Contrition and Purpose of Amendment

The actions which are done out of fear are simply voluntary, but they are usually also involuntary under a certain respect.

There is no question here of actions which are done in fear or with fear, as when I walk with fear and trembling along a lonely road by night. We are concerned with the effect which fear has on human actions done in consequence of fear; and unless it deprives the agent of the use of reason, which in rare cases may happen, the action remains voluntary, because it is done freely and deliberately to avoid the threatened danger. In such circumstances, as we saw above, the action is said to be simply voluntary; but it is also involuntary under a certain respect, for, unless the danger threatened, the action would not be done. An exception must be made with regard to attrition elicited from fear of hell, which, if it is to be efficacious, must be simply voluntary and in no respect involuntary,¹ for otherwise it would not help to justify the sinner in the sacrament of Penance.² We can easily see how this is possible with regard to sin. For other actions done through fear have some evil or loss annexed to them, on which account they are involuntary under some respect; while aversion from sin is wholly good and reasonable, and so there is no reason why repentance for sin from fear of hell should not be simply voluntary and in no respect involuntary.”

¹ St.Alphonsus, 6, n. 442.

² Trent, sess. 14, c. 4.

Vol. II, Bk. VI, Chapter III. On Contrition

Contrition is the first of the acts of the penitent which constitute the matter of the sacrament of Penance, It is defined by the Council of Trent to be a heartfelt sorrow and detestation of sin committed, with a purpose of not sinning again. In this section we will treat of contrition apart from the purpose of amendment, and in the following section, of the purpose of amendment.

Vol. II, Bk. VI, Ch. III, Section I. The Nature of Contrition

A heartfelt sorrow is not quite the same thing as a hatred or detestation of sin. Sorrow is a pain which we feel on account of the presence of some evil or the absence of some good; hatred is an aversion for some evil which is past. Hatred of sin, consequent aversion for it, and a turning away from it is the chief element in contrition; for if we have this hatred we shall have sorrow for sin regarded as a present evil, we shall turn away from it as a past evil, and we shall propose to flee from it in the future. If, then, we have this hatred of sin, we shall have sorrow and a purpose of amendment; we shall have true contrition.

That sorrow for sin which arises from the perfect love of God is called contrition in the full and strict sense; sorrow for sin arising from less perfect motives, as from the fear of hell or the moral turpitude of vice, is called attrition, Ordinarily the word contrition is used indifferently of both kinds of sorrow.

Contrition or penitence or repentance is, as we have already seen, according to the teaching of the Council of Trent, a necessary condition for the forgiveness of sin by God. God will not forgive sin unless the sinner turn from his sin and approach him by sorrow of heart. Contrition, then, is a necessary means of salvation for all who have fallen into grievous sin. It is also matter of divine precept which must be fulfilled at least when the sinner is in danger of death, for then it becomes of supreme necessity, and also sometimes during life. The Church has determined this divine precept by commanding all who have come to the use of reason and have fallen into sin to go to confession at least once a year. Moreover, repentance for sin becomes necessary when any action has to be performed which for its due performance requires the agent to be in the state of grace. Furthermore, inasmuch as one who is deprived by sin of the grace of God cannot long resist temptation and will fall again and again before long, the sinner is obliged to rise from his sin in order to avoid repeated falls.

Of course it is better, and the sinner is to be urged, by all means, to rise at once when he has had the misfortune to fall into sin. He should never sleep while he is conscious of being out of the friendship of God. Still he is not bound under pain of committing a new sin to repent immediately after committing sin. It will be sufficient if he repent at least when repentance becomes necessary according to the doctrine which has just been laid down.

Not every sort of sorrow is sufficient to justify the sinner, even with the help of the sacrament of Penance. Although perfect love of God suffices to reconcile the sinner with God, though it leaves the obligation of confessing the sin it remits, still this love will not serve by itself as a preparation and disposition for the reception of Penance. A material part of the sacrament of Penance is contrition, and contrition is not love. The sinner, then, who wishes to receive the sacrament of Penance must have true and sincere sorrow for his sin; he must detest it and turn away from it in order to be reconciled with God, whom it offends. Mere natural sorrow for sin because of the temporal evils which it causes is not sufficient. I may well be sorry because sin has ruined my good name, or my health, or my fortunes, but such motives are merely natural, and have no relation to God. The sinner in the sacrament of Penance seeks reconciliation with God, and so the motives of his sorrow must have reference to God; they must be supernatural, founded on revelation and on faith. Without faith no act can be of avail for salvation, as ‘‘ without faith it is impossible to please God.”¹ ‘The sinner must regard sin as the greatest of all evils, as in reality it is. He must be prepared to do and to suffer anything rather than commit sin again. Otherwise he cannot be said to fulfil that greatest of all the commandments, which bids us love God with our whole heart, with our whole soul, with all our strength, and with all our mind. Inasmuch as any one mortal sin deprives us of the friendship of God, the sorrow of the sinner must also be universal and embrace all the sins by which he has grievously offended Almighty God. For this it is not necessary that there should be a separate and distinct act of sorrow for every sin committed; it will be sufficient if the motive be universal, so as to embrace all sins. Thus, inasmuch as all mortal sins are directly opposed to charity, and any such sin deserves the punishment of hell, if our sorrow is motived by love toward God, or by fear of hell, it will be universal in the sense required.

Provided that there be sorrow for all mortal sins confessed, a want of sorrow for venial sins will not invalidate the sacrament. For venial sins are compatible with the state of grace and the friendship of God. Still there must be some sorrow for sin confessed; otherwise an essential part of the sacrament of Penance will be wanting. And so if the penitent have only venial sins to confess, for none of which he is sorry, the sacrament would be invalid and sacrilegious. He must at least be sorry for one sin confessed, and he should not confess venial sins for which he is not sorry unless he has some good reason, as if he wishes to ask the advice of his confessor about them, or to make the state of his soul more fully known to him.

¹ Heb. xi 6.

As contrition, according to the common view, forms a part of the sacramental sign in Penance, it should in some manner be expressed outwardly, not indeed that any form of words is necessary, but the sorrow of the penitent should appear from his confession, from his demeanour, or from his words or other signs. It must exist, if not before, at least when absolution is given, for sin cannot be forgiven if there be no sorrow for it. Moreover, as the different parts of the sacrament go to make one moral whole, the penitent’s act of sorrow should in some way be referred to the sacrament. For this, however, it will be sufficient if together with the act of sorrow there be the intention to confess the sin. In case, then, a penitent has inadvertently omitted a serious sin from his confession, but remembers it immediately after he has received absolution and mentions it to the confessor, the latter may absolve him at once, nor is it necessary for the penitent to make a fresh act of sorrow for that particular sin.

On account of the necessity of a moral union between the several parts of the sacrament, there must not be too long an interval between the act of sorrow for sin and the reception of absolution for it. Ordinarily, of course, the sorrow is virtually renewed and expressed when the sin is confessed, but if this were not the case, and the act of sorrow preceded the confession by more than one or two days, it would be doubtful whether there was the necessary union between the parts of the sacrament so as to constitute one sacramental sign.

There have been heated controversies in the past as to the sufficiency of attrition to remit sin with the sacrament of - Penance. Although they are not quite settled even yet, nevertheless, since the Council of Trent the common doctrine is fairly clear and certain. The Council, then, seems to teach¹ that sorrow for sin because of the fear of hell, or its moral turpitude, or on account of the punishment with which God afflicts the sinner even in this life, will be sufficient for the remission of sin in the sacrament of Penance, provided that it destroys all affection for sin in the heart of the penitent and converts him from sin to God. The slavish fear of hell, by which a man refrains from sinful acts while preserving his affection for them, is, of course, insufficient even with the help of the sacrament to forgive sin and reconcile the sinner with God. The fear which is salutary and efficacious must be the filial fear by which the sinner turns to God because he neither wants sin nor its evil consequences any more. Such sorrow has all the elements which, as we saw above, are required in contrition.

¹ Sess. xiv, c 4

There is a controversy among theologians as to whether the sacrament of Penance can ever be valid without producing its effects in the soul at the time of its reception on account of some obstacle which is there. We saw above that this may be the case with Baptism and other sacraments. There is a special difficulty with regard to Penance, because the dispositions, whose absence is only an obstacle to grace given by other sacraments, enter into the substance of Penance, and so their absence would seem to destroy the sacrament itself. In spite of this, however, it is a probable opinion that at any rate in two cases the sacrament of Penance may be valid but unformed, as theologians say. The first case is when a penitent has forgotten some mortal sin for which he has never elicited an act of sorrow, but confesses other sins for which he is sorry for motives which are special to them and not universal. The second is when, through inculpable ignorance, the penitent thinks that it is not necessary to be sorry for all mortal sins confessed, provided there be the requisite sorrow for some. In these cases there will be all the elements necessary for the validity of the sacrament, which, however, cannot infuse grace into the soul on account of the presence there of grievous sin - still unrepented of.

n. 7.

When Penance is received in danger of death with attrition and not contrition, some theologians insist on the necessity of the dying person making an act of perfect love of God, either to make sure before death of the validity of the sacrament of Penance or to satisfy the divine precept, which, according to them, requires all who are in danger of death to make an act of charity. However, when the dying person has made a good confession and been absolved even with attrition, he is certainly in the state of grace, nor is there any valid argument which proves that such a person is obliged to make an act of charity. Neither the dying nor those who assist them are as a rule conscious of any such obligation.

Because the Council of ‘Trent, while describing the process of the sinner’s justification, mentions acts of faith, hope, and the beginnings of love toward God, some theologians concluded that explicit acts of those virtues are required for Penance in addition to contrition. Those acts, however, are implicitly contained in the other acts of the penitent, and the fact that the Council explicitly mentions them does not prove that it teaches that they must be explicitly elicited by the penitent sinner in order to receive absolution for his sins.

Vol. II, Bk. VI, Ch. III, Section II. The Purpose of Amendment

We saw in the preceding section that contrition is essentially a turning away with hatred from sin in order to approach to God, and so all true contrition necessarily implies a purpose not to sin again. If the truly contrite sinner thinks of the future, he can scarcely fail to form an explicit purpose of amendment, and some theologians hold that this explicit purpose is necessary, otherwise why should it find a place in the definition of contrition given by the Council of Trent? On account of its importance, it is well that the purpose of amendment should always be explicit, but still as it is virtually contained in all true sorrow for sin, and the fact that the Council explicitly mentions it does not prove that it must necessarily be explicit, the opinion which denies the absolute necessity of an explicit purpose of amendment for the validity of Penance is safe. A Roman council held in 1725 under Benedict XIII issued an instruction explaining how to make one’s confession, and it only insists on an implicit purpose of amendment.

Vol. II, Bk. III, Tr. V, Diss. I, Pt. III, Section I. On the Remission of Mortal Sins · Vol. II, Bk. III, Tr. V, Diss. II, Pt. I, Sect. II, Ch. II, Article I. On Contrition · Vol. II, Bk. III, Tr. V, Diss. II, Pt. I, Sect. II, Ch. II, Art. I, § I. On Contrition Taken Integrally · Vol. II, Bk. III, Tr. V, Diss. II, Pt. I, Sect. II, Ch. II, Art. I, § II, Scholion. Sorrow and Purpose Regarding Venial Sins

Whether it be explicit or implicit, the purpose of amendment must be sincere, efficacious, and universal.

It must be sincere, with a genuine intention to avoid sin in the future; it will not suffice to make profession of good intentions with the lips, without any real determination to carry them into effect.

It must be efficacious, or the sinner must be prepared to take the necessary means to avoid sin. A mere half wish and half resolve will not do. The sinner must be prepared to do and suffer anything rather than fall into sin again. It would, indeed, be unwise to try one’s own determination by imagining all kinds of terrible temptations to sin to see if the will would remain constant, but at any rate the will must here and now be so rooted in good that, come what may, it is determined not to be moved.

There must also be a firm resolve to avoid all mortal sins for the future, not merely any that may have been confessed, but all others, or else there can be no friendship with God, whom we must love above all things. He cannot love God above all things who is prepared to offend him mortally. The purpose of amendment need not extend to all venial sins, provided that at least there is the sincere intention of avoiding some sin that is confessed, or at any rate of lessening the number of smaller transgressions,

Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology

Ludovicus Wouters, C.SS.R. — 9 passages

Vol. II, Bk. III, Tr. V, Diss. I, Pt. III, Section I. On the Remission of Mortal Sins

n. 282.

III. The following proximately dispose for the infusion of sanctifying grace, and in this sense remit mortal sins:

Formal contrition, perfected by charity. This is clear: 1. from Sacred Scripture;¹ 2. from the Council of Trent;² 3. from the condemned proposition 71 of Baius.³ But the arguments proposed also prove that no certain degree of intensity is required in order that perfect contrition proximately dispose for justification. For the documents adduced teach absolutely, with no mention made of a degree of intensity, that perfect contrition justifies.
An act of charity, even without formal detestation of sin. This is proved: 1. from Sacred Scripture;⁴ 2. from the condemned propositions 31, 32, and 70 of Baius;⁵ 3. by theological reason. For an act of charity explicitly contains that whole motive on which the dignity of perfect contrition depends, which, as was said under 1, proximately disposes for justification.

It is disputed in what way the efficacy of perfect charity must be reconciled with the necessity of penance. Moreover, some say that charity does not justify except dependently on formal penance, or except insofar as it contains the desire of formal penance. That this desire is contained at least implicitly in the act of charity is clear from the fact that one who loves God wills the things which God wills. But God wills or commands formal penance. Others judge that charity justifies because it is virtually formal penance. For it is the perfect conversion of the soul to God loved above all things, and therefore a true detestation of sin, though virtual, from the most perfect motive. Whatever the case may be, it is certain that a baptized sinner is not justified, either by perfect contrition or by charity, except dependently on the sacrament of Penance, or except insofar as these involve the reception of the sacrament in desire; but reception of the sacrament does not take place without formal penance.

Imperfect contrition together with the sacrament, whether of Baptism (n. 61), or of Penance (n. 357),⁶ or, as others add, together with martyrdom (vol. I, n. 418).

¹ Ezekiel 18:21; 33:14 sq.

² Session 14, chapter 4.

³ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1071.

⁴ 1 John 4:7.

⁵ Denzinger-Bannwart, nn. 1031, 1032, 1070.

⁶ As regards the sacraments of the living, cf. the treatise on the sacraments in general (n. 6).

Vol. II, Bk. III, Tr. V, Diss. II, Pt. I, Sect. II, Ch. II, Article I. On Contrition

Vol. III, On the Particular Obligati…, II. On the Negative Obligations of Clerics · Vol. III, On Penance, II. On Contrition

Contrition taken integrally comprises detestation, sorrow concerning sin, and purpose. We shall treat first of contrition taken integrally, then of purpose specifically.

Vol. II, Bk. III, Tr. V, Diss. II, Pt. I, Sect. II, Ch. II, Art. I, § I. On Contrition Taken Integrally

n. 295.

I. Notion. Contrition is "sorrow of soul and detestation concerning a committed sin, with the purpose of not sinning for the future."¹ It is said concerning a committed sin, so that sorrow over the fact that one does not sorrow over sin does not suffice; in which case not sin, but the defect of sorrow, is the object of sorrow. Nevertheless, one who sorrows over the defect of sorrow is commonly to be judged also to sorrow over the sin itself. Contrition comprises three things, namely detestation, sorrow, and purpose. Moreover:

Detestation is the act by which the will abhors the committed sin, turns itself away from the committed sin, and expels every affection for sin; this act of the will is expressed in this way: I would wish not to have sinned; it displeases me that I committed sin. Detestation pertains to the essence of contrition. For contrition must formally be opposed to sin; this happens through detestation, by which the sinner now does not will what he previously willed (St. Alphonsus, VI, 435).
Sorrow is a certain sadness of the will arising from the fact that the evil of sin is apprehended as present (St. Thomas, 1-2, question 35, article 8; question 36, article 1). In man as wayfarer sorrow necessarily follows detestation, so that it must at least be called a necessary element of contrition. But it is disputed whether sorrow pertains to the very essence of contrition. Whatever the case may be, at least this must be admitted: contrition consists principally in detestation, which is the cause of sorrow and specifies sorrow, which of itself is indifferent, and renders it morally good (St. Alphonsus, VI, 435).

The acts of detestation and sorrow, although they are distinguished from one another, nevertheless are morally so conjoined in man as wayfarer that they are regarded after the manner of one.

What purpose is will be explained in n. 301.

¹ Council of Trent, session 14, chapter 4.

n. 296.

II. Division. Contrition is distinguished into perfect and imperfect.

Perfect contrition is that which is conceived from the motive of charity. Moreover:

a) It is certainly conceived from the motive of charity if it is elicited from love of God loved above all things because of the divine goodness or perfection, insofar as this comprises the essence of God with all the attributes. But note that from love of this kind there is also elicited contrition which is conceived from the desire of possessing God, not insofar as this possession is good for the penitent, but insofar as it is pleasing to God, who is most perfectly loved in possession (St. Alphonsus, II, 24, doubt 1).

b) It is not conceived from the motive of charity if it is elicited from love of God loved because of some relative attribute, for example beneficence, as such, or insofar as it is not considered as a divine perfection pertaining to God.

c) It is disputed whether it is conceived from the motive of charity if it is elicited from love of God loved because of some divine attribute, whether absolute or relative, provided this is considered as a divine perfection pertaining to God, considered separately through formal abstraction. Many affirm this: 1. because Sacred Scripture stirs us up to charity by the motive of God's goodness toward us: "Let us therefore love God, because God first loved us";¹ therefore because of an attribute of God, a relative one; 2. because the divine attributes are not really distinguished from his essence, nor can they be conceived by us with objective precision from the other perfections and the essence of God; 3. because preachers commonly exhort the faithful to charity by unfolding the relative attribute, namely God's goodness toward us. Others, whose opinion St. Alphonsus holds as more probable, teach that some divine attribute taken separately is not sufficient for eliciting an act of perfect contrition from love of God, but that the formal object of love is constituted from the essence of God together with all his attributes. For in order that someone love God as the supreme good - which is required for an act of charity - he must antecedently conceive God thus by an act of the intellect, according to the familiar saying: nothing is willed unless known. Moreover, in the concept of one attribute taken separately, for example wisdom, God as the supreme good is contained only virtually and implicitly; but what is known only virtually and implicitly is not yet known in relation to reducing the will to act. It is added that, according to the truer opinion, the act of charity of the homeland and of the way is specifically the same; but it is established that the act of charity of the homeland subjectively has the whole divine goodness as its formal motive. Therefore it follows that this whole goodness is also subjectively required for the formal object of the act of charity of the way (St. Alphonsus, VI, 436). Nevertheless, the controversy is not practical, because commonly the case supposed does not occur except in appearance; in other words, God sometimes seems to be loved because of an attribute considered separately, but in reality he is loved because of the supreme goodness. Hence preachers do not take account of this controversy.

Corollary I. It was formerly disputed whether perfect contrition is that which is elicited from the motive of some moral virtue which has an order to God, for example gratitude, religion, obedience, penance. But this opinion is now very commonly denied, and it is taught that contrition elicited from the motives of those virtues is not that which proximately disposes for justification, that is, perfect contrition.²

Corollary II. Someone can elicit perfect contrition even if he does not explicitly add that he loves God for God's sake or because of his infinite perfection; in other words, even if he does not say, for example: My God, I detest my sins because I love Thee because of Thy infinite goodness; but only: I detest my sins, the offenses against Thee, because Thou art supreme goodness. Nor is it required for an act of perfect contrition that one attend to the meaning of the individual words of the formula; it suffices that he grasp with the intellect and will in the soul the general sense of the formula.

Corollary III. Besides this, for perfect contrition it is not required that one detest sin from fear of hell or another inferior motive.

Imperfect contrition, which commonly is called attrition, is that which is conceived from an honorable motive distinct from the motive of charity, for example from the motive of hope, gratitude, penance, etc.

¹ 1 John 4:19.

² Council of Trent, session 14, chapter 4.

n. 297.

III. Required contrition. Not only perfect contrition, concerning which there is no doubt, but also imperfect contrition or attrition suffices for rightly receiving the sacrament of Penance. This opinion, which today is almost commonly admitted,¹ is proved by these arguments:

The Council of Trent calls contrition taken generically a part and quasi-matter of the sacrament,² and thus sufficiently indicates that it - whether or not it is called proximate matter - suffices for the sacrament of Penance. But imperfect contrition also is contained as a species under generic contrition as circumscribed by the Council.
The same Council says this about imperfect contrition: "Although without the sacrament of Penance it cannot of itself lead the sinner to justification, nevertheless it disposes him to obtain the grace of God in the sacrament of Penance."³ Therefore, according to these words of the Council, attrition disposes to justification in one way within the sacrament and in another way outside the sacrament. Now outside the sacrament it disposes remotely to justification. It remains, therefore, that we say that within the sacrament it disposes proximately to it.
Then it is wholly improbable that the power of remitting sins is in act never exercised upon sin not yet remitted. But this would happen if in the sacrament of Penance attrition did not suffice, but perfect contrition were required, that is, a disposition which of itself would already bring with it the remission of sin before absolution.
Finally, since the more benign opinion has now for many centuries been almost common, it is hard to understand why it has not been reprobated by the Church, if it were not safe; especially since this sacrament is of such frequent use.

Objection. The Council of Trent, among those things which are required for receiving justification in Baptism, lists: "and they begin to love Him as the font of all justice";⁴ these words you may deservedly apply also to the sacrament of Penance.

Response 1. It cannot be admitted that an act of true charity is required by the Council for receiving justification in Baptism; for the contrary opinion as regards Baptism was almost common both before the Council (cf. St. Thomas, 4 Distinction 6, question 1, article 3) and after the Council.

Response 2. Initial love can well be understood of some good affection toward God, who is the font of our justice; one who is affected by this good affection toward God is deservedly said to begin to love God, according to these words of St. Thomas, whose doctrine the Council of Trent so greatly attended to: "Insofar as hope regards him through whom something becomes possible for us, love is caused by hope, and not conversely. For from the fact that through someone we hope goods can come to us, we are moved toward him as toward our good; and thus we begin to love him" (1-2, question 40, article 7; St. Alphonsus, VI, 442). Others explain the words of the Council differently.

¹ Otherwise Périnelle, O.P., L'attrition d'après le Concile de Trente et S. Thomas d'Aquin.

² Session 14, chapter 3 and canon 4.

³ Session 14, chapter 4.

⁴ Session 6, chapter 6.

n. 298.

Corollary I. From what has been said, it is gathered in what sense the solemn expression is true: the attrite, by the power of the keys, becomes contrite. Namely, he becomes equivalently contrite, insofar as the attrite person with the sacrament passes from the state of the attrite to the state of the contrite, that is, he is justified equally as one perfectly contrite. Others explain it otherwise.

n. 299.

IV. Properties of contrition. The summary of the doctrine is this: 1. For the sacrament of Penance to be received validly and fruitfully there is required contrition: a) true, b) internal, c) formal, d) supernatural, e) estimatively highest, f) universal as regards mortal sins, g) external; 2. for the sacrament of Penance to be received validly there is likewise required contrition: a) true, b) internal, c) formal, d) supernatural, e) external; but it is disputed whether, considering only validity, contrition estimatively highest and universal is required. We shall weigh the individual points.

True, or not merely thought to exist. Several of the ancients taught that contrition merely thought to exist, but in good faith, suffices for the validity - though not for the fruit - of the sacrament. But that opinion today is commonly and deservedly rejected. For the Council of Trent teaches that contrition is required for the essence of the sacrament (n. 297). But doctrine of this kind must manifestly be understood of true contrition, not of that which is present merely putatively (St. Alphonsus, VI, 433, 2). Note, however, that most of those who think they grieve over sins also truly grieve over them.
Internal; for contrition, which by Trent is called a part and quasi-matter of the sacrament, is defined by the same Council as "sorrow of soul."
Formal, so that virtual contrition does not suffice, that is, that which is contained especially in an act of charity. Several older authors judged that virtual contrition sufficed for the validity and fruit of the sacrament. But: 1. this opinion is now almost commonly rejected; 2. the Council of Trent teaches that contrition is a part and quasi-matter of the sacrament. Moreover, that word in its obvious sense signifies formal contrition, not virtual contrition (St. Alphonsus, VI, 449).

Note, however: 1. Formal contrition can well be conceived in the very recollection or confession of sins; hence it is not required that someone has used a formula of contrition. 2. It will scarcely happen that someone about to receive the sacrament of Penance, and therefore thinking about his sins, elicits an act of perfect charity without formally grieving over his offenses against God.

Supernatural. Now:

a) Certainly it must be supernatural by reason of the eliciting principle; in other words, it must be elicited through the help of grace, which elevates the act above the order of nature. This is clear: 1. from the Council of Trent;¹ 2. it is established that no salutary act can be done by man, that is, one positively conducive to salvation, without the help of grace. Therefore neither can man salutarily repent without the help of grace.

b) It is disputed whether contrition must be supernatural by reason of the motive; in other words, whether it must be conceived from a motive apprehended through faith. For the rest, the controversy is less practical; since it is certain that for the genesis of contrition which prepares for justification, faith and hope are required,² although it is not required that someone reflexively elicit an act of faith and hope, but it suffices that he perform it in act exercised, as they say (St. Alphonsus, VI, 439). Moreover, it can scarcely happen that one who believes and hopes, and fulfills the other conditions required for salutary contrition, does not grieve from a motive apprehended through faith.

Estimatively highest. Contrition estimatively or appreciatively highest consists in this: that the penitent detests sin from a motive which, while it persists, he cannot be induced to sin; or - as others state the doctrine - in this: that the penitent detests sin more than any evil by fear of which he can be induced to sin. Moreover:

a) By the consent of all, it is required for the fruit of the sacrament. For in order that the sinner be reconciled with God, there is required a will which perfectly efficaciously, or absolutely, or with respect to every possible hypothesis, turns away from sin. But a will of this kind is lacking in one who lacks contrition estimatively highest. For the will extends itself no further than the motive on which it rests. Now one who lacks contrition estimatively highest lacks a motive which, while it persists, he cannot be induced to sin. Therefore he lacks a will which absolutely turns away from sin.

b) It is disputed whether it is required for the validity of the sacrament. Many authors deny this, or at least hold the negative opinion as probable; but the affirmative seems to be held. For: 1. the Council of Trent defines contrition, which it proposes as necessary for the existence or validity of the sacrament,³ in this way: "sorrow of soul and detestation concerning a committed sin, with the purpose of not sinning for the future."⁴ But these words in their obvious sense signify a will which absolutely detests the committed sin and absolutely purposes to abstain from sin; in other words, contrition estimatively highest. Therefore this is required for validity. 2. Contrition which is presented by the Council of Trent as necessary for validity, from the same Council, suffices with the sacrament⁵ for justification or for the fruit of the sacrament. But only contrition estimatively highest suffices for justification or for the fruit of the sacrament. Therefore it is also required for validity (cf. St. Thomas, Supplement, question 29, article 8).⁶ 3. True contrition is certainly required for the validity of the sacrament. But contrition which is not appreciatively highest is not true contrition. The minor is proved from the fact that true contrition consists in the act of turning oneself away from every habitual attachment to mortal sin. But contrition which is not appreciatively highest does not involve aversion from every habitual attachment to mortal sin except conditionally, or aversion under some respect.

For the will turns itself away from something insofar as the motive by which it is moved objectively excludes turning toward that thing. Hence, if the motive is only of such objective power that, while it stands, the will can still be joined with mortal sin, there is no aversion except conditionally, or aversion under some respect. But contrition not appreciatively highest has a motive which is only of such objective power that, while it stands, the will can still be joined with sin. Therefore the will in contrition not appreciatively highest is not properly an aversion from mortal sin, or is not true contrition, but only aversion or contrition conditionally or under some respect (St. Alphonsus, VI, 433, 7).

Objection 1. Contrition is matter of the sacrament only insofar as it is sensible or is manifested. But contrition is not manifested insofar as it is estimatively highest. Therefore as such it is not matter of the sacrament.

Response. I distinguish the major: contrition is matter of the sacrament only insofar as it is sensible or manifested, according to itself, I concede; according to its qualities, I deny; otherwise it would also have to be manifested as supernatural.

Objection 2. Only that penance is the object of judgment in the sacramental forum which can be known sufficiently certainly through an external act of the penitent. But this cannot be said of contrition estimatively highest.

Response. I deny the minor; for of itself confession suffices so that the contrition required for receiving the sacrament rightly may be sufficiently certainly admitted. But for receiving the sacrament rightly, contrition estimatively highest is demanded.

Corollary I. From the fact that contrition estimatively highest is required, do not infer that contrition highest intensively, that is, highest in degree of vehemence, is also required. For this does not pertain to the substance of contrition, which it is established from the Council of Trent suffices.

Corollary II. Nor is it required that a comparison be instituted between sin and temporal evils; indeed, commonly this is not even expedient, and it is dangerous (St. Thomas, Quodlibet 1, article 9; St. Alphonsus, VI, at the cited place).

Universal. The universality of contrition consists in this: that it extends itself to all committed sins. This takes place: 1. when someone grieves from a universal motive, even if the penitent does not recall individual sins; 2. when he grieves from particular motives which comprehend all committed sins. Now the universality of contrition:

a) As regards committed mortal sins, is certainly required for the fruit of the sacrament, since one mortal sin is not remitted without another. Hence, if contrition is lacking as regards one mortal sin, none would be remitted.

It is disputed whether universality is required for the validity of the sacrament. Some affirm this, and their principal reason seems to us to be that which we have already alleged on p. 226: "Contrition which by the Council of Trent is called the quasi-matter of the sacrament, and therefore is required for validity and suffices for it, from the same Council seems also to suffice, at least with the sacrament, for justification."⁷ But particular contrition does not suffice for justification. Therefore neither does it seem to suffice for validity. St. Alphonsus (VI, 444) and most other authors deny this, and judge that particular sorrow - that is, sorrow which does not extend itself to other mortal sins, but to one only or to certain sins from those committed - suffices for the validity of the sacrament. The reason alleged is that in the case there is true contrition, so that all things required for validity seem to be present. The case would be if someone, in good faith, grieved solely from the special baseness of some sin; but this will happen very rarely, because commonly penitents grieve either from a universal motive alone, or also from one.

Finally note: if a penitent, questioned by the confessor, states sins about which he did not previously think, it is indeed useful, but not necessary, to stir him up to a new act of sorrow, because an act elicited from a universal motive is presumed to have been conceived.

b) As regards venial sins, universal contrition is required only insofar as a venial sin is not remitted to which sorrow does not extend itself. For the rest, cf. the Scholion on contrition and purpose as regards venial sins.

Corollary. From what has been said it is gathered how far the sacrament of Penance can be informe, that is, valid but not fruitful. Many deny this, but St. Alphonsus (VI, 444) and most more recent authors affirm it, namely in the case in which someone grieves solely from a particular motive concerning one or some mortal sins.⁸ Others add the case in which the sinner lacks contrition estimatively highest (p. 226). But the sacrament of Penance, though informe, probably revives when the obstacle has been removed (n. 11).

External, that is, manifested or sensible in some way. For contrition more probably is an essential part of the sacramental sign itself; but it cannot be this unless in some way it is externally disclosed or manifested. It can be manifested, for example, by oral recitation of contrition, by confession either actually instituted or - if it has followed confession - morally enduring, or by expectation of absolution.

¹ Session 14, chapter 4; session 6, canon 3.

² Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 6.

³ Session 14, chapter 3.

⁴ Session 14, chapter 4.

⁵ Session 14, chapter 4.

⁶ On the opinion of St. Thomas, see Ter Haar, De occasionariis et recidivis, n. 237 sq.

⁷ Session 14, chapters 3 and 4.

⁸ Some judge that the sacrament, even in this case, is valid and fruitful, because, when the sinner grieves in order that he may receive grace, his sorrow, although in appearance particular, in reality virtually extends itself to all sins. They add that particular sorrow does not suffice without a universal purpose. But a universal purpose will scarcely be present without universal sorrow.

n. 300.

V. Relation between contrition and the other parts of the sacrament. Here note:

Contrition or detestation of sins must, as is clear, precede absolution from them; but it makes no difference whether it precedes or follows the act of confessing, although it is better to elicit it before confession and repeat it after confession (St. Alphonsus, VI, 445).¹
It is disputed whether contrition must be referred by the penitent to absolution. Some deny this, both because it belongs to the minister, not the penitent, to refer the matter of the sacrament to the form; and because from Trent² attrition, which excludes the will to sin, suffices in the sacrament for justification, without there being any mention of some relation to be made by the penitent. Others affirm it, because the minister cannot assume the acts of the penitent as matter unless they have been referred by the penitent to the sacrament. Others add that, just as one receiving, for example, Orders must order the touching of the matter to the sacrament, so also one receiving the sacrament of Penance must refer contrition to it. Nor should it be objected that sometimes those can be absolved who are ignorant of the sacrament, and therefore do not refer contrition to absolution. For they can, with the necessary conditions posited, be absolved conditionally, because the opinion of which we are speaking is not certain. St. Thomas seems to adhere to the affirmative opinion (3 p., question 86, article 6). Whatever the case may be, in practice you should follow the safer part (St. Alphonsus, VI, 447); but the question itself does not seem practical, because contrition, by the very fact that someone wishes to be absolved, seems sufficiently ordered to absolution.
It is not required that contrition actually or virtually endure until absolution, but it suffices that it persist habitually, that is, that it has not been retracted, with the things to be observed nevertheless observed, that is, those to be set forth under 4. The reason is that the penitent - although his acts are the matter of the sacrament - nevertheless is not the minister of the sacrament. Many indeed seem to require that contrition persevere actually or virtually, that is, in some effect; but in reality - many of them at least - do not speak of virtual perseverance properly so called (cf. St. Alphonsus, VI, 446). For the rest, it is difficult to determine how long contrition virtually endures. St. Alphonsus says this: "I, however... do not hesitate to assert that whenever confession derives from sorrow for sins, sorrow always virtually perseveres at least for one or another day, while that confession is the effect of sorrow. It is otherwise, however, if someone should confess from mere devotion, or to fulfill a vow, or a penance" (Homo Apostolicus, tract 16, n. 20).
As regards the space of time which can intervene between contrition actually elicited, likewise between confession, and absolution, some judge that only so much can intervene as can intervene between the parts of a civil judgment, because the sacrament of Penance was instituted after the manner of a judgment. But most reject that, nor does the reason alleged settle the question, because from elsewhere it is clear that a sacramental judgment is a judgment of its own kind (St. Alphonsus, VI, 446); for the rest, the space of time of which we are speaking cannot be determined. In practice, however, there will be no difficulty, since one who is absolved a rather long time after contrition has been elicited and confession instituted will commonly repeat both contrition and, at least in some way, confession before absolution.

Question. Whether a new absolution requires a new act of contrition, so that one who, after receiving absolution, declares a sin inculpably omitted, or again confesses sins already declared, must, I say, in order to be absolved again, elicit a new act of sorrow.

Response. Most more recent authors, against St. Alphonsus (VI, 448) and others, hold the negative opinion as morally certain; but undeservedly. The reason for doubting is this: just as a new act of confessing is required for a new judgment, so also, at least probably, a new act of contrition is required. Nevertheless, commonly there is no obligation of imposing a new penance; but it suffices that the imposed penance, insofar as it regards sins previously declared, be commuted, and insofar as it ought to regard the sins now declared, be left unchanged.

Objection. Even if a new act of contrition is not elicited, all things necessary for the sacrament are had, namely absolution, confession, and contrition morally persevering.

Response. It is doubtful whether contrition morally persevering suffices; since probably, as we have proved, a new act of contrition is required.

For the rest, the controversy seems less practical, because the penitent, by confessing the omitted sin or by again confessing sins already declared, commonly, at least in act exercised, will elicit a new act of contrition.

¹ Some older authors taught the contrary, relying on nearly these reasons:

Contrition must be manifested through confession, and therefore must be prior to it. Response: contrition can also be manifested in other ways, for instance by oral recitation. Besides, contrition elicited after confession is well manifested through confession, insofar as this morally perseveres, or at least through the petition or expectation of absolution.
Confession must not be a mere narration of sins, but a sacramental accusation; hence let it be informed by sorrow. Response: besides the fact that confession, insofar as it morally perseveres after contrition has been elicited, is informed by sorrow, it becomes sacramental by the fact that it is instituted in order to absolution.

² Session 14, on Penance, chapter 4.

Vol. II, Bk. III, Tr. V, Diss. II, Pt. I, Sect. II, Ch. II, Art. I, § II, Scholion. Sorrow and Purpose Regarding Venial Sins

n. 306.

I. If someone confesses venial sins together with a mortal sin, he receives the sacrament validly and fruitfully, even if sorrow and purpose comprehend only the mortal sin.

II. If someone confesses only venial sins, sorrow and purpose must enjoy the same properties as sorrow and purpose concerning mortal sins, except the property of universality (St. Thomas, 3 p., question 87, article 1, ad 1; St. Alphonsus, VI, 449, 451). This is not required, because one venial sin can be remitted without another. Therefore sorrow and purpose suffice:

Concerning all the venial sins which someone confesses.
Concerning some or one of those which he confesses, as follows:

a) Concerning only those fully deliberate, because someone can detest the greater malice without detesting the lesser (St. Thomas, at the cited place; St. Alphonsus, at the cited place).

b) Concerning only venial sins of a determined species, because we can detest one baseness without detesting another different from it (St. Thomas, at the cited place; St. Alphonsus, at the cited place).

Concerning the multitude or frequency of venial sins. Some teach absolutely that this suffices, but they suppose that then one grieves concerning determined sins, namely at least concerning the later ones, which constitute the multitude. Finally, others admit this as regards semi-deliberate sins, but not as regards fully deliberate sins (cf. St. Alphonsus, VI, at the cited place, and Praxis Confessarii, n. 71). St. Thomas declares that the purpose "of preparing oneself for diminishing venial sins" suffices (3 p., question 87, article 1, ad 1).

III. Sorrow - which I note for the sake of completeness - which according to what has just been explained does not extend itself to all venial sins, cannot be perfect contrition concerning some venial sin, because perfect contrition concerning one venial sin necessarily extends itself to all venial sins, as was explained in n. 284.

Corollary I. One who confesses only venial sins concerning which he does not grieve sins gravely, because the sacrament is rendered invalid. But one who, with the value of the sacrament preserved, confesses venial sins without sorrow sins only venially; for grave irreverence is not found in this (St. Alphonsus, VI, 449, doubt 1).

Corollary II. Penitents who are accustomed to commit only venial sins should be advised to add a mortal sin, if they have committed one before, or a more serious venial sin of their past life (St. Alphonsus, Praxis Confessarii, nn. 71, 99, 188).

McHugh–Callan, Moral Theology

John A. McHugh, O.P., and Charles J. Callan, O.P. — 7 passages

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. IV, Art. 3. Repentance; Penanc…, Contrition

n. 2729.

Contrition

Contrition.—The first act of the penitent is contrition. It is defined by the Council of Trent as a sorrow and hatred for sin committed, with a resolution of sinning no more and a desire of doing what is necessary for the proper reception of the Sacrament of Penance.

(a) Thus, it presupposes a hatred of personal past transgressions, for one grieves only about that which displeases one, and the acts of the will begin with likes and dislikes.

(b) It consists essentially in sorrow or affliction of spirit, for contrition, being the chief act of repentance, looks to reparation to God for the injury done Him, and it therefore punishes the sinner by sadness for his misdeeds.

(c) It includes as a property or consequence the resolution to avoid future sin and to do what God requires for forgiveness; for no one is sincerely sorry for the past unless this sorrow makes him decide not to repeat the offense, and makes him desire to fulfill the conditions that God lays down for reconciliation.

n. 2730.

The Two Kinds of Contrition

The Two Kinds of Contrition.—(a) Perfect contrition is that which is caused by charity, or the love of benevolence or of friendship (1109, 1110) towards God. This love is had, whether the object of one’s affection is the divine being or persons, the divine and infinite perfections, or a single attribute; for all of these are really God Himself. This contrition justifies the sinner at once, for it includes charity and the will (at least implicit) to do what God wishes, and God takes up His abode with those who love Him (John, xiv. 23). Perfect contrition is necessary, both as a means and as a divine precept, whenever the duty of repentance or of the Sacrament of Penance obliges with a like necessity, and there is no opportunity of receiving the Sacrament; for it is then the only way of recovering grace.

(b) Imperfect contrition, or attrition, is contrition caused by a supernatural motive inferior to that of charity, i.e., by a less perfect motive suggested by faith that leads one to grieve over sin committed, for example, the heinousness of sin in itself, its eternal punishment by God (i.e., the pain of loss or the pain of sense), or its temporal punishment by God in this life or in Purgatory. This contrition does not justify the sinner without the Sacrament, for it does not rectify or retract the disorder introduced by sin as far as lies within the sinner’s power (that is, ex opere operantis). By his sin the sinner preferred the creature to God; by his attrition he does not go so far as to prefer God positively to every created good, else his contrition would be perfect. But attrition suffices for justification of the sinner with the Sacrament of Penance, for it includes the essentials of contrition in general, and thus removes the impediments to the activity of the Sacrament (that is, the production of grace ex opere operato). The same holds good also of the sufficient disposition for Baptism, and more probably of that for the Sacraments of the Living received in good faith by one who is not in grace.

n. 2731.

Is Attrition Based Solely on Fear of Punishment Laudable?—(a) Fear of the world is sinful, because it offends God to escape evil (1044); slavish fear of God is sinful also, because it makes self the last end, avoiding sin solely because of the harm it will bring on self (1053). Sorrow for sin caused by slavish fear is not attrition, and is not laudable.

(b) Servile fear of God in itself is good and supernatural (1050), and the sorrow for sin or attrition based on such fear is also good; and if it includes a resolution of amendment, it suffices for justification with the Sacraments. The end (i.e., to escape punishment) is good (Matt., x. 28); the means (i.e., sorrow for sin) is good; and the use of the means for the end is good, for desertion of sin is the way to escape unhappiness (Luke, iii. 7, 8). Nor is it wrong to make a nobler good (such as avoidance of sin) a means to a lesser good (such as escape from punishment) when the lesser good is not made the last end, but only the immediate end, of the greater good. Thus, when we pray for temporal goods, we make a spiritual thing a means to a material end, but the Last End of the prayer is God Himself. Servile fear, unlike slavish fear (timor serviliter servilis), does not make self the last end (Denzinger, 818, 1146, 1525).

n. 2732.

Attrition in the Sacrament of Penance

Attrition in the Sacrament of Penance.—Must attrition based on fear of punishment be joined with love of God to justify in the Sacrament?

(a) Some form of love is required, for all contrition is detestation of sin, and sin is not hated unless its opposite is loved. Hence, just as attrition must be accompanied by faith and hope, so it must also be accompanied by some form of love of God (2718).

(b) Disinterested love is not required. This is certain as regards love of friendship, for even the smallest degree of that love is charity and justifies even without the Sacrament (1112, 2730). This is commonly held in reference to love of benevolence, which seems practically to be always united with love of friendship or charity. A love that inclines to God for His own sake but that does not predominate over other loves is held by some to be necessary, but it is difficult to understand such a love or to see its possibility.

(c) Interested love (the love of concupiscence or of hope) is therefore necessary. The common opinion today seems to be that it also suffices, and that it need be only virtual or implicit. In other words, the prevalent view is that every attrition prompted by fear of punishment contains an initial love of God which suffices to turn the sinner to God and to remove any obstacle to the action of the Sacrament. For “the fear of God is the beginning of His love” (Ecclus., xxv. 16), the hope of pardon is a beginning of love of the Author of pardon and justice, the resolve to amend is an inclination to keep the great command of love of God (1556).

n. 2733.

The Conditions for Valid Contrition and Attrition

The Conditions for Valid Contrition and Attrition.—(a) It must be internal, for contrition is an act of repentance and must be in the heart. Merely pretended sorrow, and sorrow which one mistakenly thinks one has, are insufficient.

(b) It must be supernatural, for contrition is a disposition for the reception of the supernatural habit of grace. Sorrow for sin induced by natural motives, such as the punishments inflicted by human agencies, if these are not viewed in the light of faith, is not sufficient.

(c) It must be universal, that is, there must be sorrow for all mortal sins not yet forgiven, for it is impossible to be really sorry for one serious sin while retaining affection for another. But it is not necessary to repent of all venial sins before one is forgiven (see 2724).

(d) It must be sovereign, that is, if the contrition is perfect, God must be loved above every other good; if it is imperfect, sin must be hated above every evil that could lead to sin. If the sinner does not detest his dishonesty more than the privation he will suffer by being honest, he is not really contrite. It is, however, not necessary that contrition be sensibly felt, or be of supreme intensity, or that its act be of long duration; and it is rash to call to mind the kinds of evils or torments one would prefer to suffer rather than commit sin (see 1556).

n. 2734.

Valid and Fruitful Reception of the Sacrament

Valid and Fruitful Reception of the Sacrament.—Some theologians, distinguishing between contrition as matter of the Sacrament and contrition as a disposition of the penitent, hold that it is possible to have a valid but unfruitful reception of the Sacrament, and that revival of its grace is possible. They explain thus:

(a) the contrition required for the matter and the validity of the Sacrament must be such as can be known with moral certainty by the confessor from external indications, and hence it suffices for validity that the sorrow be true and sincere and supernatural;

(b) the contrition required for the disposition of the penitent and the fruitfulness of the Sacrament must be such as excludes all affection for every grave sin and includes the resolution to avoid all mortal sin in the future, and hence it is required for fruitfulness that sorrow be also universal and sovereign. (This opinion has very few, if any at all, adherents among modern theologians. It is retained here solely as a matter of record.)

n. 2735.

Properties of Contrition

Properties of Contrition.—Since contrition belongs to the matter of Penance, it must have the properties of sacramental matter (2655 sqq.).

(a) Thus, the matter must be sensible, and hence contrition must be shown in some external way, as by a sorrowful confession, devout request for absolution, or, in the case of those who are unconscious, by a call for a priest or the practices or prayers of a Christian life.

(b) The matter must be united with the form, and hence contrition must be elicited at the moment of absolution, or a short time before (not more than a few hours before, according to some, or even a few days before, according to others). But if a penitent recalls immediately after absolution a forgotten mortal sin, and is then absolved from it also, more probably he is not obliged to renew his act of contrition, because the act just made virtually continues; in practice, however, he might be told to make another act of contrition and a new penance or the same penance may be imposed before the second absolution. Moreover, for absolution when one is unconscious and in danger of death, since an habitual intention suffices (2674), it seems that contrition made long ago, but not retracted, is sufficient.

(c) The matter must have at least a moral unity of its own parts, and hence the contrition must in some way be directed to the confession; that is, either before or during or after the act of contrition there must be an intention to confess with the sorrow for sin contained in that act of contrition, or to apply that sorrow to the confession just made. Otherwise it does not appear that one has the purpose to make a sacramental confession. But there is no practical difficulty, as every act of contrition contains implicitly the will to confess, or every sincere confession includes the will to use the contrition one has exercised or will exercise.

Bucceroni, Institutions of Moral Theology

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 18 passages

Vol. III, On the Particular Obligati…, II. On the Negative Obligations of Clerics

n. 179.

Do clerics or religious sin mortally who, by being present, watch those playing dice? - "This indeed is prohibited by C. Clerici 15 de Vita, etc., where they are commanded not to be present at games of this kind. Commonly, however, doctors deny that they sin mortally in this, unless they were the cause of a mortal game, or negligently corrected the players, or unless they took complacency in such a game insofar as it is mortal; otherwise if they were present only for the sake of delighting themselves in the skill or fortune of those playing.... Bishops, however, who are present at these games deliberately and frequently can with difficulty be excused even from the sin of grave scandal." L. l. 3, n. 903; Sanchez, Cons. Mor. l. 1, c. 8, d. 29.

Vol. III, On Penance, II. On Contrition

n. 677.

What is contrition and how many kinds are there? - Contrition is sorrow of soul and detestation concerning sin committed, with the purpose of not sinning thereafter. Sorrow is displeasure and bitterness of soul; detestation is reprobation and condemnation of sin. Trent, sess. 14, C. 4; St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 85, a. 1, ad 3; Suppl., q. 1, a. 1. - One is perfect from the special motive of charity, and is customarily called contrition simply; another is imperfect from another motive, e.g., from consideration of the foulness of sin, from fear of hell and punishments, etc., and is customarily called attrition. Trent, ibid. - L. 435, 436; St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 87, a. 1; E. M.

n. 678.

What is the necessity of contrition? - Contrition, either perfect with the desire of the sacrament, or imperfect with the sacrament itself, is altogether necessary to the sinner by necessity of means for obtaining justification and salvation. But that desire is implicit in contrition itself, from the very institution of the sacrament of penance and the obligation of confessing sins; nor must it necessarily be explicit. Trent, sess. 14, C. 1, 4; sess. 6, C. 6, 14; St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 87, a. 1; L. 434. It is necessary besides by necessity of divine precept at some time in life, Luke 13:3, 5, and at the point of death, on account of the precept of obtaining the last end. L. 437. "Speaking of itself, a sinner delaying penance outside danger of death probably does not commit a special sin. The reason is that affirmative precepts, as St. Thomas teaches in 4 d. 17, q. 3, a. 1, q. 4, must have a determined time in which they must be fulfilled; but nowhere is it established what time is determined for satisfying this precept of contrition. Hence the same holy Doctor, 2. 2, q. 14, a. 2, said that final impenitence is not a special sin, in these words: impenitence, not indeed in that mode in which it means permanence in sin until death..., in this way would not be a special sin, but a certain circumstance of sin, etc. Nevertheless that is indeed to be understood apart from a positive precept; for from the precept of annual Confession, prescribed by the Church, each person without doubt is bound to penance at least once in the year." L. 437. Wherefore the precept of penance does not oblige immediately after mortal sin has been committed.

But by accident the aforesaid precept obliges when another precept urges which cannot be fulfilled without contrition, e.g., when one guilty of grave sin is about to receive or administer a sacrament; as often as the sacrament of penance is received even for the sake of devotion. - Likewise when someone, existing in mortal sin, would defer penance for a notable time. The reason is clear from what St. Thomas teaches, 1. 2, q. 109, a. 8, where he says: "Without justifying grace, that one remain for a long time without mortal sin cannot be." "But what this notable time is, the doctors greatly disagree." L. 437. Concina and others think it is a week; St. Alphonsus in the cited place and others think it is a month; others a trimester, others six months, others a year. The more common opinion, as Palaus says, de Poenit., d. un., p. 3, n. 9, admits at least that delay which the precept of the Church also admits concerning annual Confession; St. Alphonsus there also attributes this doctrine to St. Thomas, 4 d. 17, q. 3, a. 1, q. 4, although he himself "does not altogether acquiesce." Cf. Laymann, c. 2, n. 6; L., l. 6, n. 473; St. Thomas, Quodl. 1, a. 11. - Besides, as the same St. Alphonsus has it in the cited place, "sinners, especially the uneducated, can for the most part, indeed almost always, be excused from this sin of delayed penance on account of inadvertence." Cf. Lugo, d. 15, nn. 55, 56; Suarez, d. 15, s. 6, nn. 7, 8; d. 35, s. 3, n. 10.

n. 679.

What are the qualities of contrition? - Contrition 1. must be altogether true and real, not supposed; altogether formal, but virtual suffices, even for venials. Trent, sess. 14, C. 4; L. 443, 449.

It must be supernatural, even for venials, because it is part of the sacrament and a positive disposition for supernatural grace. But it must be supernatural not only because elicited with the help of grace, but also, at least in some way, on the part of the motive. The reason is that, as Lugo says, d. 5, n. 141, "for every justification, even in the sacrament, there is required a conversion of man to God, at least imperfect." But since that conversion is to God as supernatural end, hence that motive, at least considered inadequately, must be supernatural, proposed not by the light of natural reason, but by the light of faith. Busemb. 433; L. 440; Suarez, d. 20, s. 2. This is openly established from Trent, sess. 14, C. 4, where, after it had recounted among other motives the fear of hell and punishments, which seemed especially to be known by the natural light of reason, it immediately adduces the example of the Ninevites, whose object was certainly manifested not by natural reason but by the light of faith.
It must be appretiatively supreme, even for venial sins; that is, so that one detests sin more than every other evil, whence the sinner is prepared in soul to lose and suffer all things rather than commit sin. - Contrition and sorrow must be supreme not in the sensitive part, but in the will, insofar as by the soul's judgment and estimation sin is held as graver than any other evil, which the will therefore turns away from and rejects before other evils. - It is not required that a formal comparison be set up in the appreciation between various evils and sin, which someone would indeed do foolishly. St. Thomas, Quodl. 1, a. 9; L. 433.

Nor indeed must contrition be supreme intensively, since intensity is something merely accidental. Lugo, d. 5, nn. 84-87; L. 441, 442; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 5, a. 3; 2. 2, q. 24, a. 12; q. 45, a. 4. - Nor likewise is any duration of time required, because this too is something merely accidental. L. 433.

It must be universal, if it is a question of grave sins, but by no means if of venial sins. The first reason is that the remission of mortal sins is made through the infusion of sanctifying grace, which is incompatible with any mortal sin whatever. But it suffices that contrition be universal from a universal motive, nor are individual acts of sorrow required for each individual sin. For then one virtually detests each of his individual sins. Otherwise one could not be cleansed from hidden sins through universal sorrow. Trent, sess. 14, C. 5; L. 438; St. Thomas, de Verit., q. 29, a. 5, ad 4; 4 d. 17, q. 2, a. 3, q. 5, ad 2. The second reason is that since sanctifying grace is not incompatible with venial sin, one can be remitted without another. "Hence it suffices to repent and purpose concerning only one venial sin, since venials are not necessary matter, but only sufficient matter. But Lugo, d. 14 from n. 138, etc., says that it also suffices if someone grieves for each one in particular.... La-Croix, 913, etc., also rightly says that someone can well grieve for deliberate venials and purpose to avoid all of them; but concerning semi-deliberate ones it suffices to grieve that he committed them, and in the future to wish to attend to avoiding them insofar as human frailty permits. And these things are according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 87, a. 1, ad 1." L. 449; Lugo, Resp. Mor., l. 1, D. 29; E. M.

Wherefore contrition or attrition is also necessary as regards the remission of venial sins. St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 87, aa. 1, 2, 3. And lest efficacy be altogether taken away from the sacrament of penance as regards the remission of venial sins, it seems that one must say that outside the sacrament, for the remission of graver venials, a more perfect attrition is required, and for lighter ones a less perfect attrition; but in the sacrament of baptism, extreme unction, and penance, a lesser attrition is required. - Suarez, d. 11, s. 3; Lugo, s. 9, n. 28.

n. 680.

Must the contrition required for the sacrament of penance also be vocal? - It must indeed be sensible, but by no means necessarily vocal. The first reason is that it is part of the sacrament. The second reason is that otherwise dying persons unable to speak, although they give other signs of contrition, could not be absolved, which is against common practice and doctrine and against the Roman Ritual. - But it becomes sufficiently sensible by the very sorrowful Confession of sins, by the petition or expectation of absolution, and by other signs. - L. 445; H. A., tr. 16, n. 20.

n. 681.

Must contrition precede Confession? - It must certainly precede absolution, or at least coexist with it; it surely does not suffice that it follow absolution, since one who has not yet detested sins neither deserves nor can be loosed from the bond of sins. Trent, sess. 14, C. 4. - For the validity of the sacrament, sorrow need not necessarily precede accusation. The reason is that all things required for the sacrament are present, provided sorrow precedes absolution; nor can a precept be proved of placing sorrow for sins before Confession. Lugo, Suarez, and others more commonly, against others. Besides, when other theologians require a sorrowful Confession, and therefore say that sorrow must precede, they seem to demand nothing else than that the Confession not be a mere narration of sins, but an accusation of oneself in order to obtain absolution.

The Roman Ritual, de Sacram. poenit., favors this, where it is said: "having heard the Confession, the confessor will strive with efficacious words to lead him to sorrow," etc. From this the Ritual seems to suppose that sorrow elicited after Confession suffices well. Thus St. Alphonsus, 445. - Nevertheless the same St. Alphonsus, H. A., tr. 16, n. 20, says that the other opinion is probable and therefore to be followed in practice; and he adds: "But they commonly agree... that it suffices if, after the acts of sorrow, the penitent again says, I accuse myself of all the sins confessed."

But the same holy Doctor himself had previously handed down the first opinion in earlier editions of the Moral Work and of the Italian edition of the Homo Apostolicus; afterward, however, in later editions of the Moral Work, he changed it. - Ithur., Cas. 11, n. 4, says: "That sorrow is sufficient for the sacrament of penance seems to me certain, even if it does not precede Confession, provided it follows Confession and together with Confession is ordered to absolution; and this the very sense of the faithful and the practice of confessors sufficiently teach. It is founded on this: although the whole prior narration of sins, preceding sorrow in time, had not yet had the complete nature of accusation, nevertheless, afterwards informed by subsequent contrition, and thus subjected to the keys by the penitent both asking for and expecting absolution, it is sufficiently completed in the nature of sacramental accusation." E. M.

n. 682.

Through what space of time does an act of sorrow morally endure for validly receiving the sacrament? - Suarez, d. 20, s. 4, n. 29, and others judge that sorrow suffices which preceded Confession by a long time, provided it has not been retracted. For since such sorrow virtually perseveres in the flight from sin and in the very Confession which is made for preserving the state of grace, there seems to be no reason why such sorrow should be held insufficient. And Ballerinius seems to adhere to this opinion, Gur. Baller. 448. Cf. Lugo, d. 14, nn. 35, 50. - But others, such as Cardenas, in prop. 2 of Innocent XI, p. 65, n. 88, etc., say that sorrow preceding by one day suffices; for since Confession is the effect of that sorrow, sorrow virtually perseveres. Roncaglia, c. 3, q. 2, r. 2, agrees, even if sorrow preceded by several days, provided it virtually perseveres in some means, for example if the penitent, by force of the sorrow conceived, has persisted in frequent prayer, flight from occasions, penances, etc. L. 446. Gury 447 also agrees, even if sorrow preceded by one or several days, provided it was elicited from the intention of Confession and was not retracted by another sin. - D'Annibale, ed. 3, p. 3, n. 315.

n. 683.

In order that sorrow be apt matter, must it be elicited from or with the intention of Confession? - Several affirm it, and St. Alphonsus says this opinion is probable and more safely to be followed. But Lugo, d. 14, nn. 37-40, and others deny it; Tamburini thinks this probable, St. Alphonsus himself, 447, more probable, and Ballerinius, Gur. Baller. 447, as certain. The reason is both that, from Trent, sess. 14, C. 4, that attrition is said to dispose for obtaining grace in the sacrament which excludes the will to sin with hope of pardon, all of which is verified in our case; and that then sorrow, although it was not ordered to Confession by an antecedent relation, is nevertheless ordered by a concomitant relation from this, that then sorrow is still verified as being laid open through Confession.

n. 684.

Is a new act of sorrow required for receiving a new absolution when the penitent immediately after absolution confesses a mortal sin omitted from forgetfulness? - The first opinion denies it, because the prior contrition certainly perseveres, and since it was universal it extended to all sins, even those omitted from forgetfulness; and it can well serve for another form of absolution. Nor otherwise is it required that contrition be explicitly ordered to the sacrament. Besides, once a new accusation has been made, it is already sufficiently ordered. Indeed there seems to be sorrow, in some way explicit, in the act of accusing that sin. For when vocal Confession is repeated, at least virtually the sorrow of the preceding Confession is repeated, still persevering morally and virtually. - The second opinion affirms it, because through absolution the judgment has been completed; therefore if a new absolution is to be imparted, new proximate matter is required; and although sorrow perseveres in itself, it nevertheless does not persevere in order to absolution. - St. Alphonsus, 448, speaking of this second opinion, says: "Since it is probable, indeed more probable, Croix and Concina say that it must altogether be followed in practice; at least I judge that the safer opinion must be held." But of the first he says: "It is more common, and Lugo, Anacletus, Viva with Perez, Henriquez, and the common opinion, Roncaglia who calls it morally certain, Sporer, Elbel who thinks it most probable with Gobat, Dicastillo, Henriquez, Bosco, etc., likewise apud Croix, Leander, Salas, Escobar, and Moya, who says it is undoubted among all, hold this." But for it Lugo says, d. 14, n. 27, "common practice also stands," which Dicastillo also testifies, de Sacr., tr. 8, disp. 6, dub. 22, n. 160, and Diana, t. 1, tr. 3, r. 95, n. 3, and many other grave theologians adhere to it absolutely. Fr. Gury, 448, says the second opinion rests on a light foundation.

But Ballerinius there says that "neither authority nor any solid reason supports the same second opinion," but that the first "can be held in practice as very safe." D'Annibale, ed. 3, p. 3, n. 315, says, "To me, if you wish to confess something forgotten, the first opinion seems truer, because this is contained, as in the same Confession, so also in the same sorrow; if you confess the same things again, the other opinion seems truer, because it is a new Confession, which in no way pertains to the prior one." But although it is a new Confession, nevertheless virtually persevering sorrow can well suffice for it. For as it suffices for the new Confession of a forgotten sin, so it can well suffice for the new Confession of sins already accused. - Elbel 75.

n. 685.

Does one sin who confesses some venial sin without sorrow? - If he opens this very defect of sorrow and purpose to the confessor, then the priest must not absolve from such a sin, nor should the penitent say it for this end, namely as matter of the sacrament, since in fact it cannot be such. Yet it can licitly be said either for humility, or for counsel, or for excitation to true penance. - If he opens a venial sin for which he does not grieve, like the others, as matter of absolution, "then," says Suarez, d. 39, s. 6, n. 7, "many think it is a mortal sin....

But although it cannot be denied that this is some fault, nevertheless I do not judge it mortal, because the matter of such fault is light; because the defect of that sorrow or purpose of itself and by its nature is not contrary to grace and justification, which is the primary effect of this sacrament signified by the form..., nor even does it impede the remission of other venial sins, concerning which a true accusation capable of true absolution is made, notwithstanding the obstacle of some venial sin." Cf. Lugo, d. 14, n. 48. Besides, even that light fault of which Suarez speaks will often be absent, either because the penitent does not advert to this defect of sorrow or to the disorder of the same defect, or because all displeasure is rarely absent, although it is not sufficiently efficacious; in this matter it is often difficult to avoid deception. - To approach the sacrament with light matter, without any sorrow, is grave, on account of the grave irreverence inflicted upon the sacrament by frustrating it of its effect, whether from grave or light matter. Lugo, d. 14, n. 108 ff.; L. 449.

n. 686.

Does fearful attrition, or attrition conceived from fear of hell, suffice for justification in the sacrament of penance? - Resp. In the affirmative, provided it is truly supernatural, absolutely efficacious, and only materially servile, not formally or servilely servile. The reason is: 1. because attrition of this kind is a true conversion to God and a true aversion from sin; 2. because this is clearly drawn from Trent, sess. 14, C. 4, where it says that attrition conceived from fear of hell and punishments is honest and disposes the sinner for obtaining justification in the sacrament of penance. And this is certain and common among the doctors. - But attrition is called servilely servile when someone indeed grieves over sin and wishes to avoid it because of the punishments which he knows are to be inflicted by God, yet he would still be ready to sin if those punishments did not exist. But it is called simply servile when someone abstains from sin indeed because of fear of punishments, yet is not so disposed that he would wish to sin if those punishments did not exist. The former is evil, not because it is fear of punishments, but because of the depraved disposition of soul. - L. 440, 442; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 19; q. 225; Quodl. 4, a. 10; 4 d. 22, q. 2, a. 1, q. 3; E. M.

n. 687.

Whether attrition suffices for the sacrament of penance when conceived from fear of the punishments of this life, insofar as they are inflicted by God as avenger of sins? - The first opinion denies it. The reason is that Trent, sess. 14, C. 4, speaks conjointly of fear of punishments and of hell, when it teaches that "sorrow conceived from fear of hell and punishments" suffices, taking both for the same thing. For the punishment of mortal sin is eternal, and the sinner must fear this. The second opinion affirms it. The reason is that the particle and is to be taken disjunctively in the obvious sense, understanding hell for hell, Matt. 10:28, and punishments for temporal punishments, whether of Purgatory or of this life. This is confirmed by the example of the Ninevites, which Trent itself adduces, sess. 14, C. 4. St. Alphonsus, 443, says this second opinion is more probable, but that the first is not lacking its own probability, at least extrinsic; hence he concludes: "I think the safer one must be observed in practice." But others call the second opinion most probable, La-Croix 884; others morally certain, Elbel 59; others altogether certain, and Ballerinius seems to adhere to these, Gur. Baller. 452.

Insofar as they are inflicted by God as avenger of sins. For the aforesaid punishments must always be considered with relation to God as punisher of sins. Contrition sufficient for the sacrament cannot exist without relation to God.

n. 688.

Does attrition from fear of the punishments of Purgatory suffice for venial sins? - Resp. In the affirmative, with the very common and morally certain opinion; because all the reasons adduced above for the sufficiency of attrition from fear of hell are valid here also. Gur. 452.

n. 689.

Does attrition suffice for the sacrament of penance if it is conceived from the foulness of sin? - Resp. In the affirmative. Trent, sess. 14, C. 4.

But this foulness, the motive of sacramental attrition, is that which offends the eyes of God; which defiles the soul by deforming in it the image and likeness of God; which is known by faith; by no means, however, that which is contained in infamy among men, and which naturally belongs to vice, since it offends the order of right reason and is proposed merely by natural reason. The reason is that attrition must not be sorrow for sin in any manner whatever, but with some respect to God, the supernatural end of man; for there must be a certain conversion to God, at least imperfect. - Lugo, d. 5, n. 140 ff.; Suarez, d. 20, s. 2, n. 10; E. M.

n. 690.

Can there be a valid but unformed sacrament of penance because of a defect of sufficient sorrow? - There can be a twofold case: 1. When someone guilty of a double sin, from invincible forgetfulness, grieves over one only because of its special foulness, and confesses this alone. 2. When someone, from invincible ignorance, would believe that it is not a mortal sin to approach the sacrament without sorrow for all, while nevertheless sorrow was present for some sin because of its special foulness, e.g., because it is against justice, against chastity, etc., but not because it is simply an offense and injury against God. - Moreover the first opinion holds that such a sacrament is valid and formed, because the penitent places no obstacle to grace. The second opinion holds that it is not only unformed but invalid, because the sorrow is insufficient. The third opinion holds that it is valid but unformed: valid, because no essential part of the sacrament is lacking; unformed, because one mortal sin cannot be remitted without another, and the other cannot be remitted because sorrow is lacking. The first opinion seems true to D'Annibale, ed. 3, p. 3, n. 312; the third is more probable to St. Alphonsus, 444. - If contrition sufficient for the sacrament cannot exist without relation to God offended and with the purpose of not sinning thereafter, it certainly does not appear how it can be so particular that it is not at least virtually universal. Nor indeed does it appear how someone could with sincere soul detest the specific foulness of sin without also detesting the generic foulness. - Nor indeed does it appear how, according to what the Council of Trent has about the parts of this sacrament, sess. 14, C. 2, 3, it can still be an essential part of the sacrament with confession without contrition, as St. Thomas explicitly has it, Suppl., q. 9, a. 1, or with attrition, but not sufficient for grace, as others have it. Moreover this question is raised for this reason: that it may be known whether the penitent is bound again to confess the sins which he has already confessed, which indeed is doubtful in this variety of opinions. - Lugo, d. 14, n. 65 ff.; Resp. Mor., l. 1, d. 29; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 9, a. 1; 4 d. 17, q. 3, a. 4, q. 1.

n. 691.

Is one who at the point of death has received the sacrament of penance with attrition bound besides to elicit an act of contrition? - The first opinion affirms it, and Suarez, d. 14, s. 6, n. 18, Sanchez, in Dec., t. 1, l. 1, c. 1, n. 34, etc., hold this. The reason is that at the time of such great necessity safer means for salvation are to be chosen. The second opinion denies it, and Lugo, d. 7, n. 263, Laymann, c. 11, n. 7, etc., hold this. The reason is that there is only an obligation, whether in the time of life or in the time of death, of choosing safe means, not safer ones. But from Trent, sess. 14, C. 4, it is certain that attrition suffices in the sacrament for obtaining grace. L. 440. - Each opinion, says St. Alphonsus, 437, is probable; but the first is altogether to be counseled, which is evident of itself, since it is a question of the supreme business of salvation. The holy Doctor adds besides that the first must be altogether followed, because of another reason, namely because of the obligation of eliciting then an act of charity. But since this obligation too is disputed, namely for a man already justified through the sacrament, who already has sanctifying grace and habitual charity, a certain obligation does not seem to be imposed. - Gur. Baller. 445.

n. 692.

In order to obtain grace in the sacrament of penance, besides sorrow are explicit acts of faith and hope also required? - Resp. In the negative. The reason is that it cannot be proved by any probable argument that these acts are explicitly required. Besides, a penitent eliciting an act of sorrow also in some way explicitly and in exercise elicits these acts, although not reflectively; because then without doubt he believes in exercise, and hopes that through the sacrament of penance, in virtue of the merits of Christ, his sins are to be remitted. - L. 439; E. M.

n. 693.

For obtaining justification in the sacrament of penance with attrition, is the beginning of love also required? - Resp. In the negative, if by the beginning of love is understood some degree of perfect charity, by which God is loved above all things. The reason is that for rightly receiving the sacrament there is not necessarily prerequired an act which outside the sacrament essentially justifies. But an act of charity, and therefore "sorrow which suffices for the nature of contrition, however small it may be, deletes every guilt," as St. Thomas says, q. 5, a. 3. Therefore. St. Alphonsus, 440, says this is morally certain. - But it can and must be conceded that some beginning of love is required, insofar as attrition, in order to dispose for the sacrament, must exclude, as Trent speaks, the will to sin; and as St. Thomas says, 2. 2, q. 17, a. 8, "someone is introduced to loving God through this, that fearing to be punished by him he ceases from sin." - And here it must be noted that contrition not only remits guilt and eternal punishment, but also, if very intense and perfect, can abolish every punishment; yet from its own nature it does not necessarily have this efficacy. - Trent, sess. 6, C. 6, 14, c. 30; sess. 14, C. 8, c. 12; E. M.

Bucceroni, Moral Enchiridion (4th ed., 1905)

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 4 passages

Bucceroni, Moral Enchiridion (4th ed., 1905), On Penance

n. 686.

On Servile Fear

“66. He who wishes to approach God ought neither to come to Him with brutish passions nor be led by natural instinct or by fear as beasts are, but by faith and by love as sons are.—67. Servile fear represents God to itself only as a harsh, imperious, unjust, intractable master.—68. The goodness of God has shortened the way of salvation by enclosing the whole in faith and prayers.” Propositions of Pasquier Quesnel condemned by Clement XI.

n. 686, 689.

On Attrition

“6. Contrition which is prepared by the examination, collection, and detestation of sins, whereby one reflects upon his years in the bitterness of his soul, pondering the gravity and multitude of sins, the loss of eternal beatitude, and the acquisition of eternal damnation: this contrition makes a hypocrite, indeed a greater sinner.” Proposition of Martin Luther condemned by Leo X.

n. 686, 689.

“9. He truly sins who hates sin merely because of its turpitude and incongruity with nature, without any regard for God offended.” Proposition condemned by Alexander VIII.

n. 686, 689.

“57. It is probable that natural attrition is sufficient, provided that it is morally upright.” Proposition condemned by Innocent XI.

Bucceroni, Cases of Conscience

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 32 passages

121. On Contrition

Contrition outside the sacrament - "Getulius, having committed a mortal sin, remained for three months in this unhappy state. At last, conscience rebuking him, he throws himself at the feet of the confessor. The confessor asks him whether immediately after the sin had been committed he elicited an act of contrition. Since he answered negatively, he is on that account accused of a new mortal sin. The spiritual father then asks whether at least within the week he had been contrite. The penitent answers that he had delayed penance up to this time. You have acted very badly, says the confessor, for thus you have multiplied mortal sins; since you have sinned gravely as many times as, attending to the state of your soul, or remembering your sin, you omitted to elicit an act of perfect contrition.

It is asked: 1. Whether there is a grave obligation of eliciting an act of contrition immediately after a grave sin has been committed? - 2. What delay induces grave sin?

R. To the 1st. Negatively, more probably, because the precept of contrition is affirmative, or is an obligation of doing penance. Therefore it does not oblige at every moment. Therefore it does not immediately urge after a sin has been committed; otherwise sins would be multiplied according to the number of moments of delay, or as often as the sinner notices the obligation of doing penance, which is contrary to the common sense of the faithful and to the practice of confessors. Lig. 437.

To the 2nd. More probably it is grave to defer an act of contrition, after sin has been committed, beyond a month, because there seems to be a grave obligation of eliciting an act of charity once in a month; but an act of charity cannot be elicited without an act of contrition. In practice, however, many, indeed most sinners, are excused from that sin of delayed penance because of ignorance or inadvertence. Lig. 437; Comp. n. 444." Thus Fr. Gury 398, 399.

But some things in this resolution are not very carefully corrected. For it is not true what is said in the response to the 1st, that if the precept of contrition immediately urged after sins had been committed, they would be multiplied according to the number of moments of delay. For if it immediately urged after a sin had been committed, it follows only that someone would then immediately sin against the precept of contrition, and afterward would persevere in that sin until he elicited that act; otherwise he who stole another's thing and retained it for a year would commit as many sins as there are moments in the year, or at least as often as, noticing the obligation of making restitution, he does not restore, which is not true. And thus Fr. Gury himself, Comp. vol. 1, n. 166, raises the question: "Whether he who long defers restitution commits several sins." And he answers: "Negatively, if he habitually perseveres in the will of retaining another's thing, because the evil will perseveres by way of something continuous with the thing unjustly retained. Nevertheless, if the unjust possessor for a notable time has forgotten that restitution is to be made, and afterward renews the wicked purpose, he will commit a new sin, because his evil will is judged morally interrupted. St. Lig., n. 40, and others commonly, against others who say that the unjust possessor of another's thing sins as often as he attends to the obligation of restoring." Cf. Lig., l. 3, n. 683; Diana, tom. 1, tr. 7, res. 157; I. M. vol. 1, 308.

Moreover, as to the response to the 2nd, the same Fr. Gury, Comp. vol. 1, n. 218, says concerning the obligation of eliciting an act of charity: "The opinion of those who require an act of charity once in a month pleases St. Liguori. Ho. Ap. n. 12. But this opinion has no solid foundation." Likewise Fr. Gury, l. c., Comp. vol. 2, n. 444, raises the question: "What delay of contrition induces grave sin?" And he answers: "Theologians do not agree: it is indeed commonly admitted that there is given a grave delay of contrition independently of the precept of annual confession; but how great this delay must be, so that it may be judged grave, cannot be determined certainly: some extend it to a year; others to six months; others with St. Liguori to a month; nevertheless no reason or authority favors this last opinion. Moreover St. Alphonsus himself adds, n. 437, that sinners, especially rude ones, can for the most part, indeed almost always, be excused from this precept of delayed penance." I. M. vol. 1, n. 381; vol. 2, n. 478.

Defect of contrition in the Sacrament - Angelus, accusing only venial sins in sacramental confession, conceives no sorrow for them. For he says that, in order to blot them out in sacramental confession, their confession itself suffices, which is an act of satisfaction and penance.

It is asked: Whether at least attrition is necessary for the confession of venial sins.

R. Affirmatively. The reason is that Trent absolutely declares sorrow and detestation of sin to be the principal act on the part of the penitent, which with the others constitutes as it were the matter of the sacrament of penance. Cf. La-Croix, l. 6, p. 2, n. 682; Lugo, d. 9, s. 2; Suarez, d. 11, s. 3. Therefore confession of venial sins without sorrow can indeed be of itself an act of satisfaction and penance, but not sacramental. Angelus perhaps is indeed excused by good faith, but he acts badly, for, accusing only venial sins without sorrow, he exposes the sacrament to nullity, which is grave. I. M. 685.

Claudinus, a good old man, being asked by the confessor how he elicits the act of contrition for sins, answers: Thus I say: I love thee, my God, above all things, because thou art supremely good; spare, my God, spare my sins. The confessor, having heard this response, indeed labors with anxiety concerning the value of this contrition. Yet, thinking it to be a scruple, he absolves Claudinus.

It is asked: 1. Whether for sacramental confession perfect charity toward God suffices in place of an act of sorrow? 2. What is to be said to the Case?

R. To the 1st. Negatively. The reason is that the Council of Trent, sess. 14, cap. 3, asserts that the acts of the penitent are as it were the matter of the sacrament of penance. But among them it by no means enumerates charity, but places contrition, which the Council of Trent itself, in the following chapter, says holds the first place among the acts of the penitent. But it says that this is sorrow or detestation for sin committed. Therefore that contrition required by the Council for penance is formal contrition, by no means merely virtual; it is an act of the virtue of penance, by no means of charity. But the contrition required for penance must be such only as is expressed and prescribed by the Council, loc. cit., where it professedly hands on Catholic doctrine concerning the sacrament of penance. Therefore.

To the 2nd. An act of charity can be understood in two ways: first, as having for its material object God to be loved, and for its formal object the absolute goodness of God; and there that act stops; nor does that formal object advance in any way so far as to excite in us detestation of sins. And thus charity does not suffice without a true and formal act of sorrow or contrition for the sacrament of penance, so as to constitute part of its quasi-matter, although it suffices for the remission of sins outside the sacrament. But if that formal object of charity moves us also to detestation of admitted sins, then there is perfect contrition, formed by charity, as the same Council of Trent speaks, l. c., cap. 4; and it is best, not only for the remission of sins outside confession, but also in sacramental confession. Now indeed such seems to have been the charity of Claudinus, if attention is paid to the act which he elicited after the formal act of charity: spare, my God, spare my sins. For these words, by imploring divine mercy and the mercy of sins, implicitly signify sorrow of soul and detestation or hatred of the sin committed, with the purpose of not sinning henceforth. It is morally impossible that someone, recalling his sins, should elicit an act of love toward God without being sorry for his sins and detesting them, insofar as they are opposed to God supremely loved. Therefore Claudinus's confessor acted rightly.

"Nevertheless in our Case," says Fr. Gury 402, "Claudinus ought to be carefully questioned by the confessor, so that the latter may know whether he really thought about sorrow for sins, or uttered a mere formula, the sense of which perhaps he did not sufficiently understand. Moreover the confessor ought to have taught the penitent about the manner of eliciting an act of contrition before confession." But these things are said rather by divining; for, as is drawn from the exposition of the Case, there is no trace in Claudinus of such alleged ignorance and negligence. From the very fact that Claudinus did not remain only in that act of charity, I love thee, my God, above all things, because thou art supremely good; but further uttered another act of sorrow and detestation of sins, Spare, my God, spare my sins, he certainly did not utter these words materially, by no means understanding them. And indeed who is so stupid that, uttering these words, he does not understand them? Certainly Claudinus is not such, who forms so perfect an act of charity, and then asks from God remission of sins. But who, asking from God remission of sins from a motive of perfect love, does not at the same time have sorrow for them and detestation of them? It is utterly repugnant seriously to implore divine mercy and forgiveness of sins at the same time, and not to be sorry for them, nor to detest them. Moreover contrition consists essentially in detestation of sin. Sorrow is its companion or effect. Roman Catechism n. 23, 24; St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 85, a. 1, ad 3. The object of contrition of this kind is sin, that is, an evil action by which God is offended. St. Thomas, l. c., a. 2. How therefore does someone explicitly asking forgiveness of sins from God out of true love not at the same time detest and reprobate them? Does he not at the same time have displeasure with them? Therefore no obligation appears in the confessor, in the Case, of teaching the penitent the manner of eliciting an act of contrition, since the penitent elicits an act of contrition so perfectly. I. M. 677.

Motive of contrition - Albert, after making confession, is asked by the confessor by what motive he is moved to sorrow for sins. The penitent answers: I am sorry for sins, because I fear lest God, who constantly appears in Sacred Scripture indeed merciful, but also just avenger of sins, punish me in this life with miseries or with sudden death. The confessor replies: Surely, my good man, did you sorrow for sins in the same way in the past, when you approached to confess? Albert affirms it. Whence the confessor, judging those confessions to have been invalid, orders him meanwhile to depart without absolution and to prepare himself for instituting a general confession of his whole life.

It is asked: What is to be said to the Case?

R. "The confessor imprudently declared that the aforesaid confessions were invalid by reason of attrition elicited from fear of temporal punishments. The reason is that such attrition is more probably valid if it was had from a supernatural motive. Although in practice it is safer to excite sorrow from the motive of punishments to be undergone after death, nevertheless after the fact, the obligation of repeating confessions is not established. Therefore the penitent is not to be obliged to undergo that burden." Thus Gury 408. Now indeed in the Case it is not to be doubted that Albert's attrition was from a supernatural motive, since the object was for him as it is apprehended by supernatural faith. And in this way attrition of this kind is brought back to attrition from fear of divine judgment begun. For although the punishments are temporal, nevertheless if they are considered as inflicted by God, they indicate to us His wrath, and in a certain way begin divine punishment, unless we amend. Under this aspect, however, they can well move to supernatural attrition, which is very well reduced to that which is from fear of hell. Suarez, d. 5, s. 2, n. 15; Lugo, d. 15, n. 137.

But although grave theologians regard attrition of this kind only as probable, nevertheless several and also grave theologians regard it as morally certain, and even as altogether certain. I. M. 687. And the distinguished Ballerini, in Gury, Comp. 452, says that the opposed reasons detract nothing from the firmness of the common doctrine, which stands for the sufficiency of such attrition, nor can they reconcile any, even slight, probability to the opposed opinion. Hence according to this common doctrine Albert would have been disturbed neither before nor after confession. But since Albert's Case regards confessions already made, and certainly the opinion affirming that the aforesaid attrition suffices for the sacrament of penance is at least probable and most probable, Albert certainly ought altogether to have been absolved by his confessor, and could by no means be obliged to institute a general confession of his whole life.

Precedence of contrition - Eleonora, approaching the sacrament of penance for several years, is accustomed to act thus: 1. On Saturday night she institutes an examination of conscience, and is sincerely sorry for all sins. But on Sunday, very early in the morning, she makes confession, without seeing to the eliciting of a new act of contrition, although sometimes she reveals a mortal sin which had not occurred to memory in the examination on the preceding day. 2. On a certain day, when she had fallen into a lethal sin, she at once was contrite for it, yet without ordering it to confession. After three or four hours she goes to the church to pray. But seeing the parish priest coming out of the confessional seat, she runs to meet him, and at once confesses without a new act of contrition. 3. Sometimes, after absolution has been received, she remembers some sin which had not before occurred to memory; she opens it to the confessor, and is absolved of it, without becoming contrite again.

It is asked: What is to be said to the Case?

R. "More probably the contrition of Eleonora, elicited on the day before confession, was valid, because it seems virtually to persevere, especially if it had great intensity; nor does it stand in the way that the woman had forgotten a grave sin, because that sin was implicitly contained in the general contrition for the others. Eleonora is nevertheless to be exhorted that in the future she elicit an act of contrition immediately before confession.

More probably also the contrition of Eleonora was valid, although it was not elicited in order to the sacrament. The reason is that, from Trent, that attrition is said to dispose to justification in the sacrament which excludes the will of sinning with hope of pardon. Now all these things are verified in our Case. Therefore. Moreover, although sorrow was not ordered to confession by an antecedent relation, nevertheless it is ordered by a consequent relation, in that it is still verified that sorrow is laid open through confession. Nevertheless the opposed opinion is not without its probability, and therefore in practice contrition is to be renewed before confession for greater safety. St. Lig., n. 447.

Still more probably in the third Case the contrition of the woman was valid. For it was by no means necessary to elicit a new act of contrition in order to obtain a new absolution, because the prior contrition certainly persevered, which, as universal, was extended to all sins, even those omitted from forgetfulness. Add that it is not required that contrition be explicitly ordered to the sacrament, as has been said. Moreover explicit sorrow seems to be manifested in the very act of accusing that sin. Thus commonly. But since several theologians contradict, although relying on a slight foundation, in practice the opposed opinion, as safer, is to be chosen.

But Eleonora is by no means to be disturbed by reason of defect of contrition, which more probably in every case was sufficient for the value of the sacrament. Before confession indeed the safer opinion is to be followed, because there is question of rendering the value of the sacrament more certain; but after confession has been made, there is no longer question except of the precept of confession, which more probably has been satisfied. Hence this rule can well be applied: "An obligation is not to be imposed, unless it is certainly established." Thus Gury 410-412.

Now indeed Eleonora's contrition in the first Case seems not only more probably, but morally certainly, valid in order to confession. For first, the interval of time inserted from the beginning of Saturday night to very early Sunday morning is very brief, and after the examination of conscience and contrition were made on Saturday night, in approaching confession very early on Sunday morning by force of that examination and contrition, it is most evident that that contrition virtually perseveres, since with so solicitous diligence its effect is placed. Moreover, from the common opinion, even the stricter doctors make no difficulty as to so brief a space of time, since they commonly extend it much more. And Fr. Gury himself in the Compendium affirms that contrition can persevere according to the common opinion for one, or even several days, which St. Alphonsus also admits and approves, l. 6, n. 446; I. M. 682.

Not only more probably, but again with moral certitude, the contrition of Eleonora seems to have been valid in the second Case. For first, Eleonora's contrition has all those things which the Council of Trent requires, sess. 14, cap. 4, where it professedly treats of contrition, which is the principal act on the part of the penitent in the sacrament of penance. And unless we wish to say that the Council handed on imperfect doctrine, this argument is not only probable, but demonstrative. Moreover, if perfect contrition, from the Council of Trent, l. c., does not justify except with the desire of the sacrament, and yet this desire need not necessarily be explicit, but an implicit desire suffices, namely the desire which by its nature is included in contrition itself, so consequently it is that if some ordering to the sacrament is required in contrition, this certainly need not necessarily be explicit, but that implicit ordering suffices, which by its nature is included in contrition itself. Otherwise there would also be that other inconvenience, that more would be required for justification from contrition and the sacrament than from contrition alone, although it is altogether certain that less is required; since even simple attrition suffices for justification with the sacrament. There is added that in the Instruction which is found at the end of the Roman Council, Appendix 29, nothing at all is had about this explicit ordering of contrition to confession. And in the formula of the act of contrition which is proposed there, nothing at all is also had about that explicit ordering. Now who will dare to affirm that contrition duly made according to the aforesaid formula is not sufficient for then receiving the sacrament of penance? I. M. 683.

Likewise in the third Case the confession of Eleonora seems not only more probable, but also morally certain. And, if the opposed opinion, as Fr. Gury himself says, rests only on a slight foundation, it cannot therefore be held as truly and solidly probable, because several theologians contradict. For it is very well known that extrinsic probability has value insofar as it is presumed to rest upon intrinsic probability. Therefore where intrinsic arguments are lacking, it helps little to heap together the names of authors. Cf. I. M. 684. For the rest, the Case of Eleonora is also admitted by several who admit the probability of the opposed opinion. For the sin forgotten in the preceding confession was contained also in the preceding sorrow. Therefore when someone confesses it, in reality he confesses it by force of the preceding sorrow, and that sorrow is evidently extended to this new confession, which is a certain supplement of the former. And if contrition virtually persevering suffices for confession, by what reason can it be said that contrition in the Case does not suffice, when most evidently, as is proved from its very effect, contrition virtually perseveres and moves to confess the forgotten sin at once?

Intensity of sorrow - Clodomira, a pious matron, very anxious about the sorrow required for confession, complains to her confessor: 1. That she feels more intense sorrow over the death of her son than over her sins. 2. That she does not seem to herself prepared to suffer all evils, e.g., to be burned alive, rather than commit sin. 3. That she recoils more from a monster, from a fierce beast, from plague, from slaughter, from fire, than from sin. - Wherefore she thinks that she has never made valid confessions; and she asks to make a general confession of her whole life. Yet she affirms that she is sorry and very sorry; but that she is not sorry enough for so many and such great sins by which she offended the divine Majesty.

It is asked: What is to be said to the Case?

R. Clodomira, as to the first, ought not to be disturbed. For the value of contrition there is not required a certain intensity of sorrow; just as neither for sinning is required a certain intensity of will. For the degree of sorrow does not pertain to its essence. Moreover Clodomira confuses sorrow, an act of the will, with sensible sorrow. The former is necessary for true penance, not the latter. For in contrition there is a twofold sorrow. One is in the will itself, and is displeasure over past sin. The other is in the sensitive part, which is caused from the former sorrow, in one way from necessity of nature, according as the lower powers follow the motion of the higher faculties; in another way from choice, according as the penitent man excites this sorrow in himself, so that he may be sorry for sins. That sorrow of the will in contrition exceeds all other sorrows, because as much as something pleases, so much does its contrary displease. But the last end pleases above all things, since all things are desired on account of it; and therefore sin, which turns away from the last end, ought to displease above all things. And thus this sorrow is highest and greatest of all, appreciatively, insofar as man ought by his will to detest nothing else as much as sin. But the other sensible sorrow is not necessarily highest in either of the said ways. For first the lower powers are moved more vehemently by their proper objects than from the overflowing of the higher powers. And therefore the nearer the operation of the higher powers is to the objects of the lower powers, the more they follow their motion. Wherefore the sorrow which overflows from reason deliberating about bodily things is greater than that which overflows from reason considering spiritual things. Hence sorrow in the sensitive part overflowing from the displeasure of reason concerning sin is not greater than other sorrows arising from displeasure over sensible evils. And similarly neither is the sorrow which is voluntarily assumed necessarily greater; because the lower affection does not obey the command of the will so that such and so great a passion follows in the lower appetite as the higher orders. St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 3, a. 1; I. M. 679.

As to the second and third, although such really ought to be the disposition of the contrite person, nevertheless he is not to be tested concerning sensible comparisons of this kind, because a man cannot easily measure his affections. Sometimes that which displeases less seems to displease more, because it is nearer to sensible harm, which becomes more known, and more affects the sensible appetite. Likewise, as delightful things move more when considered in particular than in common or generally, so terrible things terrify more if they are considered in particular. Hence to descend in such matters to individual things is to lead a man into temptation and to furnish an occasion of sinning. But although the contrite person is bound in general to wish to suffer any punishment whatever rather than to sin, nevertheless he is not bound in particular to descend to this punishment or that; indeed he would act foolishly if someone were to solicit himself or another about punishments of this kind. St. Thomas, Suppl., l. c., ad 4; Quodl. 1, a. 9; I. M. 679.

Vol. II, Treatise On the Sacrament …, Pt. II, Chapter I. On Contrition · Vol. II, Treatise On the Sacrament …, Pt. II, Ch. I, Article I. On Contrition · Vol. II, Treatise On the Sacrament …, Pt. II, Ch. I, Art. I, § I. On the Necessity of Contrition · Vol. II, Treatise On the Sacrament …, Pt. II, Ch. I, Art. I, § II. On the Qualities of Contrition

As to that, finally, which Clodomira affirms in the last place, it must be noted that, speaking in itself and abstractly, it is not enough for the required contrition if the penitent is sorry that he is not sorry. For, speaking in itself and abstractly, if someone is sorry that he is not sorry, therefore he is not sorry; nor can sorrow for the defect of sorrow for sins supply this sorrow. But speaking practically, ordinarily penitents who are sorry from the fact that they are not sorry, or not sufficiently sorry, have true sorrow for sins and truly detest them; yet they are sorry that they are not sorry, not because they truly are not sorry, but because they do not experience sensible and intense sorrow in themselves. Therefore for the most part they are not to be disturbed about sorrow, but are to be exhorted to confidence. And this seems to be the Case of Clodomira, since she is a pious matron and is very anxious about sorrow. G. 414; Elbel 80; D'Annib. 312; I. M. 679.

Gury-Ballerini, Compendium of Moral Theology (8th ed., 1884)

Jean-Pierre Gury, S.J.; notes by Antonio Ballerini, S.J. — 106 passages

Vol. II, Treatise On the Sacrament …, Pt. II, Chapter I. On Contrition

n. 440.

Contrition is sorrow of soul and detestation ¹ for a sin committed, with the purpose of not sinning henceforth. Thus the Council of Trent, sess. 14, ch. 4.

¹ The Doctors dispute, as can be seen in St. Alphonsus (bk. 6, no. 435), whether contrition consists in sorrow or in detestation, and what order obtains between these two. But this matters little; nor is it to be feared that either one will be absent. For they mutually presuppose one another, and one is necessarily joined to the other. For, as St. Alphonsus says, he who detests his sin, that is, would wish that he had not sinned, necessarily grieves over it; and, in turn, he who grieves over a sin necessarily detests it. Moreover, detestation appears to extend more widely than sorrow. For sorrow properly can be referred to sins committed by oneself, whereas detestation can be referred to one's own sins and those of others, and both to past and to future sins.

n. 440.

The detestation of sin, in which contrition principally consists, regards the past; but the purpose is concerned with the future. This definition abstracts from the new law, under which contrition can have no efficacy without the desire of confession. The same Council of Trent adds a little below: with the desire of performing the remaining things ... which are required for rightly receiving this Sacrament (of Penance). Hence the definition of St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 1, art. 1, agrees: Sorrow undertaken for sins, with the purpose of confessing and making satisfaction.

n. 440.

Hence we must speak: 1. of contrition strictly so called; 2. of the purpose.

Vol. II, Treatise On the Sacrament …, Pt. II, Ch. I, Article I. On Contrition

n. 441.

Contrition is distinguished as twofold: 1. Perfect contrition, which is the detestation of sin from the special motive of perfect charity, or of the goodness of God supremely loved for His own sake ¹.

¹ Some have thought (see St. Alphonsus, bk. 6, no. 436, and Scavini, tr. 1, disp. 1, ch. 2, art. 1, sec. 1, q. 1) that for perfect contrition it is more probably not sufficient that it be elicited from the motive merely of some one divine attribute, but that it is required to proceed from the motive of the offense against the divine goodness, insofar as this goodness embraces all the perfections of God. They attribute this opinion to Cardinal de Lugo, Suarez, Vasquez, etc.

But the authority from which the entire strength of this opinion arises is altogether wanting. For the cited Doctors do not dispute whether the motive of contrition ought to be taken from the aggregate of the divine perfections rather than from some particular perfection of God, but whether the motive of another virtue besides charity suffices for perfect contrition; for example, if the sorrow is (as Suarez says, De Poenitentia, disp. 2, sect. 3, no. 4, and disp. 4, sect. 2, no. 15) from the motive of obedience, religion, penance, gratitude, etc.; because, as Lugo says (De Poenitentia, disp. 5, no. 3), the sin is against the precept of Him whom we are bound to obey, or against His worship, etc. The formal motive of these virtues, as is plain, is different from the motive of charity.

Moreover, since the formal object of charity is the supreme excellence and infinite perfection of God, on account of which He is to be loved above all things with an appreciative love, and since this infinite perfection and excellence of the supreme good shines forth in each of the attributes, Ripalda (De Virtutibus Theologicis, disp. 35, sect. 1) therefore rightly establishes, from the common opinion of the Theologians whom he cites (ibid., no. 4), this thesis: The formal object of charity is the divine goodness insofar as it is common and proper to the nature of God and to the attributes. St. Thomas expressed this more briefly (De Virtutibus, q. 2, art. 4, ad 5), saying that an object of this kind is the divine good.

Nor should it be passed over here that the objects of the other virtues which we have mentioned, namely, obedience, gratitude, religion, etc., if not a motive of perfect contrition, are certainly a most apt motive of imperfect contrition; indeed, by this path penitents can easily be drawn to the motive of perfect charity. For if, together with the motive of obedience, religion, justice, etc., there is added a consideration of the infinite excellence of God, to whom an injury was either inflicted, or obedience denied, or worship withheld, one will very easily arrive at the perfection of charity. These things ought to be ready at hand for the confessor, so that there may readily be available to him a means of advancing penitents to more perfect things at the opportune time.

** The VV. have written twenty-five columns to attack this Note (pp. 399-411). Nevertheless, they have scarcely, if at all, touched the hinge of the question. St. Alphonsus had written (bk. 6, no. 432): It is asked from what motive the act of perfect contrition ought to be elicited? And he replies: The first opinion, which several hold, says that it can be elicited from the motive of any offended divine attribute, of justice, wisdom, mercy, etc. And Suarez and Lugo rightly judge this probable. The reason is that he who loves the divine justice or mercy for God's sake already loves God ...; therefore, he who grieves over sin because of God's offended mercy or justice ... already grieves for God's sake.... But the second opinion, common and more probable, which Suarez, Vasquez (who calls the opposite erroneous), and Croix with Arriaga, Dicastillo, and others generally hold, teaches that contrition must altogether proceed from the sole motive of charity, namely, of the divine goodness offended, insofar as this embraces all the perfections of God.

Now, as regards the first opinion, it is false that either Suarez, Lugo, or Vasquez, in the cited places, discusses an act by which either justice or mercy, etc., is loved for God's sake; rather, they treat of sorrow elicited, not from any motive of charity, but from the motive of another virtue, not theological but moral, such as religion, justice, obedience, etc.; and they ask whether this sorrow is that perfect contrition which has the power of justifying.

Thus Vasquez (q. 85, art. 2, no. 45, which is the place cited by St. Alphonsus): I would judge erroneous the opinion of the more recent authors, who teach that the act of contrition ... is not the love of God, nor necessarily proceeds from the love of God, and NEVERTHELESS JUSTIFIES.... But concerning sorrow which is not the love of God and does not proceed from the love of God, he had premised (loc. cit., no. 35): Insofar as it is against the justice of God, it is hatred from THE SPECIAL VIRTUE OF PENANCE, and thus the hatred (of sin) under this aspect is a compensation for the offense from justice, such as ours can be found before God. Concerning this matter he adds below (ibid., no. 38): Nor does there appear to be another manner of justice on our part toward God than toward His precept, which OBEDIENCE supplies, ... or finally RELIGION in rendering, nevertheless, the worship due to God, which also is constituted by the Scholastics as a part of potential justice. Therefore, no trace is found here of the love of God from the motive of some attribute, of which St. Alphonsus speaks.

The holy Doctor then cites Lugo, De Poenitentia, disp. 5, no. 3. But neither does Lugo have a single word about that love of God from the motive of one attribute. Behold his words: Some Theologians teach that, for contrition, it suffices that the sorrow be either from the motive of charity (and this Lugo also admits with all the Doctors), or from the motive of obedience, or religion, or penance: namely, because sin displeases God, whom we love (and this is the motive of charity), or because it is against His precept, whom we ought to obey, or against His worship, or finally because it is against the right of God, which we are bound to observe, which they say is the motive of penance.... Father Suarez says that this opinion is probable, and that it once pleased him ..., although Father Suarez speaks only of sorrow arising from the motive of justice.... But to this sorrow from the motive either of obedience, religion, penance, or justice, in which Lugo finds nothing of that love on account of some divine attribute of which St. Alphonsus speaks, and which he indeed presents as moral virtues (no. 6), Lugo himself opposes the motive of charity, without, however, adding anything about a motive from all the perfections of God. Thus he says (no. 3): Yet other Theologians commonly teach that sorrow from the motive of the love of God is altogether required. And again (ibid., no. 10): It must altogether be said, with the common opinion, that contrition sufficient for justification must arise from the particular motive of charity, namely, of God loved above all things.

Nor do the things which he adduces from Suarez serve the purpose of St. Alphonsus any better. Speaking (De Poenitentia, disp. 4, sect. 2, no. 13) of the detestation of sin which is from the proper motive of justice, Suarez writes: It has seemed probable to some that this act, of itself and without formal love, suffices for the nature of contrition. And this opinion is indeed probable, and at one time simply pleased me. But now, the matter having been better considered, it seems that the contrary opinion is to be chosen. St. Alphonsus, as is evident from his words cited above, here understands the motive of justice as the divine attribute of justice which is the object of love. But nothing is more foreign to the opinion of Suarez; for he here understands justice as the virtue by which the sinner wishes to compensate God for the injury inflicted. Hence he writes (disp. 2, sect. 3, no. 4): Since this virtue of penance is a certain justice toward God, its object will be the divine right.

Dicastillo, whom St. Alphonsus nevertheless adduces for his purpose, presents the state of the question in no different manner. For Dicastillo says (De Poenitentia, tr. 8, disp. 2, no. 106): We now ask whether, in order that penance be perfect and sufficient (for the remission of sins), an act of love of God is required; and some deny this, thinking that perfect penance can exist without that love. For they think it sufficient that it be FROM THE MOTIVE OF OTHER VIRTUES; Suarez confesses that he at one time inclined to this opinion.... But he speaks of the motive according to which he thinks an act of the special virtue of penance is constituted. And other more recent authors think the same concerning other motives, especially according to the various opinions for establishing the motive of the special virtue of penance. Then, against these, he establishes this thesis (ibid., no. 112): It must altogether be asserted that penance is never contrition sufficient for the remission of sins outside the Sacrament without a formal act of love of God, and that this act belongs to the intrinsic nature of perfect contrition, which is distinguished from attrition. Therefore, it is not true, as St. Alphonsus supposes, that Dicastillo disputes whether merely some one divine attribute or rather the aggregate of all the perfections is the formal object of charity and therefore of perfect contrition, and that he defends the second opinion against the first.

Moreover, if it is asked by what means St. Alphonsus, with no one preceding him, gave a new face to the question ordinarily treated here, and attributed to the cited Doctors opinions about which they themselves had said nothing, and indeed had not even thought, one perhaps will not wander altogether from the truth who thinks that this happened to the holy Doctor merely because of a less skillful interpretation of the words of Croix, from whom he also borrowed the citations. For Croix had written (bk. 6, pt. 2, no. 722): This contrition (sufficient for justification without the Sacrament) must proceed from the motive of the goodness of God, and therefore be a hatred of sin because it is evil to God. St. Thomas, Arriaga, Dicastillo, and others most commonly teach this against a few who have said that this contrition can proceed from the motive of religion alone, or justice, or another virtue regarding God, apart from every punishment or reward, and therefore that it suffices to detest sin, for example, because it is against the worship of God, against the right of God, etc.; Suarez calls this opinion probable, and Aversa and Lugo defend it as probable; on the contrary, Arriaga says that it is not intrinsically probable, ... Vasquez calls it erroneous.

That St. Alphonsus took both the core of the question and the citations from this source is gathered not obscurely, not only from his words copied above, but also from the edition of the year 1748, where he writes (bk. 6, tr. 4, ch. 1, dub. 2, note A):

Question II. From what motive can contrition proceed? Some think that it can proceed from any offended divine attribute; but most commonly, says Croix, bk. 6, pt. 2, no. 722, with St. Thomas, Dicastillo, and others, contrition must proceed from the motive of the offended Goodness of God. Accordingly, the contrition which Croix had said, according to the opinion of a few, proceeds from the motive of religion, justice, or another virtue regarding God, the holy Doctor interpreted as contrition which proceeds from any offended divine attribute. He afterwards explained this more fully in the edition of the year 1757, saying that it is contrition which proceeds from the motive of any offended divine attribute, of justice, wisdom, mercy; and he gave the reason, as we saw above, because he who loves divine justice ... for God's sake already loves God; hence, he who grieves over sin on account of offended justice already grieves for God's sake. Everyone sees for himself how foreign these things are to the sense in which Croix, after Suarez, Lugo, Vasquez, Dicastillo, etc., spoke of contrition from the motive of justice or religion.

Lugo (loc. cit., no. 9) certainly indicates more aptly how contrition from the motive of other virtues can in some way be drawn to the motive of love of God, insofar as, he says, to love is said to be to will good to someone; for since through religion we will the worship of God, through penance we will not to offend Him, through obedience we will to fulfill His will, etc., all these things appear to contain love of God. He then rejects these things and establishes the contrary thesis (ibid., no. 10), which we related above. For these acts pertain not to theological but to moral virtues, and they furnish a motive not of perfect contrition but of attrition, no differently from sorrow from the motive of ingratitude toward the most beneficent God.

These things having been premised, the reply to the twenty-five columns of the VV. is easy. For: 1. what they heap together concerning the formal object of charity considered either adequately or inadequately has nothing to do with the argument of the Note which they undertake to attack; 2. from what has been said, it is sufficiently plain whether the citations of Vasquez, Suarez, and Lugo, whom St. Alphonsus cited, are pertinent.

n. 441.

Imperfect contrition, or attrition, which is the detestation of sin arising from another motive, for example, from consideration of the turpitude of sin, or from fear of hell, or from love of eternal beatitude. - Council of Trent, sess. 14, ch. 4.

n. 441.

Three things are to be explained here: 1. the necessity; 2. the qualities; 3. the efficacy of contrition.

Vol. II, Treatise On the Sacrament …, Pt. II, Ch. I, Art. I, § I. On the Necessity of Contrition

n. 442.

Things to be established. I. Either perfect contrition with the desire of the Sacrament, or imperfect contrition with the Sacrament itself, is altogether necessary to the sinner by a necessity of means for obtaining justification and salvation.

n. 442.

It is established from Sacred Scripture, Matt. 3:2: Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven has drawn near. - Luke 13:3: Unless you shall have penance, you shall all likewise perish. - And ibid. 5: Unless you shall do penance, you shall all likewise perish. - Ecclus. 2:22: If we shall not do penance, we shall fall into the hands of the Lord and not into the hands of men. - Apoc. 2:5: Do penance and perform your first works; otherwise I come to you and will move your candlestick out of its place, unless you shall do penance. - Acts 3:19: Do penance, therefore, and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out.

n. 442.

It is established from the Councils, especially from the Council of Trent, sess. 14, ch. 4: At every time this movement of contrition has been necessary for obtaining pardon of sins. And sess. 6, ch. 6, where hatred and detestation for sin are numbered among the chief dispositions for justification.

II. Mortal sin being supposed, contrition is necessary by a necessity of precept, at least at some time in life. For this precept is gathered from the words of Sacred Scripture related above, from the words of St. John the Baptist at the beginning of his preaching, and especially from the words of Christ Himself in the Gospel. That contrition which is required for justification is understood to fall under the precept, namely, perfect contrition outside the Sacrament, or attrition with the Sacrament. - St. Lig., no. 337. - Billuart, diss. 4, art. 3, and all others.

III. The precept of contrition obliges sometimes per se, sometimes per accidens.

It obliges per se when a grave necessity of reconciling oneself with God presses, namely, in even probable danger of death, and this on account of the precept of attaining the ultimate end; likewise, when someone is in the state of sin, because of the proximate danger of dying in this wretched state ¹, or of falling into graver sins ².

¹ These things are not to be understood so generally as though a man were obliged to this immediately after sin; for that, as the Author himself teaches a little below, is contrary to the common opinion of Theologians after St. Thomas, and is excluded by the same reasons by which St. Thomas (In IV Sent., dist. 17, q. 3, art. 1, q. 4) rejects the necessity of confessing immediately after sin. Apart from the point of death, however, the more common opinion, as Palaus says (De Poenitentia, disp. un., punct. 3, no. 9), admits at least that delay which the precept of the Church concerning annual confession also admits (see Laymann, De Poenitentia, ch. 2, no. 6); and St. Alphonsus (bk. 6, no. 473) attributes this doctrine even to St. Thomas.

² This obligation also of eliciting an act of contrition for warding off other sins is a mere opinion of certain authors. Therefore, the statement of Cardinal de Lugo (De Poenitentia, disp. 15, nos. 55-56) is to be observed: Because of the variety of opinions, we cannot impose upon him (namely, the penitent) a certain obligation.

On this argument, the things which Suarez has (De Poenitentia, disp. 15, sect. 6, nos. 7-8) and Cardinal de Lugo (loc. cit. and disp. 7, nos. 240, 242) are to be seen; from these it may be concluded either that no necessity of eliciting contrition for this reason is proved, or that its omission is not a sin distinct from that into which one falls because that means was omitted.

It obliges per accidens when another precept presses which cannot be fulfilled without contrition, especially in the following cases: namely, when the precept of annual confession presses; when the precept of an act of charity presses; when one guilty of grave sin is about to receive or administer a Sacrament; whenever the Sacrament of Penance is received, even for the sake of devotion. - St. Lig., ibid.

Questions. QUESTION 1. Does the precept of contrition oblige immediately after a mortal sin has been committed?

Reply. Negative, against a few of the ancients ³, because the precept of contrition is affirmative, namely, Do penance; but an affirmative precept does not oblige at every moment; therefore, the precept of contrition does not press immediately after a sin has been committed. Moreover, sins would thus be multiplied according to the number of instants of delay, which is contrary to the common sense of the faithful ⁴. - St. Lig., no. 437. - Elbel, no. 54. - Billuart, etc.

³ Nevertheless, this opinion is undeservedly attributed to most of them; for example, Alexander of Hales, Paludanus, and Thomas of Strasbourg indeed affirm that the penitent is bound to be contrite for committed sins always throughout his whole life, but they explain this so that he is bound to it negatively, that is, not again to take complacency in the sin when it occurs to his memory. Cajetan (Summa, s.v. Contritio) explains this opinion thus: From the fact that sins occur to the memory, just as one is not bound to confess, so neither is he bound to be contrite. For each is an affirmative precept, obliging at a time of necessity, which memory does not constitute; but he is bound always not to approve, not to take complacency, because these are negative precepts, which oblige always and at every time.

** It was indeed a remarkable achievement of Cardena that, against the common opinion, he gathered together (pt. 4, diss. 6, no. 47) both the authors just mentioned and several others, among whom scarcely, if at all, one is to be found who really pertains to the matter. He contends that this obligation of applying the means of justification immediately after sin arises from this (which no one either before or after him ever dreamed), because, as he says (no. 53), Christ commanded all men in the Gospel that they always watch and be ready for the hour of death to be expected, because they know neither the day nor the hour.

⁴ This reason is to be understood with discretion. For the Doctors are not accustomed to say that one who, for example, culpably delays restitution or annual confession sins anew at every instant, but rather whenever, advertent to the obligation and able to fulfill it, he neglects it. Indeed, even this occurs only when the subsequent acts do not follow by virtue or efficacy of the preceding purpose. See On Sins, vol. 1, no. 166.

QUESTION 2. What delay of contrition induces a grave sin?

Reply. The Theologians do not agree. It is indeed commonly admitted that there is a grave delay of contrition independently of the precept of annual confession; but how great this delay must be in order to be judged grave cannot be determined with certainty. Some extend it to a year; others to six months; others, with St. Alphonsus, to a month. Yet no reason or authority favors this last opinion ⁵. Indeed, St. Alphonsus himself adds, no. 437, that sinners, especially the uneducated, can for the most part, indeed almost always, be excused from this sin of delayed penance because of inadvertence ⁶.

⁵ ** For this monthly obligation of contrition the VV. produce a threefold argument from St. Alphonsus (p. 394, no. 106). 1. Because we are bound each month to elicit an act of charity, as the holy Doctor has it (bk. 2, no. 8, and Homo apostolicus, tr. 16, no. 10). 2. Because otherwise a man could with difficulty observe the divine commandments for a long time (bk. 2, no. 8). 3. To this is added the authority of St. Thomas, who cites St. Gregory the Great and says: Without justifying grace it is not possible for one to remain long without mortal sin.

Reply to 1. Elsewhere (vol. 1, no. 218, q. 2, in the Note) it was shown that an obligation of this kind is urged without foundation either of reason or authority, and indeed contrary to principles received by all.

To 2. Reply: If contrition were the only means of avoiding sins, let it pass; otherwise, I deny it. See Suarez, De Poenitentia, disp. 15, sect. 6, no. 7, and Lugo, De Poenitentia, disp. 15, nos. 51-52.

To 3. I reply by using the words of St. Alphonsus (bk. 6, no. 437), who, after saying that he thinks one who, existing in mortal sin, delays penance for a notable time is in no way excused from mortal sin, then adds: But what this notable time is, the Doctors disagree greatly.... The Salmanticenses, Palaus with Laymann and Elbel, Lugo, Henno, etc., think that one who satisfies the annual confession is excused; and St. Thomas, in IV Sent., dist. 17, q. 3, art. 1, q. 4, appears to adhere to this opinion. Therefore, according to St. Alphonsus himself, the cited words of St. Thomas, with St. Thomas himself interpreting both himself and St. Gregory the Great, are to be understood of those who do not satisfy the obligation of annual confession.

Moreover, the things noted in vol. 1, loc. cit., must be recalled here also, namely, that a conscience of a grave obligation or grave guilt must not be introduced where this is not established by a certain reason; for this also is a most firm principle of St. Alphonsus himself.

⁶ Cardinal de Lugo (De Poenitentia, disp. 15, no. 55) speaks thus on this matter: It is not necessary to question the penitent concerning this sin of omitting due penance throughout the whole year, whether per se from the precept of the virtue of penance, ... or per accidens for avoiding the danger of a new sin, nor even to admonish him in particular.... And this can be proved by the example of the precept of loving God, concerning which penitents are not questioned in particular whether they have loved God above all things, nor are they admonished concerning that obligation of fulfilling this precept at some time; both because from the very course of the confession it sufficiently appears how the penitent is disposed toward God, and because, on account of the variety of opinions, we cannot impose upon him a certain obligation. Indeed, he continues thus concerning the omission of the questioning and admonition: Such questioning or admonition appears useless, indeed harmful. For either the penitent is invincibly ignorant of that obligation; and then it is better to leave him in good faith than to bring him into bad faith, from which his scandal can prudently be feared. For very few among sinners of this kind will afterward, because of that knowledge, be moved to grieve over their sins before the end of the year; rather, they will add this also to their other sins by omitting the penance which they ought to have. But if the penitent knew such an obligation, he will be admonished about it in vain. Finally, he proposes an objection, in solving which he also touches upon the uncertainty of the obligation. You will say: nevertheless, it will be necessary to inquire concerning the omission ...; because if he knew the obligation, or was culpably ignorant of it, the omission was a sin, and consequently must be explained in confession. But to the contrary: neither under this heading is it necessary to inquire distinctly; for EVEN IF IT WERE CONCEDED THAT SUCH AN OBLIGATION EXISTS, nevertheless, the Confessor, having heard the confession of the penitent, from the sins which he committed throughout the whole year sufficiently understands that he did not satisfy the obligation, IF THERE WAS ANY, of grieving frequently over his sins.... Therefore, he would be questioned or admonished more distinctly in vain, especially in such matter CONCERNING WHICH THE CONFESSOR HIMSELF COULD NOT ESTABLISH ANYTHING CERTAIN FOR DETERMINING THE OBLIGATION for the following time (ibid., no. 56).

QUESTION 3. Is one who at the point of death receives the Sacrament of Penance with attrition bound, in addition, to elicit an act of perfect contrition?

Reply 1. He does not appear to be bound to an explicit act of contrition, since he is morally certain that he has been justified by attrition alone with the Sacrament. - Thus Lugo and others commonly, against some.

Reply 2. According to some, however, he is bound, for they say that the precept of perfect charity presses especially at the point of death. Whatever may be the case, it is expedient that the dying be excited, as far as can be done, both to an act of charity and to an act of perfect contrition. - St. Lig., no. 437 ⁷.

⁷ ** The VV. here produce (p. 935, no. 107) the things which St. Alphonsus has (bk. 6, no. 437): Each opinion, says the holy Doctor, is probable; but the first (the second here in Gury) is altogether to be counseled.... Indeed, I say that it is altogether to be followed by one who is at the actual point of death. For then everyone is bound to elicit an act of charity ..., which no one can satisfy if, when the memory of sin occurs, he does not detest the sin from the same motive of charity.

Reply. If each opinion, as the holy Doctor testifies, is probable, therefore the obligation of either one can by no means be imposed. For obligation is so called from binding. But a doubtful law does not bind, as the holy Doctor repeats a hundred times. Therefore, a merely probable law does not bind.

But what is added concerning the obligation of an act of charity at the point of death requires a distinction. For if the discussion concerns a man in the state of sin who has no other means of justification, it is conceded that there is an obligation of obtaining justification through contrition perfected by charity; otherwise, it is denied. See what is said concerning this argument in vol. 1, no. 219, resolution 2, in the Note.

QUESTION 4. For obtaining grace in the Sacrament, are explicit acts of Faith and Hope required in addition to sorrow?

Reply. Negative. The reason is that it cannot be proved by any probable argument that these acts are explicitly required ⁸. Moreover, a penitent eliciting an act of sorrow also in some way explicitly and exercitively elicits these acts, although not reflexively; because he then without doubt exercitively believes and hopes that his sins are to be remitted through the Sacrament of Penance by virtue of the merits of Christ. - St. Lig., no. 439, and others commonly, against some.

⁸ Some required these acts because they are expressly mentioned by the Council of Trent where the process of justification is described (sess. 6, ch. 6). This reason would also prove the necessity of hearing a preacher of the faith, since it is said there: conceiving faith from hearing; and, moreover, the insufficiency of sorrow perfected by charity without imperfect sorrow, because it is added there: they are struck by fear of divine justice!

Suarez speaks to the matter (De Poenitentia, disp. 4, sect. 2, no. 7): Finally, in sess. 6, ch. 6, the Council numbers several acts in the disposition of the sinner, all of which need not always concur formally, but it suffices that they concur virtually or implicitly, as an act of hope.

And yet there are confessors who, led by that prejudice, require penitents before the confession of sins to recite the customary formulas of the acts of the theological virtues, unless perhaps they even dismiss them so that they may first satisfy this supposed necessity. This is all the more remarkable because in the customary formula of the act of faith you will not find the things which the Council said must be believed, namely, that God through Christ will be propitious to him, etc.

n. 446.

QUESTION 5. Does one sin who confesses some venial sin without sorrow?

n. 446.

Reply. Negative, more probably, provided that sorrow concerning other sins, or at least one, is not lacking, and that the penitent does not knowingly submit the other sins as matter of absolution ⁹. The reason is:

⁹ Distinguish with Suarez (De Poenitentia, disp. 20, sect. 6, no. 7) a twofold manner in which someone can confess a venial sin without true attrition or a purpose of amendment. 1. If he discloses to the confessor this very defect of sorrow and purpose; then neither ought the priest to absolve from such a sin, nor, if the penitent is prudent, ought he to tell it for this end, namely, as matter of the Sacrament, since it cannot truly be such. Nevertheless, it can licitly be told either for the sake of humility, counsel, or incitement to true penance; but this manner has nothing to do with the present matter. 2. If he discloses the venial sin over which he does not grieve, like the others, as matter of absolution. Then, says Suarez, many think it a mortal sin.... But although it cannot be denied that it is some fault, nevertheless I do not judge it mortal, because the matter of such a fault is light; because the defect of that sorrow or purpose, of itself and by its nature, is not contrary to grace and justification, which is the primary effect of this Sacrament signified by the form ...; nor does it impede the remission of the other venial sins concerning which a true accusation capable of true absolution is made, notwithstanding the obstacle of some venial sin. See also Lugo, De Poenitentia, disp. 14, no. 48.

Moreover, even that light fault of which Suarez speaks will more often be absent, either because the penitent does not advert to this defect of sorrow or to the disorder of that defect, or because all displeasure is rarely absent, although it may not be sufficiently efficacious; in this matter it is often difficult to avoid deception.

n. 446.

for the validity of the Sacrament, it suffices that some certain matter be furnished, namely, that there be sorrow for some venial sin; for venial sins are not necessary matter of the Sacrament of Penance, and, moreover, since they do not deprive one of the grace and friendship of God, some can be remitted without the others; 2. because no injury is thereby inflicted upon the Sacrament if they are declared for a good end, all levity being excluded. Indeed, those venial sins for which one does not have at least certain sorrow are also very often usefully disclosed, namely, for a fuller manifestation and direction of conscience, for conceiving some confusion, etc. - See St. Lig., no. 449.

QUESTION 6. Must contrition precede confession?

Reply 1. It must certainly precede absolution, or at least coexist with it, as is plain. But speaking practically, it is required that sorrow at least precede absolution, because no penitent who feels himself indisposed can ask for or receive absolution.

Reply 2. For the validity of the Sacrament, sorrow need not necessarily precede the accusation. The reason is that all things required for the Sacrament are present, provided that sorrow precedes absolution; nor can a precept of placing sorrow before the confession of sins be proved. - Lugo, Suarez, and others most commonly. Moreover, when Theologians require a sorrowful confession, they appear to require nothing other than that the confession not be a mere narration of sins, but that it be a self-accusation ordered to obtaining absolution. - St. Lig., no. 445 ¹⁰.

¹⁰ Thus St. Alphonsus: Laymann with others (namely, Coninck and Palaus) require the confession to be sorrowful, or sorrow to precede confession, only insofar as they demand that the confession not be a mere narration of sins but have the nature of sacramental confession; and for this it suffices that the confession be made with the intention of obtaining absolution, and that sorrow then be manifested at least by the petition or expectation of absolution. These last words meet Coninck's objection that sorrow must be sensible. Since various authors reply to this difficulty in various ways (see Lugo, disp. 14, nos. 14-18), as the words of St. Alphonsus indicate, perhaps another could also answer that there is no need at present for those subtleties if, according to what was said elsewhere (above, in the Note to no. 414), one prefers the opinion which holds the acts of the penitent merely as the matter circa quam, and therefore attributes to absolution alone that it is the efficacious sign of grace.

Moreover, Lugo writes thus concerning Coninck's opinion (De Poenitentia, loc. cit., no. 13): This opinion is singular and has all the other theologians against it.... It also has against it the practice of the faithful; for if they have perhaps confessed their sins without sorrow and afterward, moved by the exhortation of the confessor, are excited to have sorrow for their sins, they think they satisfy sufficiently if they then grieve before absolution. Indeed, confessors are accustomed especially then to move penitents to sorrow for this end (which is also the practice prescribed in the Roman Ritual), that they may dispose themselves to receive valid absolution; nor do they oblige them, after sorrow has then been conceived, to repeat the confession which was made without preceding sorrow. These things plainly show that the solicitude of certain confessors is to be banished to empty scruples: after they have excited the penitent to sorrow, they wish altogether to extort from him again some confession, at least in a few words, for example: I accuse myself of the sins narrated.

** And St. Alphonsus in fact has it thus (bk. 6, no. 445, at the end): But the Salmanticenses add that, merely for quieting scruples, Confessors are accustomed, if they doubt the internal indisposition of the penitent, to excite him to grieve over the sins explained a little before, which is done if it is said: I grieve over the sins narrated, and I accuse myself. The holy Doctor placed these words immediately after those read above in this Note, which the holy Doctor had said to show that in this question no discord exists among the Doctors except in words: Therefore, he says, these are not two opinions, but one.

Nevertheless, behold, the VV. (p. 935, no. 108) oppose the things which St. Alphonsus elsewhere has thus (Homo apostolicus, tr. 16, no. 20): Must sorrow precede confession? Laymann ... affirms it, both because sorrow must be sensible and cannot become such except by confession, and because confession ... must be sorrowful; otherwise it would be a simple narration of sins. But others more commonly deny it ..., and the Ritual favors them.... And they rightly reply to the first reason by saying that sorrow becomes sensible not only through confession, but also by other signs and words. But to the second reason they bring no convincing reply; hence, on account of it, I say that the first opinion is probable and therefore is to be followed in practice. They commonly agree ..., however, that it suffices if the penitent, after the act of sorrow, says: Again I accuse myself of all the sins confessed.

Reply. It does not sufficiently appear to what end the VV. produce these things. For in order that anyone may at times use the doctrine of St. Alphonsus, will it also be necessary that he undertake the burden of examining every little work of the holy Doctor? But where the opinions of the different Works of the holy Doctor do not appear to agree very well with one another, as in the present matter, by what means indeed will you avoid the complaints of the VV., who, whichever opinion of the holy Doctor you finally choose, do not hesitate to oppose to you the other, contrary one? And indeed, to the things which the VV. object from the Homo apostolicus, someone could reply according to the things which are taken from the Moral Work (bk. 6, no. 445), and therefore with St. Alphonsus as guide: I deny the antecedent, namely, that in either opinion confession cannot be called sorrowful; and consequently I deny the antecedent, namely, that the contrary opinion is probable; and therefore I deny the consequence, namely, that this opinion is to be followed and therefore, except perhaps for quieting an empty scruple, it is necessary to add: Again I accuse myself, etc. Why would this man be liable to the censure of the VV.? For even if he had chosen the opinion which is handed down in the Homo apostolicus, would it not have been ready at hand for the VV. to object the things read in the Moral Work?

But something more serious to be noticed in the present matter occurs. The opinions of St. Alphonsus which the VV. here object from the Homo apostolicus are also found in the Moral Work of the same holy Doctor published in earlier years, namely, both in the edition of the year 1748 (bk. 6, tr. 4, ch. 1, dub. 2, note A, q. III) and in the other of the year 1757 (bk. 6, no. 445); in that same year he published the work written in Italian under the title Istruzione e pratica per un Confessore, which work he then published in Latin in the year 1759 under the title Homo Apostolicus instructus, etc. But since these same opinions are not found in the later editions of the Moral Work, as is plain from the texts cited above from bk. 6, no. 445, it is manifest that the holy Doctor himself, his opinion having been changed, corrected that place. But if the matter is thus, by what right of equity, by what zeal for truth, or by what zeal for sound doctrine do the VV. now draw forth and oppose against one who proposes the doctrine refined and reformed by the holy Doctor himself those things which the same holy Doctor had rejected?

QUESTION 7. For what space of time does an act of sorrow morally endure for validly receiving the Sacrament?

Reply. This cannot be determined. According to the common opinion, it can endure for one or even several days, provided that it was elicited with the intention of making confession ¹¹, and was not retracted by another sin. Moreover, penitents should be counseled to renew, immediately before confession, the act of contrition previously elicited, especially if afterward they turned their mind to other things for a notable delay. - St. Lig., no. 446 ¹².

¹¹ What the Author indicates, that sorrow must be elicited with the intention of confession, has at most some probability. Indeed, even St. Alphonsus (bk. 6, no. 447) could not deny that the opinion is more probable which teaches that sorrow is valid even if someone elicits it while then thinking nothing of the Sacrament, which he afterwards receives when the occasion is offered.

On this argument, compare Cardinal de Lugo (De Poenitentia, disp. 14, nos. 37-40), who not only excludes by most weighty reasons the necessity of that intention, but moreover notes that, according to Suarez and Reginald, who support the contrary opinion, it suffices that the preceding sorrow, even though elicited without an intention of confession, afterward moves one to confession or is in some way expressed in confession; these things, as is plain, fall entirely into the common opinion of Cardinal de Lugo.

But the little reason adduced to the contrary (in St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.), that through intention the matter must be ordered to the Sacrament, as ablution to Baptism and the touching of the instruments to Holy Orders, first supposes that sorrow is the matter of the Sacrament in the same sense as ablution in Baptism, namely, matter ex qua, which pertains to a mere opinion (see above, Note to no. 414); and then it is refuted by the very example of Holy Orders, for the Ordination of an infant is held valid, although he certainly cannot, through an intention of which he is incapable, order the touching of the instruments to the Sacrament.

Nor does the reason taken from Proposition I proscribed by Innocent XI press any more, both because of what was just said concerning the nature of the matter in this Sacrament, and because of the things which the Author noted above, no. 437, concerning this proposition.

** The VV. contend against this Note in fourteen columns (pp. 411-418). Let us touch briefly upon all these things, as the matter permits.

1. The VV. gather together several Writers (pp. 416-418) who either hold absolutely, or teach as more probable, that sorrow must be elicited with the intention of confession.

Reply. Against these, St. Alphonsus judged the opposite opinion more probable, as was noted. Therefore, let the VV. show the holy Doctor this honor: on account of him and with him, let them hold the reasons of those Authors as less solid.

2. The VV. complain (pp. 414-416) that the argument of St. Alphonsus was called a little reason, namely, that just as the minister, so the recipient must order the matter to the Sacrament. They then say that the contrary example of an infant, who is validly ordained without this intention, is sufficiently refuted by the common doctrine that no intention is required in infants for validly receiving the Sacraments of Baptism, Confirmation, or even Orders, since the intention of Christ or of the Church supplies in them, as St. Alphonsus says (bk. 6, no. 80).

Reply. This refutation falls of itself because there is no parity at all. For the will to receive a Sacrament is one thing, and the will ordering sorrow to the Sacrament is another. The latter, as they themselves contend, belongs to constituting an essential element of the Sacrament; the former, however, is altogether extrinsic to the essential elements of the Sacrament, and sometimes a merely habitual or even merely interpretative intention suffices. But the Church certainly cannot supply that which pertains to the intrinsic essence of the Sacrament. Therefore, if the Ordination of an infant is valid, as it certainly is, although the infant is incapable of ordering the contact with the instruments to the Sacrament, it is manifestly plain that this ordering intention is not necessary. To this might also be referred what is commonly said concerning the fulfillment of sacramental satisfaction. For if all the parts must be ordered to the Sacrament through intention, this will therefore hold also with regard to satisfaction. But where is that coordinating intention present when even St. Alphonsus (bk. 1, no. 165) admits that sacramental penance is truly fulfilled even if someone, forgetful of the precept and therefore having no intention of fulfilling it, nevertheless performs the prescribed work?

3. The VV. insist (pp. 412-416) that in the case the condemnation of the Proposition concerning the use of probable matter when the safer has been abandoned presses, both because the opinion concerning sorrow to be elicited with the intention of confession is probable, and because the matter here concerns matter ex qua; and that the interpretation of the condemned Proposition brought forward by Gury must be rejected.

Reply. As regards the first: let them first bring forward other reasons by which some solid probability of the opinion concerning the necessity of that intention may be proved. For if the argument adduced by St. Alphonsus, which must be considered the strongest of all, does not have that force, as we saw, then certainly, until some other reason appears, it is lawful to hold that these reasons are lacking. And since it is very well known that extrinsic probability has force insofar as it is presumed to rest upon intrinsic probability, where intrinsic arguments are lacking, it profits little to multiply citations. Therefore, thus far that condemnation is urged in vain.

As regards the second, first the VV. (p. 415), after asserting that the doctrine which holds the acts of the penitent to be matter ex qua is most probable, infer from this that the opinion which establishes that sorrow must necessarily be ordered to confession is sufficiently probable; but there will certainly be one who adds to these words: I deny the consequence, as is plain from what has been said. But, this omitted, the VV. would certainly have acted more usefully if, instead of copying the text of Suarez and citing others who followed Suarez, they had devoted some labor to the things touched upon above (Note to no. 414) concerning this argument. It was indeed said there that it cannot be the purpose of our work to undertake the solution of this question in a brief Compendium. Nevertheless, we indicated certain difficulties which neither Suarez nor anyone else has yet satisfied, just as a suitable reply to the arguments produced by Maldonatus, cited there, is still desired. But what those two lights of Theology, Suarez and Lugo, appear not to have attained, it is very uncertain whether it is to be hoped from others. Moreover, since for the probability of any opinion it is required not only that it be supported by solid reasons, but also that it solidly satisfy the contrary reasons, shall we rightly be angry with those who perhaps still hold that opinion not only not most probable, but not even solidly probable?

As regards the third, finally, it is easily plain that the interpretation of the condemned Proposition which Gury has at no. 437 was mentioned only because it explains what these words of the condemned Proposition mean: In conferring the Sacraments. And since St. Alphonsus (bk. 1, no. 51), as the VV. themselves note, sufficiently shows that for this reason it is disputed among the Doctors whether the condemnation affects others besides the minister of the Sacrament, another reason now arises from this by which it is abundantly established that the condemnation of that proposition is objected with less efficacy, even if other reasons for this were not brought forward.

¹² ** In this place also the VV. (p. 935, no. 109) oppose to the Author, who says that sorrow can endure for one or even several days, St. Alphonsus, who (Homo apostolicus, tr. 16, no. 20) affirms that whenever confession derives from sorrow for sins, sorrow always virtually endures for one or two days.

But St. Alphonsus (bk. 6, no. 446) admits and approves the opinion of Roncaglia, who (De Poenitentia, ch. 3, q. 2, reply 2) teaches that sorrow suffices even if it preceded by several days.

QUESTION 8. Is a new act of sorrow required for receiving a new absolution when the penitent, immediately after absolution, confesses a mortal sin omitted through forgetfulness?

Reply. It is controverted. The FIRST OPINION, common and much more probable, denies it; because the prior contrition certainly endures, and, being universal, extended to all sins, even those omitted through forgetfulness; nor, moreover, is it required that contrition be explicitly ordered to the Sacrament. Furthermore, explicit sorrow appears to be sufficiently present in the very act of accusing that same sin. - Lugo. - Roncaglia. - Reuter, etc., with St. Lig., no. 448.

The SECOND OPINION affirms it; because the judgment was completed through absolution; therefore, if a new absolution is to be imparted, new proximate matter is required; and although sorrow endures in itself, nevertheless it does not endure in relation to the second absolution. - Bonacina, etc. Yet this opinion appears to rest upon a slight foundation ¹³.

¹³ Cardinal de Lugo in fact denies (De Poenitentia, disp. 14, nos. 28-30) that some partial proximate matter cannot serve the same for two forms. But it was already said above that the ordering of sorrow to confession is not necessary. Moreover, it must be denied that such ordering is lacking here; for one who grieves over sins with the intention of confessing sufficiently orders the sorrow for each to the confession and absolution of the same. Add further that Vasquez, Bonacina, and Filliucci are wrongly cited for this second opinion (in St. Alphonsus, bk. 6, no. 448, from Croix, bk. 6, pt. 2, no. 711). For when these say that sorrow must be repeated, they do not dispute concerning sins omitted through forgetfulness, but concerning a repeated confession of the same sins. Therefore, neither authority nor any solid reason supports this opinion. But, on the contrary, the common practice stands for the first opinion, as Lugo says (loc. cit., no. 27); St. Alphonsus (loc. cit.) calls this opinion common, and testifies that it is called morally certain by Roncaglia, most probable by Sporer with Elbel and many others, and finally indubitable among all by others. For although perhaps one or another confessor admonishes the penitent in the aforesaid case to renew sorrow, nevertheless all the others commonly do not do so. Dicastillo also testifies to this common practice of confessors (De Sacramentis, tr. 8, disp. 6, dub. 22, no. 160).

Two things must not be omitted here. The first is that, according to the common opinion, the foregoing doctrine holds not only in the case which is ordinarily more frequent, of some sin which one forgets in confession and then confesses immediately after absolution or a little afterward, but also in two other cases: both when a dying person, because of the danger of imminent death, must be absolved after one or another sin has been heard and the confession of the rest must then be continued; and when someone, his confession being divided (which case, however, will occur very rarely, as will be said in its place), is absolved by a Superior only from reserved sins and is then absolved by another from the nonreserved sins.

The second is that, according to several, not even the aforesaid opinion of Vasquez, Bonacina, and Filliucci concerning the necessity of repeating sorrow in a repeated confession of the same sins must necessarily be admitted. Cardinal de Lugo certainly thinks the complete contrary.

First, he indicates that this opinion of his agrees with the Doctors thus (loc. cit., no. 34): Although the Authors do not treat expressly of this sin, nevertheless, from the manner in which they speak, they appear to indicate this.... Indeed, Father John Salas, in his manuscript On Penance, q. 84, art. 10, after relating the opinion of certain recent authors who said that new sorrow, just as a new confession, is required for the validity of the second Sacrament, himself says that the contrary is truer, and that it suffices that the sensible parts, namely, the confession and in the confession itself the expression of sorrow, be new, etc. But he had disclosed his own mind thus (ibid., no. 31): If the things which we have adduced in confirmation of the first part are true, it does not appear why sometimes a confession and new absolution concerning even the same sins cannot be repeated by virtue of the preceding sorrow which still endures morally and virtually (namely, has not been retracted). And he concludes (next no. 32): The reason appears the same for either case.

But both John de la Cruz and Peter de Ledesma (in Diana, vol. 1, tr. 3, res. 88, no. 1) had preceded him; Diana moreover testifies that this doctrine is common. Dicastillo also joined these (in Diana, loc. cit.), whose thesis is this: It must be asserted that, not only when someone confesses a new sin which he had not told through forgetfulness, but when altogether the same sins are submitted to a new confession, old sorrow which still endures either physically or morally suffices. Indeed, it is due to the reasons adduced by Dicastillo that Diana, who had previously hesitated to adhere to this doctrine (see loc. cit., res. 89, no. 3), afterward embraced it absolutely. For after copying Dicastillo's arguments (loc. cit., res. 88, no. 4), he concludes: Thus far Dicastillo, to whom I now adhere absolutely. Then he adds that not only did another Salamancan doctor think the same (see ibid., res. 90, no. 2), but that, with Diana himself as author, Leander also passed to the same opinion; concerning him Diana writes (ibid., res. 95, no. 4): The same Leander (De Sacramentis, vol. 1, tr. 5, disp. 7, q. 4) teaches, citing even me and Cardinal Lugo, that when someone confesses the same sins from which he had already been directly absolved, he is not bound to have new sorrow for the same sins; because when the vocal confession is repeated, at least the sorrow of the preceding confession, which still endures morally and virtually, is virtually repeated. Finally, add to these Thomas Tamburini (Methodus Confessionis, bk. 1, ch. 2, sec. 5, no. 7), who praises Joseph de Ianuario for the same doctrine: Read, he says, Ianuarius (pt. 1, res. 30), who teaches that one who confesses sins otherwise duly confessed and absolved is not bound again to elicit an act of sorrow if the prior one endures habitually (that is, has not been retracted) or virtually.

Moreover, a doctrine of this kind neither ought nor can serve practice insofar as either confessors or penitents ought to be less solicitous about exciting sorrow even in the confession of sins which have already been duly expiated by the Sacrament. Far be this. Nevertheless, it can sometimes be useful, insofar as by its aid, as Diana says (loc. cit., res. 89, no. 2), confessors will quiet many scruples, especially those of persons who confess ordinary venial sins and with them some mortal sin otherwise confessed and absolved. For although it is not greatly to be feared that sorrow for past grave sins is lacking in one who otherwise brings only venial sins, and therefore manifests a soul averse from grave fault by constantly overcoming temptations, nevertheless scruples concerning a defect of sorrow not rarely hold certain persons anxious, especially if they happen to hear some preacher who, perhaps with less discreet zeal, declaims vehemently against repeated confessions of old faults without sorrow. The confessor will fittingly be able to restrain these anxieties both with other aids and also with the support of the present opinion.

Fifteen columns which the VV. oppose to this Note (pp. 418-426) must be answered here. First, they do not hesitate to deny that Vasquez, Filliucci, and Bonacina were cited wrongly by St. Alphonsus. For, they say (p. 420), Filliucci (tr. 6, no. 76) speaks in express words of forgotten sins, not of sins previously confessed.

Reply 1. They therefore concede that Vasquez, and likewise Bonacina, were cited wrongly by St. Alphonsus. 2. St. Alphonsus with Croix does not cite no. 76 from Filliucci, but no. 77, where the discussion is not of forgotten sins, but of sins previously confessed, and this most deliberately. For in no. 77, where the discussion concerns sins previously confessed, Filliucci says that new sorrow must be elicited; but not in no. 76, where forgotten sins are treated. Therefore, if they had cited no. 76, the citation would have been not only futile but also false. Hence an argument against the VV.: if Filliucci had thought that new sorrow had to be elicited even where forgotten sins were treated, he would not have been silent about it, just as he was not silent where sins previously confessed were treated. But he was silent. Therefore.

2. The VV. insist, saying that according to Filliucci (no. 76), in the confession of a forgotten sin a new Sacrament is effected. Therefore, Filliucci is not cited wrongly. Reply. The question now is not whether in the case a new Sacrament is effected, but whether, when a new Sacrament is effected, it is necessary to elicit another act of sorrow, or whether the preceding act suffices. Filliucci expressly says the former thing; concerning the latter, Filliucci has not even a word; indeed, as we have said, by his silence he denies it. Therefore, Filliucci also is cited wrongly.

3. Nevertheless, in order to show that the opinion which St. Alphonsus, as the VV. say (p. 419), rightly calls more probable is supported by grave authority, they produce eight authors, namely, Concina, Lacroix, Holzmann, Reiffenstuel, Billuart, Antoine, Reuter, and Voit. Reply. Six among these, indeed, call the contrary opinion, namely, that a renewal of sorrow is not necessary, more probable or certain. Is it thus shown, with authority considered, that St. Alphonsus rightly called his opinion more probable? But neither do the other two call the opinion of St. Alphonsus more probable. For Concina merely says: Follow the safer things in this highest affair. But the other, whom the VV. thought was Antoine, is in reality Philip of Carboneano, an unhappy annotator of a most unhappy Work; he writes: In practice new contrition is required, ... because the opposite is not altogether certain.

4. The VV. insist that the cited Authors at least implicitly held the opinion of St. Alphonsus as probable when they called their own more probable; but Croix and Holzmann expressly call it probable. Reply. As regards the first part, I deny it. For they produce, and could produce, not even one author who defended that opinion as probable; but since they did not think their own altogether certain, they therefore counseled that the opposite should be followed in practice so that one might proceed more safely. Thus, for example, Voit (vol. 2, no. 508): The opinion is most probable (the VV. omitted these words) that new sorrow need not necessarily be elicited.... Nevertheless, in practice it is better to elicit new sorrow, so that one may proceed more safely; these words sound rather like counsel. And Reuter (pt. 4, tr. 5, no. 282): Although this opinion appears morally certain (these words likewise are omitted by the VV.), nevertheless, because the opposite appears to some not altogether improbable ..., greater reverence for the Sacrament is to be counseled. These words likewise present counsel rather than doctrine.

But as regards Holzmann and Croix, Reply. Each of them rests upon citations of Vasquez, Bonacina, Amicus, and Mastrius, who establish the necessity of new sorrow not for our case, but concerning sins previously confessed, as we already said concerning the citations of St. Alphonsus. Therefore, they rest upon citations which do not pertain to the matter.

But as regards the intrinsic reasons, Holzmann says that the arguments which he himself had objected appeared to him to have been solved probably indeed, but not evidently. Yet it is easily replied to this that it is enough and more than enough that there be a solid solution of the objections; but he himself concedes that the solution is solid. But if something appears to him not sufficiently evident, it satisfies us that it has appeared sufficiently evident to other grave Doctors.

In this matter, indeed, this Author's manner of disputing can appear singular. For he asks (pt. 5, no. 511): Can one and the same contrition suffice for two or more Sacraments of Penance in number? Here he does not distinguish whether the second confession concerns a forgotten sin or a sin previously confessed. He then adds (and the VV. ought not to have omitted these things): It is replied that it can, if contrition still physically endures at the time of each confession; indeed, even if it endures only morally. The first part is common AND CERTAIN. Cardinal de Lugo, John Bosco, Lacroix, bk. 6, pt. 2, no. 707, and very many others hold the second against others to be cited below. But the Authors whom he cites below treat only of sins previously confessed; why, then, does he not conclude that this second part of the thesis does not touch the question of forgotten sins, and therefore that what he establishes concerning the first part holds concerning them, namely, that this doctrine is common and certain? But he himself (no. 512) says that the opinion is not certain even when the penitent returns after receiving absolution to confess a forgotten sin. Reply. Let it pass; but what, then, will you draw from this confusion of things? Yet one thing is sufficiently established. For he calls the doctrine concerning the sufficiency of one contrition for two or more Sacraments certain and common if contrition physically endures. Let us now omit asking what this physical endurance means with him and why it is required. For he himself had written a little before (no. 510): If yesterday you elicited sorrow with the purpose of confessing today, while you confess today you do not need new sorrow. For does sorrow then endure physically or morally? As regards the present matter, if according to his CERTAIN opinion one contrition suffices in the case for two or more absolutions, what force, then, will his objection have (no. 511), namely, that A new composite requires new parts; or that new contrition entitatively is necessary for a new Sacrament? Does he not expressly contend that it is certain and common that one suffices? How, then, does he attribute so much strength to these objections (no. 512) that because of them he thereafter wishes the doctrine which he himself contends is certain to be uncertain? But let us now dismiss Holzmann with this obscure heap of things which do not cohere with one another, and pass to Croix.

Besides those empty citations of which we have spoken, Croix produces this one argument, as though from reason (no. 711): There is, he says, almost the same reason concerning sins which someone has forgotten and concerning those which he has previously confessed. That is, since he treated both questions together (no. 707), he contends that the little reasons which he objects to himself where sins already confessed are treated also hold for the case of a forgotten sin; and he thinks that all the more force accrues to these little reasons because certain Authors (he adduces four or five) who deny that sorrow must be renewed where forgotten sins are treated nevertheless require new sorrow with regard to sins previously confessed. Reply. The argument can easily and with greater right be turned back upon Croix himself. And indeed (now omitting those who have nothing concerning forgotten sins, such as Vasquez, Bonacina, and John Sanchez), there are very many, as Holzmann admits, who deny that new sorrow is necessary with regard to a forgotten sin. But among these, those few do not find the reasons which they find valid with regard to a forgotten sin confessed immediately afterward sufficiently valid also with regard to sins previously confessed. Yet from the very fact that those who dissent with regard to sins previously confessed nevertheless agree with the others concerning the confession of a forgotten sin, can it not rather be and ought it not be concluded that the reasons adduced in the case of a forgotten sin are of such strength and such clarity that they have extorted assent even from those who dissent in the other question?

Let us conclude, therefore, that neither Holzmann nor Croix has produced anything either from authority or from intrinsic reason which confers any probability upon that opinion which is adduced against the common opinion.

Moreover, as we have already noted elsewhere, it was altogether to be desired that the VV. devote their labors to some advancement of science, namely, to the investigation of truth rather than to defending some cause in any manner whatsoever. Thus, in the present matter, when they offered the texts of Authors, they would not have concealed that Edmund Voit calls the opinion which they endeavor to attack most probable; they would not have concealed that the same appeared morally certain to Reuter; they would not have concealed that Holzmann calls the same certain and common.

But, moreover, why did they remain silent about the judgments of other Doctors? Indeed:

1. Dominic Viva (De Poenitentia, q. 3, art. 3, no. 8) writes: Forgotten sins which are disclosed immediately after absolution do not need new sorrow in order that absolution be conferred again concerning them, as the practice of the faithful shows. He then adds (ibid., no. 9): You will ask whether these opinions concerning sorrow ... after the first thesis was proscribed by Innocent XI are probable in practice? I reply that the opinions hitherto explained ... are probable in practice, ... because it is lawful to follow an opinion which is MORALLY CERTAIN. And again (on Prop. 1 of Innocent XI, no. 26): Whatever may be the case as to whether absolution can universally be repeated concerning the same sins when sorrow is not repeated, as many think ..., it nevertheless appears CERTAIN from the practice of the Church and of Confessors that it is not necessary that those who are reconciled immediately after absolution be admonished to repeat new sorrow.

2. Felix Potestas (De Poenitentia, ch. 18, no. 5080): One who has confessed before and is reconciled by confessing a forgotten sin, although he effects a new Sacrament, is not bound to elicit new sorrow.... This opinion is MORALLY CERTAIN to me.

3. Elbel (conf. 3, De Contritione, no. 75): If he submits a new sin immediately or shortly after absolution was received, most probably he is not only validly but also licitly absolved without new sorrow.... Therefore, Cardenas and Lacroix appear to condemn the practice of this opinion too scrupulously.

4. And Sporer (Theologia Sacramentalis, pt. 3, ch. 2, no. 298): When in Confession you have forgotten some mortal sin and, having remembered it a little after absolution was given, you confess it, although it is advisable and safest to renew sorrow, nevertheless it is not necessary that you have new sorrow concerning it. Thus ... COMMONLY. And again (no. 300): This is more certain: if, because of the imminent danger of death, you gave someone absolution before he confessed all his sins, you can absolve him from the others which he will narrate afterward, even though he does not elicit new sorrow concerning the rest. This resolution directly attacks the little reason customarily objected to the contrary, that new matter is required for a new Sacrament.

5. Marcus Struggl (tr. 11, q. 2, art. 2, no. 25): Learned and pious Confessors, when the penitent after the first absolution has been conferred proposes a mortal sin which he had previously forgotten, confer absolution upon him without being solicitous about new sorrow on the part of the penitent. And this opinion, although it treats of the validity of the Sacrament, is SAFE IN PRACTICE.

6. Martin Stoz (bk. 1, q. 1, art. 7, no. 52): I willingly admit that one who confessed a little before and again confesses sins which had escaped him ... is not bound to elicit new sorrow.

7. Mazzotta (tr. 6, disp. 1, q. 3, ch. 1, sec. 3, q. 3): The same sorrow can suffice ... if someone immediately after absolution adds a new forgotten sin and is absolved again either by the same or by another Confessor; and similarly, if someone is absolved when death is imminent before he has confessed integrally, and afterward ... completes his confession, he can again be absolved without new sorrow.

COMMONLY, and Moya says that it is INDUBITABLE among the Doctors. Nor does the cited proposition condemned by Innocent XI stand in the way, because this opinion is most probable, whatever Croix may have said.

8. Babenstuber (tr. 8, pt. 6, disp. 4, art. 3, no. 57): When someone has forgotten some sin in confession and then immediately or a little afterward confesses it, the Confessor must again impart absolution.... In this case neither the penitent nor the Confessor is accustomed to be solicitous about new sorrow. Thus the Theologians COMMONLY.

9. Roncaglia (tr. 19, ch. 3, q. 3), concerning this doctrine: These foundations appear SO SAFE to me that this opinion by no means appears to me subject to the censure of that condemned opinion according to which it was said that in confecting the Sacraments it is lawful to follow a probable opinion when the safer has been abandoned.

10. Giribaldi (tr. 7, ch. 5, dub. 8, no. 63): Although one or another (confessor) admonishes the penitent to renew sorrow, nevertheless others more commonly do not do so; and thus it can be observed in practice that when the penitent returns to tell forgotten sins, he is not compelled to elicit a new act of contrition.

11. Illsung (tr. 6, disp. 6, q. 3, art. 5, no. 43): When someone has forgotten one sin and, returning to the priest either immediately or a little afterward, confesses it ..., the confessor must impart absolution again; but in such a case commonly neither penitents nor confessors are solicitous about new sorrow. Therefore, new sorrow is not required.

12. Honoratus Fabri (tr. 9, ch. 2, no. 10): The same sorrow suffices for several absolutions, as when someone after absolution discloses some sin of which he had not previously remembered.

13. Tamburini (Methodus Confessionis, bk. 1, ch. 2, no. 9): If, after absolution has duly been conferred, the penitent remembers and brings forward something which he had forgotten to confess, ... it is not necessary that he grieve again.

14. Gobat (tr. 6, no. 165): When, having forgotten some sin in confession, you confess it a little after absolution has been given, it is not necessary that you have new sorrow concerning it. COMMONLY.

15. Escobar (bk. 14, sect. 2, nos. 116-118): Someone, while making confession, forgets one or another mortal sin and immediately after absolution remembers and discloses it: he ... does not need a new act of sorrow. But here he cites Vasquez and Bonacina as contrary without relevance, for, as we have said, they do not discuss this question but another, different one.

16. Dicastillo (tr. 8, disp. 6, dub. 12, no. 160): It must be asserted that, when someone confesses a new sin which he had not told through forgetfulness, ... old sorrow which remains either physically or morally suffices.... Ledesma follows this opinion and testifies that it is MORE COMMON. And again (no. 165): Our opinion can be confirmed from the practice of the Church and of Confessors, because there are few, if any, who are solicitous about admonishing the penitent to renew sorrow in reconciliations, as Lugo rightly noted.

17. Aversa (De Poenitentia, q. 9, sect. 1): It can be observed in practice that, when the penitent returns to tell forgotten sins, he is not compelled to elicit a new act of contrition.

18. Ferraris (s.v. Poenitentia, art. 2, no. 37): One who in confession has forgotten some mortal sin can confess it a little after absolution without having new sorrow. Gobat with Dicastillo testifies that this is COMMON.

19. And, lest we linger longer over these things, see Diana (vol. 1, tr. 3, res. 88), Mezger (tr. 18, disp. 46, art. 4, no. 7), Gabriel of St. Vincent (De Poenitentia, disp. 4, q. 2), the Salmanticenses (Theologia Scholastica, tr. 24, disp. 7, nos. 116 and 121), Ledesma, Salas, Henriquez, Arriaga, Platelius (in Mazzotta, loc. cit.), John de la Cruz, and Joseph de Ianuario (in Tamburini, loc. cit.), Perez and Bosco (in St. Alphonsus, bk. 6, no. 448), cited by the foregoing.

And indeed, take careful note that the above-praised Doctors hand down this doctrine absolutely and as to be observed in practice beyond controversy; and that most of them wrote after the propositions had been condemned by Innocent XI, and even made express mention of this condemnation. And since the authorities customarily opposed have altogether nothing to do with the matter, while the little reasons objected are solved without difficulty and indeed can very often be turned back by an argumentum ad hominem against those objecting them, it is manifest that this doctrine can also be held safest in practice.

But as regards the six columns in which the VV. detain the reader (pp. 423-426) concerning the other part of the Note, namely, concerning the renewal of sorrow for a sin previously confessed, it is truly not worth the effort to linger. They say they do not see how that doctrine can contribute to quieting the scruples of certain persons. But others have seen this; and perhaps the VV. themselves do not appear to have fully grasped the sense in which the opinion in the Note is said to be able to contribute to quieting scruples.

QUESTION 9. Can there be a Sacrament of Penance at once valid and unformed, because of a defect of sufficient disposition?

Reply. It is controverted. Some deny it with Billuart, diss. 7, art. 1. - Elbel, no. 81. Their reason is that in the Sacrament of Penance, contrition is the matter of the Sacrament; therefore, if it is insufficient, the Sacrament will be invalid. But if it is sufficient, the Sacrament is valid and at the same time formed, and therefore it immediately remits sins. - Others, however, and indeed grave Theologians, affirm it with Lugo, disp. 14, no. 65. - Lacroix, no. 672; and St. Lig., no. 444 ¹⁴, calls this more probable. The reason of those who affirm is that there can be a certain lower degree of disposition which suffices for the matter of the Sacrament but does not suffice for actual justification ¹⁵. - Recall what was said On the Sacraments in General, nos. 191 and 232.

¹⁴ This opinion, says Lugo (De Poenitentia, disp. 14, no. 68), is taught by St. Thomas ... and by the Thomists commonly, Capreolus, Paludanus, Cajetan, Soto, Cano, Ledesma, Sylvester, Richardus, whom Suarez adduces ..., who follows the same in part; and this is also commonly embraced by the more recent Thomists and Henriquez ... and Cardinal Toletus ..., and others whom Antoninus and Diana relate and follow ...; all of whom consequently teach that such a valid confession is not afterward to be repeated.

The same de Lugo relates the multiple cases in which one or another Theologian thought this could occur (ibid., no. 69); nevertheless, he appears to admit it in only two circumstances: 1. when someone guilty of two sins, through invincible forgetfulness, grieves over only one and confesses only this; 2. when someone through invincible ignorance believes that it is not a mortal sin to approach the Sacrament without sorrow for all sins, provided that sorrow is present for some one. See ibid., nos. 74 and 89.

¹⁵ Yet this reason favors the cases which Cardinal de Lugo did not approve rather than those which he admitted.

Vol. II, Treatise On the Sacrament …, Pt. II, Ch. I, Art. I, § II. On the Qualities of Contrition

The qualities necessarily required for the validity of contrition, both perfect and imperfect, are numbered as four, namely: 1. that it be internal; 2. supernatural; 3. supreme; 4. universal.

I. Internal or true, that is, truly conceived in the heart and soul, according to Joel 2:13: Rend your hearts, and not your garments. For contrition, according to the Council of Trent, is sorrow of the soul; and soul signifies the rational will.

II. Supernatural, that is, elicited through the help of grace and from a motive which is in some way referred to God ¹. For sorrow elicited from a merely human motive, for example, from fear of infamy, can contribute nothing toward obtaining justification.

¹ By this manner of speaking, the Author wished also to include moral rectitude, to which sin is opposed, according to the doctrine of the Council of Trent, which numbers the turpitude of sin also as an apt motive of sorrow.

It can be noted here that, just as for an action to be meritorious it is not necessary that someone act from a supernatural motive, that is, one known by the aid of faith (see vol. 1, no. 32, qq. 6 and 8), so Ripalda consequently concludes (De Fide, disp. 17, no. 209) that attrition disposing toward sacramental justification can be elicited under the direction of infused prudence or under the direction of knowledge which some affection of faith - namely, one seeking justification in the Sacrament - directs. For, as he himself says (no. 187), a disposition sufficient for sacramental justification can exist without theological faith strictly so called. For sorrow elicited by a moral virtue to which sin is opposed (namely, from the turpitude of sin according to Trent) suffices for sacramental justification. But we premised above that it is consonant with Sacred Scripture, the Councils, the Fathers, theological reasons, and the judgment of grave Theologians that salutary and supernatural acts of the moral virtues can exist without strict faith. We have already seen (loc. sup. cit.), in the Treatise On Human Acts, that this doctrine is that of St. Thomas. On the same matter, the things which the same Ripalda teaches in De Ente Supernaturali, last disp., nos. 458-460, and disp. 22, no. 100, are to be seen.

Vol. I, Matrimony, and Holy Orders, On Penance (Volume I), Dogmatic Part — Chapter II: On the Acts of the Penitent · Vol. I, Matrimony, and Holy Orders, On Penance (Volume I), Moral Part — Chapter I: On the Duties of the Penitent

The suitable motives can be reduced to four: 1. fear of punishment; 2. hope of reward; 3. the turpitude of sin; 4. the goodness of God.

…and 66 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Tanquerey

Adolphe Tanquerey, S.S. — 41 passages

Vol. I, Matrimony, and Holy Orders, On Penance (Volume I), Dogmatic Part — Chapter II: On the Acts of the Penitent

n. 126.

Art. II. On Contrition

Tridentine doctrine. For obtaining the remission of sins through the power of the keys, confession does not suffice, but contrition is required, as Trent rightly teaches:¹ -

¹ Trent, sess. XIV, ch. 4.

"Contrition, which holds the first place among the aforesaid acts of the penitent, is sorrow of soul and detestation concerning sin committed, with the purpose of not sinning henceforth. But at every time, for obtaining pardon of sins, this motion of contrition was necessary; and in a man fallen after Baptism, only then does it prepare for the remission of sins, if it is joined with confidence in divine mercy and the intention of furnishing the remaining things which are required for rightly receiving this sacrament...

"It teaches, furthermore, that although it sometimes happens that this contrition is perfected by charity, and reconciles man to God before this sacrament is actually received; nevertheless the reconciliation itself is not to be ascribed to that contrition without the intention of the sacrament which is included in it. But that imperfect contrition, which is called attrition, since it is commonly conceived either from consideration of the turpitude of sin, or from fear of hell and punishments, if it excludes the will of sinning, with hope of pardon, it declares not only does not make a man a hypocrite and a greater sinner, but is also a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Spirit, not indeed as yet inhabiting, but only moving, by which the penitent, helped, prepares for himself the way to justice. And although without the sacrament of Penance it cannot by itself lead the sinner to justification, nevertheless it disposes him to obtaining the grace of God in the sacrament of Penance. For, usefully shaken by this fear, the Ninevites, at the preaching of Jonah full of terrors, did penance and obtained mercy from the Lord. Wherefore certain persons falsely calumniate Catholic Writers, as if they had handed down that the sacrament of Penance confers grace without a good motion in those receiving it, which the Church of God has never taught or thought; but they also falsely teach that contrition is extorted and coerced, not free and voluntary."

Two things especially are set forth in this Tridentine declaration: 1. the nature and necessity of contrition; 2. its efficacy for remitting sins with or without the real reception of the sacrament of Penance.

n. 127.

§ I. Nature and Necessity of Contrition.

Notion of contrition. (A) Contrition, from the word to crush, etymologically designates the action by which a solid body is reduced to the smallest parts; but metaphorically it designates that disposition by which the heart hardened by sin is broken and softened.

¹ St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 1, a. 1; Suarez, disp. IV; Salmanticenses, disp. VII; Bellarmine, bk. II, ch. 4; Drouin, q. IV, ch. 1; Billuart, diss. IV, a. 1; de Augustinis, p. I, a. 4; Palmieri, th. 30; Billot, th. 12; L. de San, n. 473 ff.

Hence the Roman Catechism (De Paenit., n. 33): "Rightly, however, the name contrition was imposed on detestation of sin... to signify the force of sorrow, the likeness being drawn from corporeal things which are broken little by little by a stone or some harder material: so that by this word it might be declared that our hearts, which have been hardened by pride, are bruised and crushed by the force of penance." It is also called compunction of heart, because just as swollen ulcers are cut by iron, so hearts, as if a scalpel of contrition has been applied, are incised, so that they may be able to draw out the deadly poison of sin; wherefore it has also been called a rending of the heart by the prophet Joel: "Be converted to me with all your heart... and rend your hearts."²

² Joel 2:12.

(B) As to the thing, contrition is defined by Trent:³ "sorrow of soul and detestation concerning sin committed, with the purpose of not sinning henceforth." It is said (a) sorrow of soul, or affliction, sadness, inwardly distressing and crucifying the soul; for since sin is the highest moral evil, the sinner sincerely returning to God cannot but be sad concerning the offenses committed by himself. This sadness indeed, although primarily internal, is commonly manifested outwardly; yet tears or other signs of grief of this kind are not required, since the will can sincerely grieve without such signs being exhibited.

³ Sess. XIV, ch. 4.

(b) Detestation concerning sin committed, that is, hatred of sin, proceeding from knowledge of its malice and evil effects, joined with retraction of the depraved will, so that the sinner sincerely says: if I could act anew, I would wish not to have sinned. Sorrow and detestation are so connected that one who detests his sin grieves over it, and one who grieves over it necessarily detests it; namely, according to the common opinion, sorrow is the consequence of detestation, just as delight follows love; first indeed we detest sin, because we apprehend it as evil; then, conceiving that evil to be present, whether in itself or in its consequences, we grieve over it. Hence in the Blessed hatred of sin exists without sorrow; for they do not apprehend sin as truly present, since they are now immune from sin and its consequences.

(c) With the purpose of not sinning; for true penance regards not only past faults as to be abolished, but also future faults as to be forestalled; for no one truly detests sins unless by that very fact he wills to avoid them in the future: if he should be unwilling to avoid them, he deserves not pardon, but indignation.

n. 128.

Thesis: True contrition, such as was defined above, is necessary for obtaining pardon of sins, whether within or outside the sacrament.

Scripture. This is clear from all the texts brought forward above, where we treated of the necessity of penance, n. 9-10. For the penance which is there required as a necessary condition for justification is nothing other than conversion to God, aversion from the way of iniquity, change of heart and life, a contrite and humbled heart. All these things indeed suppose sorrow of soul and detestation of sin, with the purpose of amendment.

This disposition indeed, even after the sacraments have been instituted, remains necessary; for when Jews or Gentiles are converted to the Christian faith, the first disposition required from them after faith is penance or contrition: "Do penance, and let every one of you be baptized... Do penance therefore, and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out... Do penance therefore from this thy wickedness; and pray to God, if perhaps this thought of thy heart may be remitted to thee... Therefore God has also given to the Gentiles penance unto life."¹ - Wherefore the Apostle rejoices that the Corinthians were made sorrowful unto penance: "Now I rejoice, not because you were made sorrowful, but because you were made sorrowful unto penance... For the sorrow which is according to God works penance unto stable salvation."²

¹ Acts 2:38; 3:19; 8:22; 11:18.

² 2 Cor. 7:9-10.

n. 129.

1. By Tradition. For the whole penitential discipline which we explained above (n. 57 ff.) had been instituted for this end, that by frequent reconsideration of sins and laborious expiation of them, and also by the prayers of the Church, sorrow of soul and detestation of sin and the desire of amending life might be vividly stirred up in penitents. This indeed is clear both from the testimonies already brought forward (n. 57 ff.) and from the following.

St. Justin indeed asserts that God concedes pardon to penitents from mercy; but at the same time he teaches that those are deceived who say that, even if they are sinners, God will nevertheless not impute sin to them, provided they know Him. He proves this by the example of David, who was justified only by contrition. "But if," he says, "remission was not granted before penance was done to such a man, but only then when that great king and anointed one and prophet so wept and so conducted himself, how can impure and utterly lamentable men, unless they lament and mourn, have hope that the Lord will not impute sin to them?"¹

¹ Dialogus cum Tryphone, n. 141; P. G., t. VI, p. 798-799.

n. 130.

Thus also Tertullian, by the example of the prodigal, shows that God spares the sinner, "but if he repents from the soul, if he compares his hunger with the plenty of his father's hired servants, if he leaves the unclean herd of swine, if he seeks again the father, even offended."² Likewise St. Cyprian promises pardon to penitents, "penance having been done and detestation of their deeds having often been professed, if by tears, if by groans, if by weeping, they shall have shown signs of a sorrowing and truly penitent soul."³ Nor otherwise does St. Ambrose: "And if you weep most bitterly, Christ will look upon you, guilt will depart. For the practice of sorrow abolishes the luxury of crime, the delights of error. Thus, while we grieve over the things admitted, we exclude things to be admitted, and there comes to be from the condemnation of fault a certain discipline of innocence."⁴ Elsewhere he teaches the necessity of this penance thus: "For penitence is necessary for the fallen, just as medicines are necessary for the wounded. But how great, do you think, and what kind of penance is necessary? One that either equals the crimes, or certainly exceeds them... When with firm faith you have conceived in your soul that this is certain, as it is, that it is necessary for a prevaricating soul to be handed over to Tartarean punishments and to the fires of Gehenna, and that no other remedy has been established after one baptism than the solace of penance, be content to undergo however great affliction, however great labor, provided you are freed from eternal punishments."⁵

² Tertullian, De Paenit., ch. 8, P. L., t. I, p. 1243.

³ Ep. XXXI, P. L., t. IV, p. 313.

⁴ De Paenitent., bk. II, ch. 10; P. L., t. XVI, p. 519.

⁵ De lapsu virginis, n. 33-34, P. L., t. XVI, p. 376-377.

St. Chrysostom published an entire treatise on Compunction, where, among other things, he has these words: "For what need is there, tell me, of bodily strength, when we must crush the heart, when we must pray watchfully, when we must reconsider sins, put down arrogance and swelling, depress the mind? These indeed are the things which placate God toward us, nor do they need much labor." Afterward he declares the necessity of this penance; for this becomes possible, indeed easy, if we think, he says, that impenitent sinners are damned to Gehenna; "if we always have Gehenna before our eyes, and also the angels then running everywhere through places, and gathering from the whole world those who are to be led away into Gehenna; if we also think how great an evil it is, Gehenna being set aside, to be excluded from the kingdom of heaven."¹

¹ St. Chrysostom, De Compunctione, bk. I, n. 10; P. G., t. XLVII, p. 410.

Therefore the Fathers teach two things, namely that contrition is situated in the retraction of sin and amendment of life; and that this is necessary for salvation.

n. 131.

§ II. Efficacy of Contrition with or without Absolution for Remitting Sins

Historical exposition. From the things said up to this point it is certainly clear that a Christian guilty of mortal fault cannot be justified unless he fulfills two conditions: that he have contrition and that he subject himself to the power of the keys. But, already from the fifth century, the question was agitated: what are the parts of contrition, and what are the parts of absolution, in the remission of sins?

(A) St. Augustine asserts the efficacy of contrition and of absolution together, but declares the parts of each only by comparison: just as, he says, Lazarus, raised from the dead, remains entangled in bonds until Christ commands him to be loosed, so the sinner, cleansed from sins through contrition, remains bound in some way by bonds until the Church looses him by absolution.²

² Sermon 67, P. L., XXXVIII, 434.

(B) The Scholastics tried to refine this explanation, too obscure and vague, by distinguishing between perfect and imperfect contrition, absolution in reality and in desire, yet in different ways.³

³ See their opinions set forth in Dict. de Theol. (Absolution), I, 171-182.

(a) Hugh of St. Victor declares that sins are not remitted by contrition unless the intention of receiving absolution is added; but by absolution remission of eternal punishment is conceded.⁴ Yet this is false, since mortal sin cannot be remitted unless eternal punishment annexed to it is simultaneously remitted.

⁴ "The impiety of sin is most rightly taken as hardness of heart, which first is loosed in compunction, so that afterward in confession the sin itself, that is, the debt of damnation, may be absolved." (De Sacramentis, bk. II, p. XIV, ch. 8, P. L., CLXXVI, 564-570).

(b) Peter Lombard taught that by perfect contrition sin is remitted as to guilt and punishment, but that by absolution the sins authentically remitted are shown.¹ This opinion indeed was preparing the way for the error of Protestants, by asserting that the force of absolution is declaratory only.

¹ "They [priests] forgive or retain sins, when they judge and show that they have been forgiven by God or retained." (Bk. IV Sent., dist. XVIII, P. L., CXCII, 885-889).

(c) William of Paris came nearer to the truth: he asserts that a certain attrition, or unformed contrition, that is, not informed by charity, does not suffice by itself for justification, but is a prior disposition which is easily converted into contrition informed by charity, and thus induces the remission of sins; but absolution breaks the bonds of sins in those who once enjoy gratuitous grace.²

² William, De sacram. paenitentiae, ch. 5-8, among Opera, Paris, 1676, t. I, p. 462-473.

(d) St. Thomas distinctly sets forth the difference between contrition perfected by charity and attrition, and also that the latter suffices for the remission of sins when absolution is added: "When someone approaches confession attrite, not fully contrite, if he does not place an obstacle, in this very confession and absolution grace and remission of sins are given to him."³ He adds however (which is rejected today) that attrition does not suffice of itself, but by reason of good faith, so that if someone is conscious of this defect, he ought to accuse it as pretense. Moreover, he teaches that grace is increased by absolution, if this is already had.

³ St. Thomas, in IV Sent., dist. 22, q. 2, a. 1; cf. Supplementum, q. 10, a. 1; q. 18, a. 1.

(e) Scotus proceeded further, teaching that even a small attrition, namely that which is conceived from fear of hell, suffices for the remission of sin when absolution is added, provided that the penitent actually does not adhere to sin: "Small attrition, even one which does not have the character of merit for the remission of sin, willing nevertheless to receive the sacrament of penance, as it is dispensed in the Church, and without an obstacle in the will of mortal sin... receives the effect of the sacrament, namely penitential grace, not indeed from merit... but from the covenant of God assisting His sacrament."⁴

⁴ Scotus, IV Sent., dist. 14, q. 4, n. 7.

Conclusion. Gradually scholastic doctrine was refined by the theologians of a subsequent age; today it is commonly admitted that by perfect contrition, with the intention of receiving the sacrament, the sinner is immediately justified, and nevertheless absolution is not useless, since this increases grace in those justified; moreover, attrition suffices with the real reception of absolution. Thus are reconciled the things which the primitive Church had already implicitly inculcated by her practice, namely the necessity and efficacy both of contrition and of absolution. Thus also it appears better how the Sacrament of Penance is at once a remedy for sinners, and for the fervent an efficacious means of spiritual progress.

n. 132.

Doctrine commonly received today. A twofold contrition is distinguished, perfect and imperfect: the former, which is perfected from the motive of charity, and suffices for justification even without the real reception of the sacrament; the latter, which is conceived from a motive different from charity, for example, from the turpitude of sin or fear of punishments, and does not suffice for justification unless at the same time the Sacrament of Penance is received. - A few things therefore must be recalled to memory concerning charity, or concerning the love of God: for perfect contrition corresponds to perfect charity, and imperfect contrition corresponds to imperfect charity or to fear.

(A) A twofold love of God can be distinguished: (a) imperfect love, or mercenary love, which theologians call the love of hope or of concupiscence, by which, namely, God is loved above all desirable things, not on account of Himself, but on account of the goods which He bestows, not because He is good in Himself, but because He is good to us, indeed the highest good, by the fruition of whom we shall someday be blessed; (b) perfect love, or gratuitous love, by which God is loved on account of Himself and above all things; this likewise is twofold: the love of benevolence, by which we love God as infinitely perfect, rejoice together in His perfections, and wish good to Him, namely by desiring Him to be known and loved by all; and the love of friendship, which, besides benevolence, imports mutual love, or a return of love, insofar, namely, as he who loves is loved by God. It must be noted, however, that the motive of the love of friendship is the infinite goodness of God in Himself, and not His goodness toward us; or in other words, by the love of friendship we love God on account of Himself, knowing nevertheless that God loves those who love Him; hence the mutual return of love is not the motive of friendship, but only one of its conditions.

(B) Now, since it belongs to the same virtue to pursue one of two opposites and to flee the other, so it belongs to charity to love God and to detest sin, insofar as it is opposed to God: therefore there are as many species of contrition as there are species of love. These things being posited, it is certain that the contrition which is conceived from perfect love, whether of benevolence,¹ provided it is supernatural and above all things, or of friendship, is perfect, and immediately remits sins; thus, for example, he who grieves over sin insofar as it is an offense of God, the Highest Good and loved above all things, has perfect contrition.² But it is controverted whether contrition conceived from the love of hope and of gratitude, or from the virtues of penance, obedience, or religion, suffices for contrition, as will be explained below.

¹ A few theologians have said that the love of benevolence does not suffice for perfect contrition, but they are deceived, thinking that love of this kind either is not supernatural, or, if it is supernatural, is not above all things.

² But theologians dispute whether it is necessary that that contrition proceed from the motive of infinite goodness, insofar as it is the aggregate of all perfections, or whether it suffices that it be elicited from the motive of any divine attribute offended, for instance mercy, wisdom. In our judgment, the question is more speculative than practical; for of themselves all the divine attributes are connected with His infinite goodness, and moreover he who detests sins as injuring one of the divine attributes does not exclude the other attributes, and consequently has truly perfect contrition.

Moreover, for justification there is not required an intense, or vehement, act of contrition, whatever certain ancient theologians said to the contrary; for provided that contrition is appreciatively highest, that is, provided that someone grieves over sin as the highest evil, it suffices for the remission of sins, although it is not very intense: "however small the sorrow may be," says St. Thomas,³ "provided it suffices for the character of contrition, it blots out every fault."

³ Suppl., q. 5, a. 3.

Division. These things having been noted beforehand, we shall prove three things: 1. that perfect contrition justifies the sinner without the real reception of the sacrament; 2. that attrition suffices with absolution for justification; 3. that attrition consequently is truly useful, and not a hypocrisy to be condemned.

n. 133.

Thesis I: Perfect contrition remits grave sins, without the real reception of the Sacrament of Penance, yet not without the intention of it. It is certain.

(A) For Trent expressly proposes this:¹ "It teaches, furthermore, that although it sometimes happens that this contrition is perfected by charity, and reconciles man to God... nevertheless the reconciliation itself is not to be ascribed to that contrition without the intention of the sacrament which is included in it."

¹ Sess. XIV, ch. 4.

(B) Scripture teaches in many ways that those who are converted to God with their whole heart, and truly love Him, are immediately justified, or obtain the remission of sins: (a) "I love those who love me";² "The impiety of the wicked will not harm him, on whatever day he shall have been converted from his impiety."³ Hence thus: in the Old Testament adult sinners were able to obtain the remission of offenses without the Sacrament of Penance, which did not yet exist; otherwise they could not have been saved. But if they could obtain this, certainly it was through the noblest act, such as penance perfected by charity is; for the texts adduced demonstrate that God loves, and consequently adorns with sanctifying grace, those who love Him, and remits the impiety of those who are converted to Him; therefore. (b) Nor does the matter stand otherwise in the New Law, after the Sacrament of Penance was instituted; for Christ, without any restriction, said to His disciples: "If anyone loves me, he will keep my word: and my Father will love him, and we will come to him and make our abode with him";⁴ from which it is clearly gathered that he who loves Christ immediately enjoys the divine indwelling, which is not had without habitual grace. The words of John prove the same: "God is charity; and he who remains in charity remains in God, and God in him."⁵ This is confirmed by the words of Christ to the sinful woman:⁶ "Many sins are forgiven her, because she has loved much."

² Prov. 8:17.

³ Ezek. 33:12.

⁴ John 14:23; cf. John 14:21.

⁵ 1 John 4:16.

⁶ Luke 7:47.

In vain the adversaries object that the sins had not been remitted before Christ said: sins are forgiven her, and consequently that charity does not justify of itself, but only when the words of the Lord are added. For such words merely declared that the woman's sins had already been remitted, as is clearly gathered from the Greek word apheontai, which is of the past tense and signifies they have been remitted; therefore it remains that her offenses were pardoned from the fact that she had loved much.¹

¹ The thesis could be confirmed from the Fathers, namely from texts where they affirm the efficacy of penance for obtaining the remission of sins. Cf. Tertullian, De paenit., ch. 4, P. L., t. I, p. 1233; St. Cyprian, De Lapsis, ch. 36, P. L., t. IV, p. 493; St. Pacian, ep. 3 to Sympronian, n. 8, P. L., t. XIII, 108; St. Chrysostom, In II Timoth., homil. 7, n. 3, P. G., t. LXII, p. 640, etc.

(C) Reason itself shows the fittingness of this matter. For although perfect contrition of itself cannot adequately compensate for the offense inflicted on God by mortal sin, nor merit the remission of mortal sin, nevertheless it befits God to grant indulgence to the contrite of heart; for such a disposition is the most perfect that can be had by sinners, and since it imports pure love of God, it very well disposes them to divine friendship; hence, in the Old Law, from the mercy of God, it sufficed for justification; but the institution of the Sacrament of Penance did not lessen the force and efficacy of charity, nor make the way of salvation narrower, but rather rendered it easier; therefore it is reasonably asserted that perfect contrition immediately justifies.

n. 134.

We said, however, not without the intention of the sacrament, because, from the things said, since sacramental confession is necessary in the New Law, the sinner cannot truly be contrite unless he wills to subject his offenses to the power of the keys. Yet it is not required that such an intention be explicit; an implicit one suffices, such as is found in the general will to fulfill all things that are necessary for salvation. From this likewise it follows that a man thus justified is bound to accuse to the priest, at a suitable time, his mortal sins already remitted through contrition, yet not as soon as possible; otherwise the intention would not be sincere. But the absolution of the priest in this case must not be called useless; namely, it will produce grace ex opere operato, which indeed will not remit sins, nor make the penitent from unjust to just, but from just more just. Besides, by accusing such sins, the penitent humbles himself before God and the Church, becomes more secure concerning the remission of sins, offers satisfaction for his sins, receives counsels, and, by completing sacramental penance, is at least partially freed from the punishment perhaps still due. Nor are examples of Scripture lacking, in which a similar recourse is commended. Christ sent to the priests the ten whom He had already healed of leprosy,¹ and commanded Paul, already justified by perfect contrition, to go to Ananias.²

¹ Luke 17:14.

² Acts 9:7.

n. 135.

Disputed question. But it is doubted whether other motives, besides perfect charity, suffice for perfect contrition, and for the remission of sins outside the sacrament. Commonly theologians deny it. Yet Scotists say that the motive of perfect contrition is every motive which looks to God, for example, one which is taken from the virtues of penance, religion, or obedience: for by these virtues we detest sin as an offense against God, and as opposed to His rights and will. But this suffices for perfect contrition. - Suarez and Card. de Lugo hold this opinion as probable, although they do not embrace it.³ Certain more recent authors also favor this opinion, Hurter, Palmieri, Egger, according to whom the love of hope and of gratitude can suffice for perfect contrition.⁴ Indeed this love, as most noble, is commended by Sacred Scripture; indeed scarcely is found, either in the Sacred Letters or among the Fathers, an expression of charity toward God which is not informed by this motive; thus the Psalmist said: "As the hart longs for the fountains of waters, so my soul longs for thee, O God";⁵ where love of God is shown as He is good for us; likewise St. Paul:⁶ "having a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ"; which words are referred to the love of hope. Moreover that love is very perfect, and gives the greatest glory to God: for if we love Him as our beatitude, by that very fact we testify that He alone is so perfect that He is able to beatify us.

³ Suarez, disp. IV, sect. 2, n. 13; Lugo, disp. V, sect. I, n. 3.

⁴ Hurter, n. 570; Palmieri, th. 22; Genicot, n. 269.

⁵ Ps. 41:2.

⁶ Phil. 1:23.

Whence we judge this opinion to be very consonant with divine mercy; and, if admitted, it is far better understood how Jews, who were of stiff neck, could have been justified without a sacrament, and in like manner how non-Catholics, who are in good faith, can obtain pardon of their sins: for an act of love is much more easily elicited from gratitude and hope than from the divine goodness considered in itself. Nevertheless this opinion is not common,⁷ and in practice effort must be made to ascend from the love of hope and gratitude to the love of charity. This, moreover, is not so difficult; for contrition perfected by charity can stand together with sorrow over sins conceived from other less perfect motives, namely hope, gratitude, fear of punishments; indeed commonly the soul, almost step by step, from lower to higher motives. This can be inferred from Trent (sess. XIV, ch. 4), where concerning fear of punishments it is said: "For, usefully shaken by this fear, the Ninevites, at the preaching of Jonah full of terrors, did penance and obtained mercy from the Lord."

⁷ Cf. Lugo, disp. V, sect. I, n. 3, and Billot, th. 13.

n. 136.

Thesis II: For obtaining the remission of sins by the power of the Sacrament of Penance, perfect contrition is not required, but attrition suffices. It is certain against certain older theologians (above, n. 131).

1° The thesis is explained. Imperfect contrition is called attrition; for, as St. Thomas says,¹ in corporeal things those things are called attrite which have been diminished in some way, but not yet perfectly broken into pieces, while those things are called contrite which by division are reduced to the smallest parts; and therefore attrition, in spiritual things, signifies a certain displeasure concerning sins committed, but not perfect; contrition, however, signifies perfect displeasure. - It can be defined as sorrow and detestation of sin proceeding from a supernatural motive, distinct from charity.

¹ St. Thomas, Supplementum, q. 1, a. 1.

According to Trent,² supernatural attrition can be conceived especially from a twofold motive, "either from consideration of the turpitude of sin, or from fear of hell and punishments"; moreover, fear of hell also involves fear of losing eternal beatitude, as the same Council teaches elsewhere.³ The first motive is nobler, since it considers sin as opposed to the rectitude of the moral order; but that consideration must be supernatural, namely founded upon motives known by faith, for example, from the fact that mortal sin is injustice against God, disobedience, ingratitude, something unworthy of a Christian man, defiling the soul, etc. - Yet the latter motive, namely fear of hell or of supernatural punishments, although less noble, is nevertheless good and useful. To understand this, a twofold fear of God can be distinguished: filial, or chaste, fear, by which someone fears to offend God from love and reverence; and servile fear, by which God is feared on account of the punishments which He threatens. This latter is likewise subdivided: one is simply servile, by force of which someone not only abstains from the evil deed but also lays aside affection for sin; the other is servilely servile, when someone avoids the evil work, yet retains the affection for sin. Now filial fear is certainly good and honorable, while on the contrary servilely servile fear is evil, since it retains affection for sin.

² Trent, sess. XIV, ch. 4.

³ Ibid., can. 5.

n. 137.

2° The thesis is proved. (A) It is clear from Trent: (a) from the text cited above, n. 126; for there it is declared that contrition is twofold: perfect, which reconciles the sinner to God before the sacrament is actually received; imperfect, or attrition, which "disposes him to obtaining the grace of God in the sacrament of Penance."

We do not deny that certain rigid authors understood the word disposes of a remote disposition, and not of a proximate disposition to justification. But the parallelism between contrition (which certainly is a proximate disposition) and attrition forbids this. Moreover, if the Council used the word disposes, and not suffices, this was done lest the already antiquated opinion of Peter Lombard be condemned; but the mind of the Council is sufficiently evident from the disputations held among the Tridentine Fathers.¹

¹ Cf. Theiner, Acta genuina, t. I, p. 531-600.

(b) It is confirmed by other decrees of the same Council; for Trent teaches that through the sacrament of penance sins are truly remitted.² Moreover this proposition of Baius has been condemned: "The penitent sinner is not vivified by the ministry of the absolving Priest, but by God alone."³ But if perfect contrition were prerequired for absolution, sinners would never be vivified by the ministry of the priest, since they would already have been justified by contrition.

² Sess. XIV, can. 3.

³ See Denzing., n. 938.

(c) Finally no one can say that the way of salvation is narrower and more difficult under the New Law than under the Old Law; but if perfect contrition together with confession were said to be necessary for the remission of sins, the condition of Christians would be worse than that of the Jews, since the latter were justified by contrition alone, without confession.

n. 138.

(B) The same is inferred from the universal practice of the Church in carefully absolving the dying. It has already been said, n. 65-67, that the practice of denying absolution to sinners placed in danger of death was severely rebuked, even when they had offended most gravely; and, according to the discipline received today, absolution is denied to no dying person, provided that he is probably attrite. Now this practice, ancient and universal at once, cannot be explained unless it is admitted that attrition suffices with the absolution of the priest. For if perfect contrition is required, why is the absolution of the priest preached as so necessary? For all concede that by perfect contrition alone, with the intention of the sacrament, without its real reception, sinners are justified. Therefore, if the dying have contrition, they do not need absolution; if they are only attrite, absolution is useless. But once our thesis has been admitted, the matter is easily explained: for attrition alone, which does not justify without the sacrament, remits sins when the absolution of the priest is added; this, therefore, is necessary for all who are only attrite.

n. 139.

3° The controversy concerning the necessity of some love with attrition is set forth. All indeed concede that attrition, necessary for obtaining the remission of sins in the sacrament of penance, must be joined with faith; otherwise it would not be supernatural; and with hope of pardon; otherwise there would be no purpose of a better life. But the question is whether attrition conceived from fear of hell alone suffices, without love of God, for obtaining justification in the Sacrament of Penance. The reason for doubting is that Trent, describing the conditions required for justification in a general way, requires some love:¹ "But they are disposed to that justice, while, stirred by divine grace,... they are freely moved toward God... they are raised into hope,... and they begin to love God as the fountain of all justice..." Other opinions being omitted,² two systems on this matter still stand today.

¹ Sess. VI, ch. 6.

² We pass over the opinion which Juenin (De Paenit., q. III, ch. 4, a. 2) and Habert (Theol. dogm. et mor., De paenit., ch. 8, a. 4) defend, according to whom contrition from intense charity justifies without the sacrament, and contrition from remiss charity justifies with the sacrament; and also the opinion of Billuart (diss. IV, a. 7), who contends that the love of friendship justifies without the sacrament, and the love of benevolence is required for justification with the sacrament. For these opinions are now antiquated, and deservedly: for from them it would follow that perfect contrition is necessary even with the absolution of the priest; for remiss charity and the love of benevolence belong to perfect contrition, from the things said above, n. 132.

(A) Some, after Pallavicini and Bossuet,¹ hold that together with attrition there is required an initial love of God loved on account of Himself, not indeed a predominant love, by which God is loved on account of Himself above all things, but an incipient love, such as is had by him who strives to elicit contrition from the motive of charity, and truly begins to love God, yet not so that on that account he wills to flee every grave sin; but when fear or hope is added, the will sincerely detests grave offenses and wills to flee them, so that detestation of this kind arises partly from love, partly from fear.

¹ Cf. Pallavicini, de Paenitent. ch. 12; Bossuet, De doctrina C. Trid. concerning the required love in the sacrament of Penance.

n. 140.

(B) But others hold that no other love is required except the love of hope or of concupiscence; but, according to some, this love must be elicited explicitly;² according to others, it suffices that it be elicited implicitly;³ now it is always implicitly contained in sincere attrition which excludes the will of sinning.

² Thus Tournely, De sacram. paenit., q. V, a. 3; Wirceburgenses, De sacram. paenit., disp. II, ch. 3, art. 3-4.

³ Suarez, disp. XX, sect. 2; Lugo, disp. V, n. 133; St. Alphonsus, l. VI, n. 442; Palmieri, th. 32, Coroll.; Tepe, n. 557; Kenrick, tr. XVII, n. 23.

For no one can truly detest sin, with hope of pardon and desire of grace, without by that very fact beginning in some way to love God as good to himself. But they argue thus: if it were proved that some species of nobler love is required, this would be clear either by reason or by authority. But (a) not by reason; for love stands relative to justification as a means to an end; and therefore provided that it is a means apt for obtaining the end, it suffices. Now any love included in attrition that is appreciatively highest is a means apt for obtaining the end, namely for receiving the sacrament with fruit; for by the help of love of this kind, attrition excludes the will of sinning, includes hope of pardon, and becomes a proximate disposition for receiving justification in the sacrament. Therefore it is not proved by reason that a nobler love is required besides the love included in attrition that is appreciatively highest. (b) Nor by authority; for the Tridentine text cited above, "they begin to love God as the fountain of all justice," can be understood of the love of hope, for God loved as the author of our justification is God insofar as He is good to us. Moreover not all the acts described here by Trent are absolutely necessary for justification with the sacrament: some are necessary either within or outside the sacrament, others only outside the sacrament, as Suarez had already noted: for there the Council discusses dispositions for justification in general; but where it treats specifically of the sacrament of Penance, it declares that attrition from fear of hell, which does not suffice without the sacrament, disposes the sinner to obtaining grace in the sacrament. - Therefore we embrace this opinion as much more probable.

n. 141.

But when bitter dissensions had arisen between the contritionists and the attritionists, Alexander VII, earnestly desiring to preserve the bond of peace among the faithful, on May 5, 1667, under penalty of excommunication,¹ commanded that: "If hereafter they write concerning the aforesaid matter of attrition... let them not dare to mark either opinion with the note of some theological censure or other injury or insult, whether the opinion denying the necessity of some love of God in the aforesaid attrition conceived from fear of hell, which today seems more common among the scholastics, or the opinion asserting the necessity of the said love, until something shall have been defined in this matter by this Holy See." Now nothing has yet been defined, and each one can adhere to his own opinion. Yet the opinion which requires nothing besides attrition itself has become common, and morally certain.

¹ Which excommunication, however, was not renewed in the Bull Apostolicae Sedis, and therefore is no longer in force.

In practice, however, there is no difficulty; as soon as it is clear that the penitent is truly attrite, and detests sins above all things, he can be absolved. For, Scripture bearing witness, "the fear of God is the beginning of His love";² and he who hopes for pardon from God already loves Him as the fountain of justice. Yet it is expedient that the motives of perfect contrition be proposed to him, both because they are more perfect, and for the sake of greater security.

² Ecclus. 25:16.

n. 142.

Corollary. The penitent, by receiving the sacrament, becomes from attrite contrite, not indeed in the sense that attrition can become contrition, since these are two acts distinct in species, but (a) because attrition together with the sacrament is equivalent to contrition with respect to the effect produced, namely the remission of sin; (b) and further because the attrite man, by receiving absolution, at the same time receives habitual grace and the virtue of charity, by which he becomes contrite in habit, able to elicit an act of perfect contrition.

n. 143.

Thesis III: Attrition conceived from the foulness of sin, the loss of eternal beatitude, and the incurring of eternal damnation, is true and useful sorrow preparing for grace. It is of faith from Trent against the Lutherans, who contended that servile fear (above, n. 136) is not true and honorable, but makes a man a hypocrite and a greater sinner:¹ "If anyone shall say that the contrition which is prepared by the discussion, collection, and detestation of sins, by which one recollects his years in the bitterness of his soul, pondering the gravity, multitude, foulness of his sins, the loss of eternal beatitude, and the incurring of eternal damnation, with the purpose of a better life, is not a true and useful sorrow, nor prepares for grace, but makes a man a hypocrite and a greater sinner... let him be anathema."²

¹ The proposition of Luther, condemned by Leo X, you have in Denzinger, n. 630. The Synod of Pistoia renewed the same error, in Denz., n. 1388.

² Sess. XIV, can. 5.

(A) By Scripture. That fear is good and useful which is commended and commanded in the sacred letters; but such is fear that is simply servile: "Holy and terrible is His name: the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom";³ "The fear of the Lord drives out sin: for he who is without fear will not be able to be justified";⁴ "Do not fear those who kill the body, but cannot kill the soul; but rather fear Him who is able to destroy both soul and body in hell."⁵ The Fathers frequently use these words to show that fear of hell is truly salutary.

³ Ps. 110:10.

⁴ Ecclus. 1:27.

⁵ Matt. 10:28; cf. Luke 12:4.

n. 144.

(B) By Tradition. The Fathers often propose fear of judgment and of hell as a motive for detesting and fleeing sin. Thus Chrysostom, who also notes that fear is good from the very discourses of Christ: "If fear were not good, Christ would not have spent many and long discourses speaking of the punishment and torment to come there. Fear is nothing other than a wall and a fortification and an impregnable tower."⁶ Augustine speaks no less eloquently: "Therefore you fear punishment; you do not yet love chastity, you do not yet have charity: you fear servilely; there is dread of evil, not yet love of good. But fear nevertheless, so that this dread may guard you, so that it may lead you to love. For that fear by which you fear hell, and therefore do not do evils, holds you back; and thus it does not permit the inner soul, wishing to sin."¹ And elsewhere he adds: "Fear prepares, as it were, a place for charity... But if there is no fear, there is not by which charity may enter."²

⁶ Homily XV to the people of Antioch, n. 2, P. G., t. XLIX, p. 156.

¹ St. Augustine, sermon CLXI, ch. 8, P. L., t. XXXVIII, p. 882.

² In Epist. I John, tract. 9, ch. 4, P. L., t. XXXV, p. 2047.

n. 145.

(C) Theological reason. Attrition from fear of hell imports three things: the will of fleeing punishment, which stands in the manner of an end; the detestation of sin, which is the means to the end; the ordination of this means to obtaining the end. But these three things are good and useful: (a) it is honorable to flee the punishments of hell, since they are something evil and worthy of hatred; (b) likewise there is no one who denies that the detestation of sin is good; (c) but to order the flight from sin to the avoidance of punishment as to an end is not evil, since God Himself uses the threatening of punishments to deter us from sin; moreover, the sinner who flees sin in order to avoid punishment does not exclude a higher motive; for if he excluded it, the fear would be servilely servile. Indeed, this disposition, imperfect in itself, spontaneously tends toward perfection and virtually contains it. For he who, from efficacious fear of hell, hates sin, detests it as the cause of hell, and consequently is disposed to doing whatever is necessary so that, by avoiding sin, he may also avoid hell. But for doing this it is required that he firmly propose to himself to keep all the precepts, of which the first and chief is the precept of loving God above all things; therefore by fear of hell he is induced to loving God Himself.

Nor should it be said that in this case the penitent detests punishment more than fault; for he who flees sin because it causes hell detests sin more than hell, not in this sense, that he ought to be disposed rather to incur damnation than to sin, since it cannot happen that he be damned without sin; but in this different sense, that in practice he ought to be more attentive to avoiding sin, since by avoiding sin he avoids hell, and hell is in no way to be feared if sin is avoided. - The matter is clarified by an example: the prodigal son, who had left his father and had squandered his substance by living luxuriously, was led to penance by hunger, or fear of pains and death, and approached his father again. Now if he had acted from servilely servile fear, preserving affection for the luxurious life, his manner of acting indeed would not have been worthy of praise; but, because, struck by fear, he truly also hated sin as the cause of his misery, he obtained pardon and was restored to his former rights. Thus the sinner who, from fear of hell, truly detests sin as the cause of hell, and, so that he may flee it, sincerely wills to serve God, acts laudably, and, absolution being added, obtains pardon of sins.

Vol. I, Matrimony, and Holy Orders, On Penance (Volume I), Moral Part — Chapter I: On the Duties of the Penitent

n. 203.

§ I. On the Qualities of Contrition

Contrition, whether perfect or imperfect, must be clothed with certain conditions, so that it may produce its effects with or without reception of the sacrament. Namely it must be (a) sincere, or internal, since it is sorrow of the soul; (b) supernatural, that is, elicited under the influence of actual grace, and conceived from a supernatural motive, since it is ordered to a supernatural end, namely the remission of sins; (c) universal, namely extending itself to all mortal sins, since the reason is the same for all, nor can one be remitted unless all are remitted, and consequently retracted; (d) appreciatively highest, insofar as sin must be esteemed and detested as the highest evil, and therefore more than any other evil; (e) in order to the sacrament, whenever the remission of sins is to be obtained by absolution. - Concerning these we shall speak separately.

¹ St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 2-3; Suarez, disp. XX, sect. 2; Lugo, disp. V and XIV; St. Alphonsus, H. A., tr. XVI, ch. 2; Collet, in Migne, Theol. Curs., XXII, 196-214; Lehmkuhl, n. 283 sq.; Hilarius Sexten., § 37, n. IV; Konings, n. 1349-1350; Ball. P., n. 42-142; Genicot, n. 272-279; Noldin, n. 244-251.

n. 204.

I. On Sincere or Truly Internal Contrition

1° Principle: Contrition must be sincere or internal, that is, truly conceived in the heart or will; and consequently merely external or feigned contrition does not suffice. It is certain.

(a) According to Trent,¹ contrition is sorrow of soul, and therefore must be conceived in the mind; and also detestation of sin: but detestation is an act of the will.

¹ Sess. XIV, ch. 4.

(b) Whenever contrition is treated in Scripture, the conversion of the heart is required, which, according to biblical usage, signifies the conversion of the will: "Be converted to me with all your heart... and rend your hearts, and not your garments."² - "Make yourselves a new heart and a new spirit."³

² Joel 2:12-13.

³ Ezek. 18:31.

(c) This is otherwise consonant with reason; for contrition, as the reparation of sin, ought to proceed from that source from which sin came forth; but sin proceeds from the heart or from the will, as Christ Himself bears witness: "For from the heart come forth evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false testimonies, blasphemies";⁴ therefore contrition ought to proceed from the heart, or will.

⁴ Matt. 15:19.

n. 205.

2° Corollaries. (A) Merely estimated contrition does not suffice; in other words, he who in good faith thinks himself to be attrite, while in reality he is not, does not obtain the remission of sins, although, on account of good faith, he is immune from the sin of sacrilege. Thus commonly against certain ancient theologians, whom Ballerini follows.⁵ For merely estimated contrition is not true sorrow of soul, which Trent requires for the remission of sin; it does indeed suffice that someone be in good faith, and consequently immune from the sin of sacrilege; but it does not suffice for taking away the aversion from God already existing, and consequently not for the remission of sin.

⁵ Ball. P., n. 52 sq., with the authors cited there. - Palmieri, who edited the Opus Morale of Ballerini, notes (in the note to n. 76) that this opinion, although formerly defended by theologians of great name, is today deservedly commonly rejected.

Sometimes, however, there are found sinners of timorous conscience who desire to have sorrow and grieve that they do not grieve, namely who have tried to elicit attrition, but fear lest the proper disposition be lacking to them; then the confessor should inquire whether they seriously will to abandon sin and to use the means for avoiding occasions of sin. If they answer affirmatively, it can be judged that they are truly attrite, although their sorrow is not sensible.

n. 206.

(B) The mere affirmation of the penitent does not always suffice for judging that he is attrite; but, in order that a prudent judgment be formed, it is necessary to attend to several circumstances. (a) The reason for the former is that the penitent can either be deceived or deceive the confessor; this can happen especially when he approaches the sacred tribunal not by his own motion, but because he is urged to this by the persuasion of superiors, or parents, or friends, or from habit, or from rule; or when he is moved by imagination and sensibility rather than by a reasonable motive.

(b) The reason for the latter is that the true disposition of the penitent can be discerned from many circumstances: from the character of the penitent, from the motives by which he is impelled to confessing, from the care which he used in preparation, or from a change of life, or flight from occasions of sinning, or use of remedies previously prescribed. And so in doubtful cases let the confessor attend to all these things, as will be declared more fully below, where we treat of the duties of the confessor, namely concerning absolution to be denied or deferred.

n. 207.

(C) Contrition, in order to be part of the sacrament, must be manifested by some sensible signs; this is done regularly by the recitation of some formula. No special formula is required, but it is very expedient to recite that which is found in the catechism; yet care must be taken that children and the uneducated do not place their whole contrition in the external recitation of it.

n. 208.

3° Controversy. Here it can be asked whether a formal act of contrition is required for rightly receiving the sacrament of penance, or whether virtual contrition, included in the love of God, suffices. This indeed, if it is perfect, suffices for the remission of sin outside the sacrament; but it is controverted whether it suffices for the reception of the sacrament. Theologians more commonly deny it with Suarez;¹ for contrition is an essential part and the proximate matter of the sacrament; but the proximate matter of the sacrament ought to be the formal act instituted by Christ Himself, nor does another act that only virtually embraces contrition suffice. - Yet some, such as Lugo and Ballerini,² affirm it; for those who elicit an act of love certainly place no obstacle to the sacrament; therefore they receive its effect. - But this controversy seems rather useless; for he who loves God above all things and confesses his sins by that very fact formally detests his sins, although he does not express this detestation by explicit words.

¹ Suarez, disp. XX, sect. 6, n. 2.

² Lugo, disp. V, n. 92 sq.; Ball. P., n. 80 sq.

n. 209.

II. On Supernatural Contrition

1° Principle: Contrition must be supernatural by reason of the principle and by reason of the motive. It is certain.

(A) By reason of the principle, that is, elicited under the influence of actual grace enlightening the mind and assisting the will. For contrition, as a proximate disposition for obtaining or increasing justification, is a supernatural work; but, from the things said in the Treatise on Grace (n. 50), no supernatural work can exist without actual grace. - But this grace is denied to no one who prays; whence it must be trustingly sought from God.

(B) By reason of the motive, or on account of a motive which is referred to God, according to all, and moreover apprehended by the light of faith, as is commonly held against a few, as Ballerini.¹ For (a) there ought to be a proportion between the means and the end to be obtained; but the end to be obtained, namely the remission of sin through the infusion of sanctifying grace, is altogether supernatural; therefore the act of contrition must be supernatural; but it would not be wholly supernatural unless it were elicited under the influence of a motive known by faith; for on the one hand, an act takes its value chiefly from the motive, and on the other hand, the motive is not supernatural unless it is known by revelation. (b) Besides, Innocent XI, on March 2, 1679, condemned this proposition (57):² "It is probable that natural attrition, provided it is honorable, suffices"; therefore it is not probable that such attrition suffices.

¹ Ball. P., n. 48.

² In Denzinger, n. 1074. - See this proposition clearly set forth in Viva, Damnatae Theses, on propos. 57.

Ballerini indeed contends that it suffices that the motive be apprehended by one who is endowed with supernatural faith, without, however, that motive being perceived by faith properly so called. But in practice there is scarcely any difficulty; for in fact all the motives of contrition which Trent enumerates and which are proposed to the faithful are an object of faith properly so called, and can and usually are apprehended by the light of faith. Therefore no difficulty arises from the common opinion.

n. 210.

2° Corollaries. (A) For truly supernatural contrition all motives which are known by faith suffice, namely not only perfect and imperfect love of God, but also the turpitude of sin, fear of hell and of punishments. - For these are truly supernatural, as will be clear from their exposition.

(a) The turpitude of sin is that moral foulness which arises from opposition to the supernatural order, and can be considered on the part of God, on the part of Christ, and on the part of the sinning soul.¹

¹ Cf. Lehmkuhl, vol. I, n. 225-226; Reuter, Neo-conf. n. 12; Manning, The Love of Jesus to Penitents, ch. III; Tanquerey, De peccatis, n. 463-465.

On the part of God, mortal sin, of which there is chiefly question, is rebellion against God, who is the supreme Lord; injustice, because it is opposed to the strict right which God has to be our ultimate end; irreligion, because it is opposed to the right which He has to be honored: "by the transgression of the law you dishonor God";² ingratitude, because He is the supreme benefactor (creator, conserver, redeemer, sanctifier), and we use His benefits for offending Him, and indeed at the very time when He heaps benefits upon us; insult, since we commit sin in the sight of God: "against Thee alone have I sinned, and I have done evil before Thee";³ contempt of God, since the vilest creature is preferred to God, according to that saying:⁴ "They have forsaken me, the fountain of living water, and have dug for themselves broken cisterns, which cannot hold waters"; impenitence, if someone adheres to sin for a long time.

² Rom. 2:23.

³ Ps. 50:6.

⁴ Jer. 2:13.

On the part of Christ, mortal sin is deicide, since it caused the death of the Lord and, insofar as can be done, renews it: "crucifying again to themselves the Son of God";⁵ sacrilege, since it is the violation of the divine temple, according to that saying:⁶ "the temple of God is holy, which you are."

⁵ Heb. 6:6.

⁶ 1 Cor. 3:17.

On the part of the soul, mortal sin is spiritual suicide, since it brings death upon the soul; deformity and defilement, since it deprives the soul of its supernatural beauty; submission to diabolical tyranny, since the sinner makes himself the servant of the devil: "for by whom a man is overcome, of him also he is the servant."⁷

⁷ 2 Pet. 2:19.

n. 211.

(b) Fear of eternal punishments, and the hope of obtaining eternal beatitude, are certainly, according to all, supernatural motives.

But it is controverted whether fear of the punishments of this life is also supernatural and sufficient for contrition. Now it is certain that temporal punishments considered in themselves, insofar as they afflict the sinner with natural evils, are not a supernatural motive; thus the loss of reputation, health, or merely temporal goods, or fear of prison or a fine, and other motives of this kind, do not suffice of themselves for contrition: for they do not cause detestation of sin insofar as it is an offense of God, nor do they convert the sinner to God, as is seen in the example of Antiochus, who in vain grieved over sins on account of the very bad illness by which he was afflicted.¹ - But if temporal punishments are considered in the light of faith, as chastisement intended by God the avenger for sins, and as, so to speak, the beginning of eternal punishments, they already offer a supernatural motive, and, according to the common and morally certain opinion, suffice for attrition. Thus, for example, the Ninevites did penance on account of fear of the destruction of the city,² and, according to Trent,³ obtained mercy from the Lord; likewise God often threatened temporal chastisements to the Jews, in order to lead them back to Himself.

¹ 2 Macc. 9:11-29.

² Jon. 3:4.

³ Trent, sess. XIV, ch. 4.

Whatever may be the case, it is certain that consideration of temporal losses is most useful for leading hardened sinners to higher and better motives: for if they are terrified by these passing evils, why would they not fear eternal ones, if, at the suggestion of the confessor, they think about them?

n. 212.

(B) An explicit act of faith and hope, distinct from the act itself of contrition, is not required. A few theologians had affirmed that this is required, because Trent, discussing the dispositions for justification,⁴ enumerates these acts of faith and hope. But this is commonly rejected by theologians, because the Council, discussing contrition, does not require them; moreover, according to St. Alphonsus (n. 439), he who approaches confession truly penitent necessarily elicits explicitly (if not reflexively, at least exercitively) acts of faith and hope; for since he approaches to receive the remission of sins, without doubt he also explicitly believes that they are to be remitted by the power of the sacrament, and explicitly hopes that God will remit sins to him on account of the merits of Christ. Therefore an act of faith or hope distinct from the act itself of contrition is not required. - Yet it is expedient that acts of this kind be recited as a preparation for contrition.

⁴ Trent, sess. VI, ch. 6.

n. 213.

III. On Contrition Appretiatively Highest

1° Principle: Contrition must be appreciatively, but not intensively, highest. It is certain.

Appreciatively highest contrition is that by which the penitent practically esteems mortal sin as the greatest of all evils, and is prepared to sustain all things rather than offend God. Intensively highest contrition is that which by its vehemence surpasses every other sorrow.

An act of contrition intensively highest is not required, but an act even remiss suffices, provided that it excludes every affection for mortal sin. For the intensity of an act does not vary its species; and, as St. Thomas rightly says,¹ "however small the sorrow may be, provided it suffices for the character of contrition (i.e., provided we detest sin above all things), it blots out every fault." - Therefore it remains to be proved that contrition appreciatively highest is required.

¹ Supplement, q. 5, a. 3.

(a) Contrition ought to involve that disposition by which, at least through absolution as mediator, the sinner pleases God; but unless someone loves God more than father, i.e., unless he consents to be deprived rather of every created good than of the friendship of God, he cannot please God, according to that saying of Christ:² "He who loves father or mother more than me is not worthy of me." (b) From Trent,³ contrition ought to exclude every affection for sin and every will of sinning; but it cannot accomplish this unless it is highest appreciatively; for unless someone esteems sin as the greatest of all evils, at some time he will choose sin rather than the evil which is apprehended as greatest; therefore. (c) Right reason demands that we pursue with appreciatively greatest hatred that which is truly the greatest evil; but sin, as at least objectively infinite offense of God, and as depriving man of the greatest goods, is the greatest of all evils; therefore it must be supremely detested.

² Matt. 10:37.

³ Sess. XIV, ch. 4.

n. 214.

2° Corollaries. (A) For contrition appreciatively highest, there is not required, nor is it expedient, an explicit comparison of sin with other evils in particular. (a) It is not required; for just as by faith we firmly believe revealed things without comparing divine authority with other authorities, and we love God above all things without comparing Him with creatures, so likewise we can detest sin above all evils without comparing it with the other evils.

(b) It is not expedient; for, as St. Thomas says,¹ just as delectable things move more when considered in particular than in common, so terrible things terrify more if they are considered in particular; therefore it would be imprudent to propose certain evils in species, for example the cruelest kind of death, a most grave injury, or the loss of one's whole fortune, lest perhaps these particular evils move the penitent more than spiritual losses. For all these evils are hypothetical, not impending, nor even probable; if sometimes they occur, the grace of God will be given for patiently undergoing them; meanwhile each day has enough of its own evil. It is enough that penitents resolve within themselves to do, when occasion is given and with the help of the grace of God, all those things which conscience will dictate at that time; for many things appear impossible which, when they occur, become easier by the grace of God.²

¹ Quodlibet, I, a. 9.

² Therefore the confessor would act imprudently who would address a fragile penitent, asserting that he is well disposed, in this way: "Are you truly prepared to abstain from all and each of these sins, not only for some days, but also through your whole life? If such and such temptation occurs, what will you do? Consider how much violence you must inflict on yourself, how much vigilance, and indeed continual vigilance, you must exercise; think that ordinary means do not suffice, but extraordinary ones are desired, fasts, mortifications, etc. Are you prepared for all these things?" For these or similar words are suited not to arousing contrition, but rather to destroying it. But rather he should be exhorted to use means proportioned to his strength, and confidently to have recourse to God in graver temptations. - Thus almost Berardi, De Recidivis, 5th ed., n. 49.

n. 215.

(B) For contrition appreciatively highest, sensible sorrow is not required, or sorrow which overflows into the sensitive appetite and breaks forth into tender affections of the heart, sighs, and tears; and consequently neither is sorrow required which is more sensible than that which is often felt on account of temporal losses, for example, the death of relatives and friends. For contrition does not reside in sensibility, but in the will, with the judgment of the intellect going before; moreover, sensible emotion is not in our power, and it can happen that someone, without sensible sorrow, grieves more vehemently than another who is prone to emotions of this kind. Sensible signs of sorrow are indeed not to be despised; indeed sometimes they are true indications of more vehement contrition; but what must especially be weighed is whether the penitent esteems sin as an evil more grave than the others, and therefore is prepared to suffer other losses in general rather than gravely offend God.

n. 224.

V. On Contrition in Order to the Sacrament

1° Principle: Contrition must be elicited in order to the sacrament, or a certain moral union is required between the act of contrition and absolution. It is certain.

² Suarez, disp. XX, sect. 4, n. 27-30; Lugo, disp. XIV, n. 36-50; Salmantic., cap. 5, n. 22-27; St. Alphonsus, n. 445-448; Billuart, diss. IV, art. 8; Lehmkuhl, 280-282; Genicot, n. 278; Morino, n. 431-434.

For contrition is an essential part or at least an integral part of the sacrament, and consequently must be so united with the sacrament that with it it forms some whole; but the sacrament is a moral whole, not a physical one; therefore a moral union between sorrow and absolution suffices.

n. 225.

2° Corollaries. This union, however, regards both intention and time.

(A) With relation to intention, sorrow conceived for sins must in some way be referred to absolution; otherwise absolution would become invalid or doubtful, on account of the defect of moral union among the various parts of the sacrament.

It is not required, however, that contrition explicitly and reflexively arise from an intention, previously conceived, of receiving the sacrament, whatever a few may have said to the contrary with Lacroix;¹ but it suffices that sorrow conceived before the purpose of confessing flow virtually into confession, and be morally connected with absolution. Thus, for example, he who, on the occasion of a sermon or of pious reading, conceives sorrow without thinking about confession, and afterward, by the force of sorrow thus conceived and persevering, makes a confession, or at least gives some sign of the sorrow previously conceived before absolution, sufficiently orders his contrition to the sacrament. Yet it is better that penitents explicitly elicit or renew an act of contrition in order to confession, before they enter the sacred tribunal, so that their sorrow may be more vivid and richer fruits may be received.

¹ Lacroix, n. 687.

n. 226.

(B) With relation to time: (a) contrition must precede absolution, or at least be elicited at that point of time at which absolution is given, because it is certainly a necessary disposition for absolution, and also very probably the proximate matter itself of the sacrament; if therefore contrition does not exist at least at that instant at which I absolve you is said, the sacrament will lack its effect.

n. 227.

(b) But it need not necessarily precede confession, although this is much better and more prudent. For the Roman Ritual admonishes the confessor that, after the confession has been heard, he should try by efficacious words to lead the penitent to sorrow and contrition;² therefore it supposes that the penitent is sometimes not contrite while he confesses his sins, and nevertheless can be absolved, provided that before absolution he is sincerely contrite.

² Ordo ministrandi sacram. Paenitentiae.

Some contend that this cannot be done, because the confession then is not sorrowful, and in addition the sorrow conceived after confession is not manifested by a sensible sign. But this difficulty, when the matter is carefully inspected, entirely vanishes. Confession indeed must be sorrowful, but for this it suffices that it not be a merely historical account of sins, but be made in order to the sacrament, with hope of conceiving contrition before absolution. But contrition, even if it is conceived after confession, becomes sensible by the fact that the penitent manifests internal sorrow either by asking for absolution, or by reciting an act of contrition, or by other external signs. - Whence the opinion which we defend is morally certain.

n. 228.

(c) An act of contrition once elicited in order to absolution can persevere not only for several hours, but even for several days, provided that it is not retracted by a new mortal sin, and that it perseveres in some effect, for example, the will of confessing, flight from occasions, etc. The reason is that such an interval does not destroy the moral union which must exist among the various parts of the sacrament; for that delay is permitted which can exist among the various judicial acts, since this sacrament is administered after the manner of a judgment.

This indeed can serve to calm the scruples of those who did not renew an act of contrition before confession, and, at that instant at which absolution was conferred, did not think about contrition. But in practice it is certainly expedient that an act of sorrow be elicited in preparation for confession, both so that greater fruit may be received from it, and also for the sake of security, lest perhaps a penitent who, on account of disturbance of mind, does not renew sorrow at the time of absolution, be troubled by anxieties.

n. 229.

(d) It is not required that contrition endure after absolution has been received; for true contrition, with grace helping, can be conceived in one instant, and provided that it is conceived and endures at the time when absolution is conferred, the penitent is justified; if afterward he is overcome by temptation, he indeed sins, but the sins remitted do not revive. Yet if it quickly vanishes, it can deservedly for the most part be regarded as suspect.

n. 230.

3° Disputed questions: (a) When a penitent, immediately or a little after absolution, accuses a grave sin omitted through forgetfulness, it is controverted whether or not a new act of sorrow is required for receiving a new absolution. The more probable opinion denies this, provided, however, that contrition was elicited from a universal motive which also embraces the sin given over to forgetfulness; for in this case the judgment had not yet been objectively completed, and besides the contrition previously conceived still perseveres. Some, however, affirm with probability, with St. Alphonsus (n. 448), because the judgment has already been completed, and consequently new proximate matter is required for a new sentence to be pronounced. - Whence, in practice, penitents are to be induced to elicit a new act of contrition; but if this has not been done, penitents are not to be disturbed, since the sin has already been remitted indirectly by the first absolution.

(b) But when, after a long interval, sins already absolved are accused anew, it is doubtful whether the sorrow elicited in the prior confession and not yet retracted perseveres sufficiently for absolution without being actually renewed. More probably a new sorrow is required, because, after a long interval, the sacramental judgment has been completed; therefore, in order that a new one may be begun and completed, there is required not only a new accusation, but a new act of contrition and a new absolution. - Whence in practice penitents are to be admonished to renew their sorrow; this they will gladly do. But if certain devout persons fear that they omitted this in their past life, they are not easily to be disturbed, since one must stand for the validity of the act until the contrary is proved.

…and 1 more passage — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Koch–Preuss

Antony Koch; adapted and edited by Arthur Preuss — 13 passages

Vol. II, Pt. II, Ch. II, Sect. 5, Article 1: Contrition

NATURE OF CONTRITION. —Contrition (contritio cordis) is the most necessary constituent of Penance, both as a virtue and as a Sacrament,¹ for without contrition there can be no genuine repentance and no forgiveness.² The Council of Trent defines contrition as "a sorrow of the soul and a detestation for sin committed, with the purpose of not sinning for the future." ³ Hence contrition is essentially an act of the will, by which man renounces sin and determines to avoid it in future. The act of renunciation is called contrition in the strict sense (contritio stricte dicta), while the determination to avoid future sins is termed purpose of amendment (propositum).

¹ Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Sacraments, Vol. III, pp. 1 sqq.; 72 sqq.

² Joel II, 12 sq. —Cfr. Prop. Damnat. sub Innoc. XI., prop. 60: "Absolution is neither to be denied nor deferred to a penitent who has a habit of sinning against the law of God, nature, or the Church, even if no hope of amendment appears, provided that with his mouth he declares that he is sorry and proposes amendment." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1210).

³ Sess. XIV, De Poenit., cap. 4: "Contrition, which holds the first place among the aforesaid acts of the penitent, is sorrow of the soul and detestation for sin committed, with the purpose of not sinning for the future." —Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 3a, Suppl., qu. 1, ad 1: "Contrition is sorrow undertaken for sins, with the purpose of confessing and making satisfaction."

Being an interior sorrow of the soul, contrition differs from that purely intellectual regret (dolor intellectivus speculativus) which consists in a mere perception of the damnableness of sin, and also from the so-called terror conscientiae, I. e., the fear with which conscience is smitten upon being convinced of iniquity.⁴ Both these emotions may be present without a spark of genuine contrition.

⁴ Conc. Trident., Sess. XIV, De Poenit., can. 4: "If anyone says that there are only two parts of penance, namely terrors struck into the conscience when sin is recognized and faith, let him be anathema." —Conf. August., art. 12. —Möhler, Symbolism, pp. 124 sqq.; pp. 223.

The moral value of contrition, as a turning away from sin and a turning to God (aversio a pec cat o et conversio ad Deum), consists in its being an act of the will,⁵ and consequently it need not be accompanied by sensible pain or grief, nor manifest itself by sighs and tears. Whilst there is such a thing as "tears of contrition," ⁶ sensible sorrow forms no constituent of genuine contrition, nor is its presence a sure proof thereof.

⁵ Cat. Rom., P. II, c. 5, qu. 24: "Because contrition has been defined as sorrow, the faithful are to be warned not to think that it is perceived by a bodily sense. For contrition is an act of the will." —Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, c.

⁶ (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 798).

"As there are tears that indicate no deep emotion, so there is a sorrow without tears. As a rule, however, it is desirable that contrition should be manifested by outward signs. Such outward signs of internal sorrow for sin are technically known as signa contritionis, and divided into two classes, ordinary and extraordinary. The latter manifest themselves partly in an unusual stirring of the affections and partly in the making of special efforts to go to confession, seek advice, etc. Such extraordinary signs are of particular significance in the case of habitual sinners and recidivi, where ordinary signs fail.”⁷ 2. PROPERTIES OF CONTRITION. —Contrition may be perfect or imperfect.

⁶ Cfr. Ps. VI, 7; Matth. XXVI, 75; Luke VII, 44, 47. —Cfr. St. Augustine, Serin., 351, c. i: "As sorrow is the companion of penance, so tears are witnesses of sorrow." (Migne, P. L., XXXIX, 1536).—Cat. Rom., P. II, c. 5, qu. 28.

⁷ F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, pp. 212 sq. detestatio

Perfect contrition (contritio caritate per feet a, or simply contritio) is inspired by charity, i. e., a perfect love of God as the supreme good for His own sake.

Imperfect contrition (contritio imperfecta), now technically called attrition (attritio), is sorrow inspired by some other supernatural motive, e. g., fear of eternal punishment, repugnance to sin as an offense against Almighty God, regret at having lost divine grace and forfeited heaven, etc.⁸ As can be easily seen, the distinction between perfect and imperfect contrition is not based upon the degree of sorrow a man has for his sins, but upon the motives by which that sorrow is inspired; this distinction is specific rather than generic.

⁸ Cfr. J. P. Gury, Comp. Theol. tivo Mor., II, n. 318: "Contrition is distinguished as twofold: perfect, which is detestation of sin arising from the special motive of perfect charity, or of the goodness of God supremely loved for His own sake; and imperfect, or attrition, which is detestation of sin arising from another supernatural motive, for example, from consideration of the baseness of sin, from fear of hell, or from love of eternal beatitude." —Conc. Trident., Sess. XIV, De Poenit., c. 4 (Denn. 897 sq.).

Perfect contrition, coupled with a desire to receive the Sacrament of Penance (contritio cum voto sacramenti), is sufficient to effect the forgiveness of sins not merely in cases of necessity, or when it reaches the highest possible degree of intensity, but of itself and always. Imperfect contrition (attrition), on the other hand, can produce this effect only in connection with sacramental confession.⁹ Hence perfect contrition is not an essential requisite of Penance, but attrition suffices for the valid reception of this Sacrament, provided, of course, that the penitent is resolved to sin no more and confidently trusts in the mercy of God.

⁹ Conc. Trident., 1. c. —Cfr. Prop. Bait Damnat., prop. 31, 32, 70, 71 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1031, 1032, 1070, 1071). —Gury, l. c., n. 335: "Perfect contrition justifies a man of itself, even outside the Sacrament of Penance. This is evident from reason: for contrition necessarily includes perfect charity; moreover, to love God perfectly is to be united with God, since love consists in union; and union with God necessarily effects separation from sin, since one cannot embrace one extreme without withdrawing entirely from the opposite extreme. Therefore it follows. It is also evident from Sacred Scripture. Perfect contrition does not remit mortal sins, or justify a man, except with the desire for confession, for sins cannot be remitted except through the means instituted by Christ. An implicit desire suffices, however; for an explicit desire is required neither by the nature of perfect contrition, since it can justify by itself alone, nor by a divine precept, since none can be shown." 9a Cfr. Slater, Questions of Moral Theology, 355 sqq.

However, though there is no obligation to make an act of perfect contrition in preparing for confession, the faithful should be exhorted to do so, to the best of their ability.9* Broadly speaking it is safe to assume that imperfect contrition always includes an act of at least incipient love (amor initialis), while perfect contrition is rarely without an admixture of fear (timor filialis).¹⁰

¹⁰ Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, c. 6: "They are raised up to hope and begin to love God as the source of all justice." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 798). —Cfr. J. E. Pruner, Kath. Moralthevlogie, Vol. II, 3rd ed., p. 374.

Vol. III, Pt. II, Tr. V, Ch. II, Article I. On Contrition · Vol. III, Pt. II, Tr. V, Ch. II, Art. I, § 1, Division, and Effect of Contrition in General · Vol. III, Pt. II, Tr. V, Ch. II, Art. I, § 2. On Attrition

For the valid reception of the Sacrament of Penance contrition (whether perfect or imperfect) should be: a) Sincere or heart-felt, for else it would be sheer hypocrisy. The quality of sincerity flows as a necessary effect from the nature of contrition. b) Supernatural, both in its origin and in its motives. True contrition owes its existence to divine grace and is based upon reasons or motives supplied by supernatural faith.¹¹ c) Supreme or sovereign, not in intensity but appreciatively, i. e., the penitent must detest sin as the greatest of all evils and be ready to give up everything he has, even life itself, rather than offend God.¹² Since contrition is in the will, not in the emotions, it may happen that the sorrow one feels at temporal misfortunes is both affectively and intensively greater than that felt at sin as a purely spiritual evil; but this need not prevent a man's contrition from being appreciatively supreme. "If we may not succeed in rendering our contrition perfect," says the Roman Catechism, "it may nevertheless be true and efficacious, for oftentimes things that fall under the senses affect us more than spiritual things, and hence some persons experience a greater sense of grief for the loss of their children than for the baseness of their sins.”¹³ Our sense of grief need not be supreme, for to make it so is largely beyond our control; but we must by a combined act of the mind and will abhor sin above all other evils. Theologians express this technically by saying that sin must be detested as the greatest of all evils, not affectively, but effectively ¹⁴ (non affective sed effective). d) Contrition must furthermore be universal, i. e., it must cover all the mortal sins committed by the penitent. As every mortal sin implies a complete turning away from God, no one mortal sin can be forgiven without the rest.¹⁵

¹¹ Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, can. 3 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 813). — Cfr. Prop. Damnat. sub Innoc. XL, prop. 57: "It is probable that merely honorable natural attrition suffices." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1207).

¹² Cfr. J. P. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., II, n. 328: "Supreme, that is, so that the sinner detests his offense more than every other evil and prefers to lose and suffer all things rather than commit sin. For conversion to God must be total, since sin is a total turning away; but it would not be total unless it were supreme—indeed, it would be nothing—for the man would still cling to a creature, since he would still prefer it to God."

¹³ Cat. Rom., P. II, c. 5, QU. 28: "Although we may be less able to attain that it be perfect, contrition can nevertheless be true and efficacious. For it often happens that things subject to the senses affect us more than spiritual things. Therefore some persons sometimes experience a greater feeling of grief from the death of their children than from the baseness of sin."

¹⁴ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 3a, Suppl., qu. 3, art. 1-2.

¹⁵ Cfr. Gury, op. cit., n. 328: "Universal, that is, it must exclude all grave sins, at least implicitly, either from one universal motive or from several particular motives which, at least taken together, extend to all mortal sins committed, even those not occurring to memory. The reason is that no actual sin is remitted without sorrow; but one mortal sin cannot be remitted without another, since remission takes place by the infusion of grace, which cannot coexist with any mortal sin." —Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 3a, qu. 86, ad 3.

n. ¶10.

It is not, however, necessary to make a special act of contrition for each particular mortal sin. One general act for all the sins committed (universe) will suffice.

n. ¶11.

Venial sins can be forgiven severally, one without the other, and hence it suffices to make an act of contrition for one. When many venial sins are confessed, it is advisable to elicit a more specific contrition for the one or other of them, because a too general contrition might lack sincerity and efficaciousness.¹⁶ To receive sacramental absolution from a venial sin it is necessary to have at least imperfect contrition for that particular offence.

¹⁶ Cfr. Cat. Rom., P. II, c. 5, qu. 29 sq.; St. Alphonsus, Theol, Mor., I, VI, n. 433, 438, THE PURPOSE OF AMENDMENT

n. ¶12.

Being the proximate matter of Penance, contrition must be brought into moral connexion with the Sacra- ment, 7. e., it must precede the sacramental absolution or be present in the soul while the formula of absolution is pronounced by the priest. The best way is to make an act of contrition before entering the confessional.

n. ¶13.

READINGS. —Pohle-Pretiss, The Sacraments, Vol. III, pp. 132 sqq.—Chr. Pesch, S.J., Praelectiones Dogmaticae, Vol. VII, 2nd ed., pp. 39 sqq. —R. Schultes, O.P., Reue und Bussakrament, Paderborn 1907.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. III, pp. 296 sqq.

Vermeersch, Theologia Moralis

Arthur Vermeersch, S.J. — 11 passages

Vol. III, Bk. II, Tr. V, Ch. II, § 1. On the Required Contrition

n. 567.

— Contrition, commonly understood, is sorrow and detestation for sin committed, with a purpose of amendment (Trid., s. XIV). Perfect contrition, which is called contrition absolutely, is elicited from a motive of charity on account of God loved above all things; and this already of itself alone restores grace, yet with the vow of confession which then is to be made. Imperfect contrition, which is called attrition, is conceived from an inferior motive, yet one referred to God.

As will be said in the treatise on the theological virtues, perfect contrition is not to be judged difficult for him who has efficaciously renounced sin, since the love of God above all things is itself in its own way natural to every creature, and experience teaches that men are often moved more by the goodness of God offended and contemned, or by the Passion of Christ, than by fear of punishments. The difficulty is that of triumphing over evil passions; after this victory has been won, conversion easily becomes perfect from imperfect.

But the proper reason of perfect contrition is explained in its own place, where we treat of charity.

n. 568.

— For the fruitful reception of the sacrament of Penance there suffices and is required at least attrition which is:

formal, because it is the sacrament of Penance; and because, if it is a question of necessary matter, true charity necessarily becomes formally penitent in him who is conscious of mortal sin not yet remitted. Therefore virtual attrition does not suffice. Yet Ballerini, V, 47-55, judges that virtual sorrow contained in an efficacious purpose can suffice. Before confession, let us not abandon the more common opinion; after the fact, let us not be anxious about the matter;
supernatural, that is, with the help of supernatural grace, on account of a motive which directly or indirectly says order to God: for the offense of God, which is sin, must be abhorred as such.

It is controverted whether or not it must be known by the light of faith. The necessity of that condition, posited by several, is not demonstrated.

Moreover, motives of conversion are accustomed to be apprehended by Christians by their faith. And since grace does not fail us from the mercy of God, we must be solicitous only about the quality of the motive, lest it be merely human.

Now good motives of attrition return to fear of punishments, to be inflicted or already inflicted by God, even in this life; and to the turpitude of sin contrary to the honesty of virtue which is regulated by the law of God. This turpitude itself can be common to every sin, or special to certain sins, for example lust, injustice in goods. Consideration of ingratitude toward God, indeed of divine goodness contemned, is reduced to the common deformity of sin.

When there is only fear of punishments of this life, care must be taken that attrition be efficacious; on that account it will be safer before confession to direct attention also to other punishments;

appreciatively supreme, in this way: that sin is estimated as a greater evil than every evil which must be undergone in order to avoid sin, and therefore excludes the will of sinning in every true or possible hypothesis.

Sometimes it is asked in vain whether we ought to be prepared to sustain the punishments of hell rather than offend God. For to love God and by hatred of hell to be separated from Him are repugnant to each other. These absurd things are not to be thought.

Nor even are improbable evils prudently proposed to the imagination as an argument of sincerity. It is enough that in a universal manner we conceive an absolute detestation of sin. If then God permits that we must remain in the way of virtue with heroic fortitude, He Himself will know how, "with the temptation, to make a way out,"⁽¹⁾ so that we easily perform the things which now seem to be above our strength. Therefore it suffices that, if such things come into mind, we repeat the word of Abraham: "God will provide,"⁽²⁾ and reject sin by the present will in every hypothesis.

⁽¹⁾ 1 Cor. 10:13. - ⁽²⁾ Gen. 22:8.

You ask, how can the attrition of one who remained in adulterous concubinage as long as the life of the spouse was an obstacle to legitimate marriage be above all things?

Certainly a more perfect attrition is required than that which was contained in the purpose of changing life after the difficulty had been removed. Yet it helps our psychology that, with the difficulty absent, we are less struck by it. Wherefore, with the confessor exhorting, and with the grace of the mercy of God assisting, such a penitent will be able, not with so much difficulty, to be led even to sincerely and absolutely detesting the former manner of acting.

But observe that, even for the remission of venial sin, absolute detestation, or detestation above all things, is necessary;

universal, as to mortal sins, because individual mortal sins cannot be remitted without the others, and none is pardoned without sorrow above all things. On the contrary, since venial sins can be remitted separately, attrition about these sins does not have to be universal.

n. 569.

— On a valid and unformed sacrament. If someone, unconscious of the defect, approaches without attrition above all things, yet not without some lesser attrition which excludes the will of sinning in some way, even if not absolutely, he is not proximately disposed to receiving grace; yet he seems validly to receive the sacrament, which therefore will be unformed, but will confer grace as soon as the fiction has departed, that is, after the disposition, for example in Holy Communion itself, has become more perfect. The reason is that attrition enters the sacrament only insofar as it is sensible, since the sacrament is a sensible sign. But by the sincere accusation and protestation of the penitent there is revealed of itself a true detestation, but not the supreme degree of attrition. Moreover, if attrition appreciatively supreme were required for the very validity of the sacrament: a) the usage of absolving at Easter sinners who scarcely confess once in the year, provided they are shown to be sincere in affirming their attrition, and of not then demanding a repeated accusation of faults absolved in this way, would not be so easily explained; b) the confessor who, after hearing the accusation, tries to bring the penitent to more intense contrition would have to be solicitous about the degree of contrition obtained, and would have to seek a new manifestation of sorrow.

That the sacrament can be unformed is admitted by Cajetan, who thus interprets St. Thomas, Suppl. 3 p., q. 9, art. 1; St. Antoninus, several Thomists; Ballerini, V, 41, 42, 45, on account of the things he has about supposed attrition; and especially C. Billot, De Sacramentis, II, th. 16. Yet several, after Suarez, Paen., d. 20, 15; Lugo, d. 14, s. 6; Lehmk., II, 401, 402, defend the opposite parts. These do not admit that this sacrament can be valid and unformed, unless when sufficient sorrow, elicited from a particular motive of some sin, has lacked universality. This case alone also is proved by St. Alph., l. 6, n. 441.

Nor are there lacking those who, with D'Ann., III, 210 (18), deny that appreciatively supreme attrition can remain particular, so that they contend that the sacrament is always received either fruitfully or invalidly. From this they also argue that sorrow is required which excludes the will of sinning. But even if someone demands that the purpose be virtually universal, detestation of committed sin can be of less extension than the purpose concerning future sins to be avoided. For someone can have a firm will of not repeating an act concerning which nevertheless he is not sorry at all.

Therefore penitents who have confessed in good faith, provided they have conceived some true sorrow, are not to be compelled to repeat confessions.

n. 570.

— The relation of sorrow to the sacrament. 1. According to the more common opinion, sorrow for accused sins must by the will of the penitent itself in some way be directed to the sacrament. Thus Suarez, d. 20, s. 4, n. 29. Yet this can be doubted, since the penitent is not the minister of this sacrament; but it seems enough that the minister find apt matter (Lugo, d. 14, n. 41 ff.); and thus we absolve at least conditionally heretics who are sorry for sins and are ignorant that Penance is a sacrament.

But it is in no way required that sorrow itself have been conceived from intention of the sacrament. For without a preceding intention of this kind, attrition has all the qualities which the Council of Trent, s. XIV, c. 14, requires: it can be a true detestation, excluding the will of sinning with hope of pardon, having joined to it the vow of furnishing the other things which are required for the due reception of this sacrament. And by the very fact that it accompanies confession, sorrow enters the sacrament sufficiently.

Wherefore he who, in making an examination of conscience, has stirred up contrition, and after several hours, indeed after an entire day, accuses sins, must in no way be anxious about his contrition, although he has not renewed this act and has confessed coldly. For affliction shared by the senses is not demanded; but in the sincere accusation itself there is virtually contained and expressed sorrow which has persevered in the habitual will, which we suppose meanwhile not to have been changed.

And he who, after receiving absolution, remembers an omitted sin and accuses it, is fruitfully absolved, even though the formal act of contrition has not been renewed: it was virtually included in the accusation itself (cf. Ball.-Palm., t. V, n. 76-80).

n. 571.

— The distance of absolution from the acts of the penitent, and the perseverance of attrition. 1. After sufficient attrition has existed in the sacrament itself, the absolution of the priest will be able to be distant even for a long time from the acts of the penitent, provided the dispositions of the penitent have habitually persevered. The reason is that a sentence can be separated by a long time from knowledge of the cause, and the sacrament was instituted after the manner of a judgment. Moreover, in a new approach to confession, sorrow is almost necessarily renewed.

Attrition, at least that which is required for fruitful reception of the sacrament, does not habitually persevere but is retracted by every new mortal sin; but when it is a question of venial sins alone, or of venial sins together with a mortal sin accused, sufficient attrition is not retracted as to all sins by a new fault committed, even if it was conceived from a universal motive. For sins, according to their different gravity, are opposed unequally even to a universal motive: God is offended more by an enormous sin than by a less grave one; mortal and venial sin are opposed to the love of God in different ways. Then a man, even by a universal motive, is rarely moved according to the full force of that motive; often we detest sin because it is such, so grave, so fruitless an offense of God. And even when the motive exercises its full power upon us, nevertheless we detest the opposed sins unequally, but abhor more the things which fight more against such a motive. Finally, our act, subjectively one, becomes virtually multiple on account of the several motives to which it is terminated. Wherefore a partial retraction of the act is well conceived. Therefore nothing demonstrates a universal retraction of attrition on account of a new sin committed (cf. Lugo, Resp. mor., I, 29).

n. 572.

— Must confession itself be joined with sorrow, or can these exist separately in the sacrament?

Indeed a sacramental accusation is required, that is, one made for the purpose of obtaining absolution. A confession of this kind will always be informed by at least some true attrition. Yet let us suppose someone first confessing with sacrilegious intention, then afterward being brought by the exhortation of the confessor to perfect repentance before absolution. Must the accusation be repeated? This is not established. The accusation gave the confessor sufficient knowledge of the cause; the subsequent attrition makes the penitent disposed. But before absolution this can become sensible by another sign besides confession, at least "by humbling himself before the priest and seeking or awaiting absolution." Laymann, De Paen., c. 4, n. 4. Wherefore, says Ball., t. V, n. 90, "there is no reason why sorrow should have to be joined more with confession than confession with absolution."

n. 573.

— Attrition about venial sins does not have to be universal even virtually. Therefore it suffices that you be sorry from a particular motive, for example on account of the special turpitude or gravity of certain of them, or that you be sorry for the frequency or collection of these sins. This sorrow will fall indirectly upon the sins which are affected by this circumstance. St. Alph., l. 6, n. 449. Yet it will be better to be sorry about certain sins definitely, or at least about sins deliberately committed, if there were any (cf. Lehmk., II, 393).

n. 574.

— One conscious of insufficient sorrow for the fruitful reception of the sacrament, or who knows that he does not possess sufficient attrition about all the grave sins which he has to accuse, or about any venial sin, will be guilty of grave sacrilege, even if he has committed only venial sins. The opinion of certain men, otherwise rigorous, who thought it a light irreverence to frustrate the sacrament in a light matter, is altogether false (Ball., V, n. 58).

But he who is sorry for one thing will not sin gravely if he confesses other venial sins without attrition.

Nor will he sin at all who warns the confessor about the matter, or who simply declares all things so that he may be better directed, and does not positively affirm that he wishes to be efficaciously absolved from each thing.

n. 575.

— Putative contrition is not required for fruitful reception of the sacrament, nor does putative attrition or a velleity of not sinning suffice. Nor does it suffice to be sorry that you are not sorry. For these things of themselves allow affection for sin to subsist. Yet for the most part, with that act by which "he is sorry that he is not sorry," the penitent joins true sorrow for his sins, which he does not discern; or in that accusation he merely reveals that he lacks sensible sadness, which is not necessary.

n. 576.

— Formal acts of faith and hope are not required, but in the very approach to the sacrament of Penance, so that salutary pardon may be obtained ex opere operato, they are necessarily included and sufficiently exercised, since no argument demonstrates that more is to be demanded.

Nor even in a man who seeks reconciliation with God, or wills divine friendship restored, is there wanting that beginning of this love which Trent declares to precede perfect justification,⁽¹⁾ whether you place that beginning in the love of hope, as some say, or better in charity not yet perfect (cf. Lehmk., II, 391).

⁽¹⁾ "But they are disposed to justice itself when... and when, understanding themselves to be sinners, from the fear of divine justice, by which they are usefully shaken, by turning themselves to considering the mercy of God, they are raised into hope, trusting that God will be propitious to them on account of Christ, and they begin to love Him as the fountain of all justice; and on that account they are moved against sins through a certain hatred and detestation" (Trid., s. 6, c. 6, On Justification). In s. 14, c. 4, there is speech only about hope of pardon, with exclusion of the will of sinning.

n. 577.

— Counsels about this matter. Several things just said pertain to this, that they may cut off an occasion of anxiety and repel the long-sought difficulties which theologians, more subtly than usefully, have begun to raise about this sacrament to be used very frequently.

But by our counsels we shall strive to obtain better and more perfect things. Wherefore we shall advise that a formal excitation to contrition, and indeed perfect contrition, be joined to the discussion of conscience; we shall exhort the penitent that, while he receives absolution, he renew the act of contrition; by a few words we shall try that he do the same if, after absolution has already been received, he wishes to complete the accusation. Yet here always observe that in an accusation so made attrition is virtually contained and sufficiently signified.

N.B. If it is a question of one gravely sick who is absolved several times, care must be taken that to each absolution, according as opportunity is present, there be prefixed a general sorrowful accusation which is as it were the matter of the sacrament.

Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis

Dominic M. Prümmer, O.P. — 8 passages

Vol. III, Pt. II, Tr. V, Ch. II, Article I. On Contrition

n. ¶47.

We divide this article into four paragraphs: 1. on the nature, division, and effects of contrition in general; 2. on attrition; 3. on the qualities of contrition and attrition; 4. on purpose.

Vol. III, Pt. II, Tr. V, Ch. II, Art. I, § 1, Division, and Effect of Contrition in General

n. 339.

339. Definition. Contrition, taken generically, is "sorrow of soul and detestation for sin committed, with the purpose of not sinning henceforth." Thus the Council of Trent.¹⁰⁰

Therefore three integral acts are required for contrition: a) sorrow, b) detestation, c) purpose.

Theologians dispute which act is more principal, sorrow or detestation. The question is of little moment and of no practical utility, since both acts must necessarily be present. For if someone truly grieves over some evil thing, he also detests it, that is, turns himself away from it; and if someone detests a thing, he also grieves over it when he must suffer it. There is no reason to depart from the order observed in the Tridentine definition, so that sorrow is more principal than detestation. This order indeed also seems to correspond more to the nature of sin, which is a disordered conversion toward mutable good with an aversion from immutable good, namely, from God. Because this disordered conversion toward created good is something disordered in the soul, it therefore necessarily causes sorrow, namely, remorse of conscience in this life and the punishment of Gehenna in the other life. From sorrow conceived in this manner, a man is almost necessarily induced, by the aid of divine grace, to detest the cause of this sorrow, namely, sin. Sorrow and detestation together cause the third act, namely, purpose. It can be said briefly with Billuart:¹⁰¹ "The essence of contrition consists formally in sorrow, presuppositively in hatred, and consecutively in purpose."

¹⁰⁰ Session 14, c. 4, On Penance (Denz., n. 897). St. Raymond of Peñafort (loc. cit.) already gave a similar definition, saying: "Contrition is sorrow undertaken for sins, with the purpose of confessing and making satisfaction." St. Thomas likewise adopted this definition (Suppl., q. 1, a. 1) and wrote an entire explanatory article. It is worthy of note that a twofold purpose is necessarily included in contrition, namely, of confessing and of making satisfaction, so that no true contrition is given unless at least implicitly this twofold purpose is present. In practice it is to be insisted upon that this twofold purpose be elicited also explicitly.

¹⁰¹ De poenit., diss. 4, a. 1.

n. 340.

340. Division.¹⁰² A twofold contrition is distinguished: one perfect, which is called simply contrition; the other imperfect, which is customarily called attrition. Nevertheless, from this explanation it is in no way lawful to deduce that contrition and attrition are distinguished only according to more and less, or according to accidental qualities, as several authors, especially older ones, maintained, who required true contrition for every remission of sin, as do all those more recent authors who require true love of charity for attrition, although not so perfect as in contrition properly so called. But it is better said that contrition and attrition are specifically distinguished. For they are distinguished in two ways, namely, a) by reason of motive, b) by reason of efficacy.

a) Contrition arises from a motive of charity. Now a twofold love of God is distinguished, namely, the love of hope or of concupiscence, by which God is loved because of the supreme goods which He communicates to us; the love of benevolence, by which God is loved as infinitely good and perfect in Himself, and by which a man desires the greatest glory to be contributed to God by every creature. This love of benevolence, if it exists in a perfect degree, is the love of friendship, namely, consisting in mutual love between God and man and causing a man to love God in Himself not only as the supreme good but also as his friend.

Certain authors, such as the Scotists, and among modern authors Hurter, Palmieri, Egger, and Tanquerey, seem to teach that for perfect contrition the love of hope and gratitude suffices, namely, if a man loves God because of the hope of beatitude and is thereby raised into affections of gratitude. This opinion, although perhaps probable, is nevertheless most commonly rejected. Hence almost all theologians require true love of benevolence and friendship, which nevertheless does not necessarily have divine goodness for its object, but any divine attribute. Moreover, he who loves one divine attribute with a true love of benevolence loves all, since they are not really distinct from one another.¹⁰³

b) Attrition arises indeed from a supernatural motive, but not from a motive of charity. Motives of attrition are, for example, the turpitude of sin and an eternal or even temporal punishment to be inflicted by God. But it is to be noted especially that these motives must altogether be supernatural, that is, acquired by the light of faith and actual grace. Therefore, for example, the natural turpitude of adultery, the punishments which threaten because of homicide committed, and so forth, do not suffice. A fuller discussion concerning the nature of attrition will be given below in § 2.

¹⁰² During the first eleven centuries of the Christian era theologians did not distinguish diverse species of contrition, at least explicitly. But in the time of Peter Lombard, and especially of Alexander of Hales, St. Thomas, and St. Bonaventure, attrition was distinguished from contrition. Alan of Lille (d. ca. 1200, Lib. poenit. [Migne, Patr. lat. 210, 300 and 665]) seems to have been the first to employ the word attrition nearly in our sense. Attrition was at that time taken also in other senses.

¹⁰³ See, concerning this controversy, which is of little utility, the very keen contests between Ballerini and the Vindiciae Alphonsianae.

n. 341.

341. The effect of perfect contrition is the remission of all sins, provided that the desire for the sacrament of penance is added.

For the Council of Trent¹⁰⁴ teaches: "Although it sometimes happens that this contrition is perfected by charity and reconciles man to God, ... nevertheless this reconciliation itself is not to be ascribed to contrition itself without the desire for the sacrament which is included in it." St. Pius V condemned proposition 71 of Baius: "Through contrition, even joined with perfect charity and with the desire of receiving the sacrament, crime is not remitted, outside a case of necessity or martyrdom, without the actual reception of the sacrament."¹⁰⁵

For justification it is not required that contrition be intensively in the highest degree, but it suffices that it be appreciatively supreme. Hence St. Thomas¹⁰⁶ teaches: "However small the sorrow may be, provided that it attains to the character of contrition, it blots out every fault." The desire for the sacrament is not absolutely required to be explicit, but an implicit one suffices, such as is found in the general will to perform all things which are necessary for salvation. The desire, however, must under grave obligation be fulfilled at the opportune time, that is, at least within the space of a year; and then through sacramental absolution the sin indeed is not remitted, since it has already been remitted, but sanctifying grace is increased under a twofold title, namely, ex opere operato of the sacrament and ex opere operantis of the penitent, who, already existing in the state of sanctifying grace, performs a good work by confessing and making satisfaction.

¹⁰⁴ Session 14, c. 4, On Penance (Denz., n. 898). Cf. also the proposition condemned by Sixtus IV (Denz., n. 724).

¹⁰⁵ Denz., n. 1071.

¹⁰⁶ Suppl., q. 5, a. 3.

Vol. III, Pt. II, Tr. V, Ch. II, Art. I, § 2. On Attrition

n. 342.

342. 1. Attrition cannot justify with the desire for the sacrament alone, but requires the sacrament actually received.

Hence arose the adage: A man from being attrite is made contrite through the sacrament of penance. This, however, is not to be understood as though attrition became contrition¹⁰⁷ in the sacrament of penance; rather, an attrite man receiving sanctifying grace through sacramental absolution at the same time receives the habit of charity which causes contrition.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ Suppl., q. 1, a. 3.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. R. Schultes, Reue u. Bußsakr., nn. 19, 36 ff., 91.

n. 343.

343. 2. True attrition suffices for obtaining justification in the sacrament of penance.

This proposition is now altogether certain and admitted by all, so that the contrary opinion, which many theologians before the Council of Trent held, is rash. St. Thomas¹⁰⁹ already taught: "When someone approaches confession attrite, not fully contrite, if he places no obstacle, in the confession and absolution themselves grace and the remission of sins are given to him." The same is elicited not obscurely from the Council of Trent,¹¹⁰ which says: "Although [attrition] without the sacrament of penance cannot of itself lead the sinner to justification, nevertheless it disposes him to obtain the grace of God in the sacrament of penance." The Council indeed employs the word "disposes," but this word is to be understood of a sufficient proximate disposition and signifies the same as suffices. This is evident from the context and from the comparison of attrition with contrition. For the Council wished to teach that contrition justifies even without the sacrament, but attrition only when sacramental absolution supervenes. Moreover, the same thing is manifestly evident from the universal practice of the Church, which admonishes that absolution be given to dying persons deprived of their senses whose disposition can rightly be presumed. Now this practice would not be reasonable if attrition did not suffice for valid absolution. For then, if true contrition were lacking, sacramental absolution would be invalid; but if contrition existed, absolution would be almost superfluous, since contrition justifies even without sacramental absolution actually received.

It is remarkable how many and how great ancient theologians thought true contrition to be necessary for every remission of sins, even in the sacrament of penance.¹¹¹ There are cited for this opinion: Hugh of St. Victor,¹¹² Richard of St. Victor,¹¹³ Robert Pullen,¹¹⁴ the Master of the Sentences,¹¹⁵ Innocent III,¹¹⁶ William of Auxerre,¹¹⁷ Blessed Albert the Great,¹¹⁸ Alexander of Hales,¹¹⁹ St. Raymond of Peñafort,¹²⁰ St. Bonaventure,¹²¹ and several others, for example, Vincent of Beauvais, St. Bernardine of Siena, and Gabriel Biel.¹²² Nevertheless, Harnack errs in saying that before the thirteenth century contrition was always held to be necessary, since ancient authors often take the word contrition in a different sense from modern theologians; for under contrition they also include attrition.

There are some celebrated controversies concerning attrition which it is useful to touch upon briefly here:

¹⁰⁹ In IV Sent., dist. 22, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 3; cf. Suppl., q. 10, a. 1; q. 18, a. 1.

¹¹⁰ Session 14, c. 4, On Penance (Denz., n. 898).

¹¹¹ Cf. M. Buchberger, Die Wirkungen des Bußsakr. nach der Lehre des hl. Thomas (Friburgi 1901), § 4.

¹¹² De sacr. l. 2, P. 14, c. 8.

¹¹³ De potestate solvendi ac ligandi, cc. 7 and 19.

¹¹⁴ De sacr. P. 3, c. 13.

¹¹⁵ In IV Sent., dist. 17 and 18.

¹¹⁶ In Ps. 2 poenitentialem.

¹¹⁷ Summa IV, De sacr. poenit.

¹¹⁸ In IV Sent., dist. 17 and 18.

¹¹⁹ Summa, l. 4, q. 8, membr. 1.

¹²⁰ Summa, De poenit. l. 3, § 11.

¹²¹ In IV Sent., dist. 18, P. 1, a. 2, q. 1.

¹²² Cf. Drouven, De re sacr. l. 6, c. 2, a. 2.

n. 344.

344. 1. Is attrition conceived from the fear of Gehenna alone good?

Luther contends that attrition conceived from fear is forced and evil, and that it renders a man worse and a true hypocrite. The Jansenists, Quesnel, and the Synod of Pistoia taught similar things.¹²³ Before the proposed question is answered, it is necessary to attend to the doctrine of St. Thomas¹²⁴ concerning the four species of fear, namely: worldly, servile, initial, and filial.¹²⁵ Servile fear is subdivided: for it is either servilely servile, when, namely, someone indeed avoids sins because of the punishments to be inflicted, but is so disposed that he would continue sinning if punishment were not present; or, in other words, he still loves sin and is like a dog that would wish to devour the meat but is deterred from it by the master's threatening staff. Or fear is simply servile, which indeed detests sin because of the punishments that threaten, but at the same time truly puts away affection for sin. Servilely servile fear is certainly evil because it retains affection for sin; worldly fear is likewise evil, as is evident of itself. Filial fear is certainly good, and initial fear likewise. But is simply servile fear good? The affirmative answer is of faith and was indeed defined in the Council of Trent:¹²⁶ "If anyone says that the fear of Gehenna, through which, grieving over sins, we flee to the mercy of God or abstain from sinning, is a sin or makes sinners worse, let him be anathema." Alexander VII condemned proposition 15: "Attrition, which is conceived from fear of the punishments of Gehenna without the love of benevolence toward God for His own sake, is not a good and supernatural motion."¹²⁷ Leo X condemned proposition 6 of Luther: "Contrition, which is prepared by the discussion, comparison, and detestation of sins, by which someone recollects his years in the bitterness of his soul, weighing the gravity, multitude, and foulness of his sins, the loss of eternal beatitude, and the acquisition of eternal damnation, this contrition makes a hypocrite, indeed, rather, a sinner."¹²⁸

Theological reason manifestly shows the goodness of such attrition. For three elements concur in attrition, and all of them are good:

a) The inducing motive, namely, fear and flight from the punishments of Gehenna.

b) The means for obtaining this end, namely, detestation of sin.

c) The ordering of this means toward obtaining the end.

But if these three elements are good, the whole is also good, since there is question of a moral act in which nothing evil is found. Moreover, simply servile fear is a true detestation of sin, the affection for which is altogether removed from the soul, and therefore it includes a good purpose of serving God.¹²⁹

¹²³ Hence attrition has been called the sorrow of one hanging upon the gallows (Galgenreue).

¹²⁴ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 19, a. 2 ad 4.

¹²⁵ Cf. above, I, n. 542.

¹²⁶ Session 6, can. 8, On Justification (Denz., n. 818).

¹²⁷ Denz., n. 1146.

¹²⁸ Denz., n. 746; cf. proposition 25 of the Synod of Pistoia (Denz., n. 1525).

¹²⁹ Cf. Billuart, De poenit., diss. 4, a. 5.

n. 345.

345. 2. Does attrition from the fear of Gehenna alone, without initial love, suffice for the sacrament of penance?

It is remarkable how very bitter disputes concerning this question have blazed forth since the sixteenth century. According to the testimony of Benedict XIV,¹³⁰ Francis de Vitoria and Dominic Soto, both of the Order of Preachers, were the first of all to teach that, for the remission of sins in the sacrament of penance, merely servile attrition suffices, provided that in good faith the penitent judges it to be contrition. Melchior Cano, proceeding further, no longer requires contrition thought in good faith to be present, but true attrition alone. Nevertheless, he still speaks hesitantly: "Contrition is set down as a part of the sacrament because it is certain and indubitable matter. But that attrition suffices, although it is true, is not so certain and indubitable; and therefore the Council of Florence and the common opinion, holding what is certain and leaving aside what is uncertain, set down contrition as a part of this sacrament."¹³¹ Several other authors followed Melchior Cano, at first indeed timidly, such as Suarez, Vasquez, Comitolus, and so forth; but afterward, having become bolder, they advanced so far that they called the opposite opinion, which requires at least initial love, altogether improbable, dangerous, and contrary to the mind of the Council of Trent. Authors requiring some initial love were called Contritionists;¹³² but the adversaries denying the necessity of this initial love are called Attritionists. The dispute reached such a point that Alexander VII, on May 5, 1667, had to impose silence upon the disputants. These are the words: "Our Most Holy Lord Pope Alexander VII, having learned, not without grave sorrow of mind, that certain Scholastics dispute among themselves too sharply, and not without scandal of the faithful, whether that attrition which is conceived from fear of Gehenna, excluding the will to sin together with the hope of pardon, requires in addition some act of love of God for obtaining grace in the sacrament of penance, some affirming it, others denying it, and mutually branding the adverse opinion with a censure: His Holiness, earnestly desiring to preserve the bond of peace among the faithful and to extinguish every tinder of division, ... by this present decree, in virtue of holy obedience and under pain of excommunication latae sententiae reserved to this Holy See, and other penalties to be determined at the judgment of that Holy See, commands each and every one of the faithful, of whatever rank and dignity ... they may be, that if henceforth they write on the matter of the aforesaid attrition, or publish books or writings, or teach, or preach, or in any other manner instruct penitents or students or others, they shall not dare to brand either opinion with the mark of any theological censure or other injury or insult, whether the opinion denying the necessity of some love of God in the aforesaid attrition conceived from fear of Gehenna, which today seems more common among Scholastics, or the opinion affirming the necessity of the said love, until something in this matter shall have been defined by this Holy See."¹³³

The dispute seems to be about words rather than things, because different men understand initial love differently. Initial love certainly is not the love of charity, because then there would no longer be attrition but contrition, since even the least charity suffices for justification.¹³⁴ Therefore initial love is either the love of benevolence alone or the love of concupiscence. Although in human matters the love of benevolence differs greatly from the love of concupiscence, nevertheless a true and upright love of concupiscence, which regards God as our ultimate beatitude, seems in some manner to be a love of benevolence. For a man who is truly attrite detests sin and must put away his affection for it; moreover, he must purpose the voluntary observance of God's commandments. But among these commandments there is found, as the principal one, that of loving God above all things. Moreover, he wishes to attain eternal life, which is most perfect friendship with God. From all these things it manifestly follows that true attrition is logically and psychologically altogether impossible without some initial love of God. Attrition which excludes every love of God is now nothing other than servilely servile fear, which assuredly does not suffice for obtaining justification in the sacrament of penance.

Since these things are so, today almost all theologians admit the necessity of some initial love in attrition. Therefore that opinion which in the time of Alexander VII seems not to have been so common is now far more common.¹³⁵ St. Thomas¹³⁶ already taught briefly and clearly: "Just as someone is introduced to loving God by the fact that, fearing to be punished by Him, he ceases from sin, as Augustine says; so also hope introduces charity, inasmuch as someone, hoping to be rewarded by God, is enkindled to love God and to keep His precepts." In this sense the text of the Council of Trent¹³⁷ also seems to be understood, which requires that sinners "begin to love God as the fountain of all justice." In almost the same manner St. Francis de Sales¹³⁸ and St. Alphonsus¹³⁹ explain the initial love required in attrition.

¹³⁰ De syn. dioec. l. 7, c. 13, n. 6.

¹³¹ Relect. de poenit. P. 6.

¹³² All those ancient Scholastics who attributed the remission of sins to perfect contrition alone and not to priestly absolution are also sometimes called Contritionists.

¹³³ Denz., n. 1146.

¹³⁴ Cf. St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 5, a. 3.

¹³⁵ Cf. Schanz, Die Lehre v. d. Sakr. I, § 40; Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. II, n. 391.

¹³⁶ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 17, a. 8.

¹³⁷ Session 6, c. 6, On Justification (Denz., n. 798).

¹³⁸ De amore Dei l. 2, c. 17.

¹³⁹ Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 442 at the end.

Marc, Institutiones Morales

Clement Marc, C.SS.R. — 20 passages

Vol. II, Part Third: On the Sacrame…, Tr. V, Diss. II, Chapter I: On Contrition · Vol. II, Part Third: On the Sacrame…, Tr. V, Diss. II, Ch. I, Article I: On The Sorrow Of The Penitent · Vol. II, Part Third: On the Sacrame…, Tr. V, Diss. II, Ch. I, Art. I, § 1. On The Contrition Required In The Sacrament · Vol. II, Part Third: On the Sacrame…, Tr. V, Diss. II, Ch. I, Art. I, § 2. On Perfect And Imperfect Contrition · Vol. II, Part Third: On the Sacrame…, Tr. V, Diss. II, Ch. I, Article II: On Purpose

Vol. II, Part Third: On the Sacrame…, Tr. V, Diss. II, Chapter I: On Contrition

n. ¶1665.

DEFINITION. Contrition is defined: "Sorrow of soul and detestation concerning sin committed, with the purpose of not sinning thereafter." Thus Trent, sess. 14, cap. 4.

It is an act of the virtue of penance, by which man assumes hatred toward sin committed by himself, and detests it so that by no pact whatever would he ever have wished himself to have sinned. But sadness of will necessarily accompanies such an act of detestation. But because contrition is defined as sorrow of soul and detestation concerning sin committed, Theologians dispute whether its essence consists in sorrow, or rather in detestation. The latter opinion seems truer to St. Alphonsus, because sorrow indeed is not the cause of detestation, but detestation is the cause of sorrow. - For the rest, as both are required, so one is contained in the other; for he who detests his sin necessarily sorrows for it, and conversely. Besides, detestation perseveres in the Blessed, but sorrow no longer does.¹² (Recall what was said at n. 1644.)

These things having been premised, we shall treat, according to the Tridentine definition, 1. of the sorrow of the penitent; 2. of his purpose.

Vol. II, Part Third: On the Sacrame…, Tr. V, Diss. II, Ch. I, Article I: On The Sorrow Of The Penitent

We shall treat: 1. Of sorrow or contrition of the penitent, insofar as it is required in the Sacrament of Penance, abstracting from the perfection or imperfection of that sorrow; 2. Of perfect and imperfect contrition.

Vol. II, Part Third: On the Sacrame…, Tr. V, Diss. II, Ch. I, Art. I, § 1. On The Contrition Required In The Sacrament

n. ¶1666.

Principles. I. Contrition is absolutely NECESSARY, both for the VALIDITY and for the LICEITY of the Sacrament of Penance, as often as it is received. The reason is that contrition is the proximate matter and an essential part of the Sacrament; therefore a Sacrament received without contrition is null, and consequently illicit. - Hence, although diligent labor is to be placed in the examination of conscience, more diligent labor must nevertheless be placed in exciting sorrow of soul. And although a brief space of time can suffice for conceiving this sorrow, it is nevertheless safer to prolong a little, or to repeat, the act of contrition, lest by too much haste it be extinguished in its very beginning.

We said: As often as it is received, namely lest the confession of venial sin be excluded. "For it is certain that, although outside the Sacrament some motion of grace or charity suffices for its remission, as St. Thomas teaches, nevertheless in the Sacrament FORMAL sorrow is altogether required, nor does virtual sorrow suffice, as the Doctors commonly teach with Roncaglia, Concina, and Croix, against a few."¹ - But:

It is doubted, 1. Whether he sins mortally who confesses venials without sorrow? "Genettus, Juveninus, and Natalis Alexander deny it; they say that as often as the mind of profaning the Sacrament is absent, to frustrate it in light matter does not exceed a light irreverence. But other Doctors commonly and rightly affirm it, and Lugo calls the former opinion altogether false, saying that the gravity of the injury does not consist in the matter, but in the frustration of the Sacrament, by not placing suitable and essential matter, as sorrow is. Hence, whether it is frustrated on account of grave matter or on account of light matter, the irreverence is always grave."²

It is doubted, 2. Whether in the confession of venials it suffices to sorrow for one without another? - "Some deny this; but Suarez, Lugo, and others commonly and rightly affirm it. And the reason is clear, because venials are not necessary matter, but sufficient matter. But Castropalaus, Lugo, Sporer, Tamburini, etc., say that it suffices to repent of a multitude of venials, without repenting of any one in particular; but Arriaga and Dicastillo contradict them, saying that sorrow concerning at least one of them is necessary. But these opinions are easily reconciled, because it is impossible that he who repents of a multitude should not sorrow for the last things which constitute the multitude."³ Likewise, it suffices to sorrow for a certain species of venials, or for deliberate ones alone.

n. ¶1667.

II. Contrition, in order to obtain pardon, must be TRUE, SUPERNATURAL, APPRETIATIVELY SUPREME, UNIVERSAL at least with respect to mortal sins, EFFICACIOUS, and finally must have joined to itself CONFIDENCE of pardon. We say in order to obtain pardon, and this both in the Sacrament and outside the Sacrament; because the aforesaid qualities or CONDITIONS also pertain to the virtue of penance (cf. n. 1644 and 1645).

It must be TRUE. "It is necessary," says St. Alphonsus,⁴ "that the soul conceive true sorrow, true displeasure, true bitterness concerning sin committed, and that it detest and abhor it." For contrition is called sorrow of soul or of heart, that is, of the will. Therefore contrition, or attrition, which is only thought to exist, even inculpably, does not suffice; nor does the desire of absolution without affection concerning sins, as some wish against the common opinion. And the reason is that true sorrow of the will is an essential part of the Sacrament.⁵ - Nor does it suffice to sorrow that you do not sorrow, nor a mere wish of not sinning. Yet Bonacina rightly notes that with the act by which someone sorrows that he does not sorrow for sins, there is usually joined sorrow for the sins, even if the penitent does not discern it.⁶
It must be SUPERNATURAL, both by reason of the motive from which it is elicited, which must be proposed to the mind by faith, and also by reason of the principle from which it proceeds, which is divine grace, without which no one can repent as he ought. - Hence, if someone sorrowed even most intensely, or in good faith, because his sin is repugnant to reason, or because it deprives him of reputation, health, or some temporal good, he would have merely natural sorrow, of itself plainly inept for obtaining justification, which is of the supernatural order. Hence this 57th proposition was condemned by Innocent XI: "It is probable that natural contrition, provided it is honorable, suffices." Yet the occasion of penance can be natural, as is clear from the example of the Ninevites.
It must be APPRETIATIVELY SUPREME, namely so that the offense of God displeases more than any other evil which could have happened to us. The reason is that "as God is the supreme good among all things which are to be loved, so also sin is the supreme evil among all things which men ought to hate."⁷ And the same reason runs concerning VENIAL sin; wherefore one must also sorrow supremely for it, that pardon may be obtained from God. We say appretiatively supreme, not intensively; because although it is fitting and to be desired that no end or measure be placed in the detestation of sin, this nevertheless is not required, nor is it in the common power of men.⁸
It must be UNIVERSAL, at least with respect to mortal sins. For the Lord says (Ezek. 18:21-22): "If the wicked man shall do penance for all his sins... I will not remember all his iniquities." The reason is clear: for it cannot be that he who truly sorrows for his sins detests one and takes complacency in another, since he knows that divine friendship is altogether extinguished by every mortal sin. - Yet there are not required, as is more commonly held, individual acts of sorrow for individual sins, which would often be impossible; but it suffices to sorrow for all universally, from a motive common to all, because universal sorrow virtually extends itself to all sins.⁹ (cf. n. 1397, 3.)
It must be EFFICACIOUS, namely so that it turns the will away from sin and disposes it to doing all things by which relapse is avoided. And to this pertain the words of Ezekiel (18:31): "Cast away from you all your transgressions... and make for yourselves a new heart and a new spirit." (cf. n. 1680, on formal purpose.)
It must have joined to itself CONFIDENCE OF PARDON; otherwise it would be similar to the sorrow of the damned in hell, who also repent of their sins, but without hope of remission. But the sorrow of the truly penitent is filled with hope and consolation; because the more a man repents of having displeased God, the more he trusts in divine mercy, and the more his consolation is increased. Hence St. Bernard thus addressed the Lord: "Lord, if it is so sweet to weep concerning Thee, what will it be to rejoice concerning Thee?"¹⁰

But are EXPLICIT acts of faith and hope required for obtaining grace in the Sacrament of Penance? Some indeed affirm, because sinners are said by Trent to prepare themselves for justification by these acts. But others more commonly deny it, because the necessity of those acts cannot be demonstrated by any sufficient reason. - Yet these opinions can be reconciled very well; for the penitent, by eliciting an act of sorrow, also explicitly elicits, not now reflexively but exercitively, acts of faith and hope; because then without doubt he exercitively believes that his sins will be remitted to him by the power of the Sacrament, and explicitly hopes that pardon will be granted to him through the Sacrament and on account of the merits of Christ.¹¹

n. ¶1668.

III. Contrition, which is a part of the Sacrament of Penance, must be SENSIBLE in some way, and must be MORALLY UNITED to the other essential parts of the Sacrament. - This is clear from what was said concerning the Sacraments in general (n. 1402 and 1434).

It must be SENSIBLE, not indeed so that it redounds into sense or the sensitive appetite; for such sorrow, although it often arises from sadness of the will, is not necessary; but so that it is manifested by some sign, for example through sorrowful confession, through petition for pardon, etc.; otherwise the confessor could not rightly judge concerning the disposition of the penitent (cf. n. 1817, q. 1).
It must be MORALLY UNITED to confession and absolution, so that from the diverse parts there may be one Sacrament. Wherefore the following things come to be discussed.

n. ¶1669.

Questions. Q. 1. Whether contrition must PRECEDE absolution?

Resp. Yes; otherwise absolution, which is the form of the Sacrament, would not be applied to its matter and would be invalid. Indeed, neither is contrition altogether safe when it is put off to the point of absolution; because it can easily happen, especially in the confession of the rude, that the form of absolution ends before the act of contrition has been elicited.

Q. 2. Whether contrition must also PRECEDE the ACCUSATION of sins?

Resp. The first opinion affirms it, both because sorrow, as the matter of this Sacrament, must be sensible and is not made sensible except through confession, and because confession ought not to be a simple narration, but a sorrowful accusation. The second and more common opinion denies it, and the Ritual greatly favors this, saying: "The confession having been heard, he will try to lead him to sorrow by efficacious words," namely the confessor. To the first contrary reason it is answered that sorrow is made sensible not only through confession, but also by other signs and words; but to the second it is answered that only this is required: "that confession not be a mere narration of sins, but have the character of a sacramental accusation; and for this it suffices that the confession be made with the mind of obtaining absolution, and that afterward sorrow be manifested at least through petition for, or expectation of, absolution; for thus the confession becomes well sacramental." And the very defenders of the first opinion concede this; whence it is clear that the two opinions differ more in words than in reality, and that the second, understood in the way we have said, is altogether safe.¹² "To calm scruples, confessors are accustomed, if they doubt concerning the internal disposition of the penitent, to excite him to sorrow concerning the sins just explained. This is done if it is said: I sorrow for and accuse myself of the sins narrated."¹³

Q. 3. Whether the act of contrition must be elicited IN ORDER TO THE SACRAMENT?

Resp. No, from the more probable opinion; "both because from Trent attrition, however had, suffices, and because sorrow is ordered at least to absolution when it is manifested through confession."¹⁴ - Yet the opposite opinion, which says that an act of contrition, when it was not elicited in order to the Sacrament, must be renewed in confession, is also probable, and therefore is to be held in practice.¹⁵ (cf. n. 1659, end.)

Q. 4. For how much time does an act of sorrow morally ENDURE for receiving the Sacrament validly?

Resp. According to the various circumstances, a longer or shorter space of time must be assigned: 1. If confession is made solely from sorrow for sins, sorrow endures virtually at least for one, or even another, day. - 2. But if it is made from mere devotion, or from precept, from vow, or from the mandate of a rule, a shorter space, for example from morning to evening, ought to intervene. For the rest, in practice it is counseled that the act of contrition always be renewed before absolution.¹⁶

Q. 5. Whether he is bound again to elicit an act of sorrow who immediately after ABSOLUTION confesses a sin omitted through forgetfulness?

Resp. According to the more common opinion, he is not bound; because the prior sorrow, since it is universal, extends itself also to the forgotten sins and perseveres up to the second absolution. - But according to another opinion, still probable and therefore to be followed as safer, a new Sacrament must be confected; because through the first absolution the judgment has already been completed, and therefore a new act of sorrow must be elicited, a new penance imposed, and a new absolution imparted.¹⁷

Vol. II, Part Third: On the Sacrame…, Tr. V, Diss. II, Ch. I, Art. I, § 2. On Perfect And Imperfect Contrition

n. ¶1670.

Every act of contrition, as is already clear from what has been said, requires this for itself, that it be elicited from a truly supernatural motive; and in this respect, indeed, all and each of the acts of contrition generically agree. But because the motives from which they are elicited are of unequal order, and because on account of this inequality some are more perfect and efficacious than others, Theologians, relying on this foundation, distinguish two principal SPECIES OR DEGREES of contrition, one of which they call perfect contrition, and the other imperfect contrition. - Of each, separately, we must now treat.

I. On Perfect Contrition

n. ¶1671.

DEFINITION. PERFECT contrition, or contrition simply so called, is that which is elicited from the motive of divine charity, that is, insofar as sin

is an offense of God, the Supreme Good and to be loved above all things. For divine Goodness, just as on account of its supreme lovableness it draws our will to love of itself, so likewise it moves it to detestation of the evil which is opposed to it. - Hence an act of perfect contrition will be, for example, the following: My God, with my whole heart I sorrow for all my sins, and they displease me because I have offended Thee, infinite goodness.

Two things worthy of note must be premised here: 1. Several Theologians probably teach that an act of perfect contrition can be elicited from the motive of any offended divine attribute. For he, they say, who loves divine justice, wisdom, mercy, beneficence, already loves God Himself, since these attributes are God Himself. But others commonly and more probably hold that perfect contrition must proceed altogether from the sole motive of charity, namely from divine goodness contemned through sin, insofar as this is the root and aggregate of all perfections. For, from Trent, contrition must be perfected or informed by charity; but the object of charity is God insofar as He is Infinite Goodness itself, or the infinite Good.¹

Perfect contrition admits several DEGREES, among which are distinguished: 1. Contrition in a remiss or lowest degree, by which at least mortal sin is excluded from the motive of predominant charity. - 2. Contrition in a perfect degree, or intense degree of reason, by which in addition any venial sin and any affection for it are excluded. - 3. Contrition in the supreme and most intense degree of reason and sense, such as by special grace was granted to some sinners, who died from the vehemence of sorrow. - Yet these diverse degrees are of the same nature, because more and less do not vary the species.² (cf. n. 465 seq.)

n. ¶1672.

Principles. I. PERFECT contrition, even in the lowest degree, always JUSTIFIES a man before the Sacrament is actually received. This is proved, 1. from Scripture (Prov. 8:17): "I love those who love me." "Charity covers a multitude of sins" (1 Pet. 4:8). - 2. From Trent, which (sess. 14, cap. 4) teaches "that contrition perfected by charity... reconciles man to God before this Sacrament is actually received."³ 3. From the Fathers and Doctors, among whom St. Chrysostom:⁴ "Where charity is, all evils have been taken away"; and St. Thomas:⁵ "Charity cannot be with mortal sin." 4. From the 32nd proposition of Baius, condemned by Gregory XIII: "That charity which is the fullness of the law is not always joined with the remission of sins." But the theological reason is that an act of perfect contrition is a formal act of charity toward God, or an act intrinsically joined with charity, as is clear from the very definition of contrition.

We said, 1. even in the lowest degree. For it suffices that the love of God attain to the notion of charity, which consists in the love of God for His own sake, above all things. "And the reason is evident," says St. Alphonsus,⁶ "because as any aversion from God as from the ultimate end, even in a remiss degree, suffices for losing God's friendship, so any true conversion suffices for recovering it." Hence St. Thomas:⁷ "Any contrition is informed by grace making one pleasing; therefore however small it is, it destroys every fault." And this opinion seems so certain to our Blessed Doctor that he rejects the opposite altogether as improbable and false.⁸

We said, 2. always justifies, that is, even outside the case of necessity. This is likewise certain against Adrian and Cajetan, although the Council of Trent abstained from condemning those authors. It is clear from the condemned 71st proposition of Baius: "Through contrition even joined with perfect charity and with the desire of receiving the Sacrament, guilt is not remitted, outside the case of necessity or martyrdom, without the actual reception of the Sacrament."⁹

n. ¶1673.

II. Perfect contrition of itself does not justify a man except WITH THE DESIRE OF THE SACRAMENT, at least implicit. - 1. This is clear from the very nature of contrition; for, in order that it be true and perfect, there is required the will to fulfill all the precepts of God; but confession is a divine precept; therefore. - To the point Cardinal de Lugo says aptly:¹⁰ "Contrition is said to justify in order to the keys, not because it receives the power of justifying from the Sacrament, but because, when it justifies outside the Sacrament, it has in itself the implicit desire of subjecting mortal sins to the keys; to this a man remains bound even after he has been justified through contrition." - 2. This is further clear from Trent (sess. 14, cap. 4), where it is declared that the desire of the Sacrament is included in perfect contrition.

We said with a desire at least implicit; for it can happen that a sinner elicits an act of perfect contrition without actually thinking about confession, either from inadvertence or from invincible ignorance; but that ignorance or inadvertence detracts nothing from the merit of charity and contrition. Therefore. - Besides, from Trent the desire which is included in contrition suffices; but what is included in another thing is implicit, not explicit. - Yet if the sinner actually thinks about the precept of confession, he certainly must either confess, or elicit the purpose of confessing; otherwise contrition would not be true, as is evident.¹¹

n. ¶1674.

Several things must be noted here: - 1. Perfect contrition is not the very form which justifies the sinner, but is, in the present providence, the final disposition or final preparation for justification. For, when from actual grace there has been placed in the sinner an act of charity or of perfect contrition, habitual grace is immediately infused into him, by which the man loving God and loved by God is rendered just and a friend of God. This is drawn from Trent, sess. 14, cap. 4, and sess. 6, cap. 7.

Contrition, whether considered on the part of charity or on the part of sensible sorrow, can increase to such a degree that it suffices for the FULL DESTRUCTION of fault and punishment; as is clear from the example of the good Thief. For charity, which begets displeasure, can be so greatly intensified in act that the contrition following from it merits not only the removal of fault, but also absolution from every punishment. - Likewise, sensible sorrow, which the will excites in contrition, can be so greatly intensified that it suffices for the destruction of the whole punishment, by way of satisfaction.¹²
Most vehement contrition can further bring this about, that it removes the very REMAINS OF SIN. "For St. Thomas teaches¹³ that God sometimes removes the remains of sin successively through His cooperating grace, but sometimes immediately through a great commotion, by which man obtains perfect spiritual health... as is clear concerning St. Magdalene."¹⁴

Concerning the NECESSITY of contrition, recall what was said at n. 1647.

Vol. II, TREATISE ON THE SACRAMENT …, PART SECOND: ON THE SUBJEC…, OR ON THE ACTS OF THE PENI…, CHAPTER I: ON CONTRITION · Vol. II, TREATISE ON THE SACRAMENT …, PART SECOND: ON THE SUBJEC…, OR ON THE ACTS OF THE PENI…, Ch. I, ARTICLE I: ON CONTRITION PROPERLY SO CALLED · Vol. II, TREATISE ON THE SACRAMENT …, PART SECOND: ON THE SUBJEC…, OR ON THE ACTS OF THE PENI…, Ch. I, Art. I, § I. On The Necessity Of Contrition · Vol. II, TREATISE ON THE SACRAMENT …, PART SECOND: ON THE SUBJEC…, OR ON THE ACTS OF THE PENI…, Ch. I, Art. I, § II. On The Qualities Of Contrition · Vol. II, TREATISE ON THE SACRAMENT …, PART SECOND: ON THE SUBJEC…, OR ON THE ACTS OF THE PENI…, Ch. I, Art. I, § III. On The Efficacy Of Contrition · Vol. II, TREATISE ON THE SACRAMENT …, PART SECOND: ON THE SUBJEC…, OR ON THE ACTS OF THE PENI…, Ch. I, ARTICLE II: ON PURPOSE

II. On Imperfect Contrition

n. ¶1675.

DEFINITION. IMPERFECT contrition, or attrition, is detestation of sin which is commonly conceived either from consideration of the turpitude of sin, or from fear of hell and punishments, and which has joined to itself an initial, but not predominant, love of God. - It is elicited, for example, by these words: My God, because on account of my sins I have lost paradise and have deserved eternal hell, I sorrow above every evil that I have displeased Thee.

We said, 1. commonly conceived, so that it may be intimated with Trent (sess. 14, cap. 4) that there are also other motives of attrition, as are sadness over the loss of grace and divine friendship, hope of pardon, hope of eternal beatitude, non-predominant love of God, for example on account of His beneficence and mercy; yet all these motives are inferior to charity.

We said, 2. from consideration of the turpitude of sin: namely one made not only according to the dictate of reason, but according to the light of faith; for example if the sinner considers within himself that through sin he has been despoiled of the beauty of grace, has departed from the rectitude of virtue, and leads a life unworthy of a Christian. For unless a supernatural consideration moves sorrow, attrition is not supernatural.

We said, 3. or from fear of hell and punishments; understand fear: 1. honorable, that is, not formally but only materially servile, by which the will of sinning is excluded, as we noted (n. 457, 2); - 2. supernatural, by which punishment is feared insofar as it is inflicted by God, the supreme judge and avenger of sins. For he who sorrowed from fear of disease or infamy coming to himself from sin would not sorrow as he ought (cf. n. 1667, 2).

Whether attrition conceived from fear of temporal punishments insofar as they are inflicted by God suffices? - "Some deny with Cano, Concina, etc., saying that sorrow must arise from fear of eternal punishments, because, since the punishment of mortal sin is eternal, the penitent must conceive sorrow for sins from fear of an eternal evil. - Others with Lugo, Suarez, etc., more commonly and more probably affirm it, from these words of the Council of Trent: 'Attrition is conceived from fear of hell and punishments.' For here the Council distinguishes other punishments from the punishments of hell, in which assuredly all other punishments are included. But because the first opinion cannot be said improbable, in practice we cannot embrace the second."¹⁵

We said, 4. and some initial love of God. For Trent teaches (sess. 6, cap. 6) that sinners, while they are disposed to justification, "begin to love God as the font of all justice, and therefore are moved against sins," etc. But this beginning of love is already had in attrition, both through fear of divine vengeance, according to that saying (Ecclus. 25:16): "The fear of God is the beginning of His love"; and through hope of pardon and eternal beatitude. Hence St. Thomas:¹⁶ "From this," he says, "that we hope goods can come to us through someone, we are moved toward him as toward our good, and thus we begin to love him." Therefore he who approaches the Sacrament with attrition and hope of pardon already begins to love God as his liberator, justifier, and glorifier.¹⁷

n. ¶1676.

Principles. I. Attrition, OUTSIDE THE SACRAMENT, cannot of itself justify a man. - This is clear from Trent (sess. 14, cap. 4), where it is read: "And although without the Sacrament of Penance it cannot of itself bring the sinner to justification, nevertheless," etc. - The reason is that justification consists in perfect conjunction with God; but the attrite man, although he withdraws from creatures and begins the first steps of conversion to God, is nevertheless not yet perfectly converted to Him and joined by charity.¹⁸

n. ¶1677.

II. Attrition SUFFICES, as the prerequired disposition, for obtaining pardon of sins, even lethal sins, IN THE SACRAMENT of Penance. - This opinion today is morally certain, and the opposite, which requires predominant love, is no longer probable. - It is proved: 1. From Trent (sess. 14, cap. 4), where it is said that attrition disposes to justification in the Sacrament of Penance. These words cannot be understood as though attrition disposes only remotely to justification, as the acts of the other virtues do; for thus it disposes even outside the Sacrament. Therefore it disposes proximately, namely so that grace can be infused through absolution. - 2. From reason: the Sacraments actually work what they signify. Therefore of itself this ought to happen: that when the priest imparts absolution, at that very point of time sins are remitted and the life of grace is conferred on the spiritually dead soul. Now if predominant charity had to be present in sorrow, the Sacrament of itself would never cause grace, because all would approach it already justified, since, according to St. Thomas,¹⁹ every sorrow, however small, proceeding from predominant charity is true contrition justifying of itself; therefore the Sacrament of Penance could no longer be called a Sacrament of the dead, but of the living. The reason of the end for which the Sacrament was instituted is added. "It was necessary," says the Roman Catechism,²⁰ "that the most merciful Lord should provide for the common salvation of men by an easier way." Now, if attrition did not suffice with the Sacrament, the matter would certainly no longer be so.²¹ Therefore. - A penitent who is actually attrite is said to become habitually contrite under absolution, because grace, and therefore charity, are conferred on him through absolution, and thus he is made habitually converted to God.

n. ¶1678.

It is asked: Whether one who, IN THE ARTICLE OF DEATH, has confessed with attrition alone, is also bound to elicit contrition?

Resp. "The first opinion affirms with Suarez, Bonacina, etc. But the second opinion, much more common with Lugo, Laymann, etc., denies it; and Suarez calls it very probable, because, granted that the opinion is certain, as has been shown, that attrition alone suffices for confession, he who has confessed with it is already morally certain of divine grace. - This second opinion is very probable; but it cannot be denied that the first is altogether to be advised to the dying; especially because at the end of life we are bound to an act of love, which cannot be satisfied unless we detest sin when it occurs to memory, as is commonly taught."²²

Vol. II, Part Third: On the Sacrame…, Tr. V, Diss. II, Ch. I, Article II: On Purpose

n. ¶1679.

DEFINITION. Purpose, which is the other part of contrition, is the fixed and ratified counsel or decree of the will, not to sin any more

in the future. - It is an act of the virtue of prudence. "Penance," says St. Thomas,¹ "also regards future sin, according as it has something of the act of prudence joined to it... And because of this, he who is contrite sorrows for past sin and guards against future sin."

DIVISION. A TWO-FOLD purpose is distinguished: one explicit or formal, the other implicit or virtual. - The former is had when someone, thinking of future time, expressly enters upon the counsel of not sinning any more; the latter, when someone actually sorrows for his sins without extending his thought to future time; for in such sorrow the will of not sinning any more is already included.

n. ¶1680.

Principles. I. A FORMAL or VIRTUAL purpose of not sinning thereafter is of the essence of the Sacrament of Penance. - This is clear from what was said concerning contrition; for this, in order that it be appretiatively supreme, must exclude every affection for sin and every will of sinning; but this is nothing other than the purpose of not sinning any more in the future; therefore.

It is asked: Whether in the Sacrament of Penance a VIRTUAL or IMPLICIT purpose in sorrow suffices?

Resp. There are three opinions. - The first denies it with Scotus, Cano, Cajetan, etc., because although sorrow necessarily includes purpose, nevertheless Trent seems in fact to require a formal purpose, saying: "with the purpose of not sinning thereafter." - The second, with Lugo, etc., affirms it, namely if sorrow is elicited from a universal motive. This rests likewise on the authority of Trent, saying "that attrition, if it excludes the will of sinning, with hope of pardon, already disposes man to obtain grace in the Sacrament." Finally, the third opinion, which Holzmann holds, distinguishes and says: If the penitent thinks nothing of the future, as is accustomed to happen with the sick near death, an implicit purpose suffices. But otherwise, if he thinks of the future, in which case he must formally propose amendment, because according to Trent each one ought through penance to begin a new life. Thus St. Alphonsus.

"These two last opinions are indeed more probable; but because the first does not lack its probability, in practice before the fact the SAFER is to be followed"; indeed even after the fact, if it is certain that explicit purpose was lacking; for he who certainly committed grave fault is bound to fulfill confession of it, not only probably, but also certainly validly.² (cf. n. 427, Hence 2.) - Yet, says Scavini,³ "in practice no one ought to be disturbed about this; since it scarcely, and not even scarcely, happens that a truly contrite penitent omits even an explicit purpose, although he does not reflect on this, which is not necessary."⁴

n. ¶1681.

II. There are three conditions of a true purpose, namely that it be FIRM, UNIVERSAL, and EFFICACIOUS. - Thus all.

The purpose must be FIRM. This imports that the penitent has a will altogether deliberate not to relapse into fault, and is disposed in soul so that he would not wish to admit sin in the future from fear of any evil, or from desire of any good. - Such a disposition is required for true conversion, as is clear; because the will of sinning must be abolished absolutely and for any case whatever.⁵

It is asked: Whether purpose can be firm with FORESEEING of relapse?

Resp. 1. He who fears relapse because of experienced mutability of his will is not therefore to be judged to lack firm purpose; for theologians commonly say that a serious will of not relapsing can stand with fear of a fall from human frailty. - Hence, a confessor would certainly err who refused absolution to a truly disposed penitent because he foresees that he will relapse. But on the contrary:

Resp. 2. He who certainly believes that he will relapse cannot prudently be held as disposed. "I do not deny," says St. Alphonsus⁶ against many, "that, speculatively speaking, firm purpose of the will could well consist with knowledge of relapse; but when someone certainly believes that he will relapse, practically he gives a certain suspicion that the purpose of his will is not sufficiently firm; for it is impossible that someone firmly propose to amend himself, knowing that God does not deny His helping grace to one doing what is in him, and nevertheless, these things notwithstanding, believe certainly that he will return to his sins. Hence Croix rightly says that such a penitent, before he is absolved, must be disposed so that he hopes he will be freed from sins, not through his own powers, but through the help of God." (cf. n. 539.) But to prove the firmness of purpose, "it is not necessary, indeed it is NOT EXPEDIENT, to make particular comparisons, for example: I would rather suffer this or that evil than sin mortally; because they are dangerous. And much less is it expedient to choose hell rather; because according to the present providence of God, since hell is destined for those who are confirmed in sin through eternal hatred toward God, man would incongruously choose hell in order to avoid sin, in which he could not remain without sinning."⁷

The purpose must be UNIVERSAL, at least concerning mortal sins. Thus all with St. Thomas.⁸ "Nor are certain authors to be heard who think that, just as particular sorrow is valid, so also particular purpose is valid; for it is answered that particular sorrow is admitted because sorrow regards only sins committed; but particular purpose cannot be admitted, because anyone must be prepared to avoid all mortal sins which he can commit; and therefore Trent, speaking of sorrow, says: 'Sorrow is detestation concerning sin committed'; but speaking of purpose, it says, 'with the purpose of not sinning thereafter.'"

"It was said concerning mortal sins; because with respect to venials, it is certain with St. Thomas that it suffices if the penitent proposes to abstain from some one, saying, for example, I propose not to lie any more, without proposing to abstain from the rest. For the rest, a man can propose to avoid all deliberate venial sins; and as regards indeliberate sins, it suffices to propose to avoid them insofar as human frailty permits, as the same Angelic Doctor says."⁹ (cf. n. 1667, 4.)

The purpose must be EFFICACIOUS, that is, have force for doing what is proposed. "Therefore it is necessary that the penitent propose not only to avoid sin, but also to apply the means for avoiding sin, and notably the proximate occasions of sinning, as is commonly taught."¹⁰ But concerning these there will be a longer discourse where the office of the confessor is treated (cf. n. 1821).

Meanwhile let it be noted: 1. "It is not always true that only then is purpose efficacious when that which is proposed is carried out; otherwise, as often as the penitent relapsed, so often would he be bound to repeat confessions; for relapse is not always a sign of an infirm purpose, but often only a sign of a changed will. Thus Peter truly proposed rather to die than deny Christ, and nevertheless at the first voice of the maidservant he denied." Thus St. Alphonsus against the Rigorists.¹¹

A defect of true purpose is discerned more from neglect of the means than from multiple relapse; because it is easier to apply remedies than to abstain from sin, on account of the vehement propensity into it from custom.¹² But when relapse into sins is to be held as a morally certain argument of a vicious purpose will be explained below, where Recidivists are treated (n. 1828).

Konings, Theologia Moralis

Anthony Konings, C.SS.R. — 11 passages

Vol. II, TREATISE ON THE SACRAMENT …, PART SECOND: ON THE SUBJEC…, OR ON THE ACTS OF THE PENI…, CHAPTER I: ON CONTRITION

n. ¶1345.

1345. - Contrition is sorrow of soul and detestation concerning sin committed, with the purpose of not sinning further. Thus Trent.¹ - Detestation of sin - which, if you except the Blessed, as incapable of sadness, necessarily includes sorrow - regards the past; but purpose is concerned with the future.

This definition abstracts from the new law, in which contrition can have no efficacy without the desire, at least implicit, of Confession. For the same Trent adds a little below: "with the desire of performing the remaining things ... which are required for rightly receiving this Sacrament" (of Penance).

Resolves. - The object of contrition is neither 1) punishments or other evils, the consequences of sin; nor 2) imperfections, even deliberate, at least speaking speculatively; nor 3) sins of others or original sin.

Not punishments; for contrition etymologically imports a breaking or crushing of a hardened will; but this hardness of the will, says St. Thomas,² is in the evil of fault, and not in punishment. Hence sorrow concerning the punishment of sin is indeed the occasion and beginning of contrition, but never essentially contrition itself.

Not imperfections, even deliberate, or voluntary actions or omissions which, with no precept being violated, are repugnant only to counsel here and now intimated either by divine inspiration, or from the dictate of reason soliciting to more perfect things, or from the directive ordinance of a Superior. For contrition is sorrow concerning sins, which imperfections are not. Yet I said: at least speaking speculatively; for, speaking practically, deliberate imperfections very often already have some fault annexed to them, for example by reason of an inordinate motive of sensuality, impatience, sloth, etc. Hence, as we said in n. 1344. q. 8°. § Hence ... 2° with St. Alphonsus, even those imperfections which do not reach sins certainly venial are sometimes sufficient matter of conditioned absolution.

Not sins of others or original sin; for contrition is sorrow concerning sin committed, or perpetrated by one's own will. - To be sure, it is fitting to foster true sorrow sincerely from the soul, both concerning original sin, by which we were constituted children of wrath, enemies of God and servants of the devil, and also concerning the sins of others, by which infinite goodness is offended and the souls of many are cast headlong into eternal destruction; but sorrow of soul of this kind is indeed displeasure and affliction, but not contrition properly so called. Thus nearly the distinguished Van Egeren.

It must be said 1° concerning contrition strictly so called; 2° concerning purpose.

Vol. II, TREATISE ON THE SACRAMENT …, PART SECOND: ON THE SUBJEC…, OR ON THE ACTS OF THE PENI…, Ch. I, ARTICLE I: ON CONTRITION PROPERLY SO CALLED

n. ¶1346.

1346. - Contrition is distinguished as twofold:

1° Perfect, which is detestation of sin arising from the sole and proper motive of charity, appreciatively supreme; with the purpose, on account of the same motive, of not sinning further. - I said: a) from the SOLE motive of charity; i.e. perfect contrition ought to be elicited from a motive of charity so efficacious or predominant that by itself it suffices to excite in the sinner supreme sorrow and detestation concerning sin committed, and a firm purpose of sinning no more; not, however, so that therefore other motives, less noble than charity, must be excluded by the penitent, just as hope and charity, or faith and knowledge, do not exclude each other. - I said: b) from the PROPER motive of charity; or of divine goodness. See n. 275.¹ - I said: c) appreciatively supreme; see the same n. 275 and n. 1349. III. 1350. q. 1°. q. 2°.

2° Imperfect or attrition, which is detestation of sin arising from a supernatural motive which is inferior to charity - e.g. from consideration of the baseness of sin, or from fear of hell, or from love of eternal beatitude - with the purpose, on account of the same motive, of not sinning further. - Trent.¹ Besides, contrition is either formal or explicit, by which a man, thinking of the sin committed, directly and expressly detests it; or implicit or virtual, by which a man, not actually thinking of the sin committed, posits an act which indirectly and tacitly contains sorrow and detestation of sin, for example an act of perfect charity.

Three things must be explained here: 1° necessity; 2° qualities; 3° efficacy of contrition.

Vol. II, TREATISE ON THE SACRAMENT …, PART SECOND: ON THE SUBJEC…, OR ON THE ACTS OF THE PENI…, Ch. I, Art. I, § I. On The Necessity Of Contrition

n. ¶1347.

1347. Points To Be Established. - I. Contrition, either perfect with the desire of the Sacrament, or imperfect with the Sacrament itself, is altogether necessary to the sinner by necessity of means for obtaining justification and salvation. This is clear from Scripture² and from Councils, especially Trent:³ "At every time this movement of contrition was necessary for obtaining pardon of sins." The reason from St. Thomas⁴ is this: "The offense of mortal sin proceeds from this, that the will of man is turned away from God through conversion to some mutable good; whence for the remission of the divine offense it is required that the will of man be so changed that it be converted to God with detestation of the aforesaid conversion and with purpose of amending."

II. Mortal sin being supposed, contrition is necessary by necessity of precept, at least sometime in life, and indeed of a natural, divine positive, and ecclesiastical precept. - Of natural precept; for the law of nature dictates that the means without which he cannot attain the end, which he is bound absolutely to procure, are to be assumed by man; but contrition, as is clear from what has been said at I, is for sinful man a means without which he cannot attain the end which he is bound absolutely to procure, namely his reconciliation with God and eternal salvation; therefore, etc. - Of divine positive precept, as is gathered from the words of Scripture cited at I. - Of ecclesiastical precept; for the Church, in commanding the faithful to confess their sins validly at least once in the year, by that very fact commands them to elicit true contrition concerning the sins to be confessed, since sacramental Confession without contrition cannot at all be validly instituted. - But it is understood that that contrition falls under the precept which is required for justification, namely perfect contrition outside the Sacrament, or attrition with the Sacrament.¹

III. The precept of contrition obliges sometimes per se, sometimes per accidens.

1° Apart from the precept of annual Confession, it obliges per se, i.e. from the motive of the virtue of penance - so that he who then does not elicit contrition commits a special sin of impenitence - when a grave necessity of reconciling oneself with God urges, namely in danger, even probable, of death or perpetual insanity, whether true or supposed, e.g. in a lethal disease, in war, in dangerous navigation, in difficult childbirth, in an arduous surgical operation, etc.; and this on account of the precept of attaining the last end. - I said: apart from the precept of annual Confession, in which case some say that it obliges per se, others per accidens. St. Alphonsus is silent concerning this controversy, and it seems to us a dispute about the name.

2° It obliges per accidens, when another precept urges which cannot be fulfilled without contrition, especially in the following cases, namely - when the precept of an act of charity urges, with memory of sin occurring, - when someone guilty of grave sin is about to receive or administer a Sacrament, - whenever the Sacrament of Penance is received, even for the sake of devotion, - when someone has fallen into mortal sin, in which case he would not be excused from a new mortal sin who deferred penance for a notable time. He would sin, namely, against the precept of charity toward God, which binds everyone at least several times in the year [see n. 277. q. 1°. R. 1°. c).], and against charity toward himself, since he would expose himself to the danger of new faults. But what time is to be called notable cannot be determined by one and the same rule for all; since the necessity of contrition varies according to the variety of greater or lesser infirmity of the sinner, of graver or lighter temptation which he suffers, of a continuing or passing occasion in which he is placed, etc. Nevertheless, speaking generally, St. Alphonsus, on account of the precept of charity toward God, thinks that time should not be extended beyond a month. Yet sinners, especially the untaught, for the most part, indeed almost always, will be able to be excused from this sin of delayed penance on account of inadvertence.²

n. ¶1348.

1348. Questions. - Query 1° Is he who in danger or at the article of death receives the Sacrament of Penance with attrition bound besides to elicit an act of perfect contrition?

Resp. Some affirm it, because by the law of charity in danger of this kind each one is bound to safer means; others deny it, because means simply safe suffice. The affirmative opinion is altogether to be counseled, all the more because at the extremity of life we are bound to an act of charity, to which satisfaction cannot be made unless from the motive of the same virtue we detest sins, if they occur to memory.² Wherefore dying sinners, especially those whose penance was sufficiently weak and tepid, are seriously to be excited to contrition. Van Egeren.

Query 2° For obtaining grace in the Sacrament, besides sorrow, are explicit acts of Faith and Hope required?

Resp. Negatively. See n. 250. q. 2°, n. 270. II.

Query 3° Does he sin who confesses some venial sin without sorrow?

Resp. Negatively, more probably, provided sorrow concerning other sins, or at least one sin, is not lacking (which sorrow concerning one is necessarily included in explicit sorrow concerning a multitude), and the penitent does not knowingly subject the other sins as matter of absolution. The reason is, 1° because by reason of the validity of the Sacrament it suffices that some certain matter be offered, namely that sorrow concerning some venial sin be present, since venial sins are not necessary matter of the Sacrament of Penance, and besides, since they do not deprive one of the grace and friendship of God, some can be remitted without others; 2° because no injury is thereby done to the Sacrament if, from a good end and with all levity excluded, they are declared. Indeed usually those venial sins also concerning which sorrow, at least certain sorrow, is not had are usefully opened, namely for the greater manifestation of conscience and direction, for conceiving some shame, etc.¹

Query 4° Must contrition precede Confession?

Resp. 1° It must certainly precede absolution, or at least coexist with it, as is clear.² "But speaking practically, it is required that sorrow precede at least absolution, because no penitent sensing himself indisposed can ask for or receive absolution.

Resp. 2° The more probable and more common opinion is that for the validity of the Sacrament it is not required that sorrow precede accusation; the reason is that sorrow, although it must be sensible, does not necessarily have to become such through Confession, since it can become such through other signs; and the Ritual strongly favors this opinion, admonishing: "When Confession has been heard," the confessor is "to lead" the penitent "to sorrow," etc. The opposite opinion differs from the one set forth only in appearance; for its patrons require only that Confession not be a mere narration of sins, but have the character of sacramental accusation: but for this it suffices that Confession be made with the mind of obtaining absolution, and then that sorrow be manifested through petition for or expectation of absolution.³

Query 5° For how much space of time does an act of sorrow morally persevere for validly receiving the Sacrament?

Resp. It can certainly persevere for one day, or even another, if the penitent elicits such an act of contrition by which he is efficaciously moved toward Confession, so that the Confession afterward instituted is truly the effect of such contrition. "But otherwise, if someone confesses from mere devotion, or for fulfilling a vow or penance."² Moreover, supposing that the act of contrition was elicited with relation to the Sacrament, and before reception of this was not retracted, for example through a new mortal sin, the distance between the act of contrition and the remaining parts of the Sacrament certainly does not seem too long: 1° if the penitent, going to church with the intention of confessing, first elicits an act of contrition, and then, morally speaking, continues in examining conscience or in prayer, remains at the confessional, and confesses in his own place; even if in the Confession itself or in the reception of absolution, on account of distraction or some other cause, he no longer thinks about contrition;¹ 2° if the penitent in the morning elicits an act of contrition from the intention of confessing that day, e.g. in the evening, or in the evening with the intention of confessing the next day in the morning, and then at the time proposed confesses and is absolved, not actually thinking about contrition.²

Query 6° Is a new act of sorrow required for receiving a new absolution, when the penitent immediately after absolution confesses a mortal sin omitted from forgetfulness?

Resp. It is controverted. The probable, indeed more probable, opinion affirms. The reason is that, although sorrow morally perseveres in itself, nevertheless it does not persevere in order to the second absolution; for probably for the validity of the Sacrament it is required that sorrow be elicited in order to absolution. On which account St. Alphonsus³ judges that at least as safer this opinion is to be held.

Query 7° Can there be a valid and at the same time unformed Sacrament of Penance, on account of defect of sufficient disposition, in the case, for example, in which someone guilty of twofold sin, say theft and perjury, from invincible forgetfulness of the perjury, would confess only the theft, grieving not from a universal motive but from the special motive of baseness which is in theft?

Resp. It is controverted. Some deny with Billuart⁴ and Elbel.⁵ Their reason is that in the Sacrament of Penance contrition is the matter of the Sacrament; therefore, if it is insufficient, the Sacrament will be invalid. But if it is sufficient, the Sacrament is valid and at the same time formed, and therefore it immediately remits sins. - Yet others affirm, and indeed grave Theologians with Lugo,⁶ Lacroix;⁷ and St. Alphonsus⁸ calls this more probable. - But their reason is that in the alleged case, on the one hand nothing is lacking of those things which are required for the validity of the Sacrament - not formally integral Confession, since everything that occurred to memory was declared; - not sorrow, since it is present concerning the sin confessed; - not absolution, as is supposed. - But, on the other hand, the Sacrament must actually lack its effect, since one mortal sin cannot be remitted without the other, but defect of sorrow stands in the way of the remission of the perjury.

Vol. II, TREATISE ON THE SACRAMENT …, PART SECOND: ON THE SUBJEC…, OR ON THE ACTS OF THE PENI…, Ch. I, Art. I, § II. On The Qualities Of Contrition

n. ¶1349.

1349. - The qualities necessarily required for the validity of contrition, both perfect and imperfect, are numbered as these six, namely 1° that it be internal; 2° supernatural; 3° supreme; 4° universal; and, if there is question of receiving the Sacrament of Penance, 5° formal; and 6° elicited in order to Confession.

I. Internal or true, i.e. truly conceived in heart and soul. For contrition according to Trent is sorrow of soul.

II. Supernatural, i.e. elicited through the help of grace and from a motive known by faith. For natural means cannot conduce to a supernatural end. Cf. proposition 57 among those condemned by Innocent XI. p. XVIII, and Trent.¹

But suitable motives can be reduced to four: 1° to fear of punishment; 2° to hope of reward; 3° to the baseness of sin; 4° to the love of God.

III. Supreme, so that the sinner appreciatively, i.e. from a previous appreciation or intellectual estimation of sin as the supreme evil, detests his crime more than every other evil, and is prepared in soul to lose and suffer all things rather than commit sin.

IV. Universal, as regards all and individual grave sins committed and not yet remitted. - I said: 1° as regards GRAVE sins; for as regards venial sins it is not required that it be universal, as was said n. 1348. q. 3°, and will be said n. 1350. q. 4°. R. 2°. - I said: 2° as regards ALL AND INDIVIDUAL grave sins; not because individual acts of contrition must also be elicited concerning individual mortal sins - although it is expedient to detest one by one those sins toward which one is affected by a more vehement passion - but in reality one act of contrition suffices, extending itself at least virtually to all and individual sins, both known and forgotten, in the universal: namely, it must extend itself to all grave sins either from one universal motive, or from several particular motives which, at least taken together, extend themselves to all mortal sins committed, even those not occurring to memory. The reason is that no actual sin is remitted without sorrow; but one mortal sin cannot be remitted without another, since remission is made through the infusion of grace, which cannot stand together with mortal sin. I said: 3° As regards all and individual mortal sins committed and NOT YET REMITTED; for the precept of contrition does not extend to sins already remitted, except in the case in which these sins are necessary or free matter of Confession or sacramental absolution.

V. Formal, so that a desire for absolution does not suffice, although it be without affection for sin, - nor an act of charity; for by this desire or act alone the matter of the Sacrament is not yet posited.¹

VI. Elicited in order to Confession, at least practically, since this opinion is probable, although the opposite is more probable.²

n. ¶1350.

1350. Questions. - Query 1° Must contrition be supreme intensively?

Resp. Negatively. The reason is that intensity is something merely accidental: for a greater or lesser degree of sorrow, or affection or effort, does not pertain to the essence of contrition, which can exist whole without a degree of this kind of intensity. Besides, how would you know that this or that degree of intensity must be attained? Moreover the intensity of sorrow is not always in our power. Hence, even when the sense is moved more vehemently toward temporal evil from God's offense, it is not therefore the case that the will itself, under which alone moral evil falls, is less affected by sin. It suffices, therefore, that the sin be displeasing appreciatively as the supreme evil.³

Query 2° Is a formal comparison required in appreciation between various evils and sin, or God?

Resp. Negatively. For it suffices that the sinner sincerely and truly detest sins, and not wish to sin anymore. Indeed confessors act very imprudently who, in order to explore whether sorrow is supreme, propose to penitents certain very dangerous comparisons, e.g. whether they would rather be burned alive, or suffer all the torments of the martyrs, or eat poisonous reptiles, than sin again? For such comparisons move the imagination more vividly, and when a strong temptation approaches, the true disposition which existed before is easily lost.¹

Query 3° What length of time is required for conceiving true and supreme contrition?

Resp. None per se, because length of time does not pertain to the essence of the act, but is merely accidental to it; wherefore it is enough that the act be substantially fulfilled, which can be done even in the smallest instant of time. Yet it is safer to elicit a more intense and more prolonged act of contrition, lest perhaps from levity or too much haste no act as to substance be conceived.²

Query 4° Must contrition concerning venial sins possess these same six qualities?

Resp. 1° It must necessarily possess the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, and practically also the 6th; namely it must be 1° internal, because contrition which is not elicited from the intimate heart is not true; 2° supernatural, because, as was said, natural contrition cannot be a means to a supernatural effect; 3° supreme, or the sinner must detest venial sin more than all natural evils; 4° formal, so namely that the matter of the Sacrament be posited;³ 5° elicited in order to Confession. See n. 1349.

Resp. 2° But it does not have to be necessarily universal, whether in the Sacrament or outside the Sacrament. The reason is that since venial sin is not incompatible with sanctifying grace, one venial sin can be remitted without others.⁴

Query 5° Does fearful attrition (formidolosa), or that conceived from fear of hell, suffice for justification in the Sacrament of Penance?

Resp. Affirmatively, provided it be truly supernatural, absolutely efficacious, and only materially, but not formally or servilely servile. The reason is, 1° because attrition of this kind, since it is a true conversion to God and a true aversion from sin, removes that which stands in the way of the operation of the Sacrament; 2° because this is clearly drawn from Trent,⁵ which says that such attrition disposes the sinner to obtaining justification in the Sacrament of Penance. Cf. the Roman Catechism. Besides, 3° the same Synod² teaches that it sometimes happens that contrition is perfected by charity and reconciles man to God before this Sacrament is actually received. Therefore the Council supposes that perfect contrition is not necessary for receiving the Sacrament rightly; otherwise not only sometimes, but always, the sinner would be justified before he received the Sacrament.

Moreover attrition is called servilely servile when someone indeed grieves concerning sin and wishes to avoid it because of the punishments which he knows are to be inflicted by God; yet he would still be prepared to sin if those punishments did not exist. But it is called simply servile when someone abstains from sin indeed on account of fear of punishments, yet is not so disposed that he would wish to sin if those punishments did not exist, although he abstracts entirely from this thought: if those punishments did not exist. The former is evil, not insofar as it is fear of punishments, but on account of the depraved disposition of soul.

Query 6° Does attrition from fear of the punishments of Purgatory for venial sins suffice?

Resp. Affirmatively, with the very common and morally certain opinion; because all the reasons adduced above for the sufficiency of attrition from fear of hell are valid here also.

Query 7° Does attrition from fear of the temporal punishments of this life, to be undergone for sin as they are inflicted by God, suffice?

Resp. Affirmatively, and, as it seems, more probably, provided it is supernatural. The reason is, 1° because it seems to be clear from the words of Trent, where it says: Attrition is conceived from fear of hell and of punishments: for it distinguishes between the punishments of hell and other punishments; 2° because in fear of this kind all conditions of true attrition can be present. "Yet since" the opposite opinion, founded on the reason that Trent does not say of hell or of punishments, "is not lacking in its probability, at least extrinsic, I think that in practice it is safer that it be observed." Thus St. Alphonsus.³

Query 8° Is also a beginning of love required with attrition for obtaining justification in the Sacrament of Penance?

Resp. Negatively, if by a beginning of love there is understood some degree of perfect charity, by which God is loved above all things. The reason is that for rightly receiving the Sacrament an act which outside the Sacrament would essentially justify is not necessarily prerequired. But an act of charity, and therefore "sorrow which suffices for the nature of contrition, however small it is, deletes every fault," as St. Thomas says.¹ Therefore, etc. - St. Alphonsus² says that this is morally certain.

"But if by initial love of God there is understood a certain pious movement, by which the penitent, sincerely averse from sin, trustingly turns himself to God, and begins to love Him as the font of all justice, or as his justifier, liberator, and glorifier, you will most rightly affirm the necessity of some initial love, since a true conversion of the sinner to God cannot be conceived without a begun love of God of this kind, and besides Trent³ enumerates a certain beginning of love among the dispositions required for justification in Baptism (therefore by parity in Penance). ... But ... such beginning of love of God is had by the very fact" that "the penitent, truly attrite, has recourse with hope of pardon to the tribunal of Penance"; for: 1° "True attrition is a certain sincere conversion of heart to God. But he who is converted to God with a sincere heart is certainly moved of himself toward God as toward good, and therefore he is moved by love. 2° True attrition includes a firm purpose of observing the divine commandments, among which the commandment of love of God obtains the first place. But he who firmly proposes to love God already loves God inchoatively; since a proximate voluntary disposition toward something is of itself already the beginning or inception of that thing. 3° True attrition includes hope of pardon to be obtained from God. But from this, says St. Thomas,⁴ that we hope goods can come to us through someone, we are moved toward him, as toward our good, and so we begin to love him. - Moreover, even that salutary fear of God the avenger, by which true attrition is more often conceived, already contains in itself a certain beginning of the love of God, our liberator and justifier, according to that saying of Ecclesiasticus:¹ The fear of God is the beginning of the love of Him." Thus Van Egeren.

Vol. II, TREATISE ON THE SACRAMENT …, PART SECOND: ON THE SUBJEC…, OR ON THE ACTS OF THE PENI…, Ch. I, Art. I, § III. On The Efficacy Of Contrition

n. ¶1351.

1351. Principles. - I. Perfect contrition justifies man per se, even outside the Sacrament of Penance. 1° It is clear from reason; for contrition necessarily includes perfect charity: moreover, to love God perfectly is to be united with God; but union with God necessarily works separation from sin, since one cannot embrace one extreme without totally withdrawing from the opposite extreme. Therefore ... 2° It is clear from Scripture.²

II. Perfect contrition does not remit mortal sins, or does not justify man, except with the desire, at least implicit, of Confession: for sins cannot be remitted except through the means instituted by Christ; but the Sacrament of Penance in reality, or at least in desire, is the one means instituted by Christ for remitting sins committed after Baptism. Therefore, etc. It is clear besides from Trent.³

III. Attrition, as a prerequired disposition, suffices for obtaining pardon of sins in the Sacrament of Penance. This is clear from what was said n. 1350. q. 5°.

IV. But attrition outside the Sacrament cannot justify the sinner. For justification consists in the perfect union of man with God; but the attrite man, although he withdraws from creatures and begins the first steps of conversion to God, is nevertheless not yet perfectly converted to Him and united through love. Nor by its own power does attrition justify in the Sacrament, but it is only a prerequired condition; but the Sacrament itself justifies through the infusion of grace: wherefore in the Sacrament the penitent from an attrite man becomes contrite, namely contrite equivalently, or contrite by habit, through the infusion of sanctifying grace and the habit of charity, which is conferred by the force of absolution.

n. ¶1352.

1352. Questions. - Query 1° Must the desire of Confession be EXPLICIT in contrition?

Resp. Negatively, more probably with the common opinion. The reason is, 1° because for remission it suffices that someone be truly united with God with his whole heart through perfect contrition; for God, as is clear from what has been said, cannot reject a sinner approaching Him with his whole heart and from the most perfect motive; but it can sometimes happen that a sinner elicits an act of perfect contrition without thinking of Confession, whether from inadvertence or natural forgetfulness, or from invincible ignorance. Therefore for the remission of sin through contrition it is not essential that the desire of Confession be explicit. 2° Because according to Trent this desire is included in contrition; but what is included in another is implicit, not explicit.¹

Query 2° Does contrition remit not only guilt, but also the punishment owed to guilt?

Resp. 1° It certainly remits eternal punishment, because a man justified through contrition cannot remain guilty of eternal damnation.

Resp. 2° According to its greater or lesser intensity it also remits part of the temporal punishment owed after mortal or venial sins have been deleted. Hence very intense perfect contrition can even abolish all punishment; but it does not necessarily have this efficacy from its nature. - This is drawn from Trent.²

Query 3° Does attrition elicited by a just man remit venial sins outside the Sacrament?

Resp. It is controverted. More probably it seems to be affirmed. The reason is, 1° because from Trent venial sins can be remitted in various ways: therefore they are not remitted by perfect contrition alone; 2° because in the opposite opinion venial sins are not more easily remitted than mortal sins: but this is contrary to common sense; 3° because the power of remitting venial sins is commonly attributed to Sacramentals: but it would be falsely attributed to these, if contrition were required for deleting them. - Thus Suarez,³ Lugo,⁴ and many others.

Yet not a few deny it, because from Trent¹ venial sins are usefully accused in Confession; but they would not be usefully accused if they could be remitted by attrition: therefore, etc. - But it is rightly replied that venial sins are usefully exposed in Confession also for other reasons, namely on account of remission of punishment, on account of the merit of shame, on account of the advantage of direction, etc.

Query 4° Does contrition or attrition remit venial sins without the desire of the Sacrament?

Resp. Affirmatively. The reason is that by divine institution the Sacrament is necessary for mortal sins alone: therefore venial sins can be deleted without the Sacrament of Penance; therefore no desire of this Sacrament is necessarily required for their remission. - Thus all.

Vol. II, TREATISE ON THE SACRAMENT …, PART SECOND: ON THE SUBJEC…, OR ON THE ACTS OF THE PENI…, Ch. I, ARTICLE II: ON PURPOSE

n. ¶1353.

1353. - Definition. Purpose is the will of not sinning further.

Division. It is twofold: 1° explicit, or formal, by which someone, thinking of the future, determines not to sin anymore; 2° implicit, or virtual, which is included in contrition itself, without the future time being held before the eyes.

n. ¶1354.

1354. Principles. - I. Purpose, at least implicit, is altogether necessary for the remission of sin; because purpose is a necessary consequent of contrition, and at least virtually included in it, as is clear from its nature and definition.

II. True purpose must possess a threefold condition; namely, it is required that it be firm, efficacious, and universal.

1° Firm, i.e. not wavering, nor conceived with a light mind, so that it would be a certain velleity, or a certain volatile sensation by which even impenitent sinners themselves are not rarely affected, or rather are deceived by the devil, lest they awaken from the lethal cauterized sleep of their conscience; but a serious decree of the deliberate will, by which the penitent simply and absolutely determines to guard against sin in the future, notwithstanding any inconvenience whatever or human fear: otherwise he would not wish to be converted to God totally and sincerely. Yet the confessor must not test the soul of the penitent by using comparisons suited to disturb his imagination.

2° Efficacious, i.e. the penitent must not only firmly determine that he does not wish to sin anymore, but also to apply the means necessary for avoiding sin and for fleeing proximate occasions, etc. - But it suffices that the purpose be efficacious affectively, i.e. it suffices that the sinner be prepared in soul to apply the necessary means; because future amendment in fact is not of the essence of purpose.

3° Universal, or it must extend to all and individual mortal sins, not only those committed, but also those which could be committed. The reason is that full and true conversion to God cannot be given without aversion from any lethal sin whatever.

But as regards venial sins, for the validity of the Sacrament it is required and suffices that a firm and efficacious purpose be present of avoiding either one of the venial sins, or all those fully deliberate, or of avoiding or diminishing with all diligence, insofar as it can be done in a human manner, those which creep in without full deliberation.

n. ¶1355.

1355. Questions. - Query 1° In order that purpose be firm, must it also be found constant?

Resp. Negatively; at least this is not absolutely necessary. The reason is that purpose affects the present will, which by its nature is otherwise variable. Hence from relapse after Confession the weakness of purpose cannot be gathered per se.¹

I said: at least this is not absolutely necessary. For if the penitent relapses immediately and with almost no resistance, it furnishes an argument, or at least a vehement presumption, that he lacked a truly firm purpose; for he who firmly proposes usually does not so easily forget his purpose, but is wont to persevere constant at least for some time, and to employ efforts for resisting temptations or occasions of sin, and therefore ordinarily falls with more difficulty and more rarely.²

Query 2° Can the purpose of him be firm who indeed has the intention of not sinning, yet fears that he will relapse?

Resp. Affirmatively; for fear, which is introduced from past frailty and the inconstancy of the human will, does not impede a sincere will. Hence that penitent can have true purpose who, when the confessor asks him concerning the will of not sinning, responds: I am frail, I fear a fall, yet I do not now wish it, nor do I choose the fall: which are the words of Gerson according to Croix.¹

But in practice you will look at the character and disposition of the penitent; for not rarely you will find sinners asserting that they will relapse, who for that reason fear lest they do not have a sufficiently firm purpose, and yet show nothing besides fear of relapsing and distrust of themselves. To penitents of this kind it must be inculcated that there is question not of those things which perhaps are going to happen, but of the actual will, and of confidence to be placed in divine help.

These things are said concerning him who only fears that he will relapse; for if he certainly believed it, he would furnish a certain suspicion that his purpose is not sufficiently firm. Thus St. Alphonsus resolves practically, although speculatively he admits that firmness of purpose can stand together with knowledge of relapse. The reason is that it cannot happen that he firmly proposes amendment who, knowing that God does not deny His grace to one who does what is in him, nevertheless certainly believes that he will relapse. Hence such a penitent, before he is absolved, is to be led to hope of amendment.² - Nor can the purpose therefore be judged weak because only the confessor, on account of the known frailty of the penitent, foresees, even rather certainly, that he will relapse; for Peter was not therefore judged indisposed for Communion because he was known by Christ to be going to fall. Besides, there are those who, when they say: I believe, I believe, that I will relapse, and therefore I will indeed avoid sins if I can, yet I am not able to promise anything, lest afterward I seem unfaithful, etc., - show nothing other than a well-founded fear and distrust of self, and they must be judged as those who only fear. - Finally, to relieve the soul of the penitent who, on account of an inveterate habit of sinning altogether deliberately, which perhaps he has contracted, thinks that avoidance of such sin is morally impossible for him, it will often be most useful to teach him that here and now there is strictly required of him only the purpose of not sinning anymore deliberately, i.e. with full advertence and full consent, etc.

Query 3° For receiving the Sacrament of Penance rightly, is explicit purpose required?

Resp. According to St. Alphonsus,¹ there is a threefold opinion. The first affirms absolutely: because, although sorrow necessarily includes purpose, nevertheless explicit purpose seems to be required from Trent saying: With the purpose of not sinning further.²

The second denies, in the case in which sorrow is elicited from a universal motive. The reason is that sorrow of this kind includes a purpose plainly efficacious. Moreover, from the Tridentine Synod, when attrition excludes the will of sinning, it sufficiently disposes a man to obtaining grace in the Sacrament.

The third teaches that if the penitent thinks of future life, he ought formally to propose amendment. Otherwise, if the penitent, e.g. immediately about to be beheaded, thinks nothing about the future. For if he thinks about the future, he would not seem sufficiently to repent, if he did not expressly propose amendment.

But St. Alphonsus thus interposes his judgment concerning these things: "These two latter opinions are indeed the more probable; but ... since the first ... is sufficiently probable ... before the fact the safer opinion is to be followed," indeed also after the fact, i.e. a penitent who, although in good faith, confessed a certain mortal sin without explicit purpose is bound to repeat the confession. See the reason n. 67. 2°.

Yet in practice this obligation will rarely urge. 1° Because those who are troubled about this matter belong almost to the number of those who have confessed only venial sins;³ whose accusation is no more to be repeated than to be made. 2° Because ordinarily there is only doubt concerning the defect of explicit purpose; in which case one must stand for the validity of the act. See n. 67. 2°. 3° Because the faithful are wont to recite a formula of contrition which contains the act of explicit purpose. 4° Because those who grieve in the due manner concerning sins do not easily omit an explicit act of purpose.

Query 4° What purpose is required, or suffices, for venial sins?

Resp. See n. 1354. 3°; but for practice observe:

1° It is safer to elicit purpose concerning some determinate sins, especially concerning the graver ones, and concerning especially those which are committed from habit, and to add to them some sin of past life.

2° When the faithful, even those who are held as pious and confess frequently, are seen after innumerable Confessions to make no or almost no progress, it is lawful to conjecture that they conceive purposes too general and confused, and therefore sluggish and languid.

3° Not rarely penitents are found, especially women, who spend much time in examining conscience, search out the smallest faults with the greatest anxiety, and draw out their Confessions beyond measure, and yet are not very solicitous concerning sorrow and efficacious purpose. These must be seriously exhorted that, omitting anxious care to declare all venial sins in species and number, they subject to the keys with serious sorrow and purpose of amendment only those sins which burden the conscience more, and which especially are to be rooted out. Indeed it is expedient that from those venial sins they select some one principal sin, for detesting and amending which before the others they diligently labor.

Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis

Benedict Henry Merkelbach, O.P. — 141 passages

Vol. III, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On Penance, Third Part: On the Parts o…, Chapter I: On Contrition · Vol. III, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On Penance, Third Part: On the Parts o…, Ch. I, Question One: On the Essence and Object of Contrition · Vol. III, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On Penance, Third Part: On the Parts o…, Ch. I, Question Three: On the Division of Contrition · Vol. III, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On Penance, Third Part: On the Parts o…, Ch. I, Question Three: On the Div…, Article I: On Perfect Contrition Itself

Vol. III, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On Penance, Third Part: On the Parts o…, Chapter I: On Contrition

S. Th., Suppl., q. 1, a. 1.

n. 474.

474. Contrition, etymologically from to grind down, signifies in corporeal matters an action by which a solid and hard thing is reduced to the smallest parts; whence, by similitude, in spiritual matters it signifies that disposition of soul by which the heart hardened by sin is broken and totally reduced, so that it totally dismisses the affection of sin. Namely, it is a sorrow that grinds down the hardness of the will, and, as it were, a breaking of the heart down to the smallest parts (a. 1).

n. 474.

In a more general sense it signifies any sorrow or displeasure, even imperfect, concerning sin; in the strict sense it signifies sorrow for sin that is perfect or formed by charity, and thus it is opposed to displeasure and imperfect contrition, which is an approach to perfect contrition and is called attrition, as it were a breaking of the heart into large parts without its being perfectly ground down (a. 2, ad 3).

475. Thesis. Contrition is necessary by necessity of means and of precept. - This has been sufficiently demonstrated from the necessity of the virtue of Penance (n. 412), and is explicitly taught by the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 14, and sess. 14, c. 4, can. 4, against the Protestants, who said that the whole of penance was repentance alone, or a purpose of new life, without sorrow and detestation of sins committed, or expiation.

The Catholic truth is demonstrated by:

a) The Scriptures, which say that the primary act of Penance, namely contrition, that is, sorrow and detestation, is required for the destruction of sin (Joel II, 12; Jer. VIII, 6; XXXI, 18-20; Ezek. XVIII, 30, 31; Ps. L, 6, 19; VI, 7; Isa. XXXVIII, 15; II Cor. VII, 7, 9, 10; Ps. XXXI; Acts II, 38).

b) The Fathers, who hold compunction, contrition, and detestation of sin to be necessary: Hermas, simil. VII, 6; Justin, dial., n. 14; Tertullian, On Penance, c. 8; Cyprian, ep. 31; Ambrose, On Penance, l. II, c. 10; Chrysostom, On Compunction, l. I, n. 10.

c) Theological reason: Everywhere the retraction of an offense is that which is first required on the part of the offender; but before God no retraction has value unless it begins from sorrow of heart, because God looks upon the heart.

Vol. III, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On Penance, Third Part: On the Parts o…, Ch. I, Question One: On the Essence and Object of Contrition

S. Th., Suppl., q. 1; q. 2, a. 1-5.

476. Definition of contrition. - In the more general sense, by the Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 4, contrition is defined: "sorrow of soul and detestation concerning sin, with a purpose of not sinning for the future." This definition, however, is common to the contrition required in the Old and in the New Law for the remission of sins; but in the New Law there is also required, according to the Council, "the desire of performing the other things which are required for rightly receiving this sacrament." But contrition thus accepted can be defined with St. Thomas as: sorrow assumed for sin, with the purpose of confessing and satisfying (q. 1, a. 1). This definition is equivalent to the definition of the Council of Trent. It is said:

sorrow, and not detestation alone: for although sorrow cannot exist without hatred and detestation, nevertheless detestation can exist without sadness and sorrow, as in the blessed. Sorrow is detestation of an evil affecting us, namely sadness over an evil in some way joined to us and present in us;¹ it is, however, detestation, not mere displeasure, but efficacious displeasure which tends to the destruction of the evil;

¹ "Detestation," notes Van Noort, De Sacramentis, t. II, n. 42, "is the cause of sorrow; wherefore one who sorrows, by that very fact has detestation. And conversely, we necessarily sorrow if we perceive the evil which we detest as joined to us. Therefore sorrow and detestation are so connected that one who detests his sin sorrows over it, and one who sorrows over it necessarily detests it." Cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 35, a. 1.

assumed, namely voluntarily; whence it is sorrow of the will, but not sensible sorrow, which is not always in our power, although the latter sometimes follows and can pertain to the sensible sacramental sign;

for sins committed: the matter about which sorrow is concerned is sin, as such, not as punishment but as guilt, as an offense against God to be destroyed;

with purpose...: this is not the essence of contrition, but its effect. For sorrow can exist in one who does not think of the future; nevertheless in sorrow the purpose is contained virtually and implicitly, insofar as sorrow imports the will of subjecting oneself to the divine precept of confession and satisfaction for destroying sin, and of not sinning any more in the future.

Hence three things are necessary for contrition: hatred, sorrow, purpose. For contrition exists presuppositively in hatred, formally in sorrow, and consecutively in purpose.

n. 477.

477. Contrition is an act of virtue. - For the annihilation and grinding down of the will to sin is good of itself, "because this is to detest one's own will by which sin was committed." It is an act of penance, because it is the act of that virtue to which it belongs to detest and destroy past sin, which pertains to penance (a. 2).

478. Object of contrition. - Contrition is sorrow regarding and grinding down the hardness of the will in sins (by which it stands in its own terms and does not yield to the law of God), and retracting the offense against God. Whence its proper object is guilt, not considered in the abstract, but as committed, in which hardness of heart and affection for sin are found.

Hence it concerns all actual sins, because in all of them there is a certain hardness of the will which does not yield to the law of God, either by transgressing it, or by omitting it, or by acting beside it.

It does not concern future sins, because they are not an evil joined to the will, nor in them is the will already hardened; - yet it concerns them by a certain consequence, insofar as it takes precaution against them.

Nor does it concern punishments, since hardness of the will is not found in them and they are not injurious to God; although there can be mere displeasure concerning them.

Nor does it concern original sin, which does not proceed from the hardness of our will, because it was not introduced by our will but contracted from the origin of a vitiated nature; whence concerning it there cannot be retraction, although there can be sorrow and simple displeasure.

Nor does it concern the sins of others as others' sins, because contrition ought to be in him in whom hardness of will preceded. Yet we can sorrow for them and satisfy for them; besides this, we can have contrition for our cooperation in those sins.

n. 479.

479. Corollary. - It is not an act of contrition if someone sorrows that he does not sorrow for sins, because the object of that sorrow is not sin committed, or the offense against God, but the defect itself of sorrow; nevertheless in the timorous it is ordinarily a sign of contrition, namely that they truly sorrow, because they fear too much that they do not have sufficient sorrow, which they judge not great enough or do not feel.

Vol. III, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On Penance, Third Part: On the Parts o…, Ch. I, Question Three: On the Division of Contrition

S. Th., Suppl., q. 1 and 5; q. 10, a. 1; q. 18, a. 1.

493. Contrition is usually distinguished into perfect and imperfect. - This distinction is not found explicitly proposed among the Fathers, who preached as necessary contrition alone, penance, detestation of sin from the whole heart, and indicated its various motives, but did not distinguish various dispositions according to the perfection of motive or efficacy. But in the twelfth century the distinction began to be made,1 and it can be understood in two ways:

a) by reason of efficacy, as is more often found among the older authors: contrition is imperfect if God is loved in Himself but not above all things; perfect if He is also loved above all things;

b) by reason of motive, as among modern authors: perfect contrition rests upon the perfect motive of charity by which God is loved for His own sake, and is properly contrition; imperfect contrition rests upon an inferior motive and is attrition. These are distinguished in three ways:

by reason of origin and according to cause: perfect contrition arises from the perfect supernatural love of charity or friendship toward God, the highest good absolutely and in Himself, infinitely perfect, lovable in Himself and for His own sake; imperfect contrition arises from the imperfect supernatural love of concupiscence toward God, good and perfect relatively to us and lovable to us, because He is our highest good, by the enjoyment of whom we will be blessed, and because He is supremely good toward us, from whom all benefits have been received;

by reason of motive or formal object and according to essence: perfect contrition is from the motive of charity, insofar as sin is an offense against God, the highest good lovable and loved in Himself above all things; imperfect contrition is from an inferior motive, insofar as sin is base and recedes from honesty and the law of God, or insofar as it merits the punishment of the most just judge or induces punishment to be inflicted by God;

by reason of efficacy and according to effect: perfect contrition of itself suffices for justification, and therefore without the real reception of the sacrament; imperfect contrition of itself does not suffice for justification, but from the institution of Christ in fact suffices with the real reception of the sacrament.

There is a twofold love of God: a) perfect love, by which God is loved for His own sake, and therefore above all things simply, even above ourselves and above all creatures; b) imperfect love, by which He is loved above all desirable and concupiscible things, not for His own sake but on account of the goods which He bestows, not because He is good in Himself but because He is good to us: namely, the motive is divine perfection as good and lovable to us, indeed as the highest good by the enjoyment of which we will sometime be blessed. Hence imperfect love abstracts from relation to the intrinsic infinite goodness of God, so that God is loved above all our goods but not yet above ourselves: nevertheless it does not positively exclude this, which would be evil, but abstracts from it, and thus it is not evil but less perfect. Whence from the opposite: perfect contrition detests sin as the highest evil in itself and simply, above all evils absolutely; imperfect contrition detests it as our highest evil, above all our evils, and thus is supreme in a certain respect.

From these things it is understood that imperfect contrition does not import the whole reparation of sin, even that which is possible to human frailty, and therefore does not rise to the perfection of virtue; namely, perfect contrition alone is the proper and perfect act of the virtue of Penance.

The first in whom the distinction occurs is reported to be Alanus ab Insulis, in Regulae de sacra theologia, rule 85.

Vol. III, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On Penance, Third Part: On the Parts o…, Ch. I, Question Three: On the Div…, Article I: On Perfect Contrition Itself

494. Thesis. Contrition, perfected by charity, remits sins, even mortal sins, without the real reception of the sacrament of Penance, yet not without the desire of it.

The proposition, set forth in these general terms, is certain from the Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 4, against Luther and the Protestants, who deny that contrition disposes for justification; but the Council "teaches..., although it sometimes happens that contrition (this contrition) is perfected by charity, and reconciles man to God before this sacrament is actually received, nevertheless this reconciliation is not to be ascribed to contrition itself without the desire of the sacrament which is included in it." That this effect is always obtained when contrition is perfected by charity, and not only most rarely, in a case of extreme necessity, is certain against Baius and Jansenius,1 from the condemnation of propositions 31, 32, 70, and 71 of Baius.2

It is said: a) contrition perfected by charity, namely sorrow of soul and detestation concerning sin committed, with the purpose of not sinning for the future, from the motive of perfect charity toward God supremely loved for His own sake; whence its formal object is the supreme perfection of God on account of which God is lovable above all things and the offense against God is to be detested and repaired;

b) without the real reception of the sacrament of Penance, because perfect contrition from its own nature most fittingly demands the remission of sin and from the promise of God infallibly confers it;

c) yet not without the desire of it, because, since the sacrament of Penance and therefore sacramental confession is necessary in the New Law, the sinner cannot truly be contrite unless he wills to subject his offenses to the power of the keys, namely, to fulfill the necessary means and precepts of Christ.3 Yet it is not always required that the desire be explicit; but if someone is ignorant of the necessity of the sacrament or does not recall it, an implicit desire suffices in the general will of fulfilling all things that are necessary for salvation.

From this it follows:

Vol. II, Tr. XV, Pt. II, Chapter I. On Contrition · Vol. II, Tr. XV, Pt. II, Ch. I, Article I. On Contrition Properly So Called · Vol. II, Tr. XV, Pt. II, Ch. I, Art. I, § I. On the Necessity of Contrition · Vol. II, Tr. XV, Pt. II, Ch. I, Art. I, § III. On the Efficacy of Contrition

that the desire of itself does not have the power of blotting out sin, nor does contrition have this power by reason of the desire, but the whole power is from perfect contrition;

…and 101 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Sabetti-Barrett, Compendium of Moral Theology

Aloysius Sabetti, S.J., and Timothy Barrett, S.J. — 13 passages

Vol. II, Tr. XV, Pt. II, Chapter I. On Contrition

n. 729.

Contrition according to the Council of Trent is "sorrow of soul and detestation for sin committed, with the purpose of not sinning henceforth." This definition prescinds from the new law, in which contrition can have no efficacy without the desire of confession. Therefore the same Council a little below adds "with the desire of performing the other things which are required for rightly receiving this sacrament." Hence the definition of St. Thomas is fitting: "Sorrow taken up for sins, with the purpose of confessing and satisfying." - Cf. Council of Trent, sess. 14, chap. 4. - St. Thom. Suppl. q. 1, art. 1. - St. Alphonsus, n. 435. - De Augustinis, part. 1, art. 5, p. 43.

Theologians dispute, as may be seen in St. Alphonsus, whether contrition consists properly in sorrow, or rather in detestation, and what order intervenes between these two; but practically speaking, this matters little, for it is not to be feared that either one is lacking, since they mutually suppose each other. Yet it is certain that sorrow of soul and detestation of sin regard the past, but purpose is concerned with the future. Therefore in the first place something must be said about this sorrow and detestation, or about contrition properly so called, and then about purpose.

Vol. II, Tr. XV, Pt. II, Ch. I, Article I. On Contrition Properly So Called

n. 730.

Contrition is distinguished as twofold: namely perfect, which is detestation of sin arising from the special motive of perfect charity or of the goodness of God loved supremely for His own sake; and imperfect, or attrition, which is detestation of sin arising from another motive, for example, from the consideration of the baseness of sin, or from fear of hell, or from love of eternal beatitude. Concerning each, three things must be explained, namely necessity, qualities, and efficacy.

Vol. II, Tr. XV, Pt. II, Ch. I, Art. I, § I. On the Necessity of Contrition

n. 731.

I say. Contrition, either perfect with the desire of the sacrament or imperfect with the sacrament itself, is necessary for the sinner, both by necessity of means for obtaining justification and also by necessity of precept at least sometimes in life. The reason for the first is taken from the words of Christ, Luke xiii, 3: "Unless you shall have penance, you shall all likewise perish," and also from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, chap. 6, where hatred and detestation for sin are counted among the principal dispositions for justification. But the reason for the second is both because there is frequent speech in the Scriptures concerning such a precept, especially Matt. iii, 2, where it is expressly said: "Do penance"; and because there exists a natural precept of doing whatever is necessary by necessity of means for salvation. - Cf. St. Thom. 3, q. 86, art. 2. St. Alphonsus, n. 334.

n. 732.

Questions

Question 1. How and when does the precept of contrition oblige? Resp. The precept of contrition, always supposing that someone is in the state of mortal sin, obliges gravely, although now per se, now per accidens. It obliges per se both in danger, even probable, of death, on account of the necessity of attaining the ultimate end, and sometimes in life, as has already been said and will be more determined below. But it obliges per accidens when another precept presses which cannot be fulfilled without contrition, for example, the precept of annual confession; or when someone is about to receive or administer a sacrament, or also as often as he receives the sacrament of Penance for the sake of devotion alone. Yet it is certain that the precept of contrition does not oblige immediately after a mortal sin has been committed, because it is affirmative; for it is of the nature of an affirmative precept that it not oblige immediately, because otherwise it would oblige at each moment. - Cf. St. Thom. 4, dist. 17, q. 3, art. 1, q. 4. - St. Alphonsus, n. 437. - Baller. note (c) p. 312.

n. 732, Q. 2.

Question 2. What is the force of that particle "sometimes," or when does delay of contrition induce grave sin? Resp. The theologians do not agree; for some extend it to a year, others to six months; others with St. Alphonsus to one month. But the holy Doctor himself adds: "Sinners, especially the rude, can for the most part, indeed almost always, be excused from this sin of delayed penance, on account of inadvertence." But it seems, not improbably, that not only the rude, but all who satisfy the precept of annual confession, can be excused, because it is not certainly established concerning the obligation of making an act of contrition more often than once in a year. But those who have not confessed for many years, since they already implicitly accuse this sin of delayed penance, are not necessarily to be questioned on this matter. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 437. - Lugo, disp. 15, n. 55. - Salmant. tract. 6, chap. 1, nn. 51 and 55. - Pallav. punct. 3, n. 10. Baller. note (b) p. 313; and note (a) p. 314.

n. 732, Q. 3.

Question 3. Whether he who in the article of death receives the sacrament of Penance with attrition known as such is bound besides to elicit an act of perfect contrition? Resp. Negatively, probably; for he would chiefly be bound on this account, because there is present an absolute necessity of attaining the ultimate end: but this reason cannot be urged, because it is morally certain that justification is obtained through attrition alone with the sacrament; from another source, no one is bound to use the safer means when he has already employed a means simply safe. Therefore ... Yet some affirm that there is present an obligation of eliciting an act of contrition, but per accidens, namely if the memory of a past sin occurred to the dying person; for, they say, he would not then satisfy the obligation of eliciting an act of perfect charity if, when the memory of sin occurred, he did not detest this sin from that motive. But because concerning the obligation of eliciting an act of perfect charity in the article of death, when someone has already obtained justification, there is probable dispute on both sides, neither does this argument settle the matter. Whatever may be the case, it is plainly expedient that the dying be stirred, as far as can be done, to eliciting and repeating acts of perfect charity and contrition. - Cf. Baller. note (b) p. 314.

n. 732, Q. 4.

Question 4. Whether it is necessary for the value of the sacrament that contrition precede the accusation itself of sins? Resp. Negatively, and the reason is that according to the Roman Ritual the priest is indeed bound to bring the penitent to sorrow by efficacious words, but only after the confession has been heard. But although the practice of some faithful is that, when they have completed the accusation, they use this or a similar formula: I grieve greatly for these sins and I accuse myself; nevertheless only scrupulous penitents, instructed by scrupulous confessors, think a formula of this kind obligatory. - I said instructed by scrupulous confessors; for these alone, relying on an empty foundation, demand these formulas for the value of the sacrament. This empty foundation is twofold; for they object 1°. that contrition must be sensible, and that the manifestation of this sensibility is obtained through accusation; but it is answered that the sensibility of contrition can be manifested, and in fact is manifested, in many other ways, especially through the petition and expectation of absolution. They object 2°. that according to theologians confession must be sorrowful; but it is answered that theologians by that word sorrowful require only that confession not be a mere narration of sins, but rather an accusation of oneself in order to receive absolution. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 445. Lugo, disp. 14, nn. 13 and 18. - Salmant. tract. 6, chap. 5, n. 22. - Baller. note (a) p. 316.

n. 732, Q. 5.

Question 5. Through what space of time does an act of contrition endure, so that afterward the sacrament may be validly received? Resp. This cannot be determined certainly: yet according to the common opinion it is said that it can persevere for one day, and even longer, provided it has not been retracted by another mortal sin. But some theologians require besides that it was elicited with the intention of making confession. Whatever may be the case, practically speaking those penitents are not to be troubled who, when in the morning, while they were hearing Mass, or later toward midday, they elicited an act of contrition with the intention of confessing that day, but in the evening actually approached confession without having renewed contrition. Indeed they are not to be troubled even if they had had no respect to making confession on that day, because not even in that hypothesis would the nullity of the confession be established. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 446 and 447. - Lugo, disp. 14, nn. 37 and 40. - Baller. note (a) p. 318; and note (a) p. 319.

n. 732, Q. 6.

Question 6. Whether a new act of sorrow is required for receiving a new absolution when the penitent immediately after absolution confesses a mortal sin omitted from forgetfulness? Resp. The opinion which, according to St. Alphonsus, is more common, but according to very many grave theologians is common, undoubted, and morally certain, denies that this is required. For since the prior contrition has not been destroyed by the absolution received, it certainly perseveres; and because it was universal, it extended also to that sin omitted from forgetfulness and now is again manifested in the very act of the new accusation. But St. Alphonsus holds the affirmative opinion as more probable, because sorrow must be not only elicited, but also elicited in order to absolution. Therefore in practice before the fact, if someone does not hold the negative opinion as morally certain, it is necessary that he seek from the penitent a new act of contrition; and this indeed he will most easily accomplish while he raises his hand to impart the new absolution. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 448. - Baller. note (a) p. 320.

Vol. II, Tr. XV, Pt. II, Ch. I, Art. I, § III. On the Efficacy of Contrition

n. 735.

I say 1°. Perfect contrition justifies a man even outside the sacrament of Penance, but not without the desire of this sacrament. The reason for the first is that perfect contrition includes perfect charity, which imports conjunction with God. The reason for the second is that the sacrament of Penance is the one means instituted by Christ for the remission of sins. - Cf. De Augustinis, part. 1, Thes. 5, p. 45.

I say 2°. Attrition outside the sacrament of Penance cannot justify a sinner; but if it is joined with the sacrament as a prerequisite disposition, it suffices for obtaining pardon of sins. The reason for the first is that the attrite man, although he withdraws from creatures and begins the first steps of conversion to God, nevertheless is not yet perfectly converted to Him and joined by love. But the reason for the second is that then nothing is lacking to prevent the sacrament from producing its effect. Therefore attrition in the sacrament does not justify by its own power, but only together with the other parts, especially with the absolution of the priest. But in this case the penitent is said to become contrite from attrite, not properly and formally, but as to equivalence and effect. Cf. De Augustinis, part. 1, Thes. 9, p. 90; and part. 2, p. 249, Scholion 11.

n. 736.

Questions

Question 1. Whether the desire of confession must be explicit in contrition? Resp. Negatively, with the common opinion. The reason is that for remission it suffices that someone be truly joined with God with his whole heart through perfect contrition; for God, as is clear from what has been said, cannot reject a sinner approaching Him with his whole heart and from the most perfect motive; but it can sometimes happen that a sinner elicits an act of perfect contrition without thinking of confession, whether from inadvertence or natural forgetfulness or from invincible ignorance. Therefore for the remission of sin through contrition it is not essential that the desire of confession be explicit. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 437. - Salmant. chap. 2, n. 23.

n. 736, Q. 2.

Question 2. Whether contrition remits not only the fault, but also the punishment due to fault? Resp. It certainly remits eternal punishment, because a man justified through contrition cannot remain guilty of eternal damnation. Besides, according to the greater or lesser intensity of the same contrition, it also remits part of the temporal punishment due to mortal or venial sins that have been destroyed. Consequently very intense perfect contrition can also abolish all punishment; but it does not necessarily have this efficacy from its nature. This is drawn from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, chap. 14; and sess. 14, on Penance, chap. 8 and can. 12.

n. 736, Q. 3.

Question 3. Whether attrition remits venial sins outside the sacrament? Resp. It is controverted, but more probably it seems that one must answer affirmatively. The reason is, 1°. because from the Council of Trent venial sins can be remitted in various ways: therefore they are not remitted by perfect contrition alone; 2°. because in the opposite opinion venial sins would not be remitted more easily than mortal sins: but this is opposed to the sense of the faithful; 3°. because the power of remitting venial sins is commonly attributed to sacramentals; but it would be attributed falsely if contrition were required for destroying them. Yet not a few deny this, because from Trent, sess. 14, chap. 5, venial sins are usefully accused in confession; but they would not be usefully accused if they could be remitted by attrition. Therefore. But it is rightly replied that venial sins are usefully exposed in confession also for other causes, namely for the remission of punishment, for the merit of confusion, for the advantage of direction, etc. - Cf. De Augustinis, part. 1, art. 9, p. 105.

Concina, Compendium

Daniele Concina, O.P. — 29 passages

Diss. I, Chapter I — Propositions condemned by the Holy See · Diss. I, Chapter V — On contrition, the first part of Penance, and its natural and divine precept · Diss. I, Chapter VIII — Certain questions concerning grief and purpose are resolved

Diss. I, Chapter I — Propositions condemned by the Holy See

X. Henry Henríquez, Book 4 of his Summa, chapter 6, no. 5: “He who with attrition is justified through absolution is not bound to the connatural precept of formal contrition, both because he has now obtained remission by the remedy per se instituted, and compensatory from the application of the merits of Christ, and because he has fulfilled in an equivalent, and by a stronger and better title, the whole end to which contrition is ordained. For contrition does not remit sin, nor compensate, save inasmuch as it includes the desire and place of the sacrament of Penance. Wherefore God the creditor is more content with compensation applied through the sacrament than with the compensation of contrition. Otherwise contrition, while it could be had, would be necessary, and would oblige PER SE, even while absolution is received, which then can be had; and consequently CHRIST IN THE EVANGELICAL LAW WOULD NOT HAVE LIGHTENED THE BURDEN, BUT WOULD HAVE ADDED THE GRAVE BURDEN OF CONFESSION besides the necessary contrition.”

X. Francolino, page 124: “These confessors so generally neither St. Thomas nor St. Antoninus condemns; in whom a confessor is excused, or even praised, who acts more kindly with penitents of weak virtue, in whom a graver burden of penance would extinguish the small fire of contrition.”

Diss. I, Chapter V — On contrition, the first part of Penance, and its natural and divine precept

n. I.

I. QUESTION I. What is contrition taken generally? ANSWER. Regarded universally, as it abstracts from perfect and imperfect, it draws its origin from the word contero; and contero sounds the same as I divide, I cleave, I break up. Therefore the Prophet Joel cries out, chapter 2: Rend your hearts. The Council of Trent, session 14, chapter 4, thus defines it: Contrition is a grief of soul and a detestation of the sin committed, with a purpose of not sinning thereafter. It is called a grief of soul, because it stands within the soul. There is added detestation, because penance is not only a repenting, as the Lutherans contend, but also a hatred of the former life. Of the sin committed, that is, of all sins. With a purpose, and so forth. That purpose ought commonly to be express. These two, grief for the sin perpetrated and the purpose of not sinning thereafter, are so connected that the one cannot subsist without the other.

n. II.

II. The properties of contrition are these: free, good, supernatural, true, sincere, great, vehement. Contrition therefore is an act not forced, as Luther blurted out, but free and good. Moreover it must be supernatural, both by reason of the divine help, without which no one can be contrite, and by reason of the motive from which it takes its species. The Council in the place cited adds with the desire of performing all those things which are required for the sacrament of Penance, namely of confessing and satisfying. That desire is necessary. Besides the divine help, faith, the fear of eternal punishment and of the beatitude to be lost, the baseness of sin inasmuch as it is an offence of God, and a love at least inchoate of the divine goodness, flow into contrition. Contrition must be true and sincere, which is set not in certain tears, not in the reading of some little book, but in the inmost and highest grief of the will.

n. III.

III. This contrition must be supreme appreciatively, by which a man sets God before all creatures; and vehement, by which he is borne with the greatest ardour into hatred of sin and love of God. The Prophet Micheas likens the grief of contrition to the pains of a woman in labour, chapter 4: Be in pain, O daughter of Sion, as a woman in travail. And Isaias, chapter 59: We shall roar all of us like bears, and shall lament as mournful doves. It is not necessary that it should burst forth into tears, which sometimes flow from natural disposition and the disposition of the senses.

n. IV.

IV. QUESTION II. Does the precept of contrition oblige a man as soon as he has sinned? ANSWER. That contrition is necessary by natural, divine, and ecclesiastical law all confess. Concerning the time of the obligation theologians dispute. Many teach that this precept presses on individual feast days, on which the Sacrifice of the Mass is to be heard. Others, as often as the sin committed occurs to the memory. Others, as soon as the sin is perpetrated. The opinion of those who limit this precept to the article of death, or to the reception or administration of the sacraments, is utterly false, and proscribed by force of just reasoning.

n. V.

V. In Volume I, On the Decalogue, Book 1, dissertation 4, chapter 10, I have discussed at large with a full pen the question of the obligation of contrition immediately after a mortal crime is perpetrated. That immediately is to be taken morally, not physically. A latitude of time cannot be precisely defined. The graver theologians, from the testimonies of the Scriptures and of the Fathers, teach that those sin mortally who long defer their conversion. How much time does that long comprehend? Some say a month. I should understand a week, thereabouts. This opinion, which defends that a sinner deferring his conversion beyond a week by means of contrition sins gravely, seems to me the more probable. The holy Scriptures partly, as also all the Fathers, inveigh against sinners deferring their conversion to God. The opinion of very many being admitted, with what efficacy can preachers from the pulpit convince sinners that they should not defer their conversion from day to day, but convert themselves at once? And because the time of death is uncertain, at what hour we think not the Son of man cometh. Those who persist in sin expose themselves to the danger of dying in sin. A man stained with mortal sin is the bondman of the devil. Is it lawful to serve the devil, or to persevere in his service? Is it expedient to persist under the wrath of God and in rebellion against him? Awake, ye sons of men, hear God crying out: Delay not to be converted to the Lord, and defer it not from day to day. He does not say from month to month, from year to year, but from day to day. Read the divine testimonies and the documents of the Fathers which I have adduced in the place cited, and which it is not needful to repeat here.

n. VI.

VI. QUESTION III. What is to be said of the opinion of Leander asserting that the precept of contrition obliges of itself only in the article of death? ANSWER. Fr. Leander, tract 5, disputation 1, question 38, alleges for the recounted opinion Vásquez, Hurtado, Diana, Villalobos, de Lugo citing Navarrus, Durandus, Soto, Bonacina, and Suárez citing Malfesius and Filliucci. That opinion is false and lax. Let all the cited authors teach it, be it so, in Leander. Besides, this opinion has been condemned. I prove it. The Church condemned the casuistical opinions defending that the precept of charity does not press of itself outside the article of death, or outside a five-year period. Therefore the aforesaid opinion also is condemned. I prove it. Are sinners bound outside the article of death, and within five years, to love God? Do you say yes? Therefore they are also bound to be contrite. For they cannot follow God with the love of charity unless they be contrite for the faults perpetrated. Therefore the condemnation of the former doctrine necessarily infers the condemnation of the other.

n. VII.

VII. QUESTION IV. What is to be thought of the following opinion of Fr. Sporer? ANSWER. Fr. Sporer, part 3, chapter 1, section 2, § 2, no. 174, says: “The precept of contrition, even in the article of death, does not oblige a sinful man justified by the use of the sacrament with attrition. … So Henríquez, Vásquez, Cano, with very many alleged by Cardinal de Lugo. … Dicastillo, Layman.” This opinion is false, and, as it seems to my weakness, most pernicious to the eternal salvation of Christians. For the precept of charity cannot be fulfilled without contrition either implicit or explicit. Therefore the reported opinion seems to be contained in thesis 7 proscribed by Innocent XI.

n. VIII.

VIII. QUESTION V. Has the precept of contrition conceived out of charity CEASED in the evangelical law, the use of the sacraments being admitted? ANSWER. Fr. Sporer affirms it in the place cited, no. 175, in these words: “The precept of contrition does not oblige those who by the use of the sacrament with attrition are justified, or wish to be justified. Most common, among those to be cited below. The reason is, because Christ in the new law by a singular privilege instituted another means also of justification, namely the sacraments of the dead, Baptism and Penance, so that thereupon the necessity of perfect contrition alone should cease: otherwise assuredly Christ, instituting and commanding sacramental confession — a means of itself sufficiently hard and difficult — if besides there were still required perfect contrition, and that itself not easy but very difficult to a sinner, would not have lightened but much aggravated the burden of the law, and we should be of a worse condition than the ancients of old, who were bound to contrition alone.”

n. IX.

IX. With most bitter tears are these unheard-of paradoxes to be lamented rather than struck with a sharp style. They overturn the first foundation of the Christian religion, namely the law of charity. And yet this doctrine Fr. Sporer calls most common, and cites for it Henríquez, Vásquez, Cano, de Lugo, Dicastillo, Layman. The evangelical law is a law of love, as the whole Gospel of Christ, as the Fathers, the Councils, and the whole Church cry out. The sacrament of confession is hard and difficult, replies the cited casuist with the others alleged by him. But by charity it becomes sweet, answer all the Fathers. What? Those casuists rise up: if the love of charity were necessary with the sacrament, Christ would not have lightened but much aggravated the burden of the law, and we should be of a worse condition than the Hebrews of old. Let readers meditate these things, and contain their tears if they can. I transcribe these paradoxes, that at some time those may be untaught who are forestalled by these casuistical figments, and may recall that the recited doctrine is a certain principle, whence innumerable other paradoxes proceed. See more, Vol. IX, Book 1, dissertation 1, chapter 8.

X. He subjoins in the same place, no. 177: “That the precept of contrition of itself never obliges except in the article of death, and not before, most grave Doctors teach.” Fr. George Gobat, tract 1, no. 139, similarly writes: “I say sixthly: it is indeed probable that there exists no precept concerning contrition, speaking of itself, to be elicited before the article of death.”

n. XI.

XI. Behold how by the merely probable even the first mandates themselves of the Christian religion are reduced to nothing. It has already been shown above that petty opinions of this kind are false, lax, and proscribed by force of just reasoning.

n. XII.

XII. QUESTION VI. Is a sinner who cannot confess during the year for want of a confessor bound to contrition? ANSWER. Fr. Dominic Viva proposes this question, question 3, article 1, no. 8, and resolves it in these words: “I answer indeed with Coninck and others commonly in the negative. For it is false that the Church determined that time … undetermined for repenting in general. … To the rules adduced, He who cannot do the whole, and so forth, I answer that they hold good when the whole and the parts are HOMOGENEOUS, but not when they are HETEROGENEOUS.”

n. XIII.

XIII. Behold the little distinctions drawn from the Peripatetic philosophy, by which the primary precepts of Christ are eluded. Are the evangelical precepts wrapped up in these trifles, homogeneous and heterogeneous? This doctrine of Fr. Viva seems to my weakness condemned, not merely false and lax. For this thesis has been condemned: Then only does the precept (of charity) oblige, when we are bound to be justified, and have no other way by which we can be justified. We are bound to be justified every year by the precept of the Church; and the thesis was condemned because it asserted that only then does the mandate of charity press. But Fr. Viva teaches that not even within the year are we bound to justification, a confessor being lacking: because the precept of charity and of contrition does not press. Therefore by force of just reasoning, unless I myself am deceived, this doctrine of Fr. Viva, which he calls common from his own Coninck, is more condemned. And indeed common sense itself detests this doctrine. Since he who cannot do the whole — namely be contrite and confess at the same time — let him at least be contrite. He who cannot pay a hundred, let him pay at least ten while he can. This holds true, replies Fr. Viva, when the parts are homogeneous, otherwise when they are heterogeneous. Excellently! These figments, and like ones which occur everywhere in very many casuistical books, bring terror upon me. Since indeed the whole of holy Scripture and all the Fathers teach the opposite.

n. XIV.

XIV. Fr. Sporer takes courage even against the Scriptures and the Fathers, and adds at no. 178 and following these words: “The most grave opinions of the holy Fathers and of sacred Scripture, so seriously and threateningly urging a mature repentance, and condemning a late deferring of penance, deter you.” Hear the answer. “But why cannot they conveniently be understood of a counsel indeed most excellent and most wholesome; or at most of a precept that we ought not to remain too long in a state of mortal sin?” Too long, that is, until death, or for five years! Is it therefore only a counsel that Christian sinners should not persevere under the tyranny of the devil, and in rebellion from God?

n. XV.

XV. QUESTION VII. Whether the opinion of de Lugo denying the precept of contrition in the article of death be too lax? ANSWER. Cardinal de Lugo writes these things, disputation 7 On Penance, section 13, no. 241: “Whether he who receives the sacrament of Penance with recognized attrition ought still under mortal sin to have contrition at least in the article of death? Suárez affirms it with many … Nuño … Sánchez … Granado … Valentia, and so forth. Nevertheless others teach the contrary opinion with many: Coninck, Becanus, Layman, Fagundez, Faber, Diana, Turrianus, Salas, and other more recent men. … No. 245: This latter opinion has always seemed to me the more probable.”

n. XVI.

XVI. Have you heard? Not only probable, but truer also has it always seemed to him. But to us the aforesaid doctrine has always seemed false, and condemned by force of just reasoning. Does not even in the article of death the natural and divine precept of contrition press? Has it ceased, has it fallen into nothing in the evangelical law in respect of those who confess — the precept of contrition, even in the last extremity? Are Christians not bound even in this extremity to follow God with the love of charity, nor to be contrite from grief for the offence against the infinite goodness of God?

Diss. I, Chapter VIII — Certain questions concerning grief and purpose are resolved

n. I.

I. QUESTION I. Ought a penitent to elicit grief for sin with the intention of confessing? ANSWER. De Lugo, Aversa, Tamburini, Gobat, Moya, Sporer, Illsung, and others deny it. But this opinion is to be rejected as less probable. That grief is a sacramental action. Therefore by the intention of the penitent it is to be subjected to the sacramental form. For an intention is necessary not in the minister alone, but also in the penitent. These things nevertheless are not to be discussed metaphysically and subtly, since by the very fact that a man wills to confess and grieves for his sins, his grief in fact bears a respect to the sacrament. As regards this, therefore, the minds of penitents are not to be tormented.

n. II.

II. QUESTION II. Ought grief to precede confession, or is it enough that it be elicited after confession and before absolution? ANSWER. All affirm that grief ought to precede absolution, since it is its proximate matter. But theologians dispute the other part, namely whether it ought to precede the confession which is called sorrowful. Navarrus, Toletus, Vásquez, Hurtado, Diana, Bonacina, Suárez, de Lugo, Sporer, Gobat, Moya, Tamburini, and others defend that it is enough that it follow the confession and precede absolution. Others maintain the opposite. Sudden and unusual cases being excepted, speaking commonly, it is to me more probable that it ought to precede confession: both because in the sacraments we ought to follow the safer things when the matter is called into controversy; and because by that middle grief the penitent ought to pass from the state of mortal sin and diabolical servitude to the state of the sons of God. That passage, commonly speaking, is not made in an instant, or in a few moments. Account nevertheless is to be had of penitents. For when the just confess, they most easily grieve and are contrite, since they are habitually disposed. On the contrary sinners, laden with a grave bundle, more difficultly conceive this birth of grief. It is the part of confessors to instruct penitents that, before they approach the sacred tribunal, they spend some congruous time in conceiving this grief. Let them propose to them what points they ought to meditate, what considerations to form, that they may excite themselves to conceive this grief: let them be taught that there is need of prayers, by which they may implore help from God, whereby they may be able to be contrite as they ought.

n. III.

III. That grief ought so to endure that by force of it the penitent be absolved, since that grief is the matter of absolution. Diana relates many who defend that a grief elicited several years before endures, provided it has not been retracted. Which opinion is false and lax. Escobar, Diana, and Arriaga admit an antecedence of long time. Others say that a grief elicited four or six days before, others a month before, suffices. But why do I waste time in heaping up these false opinings? The grief must be morally present. For practice, grief is to be conceived before confession and to be renewed in the confession itself, when absolution is to be imparted.

n. IV.

IV. In the confession of venial sins also this grief is necessary. It is not necessary that grief be conceived for all venial sins, since venial sins are not necessary but free matter: it is enough that grief be conceived for some graver venial sin, and that an express purpose be had of avoiding it, when no necessary matter is subjected to the keys.

n. V.

V. QUESTION III. What is to be said of the opinion of Fr. Viva asserting that a grief conceived from the motive of temporal loss is enough for Confession? ANSWER. Fr. Dominic Viva in his Treatise on proposition 1 of Innocent XI, no. 26, teaches that a supernatural attrition from the fear of temporal punishments, as to be inflicted by God the avenger, suffices; and concludes: We lawfully follow opinions of this kind which are most probable, the safer being omitted. Who defined that opinions of this kind are most probable? The probabilists? But the Roman See, even granting that they were most probable, commands that in the sacraments, when it is a question of matter and form, we follow the SAFER opinions, the probable being omitted.

n. VI.

VI. Fr. Tamburini, Book 1, Method of Confession, chapter 1, § 4, no. 11, says: “Among the motives of attrition, of which we have spoken at no. 4, although some do not admit another fourth — that is, fear of a temporal evil … fear of infamy, of chains, of sickness, and so forth — nevertheless in a most probable opinion this motive also is sufficient, if evils of this kind be feared as inflicted by God, or to be inflicted.”

n. VII.

VII. This opinion I reckon not only false and lax, but contained in the Innocentian decree. Tamburini there confesses that the Doctors teach the opposite. Therefore the opinion is controverted. Therefore the safer is to be embraced. Tamburini objects: Trent does not define that grief is to be conceived from fear of hell, or of another spiritual or eternal punishment, but adds in general from fear of punishments. Evidently is Tamburini deceived, with the others. The Council says: from fear of hell and of punishments. The proposition is copulative. Why therefore do you dismiss hell, set in the first place, and coupled by a copulative particle with punishments? The punishment owed to mortal sin is eternal. Therefore a sinner ought to grieve for an eternal evil to be inflicted by God. Fear ye not them that kill the body … but rather fear him that can destroy both soul and body in hell. Matthew 10. So the Evangelists, so Trent. Therefore the opinion of Tamburini, Viva, and others is evidently false.

n. VIII.

VIII. QUESTION IV. What is to be said of the opinion of Fr. Tamburini teaching that it is not to be inculcated upon a sinner that he grieve for that sin toward which he is affected with a great love? ANSWER. Natural reason itself dictates that that wound should chiefly be cured which lies in ambush more inwardly for the soul. But Fr. Tamburini, Book 1, Method of Confession, chapter 1, § 3, no. 5, writes: “Whence when you advert that your penitent is greatly addicted to some crime, do not inculcate an act of grief concerning that peculiar sin. For a danger will underlie it, lest he detest it from his soul while its special memory is rubbed up again; whereas of detesting it in general and together with the others he will feel either no difficulty or a slight one.”

n. IX.

IX. Beware, O confessors, says Fr. Tamburini, lest you persuade penitents to elicit an act of grief for that fault which they perish for like a beloved mistress, and toward which they are borne impotently: because a danger will underlie it lest they detest it from their soul. Is it therefore not necessary that a sinner should from his soul detest that fault which he follows with a vehement love? It is enough, replies Tamburini, that he should grieve for this greatly beloved fault confused and covered over with the crowd of other crimes. For in this fashion the penitent will easily detest that sin lurking within the multitude of sins: then he will feel no difficulty, or a slight one. On the contrary, if he look upon this beloved fault of his with unveiled face, a danger will underlie it lest he detest it from his soul.

Slater, Cases II, Penance, Case 4. No Sorrow for What She Has Done · Slater, Cases II, Penance, Case 5. Was He Prepared?

X. Every man is bound by some dominant and reigning passion and appetition. All the Fathers and preachers cry out that Christians should restrain, press down, and subdue this dominant passion, this reigning affection. Let not sin therefore reign in your mortal body, so as to obey the lusts thereof, says St. Paul, Romans 6. In this man avarice dominates, in that lust, in another anger, in another vengeance. Unless each man arm himself with a peculiar grief and fortitude against this raging and reigning beast, it is all over with his salvation. How false therefore, and how lax the aforesaid doctrine is, let each man sit as judge.

n. XI.

XI. QUESTION V. Is a formal and explicit purpose of not sinning thereafter required? ANSWER. Fr. Tamburini in the place cited, § 5, no. 7, subjoins: In the probable opinion of others it is enough that it be implicit, that is, that which is involved in the act itself of detestation or displeasure. This opinion Diana, Gormaz, de Lugo, Vásquez, and many others similarly teach. But it is openly false: for the opposite is taught by St. Thomas, Albert the Great, Durandus, Scotus, Cajetan, Cano, Soto, and Cardinal Bellarmine, who in Book 2 On Penance, chapter 6, writes these things: But to us the common and trodden way of the ancients is always safer and more suitable. It is proved therefore that for contrition there is required an explicit and formal purpose of a better life. Would that all men were willing to tread this way trodden by the ancients. Trent, besides an efficacious and universal grief, in which indeed a virtual purpose is contained, requires a purpose of not sinning thereafter. If a virtual purpose contained in the efficacious grief sufficed, it would be superfluous that the Council should require a purpose besides the efficacious grief. Someone cries out to the contrary: if besides an efficacious and universal grief a purpose were required, there would be not three but four parts of penance. It is an empty sophism. There are three parts of penance. But contrition consists of two things, namely grief for the sin committed and a purpose of not sinning thereafter. It can nevertheless happen that a penitent be so carried away with vehement grief that he think not of the purpose; but if he adverted, he would conceive a most firm resolution of not sinning thereafter. The discourse now is of those things which commonly and everywhere happen, not of some rare and sudden case.

Slater, Cases II

Thomas Slater, S.J. — 18 passages

Slater, Cases II, Penance, Case 4. No Sorrow for What She Has Done

Anna, who recently contracted marriage with Titius, a Protestant, in a Protestant church because she could not obtain from the Bishop a dispensation for a mixed marriage, comes to confession to Caius, a missionary priest in England. Concerning her other sins Anna declares that she is sorry from her heart; concerning the clandestine marriage, however, she is in no way sorry, nor can she be, because she loves her husband so ardently and rejoices in the union. Caius proposes various motives for sorrow, namely that so good a God was offended by marriage with a heretic, grave ecclesiastical laws were despised, and scandal was given to the faithful. At last, with tears, Anna professes that she is sorry for the manner in which the marriage was celebrated; for the marriage itself she neither can nor wills to be sorry, and indeed in the same circumstances she would do the same again. Caius, however, although he has faculties received from the Bishop for validating the marriage, doubts whether Anna is sufficiently disposed to receive absolution. Hence it is asked:

What kind of sorrow is required in the sacrament of Penance?

What kind of purpose of future amendment is required?

What is to be done by Caius?

Solution

What sort of sorrow is required in the sacrament of Penance?

The sorrow must be true and sincere, supernatural or rooted in faith, universal or it must embrace all the mortal sins that are to be forgiven, and it must be supreme, or the sinner must detest sin more than any other evil, and he must be prepared to do and suffer anything rather than sin again.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. ii, 156.

What sort of purpose of amendment is required?

The purpose of amendment must be sincere, efficacious, or the sinner must be prepared to take the means necessary to avoid sin in the future, and it must be universal, or extend to all mortal sins at least.²

2 Ibid., 161.

The case. Ann had married a Protestant in the Protestant Church and when she came to confession to Caius, she said she could not be sorry for what she had done; indeed she said she would do the same again in the same circumstances. Caius got her to see the malice of her action, and then she said she was sorry for the way in which she had married, but could not feel sorry for the marriage. It is not necessary that she should be sorry that she has the man she loves for her reputed husband, and as far as the past is concerned, it is enough that she is sorry for the way in which she was married against the Church’s laws. But she is still ill disposed for absolution, inasmuch as she says she would do the same again under the same circumstances. Caius must try to put her in better dispositions. In order to do this he may tell her that it will be better not to think of what she would do under the same circumstances, as she will never again be placed in the same circumstances. If she can be got to be really sorry for what was wrong in her action, and to hope that God would give her grace never to yield again, and that she would do all on her side to co-operate with the grace of God, she might be absolved, and then the marriage could be put right. For this it will now be requisite that the parties should contract marriage in the ordinary way before the parish priest or his delegate and two witnesses.

Slater, Cases II, Penance, Case 5. Was He Prepared?

Titius, a well-instructed Catholic, is accustomed to elicit an act of contrition before going to bed. On a certain Saturday he enters the church to confess, but he had scarcely knelt down to prepare himself when someone came out of the confessional and no one among the crowd that was waiting entered immediately. Since Titius knew well that he had committed one grave sin since his last confession, and that this alone besides some venial sins troubled his conscience, having obtained the opportunity he entered the confessional without special preparation, confessed his sins, and received absolution. Afterwards, however, he doubts whether he had sufficient sorrow, which ought to constitute a part of the sacrament and to be elicited in relation to receiving the sacrament. Hence he afterwards questions the confessor, who therefore asks:

When must sorrow be elicited in order to suffice for the sacrament of Penance?

Must the required sorrow be elicited with the intention of receiving the sacrament?

What is to be said of the case?

Solution

When ought the act of sorrow to be elicited in order that it may suffice for the sacrament of Penance?

As sin can not be forgiven unless the sinner is sorry for it, the act of sorrow must be elicited before absolution is given, or at least it must exist when absolution is given.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. ii, 157.

Ought the act of sorrow to proceed from the intention of receiving the sacrament?

Some theologians hold that it should do so, just as the washing with water in Baptism should be ordained to the confection of the sacrament of Baptism. However, it seems safe to say with others that the subsequent referring of the act of sorrow to the confection of the sacrament which necessarily takes place when the penitent confesses his sins with sorrow in order to receive absolution is sufficient. Or, that the intention of confessing the sin which is present in the mind with the act of sorrow, is sufficient to refer the latter to the confection of the sacrament.²

2 Ibid., 157.

Vol. III, Case XXXIV: Perfect Contrition · Vol. III, Case XLI: Necessity of Contrition in the Sacrament of Penance · Vol. IV, Case LXV: When Does Contrition Suffice for Sacred Functions Instead of Confession?

The case. As is plain from the answer given above, there is no ground why Titius should be disturbed about the sufficiency of his sorrow. It is indeed advisable to make special and immediate preparation for confession, and Titius should not repeat the action which gave rise to his scruples. Still there was nothing essentially defective in his confession. It was formally integral, and the acts of contrition which he made every night before going to bed made him habitually contrite, and they were made sufficiently sensible and referred to the sacrament by his confession. For, of course, he had always intended to confess his sins when he made his acts of contrition.

The Casuist

Various; ed. S. Woywod, O.F.M., and J. A. McHugh, O.P. — 30 passages

Vol. III, Case XXXIV: Perfect Contrition

(1) Is perfect contrition combined with the resolution to confess, only in case of necessity a valid substitute for the Sacrament of Penance?

(2) Must the resolution to confess, the votum Sacramenti, be expressly joined to the act of contrition, to make the contritio efface mortal sin?

(3) Must the resolution to confess, joined to perfect contrition, include the intention of one going to Confession as soon as possible?

Those who have searched theological handbooks and commentaries on the Catechism for information about perfect contrition will not have found uniform nor precise and plain answers to these three questions. And yet it is obvious that just about these three questions there should be no doubt whatsoever.

Ad. 1. It is taught generally that perfect contrition effaces mortal sin in case of necessity; i. e., in the case that some one is in the danger of death and a priest not there to whom he might confess. Is this correct? Is the efficacy of perfect contrition restricted to the case of necessity? The Church teaches otherwise. The Council of Trent speaks not of such case of necessity, but teaches generally that (sess. XIV., c. 4) the contrition perfected by charity reconciles man again with God before this Sacrament (namely, Penance) is actually received. Therefore, in all cases, whether there is danger of death or not, at all times, and in all situations of human life, those in mortal sin may regain through perfect contrition the state of grace even before Confession. But how about the votum sacramenti, the resolution to confess?

Ad. 2. The Tridentine teaches (l. c.) that without this votum Sacramenti the contritio has no such power to efface sin. But does the Tridentine require that this votum be expressly made (explicite), or is it sufficient if the votum is implicite included in the contrition? According to the literal meaning of the Tridentine the latter suffices. The holy Synod teaches . . . nevertheless, that the reconciliation itself is not to be ascribed to contrition itself without the desire for the Sacrament, which is included in it. To this St. Alphonsus remarks in his Theologia Moralis, in Tract. de poenit. cap. 1, n. 437, de contrit: what is included in another thing is implicit, not explicit. That a votum confessionis be made expressly and explicite in awakening perfect contrition, is, according to the opinion of St. Alphonsus, not required for the reason also: because for him who has knowledge of confession it is not necessary that, while making an act of contrition, he remember confession; it suffices that he not exclude it.

Every Christian, however, has this notitia confessionis, and perfect contrition, therefore, suffices for the forgiveness of mortal sin, even if there is no explicit thought of confessing. Perfect contrition would lose its power of effacing mortal sin only then if the sinner had the explicit intention not to confess his sin, but to content himself with an act of perfect contrition. For this reason we hold with Lehmkuhl (Theol. Mor. tom. II, n. 279): that desire for the Sacrament suffices which exists by the very fact that someone elicits an act of perfect contrition or charity. And this indicates the answer to our third question.

Ad. 3. We answer in the words of Lehmkuhl, /. c.: The desire for the Sacrament does not necessarily contain the resolution to receive it as soon as possible. What does it really mean: to go to Confession as soon as possible? Can this not be done almost any day, or at least every Saturday or Sunday, by many of those who commit mortal sins?

Were this propositum required with the act of perfect contrition, then notwithstanding perfect contrition many would remain in mortal sin, because they do not desire to confess as soon as possible. If Lehmkuhl’s dictum contains the Church’s teaching, then there can be no doubt that perfect contrition will efface the mortal sins even of a Christian who confesses only once a year, in compliance with the ecclesiastical precept, even though he may commit these sins almost a year before Confession, but is resolved to confess these sins when going to Confession next Easter time. It will not do, therefore, to tell people that they must go to Confession immediately upon committing mortal sin, it will be more correct to tell them, in sermons and instructions, that if someone has committed mortal sin, he should not hesitate to awaken perfect contrition, and through perfect contrition he will regain the state of grace; that it will be necessary, nevertheless, to confess this sin when next, going to Confession. This is ecclesiastically correct and it suffices for the Christian who has had the misfortune to sin grievously. Nor is it particularly difficult for a well-disposed Christian, who prays for this grace, to make an act of perfect contrition.

n. ¶10.

Whether, notwithstanding all this, an early Confession should not be advised, after mortal sin has been committed, is quite another matter. In praxi the priest will often have to advise early Confession, because one or the other may not be capable of a contritio and may content himself with an attritio, which only cleanses from grievous sins in connection with absolution.

n. ¶11.

Dr. Spath.

Vol. III, Case XLI: Necessity of Contrition in the Sacrament of Penance

Titus makes his Confession to the priest Sempronius, and concludes with the words: I should also mention that in the last Confession, on account of a hurried preparation, I quite forgot to awaken contrition, I consoled myself, however, with the assurance a former confessor gave me in a similar case, when he said that I need not mind the omission, because the fact that I go to Confession proves contrition. I shall make it a strict rule hereafter, nevertheless, to make after every Confession an act of contrition in advance for the next Confession, so that this matter will be attended to without fail, What will Father Sempronius say to this?

Answer.—The present case proposes three questions: (1) Is it true that people go to Confession only because they feel contrition for their sins? (2) Is contrition absolutely necessary for the forgiveness of sins? (3) Does an act of contrition, awakened immediately after a Confession in advance for the next Confession suffice in every case for the validity of the Sacrament? To the first question we must answer no, as reason and experience dictate. It is to be supposed that, like every other sacred matter, and like every Sacrament, so the Sacrament of Penance is misused by many. This misuse may consist in a culpable lack of the most essential requisite for the Sacrament on part of the receiver, the lack, namely, of a real, supernatural, all surpassing contrition, embracing all sins. Experience confirms this fact only too often. Many go to Confession solely because their usual time has arrived and not on account of a consciousness of sinfulness, not because they feel the need of conciliation with an offended God; they give no thought to that. Many again take as little trouble as possible about Confession, they confess such of their sins as they happen to think of in a hasty preparation, recite superficially the customary formula of contrition, without reflection. Some persons go to Confession in a mood of dejectedness caused by purely worldly reasons. There are others again who go for various reasons, among which the love of God, or contrition, has no place.

The second question whether contrition is absolutely requisite for the forgiveness of sins must be affirmed unconditionally. Leaving out of consideration the theological controversy whether God in His infinite freedom de potentia absoluta is able to remit to man a grievous sin without contrition, it is certain that He cannot do this de potentia ordinata; i. e., according to the order of the salvation as instituted by Him. Thus the Trident. sess. 14, cap. 4, teaches that sin never can, and never will, be remitted without contrition. For this would be in opposition to all that which God has vouchsafed to reveal to us, about His infinite perfections and attributes, it would be in opposition, also, to the natural sense of justice, if the one who had committed a crime against a mighty ruler would be tolerated to appear before the offended and say: “Forgive me, O King, for my offense, but upon the first opportunity I will commit it again,” and would obtain forgiveness. For this reason, and because the Trident, sess. 14, cap. 3, teaches that contrition is not only an absolutely necessary disposition for forgiveness of sins, but also the most important part of the matter of the Sacrament of Penance, this matter must be present at every reception. It must be supplied in the form of an interior act, with or without outward expression. That by an interior act there is meant no special formula is evident; there must be, however, present in the person’s disposition in some way a spiritual activity, a thought, however brief, that effectively and essentially contains the hatred of sin and the return to the love of God. Since the Tridentine enumerates, as matter of this Sacrament, the three acts of the penitent: contrition, confession and satisfaction, it is plain that contrition, like confession and satisfaction, must consist in some way or other of a positive act; and the more formal, lasting and profound it is, the better.

The answer to the third question depends upon the fact whether the penitent’s act of contrition must have relation to the Sacrament of Penance or not; and of what kind this relation must be. The far greater number of theologians demand this relation, so that contrition, actually awakened, but without all relation to the subsequent Confession, puts the validity of the absolution in doubt. This is evident from what has been said. For if, according to the Tridentine, the three acts of the penitent form the matter of the Sacrament of Penance, they must manifestly be supplied actus humani; i. e., with intention and consequently with reference to the Sacrament. Concerning the act of contrition it is not necessary that the intention, or resolve, to confess should precede it; but some relation to the Confession it must, nevertheless, possess. According to Lehmkuhl (Theol. mor., ed. V., II., n. 280) this relation is supplied if (1) in the tribunal of penance a person, after accusation, awakens the act of contrition, or is led to do so by the confessor. The former is not to be advised, because it may happen that absolution by the confessor is given before real contrition has penetrated the heart; (2) if a person with intention to confess examines his conscience and thereupon, in all earnestness, awakens the act of contrition as preparatory to his entering the Confessional. This manifestly is the best manner to go to Confession; (3) if a person, through some cause, is moved to contrition and to the resolution to confess, even though the actual Confession be made only the next, or the second following day; if only, in the latter case, the act of contrition virtualiter, i. e., by greater endeavor to avoid sin, or by oft-repeated prayer, continues. Should, however, in the meantime another grievous sin be committed, then the relation ceases, a new act of contrition must be awakened, over former sins as well as over the last one. Maria v. Kundt, O.F.M.

Vol. IV, Case LXV: When Does Contrition Suffice for Sacred Functions Instead of Confession?

Tullius, a priest, is often troubled by conscientious doubts and regrets having no confrater to whom he could make a confession before each celebration or administration of the Sacraments, when he is tormented by scruples. What advice should a careful confessor give him?

(1) As long as he is not morally certain that he is guilty of mortal sin, contrition alone, without the purpose of confession, suffices, even to allow him to say Mass.

(2) If he is only somewhat doubtful, he is not even strictly bound to make an act of contrition.

(3) If he doubts whether, in spite of earnest effort, he has succeeded in making a good act of contrition, he must not disturb himself. Contritio existimata, in conjunction with the reception of the Holy Sacrament, justifies him, and no sacred function would be a formal act of sacrilege, since he had a certitudo conjecturalis (which suffices) regarding the recovery of the state of grace that possibly he had lost.

(4) For administration of all the Sacraments contritio saltem existimata would be sufficient, even if there were a copia confessarii and his mortale were certain.

(5) No mortal sin is involved in discharging all the duties of a priest even in mortali, with the exception of celebration and administration of the Sacraments. There is a divergence of opinions regarding the things that involve a venial sin; for instance, recitation of the Divine Office, private bestowal of the priestly blessing, especially sine paramentis. A priest certainly does not sin grievously by performing the marriage service in this condition.

(6) It is not even a venial sin for a priest in a state of mortal sin to administer the Sacraments, such as baptism and Viaticum, in cases of urgent need, where there is no time for him to make an act of contrition. An opinion to the contrary cannot be maintained.

(7) It is regarded by St. Alphonsus, Gury, and Marc a grievous sin for a priest in mortali to give Holy Communion, but Lugo and others argue with great probability that it is only a venial sin, and we need not hesitate to follow them. A mere tractatio Sanctissimi, even immediata, is held by very many strict authorities to be veniale, and so there seems no reason why this should not be extended to the administration of Holy Communion. The administration of the other Sacraments in mortali is, strictly speaking, a grievous sin only because they are produced in mortali at the moment of their administration, but in the case of the Eucharist the transfiguration must be distinguished from the mere distribution.