IV. On Lying

What is lying, and how manyfold is it? - A lie is a false word, i.e., against the mind; false, with the intention of saying what is false. The intention of deceiving does not pertain to the essence of a lie, otherwise jocose lies would be excluded from lying, since they are not said for deceiving, but for joking; and because it is evident that he lies who, with you present, did something, and immediately afterward denies to you even that he did it, although there is no will or faculty of deceiving.

Wherefore from lying are excluded jokes which are uttered or done in such a way that from the very mode of uttering or acting, it is sufficiently understood that what is outwardly stated is false; although the hearer, from his own excessive simplicity and stupidity, takes the joke seriously, and is deceived rather by himself than by the one joking. Likewise excluded from lying are tropical and figurative locutions, ironies, fables, and parables; because they contain the true sense which the speaker intends to express, although sometimes he observes that it is not immediately apprehended by the hearer, but another false sense is conceived, which the speaker does not intend, but only permits. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 110, a. 1.; Quodl. 6, a. 17. A lie is threefold, namely jocose, officious, pernicious.

A jocose lie is one which neither profits nor harms, but is uttered so that it may delight. An officious lie is one which is done without injury to another, so that it may profit a third party. Finally a pernicious lie is one which is done with injury and harm of another, even if it profits some third party. - St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 110, a. 2, 3. No one regularly lies by silence and dissimulation, by not speaking, not acting, St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 111, a. 1 ad 4.; because he who is silent, does not act, neither affirms nor denies. Regularly, for sometimes not to speak, not to act, is not without deceit and fraud. Lugo d. 23, n. 82.

What is mental restriction and how manyfold is it; what is equivocation or amphibology? Mental restriction is an act of the mind turning or restricting the words of some proposition to another sense than the natural and obvious one; if, e.g., when asked whether you received Easter Communion, you answer that you received, understanding internally in the preceding year. - Mental restriction is: 1.

Purely or strictly mental, if the sense of the speaker added by the speaker's mental addition alone can in no way be perceived, neither from the obvious signification of the words in themselves, nor from the circumstances; and this is properly called mental; e.g., if someone is asked by a Protestant friend whether he is a Roman Catholic, and answers that he is not, because he was not born at Rome. 2. Broadly or improperly mental, if the sense of the proposition can be gathered either from the very signification of the words, because they are ambiguous, or from the circumstances; e.g., if someone is asked whether he received a benefice from the Bishop, and answers that he did not, because he properly received that benefice from the Holy See, to which it was reserved; and if someone has secretly compensated himself, and is asked whether he accepted anything, he can deny it, because he accepted nothing except what was his own. Equivocations or amphibologies are referred back to mental restriction; these are locutions having of themselves a double principal sense, but one more and the other less obvious; e.g., if someone answers nothing to a question about some matter done, and then to one insisting: what do you say? he answers: I say no.

What is simulation? - A lie not by words, but by deeds, is called simulation. Yet not every simulation is a lie: for to simulate is indeed to do one thing and to will to signify another, and consists in this; but deeds are not, as words are, destined to signify the mind and to speak to others; therefore by these no one lies unless he uses them to deceive someone. Wherefore, if someone uses them only for concealing the truth, every lie is absent. And if a lie is sometimes absent from the very words, when someone is not questioned by right concerning some matter, how can that right always be present in deeds, so that you must do this or that, lest another be deceived? To simulation or to lying pertain hypocrisy, boasting, irony. All are opposed to the virtue of truth, which is a special virtue through which man duly orders his outward things, whether words or deeds, to something as sign to thing signified. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 109, a. 2.; q. 110, a. 2.; q. 111, a. 1.; Quodl. 6, a. 17.; Quodl. 8, a. 14. "Hypocrisy is a simulation by which someone simulates the person of another, as when a sinner simulates the person of a just man." St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 111, a. 2. Generally and of itself hypocrisy is a light sin. It becomes grave from a gravely depraved end, or another gravely evil circumstance. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 111, a. 4. Boasting is properly said "when someone extols himself above that which is in him." And it is grave or light by reason of a grave or light object. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 112, a. 2. Irony is had when "someone says lesser things, departing from truth, for instance when he asserts about himself some vile thing which he does not recognize in himself, or when he denies about himself some great thing which nevertheless he perceives to be in himself; and it is always a sin," light of itself, grave per accidens....

St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 113.

Whether lying is illicit? A lie is intrinsically evil, because a lie formally imports the intention of stating what is false, contrary to the institution of words. Besides, a lie is immediately opposed to the virtue of created truthfulness, which establishes truth in signs, and mediately to the virtue of divine truthfulness; and therefore it is intrinsically evil and in no case licit. Hence Innocent III, C. Super eos de Usuris, says: "Not even for protecting life is it licit for us to lie." Indeed truthfulness is a special virtue, through which man duly orders his outward things, whether words or deeds, to something as sign to thing signified. Cf. Eccl. 8:14.; Lev. 19:11.; Eph. 4:24.; Col. 3:9.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 109.; q. 110, a. 1, 3.; Quodlib. 8, a. 14.

What kind of sin is lying? A jocose and officious lie is a sin from its genus venial, but a pernicious lie is from its genus mortal, because a jocose and officious lie is opposed only to the virtue of natural truth or truthfulness; and a pernicious lie is opposed also to charity and justice; hence the first two are sins slight of themselves, but the third is grave of itself. But a pernicious lie in the individual case is often a venial sin, not only from imperfection of the act, but also from smallness of matter, or of the harm inflicted on neighbor through the lie. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 100, a. 3, 4.; Quodl. 8, a. 14.

Whether purely mental restriction is licit? - It is never licit to use purely or properly mental restriction. Wherefore neither is it licit to swear with it, because it is simply a lie. For it states what is false simply, although it is internally determined to a true sense by the mind of the speaker. Thus, when someone questioned about theft answers that he stole no money, understanding gold, silver, bronze, when he stole paper money: he certainly lies. This is also clear from propositions 26, 27, 28 condemned by Innocent XI. L. 152.; E. M.

Whether broadly mental restriction is licit? It is sometimes licit from a just cause to use restriction broadly, i.e., improperly mental, when the sense intended by the speaker can be understood. The reason is that by this very fact that the truth can be prudently gathered from some circumstance of the thing, place, time, or person speaking, the aforesaid restriction is not evil in itself, since neighbor is not properly deceived, but from a just cause only his deception is permitted. Moreover, for the good of society it is required that a means be present of licitly concealing a secret and of avoiding damage from its manifestation; and sometimes no other means is at hand besides broadly or improperly mental restriction. And so in a case of this kind it is licit to use restriction not purely mental, by answering according to the mind of the questioner, or according to those things which appear and are commonly believed, or according to the ordinary non-authoritative mode of speaking, or finally according to received custom; e.g., if someone denies that he entered such a house, namely in which he himself committed no theft, as is believed, although truly he entered it; if those joined in civil marriage and commonly judged to be joined in legitimate marriage are mutually called husband and wife; if someone, asked by a friend about another's crime injuring reputation, answers that he does not know it; if a servant answers importunate visitors that the master is not at home. Struggl tr. 5, q. 3, n. 17.; Ithur. Cas. 37, n. 11 seqq.

Note: It is licit to use a broad restriction of this kind even with an oath, although a greater cause is then required, since divine testimony is not to be used without judgment. L. 151.

Whether amphibologies are licit? - Amphibologies, or equivocations, altogether discordant and remote from the matter at issue, so that they cannot be noticed and understood in a human way, are illicit; since then human commerce would utterly perish, as if someone asserted that he does not have a dog at home, because he does not have the constellation of the Dog. But if the aforesaid amphibologies or equivocations are perceptible of themselves, although not altogether easily and immediately, they are not illicit of themselves; but sometimes they are licit, unless they are done from the positive intention of deceiving another; for then they are not against the mind of the speaker and the virtue of truthfulness.

When are restrictions and amphibologies not purely mental illicit? Restrictions and amphibologies, or equivocations, even not purely mental, are not licit: 1. if they are done without an honest and proportionate cause; 2. if from them damage to neighbor would emerge against the order prescribed by charity; 3. when mutual contracts are celebrated; 4. if the one questioning has the right of inquiring or commanding the confession of truth. Proof. The 1st reason is that, if without any honest cause and always it were licit to speak amphibologically, equivocally, and with restriction even not purely mental, all sincerity and human faith would perish; but men are held by natural law to preserve human faith. The 2nd and 3rd reason is that this is required by charity and justice. The 4th reason is that to that right there corresponds an obligation of confessing the truth without ambiguity.

Resolutions: Public persons questioned about matters committed to their trust can especially use restriction of this kind; such are secretaries, legates of Princes, leaders of armies, magistrates, advocates, physicians, surgeons, midwives, and whoever has office and reason for concealing some truth. For if the secrets committed to these persons were violated, very grave inconveniences in society would follow. L. 165.

Whether simulation is licit? "Formal simulation, namely when someone intends through an external deed to signify something other than he has in mind, is never licit, because it is a true lie of deed; but material simulation, that is, when someone does something, not intending the deception of another, but some end of his own, is licit with a just cause, always and when from the circumstances others can conjecture that it is done for another end; as was said about restriction not purely mental. Thus Christ the Lord, Luke 24, at Emmaus feigned that he would go farther, not intending that the Disciples believe this, but wishing to signify that he truly would have gone farther unless he were invited by them." L. 171. - St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 111, a. 1. Dissimulation is had when, by not speaking, not acting, something is covered and someone is deceived from it. Of itself it is licit, for there is no obligation of always manifesting the truth.

Whether a superior has in every case the right of knowing the truth, so that one questioned cannot licitly use broadly mental restriction? Resp. Negatively, as is clear from the following exceptions. For: 1. A confessor questioned by a tyrant whether Titius confessed homicide can and ought to answer: I do not know; because the Confessor does not know this with communicable knowledge. Indeed even if the tyrant insisted and said: Do you not know this with communicable knowledge? He could still answer: I do not know. The reason is that the tyrant knows well that he does not have the right of questioning about this, nor does the Confessor understand that he knows it as a man, but as vicar of God and therefore by incommunicable knowledge.

Almost the same must be said of him who knows a matter from a committed secret, for the sake of asking counsel. 2. A penitent questioned by a Confessor about a sin confessed can swear that he did not commit it, understanding internally that which he did not confess. Thus Cardinal, the Salmanticenses, Sanchez, etc. Yet this must be understood unless the Confessor justly questions in order to know the state of the penitent. From proposition 58 condemned by Innocent XI. L. 157. - "But if the penitent has not sinned mortally since the last confession, the Confessor sufficiently knows his state, and then he has no right of questioning about the past life."

Gur. Cas. v. 2, n. 442. 3. "The opinion of Cardinal de Lugo, de Iust. d. 40, n. 15, Tamburini, Cardenas, Sporer, Mezger, Babenstuber, Elbel, and several others is sufficiently probable; they admit that the accused, when the proof stands only half-full, and when there is hope of escaping death, can use amphibology and deny the crime even with an oath, understanding internally: so that I am held to confess, as long as hope of escaping death appears. The reason for this is that the precept of obeying a legitimate judge cannot oblige the accused so that he acts against himself and by his own confession completes the half-full proof of his capital crime, when otherwise it cannot be sufficiently proved.

Nor is the aforesaid restriction, in such a circumstance of the case, purely mental; because it can prudently be gathered by a sagacious judge and assessors. Hence a Confessor will be able safely to follow this opinion, at least so that he not deny absolution to an accused person wishing to follow it; as the cited doctors note." Struggl de 8 Praec. 46 and de Virt. relig. q. 3, n. 22.; L. 154.; l. 4, n. 57.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 33, a. 7 ad 5. 4. A witness can swear that he does not know what he truly knows, understanding internally that he does not know a crime about which inquiry can legitimately be made, namely if it is certain to him that the crime lacked fault; or if he knows the crime, but under secret, with no preceding infamy; or if the crime is altogether hidden.

Struggl de Virt. relig. l. c. 21, 22. 5. The truth cannot be denied or hidden if one contracting marriage is questioned by the pastor or by the Bishop whether he is bound by any diriment impediment; if one to be promoted to orders is questioned by the Ordinary whether he is affected by some censure or irregularity. One to be promoted to a magistracy or public office, when there is no obligation of accepting it but it is free to accept it, cannot, if he is questioned, deny a hidden crime. Proposition 28 condemned by Innocent XI. - E. M. 554.