I. On the Killing of Oneself

What is the order of the precepts among themselves? - "After the three precepts pertaining to religion, by which the debt is rendered to God, and after the fourth precept, which belongs to piety, by which the debt is rendered to parents, in which is included every debt which by some special reason is owed, it was necessary that consequently some precepts be placed pertaining to justice properly so called, which renders the debt indifferently to all." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 122, a. 6.

Therefore the six precepts of the Decalogue which follow, as the same Angelic Doctor teaches, l. c. a. 1, are "about the acts of justice commonly so called, which is considered between equals." In these six precepts are prohibited homicide, adultery, theft, and false testimony. "But all other harms which are inflicted on neighbors can be reduced to these, which are prohibited by these precepts, as to certain more common and principal things. For all harms which are inflicted on the person of a neighbor are understood to be prohibited in homicide, as in the more principal thing. But those which are inflicted on a connected person, and especially by way of lust, are understood to be prohibited together with adultery. Those, however, which pertain to damages inflicted in things, are understood to be prohibited together with theft. But those which pertain to speech, such as detractions, blasphemies, and any such things, are understood to be prohibited in false testimony, which is more directly contrary to justice." S. Th. l. c. a. 6 ad 2.

What is the fifth precept of the Decalogue? - The fifth precept is: You shall not kill, Ex. 20:13. Now this fifth precept, insofar as it is negative, primarily indeed prohibits homicide, that is, the unjust killing of a man; secondarily, however, and consequently, unjust anger, or the inordinate appetite of vengeance, Matth. 5:21, 22, and every other unjust injury, wounding, or mutilation of the body, whether one's own or another's, which is reduced to homicide as the principal bodily injury. But insofar as it is virtually positive, it commands the conservation of life. Those things, however, which will be established here concerning killing, whether lawful or unlawful, will be applied, with due proportion preserved, to mutilation or any injury of the body.

Struggl 3, 5; L. 363.

Is suicide lawful? Without divine authority it is wicked directly to kill oneself. Someone is said directly to kill himself or another when truly, per se and directly, by doing something, he intends to take life from himself or another; but indirectly, when he does not positively intend this, yet voluntarily does something from which he foresees the death of himself or another will follow. Proof: For 1. this is openly prohibited by Sacred Scripture, Ex. 20:13; Deut. 52:39; Wis. 16:13. 2. It is contrary to charity toward oneself, and is injurious both to God, who alone is the direct and absolute master of human life, and to society and the commonwealth, which is unjustly deprived through suicide of its part or citizen. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 64, a. 5. Hence suicide is deservedly punished by both laws. For by Common Civil Law both suicides and those who attempt this crime, even if death has not followed, are punished with the penalty of infamy. By ecclesiastical law, however, suicides are deprived of sacred burial and the suffrages of the Church, as is established in C. 12, c. 23, q. 4, and as may be seen in the Roman Ritual; this penalty nevertheless does not include those who, by madness, insanity, or imagination disturbed through most grave sadness of soul, have taken life from themselves, or those who repented of the crime before death. Struggl 7; Ithur. Cas. 40, n. 3 seqq.; L. 366, 375.

You will resolve: It is not lawful for a virgin directly to kill herself even to preserve chastity, which is esteemed a very great good. Nor is it lawful to kill oneself, although the least space of life remains. Struggl 8; Ithur. l. c.; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 64, a. 5 ad 3, 5; L. 366.

Is it lawful by a positive act to concur in one's own death? Never, without divine authority, is it lawful to posit an external act tending per se immediately to one's own destruction, unless that act has another good and immediate effect, which alone is intended, and a grave reason urges the obtaining of that good effect. The reason is that, where the physical act, even though per se indifferent, has no other effect than suicide, it already becomes evil, since no reason is present by which the precept of conserving life and of avoiding the danger of death ceases, and the killing of oneself would be directly intended, at least implicitly. Hence in whatever case it is prohibited. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 64, a. 5 ad 4; L. 366. Cf. here 717.

You will resolve: It is wicked to throw oneself into a river, with certain danger of death, in order to baptize a child. For this would be directly to take life from oneself; namely because first one posits a means which directly and immediately tends to the killing of oneself, so that afterward, once that is posited, he may be able to administer baptism. Likewise it is wicked to do or omit something with the design that death be accelerated. But it is lawful to serve those infected with plague, to go to dangerous places of missions, and to undertake a dangerous journey from a grave and proportionate cause, as Christopher Columbus and others did. L. 366.

Is mutilation of oneself lawful? It is not lawful to mutilate oneself, or even to mutilate another, unless this is necessary for the conservation of the whole body, and with the consent of him whose member it is, or of him "to whom it pertains to care for the safety of him who has a member corruptive" of the other members. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 65, a. 1. But otherwise to mutilate someone in a member is altogether unlawful; and this even if it is done to preserve chastity and avoid temptations. The reason is that God is the absolute and direct master of human life; but man has only useful or indirect dominion over his own body. Unless this is necessary for the conservation of the whole body; for since the part is ordered to preserving the whole body, under the pressure of such necessity, some member certainly can be cut off, for example, to cut off for oneself a hand bound by a chain in order to avoid death impending from a beast, or a tyrant, or fire. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 64, a. 2; q. 65, a. 1; Lugo de Iust. d. 10, n. 22; La-Croix 786. Even if it is done, etc., because this remedy is neither absolutely necessary, nor in fact does it exempt from carnal temptations, although someone becomes impotent for generating. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 65, a. 1. Hence, a fortiori, it is more probably not lawful to castrate boys in order to preserve the voice in them, L. 374. "And indeed the reason is most valid... For man is not so the master of the members of his body that he is able to assent to the cutting off of any one of them, except if the safety and conservation of the whole body cannot otherwise be obtained." Benedict XIV, de Syn. l. 11, c. 7, n. 4; Lugo d. 10, n. 23; S. Th. l. c. The discipline of the Church, moreover, brands with the mark of irregularity a eunuch who, outside the necessity of saving life, has given assent to his own mutilation. Benedict XIV, l. c. n. 5. 1. Nor indeed is it lawful for someone to cut off his own fingers in order to avoid military service. Struggl 9, 10; L. l. 7, nn. 416-418.

714bis. Note: The Porro operation, so called from the Italian physician Porro, consists in the extraction of the uterus with the ovaries and other annexed parts. It is a true mutilation and utero-ovarian castration of the woman. Therefore it is not lawful unless for the conservation of one's own life. Just as mutilation and castration, whether in a man or in a woman, is unlawful, so also unlawful is atrophization or cutting of the canals conducting spermatozoa "or nemaspermata in a man." This atrophization or cutting is equivalently a grave mutilation, and a grave sin, unless it is done to save life itself. Nor indeed can public authority introduce this vasectomy, as it is called, lest degenerate men be procreated from degenerate parents, whether as the punishment of some crime, or as a necessary means because of the common good. For the power of procreating offspring pertains to personal dignity itself, and to the species, or to the propagation of the human race, over which public authority has no power. Nor can it be a punishment of crime, since it would render them still more criminal and unbridled in lust, and against the order of nature; nor can it of itself be a necessary and useful means because of the common good, for which wholly other, quite different means are necessary and useful, especially moral ones.

What is the obligation of conserving life? - Each one, from charity toward himself and from justice toward God and toward society, is bound to ordinary means for conserving life. The reason is that it is the same thing not to preserve life for oneself as to take it away from oneself. By ordinary means; for one is not bound to extraordinary means, unless his life is altogether necessary for the common good. And indeed extraordinary means are placed outside common powers. Therefore the law cannot commonly command them. But the labor of those who are occupied with the necessity of supporting life, such as workers, is not an extraordinary means, but an ordinary one, since it is a means given by nature itself for the necessities of life. L. 372.

You will resolve: A sick man in danger of death, when there is hope of safety, cannot reject ordinary medicines prescribed for him. One is not bound to make immense expenses for conserving life for oneself, or to use choice remedies which cause immense pains for him, for example, the amputation of a leg, incision of the abdomen for extracting a stone, etc. A virgin is not bound to suffer an operation by the hands of a physician, even if life is endangered, when because of modesty it happens to be most grave for her, and brings upon her a greater horror than death itself.

It is also lawful for a virgin to suffer death rather than permit her own violation, because of the very great good of virginity. It is lawful, for probably she is not bound, at least speaking speculatively, provided that she resists with a positive will, and the proximate danger of consent is absent. The reason is that this permission is not formal cooperation in the sin of another, but only material, and a just cause of permission is present, namely the danger of death. Likewise it is lawful for a virgin, in order to preserve chastity, to expose herself to the danger of death, at least if death is not certainly going to follow, and this both because of love of chastity and because of the danger of sin, which is often present in such an occasion. Indeed, more probably it must still be affirmed, even if death is certainly going to follow and there is no proximate danger of consent; because even bodily integrity alone is esteemed very highly. L. 366, 368, 372, 430, 433; H. A. l. 2; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 65, a. 1; Struggl 6; tr. 6 de Iust. et Iure q. 5, a. 1, nn. 5, 10; La-Croix l. 3, p. 1, n. 916; Lugo d. 10, nn. 197, 198.

Is it lawful to concur indirectly in one's own death? It is lawful, from a grave cause, to concur indirectly in the killing of oneself, or to posit an action from which, besides the intention, one's own death certainly follows, provided that from that action there follows at least equally immediately some good, and this alone is intended. The reason is that then death, if it follows, is not willed, but merely permitted, from a proportionate cause. Cf. 36. Struggl 7; L. 366.

You will resolve: It is lawful for an accused man not to flee, indeed even voluntarily to present himself before the judge, although he certainly must be punished with death; because that action is per se indifferent, indeed even honorable. For in the case to will to die is the same as to will the order of justice; and just as for a just cause it is lawful to desire death for another, and also to procure it in a legitimate way, so also for oneself. L. 369; H. A. 2. Artisans do not sin who ascend upon the roofs of buildings, and expose themselves, where there is need, to various dangers; nor blacksmiths, who daily diminish life for themselves by handling fire; the reason is that they do this from a reasonable cause.

On the contrary, bold men sin gravely who by rash wagering, from vainglory, or merely by reason of gain, throw themselves into grave dangers, by ascending on high, letting themselves down, bearing heavier burdens, etc. Hence dangerous bullfights also are prohibited, unless the danger is sufficiently removed by art and skill. L. 365, 369; l. 7, n. 209. It is never lawful to macerate the body in order to shorten life, nor also, that end being excluded, by immoderate and wholly indiscreet penances gravely to ruin health. Yet it is lawful, from virtue, to use penances ordinarily grave, with a certain abbreviation of life, because for the sake of merit and the mortification of depraved nature, some loss of longer life can be contemned.

They are very useful to the spiritual life, as the practice of the Saints and the unanimous opinion of doctors show well. L. 370, 371; H. A. 2; Lugo de Iust. et Iur. d. 10, nn. 32, 36; S. Th. Quodl. 5, a. 18; Denifle, Lutero, l. 1, s. 2. But these things concern the ordinary way; for God often inspired altogether extraordinary penances in the Saints, whose health was often the more robust the less they spared themselves. Cf. Benedict XIV, de Canoniz. SS. l. 3, c. 29, n. 6; L. Prax. 25, 26.

It is lawful, at least more probably, to set fire to a ship or a tower, so that enemies may suffer grave damage, although with the certain loss of one's own life, because it is expedient that public damage be avoided, or that the common good be procured, even with the most certain damage of private persons. L. 367. Consequently it is also lawful for a soldier, with certain danger of life, to occupy a station, or to rush into the midst of enemies. Likewise someone can leap through a window from a burning house, or throw himself into the sea from a burning ship, not indeed to seek death, but to avoid a harder one. The same must be said of a virgin who casts herself headlong from a very high window, in order to be snatched from the hands of an impure violator. Elbel 13; Struggl 8; Gur. Cas. 377, 379, 384.