§ 6. On the Cessation of a Vow Through Invalidation

411. Definition. Invalidation of a vow is its annulment or suspension made by one who has dominative power⁴⁰⁷ over the will of the person vowing or at least over the matter of the vow. Invalidation, therefore, is an act of dominative power and not of jurisdiction. According as this dominative power is exercised either over the will of the person vowing or over the matter of the vow, a twofold invalidation is distinguished: the one direct, or properly so called, which is the annulment of a vow made by one who has dominative power over the will of the person vowing, e.g., by a father with respect to all the vows of his children before puberty; the other indirect, or improper, which is not the direct annulment of the vow but its suspension made by one who has dominative power over the matter of the vow. Thus a master can indirectly invalidate vows of servants which impede the service owed.

⁴⁰⁷ I.e., dominion (Verfügungsrecht).

412. Principle 1. Direct invalidation entirely extinguishes the vow; indirect invalidation, however, only suspends the obligation of the vow.

Thus from positive law,⁴⁰⁸ which, however, is founded upon natural law.

For direct invalidation dissolves the act itself of the vow and renders it, as it were, not done; but indirect invalidation does not touch the act itself of the vow (which consequently remains intact), but only the matter of the vow. But it can easily happen that this matter of the vow is afterwards withdrawn from the power of the one invalidating. Then, however, a vow thus indirectly invalidated revives again. Hence, e.g., if a father directly invalidated the vow of his son before puberty to enter a monastery, this vow is entirely extinguished; but if a master indirectly invalidated the vow of a maidservant who promised to assist at Mass daily, this vow revives after the maidservant leaves the service of her master.

⁴⁰⁸ Code of Canon Law, c. 1312.

413. Principle 2. For the valid invalidation (whether direct or indirect) of vows, no sufficient cause is required; but for lawful invalidation a sufficient cause is required.

All authors agree concerning the first part of this principle; for the vows of subjects always involve this tacit condition: unless my superior should contradict.⁴⁰⁹ But a superior can always validly exercise the power belonging to him. The other part of the principle was disputed. St. Antoninus,⁴¹⁰ Sylvester Prierias,⁴¹¹ Cajetan,⁴¹² Suarez,⁴¹³ the Salmanticenses,⁴¹⁴ etc., teach that a cause is not required even for lawful invalidation. The reason is that the vows of subjects are always made with the tacit condition of the superior's consent. But the superior is compelled by no right to furnish this consent, but can deny it according to his judgment; just as, if someone were to promise alms from the goods of another under the condition that the owner should give consent, the owner can freely deny this consent without any cause. On the contrary, Dominic Soto,⁴¹⁵ Sanchez,⁴¹⁶ Lessius,⁴¹⁷ Laymann,⁴¹⁸ and others teach that a cause is required for lawful invalidation, because otherwise the superior would impede without sufficient reason both the worship rendered to God through the vow and the utility of the subject arising from the fulfillment of the vow. This second opinion is now to be held, since the Code of Canon Law, c. 1312, § 1, establishes: "One who legitimately exercises dominative power over the will of the person vowing can render his vows invalid validly, and also lawfully for a just cause." All authors teach, however, that an unreasonable invalidation of a vow does not of itself exceed the measure of venial fault, but per accidens, e.g., if it causes grave harm or is done from contempt of religion, it is a grave sin.

Likewise, he who without sufficient reason seeks the invalidation of a vow from a competent superior sins only venially.⁴¹⁹

⁴⁰⁹ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 8 ad 1 and 2.

⁴¹⁰ S. theol. P. 2, tit. 11, c. 2.

⁴¹¹ Summa Summ., s.v. "vow," c. 4; but he does not speak so clearly.

⁴¹² Summula, s.v. "vow."

⁴¹³ In 3, disp. 4, sect. 2.

⁴¹⁴ Curs. theol. mor. tr. 17, c. 3, n. 31.

⁴¹⁵ De iure et iust. l. 7, q. 3, a. 1.

⁴¹⁶ In Decal. l. 4, c. 24, n. 13.

⁴¹⁷ De iust. et iure l. 2, c. 40, dub. 10.

⁴¹⁸ Theol. mor. l. 4, tr. 4, c. 7, n. 18.

⁴¹⁹ Cf. Billuart, De relig. diss. 4, a. 8, § 3.

414. Principle 3. One who has the power of directly invalidating some vow, even if he gave the subject permission to vow, or promised that he would not invalidate his vow, or finally expressly approved the vow made, can nevertheless afterwards invalidate this vow. But one who has only the power of indirectly invalidating, once permission or approval of the vow has been granted, can no longer invalidate it.

The reason for the first part is that, notwithstanding the permission given or the promise and approval made, the superior does not cease to govern the subject in all his acts and retains full dominion over the will of the subject. Therefore he can also use his power of invalidating the vow made, especially if a sufficient reason is present. This doctrine is confirmed by the fact that the successor of this superior can certainly invalidate that vow. And yet this successor does not have greater power than his predecessor.⁴²⁰ Concerning the other part, the older authors dispute at great length.⁴²¹ The proposed opinion seems to me more probable. For one who has only the power of indirectly invalidating vows cannot dispose of the will of the person vowing, but only of the matter of the vow. But he permitted this matter to be handed over to God through the vow of the subject. Therefore he can no longer make any disposition of this matter by revoking the vow made by the subject.⁴²²

⁴²⁰ Suarez (De voto c. 6, nn. 15ff.), Concina (In Decal. l. 4, diss. 3, c. 5, n. 6), and others indeed admit this doctrine if it concerns the power of a religious superior; but not if it concerns paternal power.

⁴²¹ Cf. Cajetan, Comm. in 2, 2, q. 88, a. 8.

⁴²² Cf. Billuart, De relig. diss. 4, a. 8, § 3.

415. Invalidation of a vow of conjugal chastity. From the things said follows the solution of a case proposed by St. Alphonsus:⁴²³ Two spouses, with mutual consent after marriage had been contracted, made a vow of continence. The husband, perceiving that there is a grave danger of incontinence in his wife, directly invalidates her vow by virtue of the dominative power which he is said to have over the will of his wife. After the wife has thus been freed from her vow, she has the right of seeking the debt from her husband. But since he is still bound by the vow of chastity, his wife indirectly invalidates his vow, and thus both spouses are no longer bound by the vow of continence made with mutual consent. St. Alphonsus favors the opinion of those who say that this manner of acting is lawful, yet he concludes in these words: "Since this opinion is against the common opinion, ... I leave it to the wise to determine." Gury-Ballerini⁴²⁴ calls this opinion safe. Likewise Lehmkuhl⁴²⁵ favors this opinion, yet adds: "Nevertheless I would counsel that, at least for greater caution, a dispensation also be sought afterwards." Unless there is grave danger in delay, this opinion does not seem able to be safely put into practice, since this manner of acting is a dangerous evasion of the vow and deception of God. For in this manner spouses could very easily free themselves mutually from every vow. Moreover, St. Augustine⁴²⁶ already writes concerning the same case to Ecdicia, who had made a vow of chastity with her husband: "For that which you both with equal consent had vowed to God, you both ought perseveringly to have rendered even unto the end." Add that authors commonly teach that in this case a dispensation from the vow is to be sought from legitimate authority. But it is not safe to act against the common opinion.

⁴²³ Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 239.

⁴²⁴ Comp. theol. mor. I, n. 331, at the end.

⁴²⁵ Theol. mor. I, n. 612.

⁴²⁶ Ep. 262 (199); Migne, Patr. lat. 33, 1078.

416. Who can directly invalidate vows?

Only he who has dominative power over the will itself of the person vowing, as was said above. Such dominative power is possessed by:

1. The Pope, bishops, and a religious superior (superioress), over professed religious.

For religious in their profession freely vowed obedience to legitimate superiors, and thus subjected themselves to them, so that they can perform no act without their express or at least tacit consent.

The Pope is the supreme superior of all professed religious and therefore has most perfect power over them. This power, however, extends only to those who have made the vow of obedience. Therefore it does not extend to novices not yet professed, and a fortiori not to ordinary faithful, whose vows the Pope can indeed dispense by virtue of his most perfect jurisdiction, but cannot invalidate, since he lacks dominative power over their wills.

Since, according to the present discipline, bishops are sometimes superiors properly so called of women religious, the same dominative power seems to belong to them, so that they can invalidate the private vows of such women subject to them in diocesan institutes.

Religious superiors who can invalidate the private vows of their professed subjects are the general, provincial, and local superior. Certain restrictions, however, are to be added: a) An inferior prelate cannot invalidate those vows of his subjects which have already been ratified by a superior prelate. b) A religious superior cannot invalidate a subject's vow of passing to a stricter religious institute. The reason is not only the positive statute of the Church,⁴²⁷ but also the liberty of choosing a state of life, especially a more perfect one. For just as no one can be prohibited from choosing the religious state, so neither is it lawful to impede a suitable person from choosing a stricter and more perfect religious state. Hence the Salmanticenses and Noldin⁴²⁸ deservedly teach that not even the Supreme Pontiff can invalidate a vow of passing to a more perfect religious state. c) A religious superior cannot invalidate the public vows of his subjects, such as the three essential vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience. The reason is that through such vows an onerous contract is entered between the religious and the institute. This contract cannot be dissolved by a superior, at least through his dominative power. d) Certain authors, such as Cajetan⁴²⁹ and Sylvester Prierias,⁴³⁰ teach that the private vows of religious which in no way disturb the governance of the superior, e.g., of saying no idle word, of making certain ejaculatory prayers, of exercising certain interior pious acts, etc., cannot in any way be invalidated, but can only be commuted by superiors, because the will of a religious is not totally subject to the superior, but only according to the profession of the Rule. Whatever may be the theoretical truth of this opinion, in practice a religious superior can, when a reasonable cause exists, invalidate at least indirectly absolutely all the vows of his subjects, because any private vow of a professed religious can at some time impede those things which the superior considers necessary for governance. Therefore St. Thomas⁴³¹ also says without any limitation: "Even if someone [a religious] can do something for an hour when he is not occupied with other things by the prelate, nevertheless, because no time is excepted in which the prelate cannot occupy him about something, no vow of a religious is firm unless it is made with the consent of the prelate."

Superioresses also can invalidate the vows of their professed subjects, because they have true dominative power, although they lack ecclesiastical jurisdiction properly so called.⁴³²

⁴²⁷ Cf. c. 18, X 3, 31.

⁴²⁸ De praeceptis n. 220. Salmanticenses, Curs. theol. mor. tr. 17, c. 3, n. 38; cf. also above, n. 398.

⁴²⁹ Comm. in 2, 2, q. 88, a. 8 and q. 104, a. 5.

⁴³⁰ Summa Summ., s.v. "vow," c. 3, q. 3.

⁴³¹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 8 ad 3.

⁴³² Certain theologians, such as Cardinal Gennari (Quest. can. n. 469) and Ojetti (Synopsis rer. mor. n. 2533, near the end), undeservedly think that the private vows of those simply professed cannot be directly invalidated by superiors. For superiors have dominative power over the will even of those simply professed (c. 501). But nothing further is required by the Code of Canon Law, c. 1312, § 1, for direct invalidation.

417. 2. A father can directly invalidate all vows made by his children before puberty.⁴³³

Puberty is considered to occur for males in the fourteenth year of age, but for females in the twelfth year of age.⁴³⁴ If the father is absent or consents, the same right belongs to the mother, guardian, and generally to all who succeed to the rights of the father.⁴³⁵ This paternal power of invalidating the vows of children is derived from several texts of the old canon law,⁴³⁶ and moreover is derived from natural law itself. For those before puberty at that tender age are customarily of weaker judgment and reason; and therefore it is considered equitable both in ecclesiastical law and in civil laws that all their acts be rescindable by the father or one acting in his place.

Concerning this paternal power, two things are to be noted: a) Vows made by one before puberty can be invalidated by the father not only during the child's prepuberty, but also afterwards, provided that the person vowing, having reached puberty, has not ratified them, and indeed by a new vow independent of the first vow. Thus the more common opinion.⁴³⁷ But for the person vowing to be considered to ratify his vow in this manner, it is necessary that he be conscious that the first vow is subject to invalidation and that he will to bind himself anew, just as if he had never been bound. Therefore it does not suffice that he either began to fulfill the prior vow or frequently renewed it. For this is to approve the prior infirm bond, not to undertake a new and firm one. b) Absolutely no vow made by one before puberty is excepted from the paternal power of invalidation. Hence a father can invalidate even reserved vows, e.g., a vow of entering an approved order.

Certain authors, such as Vermeersch,⁴³⁸ Génicot-Salsmans,⁴³⁹ and Arregui,⁴⁴⁰ think that the vows not only of those before puberty but also of unemancipated minors can be directly invalidated by the father or those acting in his place. The argument for this opinion drawn from the Code of Canon Law, c. 89, seems weak.

⁴³³ S. theol., l.c., a. 9.

⁴³⁴ Code of Canon Law, c. 88, § 2.

⁴³⁵ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 230.

⁴³⁶ Cf. c. 15, C. 22, q. 5; c. 14, C. 32, q. 2; c. 2, X 3, 33.

⁴³⁷ Cf. Billuart, De relig. diss. 4, a. 3, § 2.

⁴³⁸ Theol. mor. II, n. 224.

⁴³⁹ Theol. mor. I, n. 325.

⁴⁴⁰ Summarium n. 213.

418. 3. Whether a husband can directly invalidate all vows made by his wife during marriage is greatly disputed.

Many affirm it,⁴⁴¹ because the man is the head of the woman and therefore has dominative power over her will. The negative opinion, however, seems to be truer and more common, because the subjection of the wife arising from marriage extends only to matrimonial duties, but not to absolutely all her acts. Moreover, the right of the husband is sufficiently and completely preserved if the power of indirectly invalidating the vows of his wife belongs to him. But the arguments which are brought forward for the husband's power of directly invalidating all the vows of his wife are not convincing. For the text cited from Num. 30:7-16 is not so clear, and then it seems to contain only a judicial precept of the Old Law, which no longer obliges. Moreover, that complete subjection and dependence of the wife upon the husband is founded upon no law: not upon natural law, because women are endowed with greater firmness of judgment than those before puberty, and indeed sometimes surpass their husbands themselves in ability; not upon positive law, for no such law exists; finally, not upon the contract and bond of marriage, since these extend only to the use of the body and the administration of the family.⁴⁴² Therefore the vows of a wife can be invalidated by her husband only indirectly, i.e., by reason of their matter, insofar as they obstruct him in the use of marriage, the administration of the family, or the governance of household affairs, e.g., a wife's vow of continence, of many prayers, pilgrimages, mortifications, alms, etc. But those vows (whether personal or real) which in no way derogate from marital rights, such as, e.g., vows of certain prayers or of alms from free paraphernal goods, cannot be invalidated by the husband. A fortiori, the husband cannot invalidate the vows of his wife concerning things prescribed from another source, e.g., of hearing Mass on feast days, of not lying, etc.

⁴⁴¹ St. Alphonsus (l.c., n. 234) calls this opinion more probable and cites for it St. Thomas, Dominic Soto, Sanchez, Peter Ledesma, the Salmanticenses, and several others. Certainly, considered at first sight, the words of St. Thomas teach this opinion: "No vow of a religious is firm unless it is made with the consent of the prelate. Likewise neither is the vow of a girl living in the house, unless it is made with the consent of her father; nor of a wife, unless it is made with the consent of her husband" (S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 8 ad 3). But nevertheless commentators more commonly explain the Angelic Doctor as speaking here only of the indirect invalidation of the vows of a wife (cf. Billuart, l.c.).

⁴⁴² Cf. Billuart, l.c., § 2.

419. Who can indirectly invalidate vows?

Every superior who has power over the matter of the vow can indirectly invalidate the vows of subjects which injure his right. The reason is that a vow cannot injure the right of another, and no one can firmly promise something over which he does not have full dominion. Hence:

1. The Supreme Pontiff can indirectly invalidate any vows whatsoever of the faithful which prejudice his rights, and notably vows made concerning ecclesiastical goods, since he is the supreme administrator of ecclesiastical goods.

2. Parents can indirectly invalidate vows of their children who have reached puberty but are not yet exempt, which impede the free and lawful administration of the family, e.g., a vow of a distant pilgrimage.⁴⁴³

3. A religious superior can indirectly invalidate the vows of novices which impede the discipline of the novitiate. But private vows which a professed religious may have made before his profession are suspended and therefore indirectly invalidated by the law itself for as long as the person vowing remains in religion.⁴⁴⁴

4. A husband can indirectly invalidate all vows of his wife, even those made before marriage, which are opposed to his matrimonial rights, as was said above. The same applies to a wife with respect to the vows of her husband; e.g., a wife can indirectly invalidate a vow of her husband by which otherwise he would be incapable of rendering the conjugal debt.

5. A master or lord can indirectly invalidate vows of servants and subjects which obstruct the service owed or the obedience owed, e.g., of visiting a church daily.

⁴⁴³ Cf. S. theol., l.c., ad 2.

⁴⁴⁴ Code of Canon Law, c. 1315.