Section — Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis
§ 1. On the Nature, Division, and Effect of Contrition in General
339. Definition. Contrition, taken generically, is "sorrow of soul and detestation for sin committed, with the purpose of not sinning henceforth." Thus the Council of Trent.100
Therefore three integral acts are required for contrition: a) sorrow, b) detestation, c) purpose.
Theologians dispute which act is more principal, sorrow or detestation. The question is of little moment and of no practical utility, since both acts must necessarily be present. For if someone truly grieves over some evil thing, he also detests it, that is, turns himself away from it; and if someone detests a thing, he also grieves over it when he must suffer it. There is no reason to depart from the order observed in the Tridentine definition, so that sorrow is more principal than detestation. This order indeed also seems to correspond more to the nature of sin, which is a disordered conversion toward mutable good with an aversion from immutable good, namely, from God. Because this disordered conversion toward created good is something disordered in the soul, it therefore necessarily causes sorrow, namely, remorse of conscience in this life and the punishment of Gehenna in the other life. From sorrow conceived in this manner, a man is almost necessarily induced, by the aid of divine grace, to detest the cause of this sorrow, namely, sin. Sorrow and detestation together cause the third act, namely, purpose. It can be said briefly with Billuart:101 "The essence of contrition consists formally in sorrow, presuppositively in hatred, and consecutively in purpose."
100 Session 14, c. 4, On Penance (Denz., n. 897). St. Raymond of Peñafort (loc. cit.) already gave a similar definition, saying: "Contrition is sorrow undertaken for sins, with the purpose of confessing and making satisfaction." St. Thomas likewise adopted this definition (Suppl., q. 1, a. 1) and wrote an entire explanatory article. It is worthy of note that a twofold purpose is necessarily included in contrition, namely, of confessing and of making satisfaction, so that no true contrition is given unless at least implicitly this twofold purpose is present. In practice it is to be insisted upon that this twofold purpose be elicited also explicitly.
101 De poenit., diss. 4, a. 1.
340. Division.102 A twofold contrition is distinguished: one perfect, which is called simply contrition; the other imperfect, which is customarily called attrition. Nevertheless, from this explanation it is in no way lawful to deduce that contrition and attrition are distinguished only according to more and less, or according to accidental qualities, as several authors, especially older ones, maintained, who required true contrition for every remission of sin, as do all those more recent authors who require true love of charity for attrition, although not so perfect as in contrition properly so called. But it is better said that contrition and attrition are specifically distinguished. For they are distinguished in two ways, namely, a) by reason of motive, b) by reason of efficacy.
a) Contrition arises from a motive of charity. Now a twofold love of God is distinguished, namely, the love of hope or of concupiscence, by which God is loved because of the supreme goods which He communicates to us; the love of benevolence, by which God is loved as infinitely good and perfect in Himself, and by which a man desires the greatest glory to be contributed to God by every creature. This love of benevolence, if it exists in a perfect degree, is the love of friendship, namely, consisting in mutual love between God and man and causing a man to love God in Himself not only as the supreme good but also as his friend.
Certain authors, such as the Scotists, and among modern authors Hurter, Palmieri, Egger, and Tanquerey, seem to teach that for perfect contrition the love of hope and gratitude suffices, namely, if a man loves God because of the hope of beatitude and is thereby raised into affections of gratitude. This opinion, although perhaps probable, is nevertheless most commonly rejected. Hence almost all theologians require true love of benevolence and friendship, which nevertheless does not necessarily have divine goodness for its object, but any divine attribute. Moreover, he who loves one divine attribute with a true love of benevolence loves all, since they are not really distinct from one another.103
b) Attrition arises indeed from a supernatural motive, but not from a motive of charity. Motives of attrition are, for example, the turpitude of sin and an eternal or even temporal punishment to be inflicted by God. But it is to be noted especially that these motives must altogether be supernatural, that is, acquired by the light of faith and actual grace. Therefore, for example, the natural turpitude of adultery, the punishments which threaten because of homicide committed, and so forth, do not suffice. A fuller discussion concerning the nature of attrition will be given below in § 2.
102 During the first eleven centuries of the Christian era theologians did not distinguish diverse species of contrition, at least explicitly. But in the time of Peter Lombard, and especially of Alexander of Hales, St. Thomas, and St. Bonaventure, attrition was distinguished from contrition. Alan of Lille (d. ca. 1200, Lib. poenit. [Migne, Patr. lat. 210, 300 and 665]) seems to have been the first to employ the word attrition nearly in our sense. Attrition was at that time taken also in other senses.
103 See, concerning this controversy, which is of little utility, the very keen contests between Ballerini and the Vindiciae Alphonsianae.
341. The effect of perfect contrition is the remission of all sins, provided that the desire for the sacrament of penance is added.
For the Council of Trent104 teaches: "Although it sometimes happens that this contrition is perfected by charity and reconciles man to God, ... nevertheless this reconciliation itself is not to be ascribed to contrition itself without the desire for the sacrament which is included in it." St. Pius V condemned proposition 71 of Baius: "Through contrition, even joined with perfect charity and with the desire of receiving the sacrament, crime is not remitted, outside a case of necessity or martyrdom, without the actual reception of the sacrament."105
For justification it is not required that contrition be intensively in the highest degree, but it suffices that it be appreciatively supreme. Hence St. Thomas106 teaches: "However small the sorrow may be, provided that it attains to the character of contrition, it blots out every fault." The desire for the sacrament is not absolutely required to be explicit, but an implicit one suffices, such as is found in the general will to perform all things which are necessary for salvation. The desire, however, must under grave obligation be fulfilled at the opportune time, that is, at least within the space of a year; and then through sacramental absolution the sin indeed is not remitted, since it has already been remitted, but sanctifying grace is increased under a twofold title, namely, ex opere operato of the sacrament and ex opere operantis of the penitent, who, already existing in the state of sanctifying grace, performs a good work by confessing and making satisfaction.
104 Session 14, c. 4, On Penance (Denz., n. 898). Cf. also the proposition condemned by Sixtus IV (Denz., n. 724).
105 Denz., n. 1071.
106 Suppl., q. 5, a. 3.