IV. On Vow

What is the nature of a vow? - A vow is: a deliberate promise made to God concerning a possible and better good. Made to God; for a vow is an act of religion, indeed it is an act of latria, owed to God alone. "A promise can also be made to man; and the promise itself of good which is made to man can fall under a vow insofar as it is a certain virtuous work. And in this way must be understood a vow by which someone vows something to the Saints or to Prelates; so that the promise itself made to Saints or to Prelates falls under the vow materially, insofar namely as man vows to God that he will fulfill what he promises to Saints or Prelates." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 5. Therefore a vow is made principally to God, secondarily in honor of the Saints, just as temples and altars which are principally dedicated to God are also said to be dedicated to them. Therefore two conditions are required for the validity of a vow: true intention of a vow, and apt matter. L. 194; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, aa. 1-6; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 281 seqq.; Bouquillon, de Virt. relig., l. 2, p. 2; E. M.

Of how many kinds is a vow? - A vow is distinguished: 1. as absolute or conditioned. The former is that which is made without any condition; but the latter is that which is made with a condition, so that, unless this is posited, no obligation arises. Hence a penal vow is specially distinguished, namely when a good thing is vowed as a penalty or penance, for example, I will give alms if I become drunk.

2. A vow is of some determinate thing, or disjunctive of some thing to be determined afterwards from several at one's judgment. If in this one part is apt and another part inept, for example, either to pray or to play, the whole vow is not valid. L. 203. 3. Personal or real, according as an action or omission of the one vowing, for example, a pilgrimage, or some thing separable from the action of the person, for example the donation of a chalice, alms, etc., is promised. 4. Temporary or perpetual, according as it is promised to be observed only for a certain time, or through one's whole life. 5. Public or private, according as it is made with the Church accepting the vow, or without this authority of the Church accepting intervening. S. C. EE. et RR., 11 Aug. 1889. 6. Solemn or simple, according as it is made solemnly and is accepted by the Church as solemn; or, solemnity and this acceptance of the Church being excluded, it is emitted. Therefore the solemnity of a vow is had in this acceptance and approval of the Church, by which, by that vow, someone is totally bound over to divine worship as to preserving chastity, obedience, and poverty, through the blessing and consecration of the Church, implicit in that acceptance and approval. But the Church annexed this blessing and consecration to the reception of sacred order, by which someone is applied to divine ministry, and to the profession of a certain rule, by which, through renunciation of the world and of one's own will, someone assumes the state of proper perfection. But since solemnity signifies a certain exterior apparatus and ceremony which is employed when someone is totally bound over to some thing, hence a vow is said to be solemnized through reception of sacred order and through profession of a religious rule, to which the Church has annexed a solemn vow. Therefore only the vow of chastity annexed to major orders and the vow of religious profession is solemn. L. 195; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, aa. 7, 11; Cajetan on this place; Struggl 28; cf. here v. 2, n. 248.

What sort ought the intention of a vow to be? - For the validity of a vow a true and deliberate intention of emitting a vow is required, or a true promise made to God and inducing obligation from the virtue of fidelity. For a vow is in the likeness of a certain law which the one vowing, otherwise capable of weighing the burden which he assumes, imposes upon himself. But no one is judged, short of sufficient deliberation of mind, to oblige himself. Hence a vow essentially differs from a purpose, because a purpose means a deliberate will of doing or omitting something, without the mind of obliging oneself. Therefore a purpose, however firm, produces no bond of obligation, nor is omission of the thing proposed a sin, unless perhaps sometimes per accidens, for example, on account of inconstancy, weariness, or negligence, which per se do not exceed venial sin. C. Litteraturam 3, de Vot.; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 1; L. 196-199; Struggl 3, 16.

You will resolve: For the validity of a vow, not just any will and deliberation suffice which would suffice for mortal sin. For grave sin, it is enough to know confusedly the gravity of guilt and to have the voluntary at least indirectly and in the cause; but a more perfect cognition and willing of the burden to which one obliges oneself is required where the matter concerns a promise and an obligation to be contracted. For good is from an integral cause, evil from any defect. "Since the obligation of a vow is most grave, intention, deliberation, and perfect liberty are required, by which someone freely and directly in himself has willed to promise with the mind of obliging himself." L. 196. Therefore a vow made with half-full advertence or deliberation does not oblige. Likewise vows made in drunkenness, even foreseen beforehand, and thus willed in the cause, are not valid, since they are not willed in themselves and directly.

Yet for this full and perfect deliberation it is not required that someone weigh exactly all the circumstances which can allure toward a vow or deter from it; but it suffices that someone has sufficiently recognized the burden and obligation of the vow as to substance. Likewise virtual intention suffices, which proceeds from a previous actual intention. Hence one who, from a previous intention of religious profession, emits the three vows of religion, although altogether distracted in mind, is truly bound by them. But if someone vows with the positive mind of not promising, nor obliging himself from religion, certainly the vow is null. If someone also wishes to promise, knowing the obligation of a vow, but does not wish to oblige himself to the promise and vow, more commonly and probably he is not held by the vow. But thus to vow without the mind of obliging oneself, Sanchez, etc., say is ordinarily only venial on account of a certain disorder. Ordinarily, because in religious profession and reception of sacred orders it would undoubtedly be mortal, because it would be deception in a most grave matter. L. 196, 201; S. Th. 4, d. 38, q. 1, a. 1, q. 1 ad 2; Struggl 5, 6; Laym., l. 4, t. 4, c. 1, n. 4.

Note: "For a vow an implicit promise suffices, as is clear in the reception of sacred orders, where, although it is not said, I vow, or I promise chastity, nevertheless this vow is made implicitly, by this very fact, that, knowing that the Church has annexed this vow to orders, you receive them. But whether, if someone plainly were ignorant of this, he would still be judged to vow from implicit intention, is doubtful. Some affirm, but others more probably deny, and say that such a person is bound to chastity, not from a vow, but from the precept of the Church." L. 200; Struggl 6.

Is a vow made through error valid? - R. Negatively, if the error concerns the substance of the thing, or substantial circumstances, or those which are principally intended, or pertain to the substance, or notably change it; because then the thing promised is not sufficiently known and willed. Indeed St. Alphonsus, n. 198, adds: "it is certain that error concerning the substance invalidates a vow, even if it was concomitant, that is, not giving cause to the vow, for example, if even when the error was known, you would still have vowed; and even if the error was however crass." For even such ignorance renders the act non-voluntary.

R. Affirmatively, if the error is only concerning an impulsive cause. "The vow is valid, because that is only a secondary cause, and if it is set aside, the act is sufficiently voluntary according to its substance. Nor does such an error vitiate the act in other contracts; for example, someone vowed a pilgrimage to Rome with zeal for worshiping God, and at the same time also had a secondary impulsive cause, that he might visit his brother, whom he thought to be at Rome; even if afterwards he understands that the brother is not there, he does not therefore cease to be obligated by the vow." L. 198.

R. Affirmatively also, if the error concerns accidental circumstances of lesser moment, which would not have stood in the way of the vow if, the error being excluded, they had been known; for one who vows is judged to oblige himself to undergo merely accidental inconveniences which can occur in fulfilling the vow. Thus St. Liguori, who nevertheless in n. 198 does not deny that it is probable that error invalidates a vow in accidental circumstances, if these are of great moment, and if, had they been known, the vow would not have been emitted. Cf. 563, 567, 597, 598.

Yet vows must be excepted which are emitted after the novitiate in any approved order; for these are not void because of any error, except only substantial error, concerning the substance. For by their nature they constitute a stable and irrevocable state; and therefore one dependent upon no other error than substantial error. Moreover, because otherwise it would follow that many Professions would be invalidated, to the grave damage and scandal of the commonwealth. This also holds concerning marriage. L. ib.; Lugo, de Iust. et Iure, d. 22, n. 88; Sanch., de Matr., l. 10, d. 9, n. 20.

Is a vow made through fear valid? - R. Negatively, if the fear is grave, unjust, inflicted from without in order to extort the vow. The reason is that that cannot be acceptable to God which is violently extorted from someone through injury, since the law of nature demands that right be restored entirely. And this indeed proves that vows of this sort are invalid by natural law. It is clear, moreover, from canon law as to solemn vows of religion, and probably also as to other vows. C. Perlatum 1, de His quae, etc.; L. 197.

Unjust; for if the fear is just, the vow is valid, since there is no true coercion in that which one ought to do, nor is the one vowing reasonably unwilling. Inflicted in order to extort the vow; for otherwise the vow is valid, for example, if someone, fearing death which robbers threaten, made a vow to God that he might be delivered. Grave; whether a vow emitted from light unjust fear is invalid, "Busembaum here affirms with Suarez and Filliucci. Likewise Navarrus and many others cited by Sanchez, Decal., l. 4, c. 3, n. 24. The reason, as they say, is that fear therefore annuls a vow because it takes away full liberty of consent; therefore light fear also will annul it, when it takes away the same liberty and is the cause that the vow is made. And Sanchez calls this opinion probable. But the opposite opinion is more probable, which Sanchez holds, n. 24, with Soto, Valentia, Sa, Azor, etc., and the Salmanticenses, ibid., n. 161, who call it common, and prove it from C. Perlatum, de His quae vi, etc. The reason is that light fear, which can easily be cast off, is not judged to be the cause of so grave a thing as a vow, just as we shall likewise say concerning contracts, n. 718." L. 197.

R. Affirmatively, if the fear arises from within or from a necessary cause, unless it takes away the use of reason from the one vowing; the reason is that vows of this sort are simply voluntary.

Is one bound by a vow who doubts whether he emitted the vow; whether he emitted it with sufficient deliberation; whether he has fulfilled the vow emitted? - R. To the first: negatively; and the same must be said if you doubt whether something is comprehended by the vow; you are not bound as to the part about which you doubt. For an obligation is not to be imposed unless it is certainly established.

R. To the second: it is certainly impossible that, while a true and positive doubt remains concerning sufficient use of reason and sufficient deliberation, a certain obligation of a vow should be had from it. For a vow essentially includes perfect deliberation of reason. Therefore if this is doubtful, consequently the vow is doubtful, and its obligation doubtful. Suarez, l. 4, c. 6, n. 10. In a negative doubt, before the seventh year the presumption is for defect of deliberation; after the seventh year, the presumption is for sufficient deliberation.

R. To the third: negatively, for the same reason as to the first, if the doubt is positive. But affirmatively if the doubt is negative, because possession then stands for the vow. L. 196; Elbel, de Actib. human., 156 seqq.

Must the matter of a vow be something morally possible? - R. Affirmatively. The reason is that a vow is a promise made to God with the intention of obliging oneself; but no one can oblige himself to something morally impossible for him. But if the thing is divisible and in part possible, the vow is valid for this part. Except, however, if it were clear that the one vowing wished to oblige himself to both parts by way of one thing, and had both before his eyes indivisibly. The reason is that a vow is a particular law, which is not extended beyond the intention of the one vowing; and therefore if the one vowing collectively promised both parts, and one depending upon the other, if one is impossible, the whole vow remains void. Thus the Salmanticenses, tr. 17, c. 1, n. 74, who soon after, ibid., nn. 75, 76, add several examples of vows which either are to be observed in the part which remains possible, or are judged void because of the impossibility of some part. But a vow is not valid if the thing is morally indivisible. L. 202, 225.

You will resolve: A vow of doing whatever is more perfect is not valid without a special impulse of the Holy Spirit; nor a vow of avoiding all sins, even venial sins, even half-deliberate ones; because this is morally impossible without special grace and privilege. Trent, sess. 6, c. 23. A vow of avoiding all mortal sins is valid, or even all fully deliberate venial sins, because this is morally possible with the ordinary help of divine grace, and does not need a special privilege, provided, however, that the matter concerns persons truly pious. "But a vow," adds St. Alphonsus, n. 303, "of abstaining from venial sins in some determinate matter is commonly valid, especially in persons of great virtue; but in others of moderate virtue it will be impossible matter; indeed in some matters, for example of unchaste thoughts, idle thoughts, etc., since they are unavoidable for all, the vow is null." But the Salmanticenses and others cited by the same St. Alphonsus, l. c., assert on the contrary that a vow of avoiding all venial sins, even if it were concerning fully deliberate sins, is altogether invalid, as concerning a thing morally impossible, from c. 23, sess. 6, Trent. But in this canon the discourse is not only about fully deliberate sins. Sanchez, in Decal., l. 4, cap. 5, n. 17.

Must the matter of a vow be something morally good, indeed concerning a better good? - R. Affirmatively. The reason is that otherwise the promise of a vow would not be pleasing and acceptable to God. "Vows which are concerning vain and useless things are more to be mocked than to be kept." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 2 ad 3; L. 204. Likewise a promise which impedes a greater good, under this respect, detracts from the worship of God, and consequently cannot be pleasing and acceptable to him, so as to beget an obligation in conscience from the motive of religion, or divine worship. But this better good is not to be understood comparatively to any good whatever, but comparatively to its opposite, so that this good is such that its positing is better than its omission. Likewise a better good is understood not only absolutely in itself, but also relatively to the circumstances. Cf. the formula of the oath of certain Colleges of the City. M. E., v. 21, pp. 351 seqq.

You will resolve: A vow of a good thing from an evil end is not valid, if the evil end stands on the side of the vow itself, namely if the vow itself is ordered to an evil end; for example, if you vow alms in order to obtain the successful outcome of theft. The reason is that the giving of alms for such an end is a blasphemous action, as though God would furnish help for sinning. Likewise a vow is not valid from a cause evil in itself, as for example if you make a vow because you have won an unjust lawsuit, or have killed an enemy.

It must be said otherwise, according to the common opinion, if the bad end only accompanies the vow accidentally, and stands entirely on the side of the one vowing; for example, if someone vows on account of the glory of God, but with some vanity, and from vain ostentation more gladly vows externally.

Likewise a vow of a good thing with a bad condition is valid, if the vow is made from affection toward the good thing, as it is good, although joined with a cause or occasion and bad condition; as if someone vows alms because he was not caught, or if he is not caught, in theft. For although theft is evil, nevertheless not being harmed is not evil, but a gift of God; and the vow does not fall upon the evil, but upon the good, insofar as it is good in itself. Much more does this hold if the vow is made from detestation of the bad condition; as if someone vows alms if and as often as he blasphemes.

A vow concerning a thing otherwise prescribed is valid, because a vow of this sort is concerning a thing good in itself, since it is supposed to be prescribed, and is concerning a better good, since it can confer a new bond and greater fidelity and devotion in fulfilling the law. L. 206, 213; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 6; Laymann, l. 4, tr. 4, c. 2, n. 7.

Is a vow invalid concerning a good which impedes a greater good? - These are the words of St. Alphonsus, nn. 207, 209: It is invalid and a venial sin to vow a good which is an impediment of a greater good, as especially are vows against the evangelical counsels, for example, to remain in the world, to take a wife, to go to military service, to engage in trade. Yet if some good, lesser per se and absolutely, should become by accident a greater good, then to vow such things is valid; for example, if someone saw that reception of orders would be harmful to him. Hence a vow of marrying, speaking per se, is null, even if it is concerning marrying a poor woman, a prostitute, or for removing the sins of others, because celibacy is always more pleasing to God. It is otherwise if the vow was emitted in order to repair scandal, or the honor of a girl from obligation, or for the common good; or also, far more probably, because of experience of one's own frailty, supposing that such a person does not wish to use other remedies. For in such a case marriage is a greater good, since it was granted by God for calming concupiscence for him who does not wish to take up other better remedies. 1 Cor. 7:9. Cf. 554, 558.

Does he sin, and how, who vows an evil thing? - These are the words of St. Alphonsus, nn. 204, 205: He who vows a vain, useless, indifferent thing sins venially. He who vows a mortal sin sins mortally. He who vows a venial sin, some say sins venially, others mortally. "It seems more probable to me that it is a grave fault, since of itself it is blasphemy to will that evil should redound to the honor of God; but commonly because of ignorance this is only venial." Cf. 554.

Whether and how does a vow oblige? - The response is contained in the following propositions: A vow is obligatory. For a promise made to a man certainly obliges; how much more, therefore, one made to God. Hence the breaking of a vow is a certain species of infidelity. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 3. And the Scriptures most evidently persuade this: When you have vowed a vow ... you shall not delay to pay it, etc. Deut. 23:21. If you have vowed anything to God, do not delay to pay it, etc. Eccles. 5:3. It is heretical, says St. Thomas, Quodl. 3, aa. 1, 2, to assert that a vow does not oblige.

A vow obliges per se, like a law or precept of the Church, and therefore gravely in grave matter, and lightly in light matter. For a vow is as it were a certain private law which someone imposes upon himself. Struggl 17; L. 211, 213.

A vow obliges according to the intention of the one vowing, if he determines the quantity of the obligation in the act of vowing, so that he can bind himself only under light obligation in matter however grave. The reason is that just as a legislator or superior can oblige only lightly in grave matter, so also he who vows can impose only a light obligation upon himself in a grave thing. Yet, conversely, he cannot oblige himself gravely in a light thing, because light matter is not capable of grave obligation. But in the vow of chastity annexed to sacred orders, and in the vows of religious profession, the Church specially requires the will of obliging oneself gravely. Hence religious profession is void when it is expressly emitted without the will of obliging oneself gravely. Struggl 18; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 3; L. 211, 212.

Note: That matter is judged grave which, when prescribed by the Church, obliges gravely, such as fasting, Mass, etc.; or which, compared with another precept, seems grave; or which contributes notably to the end of the vow, or to the worship of God.

No one can be obligated by another's vow by force of the vow, because a vow is a personal burden voluntarily undertaken, and therefore no one can promise another's thing or action. S. R. C., 18 Apr. 1643; 23 Jun. 1703.

By force of the vow; for 1. from justice an heir is bound to pay the real vows of the deceased, just as he is bound to pay his other debts, legacies, etc. The reason is that a real vow affects the thing itself, and therefore it remains bound into whatever hands it comes. Hence such vows must be satisfied before legacies, because the obligation of real vows is prior to a free legacy by reason of death, but after debts of justice, because the deceased is judged to have emitted real vows to be paid only from that part of his goods concerning which he was able to dispose freely and without injury to others. Hence a necessary heir can lawfully reserve the legitimate portion, or the portion due according to law, not only for himself but also for other descendants, and therefore he is bound to pay the real vows of the deceased only from the remaining substance.

2. From obedience, subjects, both those who now live and those who in the future will become members of the community, are bound, by force of a certain pact or statute or custom, and from the motive of religion, to fulfill a vow which has been emitted in their name by the civil magistrate, with the Bishop consenting, or by the superiors of a religion. Struggl 24, 26; Suarez, de Voto, l. 4, c. 1, 9; Tamburini, Expl. Decal., l. 3, cap. 12, § 4; cap. 16, § 2, n. 12; 7; Scav., ed. 12, Mediol. 1874, l. 2, n. 219; L. 213, 214, 216; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 98, a. 2 ad 2, ad 4; E. M.

You will resolve: Real vows are to be paid from one's own goods; but he who cannot pay from his own goods is not bound to beg from another so that he may be able to satisfy them. Yet he satisfies if another, whether asked or spontaneously, wishes to pay for him, even though he himself is able to satisfy; because what the other gives, with the consent of the one vowing added, or with ratification if he gave without his knowledge, becomes his own. Except if the matter of the real vow was determined; for then that thing must be given in its individuality, when namely a particular reason moved him to vow this thing in its individuality.

Personal vows can be fulfilled only by the one vowing himself, nor do they pass to heirs. Hence he who vowed a pilgrimage does not satisfy if he hires another; nor is he bound to hire someone if he himself cannot go.

The vows of parents, devoting their children to some religion, or imposing upon them an obligation, for example, of fasting on certain days, etc., cannot bind them. But although children are not bound by the vow of parents who devoted them to religion or to some obligation, nevertheless the vow obliges the parents so that, as far as lies in them, with the freedom of the children preserved, they move them to embrace that which they vowed for them; and much more, that they not stand in the way of children wishing to embrace it. L. 213, 216, 217, 220.

Conditional vows do not oblige when the condition ceases, even if the one vowing himself was the cause that the condition is not posited, provided he did not impede it by deceit, force, or malice; for then someone sins indirectly against the vow, but the vow no longer subsists. The reason is that the condition is now not fulfilled, although by the fault and fraud of the one vowing.

In a disjunctive vow, "if each part is apt matter, that which is chosen must be performed, even if after the election the other part perishes, or is rendered impossible. Conversely, if one part perishes, or is rendered impossible before the election, you are not bound to the other, unless the thing perishes by your fault, or you were in delay in delivering or determining it." L. 224, 218, 219.

He who vows something to be done at a certain time, after that time has passed, whether with fault or without fault, is bound to nothing, if the day was added to terminate the obligation, as, speaking per se and regularly, it is to be judged in personal vows, unless the contrary is established, as very commonly they say. For transgression of a vow does not oblige to compensation. Hence one who did not fulfill on one day is not bound to fulfill on another day.

It is otherwise if the day was added only to urge fulfillment, just as conversely it must be judged, per se and regularly, in real vows, unless again the contrary is established, since that day has no more special reason than others. But if the vow is indeterminate as to time, for example concerning a daily rosary, etc., the vow obliges perpetually, unless something else is gathered from the circumstances. Suarez, l. 4, c. 15; Sanch., in Decal., l. 4, c. 14, n. 25; Struggl 17; L. 212, 220.

Vows are to be interpreted according to the more benign part, since they are laws of a free will. L. 224.

You will resolve: One vowing that he will hear Mass for a month is probably not bound to hear two Masses on feast days; just as this is also probable if it is imposed by a Confessor for penance. One vowing that he will observe fasting can eat milk foods. One vowing fasting for a month is not bound on Sunday. One vowing fasting on the vigil of some Saint which falls on Sunday can anticipate the fast on Saturday. One vowing fasting on each Saturday is probably not bound to the vow if Christmas Day falls on Saturday, unless he expressly intended that he still wished to be obligated on that day, because then he is bound beyond doubt.

But since the matter or substance of fasting is divisible, if the fasting is strict, namely one which includes both one meal only and abstinence, so that those also are bound to one meal who in any way, whether culpably or inculpably, have eaten meats, he who vowed fasting, if he eats meats, and the obligation of the vow is ended on the same day, is bound at least to observe the one meal; but if the obligation of the vow is not ended on that day, if indeed it is not affixed to the day, he is bound to fast on another day.

One vowing that he will recite the rosary satisfies by reciting a third part, because it is commonly so understood; and he satisfies by reciting it alternately, because such a vow obliges after the manner of the divine office; and he also satisfies by dividing the decades. If someone, forgetful of the vow or of the imposed penance, etc., performs the work due, he satisfies well by the general will which each person is judged to have of satisfying first his obligations.

Whether a Religious who has vowed, when he asks license from his superior to fulfill the thing promised by vow, is bound to manifest his vow to him? It is controverted. Some affirm, because this manifestation of the vow conduces, regularly speaking, to obtaining license more easily. Others more probably deny, because a vow is of strict interpretation, and consequently the one vowing is judged to oblige himself only to that which is a necessary and commonly sufficient means for obtaining license. Thus Schmalz., in h. t., nn. 23-25; L. 222-224, 226.

Can light matters in vows coalesce with each other so as to make grave matter? - Either those light matters are vowed separately and by way of several things disjoined from each other, say from a diverse end; or they are vowed in a mass, and by way of one thing. If the first, omissions, even if multiplied, will never be able to combine into grave matter, because they are in no way united with each other. If the second, they can certainly, for the contrary reason, constitute grave matter and arrive at mortal sin.

But matters are judged to be vowed by way of several things disjoined from each other in personal vows; but by way of one thing and in a mass in real vows, unless the contrary is established. For personal vows are commonly judged to be affixed to the day, whence transgression of one does not coalesce with another; not likewise real vows. Thus, for example, a real vow is judged to exist if someone vows to give one little coin daily for a year; but it would be a personal vow if he vowed to recite one Pater on each day of the year. Therefore by omitting to recite this prayer even for a long time, it would be a venial sin; but by omitting that small alms, it would be grave when it had arrived at grave matter. Hence an omission of this sort will always have to be supplied, since by the lapse of time the obligation of the vow does not cease. Yet if the intention of the one vowing were truly doubtful, the vow is judged affixed to the day, so that its matters do not coalesce, but each is terminated in the day. For each person is judged to oblige himself as little as he can. Struggl 17, 33; L. 212, 220.

What delay is to be judged grave? - Per se, any delay of a vow gravely obliging is grave when it is affixed to a determinate time, as is a vow of fasting on such a vigil, etc., because once the time has elapsed the obligation of the vow ceases from the general principle that transgression of a vow does not oblige to compensation.

But if a determinate time was not set, or was set only to urge, not also to terminate, the obligation of the vow, either the delay diminishes the matter promised or it does not. If the first is verified, grave delay in a grave thing will be a grave sin, unless a reasonable cause excuses, as if someone meanwhile awaits a suitable time for the end which he proposed to himself. Hence, for example, if someone has vowed religious life, then, says Tamburini, "the time, or age, of the one vowing must be considered; for if the one vowing is, for example, in his fifteenth year, I would not judge a delay of three or even four years notable. For youths are accustomed to take up religious life around the fifteenth and twentieth year, namely when a state of life is usually assumed. Therefore, while someone in his fifteenth year vows perpetual religion, unless he determines the time for entrance, he does not seem to have renounced the customary manner and time in assuming a state of life... But if the one vowing had reached, for example, the fortieth year of age, I freely admit that a delay beyond six months is sufficiently notable; for such an age does not permit a longer delay."

But if the second is verified, the same Tamburini says that "it does not seem improbable that any delay whatever, provided there is not probable danger of omitting the vow altogether, is only venial. The reason can be that no one, when he gives the whole which he promised and causes no damage to the creditor from delay, seems to be condemned of grave fault, but only of light negligence; but no damage comes to God from the aforesaid delay, etc." And soon after he adds: "That is deservedly certain, when there is no danger of diminution of service, that a vow made without determination of time can be delayed, even without venial sin, until the time in which someone believes he will fulfill it with greater devotion; because this redounds to the greater honor of God, to which the vow is ordered; therefore that greater hoped-for devotion is to be judged a sufficient cause of delay." Explic. Decal., l. 3, c. 12, § 3, n. 11. But others assert generally that it is grave to defer temporary vows beyond two or three years, and perpetual vows beyond six months. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 3 ad 3; L. 221, l. 4, n. 72 seqq.; Struggl 19, 21.

How manyfold is the sin committed by one who violates a vow? - Either the vow concerns a thing otherwise prescribed, or not. If the first, there will be a double sin, one against the virtue to which the thing promised by vow pertains, the other against the virtue of religion; for a double precept is violated. If the second, there will be one sin, against religion, because the one vowing in this case does not wish to impose upon himself another obligation than that which arises by force of the vow itself.

But the malice of this sin against religion is perfidy, or violation of the fidelity owed to God, which violation directly pertains to irreverence toward God. But whether violation of any vow whatever, that is, even not solemn, also takes on the malice of sacrilege strictly such, that is, induces another sin against religion directly pertaining to irreverence toward sacred things, some affirm, others deny. Cf. 500. But violation of a solemn vow contains infidelity and violation of a person consecrated to God. From the fact that violation of a vow as such is not of diverse species from diverse matter, "if someone having a vow of chastity fornicates, he can accuse separately the breaking of the vow." L. 224. Roncaglia, tr. 7, q. 2, c. ult., quaest. 5; L. 213, 224.

How does a vow cease from within? - The obligation of a vow can cease from within and from without.

It ceases from within: 1. If the matter formerly possible becomes impossible, formerly honorable becomes shameful, formerly a better good becomes indifferent and an impediment of a greater good, by reason of the destruction of the thing itself, prohibition, and a new circumstance. For the obligation is extinguished if it falls into that case from which it could not begin. 2. If you change the vow into a work evidently better; for each person can do this even by himself, provided no special prohibition is present in the particular case. Cf. 623. 3. If the state of the thing is notably changed. "It is the common opinion," says St. Alphonsus, n. 226, cited by the Salmanticenses, "that in every promise, as also is a vow, a change of matter notable of itself takes away the obligation. The reason is that through the change the thing becomes diverse from that which was promised." Understand, "except the simple vow of chastity and of religion." L. l. 4, n. 50. 4. If the thing vowed has become useless for the intent, especially if it is more destructive of it. 5. If those conditions also so bear, which are understood in any vow whatever. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 3 ad 2. 6. If its final cause ceases; but otherwise if only an impulsive cause ceases. Cf. 566. 7. When the condition is not fulfilled, if the vow was conditioned; when the determinate time has elapsed, if the vow was affixed to a certain time. Cf. 590, 591. Struggl 32, 36; L. 225, 243.

Is that change sufficient of itself, even not notable, which nevertheless, if foreseen, one would not have emitted the vow? - The first opinion affirms, and St. Thomas expressly holds this; he teaches: "That frees from the obligation of a vow or oath which, if it had been known from the beginning, would have prevented them from being made"; 4 D. 38, q. 1, a. 3. The reason is that then the intention of obliging oneself is lacking, or it is so interpreted according to what was said in the preceding number, in the fifth place.

The second opinion denies, because, in order to exempt the one vowing from the obligation of the vow, attention must not be given to what he would have promised if he had remembered, but rather to what he actually promised. Now St. Alphonsus, n. 226, speaking of the first opinion, says: "This opinion seems to me not less probable, indeed perhaps more probable." And he hands it down as quasi-certain, l. 3, n. 720. Cf. here 563, 567, 575, 597, 3.

How does a vow cease from without? What is annulment, and of how many kinds is it? - A vow ceases from without through annulment, dispensation, commutation.

Annulment of a vow is its nullification or suspension made by him to whose dominative power the will of the one vowing, or the matter of the vow, is subject. It is 1. direct, if it falls directly upon the person or upon the will of the one vowing; 2. indirect, if it falls only upon the matter of the vow. In the former case the vow is altogether annihilated, nor does it afterwards revive any longer; but in the latter its obligation is only suspended as to matter subject to the power of another, and it revives when the one vowing has become perfectly his own master. Struggl 30, 31, 43.

What is direct annulment? - Since the dominion of anyone ought not to be violated, and any master can use his own liberty, hence, if the will of someone is subject to the dominative power of another, that one can directly annul, validly, all the vows of that subject, of whatever sort they are, emitted during the time of subjection, at his own pleasure, without any cause; that is, he can will and pronounce that those vows are null, so that in no case does the obligation afterwards revive. For this annulment is not the placing of some impediment to the execution of an act of the will, but the nullification of its value, on account of the implicit condition in the act itself: if he to whose power it pertains does not contradict; if it is not revoked by the superior. And this holds even if the vow is in favor of a third party, and perhaps accepted. This right comes from natural law, and also from positive law, by which legitimate dominative power over the will of another is given to someone. Dominative power is distinguished from jurisdiction in this, that the latter arises from the right of a public office, but the former from the right of a private office, whence it also is usually called economic power.

Schmalz., l. 1, t. 32, n. 4; Laym., de Leg., c. 5, n. 1; L. 227; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 57, a. 4; q. 88, aa. 8, 9; q. 189, a. 5; Suarez, de Relig., tr. 6, l. 6, cc. 6, 7; Bouix, de Iure Reg., v. 2, pp. 481-505; Ferraris, v. Votum, art. 3, n. 10 seqq.

Dominative power: It is the power of a master over his own things; and besides this, it is that power over persons which is similar to the aforesaid power over things; such as the power of a father over a son, who is something of the father, the power of a master over a slave, who is something of the master, and also the power of a regular prelate over his own religious, by force of religious profession, by which someone has consecrated and handed over himself wholly and totally to God in a religious Order. Therefore it is well distinguished from the power of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and from the power of jurisdiction properly such, and from the power which is properly called economic. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 57, a. 4; C. He. 331. And by force of this power the same St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 189, a. 5, grants that the vows of children can be annulled by parents.

What is indirect annulment? - If indeed not the will of the one vowing, but the matter of the vow is subject to someone, so that he has a right over it, that one can, by indirect annulment, suspend such a vow, at whatever time it was emitted, that is, suspend its obligation, insofar as prejudice is done to his right; and this from the law of nature teaching that no one can promise something to another to the prejudice of a third party. Hence the vow, when the state of things has changed, revives. But per accidens it can be extinguished, if the vow, for example, obliges for a certain time, and license is denied for that time, or the matter is prohibited. L. 241; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 8.

Can a superior annul vows if these have been ratified by him, or after the time of subjection has passed? - R. To the first: affirmatively, because he cannot take away from himself the power which he has over subjects. But, on the contrary, one who once annulled a vow, if afterwards he does not wish this, the vow is not therefore revalidated. The reason is that through annulment the vow is extinguished. But that an extinguished vow may revive, the repentance of the superior who annulled it contributes nothing; rather the will of the subject is required, who would again oblige himself by vow. L. 239.

R. To the second: Vows made in the time of subjection can still be annulled after that time, for example, when a son is now pubescent, and this, says St. Alphonsus, n. 238, is the more probable opinion. Moreover, Sanchez hands down a double rule in this matter, in Decal., l. 4, c. 30, nn. 7, 8. "The first is: When the power of the superior, during whose time the vow was emitted, is not altogether extinguished or altogether suspended, but remains as to some things, he can annul a vow emitted in the time of his subjection, even if that time has now passed; provided, after it has passed, it has not again been confirmed (understand confirmed, in such a way that he then knows the vows were infirm, as St. Alphonsus has, l. c.). The later rule is: When that power of the superior is altogether extinguished or altogether suspended, he cannot annul those vows."

Is some cause required for the annulment of vows? - To annul the vows of subjects without cause is of itself no sin, because they are judged to have been emitted under the condition of the superior's consent; whence obedience stands in place of cause. Of itself, because in practice it can with difficulty be excused from venial sin; for it would be an idle act, and the progress of another would be irrationally impeded. Nevertheless this commonly does not exceed venial sin. But any reasonable cause suffices for excusing from venial sin.

Suarez, de Relig., tr. 6, l. 6, c. 7, n. 16, warns that for annulling a lesser cause suffices than for dispensing. Hence, from the opinion of all, he infers that a subject who asks annulment of a vow from his Prelate, when he does not have a cause which would suffice for a just dispensation, does not sin, because, as he says, he uses his right, because the vow was not absolute, but conditioned, and through it he did not oblige himself to beware lest the condition be impeded, or not to take precautions that it not be posited, as is clear from the common manner of vowing. But he who feels the burdens of religion can, without sin, enjoy its advantages. Therefore, just as a Prelate does not sin by annulling, so neither does a subject by asking. L. 228; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 8.

Who can annul the vows of religious? - The Pope indeed can directly annul all vows of religious; and the Bishop can annul the vows of nuns subject to him. Moreover, besides the Pope, abbots, guardians, priors, and rectors, even secondary Prelates in the absence of the primary ones, and probably also abbesses, can directly annul the vows of religious, whatever they are, even internal vows, even those emitted under predecessors. Yet exception is made, besides the very vows of religious profession, cf. Trent, sess. 25, c. 1, de Reg., of the vow of passing to a stricter religion, as is established in C. Licet 18, de Regul. For from that profession arises the power of annulling. And because the accessory follows the principal, other vows annexed to profession are also excepted. The aforesaid vow not even the Pope can annul, insofar as he is supreme Prelate of the religious order, although not only the Pope, but also a regular Prelate, can dispense from it. C. Monacho 2, can. 20, q. 4; L. 233, 242; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 8; Struggl 37, 38; cf. here 616.

Of religious; the matter concerns religious of solemn vows. Superiors can annul the vows of religious of simple vows only indirectly. For by force of a solemn vow a religious no longer has to will and not to will; by force of a simple vow a religious is bound only to obey a superior legitimately commanding in the matter of the Rule and Constitutions. Can annul; therefore the vows are valid in themselves before they are annulled. L. 231, 233; S. C. EE. et RR., 28 Jun. 1901, n. 132, Normar.; Monit. Eccles., v. 16, pp. 367 seqq.

Nor is it valid to object against this that these Institutes are themselves also approved by the Holy See. They are indeed approved by the Holy See, but not as religious Institutes of solemn vows. They are approved only in an altogether inferior grade, namely as Institutes of simple vows, by which there is certainly not that perfect handing over of oneself and surrender of oneself, so that a religious is said to have neither to will nor not to will, as is expressly contained in C. Religiosus 2, de Testam., and ult. vol. in 6, C. Religiosi ult., de Sepult. in 6, C. Si Religiosus 27, de Elect. et elect. potest. From this, moreover, it is that the solemn vow of obedience so subjects the will of the one vowing to the Prelate that without his consent it is ineffective for contracting any civil or natural obligation through contract or any other mode. But the simple vow of obedience does not have such an effect, neither by force of its natural obligation alone, nor by force of the approval of the Church. For by force of this vow the religious only "assumes the obligation of obeying the precept of a legitimate superior, in those things which pertain directly or indirectly to the life of the Institute, that is, to the observance of the vows and Constitutions." Norm. S. C. EE. et RR., 28 Jun. 1901, art. 132. Now the obligation alone of obeying the precept of a Prelate, according to the Constitutions of the Institute, is not of itself sufficient to annul any will whatever of obliging oneself to another in matter not contrary to them. Cf. Suarez, de Relig., tr. 6, de Voto, l. 6, c. 7, n. 5; tr. 7, l. 13, nn. 4, 5; Congr. Gener. S. I. 1, Can. 22.

Note: A Prelate can licitly and validly annul the vow of a subject confirmed by an equal or inferior predecessor, but not by a superior. L. 239.

It is certain that the vows of religious are extinguished through solemn profession, as is had from C. Scripturae 4, de Voto: "He is not held guilty of a broken vow who is known to commute temporal service into the perpetual observance of religion." L. 237; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, aa. 8, 12. The same vows of religious are suspended through profession of simple vows; and therefore they revive if someone returns to the secular state. As to novices, regular Prelates can indirectly annul the personal vows of a novice when the execution of these prejudices the exercises of probation. But they cannot annul their real vows, because these do not prejudice the exercises of probation. Struggl 42.

Can a father, grandfather, or tutor annul the vows of children? - A father, or paternal grandfather in his absence, can directly annul any vows whatever of those below puberty, whether personal or real, even vows of chastity and religion, although the son is capable of deceit and the vow concerns castrense peculium, or quasi-castrense peculium, because at such an age perfect deliberation for so great an obligation is lacking. Therefore nature has provided for such a defect by furnishing parents the faculty of annulling such vows. In doubt whether a vow was emitted before or after puberty, the father can still annul it, because his power prevails.

But parents cannot annul the personal vows of pubescent children, for example of chastity, etc., except indirectly, that is, unless they prejudice domestic governance, as vows of pilgrimage, etc. Likewise they can well indirectly annul the real vows of pubescents in minority, because in it they lack the administration of goods. Except if the vow concerns castrense peculium, or quasi-castrense peculium; or if the son has gone out from paternal power.

What has been said about the father and grandfather must also be said about a tutor with respect to a ward, and about a curator with respect to a minor; and if there are several tutors or curators, each has the same power. C. Puella 2, c. 20, q. 2; L. 229, 242; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, aa. 8, 9.

Can a mother or grandmother also annul the vows of children? - A mother can annul the vows of children, the father being lacking, if she has been designated tutor or curator, and she can do what tutors and curators can do. But if she was not designated as tutor or curator, and the son lacks father and paternal grandfather, Sanchez, Suarez, etc., think that then the son is his own master. But the opposite, namely that in that case it falls to the mother, or even grandmother, to be tutor or curator, is held more probably by the Salmanticenses, Tamburini, etc., because it is reasonable that a mother or grandmother provide for a minor, and therefore she can well annul his vows as tutor or curator.

But Sanchez, Suarez, etc., deny that a mother can annul the vows of children when the father or tutor is present, and they say that the mother, and in the absence of the mother, the grandfather or grandmother on the mother's side, can annul only the vows of those below puberty when the father or tutor is lacking. But not less probably, the Salmanticenses, Roncaglia, etc., assert that the mother, even when the father is present and not contradicting, or the tutor, can annul all the vows of those below puberty, even vows of chastity and religion, and also the personal vows of pubescents which prejudice the governance of the house; but not real vows, whose administration pertains to the father or curator. The reason is that such power, although not civilly (by common law namely it belongs only to the father of the family), nevertheless naturally is also in the mother, to whom children are bound to obey, although with subordination to the father; so that the father can annul the vows of children when the mother contradicts, but not thus the mother when the father contradicts. By more recent laws, indeed, paternal power is in the father and mother, although it is exercised by the father alone. Inst. 1, l. 1, t. 9; C. I. 220; C. G. 371-373; C. H. 154; C. A. 143, 144, 147; C. B. 1627, 1634; L. 230; C. He. 273, 274; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, aa. 8, 9; Struggl 39, 40.

Note: It is owed to positive law, namely Canon Law and Common Law, that religious are most fully subject to their superiors, C. Monacho 2, c. 20, q. 4, and that parents can directly annul only the vows of children below puberty, but indirectly the vows of pubescent children. C. Puella 2, c. 20, q. 2. For by natural law no one is so subject to another that he depends upon him in all his actions; and that distinction between those below puberty and pubescents, as to children of a family, comes only from the aforesaid Law. This distinction between those below puberty and pubescents is passed over in more recent laws. Hence not improbably parents can directly annul all vows of children as long as they remain under paternal power. C. I. 120; C. G. 372;

C. A. 174; C. H. 154; C. B. 1626; C. L. 311; C. He. 14. L. 227, 232; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 8; D'Annib., ed. 4, p. 3, n. 206.

Can a husband annul the vows of his wife? - It is more probable that a husband can directly annul all vows of his wife, although they do not prejudice the use of marriage, or the education of offspring, or domestic governance. And the reason is both because the husband has dominion over the wife, and because it is very expedient for the peace of the family, for fostering mutual love, that the wife have her will totally dependent upon the husband, and thus the impulses of women be restrained. Therefore the husband can annul even vows of chastity and religion emitted by the wife, and to be executed after the death of the husband. But the husband cannot directly annul vows emitted by the wife before marriage, although he can well suspend their execution insofar as they prejudice his power. Num. 30:7, 9; Eph. 5:24; L. 234, 237; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 8; C. A. 91.

Can a wife annul the vows of her husband? - A wife cannot annul the vows of her husband unless they prejudice her, as a vow of a long pilgrimage, etc.; or even a vow of not asking the debt, as Sporer, Laymann, etc., more probably hold against Lessius, Sanchez, etc., because it would be very grave for the modesty of a wife to be forced always to ask. The doctors commonly teach that such vows are to be annulled; but rather they seem to be invalid, as concerning inept matter, as the Salmanticenses think. L. 235, 242; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 8.

Note: Spouses could also mutually annul a vow of continence emitted by mutual consent. This seems to follow from the power of the husband directly annulling the vows of the wife; from the power of the wife indirectly annulling the vows of the husband; and from the power of annulling vows even approved or ratified by oneself. St. Alphonsus, n. 236, denies this. Yet there is no lack of grave doctors who affirm it. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 8 ad 3; Sanch., l. 4, c. 32, n. 7; Suarez, l. 4, c. 6, n. 1; Gur. Baller. 331.

Can a master annul the vows of servants? - A master can annul any real vows whatever of servants or slaves, unless they have something of their own, and personal vows which prejudice the master, such as vows of religion, etc., but not of chastity, etc. Yet these vows of slaves and servants cannot be directly annulled by masters, but only indirectly, or they can be suspended for the time of servitude and service, insofar as they prejudice the services due. L. 240, 242; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 8.

Can a husband or Prelate directly annul the vows of a wife or religious concerning which it is doubted whether they were emitted before or after subjection? - The reason for doubting is that none of the aforesaid superiors can directly annul vows emitted before subjection, for example, before marriage, because the will of the one vowing was not then subject to him. Now St. Alphonsus, n. 237, denies. The reason is that the vows are certain, and the possession of the husband or Prelate is uncertain, because it is doubted whether the vows were emitted at the time when subjection began. But Suarez, Sanchez, and others affirm. The reason is that on the contrary, possession of the present will of the subject is certain, since it is certain that she is a wife, or that this one is a religious; but the exception as to those vows is doubtful. Therefore, until the exception is proved, namely that the vows were emitted before subjection, the certain possession of the superior prevails. Just as, by parity, a spouse doubting about the value of the marriage is bound to render the debt to the other asking, on account of his certain possession, as is had from C. Dominus, de Secund. nuptiis.

What is dispensation of a vow? - Dispensation of a vow is: the remission of a vow made in the name of God himself, for a just cause, by one having spiritual jurisdiction in the external forum.

Remission, by which is not understood a release from the obligation of natural law, but an action by which the Church in the name of God withdraws the matter from the vow. This is clear by the example of one who remits a promise made to himself; for he does not dispense in the natural law of standing by promises, but rescinds the contract by remitting its obligation. Moreover, that this faculty is in the Church is clear both from fact, since she has always used it, and from law, since this is expedient for the good of the faithful, and those words of Christ are general: Whatever you shall loose, etc.; but that it is in the Church alone is clear from the fact that this act is spiritual; therefore it must belong to spiritual power alone.

Made in the name of God; for since the Church does not dispense in her own law, but in God's, she can act in this only in the name of God himself. Hence the distinction between dispensation and annulment is clear. Dispensation falls upon a vow insofar as it depends upon God's acceptance. But annulment falls upon a vow insofar as it is quasi-conditioned, either on the side of the will of the one vowing, or on the side of the thing promised, subject to the power of the superior and dependent upon it. Annulment can be made against the will of the one vowing, and the superior by prohibiting the matter, or by resisting the obligation of the vow, removes the condition, namely of honesty, without which a vow cannot be valid. Dispensation, on the contrary, cannot be made against the will of the one vowing, because, since in a vow the obligation depends upon one's own will, by not accepting the dispensation someone as it were confirms the vow, or emits it again.

For a just cause; because an inferior, since he is a mere executor, cannot dispense in the law of a superior without a just proportionate cause; and if he acts, he acts invalidly, and sins, unless good faith excuses him.

By one having, etc.; for since this power is for the utility of the Church, and pertains to external governance, just as the power of making laws, whose nature the vow imitates, those cannot have this faculty of dispensing from a vow as their own unless they are strong in external jurisdiction. Besides, since a Prelate does not dispense except in the name of God, only a Prelate can dispense who bears God's place in the Church, who indeed is he who has exterior jurisdiction in it. Add that an accepted promise cannot be released unless he who accepted, or his representative, consents. L. 250; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, aa. 10, 12.

Who can dispense from vows, and with whom? - 1. The Pope with respect to all the faithful and all vows, even solemn vows. 2. A Bishop with respect to his own subjects, even travelers, in all vows not reserved to the Pope; but not a parish priest, because he has only jurisdiction of the internal forum. Nor indeed is such a faculty communicated to him by law or by custom. 3. Exempt regular Prelates with respect to their own religious and novices, as to vows which they made either in the world or even in the novitiate, except reserved vows. But non-exempt Prelates cannot dispense, nor abbesses, indeed not even penitentiaries nor vicars of the Bishop, unless the faculty is specially delegated to them. 4. By special privilege, all regular Confessors can dispense in non-reserved vows of the faithful, within or outside confession; nor indeed is it required that he be the ordinary Confessor of the one bound by vow. Other Confessors have no faculty in this matter unless it is communicated to them by the Pope or by the Bishop. 5. Legates a latere and Nuncios in the province committed to them have the same faculty; likewise a chapter, while the See is vacant, and abbots having episcopal jurisdiction. L. 256, 257, 262; S. Th. 4, d. 38, q. 1, a. 4, q. 1 ad 3; 2. 2, q. 88, aa. 9, 10, 11; Struggl 45, 46, 47; Diana, tr. 4, de Voto et Iuramento, r. 78; tr. 1, de Dubiis Regularium, rr. 274, 275.

Note: In the vows of religious their Prelates can dispense, even if the vows were emitted with their license; and even if it was a vow of passing to a stricter religion, if it is known to be more useful for the religious to remain in his own. A Bishop can dispense with his subjects in a vow of entering a stricter religion, the vow of religion as to substance being left intact, since in no law is such dispensation found to be reserved. Moreover, the faculty of dispensing can be delegated by the said Prelates even to a simple tonsured cleric. In the substantial vows of religion, or in those annexed to them, as in the vow of not eating meats, etc., which are usually emitted in some religions, no one can dispense except the Pontiff. Besides, in the vows of novices, if they are not reserved, dispensation can be made both by the Prelates of the religion and also by the proper Bishop. L. 257. Cf. here 604.

What are just causes of dispensation? - 1. The good of the Church, or the common good of the commonwealth, or of the family, or the progress of the one vowing. 2. Danger of transgression because of a particular indisposition of the one vowing, or because of the common frailty of men. 3. Great difficulty in execution, not only if it was not foreseen, but also if it was foreseen; both because then there is also danger of transgression, and because a thing is apprehended as much more difficult while execution is at hand than when it is deliberated; and even if such difficulty has arisen from the frailty of the one vowing. 4. If the one vowing is vexed by great scruples. 5.

If the vow was emitted immaturely, namely with too much ease, or from imperfect deliberation, or without perfect liberty. For this reason, in the vows of those below puberty, dispensation can be made absolutely without any commutation, without another cause. 6. If the vow was emitted because of light fear inflicted from without. C. Ad audientiam 4, de His quae, etc. 7. When imperfect deliberation or liberty in vowing proceeded from sadness, or from intrinsic fear of shipwreck, death, or another evil, because then vows are usually made immaturely, and therefore dispensation can be made in them without commutation. But if it were clear that mature deliberation was present, then some commutation should be mixed with the dispensation. Just as must also be done if the impulsive cause of the vow ceases. L. 250, 252, 253; Struggl 46, 47.

Can a superior dispense from vows made for the utility of a neighbor? - A vow, although gratuitous, if it was emitted for the utility of man alone, or principally for the utility of a third party, and that third party is determinate, for example, such a poor man, such a church, can in no way be dispensed, once it has been accepted by the poor man or by the rector of that church; for that poor man, that church acquires a true right, of which indeed it cannot be stripped without injury and without the consent of the party.

Although gratuitous; for much less could a mutual, onerous promise be dispensed, as happens in vows and oaths of perseverance which are made in some Congregations; for then they assume the nature of a contract, namely the Congregation obliges itself to sustain the subject, and he to serve, and Benedict XIV so declared in C. Convocatis, 25 Nov. 1749, § 32, which he confirmed by C. Inter praeteritos, 3 Dec. 1749, § 66. Yet the Supreme Pontiff can dispense from these vows of Religious Institutes. All religious vows, even simple and temporary, by present law and practice are reserved to the Holy See. Indeed even private vows of secular Congregations, or of persons not living in community and without habit, approved by the Holy See, are reserved to the same Holy See.

Or principally for the utility of a third party; for if it was emitted principally in honor of God, then the third party would not acquire a true right to the thing promised, except dependently on the will of God, which indeed can be relaxed. "Sporer, Viva, Fagundez, etc., say that it is sufficiently probable that such a vow can well be commuted by the authority of a Prelate or also by one's own authority even after acceptance." L. 255. But this which has been said concerning a vow must also be said concerning an oath principally emitted in honor of God, that it can be relaxed by the Bishop without the consent of the party.

If the third party is determinate; for a promise made to God alone of giving something, for example, to indeterminate poor persons, can always be dispensed and commuted. If it is accepted; for before acceptance a completed handing over is not had, and the very common opinion is that it can then be dispensed and commuted. L. 255, 276; Suarez, l. 6, c. 15, nn. 7, 8; Sanch., l. 4, c. 41, n. 15; cf. here 269.

What vows are reserved to the Pope? - By custom everywhere received and from Canon Law itself, besides the vows of religion and those annexed to them, are these five: 1. The vow of entering an approved religion. 2. The vow of perpetual and entire or total chastity. 3. The vow of pilgrimage to the sepulcher of the Lord in Jerusalem. 4. The vow of pilgrimage to the thresholds of the Apostles Peter and Paul. 5. The vow of pilgrimage to visit the relics of St. James of Compostela. Hence in a general concession of dispensing in all vows, those five vows are not comprehended, although they are not expressly excepted. The reason is that those things which are specially reserved require a special concession. R. 81, de R. I., in 6; Struggl 48; L. 258.

Note: This reservation, as being odious, must always be interpreted strictly, and therefore reservation is not had: 1. If they are not perfect by reason of the vow, for example, if they are emitted under light obligation. 2. If they are not perfect by reason of affection toward the thing promised, for example, if you make a disjunctive vow, say of religion or fasting; or if you make a vow of chastity under a condition, even when the condition has been fulfilled, or a vow of going to Rome to visit the sepulcher of St. Aloysius Gonzaga, or of going to Palestine to serve pilgrims, the sick, etc. 3. If they are not perfect by reason of liberty, for example, if they are emitted from fear, even light fear inflicted by another. 4. If they are not perfect by reason of matter, for example, a vow of not marrying, or a vow of chastity as to external acts only and not also as to internal acts, of a non-approved religion, or of a religion in which solemn vows are not made.

But although vows are reserved, nevertheless their circumstances are not reserved, for example, of making a pilgrimage by begging, of entering religion immediately, etc. Struggl 49 seqq.; L. 258, 261; cf. here 616. Bishops, and those having similar jurisdiction, can rightly dispense in reserved vows in urgent necessity, for instance if access to the Pope is not easy, and in delay there is danger of grave harm, either spiritual, as of violation of the vow, scandal, quarrels, or temporal, one's own or another's, namely grave infamy of a woman and similar things. The aforesaid faculty, which is probably granted to Bishops and to others to whom the power of dispensing in reserved vows has been communicated by them when necessity is urgent, is not granted to Confessors in the Jubilee who have from the Pope the faculty of dispensing in simple vows. But Mendicants have it. Moreover the aforesaid dispensation is not to be granted except insofar as necessity obliges; hence, if it is enough that the vow be suspended, it cannot be dispensed. Struggl 56; L. 258, l. 6, n. 987; Diana, tr. 1, de Dubiis Regular., r. 277.

A Bishop can dispense a spouse from a vow of perpetual chastity, emitted both before and after marriage, in order to asking the debt; because he can dispense from every impediment impeding the exercise of the conjugal act. Mendicant Confessors can do the same, and indeed both within and outside confession. L. 258, l. 6, nn. 986, 987. Although the faculty of dispensing from an oath is usually equated with, indeed associated with, the faculty of dispensing from a vow, nevertheless an oath of chastity, religion, etc., is not reserved. L. 259. Cf. 569.

What is commutation of a vow? - Commutation of a vow is: the substitution of one matter in the place of that which was promised by vow, made under the same obligation of the vow. But it can happen in a threefold way, namely into something better, into something equal, into something less. This faculty of commuting, however, like the faculty of dispensing, is understood without prejudice to a third party. For God does not hold ratified a dispensation or commutation unjust and injurious to another.

Who can commute vows? - He who has the power of dispensing in vows also has the power of commuting, because commutation is part of dispensation. R. 80, de R. I., in 6. Besides, according to R. 53, de R. I., in 6, "to whom what is greater is permitted, surely what is lesser is permitted," namely in the same genus. Yet he cannot dispense who has only the faculty of commuting, because the lesser does not contain what is greater. C. De peregrinationibus 1, C. Venientis 2, C. Magnae devotionis 7, de Vot.; Struggl 57; L. 246.

Can someone commute his own vow? - Anyone can by private authority, and without a special cause, commute his vow into a work evidently better, provided the Church has not prohibited this in the particular case; because while someone performs a work more perfect than the thing promised, by that very fact he observes what he had promised, since the perfect is eminently included in the more perfect. This is also clear from C. Pervenit 3, de Iureiurando. But that is judged better which conduces to the greater spiritual utility of the one vowing and to greater service of God.

Except, however, vows reserved to the Pope, unless the change is made into the religious state, as is established in C. Scripturae 4, de Voto. Except also unless the vow was made in favor of a third party, and the promise was accepted by him, because that commutation, which would be made with injury to another, cannot be pleasing to God. Except likewise penal vows, which are called preservative from sin, unless the future commutation is judged to be of such a sort that it restrains no less from committing sin than the prior matter of the vow. Pius IX, Encyclical Letter Gravibus Ecclesiae, 24 Dec. 1874, for the Jubilee of 1875.

Into a work evidently better. For he who emitted a vow cannot commute it by his own authority into a lesser good; for he must give to God whatever he promised. But whether he can change his vow into an equal good is controverted. The first opinion, more probable, denies from St. Thomas, "because commutation is a certain contract, which cannot be perfected without the consent of him who bears the place of God on earth, namely the Prelate." In 4 D. 38, q. 1, a. 4, q. 1. Then, because, the promise being supposed, it is judged to be more pleasing to God that the one vowing be faithful to him by performing rather the promised thing than another equal thing. Thus Sanchez, Cajetan, Covarruvias, Soto, etc. The second opinion, which Elbel, Tamburini, Sa, Bonacina, etc., hold, affirms. The reason is that God is presumed to accept a work equal as to substance, on account of divine benignity, at least so that the offering may be performed more cheerfully to him. Struggl 58; L. 243, 244, 536.

Can a priest delegated merely to commute vows commute them into a notably lesser work? - R. Negatively. The reason is that otherwise he would dispense in great part, and thus would exceed the faculty received. Yet the faculty of commuting vows is not to be interpreted so strictly that it is restricted to a work altogether equal; but it is to be taken in a broader sense, so that it sometimes extends itself to a lesser work. Otherwise it would be exposed to innumerable difficulties and scruples, since it is most difficult to find equality in things altogether disparate. Besides, commutation almost always must be made for the alleviation of him who has bound himself by vow. L. 247.

Merely to commute; but a faculty given of commuting vows by dispensing is not a faculty of dispensing absolutely, but is a faculty of commuting even into something less, and therefore of dispensing only in part. Otherwise it would be either a faculty simply of dispensing, or simply of commuting.

Is some cause required for commuting a vow into an equal or lesser work? - R. Affirmatively as to liceity, because otherwise a Prelate would use prodigally the power of commuting; and probably also as to validity, because the Prelate has a delegated faculty in this matter; for a delegate cannot validly dispense without a just cause. But commutation is a certain dispensation. Yet St. Alphonsus, n. 245, says that the opposite opinion is probable. The reason is that since there is no greater obligation toward men than that of supplying, so much more does this hold with God, with whom dealings are milder, or who deals more mildly with us.

Note: For commutation of a vow a lesser cause is required than for dispensation, because dispensation plainly frees from the obligation of a vow, while commutation substitutes another; and again a lesser cause is required for commuting into something equal than into something less. For the greater inclination of the person, or the lesser danger of transgressing the vow, suffices. L. 244.

After commutation has been made, is it licit to return to the first work? - R. Affirmatively, if the commutation was made into something less or equal, because the first work is equally pleasing to God, indeed it seems even more pleasing; and, more probably, even if it was made into something better, because commutation is made in favor of the one vowing. L. 248.

You will resolve: Although the one vowing has returned to the first work, nevertheless he can again return to the second substituted work. If commutation has been made several times into diverse works, the one vowing can choose whichever of them he prefers. L. 248.

Must you return to the first work if the second becomes impossible? - R. Negatively, if the change was made by the authority of another, even if it became impossible by your fault, because the prior obligation has been dissolved through the commutation itself.

R. Affirmatively, if you made the commutation according to your own judgment, because then the prior obligation is not dissolved, but is only supposed to be supplied by an equal or better one. L. 249; Gur. 335. But D'Annibale denies this, ed. 4, p. 3, nn. 201, 209, since by God's acceptance the prior obligation has been extinguished.

When a reserved vow has been commuted, does the substituted matter also remain reserved? - R. Negatively; thus commonly and more probably. The reason is that although the substituted matter has the same bond of the vow, nevertheless since it is by no means reserved in itself, it by no means draws with itself the reservation, which is attached only to the first matter. L. 260.

Does one having the faculty of commuting vows for others have it also for himself? - R. Affirmatively, as Sanchez, Bonacina, etc., commonly teach concerning the faculty of dispensing. L. 249, 256.