V. On the Use of Marriage

Is the use of marriage licit and due? R. Affirmatively. And this is of faith from 1 Cor. 7:3: Let the husband render the debt to the wife; and likewise the wife to the husband. The reason is clear from the very nature of the contract of marriage, which the Apostle himself then expresses in the cited place. Due, i.e., mutually due, if it is at least tacitly asked, because one is not bound per se necessarily to use one's own right, but only sometimes per accidens, e.g., for averting a danger of incontinence threatening the spouse. Due, and therefore after the two-month period, and if the spouse has not lost the right of asking through adultery or through incest. L. 900, 938; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 44, aa. 5, 6.

Resolutions: Spouses are bound to cohabitation, and one cannot be absent for a longer time without the consent of the other or without necessity; for this obligation follows from the very obligation of rendering the debt. But just causes for going away for a long time are the public good, the family to be supported or protected, harm from enemies to be avoided, etc. Then the husband who must remain elsewhere for a long time must take his wife there, if he conveniently can, so that she may cohabit with him. C. Pervenit, de Conv. lepros.; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 64, a. 6, ad 1; Quodl. 4, a. 11. Cf. vol. 1, n. 675.

A spouse sins gravely by denying the debt whenever there is danger of incontinence or grave annoyance on the other side. Likewise if he or she denies it to the other seriously asking. But otherwise if the spouse kindly remits it, or asks lukewarmly, or immoderately, e.g., after the third or fourth time in the same night; nor if one defers it for a short time, namely until night, or if from night he defers it to morning time, the danger of incontinence always being excluded. Likewise a spouse sins by doing something by which generation is per se impeded.

Likewise a man or woman sins gravely if he or she renders himself or herself impotent, even by means otherwise licit, against the will of the spouse. St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 64, a. 1, ad 3; a. 6, ad 4. Spouses can indeed do something from a grave cause from which the emission of seed follows per accidens; nevertheless they sin if in the use of marriage they do something by which per se either seed is poured out outside the vessel, or, once received, is rejected. Hence, perfect copulation being excluded, artificial fecundation is illicit. Holy Office, March 24, 1897. Artificial fecundation, namely by which art is substituted for nature, not by which nature is merely aided by art.

Art is indeed substituted for nature if the man is first polluted, and then the seed collected from this is introduced into the vagina by some instrument. But nature is only aided if copulation is first performed in the natural manner, and then, either by fingers or by a little tube, the seed already introduced into the vagina is driven further up to the opening of the uterus, for more certainly obtaining fecundation. "It is certain that it is illicit to have copulation for pleasure alone, as is clear from proposition 9 condemned by Innocent XI.... Yet it is common among all that this is not mortal, but nevertheless a venial sin.... But there will be no sin if the spouse principally intends the procreation of offspring and uses pleasure, intending it moderately, so that he may excite himself to copulation; just as likewise one does not sin who intends moderate delight in eating, for providing suitable nourishment for the body." L. 912, 938, 940, 942, 954. Finally, the use of marriage is licit as a remedy of concupiscence, for avoiding incontinence. Sanchez, book 9, disp. 11; E.M.

"Is it lawful for spouses to copulate if because of old age or another disposition it generally happens that the seed is poured out outside the vessel? Bossius, etc., probably affirm, provided that there is probable hope of inseminating within the vessel; because whenever such hope is present, they have a right to copulation, and if the seed is poured out, this happens per accidens." L. 954.

Nor indeed is the use of marriage illicit for them because of old age; for although then in act it is not in the office of nature, nevertheless that act is still apt per se for it, and certainly is not against it. Hence it is lawful even for old persons to contract marriage. For zoosperms, on which in men the power of generating depends, and ova, on which in women the same power of generating depends, are first produced at the time of puberty and endure in men through the whole of life and in women until advanced age, nor can any time be defined at which that power is wholly extinguished, although it is diminished by old age. That generative power is diminished in men about the sixtieth year of age, in women about the fortieth to fiftieth year, at which age the menses ordinarily have an end. Diminished; for the absence of menses because of age is not an argument of impotence. For in women menstruation and ovulation are not always joined together: the former can cease and nevertheless the latter can endure; and pregnancy can also be had without menstruation. And when menstruation ceases, it is not therefore altogether extinguished, for after some longer or shorter interruption it can continue even in extreme old age. Moreover, the release of an ovum, since by its nature it is internal and hidden, is always presumed per se. Dominic Benetti, Opus Medico-Morale, Canon Eleventh, Annotations, n. 3; Francis Topai, Importanza dell'utero, Rome, 1900, pp. 44-45; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 58, a. 1, ad 3.

Likewise copulation is licit if the woman cannot retain the seed. The reason is that copulation then is still per se apt for generation and sufficient for generation; and that emission of seed is only per accidens and by no means impedes generation. For whatever the quantity of seed emitted from the vagina, the vaginal mucosa always retains a quantity of seed most sufficient for generation. "Then, when ejaculation has been performed and the man has withdrawn, ordinarily the seed once poured into the vagina is no longer emitted, since then the vaginal walls adhere to each other in such a way that they touch one another, from which there is great difficulty of exit. Indeed, even if some part is emitted outside because of special conditions of the vagina, that which remains adhering to the mucosa and folds of the vagina is always far more abundant than the necessity of fecundation requires." Antonelli, vol. 2, p. 189, n. 381.

From these things it follows that a woman does not sin gravely if, after the act of copulation, she rises, walks, works, etc.; since, once copulation has been performed, the vaginal walls immediately adhere to each other and close the vagina, so that ordinarily nothing of the seed is emitted. Therefore there can be sin only because of a depraved intention of impeding generation. Antonelli, l.c., p. 220, n. 479.

Is the use of marriage licit for the sterile? R. Affirmatively, both because no positive law is present prohibiting it, and because the sterile are per se fit for perfecting the conjugal act. But if no generation follows from it, this is per accidens and from nature, altogether independent of that act duly perfected, insofar as it is from the spouses. Besides generation there are also other honorable ends of the conjugal act. Hence the use of marriage is also licit at that time and on those days on which generation is more difficult. Cf. 1077; E.M.

"Is a man ever bound to ask? Speaking per se, he is not bound to ask; but he is bound per accidens, namely if the wife tacitly demands, for instance if she shows some indication by which she signifies a tacit petition; because in women, also because of innate modesty, such signs are held as a true petition. Thus commonly... from St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 64, a. 5, ad 2. Conversely Sanchez rightly says, etc., from the same St. Thomas, IV Sent., d. 22, q. un., a. 3, ad 2, that a woman is not bound to render to the man unless he expressly asks; for since men are not ashamed to demand expressly, wives can well presume that men who do not ask expressly do not wish to oblige them to asking." L. 928. This indeed holds likewise, speaking per se and ordinarily. L. ibid.; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 64, a. 5, ad 2; n. 6, ad 3.

"Is a wife ever bound to ask the debt? It is certain, first, that ordinarily she is not bound..., because this is notably immodest for women. It is certain, second, in danger of incontinence, that when the other spouse is in danger of incontinence, both husband and wife are bound to ask in order to free the other from the danger.... Third, however, doubt arises whether the wife is then bound to ask from charity or from justice? The first opinion... says that she is bound from justice. The reason..., then it is rather rendering than asking of the debt.... And St. Thomas seems to adhere to this opinion, Suppl., q. 49, a. 5, ad 1.... The second opinion, which seems more probable..., says that she is bound only from charity. The reason is that where there is no express or tacit petition of the other spouse, there is no obligation of justice for rendering.... Therefore this kind of petition is not called absolutely rendering by St. Thomas, but a certain rendering of the debt.... From this opinion it is inferred that the spouse, since he or she is not bound from justice, but only from charity, in that case to asking, is not bound to ask with great inconvenience; hence the wife is probably then excused from asking if in this she would have to undergo great shame." L. 929. Cf. St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 64, a. 5, ad 1; a. 6, ad 3.

"If the man withdraws after his insemination but before the insemination of the woman, can she immediately excite herself by touches so that she may inseminate? The author of additions to Wigandt, etc., deny it. The reason is that the seed of the woman is not necessary for generation; likewise because that emission of the woman, as separate, does not become one flesh with the man. But more commonly Wigandt, Lessius, etc., affirm. The reason is both because the insemination of the woman pertains to completing the conjugal act, which consists in the insemination of each spouse; hence just as a wife can prepare herself by touches for copulation, so also she can perfect the act of copulation... and because, as many think, the insemination of the woman is necessary, or at least greatly contributes to generation, for nothing is done fruitlessly by nature. But all concede that wives who are of colder nature can excite themselves by touches before copulation, so that they may inseminate in the marital congress immediately to be had." D. 919.

And indeed nothing in this matter is had against nature, if one considers what has already been noted elsewhere: that the female seed properly is in the ovum, which almost every month descends from one or the other ovary into the uterus without any heat of lust. When the mingling of the male seed and the ovum has been made, the man and woman become one flesh, and that is had which is required and suffices for generation. Another seed in the woman, improperly so called, which is situated in that humor which sometimes also comes forth externally, is indeed useful for rendering the conjugal act easier, useful also for generation itself, but not necessary. Hence women who are cold in the very act of copulation can very well conceive and frequently become mothers. Therefore, just as, if this improper insemination simply does not have place, nothing is done against nature, so also if it does not occur at the same time, in the act of copulation, together with the insemination of the man. "It is not necessary," says Sanchez, book 9, disp. 17, n. 9, "that each spouse inseminate at the same time."

Many women, says Antonelli, sometimes do not undergo the aforesaid distillation or secretion of humor or vulvo-vaginal mucus in copulation. But although this secretion is not necessary for generation, nevertheless it is very useful for it; for through it not only does coitus become easier, but also, since it is of alkaline nature, it is able to change the acidic action of the vaginal secretion, which for this reason could even kill the spermatozoa. But since it indicates that perfect pleasure has been attained, it is clear that it truly is the complement of copulation, since pleasure of this kind is ordered by nature to generative copulation.

Nevertheless, since its defect by no means impedes generation, a woman is excused at least from every grave sin if she withdraws from inseminating, that is, from the aforesaid distillation or secretion, when the man has already inseminated. For fecundation can altogether be effected without such insemination or emission of mucus. Nor indeed are spouses bound to coire in the more apt way, but it suffices that generation not be impeded by them. Consequently, neither does the man sin gravely if he withdraws from copulation when he has already inseminated, not waiting for the insemination of the woman. Indeed, ordinarily at least it is not even venial; for, when ejaculation has been performed, the member is almost immediately relaxed, wherefore it is impossible to prolong copulation longer. Antonelli, vol. 2, p. 217, nn. 471, 472; p. 219, n. 477; p. 220, n. 478. Cf. here the following number.

"Do spouses sin mortally if, once copulation has begun, they restrain insemination? If both spouses consent in this, and there is no danger of inseminating outside the vessel, this, speaking per se, is not mortal; for that penetration of the female vessel is then reckoned like touching of the shameful parts, which is permitted between spouses, or at least is not mortal, when danger of pollution is excluded. Thus commonly.... If both consent, for if one withdraws without the consent of the other, he certainly sins gravely.... Speaking per se, for Sanchez wisely notes that this is ordinarily mortal, because ordinarily there is danger from such withdrawal of pouring out seed, unless the spouses have experienced the opposite; in which case, however, I think they can in no way be excused at least from venial sin.... But if the woman has already inseminated, or is in probable danger of inseminating, the man indeed cannot deliberately withdraw from insemination without grave fault, because then he is the cause that the seed of the wife is wasted.... But if the man has already inseminated, doubt arises whether the woman sins mortally if she withdraws from inseminating. The first opinion affirms... The reason is because, as they say, the seed of the woman also concurs actively for generation..., at least according to all the seed of the woman greatly contributes to the formation of the offspring, since at least for this it was instituted by nature. The second, more common opinion denies... These rely on the contrary foundation, namely that the seed of the woman is not necessary for generation.... Nor does it stand in the way... that the seed of the woman contributes to the perfection of the offspring; for they answer that spouses are not bound to the more suitable mode of generating, but it is enough if they do not obstruct generation." L. 918, 954.

Although the Holy Doctor says that this second opinion is more common and more probable, nevertheless he judges the first to be sufficiently probable, and therefore to be held in practice for avoiding harm to the offspring. And immediately the Holy Doctor adds that it cannot practically be probable that a woman in the act of coitus may divert her mind to other things, lest she be excited to insemination. And at n. 954 he says that this is more truly mortal. But since that insemination of the woman, concerning which the question is properly made here, namely the pouring out of interior humor, is in no way essential to generation, and it is certain that generation is not therefore impeded, it does not seem that in practice the first opinion must necessarily be held. Therefore the sin is rather from the intention of impeding generation than from the thing itself, as also happens in other things which, although they do not impede generation, nevertheless if they are done with this depraved intention, sin will certainly be present. E.M. "But something must be noted concerning the manner of quieting lust through the beginning and breaking off of copulation, by which some Theologians judge that it can licitly be quieted. We say at once that the end of quieting lust cannot be had except through copulation with emission of seed into the vessel, namely one which is apt for generation on the part of each; for the quieting of concupiscence is necessarily had only in this way, while the introduction of the penis and breaking off of copulation before ejaculation in no way diminishes, much less extinguishes, but very greatly increases and inflames the heat of lust. Therefore the breaking off of copulation cannot serve for restraining lust, since, on the contrary, the ardor of concupiscence is vehemently increased by it." Antonelli, vol. 2, p. 222, n. 483.

"Does the man sin mortally by beginning copulation in the improper vessel, so that afterwards he may consummate it in the due vessel? Commonly and more truly they affirm.... The reason is that coitus of this kind, even without insemination, is true sodomy, although not consummated; just as copulation itself in the natural vessel of another woman is true fornication, although insemination is not present." L. 916. The same Holy Doctor, ibid., affirms the same concerning simple touching of the male organs with the same improper vessel, "because at least such touching cannot morally be done without sodomitic affection."

Is it lawful in the conjugal act to think of another person and to take delight in that person? "Sanchez and Sporer excuse from mortal sin the spouse who would excite himself to copulation by taking delight in the beauty of another person, but without shameful affection; yet they rightly say that this is very dangerous and not to be permitted. Just as I think it also is not to be permitted to excite oneself to coitus by looking at images of the different sex, especially if they were sacred, which La Croix and Sporer rightly say is mortal because of grave irreverence. But is it lawful for a husband to take delight in the thought of another's copulation, namely had by others, so that he may excite himself to coitus with his wife? On the one hand it seems it must be denied, since the object in which he delights is per se shameful. On the other, such a spouse does not seem to be condemned.... But that... he, the husband, take delight in a thought of copulation between himself and another woman, I say is altogether to be rejected, since such delight is concerning an object intrinsically evil and altogether forbidden to the spouse himself." L. 913, 914.

"Is it lawful to ask with danger to health, namely if one or the other spouse labors under leprosy, venereal disease, phthisis, or another contagious disease? Speaking per se, it is not lawful, since no one is master of his life or health. Nevertheless Busembaum, etc., probably say that if the disease were long-lasting and not proximately tending to death, namely one that is not accustomed shortly and easily to bring death..., then it will not be illicit for the healthy one to ask, if there is a just cause..., because otherwise it would be very burdensome to abstain for so long from the use of marriage, which could scarcely be without danger of incontinence. Nevertheless it must be noted that a spouse infected with venereal disease, or syphilis, or a similar contagious disease, will not be able to ask from the other who is unaware, unless he manifests his defect to that person, and by manifesting it the other can meet the disease with remedies. Indeed, he will not even be able to render unless the healthy one has been informed.... But otherwise he is not bound to manifest it, because he is not bound with such great detriment to his reputation to furnish the conjugal debt. For in all contracts a most grave inconvenience in payment excuses from rendering the debt." L. 909, 910, 950. "This is the natural order, that something first be perfected in itself, and afterwards communicate to another from its perfection; and this also is the order of charity, which perfects nature. And therefore since the wife has power over the husband only as regards the generative power, but not as regards those things which are ordered to the preservation of the individual, the husband is bound to render the debt to the wife in those things which regard the generation of offspring, yet with the safety of the person first preserved." St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 64, a. 1. C. Quoniam, de Coniug. lepros.

The danger is most grave of transmitting syphilis from a syphilitic spouse to the other spouse and to the offspring through copulation. But the effects of syphilis are horrible, and it is also a frequent cause of abortion. Since through medical care ordinarily after some time, if the disease is rather light, it can be removed, copulation during this time is not to be permitted. Antonelli, vol. 2, p. 203, nn. 423, 430. But as regards having copulation in phthisis, it must be noted that grave danger of infection is present through kisses, and, as it seems, sometimes also through copulation, although through this it is not proximate. But since the phthisical are often troubled by great concupiscence, and grave harm does not come to them from moderate use of copulation, it seems that this can be permitted to them. Antonelli, l.c., n. 433. As regards other non-contagious diseases, one must see whether from copulation the disease is aggravated and brings danger of death or not. In diseases joined with fever, and especially in acute and inflammatory diseases, such as peritonitis, pneumonia, pleurisy, pericarditis, meningitis, cerebral hyperemia, and in cardiac defects and in several similar things, copulation will always bring grave harm, and also sometimes sudden death can follow during or after copulation. Antonelli, l.c., nn. 434, 436. Copulation immediately after a meal does not become free from danger until at least two or three hours have passed from the meal. Antonelli, l.c., n. 439.

There is danger of most grave evils and of the death of the mother and fetus in extra-uterine pregnancy, since this constitutes a true anomaly and derogation of the laws of physiology. Cf. Joseph Antonelli, Opusc. de Conc. impot. et steril., Rome, 1900, chap. 5, n. 104 ff.

Resolutions: "It is common that the wife is not bound to render the debt if she has experienced that she cannot give birth without probable danger of death, because payment of the debt does not oblige with such detriment." L. 953. Nor is a spouse bound to render if he or she can reasonably fear harm or grave danger to health, because spouses are not judged to have bound themselves to rendering the debt with such inconvenience. St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 64, a. 6, ad 4. The conjugal act in time of illness, at least generally, is not illicit even under light sin, because often no harm comes from it to the spouses; but the labor which accompanies the act, at least commonly speaking, can hardly influence the illness. Nevertheless, because of notable weakness of body, those laboring under strong fever or another grave disease are excused from rendering the debt. The wife is not excused from rendering the debt because of the ordinary inconveniences of birth, pregnancy, or nursing, nor even because of pains that are grave but brief in time, nor because of long-lasting but moderate pains, e.g., of the head for several months after birth, nor because of health somewhat weakened; because all these are annexed to the matrimonial condition. It is otherwise, however, if danger of life or of grave disease were truly to be feared according to the judgment of a truly prudent physician. L. 952.

"Can and must a spouse render when harm to the offspring to be born is feared? Commonly and more truly they affirm with St. Thomas, IV Sent., d. 32, q. un., a. 1, ad 4.... The reason assigned by St. Thomas is: A wife is bound to render the debt to a leprous husband, and although the offspring would be begotten infirm, nevertheless it is better for it thus to be than not to be at all." L. 951. What if the mother has experienced giving birth to dead children? In this case Laymann says that the wife can well render, indeed also ask, because that death of the fetus happens per accidens. Nevertheless Bossius and others hold that she can neither render nor ask, because from the death of the offspring the mother is exposed to great danger of life. Therefore, that danger excluded, it does not appear per se illicit to render and ask, although the spouse could for this reason be excused from rendering. And if danger of incontinence were present, as in fact it is, they almost commonly agree that then it is lawful to render and ask, and St. Alphonsus himself seems altogether to agree. L. 952, 953.

"Is it a just cause for denying the debt if more children are born than the spouses can support? The first opinion denies.... The reason is both because the procreation of offspring pertains to the principal end of marriage... and because it would expose the other to danger of incontinence.... But the second opinion affirms.... The reason is both because the multitude of future offspring would yield to the harm of the children already begotten, and because in all debts great difficulty excuses from payment." L. 941. The first opinion pleases the Holy Doctor more because of the danger of incontinence, which in reality will scarcely be absent.

Is it lawful to render to one asking illicitly with mortal sin? R. Negatively, if the fault holds itself on the part of the act, e.g., if the other asks in a sacred or public place. For the act itself is then illicit both for the one asking and for the one rendering. Affirmatively, if the fault holds itself only on the part of the person, e.g., if the person asks from a depraved end, because the act remains honorable in itself, and the other does not therefore lose the right to the act. Therefore, speaking per se, the spouse both can and must then render. Speaking per se; for if one can easily impede the other's sin, from charity one is bound to do this, or at least must admonish the other, if nevertheless one can do this without grave inconvenience, which they say is present for the most part. But if the spouse has lost the right through incest, then the other spouse can indeed render per se, but is not bound. L. 944-946; book 2, n. 61; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 64, a. 6.

With mortal sin. But with venial sin, if the act is venially illicit on the part of the act itself, the other is not bound to render to the one asking, because the other does not have a right to it, since it is per se illicit. Nevertheless the other can render when there is a just cause, "since any just cause excuses from venial sin" in this case. L. 946.

In the case of impotence supervening after marriage has been validly contracted, copulation by which a proximate danger of pollution is had consequently becomes illicit, since copulation then is not by reason of generation, and therefore cannot be had by reason of quieting concupiscence. For marriage is not ordered as a remedy of concupiscence except insofar as the union by which satisfaction is made to concupiscence is, from the nature of the thing, ordered to the more principal end of generation, such as is not the copulation of eunuchs.

The aforesaid impotence can be both on the part of the man and on the part of the woman. In impotence of this kind neither can ask nor render the debt by exercising copulation. Nevertheless spouses can in the case of the aforesaid impotence exercise touches, embraces, and kisses, yet apart from proximate danger of pollution, or consent in the case; without, however, pollution being able to impede the aforesaid acts if it follows only per accidens.

There is no lack of authors who permit the aforesaid spouses to exercise copulation, because, they say, they have a right to it. But this is the difficulty: for they indeed have a right to copulation which is according to nature; not to copulation from which pollution is had against nature.

"Is it lawful for a wife to render the debt or ask it from her husband who wishes to seminate outside the vessel after copulation has begun? The first opinion affirms..., because when the woman renders or asks, she gives her effort to a licit thing, nor should she herself be deprived of her right because of the malice of her husband. The second opinion says that the wife can neither ask nor render unless there is a grave cause which excuses her in permitting the sin of the man and in cooperating with the material element of that sin; otherwise she is bound from charity, when she can without grave inconvenience, to impede the sin of her husband. But I think a distinction must be made.

If there is question of rendering the debt, I say the wife probably can and is bound to deny the debt if she can do so without grave inconvenience, because one who will abuse the thing due to him does not have a right to vindicate the thing for himself. But it seems more probable that the wife not only can render, but is also bound. The reason is that when the fault stands on the part of the person asking, since that person has a right to copulation, the other cannot without injustice deny the debt if she cannot turn him away from such fault by admonishing him; and then it is clear that the one rendering does not even materially cooperate with the semination outside the vessel, but only with the copulation begun, which per se is altogether licit for both. But if there is question of asking the debt, I say that the wife cannot ask unless there is a just and grave cause. For then she is truly bound from charity to impede the sin of her husband. But she will have a just cause of asking if she herself were in danger of incontinence, or if otherwise she would have to be deprived of her right of asking more than once or twice, with a perpetual scruple whether then to contain herself would be a grave inconvenience to her, or not." L. 947. Cf. book 2, n. 53, par. Si vero; Sacred Penitentiary, November 16, 1816; February 1, 1823; June 8, 1842; E.M. "The sin of a married man with his own wife is not according to undue matter, but according to other circumstances, which do not constitute the species of the moral act." St. Thomas, II-II, q. 154, a. 1, ad 4. Therefore besides mutual scandal there remains the species of sin against nature, in whatever way after perfect copulation generation is impeded. Ferreres, 922, IV. This practice as regards the health of spouses is also fertile in very many grave evils. Antonelli, vol. 2, p. 351, n. 587.

Resolutions: The sin of the man in the preceding case is commonly called Onanism. It takes its name from Onan, second son of the Patriarch Judah, who after his brother Her had died was compelled according to custom to marry his widow Tamar, so that he might raise up seed to his brother; but entering to the wife of his brother, he poured the seed onto the earth, lest children be born in the name of his brother. And therefore the Lord struck him because he did a detestable thing. Gen. 38:9, 10. Voluntary Onanism is always a mortal sin, as being against nature; and therefore it can never be licit for spouses.

The wife can be excused from sin if for a grave cause she renders the debt to an onanist husband, provided that interiorly she does not consent to his sin, and exteriorly shows her repugnance by serious admonitions or other signs of displeasure. The wife does not sin by giving internal consent to pleasure when she can permit the conjugal act to an onanist husband, provided that she does not give assent to the sin of the man. The reason is that since she by no means sins by permitting an act of this kind, neither does she sin by admitting the pleasure coming from it, although she foreknows that the man will not perfect the copulation; for that act is in itself honorable and licit for the woman, and it is not through her that it is not perfected in the due manner.

But if the woman in that act has not inseminated, as is commonly said by the ancient theologians, she cannot after copulation excite herself to insemination, namely if the man withdraws without having performed insemination in the due vessel. For that act on the part of the woman is ordered by nature only to generative copulation. Therefore in the case it would be true pollution on the part of the woman, as it is on the part of the man. Likewise the man cannot excite himself by touches to insemination outside the due vessel, if the woman has already inseminated and has withdrawn from copulation without having waited for the man's insemination. The reason is the same, because such an act would be manifest pollution on the part of the man. L. 919.

Hence likewise it must consequently be said with the same St. Alphonsus, l.c., that the man cannot withdraw from copulation before he inseminates, if in it the wife has already inseminated or is in probable danger of inseminating. The reason is that otherwise that act of the woman would not attain the end intended by nature. "Vaginal washings, which women use for preserving the cleanliness of the genitals, are not to be done unless at least twelve hours after copulation, because otherwise the seed is lost with the emission of the washing employed, or life is killed and then lost, according to the nature of the washing." Antonelli, vol. 2, p. 186, n. 378. But, as far as time is concerned, a shorter time also suffices so that generation is not actually impeded.

"Can a spouse prohibited from asking by reason of a vow, or of affinity, or of spiritual kinship contracted after marriage, ever licitly demand the debt? The doctors commonly admit this if danger of incontinence is present in the other spouse. Indeed they say that then he is bound to ask, because this obligation arises from the institution itself of marriage. Likewise St. Thomas, IV Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, q. 2, ad 4, etc., also commonly admit that an impeded spouse can ask if the other asks interpretatively, namely when the woman, as St. Thomas says, is modest, and the man senses her will concerning the rendering of the debt. For then the impeded spouse can offer himself, because then it is rather rendering than asking." L. 930. Nevertheless as regards a spouse who, apart from necessity, baptized his own offspring, the opinion which denies that he is prohibited from asking the debt is sufficiently probable, and several grave doctors hold it, as the same Holy Doctor says, 150. But as regards a vow, it can be invalidated directly or indirectly by the spouse; indeed after the marriage has been made, without the consent of the spouse whose liberty of asking is restricted, it is judged illicit.

"But is it lawful for an impeded spouse to ask if he himself is in danger of incontinence? Viguerius, etc., affirms, especially if he were impeded by reason of affinity or spiritual kinship, and a dispensation could not conveniently be had, and there would be danger in delay, because ecclesiastical law does not oblige in so great a danger. But Sanchez, etc., deny, because danger of incontinence is a just cause of dispensing, but not of coeundum. But the first opinion with respect to an impediment imposed by the Church does not seem improbable to me, if truly a dispensation cannot be obtained shortly, and there is great danger in delay." L. 930. Concerning spiritual kinship, cf. here 1068.

"Is it lawful for an excommunicated spouse, although vitandus, to ask the debt, and to ask from one excommunicated, although vitandus? That it is lawful for a spouse to ask from an excommunicated person is certain from C. Quoniam multos 103, causa 11, q. 3. But is it also lawful for the excommunicated person to ask?... Commonly and more truly they affirm.... The reason is that ecclesiastical law does not oblige with so great a danger, in which the excommunicated person would indeed be if he could not be separated from the other spouse, as in fact he cannot, and could not ask." L. 931; C. Inter alia, de Sent. exc.

"Is a spouse bound to render the debt to one insane or drunk? Busembaum, etc., most commonly and more probably deny. The reason is that although such persons retain dominion, nevertheless they are incapable of the use of dominion.... But although there is no obligation of rendering to an insane or drunk spouse, nevertheless it is lawful to render to him or her, as they commonly say, since the use of marriage is per se licit, and the offspring can be educated by the spouse of sound mind, provided the danger of scandal or abortion is absent. Hence it is not lawful to coire with a furiously insane wife, unless it is established that she is sterile." L. 948.

It must be added that those conceived in drunkenness are very easily born inclined to mental alienations, to insanity and scrofula; and alcohol can infect even the ovum itself and the seed. To this is added that the offspring can easily be born dull and deaf-mute. Therefore a spouse is not bound to render to a drunken spouse. Antonelli, vol. 2, p. 205, n. 438.

"Whether and how do spouses sin by coeundum in an unnatural position? The natural position is that the woman be beneath and the man above; for this mode is more apt for the pouring out of the male seed and its reception in the female vessel for procreating offspring. But an unnatural position is if coitus is done otherwise, namely sitting, standing, from the side, or improperly after the manner of animals, or if the man is beneath and the woman above.... Commonly they say that all these modes do not exceed venial fault. The reason is that although some disorder is present... change of position does not impede generation, since the seed of the man is not received into the womb of the woman through infusion or descent, but by attraction, while the womb naturally attracts the male seed to itself." L. 917; St. Thomas, IV Sent., d. 31, at the end, in the exposition of the text. And, as the same St. Alphonsus and St. Thomas have in the places cited, this also is done without any sin if it is done from a just cause; and, on the contrary, it is a grave sin if from experience it were established that, with the natural position changed, the woman retained none of the seed. Cf. 1053.

Change of position is not grave. The reason is that in change of position the end of generation is obtained. For the fecundation of the ovum one spermatozoon alone suffices. But in the ejaculation of seed many thousands are emitted. Therefore when some of the seed penetrates into the vagina, by the proper motion of the spermatozoa these proceed as far as the uterus, the tubes, and the ovaries; all the more because their vitality lasts for several days, and if they meet the ovum, fecundation follows. Moreover, once ejaculation has been completed, and when the man has withdrawn, ordinarily the seed once poured into the vagina is no longer emitted, since then the vaginal walls adhere to each other in such a way that they touch one another, from which there is great difficulty of exit. Antonelli, vol. 2, p. 189, n. 381.

Note: The prudent confessor must beware lest he ask questions about the various modes of sexual congress which are not only useless, but also full of scandal. Hence, if the penitent introduces a doubt about these things, it will be enough for the confessor to know whether complete pollution was made outside the due vessel. If he introduces a doubt, or even if the penitent supplies an occasion of doubting; for no one fails to see that questions of this kind, in so slippery a matter, are never to be asked unless manifest necessity is present. L. 917.

"Is it lawful for spouses to coire during pregnancy? It is common that this is not mortal unless danger of abortion is present... St. Thomas, IV Sent., d. 31, at the end, in the exposition of the text.... Commonly such danger is not present.... And therefore spouses are not to be troubled with importunate questions.... But whether, apart from danger of abortion, it is a venial fault? St. Antoninus, etc., affirm. Sanchez, etc., deny, because nowhere is it held to be forbidden per se.... In order that coitus be licit in marriage, it suffices that the act per se be suitable for generation; but that generation itself does not occur holds itself per accidens. For the rest, the opinion which Pontius, etc., hold pleases me, namely that coitus with a pregnant woman cannot be excused from venial fault unless there is danger of incontinence or another honorable cause." L. 924. Therefore there is question at least of an uncertain obligation. But an honorable cause can scarcely ever be absent. Moreover, conception does not always coincide with copulation, but often happens after several hours, or days, or even after a week. Hence it cannot be determined from which copulation conception followed. Nor indeed do women themselves, especially in the first days, know their state of pregnancy. Therefore for this reason also they cannot then be prohibited from the use of marriage. But to prevent abortion it would suffice not to repeat copulation several times at the same time, and not to perform it too vehemently and with force. Antonelli, vol. 2, p. 193, n. 394.

Pregnancy is the natural and physiological development of the fetus which occurs when the fecundated ovum descends into the uterus and there settles; pregnancy is then called uterine. But any pregnancy which occurs outside the uterus constitutes a true anomaly and irregularity of physiological pregnancy, which, since it is outside the usual order and the physiological laws, is always the cause of very grave evils for the life of the mother and the fetus. Every pregnancy which has place outside the uterus, wherever the fetus develops, is called extra-uterine, and such fetuses are called extra-uterine or ectopic.

The whole time during which the fetus remains in the uterus is called pregnancy, and it ordinarily lasts for the space of nine months, or about 280 days. The fetus in the uterus is covered by several membranes and lies immersed in a certain whitish fluid, the amniotic fluid. In birth it is expelled from the uterus by contractions of the muscles of the uterus, which rupture the membranes enveloping the fetus, whereby the amniotic fluid begins to flow. The membranes of the fetus after birth are called the afterbirth.

A probable sign of pregnancy is the suppression of menstruation, when before this the woman had regular menstruation. Yet it must be noted that menstruation can cease also from other causes, and, even during pregnancy, can appear once or twice. To this are added changes in the genitals, and partly the size of the abdomen and uterus, which moreover can grow from other causes, a greater secretion of the vagina, and swelling of the breasts, which can also secrete milk.

Extra-uterine pregnancies for the most part end before the time because of the rupture of the membranes enveloping the fetus. Sometimes the fetus continues to complete development, but, as is clear, it cannot be born. In either case the life of the mother is placed in great danger. Extra-uterine pregnancy presupposes the uterus; for the uterus is the necessary way for the passage of sperm. Therefore when the uterus is absent, whether from birth or through a surgical operation, ectopic pregnancy is impossible. Antonelli, vol. 1, p. 142 ff.

"Is it illicit to coire during the period of purification after birth? There are three opinions. The first says that it is mortal from the final chapter of Dist. 5. The second opinion says there is no sin.... Because, as they say, uncleanness of this kind is only material, not moral. The third opinion, more probable and more common,... says that it is venial, but not per se mortal. It is venial because such coitus contains some indecency. Hence, unless an honorable cause excuses, namely danger of incontinence, or of discord, or another similar cause, it cannot be excused from every fault. But it is not mortal, speaking per se, because such indecency does not seem so great that it induces mortal fault.... Per se, for sometimes it could be mortal if from intercourse grave illness or a notable aggravation of illness were imminent."

L. 926. But the disposition of the cited final chapter has either fallen into desuetude, or concerns fittingness, not precept. But even light fault is only an opinion. Yet this must be noted: that in the first two weeks it can very gravely harm the woman. But in the other two following weeks the danger of so grave a harm is diminished. Generally, therefore, only after six weeks is the woman bound to render, when all danger then ceases. Therefore account must be taken in this matter of probable harm. After this time has passed, the puerperal period has its end, and menstruations again appear, which indicate that the woman is now fit for a new pregnancy. Menstruations, however, appear much later if the woman herself nurses her infant. Antonelli, vol. 2, p. 195, nn. 399, 400, 401.

"Is it lawful to ask the debt during nursing? Most commonly they affirm.... The reason is that no law prohibiting it exists." L. 911. Nor indeed is there any danger that the milk will be infected and corrupted.

Once nursing has begun, unless something impedes, it lasts for eighteen or twenty-four months. The secretion of milk suspends congestion of the uterus, or menstruation. If nursing is not done by the mother when she is able to nurse, not a few inconveniences follow, even grave ones for the mother and infant. For the breasts, since they cannot secrete the milk already prepared, exercise great action upon the uterus, which then acquires an easy disposition for contracting grave diseases. Yet there can be several physiological causes which impede the mother from nursing, e.g., great weakness on her part and various morbid affections, concerning which a physician must be consulted. Antonelli, vol. 1, p. 2, On the Fifth Precept, chap. 7.

During the time of nursing menstruation is suspended, and therefore it must be concluded that the time of nursing is less apt for a new fecundation. Yet this can still be had, and sometimes is had, and then the milk gradually diminishes until it ceases altogether. Antonelli, vol. 1, pp. 144-145; vol. 2, p. 196, n. 403.

"Is it lawful for spouses to coire during menstruation? During an extraordinary flow it is certain that it is lawful both to render and to ask... from St. Thomas, IV Sent., d. 32, q. un., a. 2, q. 2.... But during the time of the natural flow there are three opinions. The first condemns it as mortal, and this is held by the same St. Thomas, l.c., q. 3, ad 1.... The second opinion says that it lacks all fault.... The reason is that today this is prohibited by no law.... Although there is then an easy danger of frustrating the seed, nevertheless in order to make coitus honorable it is not required that generation follow from it, but it suffices that that coitus per se be apt for generation, granted that per accidens the seed is scattered, as happens in access to a pregnant or sterile woman.... The third opinion, most common and more probable, says that coitus during menstruation is not mortal, but is not excused from venial fault. That it is not mortal is proved by the reason adduced for the second opinion. But that it is venial is proved because such intercourse... involves a certain shamefulness and disorder, since... coitus then is less fitting for the end of generation. But Navarre, Paludanus, etc., agree that there is no sin in coiring at such a time if some cause is present which makes that shamefulness honorable, namely for avoiding discord, or incontinence, in oneself or in the other, or other similar things.... But in the case in which no cause is present, can and must a menstruating wife render the debt if the husband, once admonished, refuses to desist? Paludanus, etc., affirm. But more probably it must be denied.... The reason is that since the fault, even venial, holds itself on the part of the act, more probably the spouse is not bound, nor can she licitly render the debt." L. 925.

But practically, when the husband asks, scarcely, or not even scarcely, is a cause absent for the wife by which she may render. And St. Thomas himself, Suppl., q. 44, a. 4, says: "If the husband does not desist from asking, the wife must render the debt to the one asking." But the reason adduced by the Holy Doctor for the third opinion is opposed to the opinions of more recent physiological science, since during menstruation the woman is per se more apt for generation.

For the monthly flow of this kind is nothing other than a flow of blood, which flows more abundantly to the uterus when the release of some mature ovum from the ovary occurs. With the aforesaid flow, the organs become erect, the small veins of the uterus are distended, and more or less abundant blood drips forth and goes out through the genitals. Hence the aforesaid flow is a sign of ovulation; but its absence is a sign neither of impotence nor of sterility. For many women conceive without such a flow; and after it has ceased, even after a long time, it again appears. During a flow of this kind there is only danger of some local irritation for the woman, which can be lighter or graver according as that flow is more or less lasting and morbid. Regularly it lasts for two or three days. It begins from puberty, and around the forty-fifth to fiftieth year of age it usually ceases.

And in this matter it is now established as a principle that a woman can be fecundated at any time which intervenes from one menstruation to another, and sometimes cannot be fecundated in the times which are commonly held more apt for fecundation, such as the time which precedes or follows ovulation and the release of ova, and therefore menstruation. For the matter is not certain. And there are many causes which can change the time of maturation and release of ova, among which is coitus itself and the excitation of the genitals. Antonelli, Pastoral Medicine, ed. 2, part 1, chap. 15, nn. 219, 224. "Copulation during menstruation can bring many inconveniences to the health of the woman, and especially grave hemorrhages." Antonelli, vol. 2, pp. 190-191, nn. 387, 388. And if there is question of an extraordinary flow, it can be greatly feared that copulation will very much aggravate the disease. Hence, speaking per se, to perform copulation can be light or grave from this head. Antonelli, l.c., p. 191, n. 390.

"Is the conjugal act illicit on feast days, fast days, or Rogation days? It is common that rendering the debt is not then forbidden, with St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 64, a. 9.... But is it forbidden to ask? The first opinion affirms, and this is held by St. Thomas, l.c., a. 7, etc. Yet this is under venial fault, as St. Thomas says there, a. 8, with others, not under mortal fault, as some improbably hold.... But the second, more common opinion denies that it is illicit.... The reason is that this is held to be forbidden by no law." L. 923. Hence it is also deduced that there is no reason why use of this kind should be prohibited during Advent or Lent. Cf. 603.

"Are shameful touches and looks mortal between spouses on account of pleasure alone, without order to copulation? The common and truer opinion denies it.... The reason is that the conjugal state, just as it makes copulation honorable, so also makes touches and looks of this kind honorable. (Otherwise it would be exposed to very many dangers and scruples.) But just as pleasure sought in copulation does not exceed venial fault, so also in these touches and looks." L. 933. In truth, since incomplete acts of this kind are of themselves referable to the complete and perfect act, since this is licit for spouses, the former cannot per se be illicit for the same persons. L. 932, 933. A fortiori, acts of this kind are per se free from fault, whether they are less honorable or simply dishonorable, if they are immediately referred to copulation. For then they are a certain preparation for and beginning of copulation. Therefore, apart from the crime of voluntary pollution outside the vessel or of sodomy, nothing is done against the good of marriage. But the light fault which can be present in acts of this kind is easily excused by ends intrinsic to marriage itself or other extrinsic ends, e.g., because they are suitable for fostering affection or for calming concupiscence.

What if spouses foresee that pollution will follow from these shameful acts in themselves or in the other? The resolution depends on the intrinsic nature of the act, on the manner in which it is exercised, on the cause, and on the other circumstances. For there is question of the voluntary in its cause; therefore if the act is such, or at least is exercised in such a way, that per se and proximately it influences pollution, and no just cause is present, there is certainly grave sin. But otherwise, if the act is such, and is exercised in such a way, with due caution applied for preventing it, that pollution, if it follows, follows only per accidens, and there is a just cause.

Hence St. Alphonsus, after relating three opinions concerning the proposed question, says: "I think it more probable that it must be said that shameful acts between spouses with danger of pollution, both in the one asking and in the one rendering, are mortal; unless they are had so that the spouses excite themselves to copulation to follow proximately, because since they have a right to copulation, they also have a right to such acts, although pollution per accidens should precede copulation. But I also judge modest acts to be mortal if they are done with danger of pollution in oneself or in the other, in the case in which they are had for pleasure alone, or even for a slight cause; otherwise if for a grave cause, for instance if sometimes there is an urgent cause of showing signs of affection, for fostering love, or so that a spouse may avert suspicion from the other that he himself is inclined toward another person. Sanchez, etc., probably say that in the one rendering, even immodest touches, unless they are such that they seem to be pollution begun, are licit, although danger of pollution is present in either one, because then the one rendering applies himself to a licit thing to which he is bound by reason of the right of the one asking, who although he sins, nevertheless does not lose the right, since the fault holds itself on the part of the person." L. 934; Sanchez, book 9, disp. 45. Indeed St. Alphonsus himself, book 3, n. 484, says: "The common and more probable opinion teaches that pollution is not mortal unless it proceeds from a cause per se mortal in the genus of lust." And in book 3, n. 483, he says: "Yet exception is made if the aforesaid actions (gravely influencing pollution) are placed from a cause necessary, useful, or fitting for soul or body; for then pollutions proceeding from them, even foreseen, are not sins, provided that consent, or danger of it, is absent."

"Is it always mortal if a man places his private parts in the mouth of his wife? Sanchez, Bossius, and Perez deny it, provided danger of pollution is absent. But Sporer, Tamburini, Diana, and Fagundez more truly affirm it; both because in this act... there is proximate danger of pollution, and because this per se seems to be a new species of lust against nature, called by some irrumation. For whenever another vessel is sought by a man besides the natural vessel instituted for copulation, there seems to be a new species of lust." L. 935.

"Are the shameful touches which a spouse has with himself or herself, the other being absent, and apart from danger of pollution, mortal? The first opinion denies it.... The reason is that touches of this kind are made honorable by the conjugal state itself, since by their nature they are ordered to copulation; and therefore, apart from danger of pollution, they cannot be gravely illicit in a spouse, although he could not consummate copulation at present. But the second opinion, more probable, and altogether to be recommended in practice, affirms it.... The reason is both because a spouse does not have a right per se over his own body, but only per accidens, namely only so that he can dispose himself for copulation..., and because touches of the private parts, when they are done lingeringly and with commotion of the spirits, per se tend to pollution and are proximately connected with its danger." L. 936. And from the very reason of the second opinion, the first opinion rather certainly appears more probable.

"Is morose delectation in a spouse concerning copulation had or to be had, which nevertheless could not be had at present, mortal? The first opinion affirms it.... The reason is that such delectation is, as it were, pollution begun.... But the second, more common opinion... says that such delectation is not mortal if danger of pollution is absent, but only venial. It is venial because it lacks the due end, since it cannot be ordered to present copulation. But it is not mortal because delectation takes its goodness or malice from the object, and since copulation is licit for married persons, delight in it cannot be gravely illicit. And St. Thomas expressly favors this in De Malo, q. 15, a. 2, ad 17.... And Sporer admits this, even if venereal delectation is had, arising from commotion of the spirits. Finally the third opinion... distinguishes and says that if the delectation is without commotion of the spirits it will not be mortal; otherwise, if with commotion and titillation of the parts." L. 937.

It is indeed a grave sin if that delectation is proximately joined with danger of pollution; otherwise, however, if the danger of pollution is not proximately joined with that delectation. But this proximate danger of pollution, speaking per se, is not had according to the Holy Doctor from any commotion whatsoever of the spirits and alteration of the parts, but from a vehement and graver commotion of the spirits. But St. Thomas, in the place cited by St. Alphonsus, says: "Delectations in goodness and malice follow the pleasurable operations; and therefore, just as carnal union is not a mortal sin for one married, but is a mortal sin for one not married, a similar difference also exists concerning delectation and consent in delectation. For consent in delectation cannot be a graver sin than consent in the act, as is clear through Augustine."

But in truth this argument proves not only that consent in delectation (for this is what morose delectation means) is not mortal, but that it is not even a venial sin. Namely, it cannot be illicit to take delight in a licit thing, that is, to take delight with rational delectation; and similarly neither desire concerning future copulation nor approval concerning past copulation is per se illicit, because approval and desire of a licit thing cannot be illicit. L., book 5, nn. 23, 24, 25.

Therefore for spouses all those things are illicit which have the nature of pollution, or which by their nature contain its proximate danger. Hence several cases can be resolved which can occur from an abnormal state of the spouses. Sanchez, book 7, disp. 102, n. 6 ff.