Whether the mysteries of faith are evidently credible?

I answer : The mysteries of our faith are evidently credible¹⁰, according to that of Psal., XCI, 5 : Thy testimonies are become exceedingly credible. ¹⁰ Below, q. 5, aa. 1 and 2, o.

It is proved. 1° That is evidently credible — with evidence, namely, not metaphysical but moral, excluding reasonable doubt — which is proved by competent witnesses, signs, and other extrinsic arguments. But the mysteries of our faith are of this kind. Therefore. — The minor will be clear from the motives of credibility to be set out below. — The major also is evident; for credibility, like truth, is not taken from within, from the connection of predicate with subject, or from what the thing is, but from extrinsic arguments, namely testimonies, signs, etc. Thus from the fact that competent witnesses affirm something at a trial, there is evidence, not that it is so — for they may lie — but that it is so credible and judgable, without reasonable fear of the other side.

2° Nothing is knowable without the evidence of knowability, nor probable without the evidence of probability. Therefore neither is anything believable without the evidence of credibility.

^{11 11} Ibid., a. 4, ad 2.

3° The assent of faith ought to be prudent; for it is an act of virtue. And prudence dictates that nothing is to be believed except what is credible: For he that quickly believes, that is, rashly, is light of heart. Eccli., xix, 4. But we are commanded to believe most firmly the mysteries of faith. Therefore they are supposed to be evidently credible, or worthy of faith.

[You will object 1° : What is evidently credible is evidently true. But the mysteries of faith are not evidently true. Therefore.

I answer. I deny the major. For truth, as was said, is sought from within, or from what the thing is; but credibility from testimonies and extrinsic motives.

I insist. What is evidently credible is evidently possible. But, in divine things, to be possible and to be true are the same. Therefore.

I answer. I deny the major; because possibility, like truth, is sought from within. Hence it sometimes happens that false things are more credible and more probable than true ones.

You will object 2° : If the mysteries of faith were evidently credible, all to whom they are equally proposed would believe. But the consequent is false. Therefore.

I answer. I deny the consequence, both because not all attend to them as they ought, but either from perversity of affection, or from carelessness for salvation, or because of the difficulty of the things to be believed in particular, remove their mind from examining them, and because they place an obstacle in the way of interior illumination, as was said elsewhere.

You will object 3° : The mysteries of faith are opposed to reason. Therefore. — Proof of the antecedent. 1° They cannot be understood by reason. 2° They have no agreement with reason. 3° They can be attacked by arguments that cannot be dissolved by reason. Therefore.

I answer. I distinguish the antecedent. The mysteries of faith are opposed to reason apparently, I concede; truly and really, I deny. For true and real opposition cannot occur except between things of the same order, one of which directly excludes the other. But our reason is shut up within natural things, while the objects of faith are above nature. There cannot therefore be between them an opposition. true, whereby they would exclude one another, but only in this, that among the ideas of reason there is none that either clearly represents the truths of faith or even evidently excludes them: which opposition is merely apparent. Wherefore it must be diligently noted that it is one thing for something to be above reason, that is, that it is neither understood nor can be understood through the ideas of reason, or that it exceeds and surpasses the grasp of our reason; another thing for it to be against reason, namely that it be evidently excluded through the ideas of reason, which exclusion would be wholly required for true and real opposition. Now the case stands thus between the mysteries of faith and reason, that reason simply does not grasp them. Hence, although they are above, they are not however against reason, nor can they be held by reason to be false.

To the first proof, I distinguish. That the mysteries cannot be understood by reason as to what they are and how they are, I concede; that they are and have a real object, I deny. Also in natural things there are many whose intrinsic mode of subsisting we by no means know, and yet we are certain that they truly exist.

To the second proof, I distinguish. That the mysteries have no immediate agreement with reason, I concede; mediate, I deny. It is not denied that in every cognition some agreement with reason is necessary; for reason is the universal medium of all cognitions. But this agreement is mediate or immediate. In natural things, it is immediate, because reason is of itself apt to know them. But in things placed above nature, recourse is had in vain to the light of reason, which is not proportionate; an immediate agreement is undeservedly demanded which the essence of things does not allow. Recourse must therefore be had to mediate agreement, which consists in this, that on account of the infallible authority of God revealing we know many things that are not contained proximately in the ideas of reason, yet are understood by the light of reason to be most certain, since nothing is more consonant with reason than that full faith be given to God speaking.

To the third proof, I distinguish. That revealed truths can be attacked by arguments that cannot be dissolved by reason, apparently. I concede; truly and really, I deny. For a universal answer let it suffice that, since it has been proved that the opposition between supernatural truths and the ideas of reason is merely apparent, the arguments brought from the principles of reason against the revealed mysteries cannot be truly and really insoluble, but only apparently. Let III Contra gentes, c. 7 be read on this question, where D. Thomas proves by several arguments what he asserts, namely: « Although the truth of the Christian faith exceeds the capacity of human reason, nevertheless those things which reason naturally has indwelling cannot be contrary to this truth. »]

You will ask 1° by what light the knowledge of credibility is had: by a supernatural or by a natural light?

I answer. It is more probably held to be had by natural light aided by some supernatural Light, namely the actual illuminations by which God illumines their intellect to perceive and judge the things that are of God; and it comes about that they attend to those things that are said and preached, as Act., XVI, 14: The Lord opened the heart of Lydia, to attend to those things which were said by Paul; and that in them they observe and judge there to be divine credibility, to which faith finally follows.

You will ask 2° whether, in order that he believe something, it must necessarily be evident to him that the mysteries of faith are credible.

I answer. Affirmatively. It is clear from what has been said; otherwise indeed he would believe imprudently. However, an equal evidence is not necessary for all; for sometimes the mere voice of the preacher suffices, with an interior light persuading the credibility of his words, as is clear in children and ruder believers believing the words spoken by pastors whom they know to speak in the name of the Church, in India believers believing missionaries preaching without miracles, in the Apostles following Christ at his mere call, before they had seen his miracles.