I. On the Nature of Law

What is law? - Law is the rule of human actions in order to their moral honorableness or shamefulness. But if law is taken strictly, it is not the only rule. For human actions can also be regulated by counsel and by precept. Counsel is direction from a teacher, friend, or equal, or even from a superior, but by no means insofar as he is superior. - Precept is also usually called law, from its proper act, which is to command. But a precept, as distinguished from law, is a rule imposed by a superior, insofar as he is superior, not on the whole community, but on a particular individual, one or several. - Finally, law is a rule imposed on the whole community. Therefore counsel directs, but does not oblige; but law and precept direct and oblige. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 90. a. 3.

If the question concerns the name, law has been called this indiscriminately from reading or from binding. From reading, because in it what is the will of the superior is read, or known; from binding, because the physical will of the subject, although after the law it remains physically free as it was, nevertheless remains morally restricted, so that it cannot morally act honorably if it departs from what is prescribed by law. - If the question concerns the thing, it is defined variously by various authors. But commonly the definition of S. Th. 1. 2. q. 90. a. 4 is received: "An ordinance of reason for the common good, promulgated by him who has care of the community." Ordinance; for to order is to constitute something in its due place. But this is what law does: certainly law commands, prohibits, authorizes, permits, punishes. L. 7 de Legib. Doing these things, it constitutes human acts and actions in their due place with respect to the end to be obtained, which is the common good. Of reason: ordinance can be taken actively and passively. Law is active ordinance; but reason is what knows how to distinguish between place and place, between due and undue place. Of reason, namely inducing obligation; for law is a command. Whence it is both of reason because it is an ordinance, and an act of the will because it has the force of obliging. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 97. a. 3. For good; for if it were not such, it would no longer be an ordinance, but a disorder. - "Those who preside over the others preside for this one reason, that they may protect the utility of the state." Enc. Leo XIII, Immortale Dei, Nov. 1, 1885. - Common; in this law is distinguished from precept, which is imposed on individuals: for the common good does not regard this or that, these or those particular individuals only, but regards all; and therefore individual persons too, not insofar as they are individuals, but insofar as they are members of the community. But law is imposed on all, either absolutely all, for example all citizens, or all of some order, who specially apply themselves to the common good, for example all soldiers, who fight for the safety of the people, Can. 2. Dist. 4. This common good is the order, peace, and prosperity of society. By him who has care of the community; namely by the legitimate Prince of a perfect community, which is capable of political governance. In this, again, law is distinguished from precept and counsel. A precept is also given by one who has only private authority, as father, husband, master. Counsel is also given by one who otherwise does not enjoy authority. - Has care; that is, who presides over the community by his jurisdiction, or public authority. Hence law can be neither above nor beyond the jurisdiction of the Prince. - Promulgated; for law obliges rational beings precisely insofar as they are rational, namely insofar as they operate in a rational mode. Therefore in order that it oblige it must be known; but in order that it become known it must be brought forth externally by the legislator, and not in any way whatever, but solemnly or with some public solemnity: namely it must sufficiently become known to all that this is the mind and will of the legislator, and indeed on the part of the legislator himself. Sufficiently become known, that is, by certain knowledge; otherwise a rational being would be altogether unjustly despoiled, from the uncertain will of the legislator, of the natural and greatest good of liberty, which he certainly possesses. For there is no equality between certain liberty and uncertain obligation, that is, between the most certain and most just dominion and possession of the greatest good, and the uncertain and doubtful spoliation of that good. Hence S. Alph. says: "In order that law oblige, it must not only be promulgated, but also promulgated as certain." - Dist. 1. C. 3, Dist. 4. C. 3; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 90. q. 92, De Verit. q. 17. a. 3; L. 90 seq.; E. M.

He who sins against a precept, of itself sins only against obedience owed to his superior. He who sins against a law, besides this, sins also against that virtue to which the law is referred because of the public good in such matter, and against the public good itself, which is referred to legal justice. Cf. n. 835.

You will resolve: Private knowledge of a law without promulgation does not suffice for obligation. But promulgation, as soon as it has been sufficiently made, without knowledge of the law, suffices for obliging in the external forum, because knowledge of a law duly promulgated is rightly and deservedly presumed by the judge. Hence the Rule of Law: Ignorance of fact, not of law, excuses. R. 13 de R. I. in 6. But in the internal forum, besides exterior promulgation, knowledge of the law is always required; because no one can sin without cognition of the obligation. - C. Ad haec 1 de Post. Prael.; C. A. 2; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 77. a. 3 ad 4; Lugo Resp. Mor. Mor. l. 1. d. 21; Wirceburg. c. 1. a. 1, c. 4. a. 1.

How, and where, are laws to be promulgated; when do they begin to oblige? - Nothing is defined by natural right. Therefore it is in the choice of the legislator to promulgate it in the mode and place constituted by him. Civil laws are regularly promulgated by their insertion in the official gazette. C. I. preliminary disposition 1. - Canonical laws are promulgated at Rome, by placing their copy at the doors of the Vatican Basilica and of the other Roman Basilicas which are usually named; or by exhibiting it in the Secretariat of the individual Congregations, and then publishing it, or by transmitting them to all Bishops. The Acta Sanctae Sedis were declared authentic and official for publicly publishing the acts of the Holy See. Nor indeed is it necessary that they be published also in individual dioceses by the Ordinaries of the places. S. Poenit. Nov. 8, 1821; June 15, 1870. Thus matters were previously. But now from the Constitution Promulgandi of Pius X, Sept. 29, 1908, all Pontifical laws published in the official Commentary on the Acta Apostolicae Sedis are held as legitimately promulgated, unless in some particular case it has been otherwise established by the Supreme Pontiff. E. M.

Diocesan laws are promulgated either in Synod, or by their public reading in the cathedral church, or by affixing them in some public place, or in some official Commentary. Bened. XIV De Syn. l. 13. c. 4. n. 1. But after the law has been promulgated, when it begins to oblige depends, as regards civil laws, on the law of each nation. From C. I. preliminary disposition 1, laws begin to oblige on the fifteenth day from their publication, which consists in the insertion of the law in the official Collection of laws and decrees, and in the announcement of such insertion in the official commentary of the kingdom, Gazzetta officiale del regno. From C. H. art. 1, they oblige after twenty days from their publication in the official newspaper la Gaceta. Cf. C. G. art. 1 and decree Nov. 5-11, 1870. As regards Pontifical laws, some think they oblige after subjects, a suitable time having elapsed, could have known them, C. 1 de Conc. Praeb. in 6; others after two months, Auth. Ut factae novae Coll. 5; others immediately when they have been promulgated from C. 1 de Postul. Praelat., from the clauses of Bulls, from the cited responses of S. Poenit. But sometimes, in the law itself, the time of obligation is determined. As regards diocesan laws, after their promulgation has been made, no determinate time is required for their obligation. C. I. at the beginning, Dispos. etc. a. 1; Decree Nov. 5-11, 1870; C. A. 2. 3; C. H. 1; L. 96. 105. 106, H. A. tr. 2. n. 8; Suarez De Legib. l. 4. c. 15. n. 11; Struggl q. 1. n. 21. 22; Bened. XIV De Syn. l. 13. c. 4; Wirceburg. c. 4. a. 1; E. M.

Does Trent oblige in those places where it was not promulgated? - It is certain: 1. that it obliges everywhere as regards faith and morals, since there is one rule of these and it is necessary for all. Nor indeed are they new laws, but mere declarations of natural and divine right already sufficiently promulgated before. - 2. That it does not oblige as regards the Decree concerning clandestine marriages, sess. 22. C. 1 de R. But concerning this matter the new Decree Ne temere, edited in the present, must be attended to. - As regards other Decrees which regard discipline, the common and to-be-held opinion affirms. For the Bull which establishes the obligation of the Council of Trent regards the whole world; likewise the Bull which determines the day on which Trent begins to oblige was given for the whole world and legitimately promulgated at Rome. B. Pius IV Benedictus Deus 1564, and Sicut ad Sacrorum 1564. - Scav. 4. n. 83, Milan ed. 1874; E. M.

Does the force of law depend on acceptance by the community? - Of itself law in no way depends on acceptance by the people in order that it oblige. Therefore law, independently of that acceptance, is in itself altogether perfect as regards the obliging force which it has. Proof. The whole force of obliging is in the superior, not in the subject. Therefore as soon as the will of the superior is sufficiently known, someone is subject to the obligation. And this is confirmed by proposition 28 condemned by Alexander VII. Of themselves, therefore, Bishops who do not accept Pontifical laws sin; civil governments of Catholic nations also sin which prohibit the laws of the Church from being accepted. These laws, notwithstanding that prohibition, retain their force of obliging. L. 96. 97. 136-138.

Accidentally, sometimes a law not accepted does not oblige, by reason of the tacit or express consent of the superior, or by reason of privilege or tolerated custom. Proof 1. from the common consent of theologians. 2. Because the whole force of obliging is in the superior. Therefore, if the superior consents not to oblige, in whatever way he consents, the law will no longer oblige. Therefore, if the greater part of the people has not accepted the law, and the Prince knowingly and willingly does not urge it, although those who first did not accept the law sinned, nevertheless the others are without fault because of the presumed consent of the superior. Not accepting: namely contrarily by breaking the law, with a will not to observe it. For if the greater part has not accepted the law merely negatively, that is, because of a reasonable cause suspends its obligation for a time, until that cause is manifested to the superior, meanwhile prepared to obey if the superior urges the obligation, then not even the former sin. From a certain benign interpretation, the obligation of the law can be held as suspended until the matter is settled. Knowingly and willingly: for if the Prince does not know that it is not received and not brought into use, or cannot contradict at the beginning, the obligation of the law endures until the time required for prescription elapses, and a legitimate custom is formed. Nevertheless, "if you are prepared to receive a promulgated law and, given the occasion, even observe it, but most others from the community do not receive it and do not seem likely to receive it, then at least you will be excused from it by discretion," L. 137, or rather because of the presumed will of the superior, who does not wish to oblige you alone. - Suarez De Legib. l. 3. c. 19. n. 5, l. 4. c. 16. n. 8; Vazquez on 1. 2. d. 156. c. 5. n. 40; L. 139; Struggl q. 1. n. 27-30; Laymann cap. 3. n. 3; Bened. XIV De Syn. l. 9. c. 8; Wirceburg. c. 4. a. 2; E. M.

What are the properties of law? - They are the following:

1. Possibility, namely even moral possibility: that is, that it not bring grave or most grave inconvenience and difficulty, at least commonly speaking, and in the case of positive law. The reason is that since law is an ordinance of reason, it too must be ordered. Now it is imprudent and rash to pour out life and other goods which can be preserved thereafter for better use, excluding the case of the common good, contempt of God, or violation of a negative law. Moreover, since law again is an ordinance of reason, and therefore ought itself also to be ordered, it must be accommodated to the common condition of men, so that it can morally be observed by the whole community or at least the greater part of it; otherwise it would be useless, indeed harmful, to make the law. To exercise all acts of virtues, even heroic ones, certainly is not for all. And this is confirmed from the very practice of each Law, ecclesiastical and civil, and from the consent of all theologians, asserting that divine positive and human law generally do not oblige with proportionate grave harm which is accidentally joined to the observance of the law. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 79. a. 3 ad 2, q. 96. a. 2; Sanchez on Decal. l. 1. c. 18. n. 2. Appositely S. Th. 1. 2. q. 96. a. 2: "Human law is laid upon a multitude of men, in which the greater part is of men not perfect in virtue, and therefore by human law not all vices are prohibited, but only the more grave ones, from which it is possible for the greater part of the multitude to abstain, and especially those which are to the harm of others, without whose prohibition human society cannot be preserved." - Wirceburg. c. 4. a. 5.

Hence heroic acts generally cannot be commanded by law, because they are judged morally to exceed human powers, and therefore a law of this kind would lack that quality by which it could be called possible. Nevertheless sometimes, when the common good requires it, they can be commanded, because in any perfect society there is the right and power for its own preservation. Thus watch-soldiers cannot desert their post, even when danger of life threatens, if the republic would suffer damage from it. Thus also law obliges with danger of life, if souls would perish unless the pastor goes to the sick in time of plague. When the common good requires it, namely if that precept is necessary for conserving a good or averting a common evil. - This, however, must not be understood of those laws which are made from the given hypothesis of some peculiar state into which the subject has voluntarily cast himself, which they therefore call hypothetical, adventitious, or elective. Thus the Church commands perpetual enclosure to nuns. Thus also most grave punishments can be imposed on men guilty of a most grave crime. For it was free to them to withdraw themselves from those things by acting otherwise. L. 175; Struggl q. 2. n. 8; Suarez l. 3. c. 30. In the case of positive law: for negative laws, namely those which forbid evil by natural right, must be observed even with the danger of life. For evil is never to be done. But except laws commanding a thing which by its nature cannot be performed without grave inconvenience, such as the law of Confession, for which the help of grace is at hand, and from which impossibility also excuses. But positive laws, the more they look to the good of religion and of the republic, the more they oblige with greater inconvenience. - E. M.

2. Honorableness; for law is an ordinance of reason. Therefore law cannot command dishonorable acts; it can however command acts indifferent per se, which can be ordered to the common good, and which consequently become positively honorable. A law will be honorable if it agrees both with religion and reason. - Struggl q. 2. n. 9; Elbel 252-254; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 95. a. 2. 3, q. 96. a. 2.

3. Utility; for law is an ordinance of reason for the common good by him who has care of the community. Hence any law cannot command any honorable acts whatsoever, but all and only those acts whose placement or omission can contribute to the common good of society, namely so that either immediately and directly, or at least mediately, indirectly, and ultimately, it yields to the common good. - Therefore civil law certainly cannot command merely internal acts. Nor can ecclesiastical law, more probably according to many, do this, because the legislative power of the Church in the external forum pertains only to the external governance of the faithful. C. 34 de Simon., S. Alph., S. Th., Suarez, Bened. XIV, etc., against others, who also probably affirm it, because the Church received unlimited power from Christ. - But human law can command mixed acts, or acts partly internal, partly external, which together constitute one moral act; and external acts even if hidden, for both the former and the latter acts can be directed to the common good. "And thus externalized heresy is prohibited under excommunication, although hidden; thus under irregularity hidden homicide." L. 100. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 91. a. 1, q. 96. a. 1. 3, q. 100. a. 9, 2. 2. q. 104. a. 5; Suarez l. 4. c. 12. 13; Ithur. Cas. 41. n. 23; Bened. XIV De Syn. l. 9. c. 4. n. 4; Wirceburg. c. 4. a. 3.

4. Justice; for again law is an ordinance of reason, and "in human matters something is said to be just from the fact that it is right according to the rule of reason." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 95. a. 2. "But laws are said to be just both from the end, namely when they are ordered to the common good; and from the author, namely when the law enacted does not exceed the power of the one enacting; and from the form, namely when burdens are imposed on subjects according to equality of proportion in order to the common good. For since one man is part of the multitude, every man, this very thing which he is and which he has, belongs to the multitude, just as every part, that which it is, belongs to the whole; whence nature also inflicts some detriment on the part, so that it may save the whole. And according to this, laws of this kind, proportionately imposing burdens, are just and oblige in the forum of conscience, and are legal laws. But laws are unjust in two ways: in one way by contrariety to human good, contrary to the aforesaid things; either from the end, as when someone presiding imposes burdensome laws on subjects, not pertaining to the common utility, but rather to his own utility or glory; or also from the author, as when someone makes a law beyond the power committed to him; or also from the form, for example when burdens are distributed unequally to the multitude, even if they are ordered to the common good. And such things are rather acts of violence than laws.... Hence such laws do not oblige in the forum of conscience, except for avoiding scandal or disturbance, on account of which also man ought to yield his right.... In another way laws can be unjust by contrariety to divine good, as the laws of tyrants inducing to idolatry, or to any other thing which is against divine good; and such laws it is in no way licit to observe." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 96. a. 4. A law will be just if it is accommodated to the powers of the subjects, although hard for individuals. L. 12 Qui et a quib. manum.; Suarez De Leg. l. 3. c. 21.

5. Stability; because custom, which cannot be had without stability of law, has very great force for the observance of laws; and because the common good is not so easily changed from day to day. For this reason law is constituted without a defined time, so that once enacted, unless it is abrogated, or becomes harmful or useless, it endures as long as the community stands to which it is imposed, or as long as the circumstances persevere for which it was enacted. - What is indeed constituted generally, but not in perpetuity, has the name of Statute, Edict, Decree. Nevertheless those things which are established by supreme civil power, although they are only certain simple ordinances, are presently called laws. Likewise those things which are constituted by Synods and commanded by Sacred Congregations are called Synodal Statutes and Decrees of Sacred Congregations. - S. Th. 1. 2. q. 96. a. 1, q. 97. a. 1. 2.

Hence law can cease only in three ways: 1. Through abrogation or derogation, according as it is abolished altogether or only in part. L. 102 de R. I. For just as a superior can make a law, so he can take away or restrict the same. And here it must be noted that by a general law a particular law of some place is never of itself abrogated, unless this is expressly or equivalently provided in it; nor is a particular custom abrogated, which the Prince is presumed to be ignorant of, since it is a matter of fact and consists in fact: namely unless the clause is added, notwithstanding any custom whatsoever, or, if it exceeds the memory of men, notwithstanding any custom whatsoever, even centenary and immemorial. On the contrary, because universal customs are presumed to be known to the Prince, they must be said to be abrogated by that very fact that the Prince enacts a contrary law, even if a general derogatory clause is lacking. And the same must be said of a universal law. But Bishops by their laws abrogate any particular custom whatever, because they are presumed to have full knowledge of the customs of their dioceses. C. Licet 1 de Const. in 6; C. I. beginning, Dispos. etc. a. 5; C. H. 5; L. 109. 199. Cf. l. 6. n. 680.

2. Through cessation of the adequate motive cause, or the total end, on account of which it was enacted, with respect to the whole community; for when the cause of the law ceases, the legislator cannot reasonably urge it. And thus a precept also ceases if its end wholly ceases. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 103. a. 4 ad 3. - 3. Through desuetude, or through contrary custom clothed with the due conditions; for then at least the legal consent of the superior accedes. - Wirceburg. De Legib. c. 5. a. 5. 6.

This stability is a property exclusively proper to law, if law is compared with precept. For a precept ceases by the death of the one commanding or by cessation from office; but law is not extinguished together with the legislator. For when the physical person from whom the law emanated ceases, neither does the office of making laws cease, nor does the common good cease; and for that reason the law does not cease, since that common good is the universal and constant good of the whole society. But the good which a precept regards is a private or individual good, and by its nature variable; and with the physical person of the superior, the very office of commanding ceases of itself, as may be seen in a father, master, teacher, etc. - Meanwhile, however, even a precept or mandate sometimes does not immediately expire by the death of the one mandating: namely if the mandate is for pious causes, or in favor of a matrimonial dowry or of some student; if the mandatary is expressly ordered to execute something even after the death of the one mandating; if the matter is no longer intact, namely in judgments, in donations and promulgations to be made in the name of another; if the matter is even intact, but only the execution of some grace has been mandated in favor of another, and the granting itself of the grace has not been left to the choice of the mandatary; if the mandate proceeds from one having public power, for the cause of public utility; if it has been thus provided in the law itself, as sometimes happens in religious Institutes, and then the precept obtains perpetuity by force of the law itself. - La-Croix 566. 876; Struggl q. 1. n. 5; L. 140.

6. A real law, which is concerned with immovable goods, adheres to the territory in which the immovables are situated. A real law, which constitutes the form and order of acts, also adheres to the place. The place governs the act, unless the act is altogether private. A personal law, which decrees those things that pertain to the state of persons, follows the person everywhere. A moral law, commanding or prohibiting a human action, immediately affects the territory, and is called a local law, to distinguish it from real and personal law; while a precept immediately affects the person. C. 2 de Const. in 6; C. I. preliminary disposition a. 6 seq. But in reality every law is properly local. For law regards the common good, namely the good of the community, which exists only in a determinate territory; whence it obliges a person only as existing in the territory, at least by fiction of law. Law obliges only subjects, and they are not subjects except in the proper territory of jurisdiction. But a precept regards the private good of the person; whence wherever he is, the precept urges. And this is certain and common if the question concerns a commanding superior directly having authority over the person, as a husband, father, master, regular prelate. But if the question concerns a superior directly having jurisdiction in the community and in the territory, the more common opinion affirms, while the less common opinion and one probable to S. Alphonsus denies. Nevertheless the more common opinion, according to prevailing practice, must be held; and consequently the precept endures until it is revoked, if it was made with legitimate cause and legitimate form. - L. 1. 2. n. 23; Bened. XIV De Syn. l. 13. c. 4. n. 9; Wirceburg. De Legib. c. 1. a. 1.

Does a law cease when the final cause ceases only in a particular case? - R. Affirmatively, if it ceases contrarily, namely when the matter of the law would be rendered harmful in that case, or very difficult. For positive law, especially human law, does not oblige with grave and proportionate inconvenience. It is controverted if it ceases only privatively, namely if the law would then be rendered useless. The first opinion, which several grave theologians hold, affirms, because the law is then rendered useless. But the second opinion, which pleases S. Alph. more, denies, because although the end of the law ceases in the particular, nevertheless it does not cease in common. For commonly speaking there is almost always the danger of hallucination, by which someone can easily be deceived in his own case.

Hence then the law becomes founded in a presumption of law, which indeed always obliges. Nevertheless S. D. adds that if a case occurred in which "someone were altogether certain and secure that every danger of hallucination is absent," he would not dare to disapprove the former opinion, L. 199. 1. 6. n. 613; indeed S. D. calls this opinion probable, l. 3. n. 846. - But it must be noted that the end of a law can be multiple, as in the reading of prohibited books; and then, when one ceases, the law does not therefore cease. L. H. A. tr. 2. n. 69; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 103. a. 4 ad 3, 2. 2. q. 154. a. 2. 3; Struggl q. 4. n. 25-27.

You will resolve: Betrothed persons are not exempted from the proclamation of banns, even if they certainly know that no impediment underlies the marriage. For the law is founded on the danger of universal nullity of marriage from omitted proclamations. Hence also someone cannot read prohibited books if he fears no danger to himself from them. And although that danger also truly ceases in a particular case, nevertheless the end of the prohibition does not wholly cease, since that end is not only that the danger of perversion be avoided, but also that occasion not be given to depraved writers to commit harmful things to print. Likewise he is still bound by the law of abstinence and fast who abhors meats and delights in fish, and he who can sustain for his stomach only one eating in the day. - L. 199.

What is interpretation of law, and how manyfold is it? - Law is not always clear. Hence for rightly understanding it interpretation is needed, which is defined: the genuine explanation of the law according to the mind of the legislator. Mind, not hidden, but expressed by the words of the law. Mind, because law is what the legislator willed. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 120. a. 1 ad 3.

Interpretation is: 1. Authentic, doctrinal, and usual, according as it is made by the superior himself, or by learned men, or from custom. In order that interpretation be truly authentic and not doctrinal, it is necessary that the Superior, or another who has this power from the Superior, declare the law insofar as he is Superior, that is, using the power of jurisdiction. For if as a private person he declares his mind, the interpretation will not be authentic, but doctrinal. Custom is equivalent to authentic interpretation if it is legitimately prescribed; otherwise it is merely doctrinal. For custom is "the best interpreter of laws." C. 8 de Consuet. Whence "those things are by no means to be changed which have always had a certain interpretation." L. 23 de Legib.

2. Strict or broad, according as it is made strictly according to the natural property of the words, or broadly according to the more benign sense. Thus these words: sons, clerics, religious, etc., according to their natural signification can be taken strictly of natural and legitimate sons, of those initiated by first tonsure, of regulars solemnly professed, or broadly of all sons, of all ecclesiastical persons, of all religious, even novices.

3. Comprehensive or merely declarative, or extensive or restrictive, according as by that interpretation either nothing new is introduced, or something is added by it, when the words are taken either as they sound or beyond their natural sense. - C. Inter alia 31 de Sent. exc.; Sixtus V, C. Immensa, Jan. 22, 1588; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 86. a. 6; Ithur. Cas. 53. n. 2 seq.; L. 1. 3. n. 760. 265; C. I. beginning, Dispos. etc. a. 3.

What are the rules of interpretation? - The words of law are to be taken according to their proper and usual acceptance, unless something absurd or unjust follows from this, or the law becomes wholly useless. For words demonstrate the will of the one speaking. And otherwise nothing would be certain in laws. Hence the common saying: Where the law does not distinguish, neither ought we distinguish. In doubt about the true sense, attention must be given to the mind of the legislator, or to the end and reason of the law; to the thing or matter about which the question is concerned; and to the circumstances either antecedent or consequent. R. 88 de R. I. in 6. - A penal and odious law in doubt is to be interpreted strictly; but a favorable law undergoes a broad interpretation. And generally "laws are to be interpreted more benignly, so that their will may be preserved." L. 18 de Legib. L. 12. 18. 19. 23. 24. 25. 26. 37 de Legib., L. 155 de R. I.; R. I. 15. 30 in 1; L. 200; Struggl q. 4. n. 1 seq.; Suarez De Legib. l. 6. c. 1; Wirceburg. De Legib. c. 5. a. 1.

Does authentic interpretation need promulgation in order to oblige? - R. Negatively, if that interpretation is a declaration of a sense clearly contained in the law, since such a declaration is not a new law; for it establishes nothing new, but declares what has been established, and has force backward. - R. Affirmatively, if the declaration is of a sense obscurely contained in the law, because it is then had as a new law; or if it restricts or extends the law, since then it is truly a new law. - L. 100. 200, 1. 3. n. 1027; Suarez De Legib. l. 6. c. 1. n. 3.

Must a law be extended from case to case because of identity of reason? - "Penal laws are not to be extended from case to case." L. 1. 6. n. 689. For hatreds are to be restricted. R. I. 49 in 6. - Likewise invalidating laws or laws granting some right cannot be extended from case to case; for then the act lacks value, or has force only from the positive will of the legislator. C. I. beginning, Dispos. etc. a. 4. - It must likewise be denied as regards other laws, even if the same reason runs; a fortiori if there is only a similar reason. For not the reason of the law, but the will of the legislator, duly intimated to the subjects, has the force of law and obliges. For the legislator can well dispose concerning one thing and not concerning another. Hence the common axiom: The reason of the law is not the law; and the end of the precept does not fall under the precept. L. 20. 21 de Legib.; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 100. a. 9 ad 2; L. 1. 3. n. 273. But "to act contrary to the end of the law is a certain disorder, which does not seem to be excused from all fault." L. 1. 3. n. 1030. - But if it is not licit of itself to extend a law from case to case, a fortiori it is not licit to extend a privilege from persons to other persons, from things to other things. C. 27 de Praeb. in 6; Reg. 28 de R. I. in 6; L. 14. 15. 16 de Legib.

Except nevertheless whenever otherwise something manifestly absurd or inequitable would follow, and the legislator could manifestly be accused of injustice, imprudence, ignorance. Thus by the Constitution Decori of S. Pius V, nuns are prohibited from going out of the monastery, except because of a great fire, or epidemic, or the sickness of leprosy. Therefore they will also be able to go out for another similar cause, for example flooding of the monastery, collapse, attack of robbers.

But this is chiefly had in the following: 1. In correlatives, for example, between husband and wife, betrothed man and betrothed woman; whence if the husband because of the adultery of the wife is admitted to divorce from bed, the wife also enjoys that right because of the adultery of the husband; if the betrothed woman is freed from betrothal because of the long absence of the betrothed man, C. 5 de Spons., similarly he is freed because of the absence of the betrothed woman. For then the legislator, expressly willing one thing, is judged to have implicitly willed the other also. 2. In things equated by law, such as presentation, postulation, election to a benefice; eggs and milk foods by reason of abstinence. What the law disposes in these matters concerning one, it is judged to dispose the same concerning another. And thus, if the more worthy is to be elected, the more worthy is also to be presented; if eggs are permitted, milk foods also are permitted. R. I. 53 in 6. 3. In connected things, of which one cannot stand without the other. Therefore he to whom a case is committed can also compel the parties to appear. C. 5 de Off. Deleg. 4. In things contained: for in the whole the part is contained; thus he who can make a testament can also make legacies; those to whom marriage is prohibited are also prohibited betrothal. L. 16 de Sponsal.

And these things have force even if the question concerns a penal law. Nor then does the rule have force: Hatreds are to be restricted, favors broadened. For that proceeds only when the disposition of the law is extended from interpretation of congruity, not when it must be extended from interpretation of necessity, which ought not so much be called extension as mere comprehension. And certainly extension of law is of two kinds: one necessary, the other congruential. The former is altogether required for justice or rectitude; but the latter not so, but is only voluntary, because although the law can justly comprehend many other things, nevertheless a lesser comprehension suffices for the justice of the law and the property of the words, with the reason of the law also being preserved. Now the general rule about not broadening penal laws must be understood of voluntary interpretation, that is, without which the prudent disposition and justice of the law can still be preserved; not of the necessary extension of law, which is required so that justice or equity may be preserved. And thus, a heretic is irregular. Therefore also an apostate. L. 12 de Legib. - L. 200, 1. 3. n. 293. 1027; Ithur. Cas. 53.

As it is necessary to extend a law when its reason is manifest, L. 12 de Legib., so also it is necessary to restrict it when similarly its reason is manifest; because the thing itself about which the question is concerned requires restriction; because otherwise something unjust or absurd would follow; because the case is altogether rare and foreign to the mind of the legislator; because otherwise the law would become too hard and severe. L. 18. 25 de Legib.

Do the Declarations, Decisions, and Decrees of the Sacred Congregations have the force of law? - There is no doubt that they oblige in the particular cases for which they are made. C. Sixtus V Immensa. There is no doubt that they have the force of law if the strength of Apostolic firmness is added to them. Cf. Bened. XIV, C. Sacramentum Poenitentiae, or if they have been solemnly published by mandate of the Apostolic See, or if in the Church they have been universally and by the use of several years disseminated. L. 106. But all the Decrees of the Sacred Congregations have the same authority if they have been duly promulgated. Pius X, C. Sapienti consilio, July 1, 1908.

Besides the aforesaid cases, concerning particular Decrees, about which alone there can be a question, there is a threefold probable opinion. The first opinion asserts that they have the force of obliging all, because they contain an authentic interpretation of laws. - The second opinion says that they do not oblige universally. The reason is that, in order that a law oblige all, solemn promulgation of a universal law is altogether required, and simple publication of a particular Response does not suffice. - The third opinion affirms this when the Declarations are comprehensive, namely when they do not depart from the proper and usage-received signification of the words. For then no promulgation is needed, since a new law is not made, but a law already made and promulgated is only explained. But it denies this when the Declarations are extensive, namely when they depart from the proper and commonly accepted signification of the words. For then they are new laws, which require legislative power and promulgation. But even if they contain an interpretation of doubtful and obscure common law, and not a mere declaration of clear law, they cannot have the value of universal law without legitimate promulgation, or before they are brought into common practice. Cf. 176. Schmalz. Dissert. prooem. n. 373 seq.; Pichler. Proleg. n. 46; Reiffenst. Prooem. n. 130 seq.; L. 1. 1. n. 106, 1. 3. n. 760. 765. 1027, 1. 6. n. 401. 403. 556. 593. 699, H. A. tr. 15. n. 87; Bened. XIV De Syn. l. 6. c. 6. n. 4, Index of the Work v. Congregation of the Council, its prudent inconstancy in its decisions and in rendering judgments; Scav. 1. 1. n. 339. 240, Milan ed. 1874; A. S. S. v. 3. p. 563 seq.; E. M.

178 bis. Note: The most recent ordering of the Roman Curia was made by the Constitution Sapienti consilio of Pius X, July 1, 1908. In it Congregations, Tribunals, and Offices are distinguished. There are eleven Sacred Congregations, and they are the following; to each of them its own matter is exclusively assigned, the cumulation of rights in all Offices of the Holy See being abrogated.

1. Congregation of the Holy Office. It guards the doctrine of faith and morals. Therefore to it alone remains judgment concerning heresy and other crimes which induce suspicion of heresy. - To it also was devolved the whole matter concerning Indulgences, in which matter the Constitution In ipsis of Clement IX, July 6, 1669, fully remains in force. But the faculty remains intact to the Holy Office of knowing those things which concern the Pauline privilege and impediments of disparity of cult and mixed religion, besides those things which touch dogmatic doctrine concerning marriage, as also concerning the other Sacraments.

2. Consistorial Congregation. It prepares the matters to be done in Consistories. In places which are not Mission places, it constitutes new dioceses and chapters; and treats those things which pertain to the division and general governance of dioceses, and to the election of Bishops, Apostolic Administrators, and Coadjutor and Auxiliary Bishops. In naming Bishops one must adhere to the Constitution Romanis Pontificibus, Dec. 17, 1903. To it also pertain those things which regard the governance, discipline, studies, and temporal administration of seminaries. But it resolves doubts concerning the competence of the Sacred Congregations. - A section was added concerning the spiritual care of emigrants, and concerning priests themselves who emigrate. Pius X, M. P. Cum omnes, Aug. 15, 1912.

3. Congregation on the discipline of the Sacraments. To it pertains the whole legislation concerning the discipline of the seven Sacraments. Therefore to it pertain matrimonial dispensations in the external forum, dispensations of those to be ordained, and dispensations concerning the place, time, and conditions of receiving and reserving the Eucharist, and of celebrating Mass, etc. To it also belong questions concerning the validity of marriage or sacred ordination, and others pertaining to the discipline of the sacraments. Dispensations from impediments of marriage, in the form of a Brief, are granted by this Sacred Congregation, provided they are of an honorable nature, and if the dispensations themselves are subject to greater taxes. Other dispensations are given in the form of a rescript. Cf. Ord. servand. in Rom. Cur., special norms c. n. 13-16.

4. Congregation of the Council. To it is committed the whole discipline of the secular clergy and Christian people; and therefore to it pertains the observance of the precepts of the Church, except the Eucharistic fast, which belongs to the S. C. on the Sacraments; to it pertain those things which regard Pastors and Canons, those which are referred to pious Confraternities, pious works, pious legacies, Mass stipends, benefices, offices, ecclesiastical goods; to it also pertains the faculty of exempting from conditions required for obtaining benefices, whenever they are to be conferred by the Ordinary; likewise those things pertain which regard ecclesiastical immunity and the celebration of Councils. - To this Congregation is joined the special Lauretana Congregation. The faculty of interpreting the Decrees of the Council of Trent no longer pertains exclusively to the S. C. C., but belongs to the individual Congregations according to their proper competence. S. C. Cons. Feb. 11, 1911.

5. Congregation of Religious. To this Congregation pertain the affairs of all Religious, of those who live a common life without vows, and of secular third orders, whether among themselves, or with regard to them in relation to others; also dispensations from common law with religious pertain to it.

6. Congregation of Propaganda Fide. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed by regions where the sacred hierarchy has not yet been at least perfectly constituted, and the state of mission perseveres. Nevertheless those things which regard faith, marriage, sacred rites, and religious as such are to be referred to the proper Congregations. It has united to itself the Congregation for the affairs of the oriental rite, which preserves its functions entire. - To it is joined the Committee for the union of dissident Churches. Besides, the administration of all goods has been committed to it, even of the Reverend Chamber of Spoils. Indults which until now it was accustomed to grant to others, it now grants only to its own subjects. Ord. servand. in R. C., special norms c. 7. art. 6.

7. Congregation of the Index. To it pertains everything which regards harmful books and writings which are to the ruin of souls. - The Cardinals, Consultors, and ministers of this Congregation and of the Holy Office can communicate with one another all those things, and only those things, which pertain to the prohibition of books, and all are bound in this matter by the same secrecy.

8. Congregation of Sacred Rites. To it pertain all those things which proximately regard the sacred rites and ceremonies of the Latin Church, and also the insignia and privileges of honor to be granted, both personal and real, which are referred to sacred rites and ceremonies. To it also pertain those things which regard the beatification and canonization of Saints and Sacred Relics, concerning which one must adhere to the Constitution In ipsis of Clement IX, July 6, 1669. - To this Congregation are joined the liturgical, historical-liturgical, and Sacred Chant Committees.

9. Ceremonial Congregation. To it pertains the moderation of ceremonies in the Pontifical Chapel and Court, and of the sacred functions of Cardinals, and also the precedence of Cardinals and Legates before the Holy See.

10. Congregation of Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs. It treats those affairs which are referred to it through the Secretariat of State, especially those which are referred to Civil Laws and Concordats.

11. Congregation of Studies. To it pertains the moderation of studies and academic degrees of Catholic Universities, even of those which pertain to Religious, and the faculty itself of granting academic degrees.

There are three Tribunals, namely:

1. Sacred Penitentiary. Its jurisdiction is restricted only to those things which regard the internal forum, even non-sacramental, and it settles questions of conscience. It especially retains the norms of the Constitution In Apostolicae of Benedict XIV, Apr. 13, 1744, with the changes introduced and approved by legitimate use being preserved, and also the prescriptions through the Constitution Sapienti consilio and through the law Ord. serv. in R. C. which regard this tribunal. All things are expedited secretly and gratis in this tribunal. - Ord. serv. in R. C., special norms c. 8. art. 1.

2. Sacred Roman Rota. To it are devolved all contentious non-major causes which are conducted in the Roman Curia, both civil and criminal, the judicial process being preserved. But causes are treated in disciplinary manner by the Congregations themselves to which they belong by reason of the matter. The proper Law must be observed by the S. R. Rota, which is joined to the praised Constitution Sapienti Consilio. In it is established the constitution of the Tribunal, competence, and mode of judging. Besides, in judgments the Rules approved by the Supreme Pontiff Pius X on Aug. 4, 1910, and promulgated on Oct. 25 of the same year, are to be observed. Finally those things also must be observed which agree with it in the Constitution Sapienti consilio and in Ord. serv. in R. C. Cap. 2. Canon 14 of the aforesaid proper law declares the competence of the Sacred Roman Rota thus: "§ 1. The Sacred Rota judges in first instance causes which the Roman Pontiff, either motu proprio or at the instance of the parties, has called to his own tribunal and committed to the Sacred Rota; and these, if need be, and unless otherwise provided in the rescript of commission, it judges also in second and third instance, by means of subsequent turns according to the prescriptions of can. 12. § 2. It judges in second instance causes which have been judged in the first grade by the tribunal of the Most Eminent Vicar of the City and by other tribunals of Ordinaries, and are referred to the Holy See by legitimate appeal. And likewise it judges these, if need be, even in third according to the mode prescribed in can. 12. § 3. Finally it judges in the last instance causes already known by Ordinaries and by any other tribunals in the second or further grade, which have not passed into a res judicata, and are referred to the Holy See through legitimate appeal. § 4. It also sees concerning recourses for restitution in full from any sentences which have passed into a res judicata and cannot find remedy before the judge of second instance according to the title on Restitution in full; provided nevertheless that the matter does not concern a res judicata from a sentence of the Sacred Roman Rota; and in these it judges both concerning form and concerning merit."

3. Apostolic Signatura. Newly instituted, it is bound to observe the proper Law joined to the Constitution Sapienti consilio itself, and also those things which agree with it in the Constitution Sapienti consilio and in Ord. serv. in R. C. In that Law the question concerns the constitution and competence of the Supreme Tribunal of the Apostolic Signatura, and the mode of judging. This supreme tribunal knows concerning an exception of suspicion against some auditor of the Rota, concerning violation of secrecy and concerning damages inflicted by Auditors, concerning a complaint of nullity against a rotal sentence, concerning restitution in full against a rotal sentence which has passed into a res judicata.

Five Offices are listed, namely:

1. Apostolic Chancery. Its proper function is to expedite Apostolic Letters under lead concerning the provision of consistorial benefices, concerning the institution of new dioceses and chapters, and for other greater affairs of the Church.

2. Apostolic Datary. Its proper ministry is concerned with all those things which regard non-consistorial benefices to be conferred, reserved to the Apostolic See. Therefore it also draws up and expedites Apostolic Letters for their conferral, exempts in conferring benefices from required conditions, and cares for burdens and pensions imposed by the Supreme Pontiff in conferring the aforesaid benefices. But benefices are conferred by it through a Bull, or through a decree of simple signature, that is, no Bulls having been expedited. Ord. serv. in C. R., special norms c. 9. art. 2.

3. Apostolic Chamber. Its care is also the administration of the temporal goods and rights of the Holy See, especially at the time when this is held vacant, according to the norms of the Constitution Vacante Sede Apostolica, Dec. 25, 1904.

4. Secretariat of State. To it pertain extraordinary ecclesiastical affairs; insignia of honor to be granted, not reserved to the Prelate set over the Pontifical Household; and the expedition of Apostolic Briefs which are committed to it by the various Congregations.

5. Secretariat of Briefs to Princes, and of Latin letters. This double office has its own function of writing the acts of the Supreme Pontiff in Latin.

The beginning of the year henceforth is to be taken not from the day of the Incarnation of the Lord, that is, from March 25, but from the Kalends of January, in all Apostolic letters to be expedited either by the Chancery or by the Datary. Apostolic Letters, by reason of the gravity of the affairs and of varied form, are distinguished into Bulls, Briefs, and Pontifical Rescripts. - Formerly Bulls were written on rather dark and thicker parchment, and in Lombardic or Teutonic characters; but now from the Motu Proprio of Leo XIII, Dec. 29, 1878, they are written on parchment paper and in Latin characters. Likewise the seal or leaden medal, from which they are called Bulls, with attached cords, is preserved only in Apostolic Letters of conferrals, erections, and dismemberments of major benefices, and also in other solemn acts of the Holy See. In others, the impression of a red-colored seal bears the images of the Apostles Peter and Paul, with the inscription of the name of the reigning Supreme Pontiff drawn around it. A Bull is inscribed: Pius, Bishop, Servant of the Servants of God, and the date is written according to the Roman Calendar. Consistorial nominations, the constitution of new dioceses and chapters, are done through a Bull. Briefs are expedited for affairs of lesser moment; they are written on white and thin parchment, or ordinary paper, and in Latin characters. They bear the seal of red wax with the image of S. Peter engaged in fishing; and therefore they are said to be expedited under the Ring of the Fisherman. Briefs are inscribed Pius Pope X. Their date is designated according to the common calendar. - Finally Rescripts are Responses of Pontiffs, which are often written on the back of the petitions themselves of the supplicants. The Congregation which is called the Reverend Fabric of S. Peter has care only of the property of the Basilica of the Prince of the Apostles according to the Constitution Quanta curarum of Benedict XIV, Nov. 15, 1751.

The Committees for advancing studies either of Sacred Scripture or of history; for administering Peter's Pence; for preserving the Faith in the City, remain in the state in which they were before. The Congregation of the Apostolic Visitation of the City having been removed, those things which pertained to it are referred to the committee of Cardinals to be constituted at the Vicariate of the City. In all Congregations, Tribunals, and Offices, things which are grave and extraordinary must first be signified to the Supreme Pontiff. Other things need pontifical approval, unless special faculties have been granted to their Moderators, and excepting the proper sentences of the Sacred Rota and Apostolic Signatura. - But the affairs to be treated in them are to be treated according to the proper laws and norms joined to the same Constitution Sapienti Consilio. - Organization, provision of officials, internal discipline, manner of acting before the Sacred Congregations, and taxes to be paid are established in the Order to be Observed, or General Rule, which is had for the Sacred Congregations, Tribunals, and Offices. - All officials are bound to swear an oath concerning faithfully fulfilling the office, not receiving gifts even spontaneously offered, and preserving secrecy, according to the formula established there. Provision of minor officials is made through competition in titles and knowledge. - Anyone can treat his own affairs before the Sacred Congregations by himself, through an advocate, through a procurator, through an agent either public or private, Ordo servandus p. 1. cap. 9. - Finally in the Sacred Congregations, Tribunals, and Offices of the Roman Curia, the special Norms of the same Order to be Observed of Sept. 29, 1908, p. 2, must be observed, which especially determine competence, the manner of treating various affairs, the mode of proceeding of full Congregations, and the functions and qualities of various administrators. Assistants must be distinguished by the laurel of doctor in sacred theology and in canon law. Although, with the cumulation of rights in the Offices of the Holy See abrogated, its own seat has been constituted for each affair, nevertheless, because in peculiar cases there can be place for doubt or error, the ancient law remains firm by which, when a petition for obtaining a matter pertaining either to grace or to justice has been referred to and accepted by some Office, it is licit for no one for any reason to approach another Office of his own accord for the same end; but the consent of the Office itself with which the matter began to be treated is needed, or a decree of the Consistorial Congregation by which permission is given of transmitting the affair. Once a question has been instituted before some Congregation by the path of administration and discipline, and this mode of acting has been admitted by the parties, or at least not refused, it is no longer licit for them to institute a strictly judicial action on the same cause.

What is epikeia? - Epikeia is brought back to interpretation, which is a benign but equitable interpretation of law, by which a universal law, or when it speaks universally, is judged not to extend itself to such a particular case, although clearly comprehended in the words of the law, because of particular circumstances which were not either foreseen or in fact comprehended by the legislator. If, for example, a law prohibits carrying weapons at night, I can carry them if I must go out and I will be meeting my enemy seeking me to death.

Yet in order that there be place for epikeia, the law must not only cease negatively in the particular case, because namely the end of the law is then lacking; but it must cease contrarily, namely because observance of the law is rendered sinful, harmful, or too burdensome. Nor then is it necessary to ask the superior, although this can easily be done. For this is deduced from the very properties of law. For law must be honorable, useful, possible, just; and therefore it does not oblige with grave inconvenience, nor does it burden someone above the rest. And this pertains to epikeia. For epikeia is the directive virtue of laws, according as the notion of justice and common utility demands. Hence epikeia pertains to justice commonly so called, as a certain existing justice according to which legal justice is directed, as by a higher rule of human acts.

But there is also place for epikeia when, although the law in a particular case is not rendered sinful, harmful, or too burdensome, nevertheless from a certain equity and benignity it is judged, certainly or at least probably, that the legislator did not wish to include that case in the words of the law. For equity is preferred to rigor. L. 7 de In integrum restit.; L. 8 de Iudiciis C. And then, while doubt remains, since it almost falls back into dispensation, it is necessary of itself to approach the superior, if he can be consulted. But this will not be necessary when it is evidently established that the mind of the legislator was otherwise; for in manifest things there is no need of interpretation, but of execution. - L. 3 seq. de Legib.; L. 201; L. 201; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 96. a. 6, 2. 2. q. 60. a. 5 ad 2, q. 120, q. 147. a. 4; Suarez l. 2. c. 16; Struggl q. 4. n. 7. 8; Ithur. Cas. 53. n. 9-13; Schmalz. l. 1. t. 2. n. 44.