Question XXIX: Whether in the Church there is power to dispense from vows

HITHERTO we have treated of the first way in which vows are removed, which is irritatio [annulment]. Now the second must be treated, which is dispensation. And indeed that this power exists in the Church is clear from that saying of Matth. 16, Whatsoever you shall bind, which words are universal, as D. Bonaventure notes in 4. d. 20. quaest. 5, and after him Sanchez lib. 4. summa, cap. 37. num. 3, where he proves the same from Ioan. 22, Feed, etc., where also D. Bonaventure.

IT MUST BE NOTED FIRST, from what was said in the tract. de legibus, d. 5. quaest. 14, with D. Bonaventure in the body, and Sanch. cap. 37, what the difference is between the dispensation of a vow and a declaration; for a declaration takes away no obligation of a vow; it only declares that the vow of itself does not bind in that event; as if someone vowed to fast on such a day, or to perform certain prayers, and the prelate declares that he is not bound because he is infirm; this does not take away the obligation but only explains that it ceases by reason of impotence. But a true dispensation is when, a just cause existing, the prelate takes away an obligation of the vow still existing; as if one should free someone beset by the burning goads of concupiscence from a vow of chastity which still endures: or if one having a law for the public good, having subjects under him for its execution, judges that for the time being it should not be commanded to be carried out.

THE FIRST opinion, which D. Bonaventure reports, is that the Church can properly dispense. This opinion is exceedingly celebrated, and is upheld by D. Thom. 4. d. 38. quaest. 1. art. 4. quaestiuncula prima, ibi, Richard. art. 9. quaest. 1, and d. 17. art. 2. quaest. 2. supplem. Gabr. 4. d. 38. quaest. 1. art. 1. Hostiensis in summa, tit. de voto, num. 16, and cap. Non est, num. 1, same title, ibi. Abbas num. 5. D. Antoninus 2. part. tit. 11. cap. 2. §. 9. Canus relect. de poenit. part. 5. Medina de Poenitentia Tract. de confess. quaestione de dispensatione super confessione revel. ad 2. Sotus lib. 1. de iustitia quaest. 7. art. 3, and lib. 7. quaest. 4. art. 1. Palac. 4. d. 38. d. 3. fol. 884. Suarez Tract. de voto, lib. 6. cap. 9. Toletus lib. 4. summae from cap. 18. Angles flor. 2. part. quaest. unic. de voto, art. 8. diff. 1. Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 10. Sayrus lib. 6. cap. 11. num. 9. Azorius Tom. 1. lib. 6. cap. 1. quaest. 4, and lib. 11. cap. 18. quaest. 5. Graffis s. p. p. decis. lib. 2. cap. 31. num. 18 and 20, and cap. 32. num. 2. Valentia 2. 2. d. 6. quaest. 6. p. 7. Lessius lib. 2. de iustitia, cap. 40. d. 12. num. 98. Petrus Ledesma 2. Tomo, Tract. 10. cap. 8. dub. 2. Henriquez lib. 8. de Eucharistia, cap. 13, and lib. 7. de Indulg. cap. 23. Vasquez prima 2. quaest. 97. art. 4. d. 178. num. 10. Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 12. Sanch. 2 lib. 4. summae, cap. 37. num. 5. Fagundez in secundum Praeceptum Decal. lib. 2. cap. 40. Tanner. d. 5. quaest. 6. dub. 6, citing many. Bassaeus, V. Votum 7, proclaims this to be of faith.

THE SECOND opinion denies that there is in the Church a power to dispense, but only to declare. So D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 10 in the body. Abul. cap. 30. Numer. quaest. 102 and 103. Caietanus in summa, verb. votum, cap. de dispens. Armilla verb. votum, num. 13. Gloss. cap. Non est, under the word Authoritate, de voto. Ibi Anton. num. 3. Cardin. cap. cum ad monast. num. unico de statu monach. Covarr. ac pactis 1. quaest. §. 3. num. 3. Ferrar. lib. 3. contra G. cap. 124, and Paludanus 4. d. 38. quaest. 4 art. 4. concl. 1. num. 38 sufficiently indicate it. D. Antoninus 2. part. tit. 11. cap. 2. §. 9. notab. 1. Sylvester verb. votum 4. quaest. 3. d. 3.

AS TO D. Bonaventure, he is adduced for this opinion loc. cit., but one must explain in what sense he upholds it: he himself, after stating the opposing opinion, puts forward this one, which he calls more reasonable and more secure, and because by it the conscience is more fully satisfied. And it is such that it is not a mere interpretation of the law, such as any learned man can make, but is a declaration of law. For since a vow is a good directed to the glory of God and the salvation of the one vowing, and looks to the good of the whole Church, therefore the Pontiff, who is the supreme judge, has the power of choosing from those goods the one which he has known to be better and more expedient for the Divine glory and the good of the Church; and consequently, even if the obligation, for example, of continence in a King, be in force; if the Pontiff judges it to be for the utility of the public Church that he marry and endeavor to obtain children for the preservation of peace, and this good be more certain than the evil that presses, namely that the King lack a successor, he can dispense; which in rigor is not to relax the law, but to declare, the true obligation remaining: But if the good arising from the dispensation is uncertain, he ought not take away a certain obligation, as S. Bonaventure notes. ad 2. Thus, then, the law, which is ordered to the greater good of the Church, is not relaxed, and this is also the opinion of D. Thomas, as I shall show.

This is the genuine opinion of S. Bonaventure, who defines it better than all others and avoids the difficulties, as we shall see.

I ASSERT with this opinion, first, that vows cannot be dispensed in the Church by relaxing the law.

THE FOUNDATION of D. Bonaventure is: Those things which are of natural Divine law cannot be dispensed by man: But a vow is of this kind: Therefore. The major is the axiom of all Theologians and Canonists, as Azorius notes, lib. 6. quaestio cited above, and Sanchez confesses it, num. 4. The minor is proved by S. Bonaventure, foundation first, from Psal. 75, Vow, and pay to the Lord your God. And since this law has always existed, as all confess, it follows that it is a natural law, not a positive one, as is gathered in the second foundation.

IT was led by this reasoning that S. Bonaventure, devoutly devoted to the authority of the Church, adapted his opinion. By this argument the adversaries are badly twisted about, and they sweat marvelously in rendering an account of this power.

RICHARDUS answers, 4. d. 38. art. 9. quaest. 1. Graffius p. p. decis. lib. 2. cap. 31. num. 8. and others cited with D. Bonaventure; whenever someone binds himself by vow or oath, he does so not absolutely, but saving what must be saved; and because the Pope is the supreme Pastor, upon whom rests the salvation of all the faithful, this condition is always understood in the one vowing: if the Pontiff wish it ratified.

YET this response is refuted by Azorius, loc. cit., and Sanchez, num. 7, because on this account the Pope could dissolve a vow and an oath without cause by a mere nod, which cannot be said, since a cause adequate to this is required. In this attack Azorius and Sanchez fall into the opinion of D. Bonaventure, while they confess that dispensation is not a proper relaxation of law, since a just cause is required, which is the end of every law, and while it remains, in a dispensation the law is not relaxed.

IT is indeed attacked by D. Bonaventure because this condition, thought up gratuitously, finds a foundation nowhere; for vows, which are offered, are offered most freely, as all proclaim, and one can offer what pleases God more. And this being the absolute counsel of the Lord,³, some condition is added to its execution without foundation, as Bassaeus also warns, verb. Votum 5. num. 2. ³ Editor's note: the print reads 'Et hoc sit Domini consilium absolutum', grammatically odd — perhaps 'Et hoc si sit' ('and if this be') ; rendered from context

THE SECOND response is that of Conar. cap. 2. in fine de testam. Graff. eodem num. 18. — a vow indeed as to its genus asserts an obligation of natural Divine law; yet the peculiar obligation of the vow is not of so strict a law, just as to obey human laws is of natural Divine law, yet no particular law binds by that law.

Against this Sanchez argues, first, because if the singular obligation were of human law, it could not be established by any private man, who has not the power of enacting a law. Indeed not even if he were a prince, who cannot bind himself by coercive force.

SECOND, because if the obligation were only human, a dispensation without cause would be valid. This is according to the mind of D. Bonaventure.

THE THIRD response is, that Divine law is not dispensed, because it does not happen that, the obligation toward God remaining, it is not observed; rather the obligation resulting from human will is taken away, which is a kind of human law; Just as when a superior dispenses in his own laws, he is not considered to dispense in the Divine law, which dictates that the laws of superiors be obeyed, so long as they retain their force, but by the dispensation he takes away from that law its binding force, which being removed, the Divine law is taken away indirectly by a certain consequence, and therefore he truly dispenses in the human law alone. So D. Thom. answers, 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 10. ad 1, and quaest. 89. art. 9. ad 1. Caietanus, same quaest. 88. art. 12. Abul., quaest. 102. in 30. Numer. Victoria, de potestate Papae, et Concilii, proposit. 1. ad 3. D. Anton., 2. part. tit. 11. cap. 2. §. 9. Sotus, lib. 10. de Iustitia, quaest. 4. art. 1. ad 2. Arag., 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 10. in fine. Valentia, puncto 2. d. 7. quaest. 4. p. 6, and l. 1. d. 6. quaest. 6. p. 7. Sayrus, lib. 6. cap. 11. Henriquez, lib. 7. de indulg. cap. 23. num. 5.

YET this response is refuted by Sanchez, num. 17, and Azorius, loc. cit., because the law of the vow is not human but Divine, as I showed above; otherwise it could be dispensed from by the one vowing, and a dispensation without cause would be valid, as in the example given of the Prelate dispensing in his own law.

BUT the adversaries are mistaken, because they consider the obligation of the vow as merely resulting from the act of vowing, as if the bond came from nowhere else; yet the bond comes from the natural precept of fidelity, and from the Divine, inasmuch as God is owed, by the natural and Divine precept, the rendering of what has been promised to him. Therefore it is only the application of the bond, which remains in its natural law, just as in ancient times the law of circumcision bound to the whole Judaic law, as the Apostle says, yet it did not bind any Gentile absolutely. And if he had freely accepted it, he was not for that reason bound to the Mosaic law merely by human law, because he had bound himself to it by human will, but he was bound by Divine law. So it is in the matter at hand.

IT IS CONFIRMED, because the obligation of a vow arises principally and completely from the acceptance of God, who has testified that he wills whatever we duly vow.

THE FOURTH response is that of Vasquez, num. 13, Lessius, num. 99, Suarez, num. 15, in the places cited — that in a vow the relaxation takes place through the remission of the promise, made by the Prelate in the name of God, by the faculty of remitting received from God himself; and therefore the Prelate, in the name of God, cedes the Divine right acquired by God through the vow. For the natural Divine law exacts the promise, so long as God himself does not cede his right by himself or through his Vicar; but here he cedes it, and therefore the Pope does not dispense in the natural Divine law, because God has already ceded to him his right in that matter: Just as if Peter were to cede a field promised to him by oath by Titius, he would not relax the natural Divine law prescribing that an oath be kept.

YET this response is refuted by Azorius, loc. cit., for whence is it established from Divine authority that this was granted to the Pontiff?

THEY ARE REFUTED by Sanchez, because this mode of dispensing by taking away the obligation, namely by ceding his own right, is not to dispense but to forgive or to cede the promise: Just as one who absolves from sins and remits them is not said to dispense in the debts owed to God, but to remit them.

SANCHEZ himself answers, num. 14, that natural Divine right is twofold: one arising from human will, as a vow: the other absolute: And indeed the Pontiff can dispense not only in the former, and thus in a vow, oath, etc., but even in some things of absolute natural Divine law, truly taking away the obligation by a true dispensation, as in Communion under both species in the most remote regions, where there is no wine, and in other cases which he pursues at length, lib. 8. de matrim. disp. 6. The same is answered by Cano, relec. 5. de Poenitentia p. 5. Medina, loc. cit. ad 2. Azorius, lib. 6. cited above. Petrus Ledesma, loc. cit. and others.

AGAINST this mode Suarez rises up, cap. 9. num. 9, from D. Bonavent. foundation 4. What is intrinsically evil is indispensable by God; but what is against a vow is intrinsically evil: Therefore. The major is certain. The minor is proved, because what is against natural law is intrinsically evil, and therefore indispensable, as to lie.

SANCHEZ answers that not all things which are against the law of nature are intrinsically evil to such a degree that they are never lawful, as to steal and to detain what belongs to another, which are lawful in necessity.

BUT in those cases the circumstances required for natural law to bind do not concur; yet when a dispensation is granted in a vow, those do concur — otherwise they would not have bound before the dispensation, and thus there would be no relaxation of law. But it is certain that all of them intervene there, namely the obligation of truth to be exhibited to God: And therefore, as it is intrinsically evil to lie, so it is intrinsically evil not to keep a promise made to God; for it is to lie to God, as S. Bonaventure rightly argues, loc. citato.

SANCHEZ answers that it is not as with lying, and in this his comparison stands, that just as to steal is not intrinsically so evil that it may never be lawful, so also not to observe a vow when some just cause intervenes; which, he says, although it does not suffice of itself to take away the obligation, yet suffices, he says, for Prelates to dispense by authority received from God.

BUT again he begs the question; for he is bound also to assign the parity in this, that as it is sometimes lawful to steal by reason of circumstances, so also by a just cause it should be lawful not to keep vows made to God, and thus the malice would cease on both sides; for if this is taken away by dispensation, it follows that it is still of itself evil against nature, and the burden of proof falls on him; by which reasoning, those things which are still intrinsically evil could be dispensed — and whence this power would be had, as Azorius argued.

THEREFORE S. Bonaventure explains it thus most excellently: all laws look to the common good, and particular laws to a particular good; and consequently, and often even directly and primarily, to the public good, over whose judgment the Pontiff presides, as Pastor of the whole Church, whose good it falls to him, by Divine power, to labor for; and therefore it belongs to him to judge what is more expedient for it. Therefore, when he wishes to dispense, there must be present such a cause as renders the dispensation just, as even the adversaries confess — which is a sign that what is just belongs intrinsically to the dispensation, and consequently enters into making what is dispensed validly done on this account, namely because provision must always be made for the greater good of the Church. And so when a dispensation is granted, the law of the vow is not relaxed, which must always look to the good of both the one vowing and the Church. But if for the one vowing, or for the Church, it were better in the Lord not to carry out the vow, for a grave cause bringing greater spiritual utility; then the law will not be relaxed, but it will be judged for the time being, according to the mind of God, that God does not will it to be done, or at least does not compel it. Which definition is not a simple declaration, such as a learned man would make, as Sanchez thinks, num. 5, but a judgment and definition, not of the measure of knowledge and prudence, but of jurisdiction, which is not granted to any learned man whatever. But even if we were to concede that it is an act of prudence, as Sanchez says we assert, still it would be ampler than the declaration of a learned man; for this looks to the providence of the Church, and consequently, while it is being made, indicates the power of jurisdiction for execution; for this belongs to God authoritatively, that he may render wholly secure the one with whom he dispenses.

SANCHEZ INSISTS, lib. 18. de matrimonio d. 6. num. 5. Thus to interpret laws belongs to the Legislator alone, or to his Superior, cap. inter de sent. excom. cap. ideo, 25. quaest. 1. cap. sicut enim 11. quaest. 3. leg. fin. ff. de legibus.

IT IS ANSWERED that this belongs to the Pontiff by Divine commission; for God entrusted to the Pontiff, in Peter, the sheep to be fed, Ioan. 22. Feed my sheep, etc.

BUT he himself argues against this, that even the power of dispensing belongs by Divine commission, since God does not fail the Church in necessary things; just as to Bishops, in a case of necessity, it has been given to dispense in Pontifical laws in some case of necessity, e. g. when the Pontiff cannot conveniently be approached; and just as the dispensation of inferiors in the law of a superior does not derogate from the authority of the superior, because it is done by his tacit commission; so this Pontifical dispensation does not derogate from the authority of God, since it is done not by the proper authority of the Pontiff, but by the tacit and most lawful, presumed commission of God.

IT IS CONFIRMED THUS: if the Pontiff, declaring that it is lawful in extreme necessity to steal or to kill an aggressor, were to use the word "I dispense," he would speak ineptly; so therefore in our case.

FOR INDEED Sanchez is bound to show where this faculty of relaxing a vow was given, nor is it sufficiently presumed, as Azorius well notes. For why do you presume that what was promised to God is not to be rendered to God? Nor is it similar with human laws, which do not bind with so much rigor as natural or Divine ones, as Sanchez himself often urges. Nor is the necessity the same, since provision is sufficiently made by that authoritative judgment by which it is decreed that it is thus fitting at that time not to fulfill so particular a law, by another will of God, which is not presumed but declared often and again, that the perfection of individuals may be intended and the progress of the Church. And as to the dispensations of Bishops, it is not ineptly held valid, because the mind of the Church and of the Pontiff is sufficiently expounded in their laws, lest it be wanting in necessities. Therefore in the article of death anyone can absolve from all reserved cases, which would be lawful even if it were not explicit in the laws or censures; but in our case this is not necessary; for that authoritative judgment suffices, from a cause which even the adversaries do not deny to be necessary for the dispensation to be valid. And so what Sanchez last says, that it is inept, is denied; for it is not a mere declaration, as in the case of theft or of blameless self-defense, but a juridical judgment.

THE SAME with D. Bonaventure D. Thomas thinks, and defines in the same way. Nor does Azorius himself rightly insist that by this means the vow is taken away, not by the benefit of Pontifical indulgence, but by the very interpretation of the law.

FOR IT IS ANSWERED that the obligation is not sufficiently taken away by a mere declaration, but by the authoritative providence of the Church, which resides in the Pontiff, as I said.

BUT STILL Sanchez objects, loc. cit. summa, num. 5, from cap. 4. de iureiurando: But it is chapter 18, where it is said: On which point a diligent inquirer could easily have seen that not so much the absolution of the oath was necessary as an interpretation to be required. Sanchez leans deeply on this text, because the Pontiff openly distinguishes that both could be granted, and says that absolution was ineptly sought, since in that case the oath did not bind; and therefore there was no need of absolution, but of a declaration.

YET this text profits the adversaries nothing; for there the Pontiff Innocent III had been asked by the King of the Aragonese to be absolved from the oath he had made to keep the coin that fell short of its due weight; for on that account the people had risen in revolt.

He replied: If you had been diligently investigated, you would indeed have seen that you ought rather to have inquired: whether it was valid, namely because, when you swore, you either knew or did not know the coin to be false; if you knew, the oath was illegitimate and invalid, because an oath is not a bond of iniquity. But if you believed it legitimate, the oath is to be kept, and that it be observed, you shall reduce the coin to its lawful weight. Nevertheless, if in making the oath you believed it diminished from the lawful weight, and your conscience pricks you, humbly confess your sin.

The Pontiff does not will that the definitive judicial declaration, according to the mind of D. Bonaventure, be distinct from absolution, but from that interpretation which was a mere declaration of whether it was valid or not, which depended on a multiple knowledge of circumstances, namely in what way, with what knowledge, with what mind the oath was made, which he had carried, wrapped up without due exposition, to the Pope. He therefore wishes to say: You ought to have proposed the fact, clothed with its circumstances, so that you might first know what kind this oath of yours was: whether it was valid or not; whether you were bound to confess it and be sacramentally absolved from it; for you swore wickedly and sinned, if you swore knowingly. But after you had learned that it was valid, you could have asked to be absolved, which I would have done — not indeed by merely interpreting whether the oath was valid or not; for that would be presupposed; but by exempting you from the authoritative judgment, if I had seen that it so suited the Church.

Therefore Sanchez confuses, first, the interpretation of fact with the interpretation of law. Then he infers that we confuse the interpretation which is a mere declaration of whether the oath is valid or not with absolution; and moreover he also says badly that the Pontiff answered absolutely that absolution was not necessary, for he always speaks conditionally, as is clear to the reader. And so I concede that the interpretation, insofar as it is a decision of fact — whether it is a sin, or whether the oath is valid — differs from absolution or dispensation; yet that is not a dispensation as understood in the sense of the Seraphic Doctor; for that is rather a theological definition of fact: but the declaration in the opinion of S. Bonaventure is a definition of law, by which, the oath having been recognized as valid by the supreme Provider and Pastor, his observance having been compared with the evils arising from it and the scandals that had already arisen among the people, he determined by supreme authority that it pleases God more that the now-binding right, from Divine and natural law, no longer require observance, but that, according to the mind of God, it can be dispensed.

From this doctrine the remaining little arguments of Sanchez collapse, as is clear to the reader. For all of them suppose that dispensation in our opinion is a mere doctrinal interpretation, which is false; for S. Bonaventure, with loosened sinews, as they say, confesses that this power inheres in the dignity of the Lord Pope, and consequently is one of jurisdiction, which Sanchez, Tract. de voto, lib. VI. cap. 10, asserts to be of faith.

Still Sanchez objects: All Doctors deny the Church the power of dispensing in natural law which does not emanate from human will, while they nevertheless concede it concerning natural law that takes its origin from human will, as concerning a vow and an oath, and this is of faith; but this distinction would be made in vain if dispensation were a mere declaration.

It is answered, from D. Bonaventure, that this happens because those things which are natural in that way are goods so necessary that they do not admit the exchange of an equal good, nor would it ever be more useful for the Church not to carry them out. They are only declared in themselves, as they lie of their own nature; but vows and oaths, since they have something that is not a necessary good but freely exhibited, which since it depends on our will, can be compensated by another greater or equivalent good; therefore, besides exposition, they have it that they can be taken away by the authority of the Church; but this is not a simple declaration, as the argument supposes, but a potestative definition.

From these things it is gathered that this jurisdiction belongs first to the Pope universally for the whole Church, as S. Bonaventure notes. And so he can dispense in all simple vows. But of solemn vows I shall treat in the following Disputation, although as to the vow of Chastity S. Bonaventure speaks timidly, in corpore, and says he does not know whether it is better to say that one can dispense in the vows of Religion, and especially of chastity, even a private person. But the holy Doctor speaks according to his own phrase of dispensation, which others call relaxation, while he himself calls it a juridical declaration, or Epikeia; of which I treated at length, quaest. I; and as I shall treat of the vows of Religion, disp. 2. quaest. 4.

Hence you have that only those can dispense who have Ecclesiastical jurisdiction, such as Legates in their province, whose power is ordinary, as annexed to the office, not to the person.

So also Bishops in their Diocese; and the See being vacant, the Chapter obtains this power. Similarly Abbots and other Prelates having quasi-episcopal power. See Sanchez, lib. IV. cap. 38. Suarez, cap. 10. As to Archdeacons, S. Bonav. seems to think that some have this power, as also that of excommunicating, because they have jurisdiction. So in IV. dist. 18. parte II. quaest. III. See also Sanchez, lib. IV. cap. 38. num. 20. To some Archdeacons only, not to all, he denies it, with many Doctors whom he cites. Of this I shall treat more fully in the Tract. de matrim. d. VIII. quaest. VI.

It follows also that this dispensation, since it is of jurisdiction, extends to subjects alone. See Sanchez. And indeed that Prelates of religious, not only Generals, but Provincial and local ones, can dispense in the vows of their subjects, the Doctors commonly teach, as cited with Sanchez, lib. IV. cap. 39. Indeed even with Novices. Similarly, in the vows of religious, that even the Pope can; it is clearly evident; add the Apostolic Legate, or Nuncio a Latere. So Henriquez, lib. VI. de Sacramento Poenitentiae, cap. 16. num. 8. Sanchez, loc. cit. num. 25.

Observe, however, that certain vows are reserved to the Pope; and they are five: of Religion, of Chastity, of Pilgrimage to Rome to the thresholds of the Apostles, to Jerusalem for the aid of that place, and the Compostellan to St. James. Thus it is gathered from the extravag. §. Si Dominici, tit. I. de poenit. et remiss. where those who commute these five vows without the license of the Pope are excommunicated.

Note, however, that this excommunication is thundered against those who dispense by privileges granted by Sixtus IV himself, who issued that extravage. Therefore one who dispensed by privileges received from elsewhere would not incur it. See Suarez, Tom. V. in III. part. disp. 22 sect. V. num. 28. Sanchez, lib. IV. cap. 40. num. 23.

Yet those vows are supposed by that Bull to be reserved, as Sanchez notes, numero 6, who says they are not reserved by law, even common law, but by custom only. But these five are so reserved to the Pope that not even a Legate a Latere can dispense in them. Others add other vows, but truly only these are reserved to the Pope, as Sanchez teaches, loc. citato.

¶ INDEED Bishops, the reservation set aside, could dispense in those vows, since in relaxing they succeed the Pope; because as the Pope in the whole world is the Prince of the Church, so the Bishop in his diocese — excepting those things which touch the universal government of the Church, as to define matters of faith, etc. And so he can do in his diocese everything that the Pope can in the city, unless it is specially reserved to him. For he is ordinary in his diocese, as the Pope in the world, as D. Bonaventure notes, in 4. dist. 20. part. 2. quaest. 3. in corpore.

You will say: the Parish Priest also is ordinary in his parish: Therefore he can dispense in vows, and whatever the Pope can in the world.

D. Bonaventure answers that the reason is different; for the full power over the Church was granted by Christ in a certain spiritual marriage, through consecration; now the bridegroom ought to have the power of begetting sons imperfect and perfect — such are Bishops, who can both regenerate neophytes by Baptism, and not only make the imperfect perfect by penance, but recreate sons perfect by Orders, etc., and strengthen them by Confirmation — not so Parish Priests. Therefore the Bishop in consecration receives the ring, as a bridegroom. On this reason the Doctors commonly rely, as cited with Sanchez, lib. 1. de matrimonio, disp. 61, and disp. 9 of the eighth book, and lib. 4. summae, chapter 40.

From these things very many Corollaries follow. For since dispensations of chastity and religion are reserved to the Pope only absolutely, and that law is odious to Bishops, it follows that it must be restricted.

¶ FIRST, therefore, it follows that a Bishop can dispense in a vow of chastity made for a time. So D. Thom., 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 11. ad 2, and it is gathered from D. Bonavent., loc. cit., whom others follow, as cited with Sanchez, lib. 8. disp. 9. num. 6.

SECOND it follows that he can dispense in the conjugal vow of chastity, since it falls short of absolute chastity, and likewise from the vow of not entering marriage; for the vow of chastity is greater, obliging to more. So the Doctors commonly, as related by Sanchez, num. 11.

THIRD it follows that he can dispense in the vow of taking sacred orders, for it is not simply of chastity, but of the thing to which the vow of chastity is annexed. So very many Doctors, as cited with Sanchez, numero 13, and Bassaeus, numero 14.

FOURTH it follows that he can dispense in a disjunctive vow, which promises the alternative of a thing reserved or not reserved, as of religion or of sacred orders, since in alternatives the choice belongs to the one bound, and it suffices that one be fulfilled: Rule on alternatives, de regul. iuris, in 6. So Azorius, Tom. 1, lib. 11. cap. 19. quaestio 10. Sanchez, loc. cit. num. 14.

¶ FIFTH it is inferred that he can dispense with a religious in a vow concerning a stricter religion, since he does not vow the substance of religion but an excess; or if a secular vows a stricter religion, he will be able to enter a looser one. So many Doctors, as cited with Sanchez, num. 17.

SIXTH, that one who has a vow of entering religion can be dispensed from perseverance in it, if the entrance, for just causes, leads to not persevering. So Sanchez, num. 18.

SEVENTH, he will be able to dispense in deferring the execution of his entrance into religion. So Sanchez, num. 19.

EIGHTH, he will be able to dispense in the matter into which a reserved vow, for instance of religion, has been changed by the Pope. So many, with Sanchez, num. 20. And this separately, even if one has vowed in simple vows the individual parts of chastity, e. g. by one to abstain from fornication, by another not to enter marriage, which comprise the whole matter of chastity.

NINTH, in all those in which only a part of the matter of chastity is vowed, as in the vow of a spouse.

They ASSERT besides that Bishops can, in a case of necessity — for instance the gravest danger of incontinence, and difficult access to the Pope — dispense in a vow of integral chastity. So Sanchez, lib. 2. matrim. disp. 40, and lib. 8. dub. 6, relating very many. The reason is, because the Pontiff is not to be presumed to will to reserve these cases to himself, casting nooses around himself. The same concerning other Pontifical laws very many teach, as cited with Sanchez, lib. 2. cited above. Indeed even to absolve from a case reserved to the Pope, besides the article of death, when access to the Pontiff is an impediment. The common reason is, because Pontifical laws proceed for the good of the Christian commonwealth, for the salvation of souls, according to the rules of charity; but it would be against charity so to bind the impotent. But the Church uses censures for salvation, not for destruction. So also S. Bonaventure runs, in 4. dist. 17. part. 1. quaest. 1. Say the same of the other reserved vows, if it be necessary. See Bassaeus, num. 15.

By the same reason very many say that even the Parish Priest can dispense in vows, when access to the Bishop is not easy. These are related by Sanchez, num. 27. They rely on this, that dispensation in a vow is like dispensation in a law, as D. Thom. teaches, 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 10, and D. Bonavent., in 4. dist. 38. quaest. 3, argument 4, first place, and argument 2, sed contra: where he mixes and compares the obligation of the natural law of lying, and of the species to be kept, with the vow. But all follow them, as Sanchez notes, num. 27 of the disputation cited. Now indeed, since the matter stands thus, and the Parish Priest can dispense in the law of fasting when access to his Bishop is not easy, as very many teach, cited there, indeed with no necessity pressing, as many there affirm; it follows that he can also in the other things said above.

Indeed Manuel goes further, Tomo 2, quaestionum regularium, quaest. 46. art. 9. — that the Parish Priest can dispense even in vows which belong to the Bishop; not by ordinary law, but by the sole presumed will of the supreme Pontiff, of which above, when access to the Bishop is not easy. He proves it by the reason given above, because the Parish Priest, although by the law of parishes he has not the power of dispensing in the law of fasting, yet dispenses by custom, even if the Bishop could be approached, and this by custom, because custom gives jurisdiction, cap. cum contingat, de foro competenti, with many texts which the Gloss heaps up there; this is not to be denied of the vow, which is put on a level with law. Some say that a Bishop can dispense in a vow of chastity emitted from perturbation, when the one vowing is young or suspect; they rely on cap. veniens, qui cleric. vel vovent: but the dispenser there is the Pontiff himself, not a simple Bishop, as is clear in the title, Idem, namely Alexander III, as above.

SOME ADD that a Bishop can dispense for asking the debt in a vow of chastity, marriage having been entered before. And Sanchez adds, lib. 4. summae, cap. 40. num. 63, that custom is equivalent to law.]

¶ There is a certain difficulty: whether he can dispense concerning penitential vows. Now a vow is penitential: I vow to undergo such a punishment, as fasting, if I game; I promise religion, if I have been drunk.

MANY say he cannot, when the will falls even upon a reserved thing, e. g. religion.

OTHERS bring forward, because odious things are to be restricted: but this vow is only conditional: Therefore it is not reserved to the Pope, because only absolute vows are reserved. So Sanchez, lib. 8. de matrimonio, disput. 10. num. 8, and lib. 4. summae, cap. 40. num. 91. Suarez, Tract. de voto, lib. 6. cap. 13 — who nevertheless adds that it cannot be done when the punishment is imposed as medicinal, but only when it is imposed as vindicative. Similarly if a punishment is imposed in thanksgiving for a future benefit: as, I vow religion, if I shall have been preserved from such a sin; but this Sanchez does not admit, with very many cited by him. But of this below.

Hence you have what must be said of a conditional vow concerning the future (for if the condition be of the past, it is not valid). Suarez says it cannot be done after the condition is fulfilled, loc. cit. cap. 12; the reason is, because the condition fulfilled, the obligation arises as of an absolute vow, leg. Potior 11. in fine principii, ff. qui in pignore potiores habentur, and it is confirmed from other contracts also.

But many others assert that one can dispense even after the condition is fulfilled. So Sanchez, lib. 8. de matrim. disp. 10. num. 15, citing Toletus, lib. 4. summae, cap. 18. num. 11. Gomez, in Bulla Cruc. clausa 10. num. 99. Ledesma, 2. part. summae, tract. 10. cap. 8. and others. Add also those whom I shall cite below with Diana and Bassaeus.

It is proved, because such a vow is at root imperfect, and conditional, not absolute. It is confirmed. For if in penitential vows it holds even after the condition is fulfilled, as Suarez confesses: Therefore also in these. For just as in penitential vows this is conceded because the will toward that object is imperfect, nor does it proceed first from affection for the thing, toward which it stimulates itself through fear of punishment; so in the conditional, the will is imperfect, nor does it go forth from love of the thing promised, but of the condition: thus that man vows religion, if he wins the lawsuit; or if his brother has had a male son.

Hence the principal argument of Suarez is solved, for it tends also against the conditional penitential vow, that it be absolute. It is answered, therefore, that the obligation indeed becomes absolute, the condition being fulfilled; yet there still remains an imperfect obligation.

From these things you have that in the same vows even regular Prelates can dispense with their religious, in which also Bishops with theirs (let this be said, however, without prejudice to the vow of religion). And so they can dispense in the vow of passing over to a stricter religion, although they cannot annul it: the reason of the disparity is, that as to this vow, it is not subjected to the dominative power of Prelates, and therefore they cannot annul it. For by a coercing power they retain him from that passing over: but dispensation is by their consent. So very many Doctors, as cited with Sanchez, lib. 4. summae, cap. 42.

Therefore that they can dispense in all the vows in which even Bishops can dispense is clear from the privilege of Martin V, which is found in the Compend. Privil. societatis Iesu, verbo Dispensatio, §. 10 — which is understood of those reserved vows which fall short by reason of some condition; not of those which are perfect, but which are dispensed by reason of necessity. So Sanchez, lib. 4. cap. 43. Suarez, loc. cit. cap. 26. num. 17, 18, and 19. Yet Bassaeus doubts this in vain, V. Votum 7. num. 10. Whether it was granted by the Bull.

Likewise the Confessors of Mendicants can dispense in all the cases in which even Bishops. This Iulius II granted to the Congregations of St. Benedict and of St. Bernard; and Eugenius IV to Monks, as is seen with the Confess. fol. 31. Bordon., resol. 15; and it is an absolute concession. Whatever limits C Caesarub and Lezana impose, Bassaeus refutes them, num. 10.

By the concession of Julius II it is possible to dispense by the confessors of mendicants with the incestuous for asking the debt, as Rodriguez relates, Bulla 23, and Sorb. V. Dispensatio — provided they be specially deputed to him by the superior; and this he has in the Sacrament of Penance, and in the houses of Regulars, not outside. See Bassaeus, V. Incestus, in fine. These faculties are universal.

But that Provincial Prelates can do with their subjects what Bishops do with theirs is clear and consonant to reason; otherwise Regulars could not be rightly governed, since they do not have recourse to Bishops.

Other Privileges of Innocent VIII and Pius V exist concerning these things by the oracle of the living voice; but they have already been abrogated by Urban VIII, who abrogated all oracles of the living voice in the Bull Alias feliciss. 20. Decembr. 1631.

The same Confessors can dispense with those who have entered marriage with a vow of chastity, for asking the debt, as Bassaeus notes, V. Privil. num. 8, and Bonagratia, V. Dispensatio, num. 148, and V. Privilegium.

The delegated power for dispensing in vows must be specified, and to a fit person. See Suarez, lib. 6. cap. 12. Filliucius, tract. 26. cap. 9. Bassaeus, verb. Votum 7. num. 9.

But you can draw many corollaries from this.

First, that regular Prelates with their subjects, and the Confessors of Mendicants with their penitents, can dispense in all true vows, except those reserved to the Pope related above; but some things must be noted about these.

Concerning the vow of perpetual and integral Chastity, which excludes every act, even an internal licit one, of the flesh — with the danger of scandal, incontinence, or harm to a third person pressing, the Bishop can in some way dispense, or suspend, as Suarez teaches, lib. 6. cap. 26, and Sanchez, lib. 4. cap. 40. So also to the confessors above, as Crouf. notes, ad cap. 7. Reg. lib. 29; and it was tolerated in the year 1629 in the S. Congregation, and it is established by the Bull of Clement VIII, given 13 Jul. 1604, as found with Rodriguez and Bassaeus; and just as the Bishop can dispense with one who contracted marriage with a vow of chastity, even if he has not consummated it, that he ask the debt to avoid incontinence; and just as he can, on account of the same danger, dispense with both spouses concerning the vow of concordant continence. And so the custom and practice of Bishops from time immemorial has carried this; although some add that this is true if recourse to the Pope is difficult to be had, as you see in Diana, part. 4. tract. 4. resol. 125. So also the Confessors of Mendicants; and just as the Bishop can dispense in a vow of integral chastity entered from a fear that is not grave, as found with Diana, part. 5. tract. 12. resol. 61. He can also dispense in it if it is elicited less principally together with another vow; as if one should vow not to play under the penalty of keeping chastity; so also the confessors related above. Similar is the case of one vowing sacred orders, to which chastity is tied.

Concerning all these reserved vows say: Just as the Bishop is able to dispense in a conditional vow, even though reserved absolutely; as if you vowed chastity if you escaped this danger, provided the condition be not yet fulfilled — indeed, probably, even with the condition fulfilled, with such great danger, as Diana relates, part. 3. tract. 5. resol. 25, and part. 6. tract. 8. resol. 16 — because such a vow is imperfect, arising more from affection for one's own utility. So also the Confessors can dispense in a similar case, above.

Similarly, as in alternative vows, as if one of them is reserved, the other not; and the one vowing determines himself to the one not reserved, the Bishop can dispense. So also the confessors. And as it is more probable, in a reserved penitential vow, that the Bishop can dispense even with the condition fulfilled, since such a vow is not made directly for the worship of God, but from detestation of the crime; as if you vowed Religion, or the reserved pilgrimages, if you had committed fornication. So also the Confessors related above. Yet it is probable¹ that such a vow arising from a medicinal condition is reserved. See Suarez, lib. 6. cap. 15, and Bassaeus, num. 22. Say the same, therefore, of both. ¹ N. Editor's note: the print/OCR shows a duplicated 'Probabile'; rendered once.

Just as the most urgent cause is left to the Bishop, that he dispense in a vow made for the utility of a third person, after he has accepted the promise: so, etc. See Sanchez, lib. 4. cap. 41. num. 16, Suarez, lib. 6. cap. 15, and Bassaeus, num. 275.

Note from the same author that it suffices that it be a matter of opinion whether it is reserved, for the Bishop and Confessors to be able to dispense. See V. Votum 7. num. 13.

What I said of chastity — namely that it must be integral to be reserved — say the same of the Vows of Religion, of pilgrimages not impeded, etc.

Wherefore if anyone has vowed poverty, or part of the journey to Jerusalem, or a military Religion (except the Maltese), since it is disputed whether those are true Religions, dispensation could be given.

Finally, Regular Novices are to be dispensed by the regular Prelates; for although they are not subjected to their power of economic dominion, yet they are subjected to the power of jurisdiction, or spiritual polity. See Bassaeus, num. 25.