§ 8. On the Cessation of a Vow (or of Its Obligation) Through Commutation

429. Definition. Commutation is the transfer of the obligation of a vow from one matter to another. Or, in other words: The commutation of a vow is the substitution of another good work in place of that which had been promised by vow, made under the same obligation of the vow. Commutation, therefore, is something less than dispensation, because in dispensation the obligation of the vow can be totally removed; but in commutation there remains at least a partial obligation of the vow, whose matter alone is changed and is often somewhat remitted or even increased. The commutation of vows can be made by one's own or by ecclesiastical authority, as will be said more fully below. This, however, is the difference among the powers of invalidating, dispensing from, and commuting vows: Invalidation requires no jurisdiction, but dominative power. Dispensation always requires jurisdiction. Commutation sometimes requires jurisdiction, but not always.

Distinction. A threefold commutation of a vow is distinguished, namely, into a better, equal, or lesser work.

A better work is not always that which is more difficult, but that which is more pleasing to God and accords more with the spiritual salvation of the person vowing. Thus, e.g., one who vowed alms to a determined poor man who has not yet accepted the promise can give the same alms to one who is poorer or to a poor relative, since this seems to be a work objectively better and more pleasing to God.

An equal work is considered to be that which presents almost the same difficulty of fulfillment, e.g., saying the Rosary or other prayers of almost the same duration.

A lesser work is that which evidently causes less difficulty; e.g., saying the Rosary is a lesser work than hearing Mass with devotion or making a pilgrimage.

430. Principle 1. The commutation of a non-reserved vow into a work either a) evidently better or b) equal can be made even by the own authority of the person vowing.⁴⁹⁵

The reason for the first part is that the end of a vow is a) the worship of God and b) the spiritual good of the person vowing. But by an evidently better work this twofold end is obtained more perfectly; therefore God is presumed to consent to such a change. Hence all vows whatsoever made before religious profession are suspended for as long as the person vowing remains in religion,⁴⁹⁶ because all other vows concern certain particular goods, whereas through religious profession a man dedicates his whole life to the service of God. But the particular is contained in the universal. Moreover, religious profession is regarded as a civil death. But just as all vows are extinguished by physical death, so also vows are suspended by the civil death of religious profession. Therefore Alexander III⁴⁹⁷ already established that he is not to be regarded as guilty of a broken vow who commutes a temporal service into the perpetual observance of religion.

It is said in the principle enunciated: into an evidently better work. This is to be understood not of a work merely objectively better and more excellent, but of that which, after all the objective and subjective circumstances of the person vowing have been considered, is better. In practice it is often difficult, not to say impossible, to determine by one's own authority which good is better between two proposed goods. Certainly one who vowed to give a silver chalice can fulfill that vow by giving a golden chalice; or one who promised one hundred marks by vow can give one thousand marks; or one who promised a fast of one day can fast for three days. All these things are evident of themselves; nevertheless, these are not commutations properly so called, but rather more abundant fulfillments of vows; and then the saying is true: The greater contains the lesser, and he does not break faith who commutes into something better. But commutation properly so called is present if the work promised is changed into another disparate work, e.g., a fast into alms or prayer. Then, however, in practice it seems scarcely ever lawful by one's own authority to commute one private vow into another. For no one can safely judge by his own authority which work is better both for himself and for the worship of God. E.g., prayer is a more perfect work than fasting, because the virtue of religion is more excellent than the virtue of temperance. But can someone by his own authority commute a vow of fasting on Saturday into the recitation of the Rosary? Therefore it is not only better but also safer not to make the commutation of a vow except through the authority of a confessor or an ecclesiastical superior. This doctrine indeed seems to be intimated by St. Thomas,⁴⁹⁸ who says: "In commutation there is a certain contract which cannot be completed without the consent of both parties; hence, since man through a vow obliges himself to God, a commutation of the vow cannot be made unless the consent of him who acts in the place of God on earth, namely, the prelate, intervenes, unless perhaps one vow is included in another."

The reason for the second part is a positive ecclesiastical law.⁴⁹⁹ Before the new Code of Canon Law, St. Alphonsus and many other theologians taught that the commutation of a vow into an equal work could not be made by the person vowing himself.

⁴⁹⁵ Code of Canon Law, c. 1314.

⁴⁹⁶ Ib., c. 1315.

⁴⁹⁷ C. 4, X 3, 34; cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 12 ad 1.

⁴⁹⁸ IV, dist. 38, q. 1, a. 4, solut. 4.

⁴⁹⁹ Code of Canon Law, c. 1314.

431. Note. The following are excluded from commutation made by one's own authority: 1. vows reserved to the Supreme Pontiff (unless, however, the commutation is made by entrance into religion); 2. vows made in favor of a third person (whether physical or moral), if these vows were accepted; 3. a vow of passing to a stricter religious institute.⁵⁰⁰ Concerning this last vow and its fulfillment, it is to be noted that, according to the present discipline of the Roman Curia, the permission of the Holy See is required for every passage of a professed religious to another religious institute.⁵⁰¹ But in ancient times any religious could by his own authority pass to another religious institute certainly stricter.

⁵⁰⁰ Thus c. 18, X 3, 31.

⁵⁰¹ Code of Canon Law, c. 632.

432. Principle 2. The commutation of a vow into a work certainly and notably lesser cannot be made validly and lawfully except by one who has a special faculty.

For such a commutation is a partial dispensation from the vow. But for every dispensation from vows a special faculty is required, as was said above in n. 423. But whoever has the power of dispensing from vows also has the power of commuting them into another lesser work. For Rule of Law 33 in VI° says: "He to whom what is greater is lawful, to him surely what is lesser is lawful." It is admitted by all that regular confessors (who have the privileges of the Mendicants) possess the faculty of commuting all non-reserved vows, as was already said.

433. Principle 3. For the commutation of a vow into a better work, no cause is required; for commutation into an equal work, a light cause is required; for commutation into a notably lesser work, a grave cause is required.

The reason for the first part is that it is always lawful to perform a work which is objectively and subjectively better, without another cause rendering it fitting being necessary. The reason for the second part is that to make such a change without cause would be mere inconstancy, certainly not pleasing to God. But a light cause suffices, e.g., greater devotion of the person vowing or less danger of transgressing the vow.⁵⁰² The reason for the third part is that such a commutation is a partial dispensation, for which a reasonable and grave cause is always necessary. So great a cause as is necessary for a total dispensation or abolition of the vow is not, however, required, as is evident of itself. It is disputed among authors whether a reasonable cause is required not only for the lawful but also for the valid commutation of a vow into a lesser work. St. Alphonsus calls both opinions, i.e., the affirmative and the negative, probable. The affirmative opinion, however, seems more probable, because St. Thomas⁵⁰³ deservedly requires a sufficient cause on equal grounds for dispensation and commutation. But just as God does not ratify a dispensation from a vow given without sufficient cause, so likewise He is not considered to approve a commutation frivolously given. But in a doubt whether the cause of commutation was sufficient or not, the Angelic Doctor⁵⁰⁴ teaches that a subject can and ought to acquiesce in the judgment of the one commuting.

⁵⁰² Cf. St. Alphonsus, l.c., n. 245.

⁵⁰³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 12 ad 2.

⁵⁰⁴ Ib.

434. Corollary 1. After a commutation has been made, it is always lawful for the person vowing to return to the first work, even if the commutation was made into something better. A fortiori this is lawful if the commutation was made into an equal or lesser work.

The reason is that commutation is a favor which no one is ordinarily bound to use, according to Rule of Law 51 in VI°: "That which is granted for the favor of someone is not to be turned to his detriment." Although certain authors limit this doctrine to the case in which the commutation was made by one having authority, and teach that the person vowing cannot return to the first work if he himself commuted his vow into an evidently better work, nevertheless St. Alphonsus⁵⁰⁵ deservedly rejects this limitation as unfounded and indeed concludes: "If commutation has been made several times into diverse works, the person vowing can choose whichever of them he prefers."

⁵⁰⁵ St. Alphonsus, l.c., n. 248.

435. Corollary 2. If the work into which the vow was commuted becomes impossible (even through the fault of the person vowing), the person vowing is not bound to return to the first work, provided the commutation was made by a confessor or by a legitimate ecclesiastical superior.

The reason is that through a commutation made by legitimate authority the prior obligation is entirely extinguished. Hence, e.g., if a vow of pilgrimage was legitimately commuted by a confessor into a fast to be performed on a certain day, and such a fast became impossible because of illness, the person vowing is now bound to nothing. Thus the common opinion.⁵⁰⁶ But when the vow was commuted by the own authority of the person vowing, then the obligation of the prior work does not seem to be entirely extinguished, and consequently, when the substituted work became impossible, the person vowing is bound to return to the prior work. Certain authors, however, teach⁵⁰⁷ that even then there is no strict obligation of returning to the first work, because the person vowing, whether by making or by accepting the commutation, implicitly vowed the substituted matter, and therefore the prior vow is extinguished. This opinion is certainly probable theoretically; but since it is not expedient to commute any vow by one's own authority (except by making religious profession), as was said above, therefore in practice one must not depart from the first opinion.

⁵⁰⁶ Cf. ib., n. 249.

⁵⁰⁷ Cf. Billuart, De relig. diss. 4, a. 8, § 6, Petes 4°.