vows a Religious binds himself to observe poverty, chastity, and obedience, and moreover to persevere to the end in the observances of religious life according to the rule of his order. These obligations are grave of their own nature, but sins against the vows may be venial from lightness of matter or imperfection of the act.

2. Who can dispense in the vows of religion, and is a cause required for dispensation ?

The substantial vows of religion taken in an order approved by the Holy See are reserved to the Holy See, and can only be dispensed by the Pope or by his authority, and for grave and just cause. Such cause is the good of Church or State, or the notable good of the Religious himself.

3. If a fictitious cause is alleged for a dispensation, is this valid ?

No; the Pope acts in the name of God to whom the vows are made, and he can not dispense them unless for a sufficient cause. Hence if a false cause is assigned as a reason for dispensation, the dispensation is void.

4. The case. Caius, a regular and a priest, on account of the difficulties he met with in his order, asked for his dismissal. At first his superiors refused his request and urged him to persevere. At last, however, by repeatedly making his request he obtained his dismissal, but after some time he became so uneasy in conscience about the way he had obtained it, that he went to Julius, a confessor of the order which he had left, and consulted him on the matter. Julius will tell Caius that there may have been fault in the determined obstinacy with which he demanded his dismissal. But we must presume that Caius acted in good faith, and did not give fictitious reasons for obtaining his dismissal. On that hypothesis he should be sorry for any fault there may have been on his part, but there is no reason why he should be uneasy about the validity of his dispensation. The difficulties which he experienced, the dissatisfaction which he felt in his state of life, and his great desire to change it, were sufficient reasons to justify his superiors in granting the dispensation, though perhaps Caius should not have asked for it.