Section — Bucceroni, Institutions of Moral Theology
On the Procurement of Abortion
To n. 742 ff. ON THE PROCUREMENT OF ABORTION
Abortion is commonly defined: the ejection of an immature fetus. It is said immature, i.e., not yet apt for vital birth, in such circumstances of the time of gestation that, although the fetus may still come forth into the light living, nevertheless it must necessarily die soon. Wherefore, as is clear, abortion and the mere acceleration of birth are not in reality the same. In acceleration of birth the fetus is not immature, and although it comes forth into the light before the completed time of gestation, nevertheless it can naturally live. Certainly there are those who wrongly confuse abortion with the mere acceleration of birth. They do this, departing from the common manner of speaking of theologians, so that they may more easily conclude, from the mere acceleration of birth, the lawfulness of the direct procurement of abortion. Every abortion is a certain acceleration of birth, but not a mere acceleration of birth; every acceleration of birth is not truly abortion. Abortion properly has place in the first seven months of gestation; in the remaining two months there is mere acceleration of birth, commonly speaking and from the general rule.
It is said besides, ejection of the fetus; wherefore abortion is properly distinguished from any action which per se and first is not ejective of the fetus, but injurious to the same fetus, such as that surgical operation which is called craniotomy and embryotomy for the reason that it is the cutting of the skull of the infant, or fetus, for extracting him from the mother's womb. From the general rule. Absolutely speaking, the fetus can live outside the womb after six months, six and a half months, and even before this term, if extraordinary means for nourishing the fetus are present. But, so that the moral danger of the death of the fetus may be excluded, the term of seven months is to be awaited.
The ejection of the fetus can be procured in two ways: 1. directly and per se, 2. indirectly and per accidens. Direct procurement of abortion or of the ejection of the fetus is had by applying a means or medicine effective per se and ordered per se and first to expelling the fetus, as are those local causes which have action on the womb for expelling the fetus, such as the cutting or rupture, by the help of some instrument, of the afterbirth, or of that leathery membrane in which the fetus is enclosed and floats in fluid; when this is removed, he can no longer live there, but is necessarily ejected. Wherefore direct procurement of abortion is understood here not only by direct intention, insofar as someone intends the ejection of the fetus, but also by direct exterior action, insofar as this tends effectively per se and first to expelling the fetus. Indirect procurement of abortion is had by applying a means or medicine ordered per se and first to conferring health on the mother, from which nevertheless the expulsion of the fetus also follows; or also by employing a means or medicine from which equally there is had the health of the mother and the expulsion of the fetus. Of the former kind are certain irritating and violent drugs, which per se and first tend, by their own efficacy, to correcting bad humors and bad dispositions of disease, but consequently also procure abortion. Of the latter kind are those remedies which cause the relaxation of fibers, such as a bath, a flow and emission of blood; whence while health is at the same time being cared for, abortion is produced by one and the same cause. This indirect procurement of abortion is indirect at once in action and in intention. But nothing prevents someone, with direct intention toward procuring abortion, from employing a means indifferent of itself and ordered per se to another honorable end.
From the common opinion of the older doctors, and from the practice of the S. Penitentiary, the fetus is said to be animated after a space of 40 days, if male, 80 if female. From the view of several more recent authors, with no distinction of sex made, the fetus is said to be animated from conception itself, as soon as he begins to be formed, which indeed they judge to happen immediately from the fertilization of the ovum. Their reason is this, that from experiments made it is established that even from the beginning of conception the fetus lives, and gives signs of life by his motion. But this reason does not demonstrate the matter; for one thing is that the fetus lives, another that he lives by a rational soul. Wherefore we adhere in this matter to the doctrine of St. Thomas, which is in no way obsolete, as several pretend. First the soul only vegetative informs the embryo, and thus sufficiently are explained all the phenomena of motion and life which are observed from the beginning in the embryo. Then, when the embryo has arrived at greater perfection, the sensitive soul succeeds, through which the vegetative is expelled. For "since the generation of one thing is always the corruption of another, it is necessary to say that ... when the more perfect form arrives, the corruption of the prior form occurs; yet in such a way that the following form has whatever the first had, and still more; and thus through many generations and corruptions one arrives at the ultimate substantial form, both in man and in other animals.... Thus therefore it must be said that the intellective soul is created by God at the end of human generation, which is at the same time both sensitive and nutritive, the preexisting forms having been corrupted." S. Thom. 1 p., q. 118, a. 2 ad 2. Cf. Contra Gent. l. 2, c. 90. Nor indeed in the present matter is this question to be despised, nor with excessive facility is that to be asserted as certain which is not certain, since the matter concerns protecting the very life of the mother and also the bodily and spiritual life of the infant, with a most grave collision of rights standing on either side. St. Alph., l. 3, n. 394, question III, asks when offspring is judged informed by a soul, and says: "Proposition 25 was condemned by Innocent XI, which said: It seems probable that every fetus, so long as he is in the womb, lacks a rational soul, and that he first begins to have the same when he is born; and consequently that homicide is committed in no abortion. Conversely, some have spoken badly in saying that the fetus is animated in the first instant in which he is conceived, because the fetus certainly is not animated before he is formed, as is gathered from Sacred Scripture, Exod. 21, where according to the version of the Seventy it is said: He who strikes a pregnant woman, and she miscarries, if it was not yet formed, shall be fined with money. It is certain, therefore, that the fetus is not animated immediately." This is confirmed from the theses contained in the doctrine of St. Thomas, and most recently approved. For the soul requires organic disposition, or heterogeneous parts. Thesis 13. The human soul is then created by God and infused into the body, when the subject is sufficiently disposed. Thesis 15. S. C. of Studies, 27 July 1914, A. A. S. v. 6, p. 385.
It is sometimes lawful indirectly to procure abortion, or rather to permit it, namely by supplying to the mother, laboring under a grave disease, remedies suitable per se for curing the disease, even if consequently abortion can follow, or remedies equally suitable per se for curing the disease and harmful to the fetus. It is proved: 1. from the common doctrine of theologians. S. Alph. l. 3, n. 394; Struggl, Tr. 7, q. 3, n. 15; Sanchez de Matr. l. 9, D. 20, n. 13 ff.; Diana Tr. 6 de abortu, Res. 38 ff.; Gury n. 402; Scavini, etc. 2. For when some remedy, by itself and by one and the same efficacy, can produce both effects at once, that of healing the mother and that of killing the offspring, whether primarily the health of the mother and consequently abortion follows, or whether these effects are parallel to one another, one is not necessarily assumed, either in reality or in intention, as a means for procuring the other. Therefore there is then present the case of a good or indifferent action, from which there follows a twofold effect, one good, but the other evil, which it is lawful to posit, if the end of the agent is honorable, namely if he does not intend the evil effect, and if a proportionately grave cause is present.
Hence it is said, it is sometimes lawful, namely if the matter concerns a lethal disease of the mother, whose life to be preserved is a proportionately grave cause with respect to the temporal life of the offspring. "It is certain," says St. Alph. l. c., "among all that it is lawful to furnish a remedy to a pregnant woman, directly for curing her, even with danger of abortion, if the disease is mortal, otherwise if it were not such"; and below: "If the remedy tends directly to saving the life of the mother, as would be purging of the body, cutting of a vein, a bath, etc., these are certainly lawful, when otherwise it is morally certainly judged that the mother will die with the offspring," namely if the remedy is not employed; or when there would be equal danger of abortion, whether the remedy is employed or not; or when it is morally certain that the fetus is not yet animated, as can be held at least for the first days of conception. 1 Reg. 1, 19, 20. The reason is because then the safety of the mother is cared for without greater danger of the offspring, and "because, as Busembaum has it in the same St. Alph. l. c., in equal necessity the mother can look out for herself rather than for the offspring." And the necessity is equal; for no hope indeed is present of procuring baptism for the offspring in the first and third case; but that hope in the second case is equal.
On the contrary, the necessity is not equal when indeed the death of the mother is certain if she does not take the medicine; but if she takes it, the death of the offspring is certain, not only temporal but also eternal, because baptism will not be able to be administered to him, which, however, certainly could be administered to him if the mother abstained from the medicine; because the offspring will certainly survive the dead mother: and then "the mother is indeed held from the order of charity to abstain from medicine, and to prefer to her own bodily life the spiritual life of the offspring." Thus St. Alphonsus l. c., who there continues, saying: "so also from the same charity she is held to abstain, when there is doubt about the safety of the mother and of the offspring," namely when it is doubted whether, the mother dying, the offspring can survive and be baptized. And the same holy Doctor soon adds: "And even if the death of the mother were morally certain, if she does not take the remedy, not even then would I dare to permit medicine to her, if some reasonable hope shone forth that, the mother dead, the offspring would survive and could be baptized: because it is lawful for no one, for protecting his own temporal life, positively to expose a neighbor constituted in necessity to the danger of eternal death. But conversely I think it must be said with Sylv., Tourn., etc. and the common opinion, if there were no reasonable hope concerning the life of the offspring after the death of the mother, such that she could be brought to the grace of baptism; because then charity does not seem to oblige the mother placed in extreme necessity, that she neglect her own life by abstaining from remedies, on account of the slight and most remote hope of the life of the offspring."
"And here, as far as regards practice, the same holy Doctor notes, l. c., that physicians, as regards furnishing drugs to mothers, are not to be tormented scrupulously, because it is most probable that the case is most rare and morally impossible, that it is almost a miracle, that when the mother perishes the offspring should survive so that he can receive baptism." Yet this matter is not so to be neglected; because it has happened more than once that, on account of the skill of surgeons, immediately when the mother had breathed forth her spirit, the womb of the mother having been cut open, the offspring was extracted living and baptized. Consequently, mere acceleration of birth is lawful when the fetus can live outside the womb, from ordinarily occurring circumstances, and provided that provision is made seriously and opportunely for the life of the fetus and of the mother, as far as can be done, and a grave necessity for the aforesaid acceleration is present, whether the necessity is on the part of the life of the mother or on the part of the life of the offspring himself.
In no case ever, or for any cause, is it lawful directly to procure abortion, even if the fetus were supposed still inanimate. It is proved. For 1. if the discussion is of direct procurement of abortion improperly so called, namely through means or medicines by which there is a direct tendency to injuring and destroying the fetus or infant, as, for example, when physicians, by the help of forceps, crush the skull of the little infant in the mother's womb itself, afterward violently to extract the dead fetus; there is had most truly a homicide, directly intended and directly exercised, which is never lawful.
Nor indeed is it valid in any way to say that in reality the death of the infant is not intended, but the health of the mother. For although the death of the infant may not be explicitly intended, nevertheless it is implicitly intended; since that surgical operation is directly killing of the fetus or infant. Wherefore any intention, even implicit, of not killing the infant is retracted by the fact itself, since in fact the infant is directly killed; and the intention, at least in the exercised act, is had of direct killing of this sort. Anyone acting in a human mode always intends to do that which in reality he does, in at least some way, either explicitly or implicitly.
Nor likewise is it valid to say that that action is not directly killing of the fetus. For that compression of the skull, in an infant already born and in an adult man, is certainly directly killing of the infant and the man. Therefore also of the fetus and infant still existing in the maternal womb; for the nature of that action is not changed thereby. But, the adversaries insist, it is changed: for that action becomes from that circumstance an action merely extractive and bringing out of the fetus and infant from place to place. But this is altogether nothing: since that action first by nature and time is lethally injurious and killing, and then extractive; by this means the fetus and infant is extracted, by lethal compression of the skull; and thus the life of the mother is saved. Now evils are not to be done that goods may come.
Defenders of craniotomy appeal to the collision of the rights of the life of the mother and the life of the infant: and the right of the mother in that matter, as the more important and more effective, ought to prevail. But this doctrine concerning the collision of rights is of no assistance to the adversaries. For in a collision of rights, the more important and more effective right ought indeed to prevail; if it can prevail without an intrinsically evil means being assumed for that prevalence. But in the case, so that the right of the mother may prevail and her life be preserved, there is assumed as means that which is intrinsically evil, the direct killing of an innocent.
If the discussion is of direct procurement of abortion through means or medicines which directly cause only the premature acceleration of birth, from which the offspring, necessarily, from the very laws of nature, must succumb to death, "after animation this would be directly to kill the infant, which is never lawful": for to eject by positive action an immature infant outside the womb is positively to withdraw from him the means instituted by nature itself for the conservation of his life, which is directly to kill someone. "But before animation it is not lawful directly to procure this either, just as it is not lawful to procure the effusion of seed even to save life, in which case Tertullian seems to speak in Apol. cap. 3; for he gives the universal reason: he is a man who is going to be one, for the fruit is in the seed." Lugo de Iust. et Iure, Disp. 10, S. 5, n. 130. Wherefore, since even the non-animated fetus is ordered to forming a man, his ejection is anticipated homicide. Hence Ithur., Cas. 21, n. 5, says that direct procurement of abortion "most certainly is always infected with grave malice."
There are indeed grave and several doctors, whom Sanchez follows and reports, de Matr. l. 9, D. 20, n. 9, and Struggl, Tr. 7, q. 3, n. 16, who think that abortion directly procured, where nevertheless the matter concerns only true premature acceleration of birth, but by no means direct injury to the fetus, is not so intrinsically illicit that it is not lawful at least in the case of saving the life of the mother, who is in extreme danger from present disease. But Sanchez limits this opinion to the single case of an inanimate fetus. "Where," says the praised Theologian, "it has been established that the fetus is already animated, or this is doubtful, it is established among all authors to be referred to in this whole disputation that this is by no means lawful"; n. 7. But his reason and that of others is, both because since that fetus is part of the viscera, the mother is not held to preserve him with so great a danger to her life, and all the more because, if the mother perishes, the fetus will by no means be animated; and because the mother in that case can expel him as an aggressor against her own life. Hence the same Sanchez expressly limits that opinion still more and excepts a twofold case, n. 10. The first case is if the mother, by giving birth at another time, had experienced danger of death; and on account of this it is not lawful to expel the fetus, as the common opinion of theologians teaches, because in that case there is no present aggressor, since the danger is much distant, and the mother will be able meanwhile to die from another cause. And this is confirmed from another common doctrine, which the same Sanchez hands down there, n. 2 and 10, namely that it is never lawful for a mother, on account of any danger whatever, to take a potion for impeding conception. The other case is when the mother, unless she expelled the fetus, would undergo danger of being killed by relatives, or of her own reputation; that this is altogether illicit is established from the condemned proposition 34 by Innocent XI: "It is lawful to procure abortion before the animation of the fetus, lest a girl discovered pregnant be killed or defamed." But the reason is that, even with that reason admitted which is taken from the aggressor, or from the fact that he is part of the viscera, one thing is that the fetus be an aggressor per se and intrinsically in the case of the lethal disease of the mother; another that he be so per accidens and extrinsically. For anyone can kill an aggressor lest he be killed by him; nevertheless he cannot kill another lest he himself be killed by an enemy. Likewise the fetus, says the same Sanchez, considered as part of the viscera of the mother, has an order per se to the conservation of the whole; whence, just as it is lawful to cut off a member, so also to expel the fetus, if the conservation of the whole demands this. But to that killing to be inflicted by relatives, and to that infamy, one can oppose by other means and by sought pretexts. This opinion, enclosed within all these restrictions, St. Alph. indeed affirms probable, adding that "the opposite is altogether to be embraced as safer," since the former can serve nothing for practice. Cf. Struggl, Tr. 7, q. 3, n. 16; Laymann l. 3, Tr. 3, C. 4, q. 2; Tamburini, Explic. Decal. l. 6, C. 2, § 4.
Now then, to omit extrinsic authority, as regards the reasons on which that opinion rests, Sporer, de matr. P. 4, C. 4, S. 1, n. 706, says these things shrewdly: "The fetus," he says, "is not properly part of the mother, nor on account of the mother; but has another end intended per se by nature; indeed, inchoatively, in becoming, he is already a human individual distinguished together with her. Certainly seed is more clearly and more properly part of man, and at least in some respect on account of man, since it itself also is nourishment of contiguous parts according to the teachings of physicists: therefore, etc. But if by reason of aggression it is lawful to procure abortion of an inanimate fetus, certainly abundant seed attacks human life far more violently in those most acute diseases than that little substance of a fetus still inanimate. Therefore, a fortiori, why would it not similarly be lawful in that case to procure the emission of seed? Indeed, why not also the abortion of a fetus already formed by a soul, since an innocent can no less defend himself from an animated aggressor than from an inanimate one?" But in no way indeed is the fetus an unjust aggressor. For one who from the mere course of natural causes becomes naturally the cause of death to another cannot be called an aggressor, whether formally or materially unjust; for an aggressor inflicts unjust force, and that force cannot be called unjust which proceeds from the very course of natural causes. Indeed, neither is he simply an aggressor. For an aggressor is per se the cause of death; but the fetus does not per se threaten death to the mother, but this happens altogether per accidens. And for the most part it is not the fetus, of small bulk and inert, but rather the mother who is the aggressor, either on account of narrowness of the womb, or because of the grave disease from which she suffers, or because of another inconvenience.
Lugo expressly attacks and refutes the doctrine of Sanchez, l. c. n. 130, 131, "because," he says, "even in the latter cases (namely when death would be feared from the future difficulty of birth, or from infamy), the fetus is an aggressor, since by the effort by which he will try to come forth from the womb, the mother is to be brought into manifest danger of death. Add that, if this is rendered lawful by reason of the invasion by which the mother is invaded by the fetus, it would also be lawful to procure his abortion after the fetus is animated, since an innocent can no less defend himself by any way from an animated invader than from an inanimate one. But that the danger is not present matters little, both because even the infirmity against which it is lawful to procure abortion can bring danger of death not today, but after a month, and nevertheless today a means for abortion can be applied, nor is the last article of necessity and danger to be awaited, but one ought to forestall, remedies being employed in time, because afterward medicine is prepared too late, and perhaps it will not be useful after the disease has by longer delay become too strong. Whence in the same way one could forestall by procured abortion against death to be inflicted from outside after some months, if the crime is published; and also because the danger can be present in the latter case, as if a husband soon to arrive, if he should find his wife pregnant, is believed about to kill her. Finally, that in these cases one can oppose the danger by other means does not solve the difficulty. For the question is when, other means having been tried, no other occurs, nor is any useful one hoped for, except abortion alone.
"Therefore it is better universally to deny that this is ever lawful, which Vazquez also universally taught, Cap. 3 de rest. § 2, dub. 6, n. 52, which the example brought forward seems to prove concerning the obligation never to procure the effusion of seed. To this, however, the same Sanchez, n. 12, responds that the reason why effusion of seed is never lawful is not the harm of generation, but because nature has denied every administration of seed outside intercourse for generation, on account of the imminent danger from the excessive pleasure which is felt in its effusion; and this reason has no place in abortion. But if it is weighed rightly, the same reason can be applied to this, that the procurement of abortion is never lawful: because just as nature never permitted the effusion of seed outside copulation for generation, because if sometimes it could lawfully be procured outside copulation, there would be danger that men, content with that pleasure outside copulation, would care less for begetting offspring; so also, much more, the procurement of abortion ought to have been altogether prohibited, because if that were ever lawful, there would also be danger that men would seek the pleasure of copulation with this mind and confidence, that afterward, from some supervening cause, abortion could be procured, so that birth might be impeded; and great occasion would be given for fornications and rapes, from which fear of offspring and future birth deters, and this fear would cease in great part if afterward, from some cause, it were lawful to procure abortion. Therefore it must be admitted that nature has reserved to itself the administration of the fetus just as of seed, with the faculty denied to parents of disposing of seed or fetus except for the end of generation intended by nature itself; because any other administration granted to them could easily bring inconveniences against the end of generation." Cf. Salmant., Tr. 13, C. 2, n. 58-66.
The authority of the older theologians in no way favors the more recent theologians in this controversy. For the ancient theologians who defend the lawfulness of abortion commonly restrict it to the abortion of an inanimate fetus. But the more recent theologians, defending the lawfulness of abortion, defend it indiscriminately; indeed, with the new views standing, of which they are very keen supporters, they almost altogether reject the hypothesis of an inanimate fetus.
But they enter upon another way to demonstrate the lawfulness of abortion. First they confuse abortion with acceleration of birth, and use one for the other. Then they reduce direct procurement of abortion to procurement of abortion by direct intention, with the nature of the action by which abortion is procured put aside. Moreover, they assume as a certain principle that the question concerning acceleration of birth does not look to whether it is lawful to deprive the offspring of life, but rather to how far the mother is held to conserve the life of the offspring. Finally, since surgical art has now found an instrument by which the membranes enveloping the fetus are cut in such a way that water injected by the help of a little siphon can certainly touch the fetus immediately, and therefore we can be wholly certain concerning the validity of Baptism conferred in this way on infants enclosed in the womb, the difficulties and questions moved by the older doctors concerning the dangers which the mother is held to undergo so that provision may be made for the eternal salvation of the offspring almost cease.
Hence, they say, the lawfulness of abortion is easily shown. For what the Doctors commonly hold with St. Thomas, that the death of an unjust aggressor in just defense follows only indirectly, for the reason that the direct intention of the killer is borne only toward his own defense, but the other effect, namely the death of the aggressor, is outside the intention and per accidens; this very thing can have place in acceleration of birth, namely when the will tends directly not to the temporal harm of the offspring, which follows per accidens and outside the intention, but to another end.
Therefore, where 1. the death of the mother is certain unless the fetus is expelled, and the matter concerns only the temporal death of the offspring, because, for example, Baptism can be conferred upon him according to what has been said, the mother is not held to die so that she may conserve temporal life for her son. "The mother," says Lugo, De Iust. et Iure, D. 10, n. 133, "is not held, with so great danger and detriment of her life, to procure and conserve the fetus: just as neither is she held, with danger to life, to nourish and retain a son already born, nor even to preserve milk in her breasts for nursing him, when for protecting her own life it would be necessary for her to dry up her breasts."
- If the mother, seized by disease, labors under grave danger of death unless the fetus is expelled by accelerating birth, but there is probable hope that by the help of medicine it can be effected that the fetus come forth living into the light, and thus, if not temporal life, at least eternal life, he will obtain, then an expulsion of this sort seems not only lawful, but commanded. The reason is that the danger and death of the mother would profit nothing for the temporal life of the offspring, and moreover would cast the offspring itself into very grave danger of eternal salvation. Nor ought it to obstruct that perhaps the death of the offspring is accelerated a little. For first, according to Lugo, the mother is not held with so great a danger to conserve the life of the offspring further. Then "in that case," says St. Alph., l. 6, n. 106 at the end, "that small loss of life can be neglected, so that the infant may obtain eternal life."
- If from the force of the disease there probably threatens a danger of abortion, and at the same time there presses the danger lest, if abortion in fact follows from the disease, the offspring die in the womb; but, on the contrary, probable hope shines forth that, birth having been accelerated through medicines, the offspring may come forth living into the light, and thus provision can be made for his eternal salvation: the uncertain hope of temporal life does not seem to be preferred to the more probable hope of eternal salvation, and therefore it would be lawful to accelerate birth. And this indeed must be said to be valid, even if the disease brings no danger to the life of the mother, but the matter concerns only the better good of the offspring.
The preceding doctrine of the more recent theologians is indeed such that it cannot approve itself. Let us weigh each point gradually and briefly. Abortion cannot be confused with acceleration of birth. This new manner of speaking about abortion as acceleration of birth is proved false from the constant doctrine of the older theologians, which is altogether to be retained unless a grave reason recommends a new way of speaking. If theologians have constantly spoken of abortion in an altogether different way, this certainly must have been done not without a grave foundation. To consider abortion as acceleration of birth is certainly not a subtle consideration which could have escaped the keenness of the older theologians. Moreover the Supreme Pontiffs do not speak of abortion in such a way as to regard it as acceleration of birth. They speak of abortion as of the ejection of an immature fetus, namely one not yet apt for life outside the mother's viscera. Among others, let the Constitution of Sixtus V, Effraenatam, 29 Oct. 1588, be consulted, which expressly treats of abortion and turns wholly around this matter. Now Sixtus V defines abortion: "the ejection of an immature fetus, both animated and also inanimate, formed or unformed." Ib. § Nos igitur. Besides, from reason itself it is established that simple acceleration of birth is a thing well diverse from abortion; as birth itself is a thing well diverse from abortion. For acceleration of birth, although it is accelerated birth, is still birth, and therefore imports offspring already so formed and perfected that it can live outside the mother's viscera. Abortion, on the contrary, from its concept and from the most common acceptance of all, even vulgar, imports offspring which, from premature exit from the maternal womb, is unformed and imperfect, so that it is altogether unfit for life outside the mother's viscera; whence in this same sense the word abortion is also accustomed to be used metaphorically.
The other point which is brought into the middle concerning procurement of abortion by direct intention, with direct procurement of abortion on the part of the action itself put aside, is altogether most false and most pernicious. Most false, for when on the part of the thing there stands an action directly procuring abortion, only illusorily can someone affirm that he does not intend abortion, but, for example, the health of the mother, and merely permits abortion. For it is impossible that someone acting in a human way not intend that to which his action is directly ordered, as a means per se and first conducing to it. Most pernicious, for there is no sin perpetrated by exterior work which could not be made honorable by that doctrine.
Although, by an action directly procuring pollution, someone procures this in himself, nevertheless if he does it with the intention, for example, of health, then certainly he would not sin at all. The same can be said about any other matter.
The third assertion likewise is altogether alien from the truth: namely that in this question the matter concerns the obligation of the mother to conserve the life of the offspring. As is most evidently clear from the Constitution itself of Sixtus V, Effraenatam, here the matter concerns homicide; it concerns the deprivation of the life of the infant. To eject an immature fetus from the bosom of the mother is not simply not to conserve the life of the fetus, but positively to deprive him of life, through a positive action tending and ordered by its nature to the destruction of the offspring. If it were otherwise, it would have to be said that immature offspring can live equally in the womb of the mother and outside it, which is altogether absurd, with attention to the physical laws of nature; it would have to be said that to eject an immature fetus is only not to help him in prolonging life, and to bear oneself merely negatively as regards his death.
Lastly, what is said in the fourth place about the invention of that instrument does not remove the difficulties and questions in this matter, but increases them. For the invention of that instrument can be praised as altogether useful for conferring Baptism on an infant in the best way in which it can be done, if the offspring survives after the death of the mother, or where the matter truly concerns mere acceleration of birth. Nevertheless, where the question is instituted about abortion itself, the adversaries assume as certain that, even in this case, without any controversy, it is lawful to confer Baptism by the help of such an instrument. But this is in no way certain. For since with the introduction of that instrument the afterbirth is cut, and that fluid in which the fetus floats and lives flows out, already that action, by nature and time first, is direct procurement of abortion, and then the conferral of Baptism; just as in craniotomy that action of bringing out the infant from the maternal bosom by forceps is first killing of the infant, and then extractive. Wherefore if it is lawful directly to procure abortion and to kill the infant in order to baptize him, then indeed it will also be lawful to confer Baptism in that way. Now St. Alph., l. 6, n. 106, says: "It must altogether be held ... commonly against some, that it is never lawful to throw an infant into a river in order to baptize him, although he is soon to die without Baptism; because it is never lawful for any cause whatever directly to kill an innocent.... And for the same reason it is not lawful to cut the belly of a mother very near death, so that her infant may receive Baptism, as they also commonly say ... from St. Thomas, who in 3 p., q. 68, a. 11 ad 3 expressly teaches this, saying: A man ought not to kill the mother in order to baptize the child; if, however, the mother has died, with the offspring living in the womb, she ought to be opened so that the child may be baptized.... With respect to the surgeon I say that then he can cut the mother if the danger of her death is remote; otherwise if it is proximate or probable. For just as it is illicit to kill the mother so that the child may be baptized, as we have seen with the common opinion from St. Thomas, so also it is illicit to expose the mother to probable danger of death.... But with respect to the mother ... I say that if the danger of her death is probable, she is neither held, nor can she by her positive consent concur in the incision; only she could and would be held to suffer it, if the surgeon, without her consent, while she bore herself altogether negatively, cut her, and probable hope were present that the offspring would be baptized, and the death of the mother were not certain; for in doubt probable on both sides she is held to prefer the spiritual life of the offspring to her own temporal life. But if her death is certain, and the salvation of the offspring doubtful, namely if the offspring is not certainly to be baptized, she is not held to lose life certainly." Now if it is not lawful to kill the mother in order to baptize the infant, if it is not lawful to kill the infant himself in order to baptize him, neither is it lawful directly to procure abortion in order to baptize the infant. For direct procurement of abortion is evil by its intrinsic nature, as homicide is evil by its intrinsic nature. Wherefore just as it is not lawful to throw a child into the sea in order to baptize him, so neither is it lawful, in order to baptize him, to eject him immature from the maternal bosom, by cutting the membrane in which he is enclosed; whence abortion must necessarily then follow. Nor indeed must it be passed over that, at least practically, it cannot be held as altogether certain that Baptism has been conferred on an infant still enclosed in the maternal womb. Benedict XIV, De Synodo, l. 7, C. 5; S. Alph. l. 6, n. 107; Billuart, Tr. de Bapt., D. 3, a. 3; S. Thom. 3 p., q. 68, a. 11 c. and ad 1.
Therefore what is deduced as though a corollary, the lawfulness of abortion, must be converted into the opposite corollary, of the unlawfulness of abortion. But the confirmation which is taken from the doctrine of St. Thomas and the common doctrine of theologians concerning the unjust aggressor either proves nothing or proves the contrary. Truly what is assumed, namely that the death of an unjust aggressor in just defense follows only indirectly for the reason that the direct intention of the killer is borne only toward his own defense, is altogether false, and shows that Doctors of this sort have not understood, and perhaps have not even read, this question in the Angelic Doctor. The reason why it is lawful to kill an unjust aggressor is because it is lawful to repel force by force. That which is lawful is not to kill the unjust aggressor, but to repel force by force, which is an action well diverse: since it is an action which has a twofold effect, the defense of oneself and the killing of the aggressor. And thus the death of the unjust aggressor in just defense follows only indirectly, not because the direct intention of the killer is borne only toward his own defense, but because that action, to repel force by force, is an action indifferent of itself, having a twofold effect: the good of defending one's own life, the evil of offending the life of another; the good effect is intended, the evil is permitted. And indeed natural right and positive right, and all positive rights, do not proclaim that it is lawful to kill an unjust aggressor; but all rights proclaim that it is lawful to repel force by force. Whence commonly is added that well-known phrase concerning the moderation to be preserved of blameless defense, and this moderation certainly would have no place if it were lawful per se to kill an unjust aggressor, and if something else were not rather lawful per se, namely to repel force. C. Si vero 3, De Sent. excomm., says in so many words: all laws and all rights permit force to be repelled by force.
Let St. Thomas be heard. 2. 2, q. 64, a. 7. The Angelic Doctor asks "whether it is lawful for someone to kill someone by defending himself"; and in order to resolve the question he establishes this principle: "It must be said that nothing prevents one act from having two effects, of which one alone is in the intention, but the other is outside the intention. But moral acts receive their species according to that which is intended, not from that which is outside the intention, since it is per accidens." With this principle established concerning the objective indifference of an action having two effects, and concerning the specification of the human act which turns around it, immediately the holy Doctor concludes as regards the act of repelling force by force: "Therefore from the act of someone defending himself a twofold effect can follow: one indeed, the conservation of his own life; the other, the killing of the invader. Therefore an act of this sort" - namely of self-defense, certainly not of killing the invader, as it would have to be according to the interpretation of the adversaries - "from this, that the conservation of one's own life is intended, does not have the notion of the illicit, since it is natural to each that he preserve himself in being as far as he can." But so true is it that the holy Doctor is not speaking of the lawfulness per se of killing the invader, but of the lawfulness per se of defending oneself, or of repelling force by force - for this is to defend oneself - that immediately he notes: "Nevertheless some act proceeding from a good intention can be rendered illicit if it is not proportioned to the end. And therefore if someone, for defending his own life, uses greater violence than is necessary, it will be illicit. But if he repels violence moderately, it will be lawful defense: for according to the rights, it is lawful to repel force by force, with the moderation of blameless defense. Nor is it necessary for salvation that a man omit the act of moderate defense in order to avoid the killing of another; because a man is held to provide for his own life more than for the life of another." Wherefore again that which is properly lawful is not the killing of the invader, but moderate protection, or repelling force by force; and this act is lawful, since, as is fitting, man intends in it the conservation of his own life, but by no means the killing of a man, even an unjust aggressor; for the killing of a man by private authority is altogether illicit. And that this, in reality, and not another, is the mind of the holy Doctor is clear not only from the preceding things, but also from those things which he soon adds; for he says: "But because it is not lawful to kill a man except by public authority on account of the common good, it is illicit that a man intend to kill a man in order to defend himself, unless he is one who has public authority; and he, intending to kill a man for his own defense, refers this to the public good, as is clear in a soldier fighting against enemies, and in a minister of the judge fighting against robbers; although these also sin if they are moved by private passion." Therefore no argument can be taken for the direct procurement of abortion from the common doctrine concerning the unjust aggressor, and in particular from St. Thomas, who, speaking generally of abortion in 4 Sent., D. 31, in the exposition of the text, affirms abortion to be a grave sin, to be numbered among malefices, and against nature. Let the adversaries see whether an act against nature can, from an otherwise honorable intention of the agent, become an action according to the order of nature.
But as regards the first practical case: concerning the conferral of Baptism by the help of a little siphon, it has already been said. But what is asserted, that the mother is not held to undergo death so that she may conserve temporal life for her son, is most true if the matter concerns mere non-conservation of the life of the son, which indeed is verified in indirect procurement of abortion. And thus, where the necessity of mother and son is equal, we ourselves said above, cf. n. 6, from the common opinion of theologians, that it is altogether lawful indirectly to procure abortion. Lugo l. c. speaks of mere non-conservation of the life of the offspring. But if the matter concerns the positive deprivation of the life of the offspring, which is had in direct procurement of abortion, it is altogether illicit for the mother, whether on account of her own bodily health, or even on account of the spiritual salvation of the son, as we have already seen from St. Thomas, from St. Alphonsus, and from the common doctrine, to destroy the offspring by positive action. Through direct procurement of abortion, the mother by positive action ejects immature offspring from the womb, and does not merely cease to retain him in the womb. As regards Lugo, from what has already been said it can be sufficiently clear what his doctrine is.
But so that it may be manifested more, how falsely Lugo is brought forward for direct procurement of abortion, and how false from the same Lugo is that doctrine concerning illicit procurement of abortion direct in intention, but not direct also in action, it is worthwhile to bring forward the entire sentence of Lugo, and it will also appear in what sense the words of Lugo, reported by the adversaries, are said by him. "If a drug," he says, l. c. n. 130-132, "is taken, and the same is true of the emission of blood by cutting a vein, directly for abortion, it is lawful in neither case" - namely of an inanimate and animated fetus. "But when a drug or remedy would not be taken directly for that end, but for protecting the health and life of the mother, again a distinction must be made according to what has been said above; for if it conduces to the life of the mother in no other way except insofar as it excuses abortion, then abortion is already directly intended, although it is not intended for its own sake, but on account of another end, as above we were saying about an action which can be useful for killing an enemy in no other way except insofar as it kills an innocent, and the same will have to be said in our case. But if that drug is useful for the life of the mother, yet consequently causes abortion, and outside the intention, then if the fetus is not animated, that remedy will be lawful, just as also that which is taken for health, although consequently, outside the intention, it is foreseen to bring the expulsion of seed, which is not intended, nor conduces to health, but is caused by that remedy through which health is obtained from another source, insofar as it purges other harmful humors. For the reason is the same as regards this concerning the expulsion of seed and of the fetus not yet animated: so that neither can be procured, each can be permitted indirectly on account of health, and in this almost all agree. The difficulty is whether also after the animation of the fetus it is lawful to take or apply such a medicine.... It must be said, speaking per se and with attention to the order of nature alone, that this can be done, because the mother is not held, with so great danger and detriment of her life, to procure and conserve the fetus; just as neither is she held, with danger to life, to nourish and retain a son already born, nor even to preserve milk in her breasts for nursing him, when for protecting her own life it would be necessary for her to dry up her breasts. Nevertheless the moderation pleases which Vazquez later added to this doctrine, saying that this is to be understood of emission of blood, a bath, or remedies of this sort, which do not tend to the killing of the fetus except negatively, by the withdrawal of fluid necessary for his sustenance, but not of remedies which would positively concur to the death of the fetus, such as a potion which by a positive alteration would kill the fetus; for this would be to give poison positively to an innocent, so that you may free yourself from death, which is never lawful"; such also would be to cut the membrane in which the fetus is enclosed and to eject him immature from the maternal womb; for this would be positively to deprive the fetus of life, so that you may preserve your own, which likewise is never lawful. It would certainly not be lawful to throw into the sea a man infected with plague, in order to free others from plague, or to throw him down from a high tower, although he would not be killed by iron. For it would always be directly to kill a man. But the matter is most clear: Lugo speaks only of indirect procurement of abortion; and if he moves a special difficulty in the case of an animated fetus, this certainly is not because he thought direct procurement of an animated fetus could be lawful, after he had affirmed the unlawfulness of direct procurement of abortion even of an inanimate fetus; but because even in only indirect procurement of abortion of an animated fetus there is a special difficulty, which can render the very indirect procurement of abortion of an animated fetus illicit. And thus Lugo, in affirming that lawfulness, restricts the question to the matter merely inspected per se, with attention to the order of nature alone, and so, speaking only generally, he affirms the lawfulness. Nor indeed can that withdrawal of fluid make difficulty; for as is clear from the whole context, Lugo certainly does not speak of that withdrawal of fluid, or rather outflow of fluid, which is had from the cutting of the membrane in which the fetus is enclosed, by the help of the more recent little siphon or another instrument. For he speaks of withdrawal of fluid which would be had by weakening the powers of the mother through emission of blood, through a bath, and remedies of this sort; and the cutting of the afterbirth through the aforesaid little siphon of the more recent authors certainly does not pertain to remedies of this sort.
The other case concerning abortion directly to be procured in order to baptize the offspring cannot be admitted. The reason is clear from what has been said, from which it is also clear what must be said to the reason brought from Lugo. But as regards the reason brought from St. Alphonsus, from what has already been said it is first established what the opinion of the holy Doctor is concerning direct procurement of abortion. Whence it becomes clear that the reason of the holy Doctor, like the reason of Lugo, can be brought forward altogether beside the point for direct procurement of abortion, since St. Alphonsus, like Lugo, holds it to be illicit. But in order that the reason brought by the holy Doctor may be understood, it is necessary to weigh the whole context. The holy Doctor, l. 6, n. 106, teaches: "it must altogether be held that it is never lawful to throw an infant into a river in order to baptize him, although he is soon to die without Baptism." How then, in the same place, could he assert the very contrary, contradicting himself so openly, that a small loss of life can be neglected so that the infant may obtain eternal life? He indeed asserted this without any contradiction, because he was treating another question, of conferring Baptism through an action indifferent per se, having a twofold effect; and thus, with an action supposed that is not evil per se, as directly killing, but indifferent, the holy Doctor reasoned excellently, saying that in the case there is a sufficient reason for permitting or neglecting, namely by not impeding, that brief loss of life. But on the contrary, in the preceding question, concerning an infant to be thrown into a river in order to baptize him, the holy Doctor regarded that action as directly killing of the infant, and therefore illicit even for conferring Baptism on the infant. For immediately he added this reason: because it is never lawful for any cause whatever directly to kill an innocent. Hence in the following question he said: "But although it is not lawful to throw the child into a river, nevertheless it is lawful to baptize a child soon to die with water even cold, if no other can be had, even if it were feared that death would be accelerated from this: both because death then would not occur per se, but per accidens, since such an action per se tends not to killing but to ablution"; and with this supposed, then because, he afterward added another then because, saying: "then because in that case that small loss of life can be neglected, so that the infant may obtain eternal life." Wherefore the argument from St. Alphonsus can excellently and better be turned back. The expulsion of the fetus from the maternal womb, like his throwing into the sea, in order to baptize him, is not only not commanded, but altogether illicit, although the infant is soon to die without Baptism, because it is never lawful for any cause whatever, on account of any good intention whatever, directly to kill an innocent.
It follows from what has been said that neither can the third case be admitted. What nature does by force of the natural laws which God has established, it does well; but we cannot always lawfully do that very same thing. It is altogether natural that man die, yet therefore it is not lawful to kill a man, or to accelerate his death, even by the briefest time, although he himself may suffer immense pains, and there perhaps would be proximate danger of death for others on account of the pestiferous infection of the disease. Pollution also is often natural; yet it is not lawful therefore to procure it directly. Similarly, although abortion follows from the laws of nature, and from the same laws the offspring dies before he is ejected from the womb, it is not therefore lawful to procure abortion directly. Cf. Gury-Dumas, Compend. Theol. Mor., T. 1, n. 402 ff.; Cas. Consc., T. 1, n. 402, 403, etc.
Hence it is clear that laparotomy for extracting ectopic or extrauterine fetuses, still immature, from the bosom of the mother is also illicit. On the contrary, when necessity compels, laparotomy is lawful for extracting ectopic conceptions from the bosom of the mother, provided that the lives both of the mother and of the fetus are seriously and opportunely cared for, as far as can be done. -
Since they cannot be born, they often bring with themselves the death also of the mother.
- And the preceding doctrine, which already several years ago was publicly proposed in print, was afterward confirmed by several Decisions of the Holy Office, which are had in the Enchiridion Morale, ed. 4, p. 99, 100.