Special Duties of Religious

WE learn from the Gospels that, besides the ordinary way of the Commandments to be followed by all who wish to save their souls, our Lord proposed the way of perfection to the select few who wished to follow him more closely.¹1 This way of perfection consists in renouncing the goods of this world and the cares of family life, and following our Lord’s example of perfect obedience to the will of our heavenly Father. From the first ages of the Christian Church there were many who accepted our Lord’s invitation and lived in voluntary poverty and chastity. Comparatively few historical documents of the earliest centuries of the Christian era have survived, but we find traces of a body of ascetics and virgins to whom a place of special honour was assigned in the Church. At first they seem to have lived in the bosom of their families, but soon they fled to the deserts of Egypt, Syria, and Palestine, and for guidance and encouragement put themselves under the rule of some experienced hermit. Nothing was then wanting to the essence of the religious state except vows and a rule. When the counsels of perfection began to be practised under vow cannot be determined exactly; the first formal religious rules are the work of St Basil and St Benedict. Thus in its essence the religious state has been instituted by Jesus Christ, and, as historically evolved under the guidance of his Church, it may be defined as a fixed and stable way of life approved by the Church for the faithful who, under a certain rule and a common way of living, wish to aim at perfection by the observance of the three vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, with the entire surrender of one’s self to God. Thus those who devote themselves to works of piety and charity without vows, or with only private vows, are not in the religious state, nor are they technically called religious. They want the necessary stability. This stability is given by the profession of public vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, the chief of the counsels of the Gospel, by which a person renounces the attractions of this world which draw so many away from God, in order to give himself wholly and entirely without let or hindrance to the love and service of God. The Church has always watched over and fostered the practice of religious life. In the thirteenth century there was danger of the great variety of religious orders causing confusion, and the Fourth Council of the Lateran forbade any new orders to be founded. The practical effect of this law was to prohibit new orders without the approbation of the Holy See. It is still in force as regards orders with solemn vows, which cannot be founded without the special approbation of the Pope. According to the new Code, bishops, but not Vicars Capitular or Vicars General, can found religious congregations with simple vows, but they are forbidden to found them or allow them to be founded without consulting the Holy See. If there is question of founding tertiaries living in common, the leave is also required of the General of the first order to which the tertiaries are to be affiliated (Can. 492).

A religious congregation founded by a bishop may in process of time acquire houses in other dioceses, but it remains diocesan and is wholly subject to the local Ordinaries, according to law, until it obtains a decree of the Holy See in praise of its end and scope, or one of formal approbation.

The end of religious life is perfect union with God, in which man’s perfection consists, and this union the religious disposes himself for by the constant practice of works of sublime charity and of renunciation of all that could be an obstacle to charity. Thus the religious state is the state of perfection; not that religious are supposed to be already perfect, but because perfection of Christian charity is the end aimed at, and suitable means are furnished therein for obtaining that end.

¹ Matt. xix.

The special obligations under which a religious lies follow from the nature of the religious state which we have described. Inasmuch as he devotes himself to the service of God in religion, he must do nothing that would endanger his perseverance or cause him to be dismissed from the order. He is especially bound to observe his vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, which he has voluntarily made to God, and in which the essence of religious life and the chief means of practising perfection consist. He is bound to keep the rule which he takes for his guide in life by the very fact of entering into the order which he has chosen as well as by ecclesiastical law (Can. 593). The obligation imposed by the rule is not the same in all religious orders. In some it binds under sin like the precepts of the superior. The rules of the Dominicans, Jesuits, and of most of the-modern congregations, of themselves, speaking generally, do not bind under sin. Particular precepts are sometimes inserted in the rule, and these of course are to be observed under sin like any other precepts of obedience. Apart from these the rule is rather a guide of conduct in religious life, and an indication as to how the superior should govern his subjects, than a rigid code of law binding under pain of sin. However, divines point out that frequently violations of such a rule will be sinful, not precisely because they are infractions of the rule, but because there will frequently be something defective in them as moral acts. If the silence which the rule prescribes is broken without just cause, the act will be sinful on account of the motive which led to it, the scandal which it causes, and its tendency to loosen the bonds of religious discipline. Formal contempt of the rule, by which a religious refuses to be guided by it, and wishes to show his independence, is mortally sinful, because it is directly contrary to his religious profession.

Vol. II, Bk. I, Pt. III, Chapter II. Entrance into Religion

Our Lord Jesus Christ proposed the counsels of perfection to all his followers in general: ‘‘ He who can take, let him take it’; “ If thou wilt be perfect.” When, however, we consider particular cases, we see that many are debarred as a matter of fact from embracing the religious state. Many find themselves in a fixed position in life with duties to be performed towards parents, relations, and others, which will not allow of their abandoning the world. Many more are unsuitable by character and temperament for the religious life. None of these can properly be said to have a divine call to the religious state, for when God gives a call he provides the necessary means for following it. There are others whom God calls in wonderful and different ways, making known his will to them sometimes in an extraordinary manner, more often by slowly developed inclinations and desires to forsake all and give themselves to him. The question arises whether such a divine vocation is a necessary condition for lawfully entering into religion, and whether one who felt himself called would sin if he neglected to follow the call.

Anyone who is free and who wishes to enter religion to be able to do more good, or to save his soul with greater security, is in fact called by God, for such desires are special graces given by God, and so they are signs of a divine vocation. So that all who have the aptitude, are free, and are led to religion by supernatural motives of some sort, are divinely called by God. One who entered religion from merely natural motives would probably soon find that he had made a mistake, and would return to the world. However, if such a one chose to rectify his intention and remained in religion to do good and to save his soul, he would not commit sin. He embraces a more perfect state of life, and if he does what in him lies, God will give him abundant grace to live a good religious life. Of course, sin is committed by one who enters religion from merely natural motives, and does not intend to fulfil the obligations of the state into which he has intruded himself. One who is called to religion and prefers to remain in the world acts very foolishly, throws away a great grace, and may expose his salvation to great danger. If such a one is persuaded that he cannot save his soul in the world, he commits grave sin by not taking the necessary means to secure his eternal salvation. If, however, he hopes with God’s grace (which will not be wanting to him) to lead a good life in the world, he will not commit sin by not following the divine call; for this is a counsel, not a command, and counsels do not bind under sin. Some divines disagree with the foregoing doctrine, but it is supported by the authority of St Thomas and many approved authors (cf. Can. 538).

As, therefore, the observance of the counsels is not only lawful but a more perfect state of life, anyone may enter into religion who is not prevented by some obstacle. Those who have not possession of their faculties, and children who have not arrived at the age of puberty, and are still subject to their parents, cannot enter into religion. In former times parents used occasionally to present their children to be brought up in monasteries with the intention of their becoming religious when they reached the proper age. This custom, however, has long been abandoned.

Besides safeguarding what the constitutions of each institute prescribe on the point, the Code declares that the following cannot be validly admitted to the novitiate: Those who have formally belonged to a non-Catholic sect.

Those who have not the age required for the novitiate.

Those who enter religion induced thereto by violence, grave fear, or deceit, or whom the superior receives from the same motives. A spouse while the marriage lasts.

Those who are bound or who have been bound by the bond of religious profession.

Those over whom hangs a penalty on account of committing some grave crime of which they have been or can be accused.

A Bishop, whether residential or titular, although only designated by the Roman Pontiff.

Clerics who, by an arrangement of the Holy See, are bound by an oath to work for the benefit of their diocese or mission, for the time during which the obligation of the oath lasts.

The following are admitted unlawfully but validly: Clerics in sacred orders without the local Ordinary being consulted, or against his will, because their departure would be to the great loss of souls, and this loss cannot otherwise be avoided.

Those in debt who are not solvent.

Those who are liable to render accounts or who are implicated in other secular business from which religion may have to fear lawsuits and troubles.

Children who ought to assist parents—that is, father, mother, grandfather, or grandmother—placed in grave necessity, and parents whose care is necessary for the support and education of children.

Those destined for the priesthood in religion, but who are debarred from it by irregularity or other canonical impediment (Can. 542).

Girls may not be admitted to the novitiate or be professed before they have completed their fifteenth year, and before doing so they must be examined by the bishop or by someone deputed by him as to whether they know the grave character of the step they are about to take, and whether they are acting of their own free and unfettered will (Can. 552).

n. 4.

Boys cannot be lawfully admitted into any order or congregation before the superiors thereof have received from the Ordinaries of their place of birth and of any place where they have lived for more than a year after attaining their fifteenth year testimonial letters bearing witness to their having the qualifications necessary for entering religion.¹ By the common law a full uninterrupted year of probation must be spent by the candidate for religion in the house of the novitiate. Although the novice has not yet taken the vows of religion, he is subject to the authority of the superiors of the order and is bound to obey them.

¹ S.C. super Stat. Reg., January 25, 1848; can. 544.

Vol. II, Bk. I, Pt. III, Chapter III. Religious Profession

PROFESSION is the promise lawfully made and accepted by which a religious binds himself to observe the vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, according to the constitutions of his order.

For the validity of any religious profession whatever it is required: (1) That he who makes it be of the legitimate age, so that he must have completed for the temporary profession, his sixteenth year, and for the perpetual profession whether solemn or simple, his twenty-first year.

(2) That the legitimate superior according to the constitutions admit him to profession.

(3) That it be preceded by a valid novitiate according to the terms of Canon 555.

(4) That the profession be free from violence, grave fear, or fraud. -(5) That it be expressed in formal terms.

(6) That it be received by the legitimate superior according to the constitutions, either personally or by delegate.

(7) For the validity of the perpetual profession, whether solemn or simple, it is required besides that it be preceded by a temporary simple profession. Except in the case of a professed religious who joins another institute, in every order with solemn vows both of men and of women, and in every congregation with perpetual vows, the perpetual vows, whether solemn or simple, must be preceded by the profession of simple vows, which the novice on the completion of his novitiate shall make in the novitiate house itself, this profession is valid for three years, or for a longer period if the subject requires more than three years to attain the age prescribed for perpetual profession, unless the constitutions require annual profession (Can. 572-574).

Simple profession, whether temporary or perpetual, renders acts contrary to the vows illicit, but not invalid, unless it be otherwise formally expressed; while solemn profession renders such acts also invalid if they can be nullified (Can. 579).

Vol. II, Bk. I, Pt. III, Chapter IV. Religious Poverty

Poverty in general is the want of temporal goods that have a money value. It is not a virtue of itself, but rather a physical defect, for a suitable provision of temporal goods is very useful and necessary for men to lead a decent life. Poor human nature, however, is inclined to attach itself too much to wealth, and for the sake of wealth to forget why man was created by God and placed in this world. Jesus Christ taught that detachment from worldly possessions was a necessary condition for being his disciple: “‘ Every one of you that doth not renounce all that he possesseth, cannot be my disciple.”¹ And for such as were not content to follow him in the ordinary way of the observance of the Commandments, but aimed at perfection, he proposed not only detachment from wealth or spiritual poverty, but actual poverty, the actual renunciation of wealth for his sake in order to imitate him more closely: “ If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven; and come, follow me.² Hence voluntary poverty in imitation of Jesus Christ is the foundation of the religious state. Voluntary poverty, however, does not constitute the essence of religious perfection; all Christian perfection consists in charity, to which poverty is but a means. Hence there is not an absolute and uniform standard of religious poverty, but it varies with the different ends which religious orders propose to themselves. Indeed, religious poverty is personal; it is the voluntary renunciation of personal and individual wealth, so that the love of wealth may not be an obstacle to the perfect following of Christ. Its essence consists in the renunciation of personal and independent ownership and use of property, for this it is which constitutes a snare for men’s affections and a hindrance to perfection, So that religious poverty does not of itself prevent property being owned in common by religious, and if the end for which an order was founded requires it, there is nothing to prevent it having large possessions in common, provided that the individual religious practises poverty and is imbued with its spirit.

The effects of the vow of poverty depend to a great extent on the rules and constitutions of the various religious orders and on the positive law of the Church. The chief distinction is that between solemn and simple vows of poverty, due to positive ecclesiastical law. The legal effects of a solemn vow of poverty are to render the religious incapable of individual and personal ownership of any property that has money value. So that after taking a solemn vow of poverty the religious cannot own any property in his own personal right. As a member of a religious community he may be a joint owner of vast possessiens, but individually he is incapable of having anything as his own.

Ownership may be absolute or qualified. Absolute ownership is the moral right to dispose of property and of all its uses for one’s own advantage. Qualified ownership is the right to dispose of the property or of its uses for one’s own advantage. Divines call the qualified ownership of the thing itself direct ownership, and the qualified ownership of its uses they call indirect ownership. A religious, even though solemnly professed, retains his personal rights to life, good name, and honour; he can still dispose of his personal actions, such as the celebration of Mass, and such personal rights as that of presenting to a benefice; he may own a relic and dispose of it by gift, for it has no money value. As a solemnly professed religious is incapable of owning property in his own right, so he cannot acquire it for himself; whatever he gains by his labour, or whatever comes to him by gift or inheritance, becomes the property of the community to which he belongs; “ whatever a monk acquires he acquires not for himself, but for his monastery,” as the old adage had it. By the special constitutions of their respective orders, Capuchins, Observantines, and professed Jesuits cannot take property, even in the name and for the benefit of the community to which they belong, if it come to them by any hereditary title or by operation of law. They may, however, take gifts and legacies, and these become the property of their communities (Can. 582).

The simple vow of poverty does not deprive the religious of the direct, but of the indirect, ownership of property; so that he cannot lawfully use or dispose of anything that has a money value without the leave of his superior. Notwithstanding, then, the simple vow of poverty, religious retain the direct ownership of all the property that they had before profession, and of all that comes to them afterwards by any legal title or gift.

Several Canons of the new Code affect the matter of religious poverty. By Canon 568, if during the novitiate a novice in any way whatever renounces his benefices or his property or encumbers them, such a renunciation or encumbrance is not only illicit but also null and void.

Canon 569 prescribes: Sec. i. Before the profession of simple vows, whether temporary or perpetual, the novice must cede, for the whole period during which he will be bound by simple vows, the administration of his property to whomsoever he wishes, and dispose freely of its use.and usufruct, unless the constitutions determine otherwise.

Sec. ii. If the novice, because he possessed no property, omitted to make this cession, and if subsequently property come into his possession, or if, after making the provision, he becomes under whatever title the possessor of other property, he must make provision, according to the regulations of Sec. i, for the newly acquired property, even if he has already made simple profession.

Sec. iii. In every religious congregation the novice, before making profession of temporary vows, shall freely make a will of all the property he actually possesses or may subsequently possess, While safeguarding this latter canon, Canon 580 prescribes that all those who have made profession of simple vows, whether perpetual or temporary, unless the constitutions declare otherwise, retain the ownership of their property and the capacity to acquire other property. But whatever the religious acquires by his own industry or in respect of his institute, belongs to the institute.

As regards the cession or disposition of property treated of in Canon 569, sec. 2, the professed religious can modify the arrangement, not, however, of his own free choice unless the constitutions allow it, but with the permission of the Superior General, or, in the case of nuns, of the local Ordinary, as well as with that of the Regular Superior if the monastery be subject to regulars; the modification, however, must not be made, at least for any considerable part of the property, in favour of the institute; in the case of withdrawal from the institute this cession and disposition ceases to have effect.

Except within sixty days preceding the solemn profession, the professed of simple vows cannot validly renounce his property, but within this time, he must, saving special indults from the Holy See, renounce in favour of whomsoever he wishes all the property which he actually possesses on condition of his profession subsequently taking place. 47 The profession having been made, the necessary measures must be immediately taken to insure that the renunciation be effective also according to the civil law (Can. 581).

‘After profession of solemn vows, likewise without prejudice to special indults of the Apostolic See, all the property which comes in whatever manner to a regular— (1) In an order capable of ownership, goes to the order, to the province, or to the house, according to the constitutions: (2) In an order incapable of ownership, such as the Capuchins, it becomes the property of the Holy See (Can. 582).

Those who have made profession of simple vows in any religious congregation: (1) May not abdicate gratuitously the dominion over their property per actum inter vivos. This phrase is technical, and signifies any way of disposing of property except by will. So that after profession of simple vows the professed cannot lawfully make a gift of his property to anyone.

(2) May not alter the will made according to the terms of Canon 569, sec. 3, without the permission of the Holy See, or if the case be urgent and time does not admit of recourse to the Holy See, without the permission of the higher superior, or, if recourse cannot be had to him either, without the permission of the local superior (Can. 583).

Within the limits indicated above, a religious, with the leave of his superior, may lawfully use and dispose of property. In order to justify such use and to excuse it from sin against the vow, the presumed leave of the superior is sufficient, which consists in a reasonably founded judgement that the act contemplated is not against the superior’s wish. Much more will the actual, virtual, or tacit leave of the superior excuse an act of ownership on the part of a religious and prevent it from being a violation of the vow.

¹ Luke xiv 33.

² Matt. xix 21.

Sins against poverty are grievous if the matter be considerable. The measure as to what matter is considerable is the same here as in theft, for just as the sin of theft consists in taking away the property of another against his reasonable wish, so a sin against religious poverty consists in the use, disposal, or acceptance of property contrary to one’s promise to God and the wish of religious superiors. The absolute sum which is necessary and sufficient for a mortal sin against the vow in all cases will be one pound sterling, and less will be sufficient if the community whose property is used or disposed of without leave is poor. Divines, however, allow that a moderately rich monastery may be considered in this matter as equivalent to an absolutely rich individual proprietor.

In some orders it was customary for the religious to have money, books, eatables, for their own use, and such allowance was called the peculium of the religious. Such a practice is against the purity of religious poverty, and it was forbidden by the Council of Trent, as well as by several Roman Pontiffs. Indeed, if it was understood that subjects had the right to use and dispose of the peculium as they pleased, in perfect independence of the will of their superior, it would be against In many orders the the very essence of religious poverty. custom is still sanctioned of having a peculium in more or less dependence on the will of the superior.

It is not against poverty to administer money in the name of another, for such administration is not an act of ownership. A religious may, then, act as the almoner of another, but he must not distribute alms in his own name as if the money were his own. To keep a deposit of money with the obligation in justice of accounting for it is against religious poverty.

Vol. II, Bk. I, Pt. III, Chapter V. Vow of Chastity

THE Catholic Church, following the teaching and example of our Lord and of St Paul, esteems very highly the beautiful virtue of chastity. According to her teaching, the state of marriage is indeed good, and Jesus Christ raised marriage to the dignity of a sacrament, but the state of virginity is better. For such as wish to follow Jesus Christ more closely and to dedicate themselves wholly to God, celibacy and absolute chastity are proposed as a counsel of perfection. There is no fear that the number who embrace this counsel will ever be so great as seriously to interfere with the proper increase of “ the population. There will always be a sufficient number left in the world to enter upon the married state. Nor is the heroic renunciation of the pleasures of married life made by religious lost upon the world. As long as there are numbers of men and women to be seen who for love of God and chastity lead solitary lives, it should be more easy for people in the world to curb their fleshly appetites so as to keep within the bounds of reason and virtue.

By the vow of chastity the religious promises Almighty God. that he will altogether abstain from all venereal pleasure, whether of thought or deed. In consequence he is bound to observe perfect chastity of body and mind, so that any act which he commits contrary thereto will be a double sin, against the virtue and against his vow. We saw, when treating of the Sixth Commandment, that sins by which venereal pleasure is directly sought or consented to are always grave, and so, when such sins are committed by religious, their grievous malice will be twofold.

One who has taken a solemn vow of chastity is incapable of contracting a valid marriage by the law of the Church, and a fortiori he cannot enter on valid espousals. A marriage contracted and consummated before the taking of a solemn vow of chastity remains valid, but by ecclesiastical law a marriage which has not been consummated is dissolved by solemn vows taken in a religious order (Can. 1119). A simple vow of chastity never annuls a previous marriage, but it makes the use of marital rights unlawful. It is a disputed point as to whether a simple vow annuls previous espousals. A simple vow of chastity certainly makes subsequent espousals invalid, as being an unlawful promise, and it renders subsequent marriage unlawful though not invalid, except the simple vow made in the Society of Jesus, which is a diriment impediment to marriage by a special privilege of the Holy See.

In order to safeguard the chastity of religious, and to enable them to lead more quiet and tranquil lives, the law of enclosure has been introduced. The enclosure in a religious house is all the space within which the religious may move freely, but which they may not leave without the required permission, and to which others are denied access.

The law of enclosure is laid down in detail in the new Code of Canon Law, Can. 597 ff.

Papal enclosure should be kept in the houses of regulars, whether of men or women, if they are canonically erected, even though less than six professed religious live there.

Enclosure should also be kept in the houses of religious congregations whether of pontifical or diocesan law. The bishop has authority in this matter, and can enforce his regulations by censure.

Even societies of men or women who live together under a superior like religious, but without vows, are subject to the law of enclosure according to Canon 679, sec. 2.

Vol. II, Bk. I, Pt. III, Chapter VI. Vow of Obedience

MEN of the world find it difficult to understand how one man can surrender his liberty and bind himself by vow to obey another. And yet this counsel of perfection, too, is contained in the life and teaching of the divine Founder of the Church. He did not intend that all the members of his Church should be equal; he placed some in authority over the others, and he gave them power to teach, instruct, correct, and guide those who were subject to them. He therefore laid a duty of obedience to spiritual rulers on all the faithful. Those who were content to observe the Commandments were bound only to obey such positive precepts as the rulers of the Church judged it expedient to impose on all Christians; but those who aimed at perfection became as a consequence subject to the teaching and authoritative guidance of their rulers in matters which pertain to perfection as well. Those who were content with observing the Commandments reserved some liberty for themselves; those who aimed at Christian perfection gave themselves wholly to obedience after the example of him who was obedient even unto death. The prelates of the Church are therefore the superiors of religious men and women, and even if some are exempt in some matters from the jurisdiction of the ordinaries, all are subject to the Pope, not only as the Supreme Head of the Church on earth, but as their highest religious superior.¹ In approving of a religious order or congregation the Pope and the bishops delegate the necessary authority to the lawful superiors of the order, and give them power to command their subjects in all that pertains to the observance of the rule.

A religious, therefore, who takes a vow of obedience binds himself thereby to obey all the precepts which his superiors lay upon him according to the rule of the order.

In order, then, that the obligation of the vow may become operative, a precept must be given by the superior, And here we must distinguish between the vow and the virtue of obedience. The virtue of obedience inclines to the most perfect conformity of will and judgement of the subject with the will and judgement of the superior. A subject who has the virtue of obedience will strive to execute the known will of his superior without waiting for a strict command. The obligation of the vow is not so extensive as the virtue of obedience. The vow will be saved if precepts are externally executed, for, according to the more common opinion, the vow of obedience does not extend to merely internal acts.

The superior’s authority is limited and defined by the rule, and so the subject is only bound to obey such commands of the superior as are sanctioned by the rule directly or indirectly. It is not, however, necessary that the precept should be expressly sanctioned by the rule in order to enable a superior to impose it with authority: it is sufficient if it be implicitly and indirectly sanctioned, as it will be if its imposition conduces to the better and more perfect observance of the rule.

¹ St Thomas, 2-2, q. 186, a. 5; can. 499, sec. 1.

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. II, Diss. III, Part III. On the Duties of Religious · Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. II, Diss. III, Pt. III, Section I. Preliminary Notes · Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. II, Diss. III, Pt. III, Section II. On the Duties of Religious · Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. II, Diss. III, Pt. III, Sect. II, Chapter I. On the Substantial Duties of Religious

Violations of the vow of obedience are grave sins of themselves. However, in practice, sins of religious against obedience are seldom mortal, for want of sufficiently grave matter, or because the superior does not intend to impose a grave precept. Such sins will be mortal when in grave matter the superior commands anything to be done in virtue of obedience, or when serious harm follows from disobedience, or when a subject refuses to obey from formal contempt of authority, wishing to exercise and display his independence.

When the vow of obedience is violated, there is a double malice in the sin. Such a violation is a sin against the vow, and thus it is a sacrilege; and it is also a sin against the Fourth Commandment of the Decalogue, which prescribes obedience to be rendered to all lawful superiors. Such lawful superiors are armed with spiritual jurisdiction delegated to them by ecclesiastical authority, or at least they have the natural authority which belongs to all rulers of a community, great or small. Superioresses of nuns have this natural authority, and so they can impose even grave precepts of obedience on their subjects, although as women they cannot have ecclesiastical jurisdiction.

Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology

Ludovicus Wouters, C.SS.R. — 4 passages

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. II, Diss. III, Part III. On the Duties of Religious

(St. Thomas, 2-2, qq. 179-189; St. Alphonsus, Theologia Moralis, book IV, nn. 1-82; Homo Apostolicus, tract 13, nn. 1-29.)¹

¹ Cf. Code of Canon Law 487-681; Cajetan, Commentarius on the cited place of St. Thomas; Billuart, Tractatus de statu religioso; Suarez, De virtute et statu religionis, tract VII-X; Wernz, Ius Decretalium III, n. 586 sq.; Vermeersch, De religiosis institutis et personis; Vermeersch-Creusen, Epitome Iuris Canonici, 4th ed., I, n. 531 sq.; Peyska, Ius canonicum religiosorum; Schafer, De religiosis ad normam iuris canonici; Fanfani, De iure religiosorum; Chelodi, Ius de personis.

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. II, Diss. III, Pt. III, Section I. Preliminary Notes

In order that the duties of religious may be better explained and understood, certain things must first be noted concerning the religious state itself, then concerning the society of persons which lives the religious state, or concerning a religion, and finally concerning admission into religion.

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. II, Diss. III, Pt. III, Section II. On the Duties of Religious

Vol. III, On the Particular Obligati…, I. On the Nature of the Religious State · Vol. III, On the Particular Obligati…, II. On Divine Vocation · Vol. III, On the Particular Obligati…, III. On the Novitiate · Vol. III, On the Particular Obligati…, IV. On Profession · Vol. III, On the Particular Obligati…, V. On the Vow of Poverty

The Code first declares: All religious are also held by the common obligations of clerics, concerning which in canons 124-142, unless something else is clear from the context of the discussion or from the nature of the thing (can. 592). We spoke about these obligations in n. 1157 sq. But here we must speak about the special obligations or duties of religious; and indeed first about the substantial duties, so to speak, and those connatural to the religious state, then about certain other duties.

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. II, Diss. III, Pt. III, Sect. II, Chapter I. On the Substantial Duties of Religious

n. 1234.

The substantial duties of religious are: the pursuit of acquiring perfection, the observance of vows, likewise of rules and constitutions. These are sufficiently indicated by can. 593: All and each religious, Superiors equally as subjects, must not only faithfully and entirely observe the vows which they have pronounced, but also compose their life according to the rules and constitutions of their own religion and thus strive toward the perfection of their state.

McHugh–Callan, Moral Theology

John A. McHugh, O.P., and Charles J. Callan, O.P. — 1 passage

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. III, Art. 1. The Duties of Memb…, Special Duties of Religious

n. 2611.

The Special Duties of Religious

The Special Duties of Religious.—The particular obligations of religious are declared in the proper rules of the various institutes, just as the particular obligations of the secular clergy are set forth in the statutes of local synods and councils. We shall outline here only the general obligations of religious, to which they are held by the common law of the Church.

(a) By reason of his profession, a religious is obliged to strive after the perfection of charity (see 1560, 367) through the religious life, that is, by means of the rules and constitutions of his own institute (Canon 593). All religious, superiors and subjects, are bound to observe their laws, but per se these laws oblige under penalty, not under sin (see 570). Per accidens, however, the transgression of rule or constitutions may be sinful, as when the matter belongs also to divine or church law or to the observance of a vow, or when the transgression includes contempt, scandal, or demoralization of discipline.

(b) By reason of the vows, a religious is obliged to follow the three evangelical counsels (see 2191 sqq.) and any other vows of his institute according to his rule (e.g., poverty is a renunciation of even community possession in some rules and of individual possession in others). The vows oblige per se under grave sin, on account of the duty of religion (see 2209) and the intention of the religious to bind himself gravely; but there may be venial sin on account of imperfection of act or lightness of matter.

Bucceroni, Institutions of Moral Theology

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 56 passages

Vol. III, On the Particular Obligati…, I. On the Nature of the Religious State

n. 248.

What is the religious state? - The religious state, considered as regards its intrinsic essence, is defined: A stable institute of life, approved by the Church for the faithful, who under a certain rule and common manner of living wish to tend to perfection through the three vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, with a handing over of themselves made to God and accepted by him. Therefore religious do not necessarily belong either to the hierarchy of jurisdiction or to the hierarchy of order; but they are, or can be, simple faithful in the Church, and therefore of either sex. - Suarez, de Relig. tr. 7, l. 2, c. 1, n. 1.

Their state is a state of perfection. There is indeed a twofold state of life: one of common life, which intends nothing other than the observance of the commandments of God; another of perfection, which adds the observance of the counsels. The perfection of Christian life is in charity. "Each thing is said to be perfect insofar as it attains its proper end, which is the ultimate perfection of the thing. But charity is that which unites us to God, who is the ultimate end of the human mind." St. Thomas 2. 2, q. 184, a. 1. Therefore the perfection which constitutes the state of perfection, distinct from the state of common life, is the perfection of charity.

Moreover a threefold perfection of charity can be considered. The first is absolute, by which "God is loved as much as he is lovable, and such perfection is not possible for any creature, but belongs to God alone." Another, by which "the affection according to its whole power always actually tends toward God; and such perfection is not possible on the way, but will be in the fatherland." The third, by which "those things are excluded which are repugnant to the motion of love toward God.... And such perfection can be had in this life. And this in two ways: in one way insofar as from the affection of man is excluded everything which is contrary to charity, such as mortal sin; and without such perfection charity cannot exist, whence it is of the necessity of salvation; in another way insofar as from the affection of man is excluded not only that which is contrary to charity, but also everything which impedes the affection of the mind from being totally directed to God, without which perfection charity can exist." St. Thomas 2. 2, q. 184, a. 2. Hence precepts pertain to that former charity; counsels to this latter.

Therefore that perfection of charity is certainly not in merely essential charity, but in a certain peculiar superabundance of charity, which surpasses the common and necessary charity of Christians. But this excess of charity is not situated in some one or several transitory acts of charity, even if they are of great or greatest intensity; but in such charity, in preparation of soul and habitual disposition, that a man is proximately prepared and disposed to act easily and ordinarily according to the precepts and counsels of God. St. Thomas q. 184, a. 2, 3, 4. And thus the same Angelic Doctor, q. 186, a. 1 ad 4, says: "The state of religion is principally instituted for acquiring perfection through certain exercises by which the impediments of perfect charity are removed." And a. 2: "He who assumes the state of Religion ... is held to tend to this and to give labor to it, that he may have perfect charity."

Now the state of perfection is twofold: one is the state of acquired perfection, another of perfection to be acquired. The former is proper to Bishops, the latter to religious. Indeed the state of Bishops is the state of exercising charity in a more notable grade, and of moving others to it by chosen works of zeal. But the state of perfection to be acquired is one thing incomplete or begun, another complete. For the former the three principal evangelical counsels of poverty, chastity, and obedience are not required; but some counsel is sufficient, whether it is one of those three principal ones or another, for the counsels are very many in number. But for the latter the three evangelical counsels of poverty, chastity, and obedience are required and suffice, to be observed from obligation; and consequently they must be confirmed by vow. For by these three vows almost all impediments of charity are removed. But the religious state is the complete state of perfection to be acquired. - St. Thomas q. 184, a. 4-8; q. 186, a. 3-7; Quodl. 3, a. 17; Quodl. 4, a. 24; Quodl. 5, a. 19.

Those three vows, although nevertheless of themselves they ought to be perpetual, for this is required by the very nature of the state; by no means is it required from the intrinsic nature of the thing that they be solemn, but it is enough that they be simple. This is openly established from the Constitution Quanto fructuosius of Gregory XIII, 1583, and Ascendente Domino, 8 Kalends of June 1584, where it is established that those who have emitted the three simple vows in the Society of Jesus are truly and properly religious. Moreover Leo XIII, Decree of March 16, 1886, established that knights of the Teutonic Order continue to become true religious, but emit only simple vows.

The solemnity of vows is from the disposition of the Church; hence it is a certain force added to them, of constituting one as religious properly and strictly such from canonical institution, and of making certain acts of a religious, concerning the matter of the same vows, void or at least voidable, and of dissolving ratified marriage, and of rendering the vows themselves altogether firm and stable. And that force is absolute, and not merely relative to a certain time, or until the religious, free from vows, is dismissed. Hence for the solemnity of vows it is not sufficient that there be just any force of producing the aforesaid effects; but that force must be absolute, i.e., so perpetual and immutable that neither the religious nor even the religion itself can suspend or remove that force and the vow itself. But it is by no means required, as is clear, that that force of the vow and the vow itself cannot be removed by the Roman Pontiff; for that force is of ecclesiastical law, and therefore the Pope can dispense both from the effect of the solemnity of vows, while solemn vows remain, Decree of the S. C. of Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs, July 31, 1878, and from the solemn vows themselves. Therefore the solemnity of a vow is in its complete dependence on and subjection to the Supreme Pontiff, in the full acceptance and approval of the Church as regards the being of the vow, its force, and the said canonical effects. And thus Busembaum, l. 3, n. 195, says a solemn vow "is that which is accepted as such by the Church.... But simple is every vow which does not have such solemnity," namely such acceptance of the Church as regards the aforesaid canonical effects. And the S. Penitentiary in the year 1820 declared: "a solemn vow is that which is accepted as such by the Church, and renders the one vowing perpetually and immovably incapable of contracting marriage and of acquiring or retaining dominions of things." "And this is," says Cajetan on 2. 2, q. 88, a. 7, "what Boniface VIII determined in the Sixth, saying that the solemnity of a vow was found by the institution of the Church alone." And St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 189, a. 5: "The vow of religion is twofold. One is simple, which consists in the promise alone made to God, which proceeds from interior deliberation of the mind, and this vow has efficacy from divine law.... But another is the solemn vow, which makes a monk or religious; and this indeed is subjected to the ordering of the Church because of the solemnity which it has annexed," a solemnity not extrinsic from extrinsic ceremonies, but intrinsic by reason of the object insofar as it extends broadly, and of the immobility of the vow itself. And from this ordering of the Church the Angelic Doctor immediately repeats that a vow made before puberty "does not have its effect, so that it makes the one professing already to be religious," and consequently that it is not solemn, "however much someone may have full use of reason, or be capable of fraud, namely because the Church regards that which is in the majority of cases." Therefore the solemnity of a vow is not from the nature itself of the vow, but from the constitution alone of the Church, accepting and approving the vow, and by that acceptance and approval implicitly blessing the person and perfectly, totally, and stably consecrating him in order to observe chastity, obedience, and poverty, in the profession of a certain rule, "by which through renunciation of the world and of one's own will someone assumes the state of perfection, and totally subjects himself to divine service." St. Thomas 2. 2, q. 83, a. 7. "The solemnity of a vow consists in a certain spiritual blessing and consecration, which is done through the ministry of the Church; therefore the solemnization of a vow falls under the disposition of the Church." St. Thomas l. c. a. 9; C. Quod votum un. de Vot. et vot. red. in 6. - St. Thomas 2. 2, q. 88, a. 7, 9; q. 133, a. 1; q. 134, a. 4, 5; q. 186. Cf. here vol. 1, n. 571.

Hence a distinction is especially had between Religion properly and strictly said, according to canonical institution, and a religious Congregation. For by Religions properly and strictly said are to be understood institutes which have the essence of the religious state with solemn vows; but by Religious Congregations are to be understood institutes which have the essence of the religious state, but with simple vows only, approved however by the Holy See, and so approved that the vows which are emitted in such a Congregation are not private vows, but public, i.e., are accepted by someone in the name of the Congregation or of the Apostolic See, whence they are said to be made into his hands. Otherwise it is not a religious Congregation, but a secular one. Benedict XIV, Brief Quo magis, December 18, 1742; S. C. Bishops and Regulars, August 11, 1889; Enchiridion Morale 248, ed. 4, p. 224.

By this pronouncing of the three vows, with attention to their nature, there is had a total handing over of oneself to God, St. Thomas q. 186, a. 7, a. 6 ad 2; yet this is accepted not immediately by God himself, but by some man in his name. And thus it was always judged by the Fathers that the religious state is a donation and handing over of oneself made to God. But God, "according to ordinary providence, does not receive a peculiar care of governing a private person immediately by himself, nor does he need these sensible things, so that he may use them immediately and without the intervention of secondary causes. And therefore a donation thus made to God either would be vain and idle, or as if tempting God by demanding immediate governance from him: and for this reason it does not please him, nor is it accepted immediately by him." Suarez, de Relig. l. 2, c. 4, n. 7, 8. By the acceptance and approval of these vows on the part of the Church, a blessing and consecration of the person is implicitly had, whence the person becomes sacred, i.e., irrevocably devoted to God. And then the vows are solemn. St. Thomas 2. 2, q. 184, a. 4. - And if the acceptance on the part of the Church is not for every effect of the aforesaid vows, but only for some, and therefore the vows are not solemn but simple, then there is not had a blessing and consecration of the person, but a certain simple blessing, which does not devote the person to God so immovably. Hence a dismissed person is ordinarily accustomed also to be dispensed from vows, and ceases to be dedicated to God. - Consequently, as by the profession of solemn vows a certain handing over and donation of oneself is had, so by simple vows a simple promise is had. St. Thomas Quodl. 3, a. 17, 18; Quodl. 8, a. 10; Quodl. 10, a. 11.

Hence it is entirely clear that the approval of the Church is needed for the religious state in the face of the Church. But the Church no longer approves eremitical life in the religious state, but common life under a certain rule and under certain constitutions. C. fin. de rel. dom.; C. un. e. t. in 6; Benedict XIV, Notification 105, n. 59 ff.; St. Thomas 2. 2, q. 188, a. 8; E. M.

248 bis. The approval required, for Orders of solemn vows, is the approval of the Supreme Pontiff; for Institutes of simple vows, the approval is first of the Bishops and then of the S. C. of Religious, as can be seen in the Norms edited for institutes of this kind by the S. C. Bishops and Regulars, June 28, 1901. - The approval of New Institutes and of their Constitutions is now done according to the Particular Norms established by the S. C. of Religious, March 24, 1914. "No Bishop or Ordinary of any place, unless the license of the Apostolic See has been had by letters, is to found a new Sodality (Religious) of either sex, or permit one to be founded in his Diocese." Pius X, Motu Proprio, July 16, 1906.

The Constitution of Supreme Pontiff Leo XIII Conditae a Christo Ecclesiae, 6 Ides of December 1900, and the Norms of the S. C. Bishops and Regulars, June 28, 1901, constitute the current Law according to which the Holy See is accustomed to approve New Institutes of simple Vows, for women and for men. At present they are accustomed to be approved only with simple vows, by a threefold Decree: of Praise, of Approval of the Institute, and of definitive Approval of the Constitutions. Regularly Religious Institutes without their own habit, and whose members do not live in Community, are not approved by the Holy See. Yet there are not lacking some Institutes approved by the Holy See without a special habit, and whose members, some live in Community and others outside Community.

From this approval of the Church, finally, depends the truly religious state and religious order or religion. To the point Benedict XIV, C. Quamvis iusto, Pridie Kalends of May 1749, § 13: "For if," he says, "for the essence of the truly religious state it is required that religion or an order in a state of this kind be established by the confirmation of the Apostolic See, according to canonical sanctions, concerning which in C. un. de Relig. dom. in 6, and it is not sufficient to have obtained merely from the same Apostolic See the approval and confirmation of rules which some society of men or women has prescribed for itself to be observed; if the vows of poverty, obedience, and chastity emitted by the English Virgins according to the form of the rules approved by Clement XI cannot be said to be joined with express or tacit profession in some order approved by the Apostolic See in the state of true religion, as is stated above, it is clearly evident both that the state of the English Virgins is not the state of true religion, and that the vows which are made by them must be judged at most simple vows, but not solemn ones, according to the paths of the Decretal of Pope Boniface VIII, which alone exists under the title de Voto et voti redempt. in 6." Cf. ib. § 14. Hence it is clear that religious vows are solemnized through the very profession of a rule fully approved by the Apostolic See in the state of true or strict religion.

Third Orders: Tertiaries, some are religious, living in community; others are secular, living in the world. As Confraternities imitate chapters and collegiate bodies of churches, so these secular third orders imitate religious congregations. Religious of solemn and simple vows cannot be enrolled in these secular Third Orders. S. C. Indulg., July 16, 1887; January 31, 1893. And the faithful regularly can be enrolled in only one Third Order. S. C. Indulg., June 21, 1893. Secular Tertiaries do not enjoy communication of privileges and indulgences with Regulars of the first and second Order, and with other Tertiaries. S. C. Indulg., July 18, 1902. But Tertiaries living in community, and bound by simple vows, legitimately aggregated to Orders, enjoy the indulgences of the first and second Order. S. C. Indulg., August 28, 1903. - Secular Third Orders have precedence in processions above any Sodalities whatsoever, provided they proceed collegially, in their proper habit, and under the cross.

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You will resolve: From the profession of the religious state there results a reciprocal obligation between the religious and the community, namely by which not only is the religious held to remain in the order and to live in it according to his own rule and constitutions, but the order in turn is held not to cast him out without a just cause. The reason is that "a religious becomes a member of one mystical body, which is the religion itself; but this cannot be done except through mutual union between the whole and the part; and that union, since it is moral, is made through mutual obligation." Suarez, de Relig. l. 2, c. 4, n. 10.

A religious, by force of his profession, is not held to be perfect, but is held under grave obligation to devote himself in some way to perfection. St. Thomas q. 186, a. 1. But he must tend to perfection primarily through the essential means of the religious state, namely through observance of the three vows, poverty, chastity, and obedience; secondarily through accidental means, namely through the proper rules of the order, at least by not despising those helps. St. Thomas q. 186, a. 2, 7. Hence he sins gravely who firmly resolves not to tend to perfection, or in no way to care about it. And against this obligation of tending to perfection he does not sin gravely who only sometimes would sin gravely, but would not be habitually so disposed that he does not attend to it.

But whether a religious sins gravely who intends to observe only the commands under grave obligation, and as for the others, resolves to transgress them all, or not to care about them, is disputed. The first opinion probably affirms it, because a religious of this kind no longer tends to perfection. The second opinion, however, more common and more probable, denies it. The reason is that the obligation of tending to perfection is from religious profession, which consists in vows. From vows there is not a grave obligation of observing all things, but all things which gravely regard the vows themselves.

But to profess a rule, or according to a rule, is not to vow to observe all things which are in the rule, but to oblige oneself to regular life, against which nothing is gravely contrary except only that which is gravely against a grave precept expressed in the rule. But contempt of both is directly contrary to the profession of perfection and of regular life. L. 11; St. Thomas 2. 2, q. 186, a. 9; Quodl. 1, a. 20; Sanchez, in Decal. l. 6, c. 5, n. 5.

Therefore he also sins gravely who transgresses rules, even those obliging only to venial fault, or to none, from formal contempt, namely when he transgresses them with the mind of not being subject to them, or to the precepts of prelates. But otherwise if he transgresses them led by concupiscence, or because he thinks they are not necessary for salvation, or if he judges that they are not commanded under grave obligation. - Therefore to transgress rules in matters of small matter, even from custom, of itself does not exceed venial sin. Of itself, for it can be grave by reason of scandal, or if it were gravely pernicious to Religion by inducing others by bad example to laxity of the rule, or by reason of proximate danger of sinning gravely in some particular case, and if from it he were constituted in such a state that he must be expelled as incorrigible. St. Thomas q. 186, a. 9. - Yet not rarely there is no sin in transgression of rules, because rules do not oblige under fault, and the religious either places the act without advertence, or indeed places it with advertence, but from a just and reasonable motive. L. 10; Trent s. 25, c. 1, 22 de Reg.; E. M. - Ferraris v. Religiones Regulares et Militares.

n. 250.

Does the Rule always oblige and how? - Whether there is an obligation of observing the Rule, and how great it is, is ordinarily explained in the Rule itself. If nothing is determined in it, custom is to be attended to, which is the best interpreter of laws. Moreover no obligation is to be imposed unless it is certainly established concerning it. But sometimes in the Rule and in the Constitutions a grave obligation is imposed; sometimes only a light obligation of observing them; and sometimes there is had only an obligation of accepting or executing a penalty. If some Rule or Constitution contains no such obligation, then that Rule or Constitution is not properly a law or statute, but a mere counsel, by which a certain determined manner of perfection is proposed, to which the religious ought to aspire. Sanchez, in Decal. l. 6, c. 4, n. 9.

Hence in Rules and Constitutions prescriptions are to be distinguished from spiritual documents, which are often contained in them. - And although the Rules of Religious Institutes of themselves do not always oblige to sin, nevertheless sometimes of themselves and by accident they can oblige by force of the virtue of obedience; but they always oblige by force of a higher natural law, unless they present themselves as mere counsels. Practically speaking, however, in their transgression some fault is rarely absent. Rules of this kind are now customarily called Constitutions. Cf. Cases of Conscience, ed. 6, vol. 2, App. XI.

Besides the Rules, all Religious are evidently held to observe the laws of the Church with great submission. Several Apostolic Constitutions and Decrees gathered into one concerning the discipline of Regulars are to be read by the same Regulars at public table or in Chapter at stated times. But it is most highly commended to Bishops that they effectively spread among Religious Families and also diocesan Institutes the knowledge of the Decrees of the Holy See which regard religious life. S. C. of Religious, July 3, 1910.

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Do religious, dispersed by force, remain bound by the obligations of religious life? - R. In the affirmative. For they remain true religious. Hence they are by no means to be judged released from their solemn vows; yet by reason of the peculiar condition in which they are found, some modification is to be attended to as regards obedience and poverty, for as regards chastity there can be no difficulty.

As regards obedience, from the accident of the suppression of the religion, the professed do not become seculars, nor are they released from vows, by which they still remain bound; but only it is permitted to them by the Sacred Congregation to live in the world and in the habit of a secular cleric, nevertheless carrying inwardly something proper to the regular habit, under the obedience and jurisdiction of the Ordinary. Yet they always remain subject to their own superiors. As regards poverty, dispersed regulars can licitly and validly procure for themselves useful or necessary things, but by no means superfluous ones, have money with them, and enter various contracts of buying, selling, and donation. For religious can do all these things from the license and deputation of prelates; moreover in the case of dispersion a deputation of this kind is rightly presumed. For then each one, by the fact itself, is deputed as if steward of himself, at least for all cases in which recourse to a superior cannot be had. L. 65 Note; Cardinal De Luca, Works tom. 14, Annot. ad S. Conc. Trid. disc. 36, n. 1-4; de Regul. p. 1, disc. 28, n. 16; E. M.

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Does a religious promoted to a parish or episcopate remain bound by the obligations of religious life? - R. To the first: In the affirmative, and therefore he is held to wear the habit of the religion and to observe the rule in all things which can stand with his office, unless a contrary legitimate custom excuses. But if he acquires anything from the parochial office, he acquires it for the parish. - The Superior of a religious Order cannot exercise the office of pastor. S. C. Regular Discipline, May 28, 1715; Ferraris v. Parochus, art. 2, n. 85.

R. To the second: In the affirmative, according to the form of the Constitution Custodes of Benedict XIII, S. C. Bishops and Regulars, May 6, 1864. He is indeed held by the vow of obedience, but to the Roman Pontiff alone. He is also held by the vow of poverty; but first, after confirmation, he becomes capable of dominion and recovers rights of succession, even those which he had renounced, which are deferred to him after promotion; second, he does not acquire for himself, but for his cathedral church; and titular Bishops must distribute these things into pious works. Therefore he can neither dispose of these acquired goods by legacy, nor make a testament concerning them. Yet he can use and enjoy them, and dispose of his revenues among the living, as secular Bishops do. Likewise he is held by the Rules, but only by those which, in his judgment, are not repugnant to episcopal dignity and office. Yet he must wear the habit, at least as regards color, as before, and he can use the form which secular Bishops use. - Those promoted to the Cardinalate are judged to have the same law. C. Statutum est 1, causa 18, q. 1; C. Clerici 15 de Vita et hon. cler.; Ferraris v. Episcopus, a. 7; Suarez tom. 4, tr. 8, l. 3, c. 17, n. 5; c. 18, n. 4; L. 4; Lugo de Iust. et Iur. d. 3, n. 232, 233; Resp. Mor. l. 5, d. 1, 12; St. Thomas 2. 2, q. 185, a. 8; E. M.

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Do apostates and fugitives remain bound by the same obligations? - R. In the affirmative, for they are released by no obligation legitimately. - If these and those acquire anything, when they have died it belongs by right of spoil to the Apostolic Camera. Gregory XIII, C. Officii nostri, January 27, 1577. - Lugo, de Iust. et Iur. d. 3, n. 235; Resp. Mor. l. 4, d. 37; Ferraris v. Apostasia, n. 21 ff.; L. 80, 82.

For apostasy from an Order or Institute, unless the Religious has returned within three months; and for flight from a Monastery, taking a woman with him, "the penalty of expulsion or dismissal is judged as if brought by law." S. C. of Religious, May 16, 1911.

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Are those cast out and dismissed free from the said obligations? What about those secularized? - R. To the first: In the affirmative as regards merely regular observances; for by sentence, separated from religious life, they are no longer bound by the observances proper to religious life. Religious solemnly professed, not yet initiated in sacred orders, who are cast out or return to the world from Indult of the Holy See, are also released from the burden of the breviary. Cf. n. 112. - R. In the negative as regards vows, if it is a question of those solemnly professed; for by ejection they by no means cease. Hence they are held under grave obligation to amend themselves. Those cast out must walk in clerical habit and tonsure and be subject to the Ordinary of the place, also by force of the vow of obedience. Urban VIII, Decree de Apost. et eiect., 1624. They cannot make a testament, and whatever they acquire, by right of spoil, when they have died, pertains to the Apostolic Camera, excepting those things which they have preserved or acquired from goods of the religion. Gregory XIII, C. Officii nostri, 1577. In the meantime they have administration and use of goods, nor is it inspected how they expend them; but they can claim no dominion for themselves. St. Pius V, C. Grave nobis, May 26, 1560. - R. In the affirmative as regards vows, if it is a question of simple vows. For those dismissed and cast out are ordinarily accustomed also to be dispensed from simple vows, either by their own superiors, if they have such faculty, or by the Holy See. Bishops in France can dispense nuns of the ancient orders, who emit only simple vows, while the vow of chastity remains firm. S. Penitentiary, December 23, 1835. - Innocent XII, July 24, 1674; L. 79 ff.; St. Thomas Quodl. 12, a. 36; Ferraris v. Eiicere; Benedict XIV, de Syn. l. 13, c. 11, n. 19, 20; L. 142; E. M. "All Religious constituted in sacred orders, expelled or dismissed, remain perpetually suspended.... Clerics not in sacred orders are prohibited from ascending to higher orders. But all who have been expelled or dismissed, even if they have truly amended themselves, will not be able to be admitted to their own or another Order or Congregation without special license of the Holy See." S. C. of Religious, May 16, 1911.

R. To the second: Secularization contains the faculty for a Religious of living in the world. He is still held by vows. He is held, by force of the vow of obedience, to obey the Ordinary of the place. S. C. of Religious, September 1, 1912. He can make honest and licit expenses; but he does not acquire dominion of those things which are given to him. Hence he cannot dispose of them, and when he has died, they pass to the Camera of spoils. Nor indeed can he obtain ecclesiastical benefices without a new Indult.

Indults of perpetual or temporary secularization, or of relaxation of perpetual vows, or even only of temporary vows, or of the oath of perseverance, or of certain particular promises, granted to priests and clerics constituted in sacred orders, are always understood with the following clauses, even if not expressed, dispensation from which is reserved to the Holy See, namely: They are forbidden, without a new and special indult of the Holy See: 1. any office, and, as regards those who are habilitated for benefices, any benefice in cathedral basilicas; 2. any teaching office and office in major and minor clerical seminaries and other Institutes in which clerics are educated, as well as in Universities and Institutes which enjoy apostolic privilege of conferring academic degrees in philosophy, theology, and canon law; 3. any office or function whatsoever in episcopal Curias; 4. the office of Visitor and Moderator of Religious houses of either sex, even if it is a question of merely diocesan congregations; 5. habitual domicile in places where there exists a convent or religious house of the Province or Mission to which the secularized priest or cleric, or the one released from perpetual vows, as above, was enrolled. S. C. of Religious, June 15, 1909.

Vol. III, On the Particular Obligati…, II. On Divine Vocation

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Is divine vocation required? - R. In the affirmative. In the Norms of the S. C. Bishops and Regulars, June 28, 1901, art. 55, 56, it is said that, among the conditions required for the admission of aspirants to the Institute, first of all a true vocation proceeding from a supernatural end is required.

It is certain that a divine vocation is given to the religious state, by which namely God calls some, before others, to this more excellent state, and bestows graces so that they may rightly live according to it. This is proved: 1. from the common authority of the doctors; 2. because, if divine vocation is given to the priestly state, the same must consequently be said of religious life, which is a more perfect and much more difficult state. For since the clerical and religious states contain the exercise of greater holiness than that which is commonly required of all, God does not move all, but only some, by special movements of grace to embrace it. Cf. S. C. of Religious, April 5, 1910, ad 2; St. Alphonsus l. 6, n. 802, 803, 804.

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Note: The Saints judge that this vocation is always from God; for it cannot be from nature, which abhors the chastisement of the flesh; nor can it be from the devil, since it induces man to good from a good end. St. Thomas 2. 2, q. 189, a. 10 ad 1. - The ordinary signs of vocation are: aptitude for the obligations of the religious state in general, and for the observance of this or that order in particular; right intention, namely the desire of being free for the divine glory, for one's own salvation, and for the salvation of souls, St. Alphonsus l. 6, n. 802; a constant and right inclination to such a state, notwithstanding some past hesitation arising from temptations of the devil or from the repugnance of nature, although in reality that inclination is not necessary for having a true vocation; a certain interior peace and joy from the consideration of such a state as suitable to oneself for obtaining one's salvation more securely and fruitfully. But extraordinary signs are: divine revelation; a certain singular inspiration of such a state. - In this matter there is no need of the counsels of many and of long deliberation. St. Thomas q. 189, a. 10. - Clement VIII, C. Cum ad regularem; Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius on Election; L. l. 6, n. 802; Lugo, Resp. Mor. l. 3, d. 1, n. 5, 6, 8.

n. 257.

Whether and how does one sin who, not called, nevertheless receives the state of religion? - He sins of himself gravely if he clearly knows the defect of vocation, because of the proximate danger of transgressing the grave obligations of the religious state, to which knowingly and willingly he exposes himself. Yet he will be excused from that fault if he is supposed to have the will of fulfilling, with the grace of God, the obligations of the state assumed. "A novice who would enter religion with the mind of not persevering can with difficulty be excused from grave fault, because of the temporal damages and inconveniences which he would then bring uselessly to the religion, and also because of the scandal which he would furnish to other novices; for the example of a companion introduces a great temptation to another." L. l. 6, n. 785. In the Catechism published at Rome in the year 1913 by command of the Holy Father Pius X, it is said: "He who would enter the Priesthood without vocation would act most badly, because he could with difficulty observe its most grave obligations, with evident danger of public scandals and eternal perdition." Moreover, he who entered religion from a disordered intention and not from divine vocation should do sincere penance and hope in the Lord. Necessary graces certainly will not be lacking to him; and he can easily also have special helps from the riches of divine Goodness and Mercy. St. Thomas 2. 2, q. 189, a. 10. - St. Alphonsus l. 6, n. 802, 803.

n. 258.

What about those who induce others to religion? - "It must be said," says St. Thomas 2. 2, q. 189, a. 9, "that those inducing others not only do not sin, but merit a great reward. - Yet a threefold disorder could happen concerning an inducement of this kind: if he allures him violently, simoniacally, or by lies." Cf. Quodl. 3, q. 5; Trent s. 25, c. 18 de Reg.

n. 259.

Whether and how does he sin who, sensing himself called to religion, does not obey the divine vocation? - R. "To neglect a religious vocation of itself is not sin; for divine counsels of themselves do not oblige to fault. Yet by reason of the danger of eternal salvation to which the one called commits himself, making the choice of state not according to the divine good pleasure, it cannot be excused from some fault. And indeed, if someone believed that, remaining in the world, he would incur damnation, both because of his own frailty which he has experienced among the occasions of the world, and because of the lack of helps which he would have in religion, he cannot be excused from grave sin, since he casts himself into grave danger of his salvation.... But whether the conscience of those is in a bad state who, having already become morally certain of God's vocation to religion, strive to persuade themselves that, by remaining in the world or returning to it, they can work out their salvation equally easily? It does not seem to be doubted that these expose themselves to great danger of salvation.... But the reason of this danger is that he who remains in the world against God's vocation will not have the congruous helps of grace which God prepared for him in religion; and therefore, destitute of them, he will with difficulty resist the temptations of the world, and thus, succumbing, will incur damnation.... Moreover I do not wish to pronounce an absolute judgment on this point: I leave it to the wise." L. 78.

Therefore in practice particular cases with all their circumstances are to be maturely weighed; and no one after the fact is to be cast into despair, but courage is to be added to him, so that, if the fact no longer has a remedy, he may trust in God, who is rich in mercy, and may establish a Christian and holy life with greater solicitude. - Elbel, de Actib. human. 124, 125; Lugo, Responsa Moralia l. 1, d. 28.

n. 260.

Whether and how do they sin who turn others away from the religious state? - He who by force, fraud, or grave fear impedes or turns someone away from religion sins gravely, even against justice. This is proved from Trent s. 25, c. 18 de Reg., where he is excommunicated who impedes a girl from religion. But each one has a right not to be impeded by force or deceit from the attainment of good. But if the turning away is done only by prayers or promises, it will be a grave sin only against charity, because this cannot be without grave harm to him who is drawn away from religion. "But parents," adds St. Alphonsus 77, "turning children away from religion, I think, offend by a twofold grave sin; for besides the sin against charity, they commit another sin against piety, since they themselves from their proper office of education are held under grave obligation to devote themselves to the spiritual advancement of their children.... Yet I do not therefore deny that many parents can be excused from mortal sin, at least for some brief time, by reason of ignorance or inadvertence, which can easily be in them because of vehement affection of the flesh toward their children." - Elbel l. c. n. 126; L. l. 3, n. 663; St. Thomas Quodl. 3, a. 1.

Vol. III, On the Particular Obligati…, III. On the Novitiate

n. 261.

Who can enter religion? - From the preceding Law, still in force, but to which several other things have been added: all those and only those can enter religion who 1. are their own masters; 2. are not bound to others by some graver obligation; and 3. are not criminals. Those who are not their own masters, but depend on others, cannot validly enter and profess without their consent. But the others validly enter and profess, although illicitly. L. 65; St. Thomas 2. 2, q. 189, a. 5, 6; E. M.; Lugo, Resp. Mor. l. 3, d. 1, d. 21; l. 4, d. 47.

261 bis. You will resolve: From the first head, the following cannot enter religion: those before puberty, because they are subject to parents or guardians as regards the disposition of life; spouses after consummated marriage, unless the other party is guilty of a delict on account of which he or she can licitly be dismissed. Religious profession entered into by a spouse, the other spouse being unwilling, is resolved into a simple vow of chastity from presumption of law, C. 3, 12 de Conv. coniug.

A Bishop already consecrated and even only confirmed cannot enter religion without the license of the Supreme Pontiff, because of the spiritual marriage by which the Bishop is bound to his church. C. Licet de Regular.; C. Inter de Transl. Episcop. - From the second head the following cannot enter: those liable to intricate and litigious accounts, those burdened with debt; those who have seduced a virgin with marriage promised; those who would leave brothers in extreme necessity, parents or unemancipated children in grave necessity. - From the third head those cannot enter whom from public acts it is established have been accused or investigated for crime. C. Cum de omnibus and C. Ad Romanum of Sixtus V; C. In suprema of Clement VIII. - Illegitimates from the same law are admitted validly and licitly. Sixtus V, C. Cum de omnibus, November 26, 1587; Gregory XIV, C. Circumscripta, March 15, 1591; Clement VIII, C. In suprema, April 2, 1862. From Clement VIII, C. Cum ad singularem, March 19, 1603: "If someone exceeding the twenty-fifth year has asked for the regular habit and is without learning, let him be counted only among the number of Conversi." - Lugo, Resp. Mor. l. 3, d. 1; L. 65, 71, 76, 969, 971; St. Thomas 2. 2, q. 185, a. 4; q. 189, a. 5, 7; E. M.

n. 262.

From the Norms of the S. C. Bishops and Regulars, June 23, 1901, art. 61, "without dispensation of the Holy See there cannot be admitted: 1. illegitimates not duly legitimated; 2. those bound by marriage; 3. those more than thirty years old; 4. those less than fifteen years of age; 5. those who in another Institute have emitted perpetual vows, or even temporary vows, while these endure; 6. those burdened with debt which they are not able to pay; 7. those liable to rendering an account, or involved in other secular business, from which the Institute could fear lawsuits and troubles; 8. for Institutes of women, widows." "Furthermore.... The following things, gravely burdening the conscience of Superiors, are to be faithfully observed hereafter by all religious Families of men: "In no way, without special leave of the Apostolic See and under penalty of nullity of profession, are postulants to be received, either to the novitiate or to the emission of vows:

those who have been expelled from colleges, even lay ones, because of dishonest morals or because of other crimes;
those who have been dismissed for any reason from seminaries and ecclesiastical or religious colleges;
those who, whether as professed or as novices, have been dismissed from another Order or religious congregation; or, if professed, have obtained dispensation from vows;
those who, already admitted, whether as professed or as novices, into one province of some Order or congregation and dismissed from it, attempt to be received into the same or into another province of the same Order or congregation.

Anything contrary, even things worthy of special mention, notwithstanding." Decree Ecclesia Christi of the S. C. of Religious, September 7, 1909.

The Decree Ecclesia Christi, September 7, 1909, concerning certain postulants not to be admitted into religious families, by another Decree of the S. C. of Religious, January 4, 1910, was extended also to religious families of women, as follows: "And therefore without special leave of the Apostolic See and under penalty of nullity of profession, postulants are not to be received, either to the Novitiate or to the emission of vows:

those who, by their own fault, have been expelled from colleges, even lay ones, for a grave cause;
those who have been dismissed for any reason from domestic schools in which girls are educated with special care in hope of embracing religious life; or, if professed, have obtained dispensation from vows;
those who, already admitted, whether as professed or as novices, into one province of some Order or Congregation and dismissed from it, attempt to be received into the same or another province of the same Order or Congregation. - Anything contrary notwithstanding."

A strict obligation is not had that lyceal studies precede the novitiate, otherwise than primary and gymnasial studies. Yet, for just causes, among clerics pupils who have exceeded the fifteenth year of age will be able to be admitted to the novitiate after the fourth gymnasial year, but on this condition, that after the novitiate they duly complete gymnasial studies before they are admitted to lyceal studies and undergo the final examination. Before the fourth gymnasial year has been completed, it is not lawful to enter the novitiate except by leave of the Apostolic See. S. Congregation of Religious, September 7, 1909; May 31, 1910.

Orientals to be admitted into religious families. "Through the Apostolic Letters Orientalium dignitas Ecclesiarum, given on the day before the Kalends of December of the year 1894, Leo XIII of happy memory commanded as regards the entrance of Orientals into Latin religious Sodalities: 'It will be lawful for no Order or religious Institute of the Latin rite, of either sex, to receive any Oriental among its members who has not first exhibited testimonial letters of his own Ordinary.' "But by the aforesaid prescription there was no derogation from dispositions already long ago established, and especially in the general Convention of this Sacred Congregation held on the day June 1 of the year 1885, by which in individual cases recourse is prescribed to the Apostolic See, or to the S. Congregation de Propaganda Fide for Affairs of the Oriental Rite, to which also belongs the faculty of granting a change of rite either for a time or in perpetuity. "Now, since in these most recent times it has been discovered that not once only Orientals have been received into religious Institutes of the Latin rite with testimonial letters indeed of the Oriental Ordinary, but with the Apostolic See altogether not consulted, this Sacred Congregation judges it opportune to recall to the mind of all Superiors placed over religious Institutes of the Latin rite, of whatever form and of either sex, the obligation by which they are held, namely of consulting this Sacred Congregation in writing before any Oriental is enrolled among their members. "Moreover in the petition the case is to be proposed clearly with all its circumstances; and there must be expressed not only the name, surname, age, rite, and diocese of the postulant, but, if it is a question of a man, it must especially be explained whether he asks to be admitted into an Institute of solemn or simple vows, and whether for the clerical or lay state; for the Pontifical Rescript, if it is favorable, is granted differently according to the diversity of cases." S. C. de Prop. Fid., June 15, 1911, Acta Apostolicae Sedis v. 4, p. 534 f.

262 bis. Note: No one can licitly be admitted to the habit, or to beginning the novitiate, and then to profession, whether in an Institute of men of solemn vows, or in an Institute of men and women of simple vows, but by no means in an Institute of women of solemn vows, without testimonial letters of the Ordinary of origin and of the place in which the postulant has stayed beyond a year after the completed fifteenth year of his age. S. C. on the State of Regulars, January 25, 1848; May 1, 1851; February 25, 1863. The Decree Romani Pontifices, January 25, 1848, is to be read publicly each year on January 1. The Decree Regulari Disciplinae, January 25, 1848, is to be read publicly on January 1 and the first Sunday of July. The Decree Romani Pontifices cannot be derogated except expressly and by name. A dispensation granted to some Institute is not communicable to others.

According to the Norms of the S. C. Bishops and Regulars, art. 57, for Institutes of simple vows, there is required testimony of baptism, confirmation, free status, good morals, Postulancy before the Novitiate, and examination before reception of the habit for Sisters. Besides the examination, from a more recent Decree Postulancy is also required for nuns. Cf. 267, 273. - E. M.

n. 263.

Can children after puberty licitly enter religion against the will of their parents? - R. In the affirmative. The reason is that there is no obligation of obeying parents as regards the election of a state, especially a religious one, because they not only do not have experience, but because of their own interest or worldly affection they are often changed into enemies. The election of the state of children is a matter which already surpasses their education and domestic discipline, in which the authority of parents is contained. The contrary are art. C. I. 221, C. G. 372, 374, and are to be attended to in practice, to avoid grave inconveniences. - "Sanchez, etc., with Suarez, etc., and commonly, say that a son cannot enter religion leaving parents in necessity, whether extreme or grave, even if the son has emitted a vow of religion. But otherwise if the necessity is common, or if they would suffer only some diminution of status." L. 66.

But is a son already professed held to go out in order to help parents pressed by want? In extreme necessity it is certain that he is held. But if the necessity is grave, there is a threefold opinion. The first says he is held by reason of a natural obligation, which is not extinguished by the vow. The second, very probably, says he is held if the necessity precedes profession, otherwise if it follows. For the natural obligation persists in the first case, but in the other cannot arise. The third, more probable, teaches that in such a case the son is not held, nor can he go out without license, whether the necessity of the parents precedes profession or not. The reason is that "he who is already professed in religion is regarded as already almost dead to the world. Hence he ought not, on the occasion of the support of his parents, to go out of the cloister." St. Thomas 2. 2, q. 101, a. 4 ad 4; q. 104, a. 5; q. 189, a. 6. - It is not lawful to desert brothers or sisters in extreme necessity; but it is lawful in grave necessity. There is a much lesser obligation toward brothers than toward parents. Yet someone could, by reason of charity, defer or even omit the religious state in order to help brothers gravely in need. - St. Thomas Quodl. 3, a. 16; Quodl. 10, a. 9; L. 67, 68, 70; l. 2, n. 50; l. 3, n. 335.

n. 264.

Can one burdened with debts enter religion? - R. In the affirmative, if the debts by which someone is burdened are uncertain as regards the person, so that restitution must be made to the poor; for even if it is granted that uncertain debts are owed to the poor or to pious causes by natural law, the matter obtains equivalently according to the mind of the owners if they are remitted so that someone may enter religion, since they are always given to pious causes: indeed nothing is so pious as to dedicate oneself and all one's things to God perpetually. This is commonly still conceded, at least for the internal forum, if the debts are from a purely liberal contract, because in this there is always understood the condition: unless I shall choose a better state.

If it is a question of debts from delict or from an onerous contract, there are three opinions, all probable to St. Alphonsus 71, but the third more probable. The first absolutely denies it, because it is against natural justice to seek a spiritual good with the temporal harm of creditors. The second absolutely affirms it, because "because of money the person of a free man according to Civil Laws is not bound, but only things; because the person of a free man exceeds every estimation of money. Hence he can licitly, his goods having been presented, enter religion, nor is he held to remain in the world so that he may procure means by which to pay the debt." St. Thomas 2. 2, q. 189, a. 6 ad 3. The third affirms that the debtor can enter in the case in which otherwise he must remain in the world for a long time; for then payment would be had as morally impossible. But otherwise if, remaining in the world for a brief time, for example within a year or two years, with danger to the soul excluded, by his industry and labor he would easily pay his debts or a great part of them.

These things are from Natural Law. For Sixtus V, Bull Cum de omnibus, November 26, 1587, rendered those debtors incapable of religion who had squandered their goods, or who must render accounts before they have paid the debts or rendered the accounts themselves. But Clement VIII, C. In suprema, April 2, 1602, did indeed remove that incapacity, but left the prohibition. Yet these things are to be understood: 1. Of those who, remaining in the world, can satisfy creditors; otherwise they would delay uselessly. 2. Of those who are burdened with great debts from their own fault, because the Bull speaks of those burdened by an immense debt, who have squandered their goods. 3. Benedict XIV established that Decrees for religious men also comprehend women, where the cause would be the same. Cf. C. Si datam hominibus. Yet in the present matter the aforesaid Bull is not to be extended to nuns, nor to those burdened with uncertain debts, since in odious matters strict interpretation is always to be applied, and they testify that Sixtus V declared thus by another Decree. 4. Finally the precept is to be understood of accounts to be rendered which are very litigious, intricate, fraudulent, and about to furnish cause for lawsuits; for the Pontiff speaks only of these. - L. 71; Lugo d. 21, n. 61 ff.

From the Norms of the S. C. Bishops and Regulars for modern Institutes of simple vows, those burdened with debt which they are not able to pay cannot be admitted without dispensation of the Holy See, art. 61.

n. 265.

Can a pastor licitly enter religion, the Bishop contradicting? - "It must altogether be affirmed," says St. Alphonsus 74, and the matter is certain from C. Duae sunt leges, caus. 19, q. 5, from the Constitution Ex quo dilectus of Benedict XIV, January 14, 1747, and from St. Thomas 2. 2, q. 189, a. 7. Yet he is held first to warn the Bishop of his purpose, lest the flock be deserted without a guardian. But the Bishop can still legitimately contradict, and even recall a pastor from religion, if the parish would suffer grave detriment. As regards clerics and other beneficiaries, it is likewise certain that Bishops cannot impede their clerics from entering religion, as is contained in C. Clerici, caus. 19, q. 1. Yet a Bishop could well recall his cleric from religion if his entrance would be to the grave detriment of the church to which he had been assigned. Benedict XIV, C. cited; L. 75; l. 6, n. 828. - St. Thomas 2. 2, q. 185, a. 4.

n. 266.

Can a religious pass from his own order to another stricter one? - A religious can well pass from his own order to another stricter one, after license has been sought from his prelate, although denied, from C. Licet 18 de Regular., if nevertheless according to the precept of Urban VIII it has been established that that religion is prepared to receive him. Hence they commonly hand down that the prelate would sin gravely if without just cause he denied the license, because he would inflict grave injustice on the subject by drawing him back from a more perfect state. But in this matter the particular law of each religion is to be attended to. - Trent s. 24, c. 19 de Reg.; L. 73; St. Thomas 2. 2, q. 189, a. 8; Pignatelli, Cons. Can. a. 1, cons. 39; Lugo, Resp. Mor. l. 4, d. 41.

A transfer of this kind by license of Superiors is not opposed to the Decree of the S. C. of Religious, September 7, 1909. Cf. above n. 262. Yet the practice now and the style of the Curia is that license be sought from the S. C. of Religious.

n. 267.

What age is required for beginning the novitiate? - A completed age of fifteen years is required for clerics and of twenty years for lay brothers, from the Decree of Clement VIII and of the S. C. Bishops and Regulars, May 16, 1675. From Trent s. 25, c. 17 de Reg., "a girl who wishes to receive the regular habit is to be more than twelve years old; she is not to receive it before then, nor afterwards is she or another to emit profession, until the Bishop, or, if he is absent or impeded, his vicar, or someone deputed by them at their expense, has diligently examined the will of the virgin, whether she has been forced, whether seduced, whether she knows what she is doing." This twofold examination is grave; nevertheless the omission of only one or the other is not judged grave, nor indeed does the omission of both render the profession invalid. But from the Decree of the S. C. of Religious, January 19, 1909, the examination of the will of individual nuns is to be repeated before the pronouncing of solemn vows, although it had already been made before profession of simple vows. A. A. S. v. 1, p. 233. - But from the Decree of the S. C. Bishops and Regulars, May 23, 1659, nuns ought not to be admitted to the habit before the fifteenth year has been completed. In the Norms n. 61, it is established for modern Institutes that without dispensation of the Holy See those born more than thirty years and those less than fifteen years of age cannot be admitted. - From the Decree of the S. C. of Religious, September 7, 1909, and January 1, 1911, it is established that no youth be admitted to the Novitiate as a Cleric unless he has exceeded the fifteenth year of age; as a Conversus, to Postulancy unless he has exceeded the seventeenth year. Cf. above n. 262 and the following number. - St. Thomas 2. 2, q. 189, a. 5; Quodl. 4, a. 23; Ferraris v. Moniales, a. 1, n. 72; E. M. n. 294.

267 bis. What specifically has been established at present for lay Brothers? - The S. C. of Religious, Decree Sacrosancta Dei Ecclesia, January 1, 1911, established these things, most carefully to be observed by all Religious Families among whom solemn vows are pronounced also by Conversi, namely:

To Moderators General there is given the faculty of permitting Provincial Superiors, as often as needed, that they may be able to receive also those youths destined to the duties of Laymen who have scarcely completed the seventeenth year of age, all things to be observed having been observed.
No one is to be admitted to the Novitiate who has not completed postulancy for at least two years, or for more if the Constitutions of the Order prescribe a longer experiment, under penalty of invalid profession afterwards.
The Novitiate is not to have its beginning before the twenty-first year of age, according to the path of current law; and it is to last one or even two years, according to the Constitutions of the proper Order.
When the Novitiate has been completed, and those things which must be observed have been observed, Laymen can be admitted to simple profession of vows, which indeed, perpetual on the part of the one vowing, is to be for the time of six years on the part of the Order.
When the six-year period of simple vows has been completed and the thirtieth year of age has been completed, and not before, likewise under penalty of invalidity, and with the things to be observed likewise having been observed, Laymen will be able to pronounce solemn vows.
Those things which in the preceding articles regard the profession of simple and solemn vows are also to be observed as regards Laymen now living in Monasteries, who have not yet pronounced solemn profession.

It is to be hoped that this rather long space of nine years will give both Superiors and candidates the opportunity of examining, on the one hand, the will, and on the other, the institute of life, for afterwards embracing it solemnly; strengthened in virtue, a man can bring a more mature judgment.

But these things would give some hope of perseverance, though not altogether firm, unless they are accompanied by the following and other cautions and efforts of that kind, which the Apostolic See over the course of the centuries has proclaimed or advised to be used, and which the more observant Religious Families have experienced by praiseworthy custom and happy result.

And first, as regards the reception of Conversi, many equally careful cautions are to be used and inquiries to be made beforehand.... Let a Father be placed over the Postulants whom both age and life have approved.... Let the superior and the Master be wholly with the postulants and novices for spiritual instruction.... Let them explain to them the whole of Christian doctrine ... the obligations of the vows ... of the Rule, of the Constitutions.... Let there be gatherings or discourses to the laymen on stated days ... for which gatherings or discourses the subject is to be not only the catechism, warnings of the spiritual life, the Rule, and explanation of the Constitutions, but also practical norms and examples of modest and moderate courtesy.... Anything contrary notwithstanding, even things worthy of special mention.

n. 268.

What form of admission is to be observed? - Those who are to be admitted to the religious habit must be approved by a twofold scrutiny. They must first be examined and approved by the Provincial and at least three provincial Examiners. The report of this examination and scrutiny and the authentic documents are to be transmitted to the Superior General, who, with the Procurator General and at least two General Examiners, confirms or revokes the approval in the first scrutiny. In both scrutinies secret votes are given. Decree Regulari disciplinae of the S. C. on the State of Regulars, January 25, 1848. "But in order that the Candidate be definitively received to the habit, besides the prescribed law and form, to which absolutely all must conform themselves, those things also will have to be observed which are further prescribed by the Constitutions and Statutes of the respective Order concerning reception to the habit, yet only in that part which is not opposed to this Decree." Decree cited.

But as regards modern Institutes the form is determined in the Norms of the S. C. Bishops and Regulars for Institutes of this kind and in their proper Constitutions. And as regards nuns of solemn vows, their own approved Constitutions also are to be attended to.

268 bis. For how much time must the novitiate last? - Privilege excluded, the novitiate must last for one whole year; otherwise profession is null. Trent s. 25, c. 15 de Reg. As regards a longer duration, the particular constitutions of the various orders and congregations are to be attended to.

From ancient law, the year of novitiate is to be computed from the moment of receiving the habit, or, if reception of the habit is not required in some religion, from the moment of entrance into the novitiate with the intention of remaining there. - The year must, for validity, be complete, so that in a leap year the passage of the day which is to be added must be awaited. Thus the S. C. C. expressly declared. - It must likewise, for validity, be continuous, from a Decree of the S. C. C., which established that a novice who had gone away from the monastery in order to enter another Religion, and after only two hours spent in another convent, repentant of the act, had returned, was held to begin a new year of probation. Ferraris v. Annus prob. n. 25 ff.; E. M.

From ancient law; for at present: "1. The whole year of novitiate, which alone is required for the validity of profession, must hereafter be understood not strictly from hour to hour, but from day to day. The same is to be said of the three whole years of simple vows which must precede the emission of solemn vows. "2. The novitiate is interrupted so that it must be begun again and completed: a) if the novice, dismissed by the Superior, has left the house; b) if without the Superior's license he has deserted the house; c) if for more than thirty days, even with the Superior's license, he has remained outside the enclosure of the novitiate. "3. If the novice, within thirty days, even not continuous, with the license of Superiors, has remained outside the enclosure of the house, although under the obedience of the Superior, it is required for validity, and it is sufficient, to supply the days spent in this way; but Superiors are not to impart this license except for a just and grave cause." S. C. of Religious, May 3, 1914, A. A. S. v. 6, p. 229.

n. 269.

Is the year of probation judged interrupted or suspended on the occasion of military service? - R. "1. Whether the Novitiate of those who are compelled to leave the house of probation because of military service, or called again to the same military service, is to be judged interrupted, so that it must be repeated from the beginning, with no account taken of the time of novitiate already completed; or whether it is to be considered only suspended, so that it must only be completed? "2. Whether military service can be computed as time of novitiate, when it is completed in a place where there exists a house of probation, if the novices remain under the discipline and vigilance of the moderators, and in spare hours stay in the same house of probation and perform all those things which can be reconciled with military service? "R. To the first: In the affirmative to the first part; in the negative to the second, if the novice has actually been assigned to military service beyond thirty complete days.

If within thirty days, these will have to be supplied. And in any case, he cannot be admitted to profession of vows unless he is tested for at least thirty days. - To the second: In the negative." S. C. of Religious, May 3, 1914, A. A. S. v. 6, p. 230. - Lugo, Resp. Mor. l. 3, d. 2; l. 4, d. 2; Sanchez in dec. l. 5, c. 4, nn. 30-35; Lezana, Works t. 4, Cons. 8; Suarez, de Relig. t. 3, l. 5, c. 14, 15; La Croix l. 4, n. 13 ff.; Schmalz. de Reg. 68 ff.; Ferraris l. c. n. 10-34.

n. 270.

Can the time of novitiate be prorogued? - R. In the affirmative, if a legitimate cause is present; otherwise if it is not present. A prorogation of this kind is restricted to a brief time. Thus from Trent s. 25, c. 16 de Reg. and from the Decree and practice of the S. C. Bishops and Regulars, Decree Perpensis temporum, May 3, 1902. - According to the Norms of the S. C. Bishops and Regulars, n. 65, 75, the time of Postulancy and Novitiate cannot be prorogued beyond three months. Ferraris l. c. n. 29 ff.; E. M.

n. 271.

If a novice, after completing the whole year of novitiate, is not admitted to profession, but is dismissed, or himself departs spontaneously, and after a brief delay returns and is admitted, can he profess at once without another new year of novitiate? - R. In the negative in the case of dismissal, from the Decree of the S. C. of Religious, September 7, 1909. - In the case of spontaneous departure, R. In the affirmative, provided the condition of the person and of the religion has not been changed. S. C. C., February 27, 1597, and February 12, 1598. The first reason is that here he has already been tested for a whole year, which alone is required by Trent. The second reason is that since judgment for profession must be taken from probation, if after probation a change is made, the preceding probation will serve little or nothing for making that judgment. - And from the Decree of the S. C. of Religious, April 5, 1910, it is necessary that accurate and secret information under faith of oath be had by the Moderators of the religious Institute, if such a Novice who spontaneously departed will enter another Institute. - Ferraris l. c. n. 20 ff.; v. Professio religiosa n. 64; Lugo, Resp. Mor. l. 4, d. 1.

Does one who is dismissed after profession and afterwards is received again need a new novitiate? - R. In the affirmative. The reason is that the first novitiate has already obtained its whole effect through profession, to which it was ordered. Lugo, Resp. Mor. l. 4, d. 1, n. 3. - But at present after the Decree of the S. C. of Religious, September 7, 1909, he cannot be admitted.

n. 273.

In what place and in what habit is the novitiate to be carried out? - The novitiate cannot be done outside the monastery; indeed it must be carried out in the monastery destined for it. Thus from the Decree of Clement VIII, June 20, 1599, and several other Decrees and the practice of the S. C. Ferraris v. Annus prob. n. 36 ff. - By common law, the novitiate must be carried out in the habit of the religion which the novice intends to profess. Trent s. 25, c. 15 de Reg. And this is required even under penalty of nullity, according to the S. C. Bishops and Regulars. Ferraris v. Habitus n. 2, 3; v. Moniales a. 1, n. 76 ff.; v. Novitiatus n. 4. - C. Is qui de Regul. in 6; Clement VIII, Decree Regularis disciplinae, March 12, 1596; Benedict XIV, C. Si datam § 6; Lucidi c. 4, n. 146; Bizzarri p. 279 ff., ed. 1885; Kenrick tr. 8, n. 50; Bouix, de Iure Regular. p. 4, s. 1, c. 5, par. II, 5; Benedict XIV, Quaest. Can. et Mor. Quaest. 220; Norms cited 76.

Clerics regular are not comprehended in the Decrees of Clement VIII concerning novices to be admitted only in certain monasteries designated by the Apostolic See. Urban VIII, C. Decet Romanum, November 17, 1634. E. M.

During the time of Novitiate, Novices must give attention to spiritual exercises. Norms cited, art. 74. - The religious instruction of Novices can be taken from the Constitution Quum ad Regularem of Clement VIII, March 19, 1603.

At present literary studies are not altogether to be omitted. Novices privately will dedicate one hour on individual days, feast days only excepted, to studies. The Master of Novices or Vice-Master, or one of the professors of humane letters who lives in the house or nearby, will be in charge of studies. It will be theirs to instruct three times in the week for one hour. They will also be able to have written or extemporaneous exercises, and, conversing among themselves, can sometimes use the Latin language. He who is in charge of this school is to note in writing the diligence and progress of each Novice and send this writing to the Superior General or Provincial. Decree Ad explorandum of the S. C. of Religious, August 27, 1910. - From the Norms art. 72, in the second year of Novitiate, "under the direction and vigilance of the mistress, the novices will be able moderately to devote themselves to studies or other works of the Institute; but in the house itself of the novitiate, and not outside, unless grave reasons persuade otherwise."

From the cited Norms, Postulancy precedes the Novitiate, art. 63 ff. Postulancy for lay Brothers is prescribed by the Decree reported above n. 267 bis. Likewise Postulancy is prescribed by the following Decree in monasteries of solemn vows for nuns. "Any Postulant in Monasteries of solemn vows and papal enclosure can be admitted without previous leave of the Holy See, yet with the other things to be observed by law being observed. "2. Any Postulant, before she enters the Novitiate, will have to be tested for the time and according to the manner prescribed in the proper Constitutions of each Monastery. "3. If nothing is established in these concerning these matters, then the probation is to be made at least for six months, yet in such a way that Postulants, admitted within the enclosure of the Monastery for the sake of probation, use a garment of modest color, different from the habit of the Order, which they are not to put on unless when they are about to begin the Novitiate properly so called." S. C. of Religious, August 2, 1912.

n. 274.

Whether, when, and how must a novice or novice-woman dispose of his or her goods? - A novice or novice-woman, excepting the Society of Jesus, must renounce his or her goods within the two months immediately before profession of solemn vows, not before, and with the license of the Bishop or his vicar. Trent s. 25, c. 16 de Reg.; S. C. Regular Discipline, August 1, 1862; S. C. Bishops and Regulars, May 3, 1902. - But before profession of simple vows they must cede, for the time in which they remain in the same profession of simple vows, the administration, usufruct, and use to whomever they please, and also to their order or monastery, if they so wish. S. C. Regulars, June 12, 1858; S. C. Bishops and Regulars, May 3, 1902.

Lugo, Resp. Mor. l. 4, d. 44, 45.

In the more recent Norms of the Sacred Congregation for more recent Institutes it is said, the ancient formula unchanged: "Before the first emission of vows they must dispose of the use and usufruct of the revenues or fruits of their goods, in whatever way they please, and also, if they judge it so according to their own choice, in favor of their Institute. They must also before first vows cede the administration of their goods to the person or persons well-liked by them; and, if they freely wish, also to their own Institute, having been forewarned and accepting. - A change of the aforesaid disposition and cession can be made with the license of the Moderatrix General. In order that perpetually professed Sisters may licitly divest themselves of the radical dominion of their goods by acts inter vivos, the license of the Apostolic See is required. - It is fitting that, before they first emit temporary vows, they dispose entirely freely by testament of their present and future goods. - Professed Sisters, both for making and for changing a testament, need leave of the Apostolic See, or in an urgent case of the Ordinary, or of the Superiorissa General and even local, if it cannot be done otherwise." Norms 115, 117, 120-122.

But in order that a renunciation of this kind be valid in conscience, there is no need of the solemnities of civil law. L. l. 3, n. 935; Ferraris v. Annus probat. n. 53; v. Novitius n. 30 ff.; v. Moniales n. 98 ff.; E. M.

The dowry of a deceased nun, the three-year period of simple vows not yet completed, according to the norm of the Decree of the S. C. Bishops and Regulars, May 3, 1902, passes

Vol. III, On the Particular Obligati…, IV. On Profession

n. 275.

Is a novice held to regular discipline? - The Rules and precepts of the order do not of themselves oblige novices. For Novices have not yet professed the Rule, and are only in the way of probation. C. Ad Apostolicam 16 de Regular. But although the prelate cannot command a novice by reason of vows, as is clear, nevertheless he can command by reason of the power which any superior naturally has in any community, and by reason of ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the novice. C. Recolentes de statu monachor. Hence several infer that he can bind novices by precepts under sin and under censures, and reserve cases with respect to them. But several other grave theologians teach the contrary as regards this last point, namely that novices, without license of the prelates of the order, can validly confess to any Confessor approved by the Ordinary of the place for seculars, and be absolved by him, even from cases reserved in the religion. But generally novices enjoy all privileges, indulgences, protection of the canon, etc., which the professed of the order which they intend to embrace enjoy; for from R. I. 55 in 6: "He who feels the burden ought also to feel the advantage." Schmalz. tit. de Regular. n. 85 ff.; Ferraris v. Novitiatus n. 13-16, 20, 21.

Only the Master of Novices hears the Confessions of these. Yet it is lawful for the Superior, even the local one, to hear them once or twice in the year. Thus from the Constitution Quum ad Regularem of Clement VIII, March 19, 1603, apud Bizzarri, Collection, at the end. But at present Novices, as all other Religious, can freely confess to any Confessor approved by the Ordinary of the place. S. C. of Religious, May 3, 1914, A. A. S. v. 6, p. 232.

n. 276.

What is the force of religious profession? - Religious profession is distinguished in two ways; for one is such broadly, another strictly. The former is had through simple vows, the latter through solemn vows. But where the word profession is used without addition, it is customarily understood of profession strictly taken. - Solemn profession frees the professed from paternal power, because the professed passes into the full power of the regular superior and is fully subjected to him. But understand this concerning burdens, not concerning favors. For this is a benefit, and what is conceded in favor of someone is not to be turned to his disadvantage, R. I. 16 in 6. Hence the professed retains rights of succession, and if goods come to the son after profession, they pertain to a quasi-military peculium, all of which, although he does not acquire them for himself, he nevertheless acquires for the monastery. Schmalzgr. l. 3, t. 27, n. 67 ff. - Solemn profession dirimently impedes marriage to be contracted and dissolves a ratified marriage. - Solemn profession induces the vacancy of benefices. Indeed even perpetual profession in Institutes of simple vows induces the vacancy of residential benefices. S. C. Bishops and Regulars, August 25, 1903; March 30, 1908. Likewise profession frees from irregularity coming from birth, in relation to receiving sacred orders; not likewise to prelacies. C. 1 de Filiis presbyt. - Other vows previously emitted are commuted into religious profession, unless they have been made in favor of a third party and accepted by him. C. Scripturae 4 de Vot. et vot. redempt.; C. Qui post 5 de Reg. et trans. in 6. - St. Thomas 2. 2, q. 88, a. 12 ad 1; q. 189, a. 3 ad 3; E. M.

More recent male and female religious emit only profession of simple vows, first for a time and then in perpetuity. But they can never remain without vows; rather, when the time of temporary vows has elapsed, these are at once to be renewed. Indeed nuns also belonging to regular Orders in several regions emit only simple vows, and are subjected to the jurisdiction of Ordinaries, so that Superiors no longer have any jurisdiction over them. Four monasteries of the Visitation in the United States of North America and the Monasteries of Savoy retain solemn vows. - S. C. Bishops and Regulars, March 23, 1869.

105. On the Religious State · 106. On the Novitiate and Profession

What things are required for religious profession? - For the value of profession there is required: 1. That the person be fit for entering religion. - 2. That the one professing has completed the sixteenth year, computing this time mathematically from moment to moment. For thus Trent decreed, s. 25, c. 15 de Reg., according to the S. C. and all the doctors. Laymen or conversi cannot be admitted to profession before they have arrived at the age of twenty-one completed years, from Clement VIII, C. Regularis disciplinae, March 19, 1603. But now from the Decree of the S. C. of Religious, January 1, 1911, they are admitted to solemn vows only when the thirtieth year of age has been completed, after a six-year period of simple vows, a year of Novitiate, and two years of Postulancy. Cf. 267 bis. - 3. That a whole year of probation has preceded. Trent ibid. - 4. That it be done with the intention of making profession; for it is a certain spiritual marriage with religion, which, just as carnal marriage, is itself lacking when consent is lacking.

That profession not be emitted because of fraud or deceit; otherwise true consent would be lacking. - 6. That it not be done from force or grave fear, unjustly inflicted from without to extort profession. C. 1 de His quae de vi metusve, etc.; C. ult. Qui clerici vel voventes; Trent s. 25, c. 18, 19 de Reg. - 7. That the three substantial vows be emitted; otherwise the essence of the religious state will not be present. - 8. That profession be made in some approved religion. - 9. That profession be accepted by one having power for this. Cf. Ferraris v. Moniales a. 1, n. 101 ff.; C. Ad Apostolicam de Regular. - 10. That the one professing attach no condition repugnant to the substance of religion. - 11. That express profession be made; for tacit profession as regards men has been abrogated by Pius IX, Decree of the S. C. Regular Discipline, June 12, 1858. Cf. Ferraris l. c. n. 109. By custom it has also been abrogated as regards nuns, and as regards more recent Institutes of simple vows. - 12. That both men and women first emit simple vows and remain in them for three whole years before solemn profession is to be emitted. From just and reasonable causes these vows can be extended up to the completed twenty-fifth year of age. Pius IX, Brief In universalis Ecclesiae, February 7, 1862; S. C. Bishops and Regulars, May 3, 1902. Meanwhile they must remain in houses of the professed and of studies, and observe perfect common life, and they are held to the observance of the rule of the order as solemnly professed men and women are; and they enjoy the privileges and indulgences of the order or monastery as these do. The active and passive voice is computed from the day of emission of simple vows. Yet they do not have a suffrage in admission to solemn profession, and can be elected only to lesser offices, not also to offices of superiority. S. C. Regular Discipline, August 6, 1858; S. C. Bishops and Regulars, May 3, 1902; February 20, 1905. By this profession of simple vows, which precede solemn vows, residential benefices do not become vacant. S. C. Bishops and Regulars, March 30, 1908. - 13. If one vow, e.g., of poverty, is not solemn, neither are the other two solemn. S. Penitentiary 1820 to the Bishop of Limoges. - 14. As regards nuns, solemn profession is not had without papal enclosure, C. Periculoso un. de Stat. reg.; St. Pius V, C. Cura pastoralis, May 29, 1566. - Lugo, Resp. Mor. l. 4, d. 14, 18, 21, 43; l. 3, d. 16.

Concerning Religious bound to military service. - "... The S. C. of Religious ... decreed the following:

I. In Regular Orders in which solemn vows are emitted, young men who are not certainly established to be exempt from active military service, namely from that service which they, when first called to the military, must perform for one or more years, cannot be admitted to Sacred Orders or to solemn profession until they have completed military service and, this having been completed, have remained at least for a year, according to what is to be said below, in simple vows, with the decree Sacrosancta Dei Ecclesia, edited on this same day, observed as regards Laymen.

II. In Institutes of simple vows, the young men concerning whom in the preceding article will be able to be admitted only to temporary vows up to the time of military service; nor is it lawful for them, while they give service to the military, to renew profession. When they have been dismissed from military service, they will again emit profession, at least for a year, before they bind themselves by the bond of perpetual profession.

III. But let young men serving in the military take care lest they lose the gift of holy vocation, and let them always converse with that modesty and caution which befits religious men. Wherefore let them shrink from suspect places and little gatherings; let them abstain from theaters, dances, and other public spectacles; let them avoid the commerce of the bad, slippery conversations, things discordant with religion, men professing suspect doctrines, readings contrary to morals or faith according to the dictates of the Holy See, and other dangers of sinning; let them not omit, as much as is lawful for them, to frequent churches and the sacraments; let them approach Catholic circles or meetings for recreation and instruction of soul.

IV. Wherever their station is placed, if there is there a house of their Religion or Institute, let them frequent it and be under the immediate vigilance of the Superior. But if the aforesaid house is not present, or they cannot conveniently frequent it, let them approach a priest designated by the Bishop, and use his counsels and company, so that when it is necessary to leave the same station, they may be able to receive from him written testimony concerning the observance of all those things which are prescribed in the preceding article. But if a priest designated by the Bishop is not had, let them choose for themselves a prudent priest, to be indicated at once to their Superiors, who will procure for themselves from the Ordinary information about his morals, doctrine, and prudence. Furthermore, let them establish correspondence by letters and, as far as can be done, diligently pursue it with their respective Superior or another religious or member of their Institute designated for this, whom they are to make more certain concerning the manner and condition of their life, concerning each change of their station, and especially let them notify him of the name and domicile of that priest whose company and direction they use, as was prescribed above.

V. Superiors General or Provincial, even local according to the custom of each Institute, by themselves or by a delegated member, who in clerical Institutes is to be marked with the priestly order, are altogether held to inquire concerning the life, morals, and conduct of the pupils while military service lasts, especially by the work of the priest or priests concerning whom above, through secret letters if there is need, so that they may be made more certain whether these have preserved the right way of faith and morals, observed the cautions prescribed above, and shown themselves faithful to the divine vocation, their conscience being gravely burdened.

VI. When they have been definitively dismissed from active military service, let each one be held to return by a straight path to his own religious houses, and there, if it is certainly established concerning their good conduct, as was said in the preceding article, some days of holy recollection having been premised, those who are assigned to Institutes of simple vows are to be admitted to renewing temporary profession; but in Regular Orders, let them be placed among the younger clerics or professed, or at least in a house where perfect regular observance flourishes, under the special vigilance and direction of a religious commended for piety and prudence, who in clerical Institutes must be a priest. In that state they must complete the whole time, which, according to what has been said in articles I and II, will not be able to be less than a year, to be premised to solemn or perpetual vows according to the path of the Apostolic Prescriptions and of the Constitutions of their own Religious Family, yet in such a way that the time spent in simple or temporary vows from the first emission of vows up to departure from the religious house because of military service is indeed computed, but not that which was given to military service.

VII. At that time, let them give attention to studies and regular observance; but let the immediate Superiors and the members placed over the direction of the younger men consider them most diligently, investigate their morals, fervor of life, opinions, doctrines, and zeal for persevering, so that concerning them before the last profession they may be able to render an account under faith of oath to the higher Superiors.

VIII. If any, during military service or after it has ended, before they are admitted to solemn or perpetual profession, have given doubtful signs of perseverance, or have not obeyed the cautions prescribed during the time of military service, or have turned aside from purity of morals or faith, let them be dismissed by the Superior General with the consent of his Counselors or Definitors, and let their vows be held as dissolved by the very act of dismissal.

But if the young men themselves desire or spontaneously ask to be relaxed from the bond of vows, the faculty is given to the aforesaid Superiors, as delegates of the Apostolic See, of dissolving the vows, if it is a question of clerical Institutes; but if the matter concerns Institutes of laymen, let the vows be judged dissolved by letters of the Superiors, by which license is given to them to return to the world.

IX. Ecclesiastical Societies also are held by these prescriptions, which, although they do not use vows, neither solemn nor simple, nevertheless have simple promises by which their pupils are bound to those Societies.

X. If anything new, not foreseen in this Decree, or if anything doubtful in understanding it should occur, recourse is to be made in individual cases to this S. Congregation.... Anything contrary whatsoever notwithstanding." S. C. Religious, Decree Inter reliquas, January 1, 1911.

Declarations concerning the Decree Inter reliquas on the military service of religious. - "I. Whether perpetual vows emitted before the promulgation of the Decree Inter reliquas cease ipso facto when active military service is assumed?

II. Whether temporary vows likewise cease ipso facto when the same service is assumed?

III. Whether solemn profession in Orders, and perpetual profession in Institutes of simple vows, emitted in good faith by one who falsely thought himself exempt from military service, is valid?

IV. Whether solemn profession in Orders, and perpetual profession in Institutes of simple vows, emitted before a year has been completed from the day active military service was completed, is valid?

V. Whether a whole year must flow before he who was assigned to active military service for only three months is admitted to solemn or perpetual profession?

VI. Whether those Religious can be admitted to solemn or perpetual profession who, subject to active military service, nevertheless have and manifest the firm intention of giving themselves to foreign Missions, and of remaining in them up to the time established by civil law for obtaining perpetual exemption from military service, as, for example, in Italy it is the thirty-second year of age?

R. To I. In the negative. - To II. In the negative of itself, or, the vows do not cease ipso facto at the beginning of military service; nevertheless Religious can ask for dispensation from vows from the first day of military service, according to Art. VIII of the Decree Inter reliquas, if they do not intend to persevere; if they intend to persevere, in no case can they emit a new profession of vows unless military service has been completed, even if the time of profession has expired during military service. - To III. In the negative. - To IV. In the negative. - To V. In the negative; but it is necessary and sufficient in the case that there be three months, or a space of time shorter than a year, corresponding to the time spent in military service. - To VI. In the negative of itself. Yet the Sacred Congregation concedes that in the last year of the course of studies it is lawful to admit to solemn profession, or respectively to perpetual profession, and to promote to sacred Orders, young men about to set out for sacred Missions within a year, after an oath has first been emitted on the part of the candidate concerning service to be rendered to the Missions up to the time predefined by civil law for obtaining exemption, and with the conscience of Superiors burdened concerning its execution.

Concerning religious Profession in the article of death. - "... In any Order, or any Congregation or religious Society, or monastery whether of men or women, or even in Institutes in which, although vows are not emitted, nevertheless common life is lived after the manner of Religious, it is lawful thereafter to admit Novices or Probands, who by the judgment of the physician are gravely sick, so that they are judged to be constituted in the article of death, to profession or consecration or promise according to their own Rules or Constitutions, although they have not yet completed the time of novitiate or probation.

Yet, in order that novices or probands may be admitted to the above-said profession or consecration or promise, it is necessary:

That they have canonically begun the novitiate or probation.
That the Superior who admits the Novice or Proband to profession or consecration or promise be the one who actually governs the monastery or house of novitiate or probandate.
That the formula of profession or consecration or promise be the same which is in use in the Institute outside the case of sickness; and vows, if they are pronounced, are to be pronounced without determination of time or perpetuity.
That he who has emitted profession, consecration, or promise of this kind will be a participant in absolutely all the indulgences, suffrages, and graces which Religious truly professed dying in the same Institute obtain; and to the same there is mercifully conceded in the Lord plenary indulgence and remission of his sins in the form of a Jubilee.
This profession or consecration or promise, besides the graces declared in the preceding article, produces altogether no other effect. Therefore:

A) if the Novice or Proband after profession or consecration or promise of this kind dies intestate, the Institute will be able to claim for itself no goods or rights pertaining to him;

B) if he recovers before the time of novitiate or probandate expires, he is to be in altogether the same condition as if he had emitted no profession; and therefore: a) freely, if he wishes, he will be able to return to the world; and b) Superiors are able to dismiss him; c) he must complete the whole time of novitiate or probandate defined in individual Institutes, even if beyond a year; d) this time having been completed, if he perseveres, a new profession or consecration or promise will have to be emitted.

Anything contrary whatsoever notwithstanding." S. C. of Religious, September 10, 1912.

277 bis. What form of admission is to be observed? - When Novices are to be admitted to profession, "the Conventual Chapter ... is to declare by secret votes whether the Novice can be admitted to profession.... Then the Provincial and the Examiners (Provincial, at least three) are to define by secret votes whether the Novice ... can safely be admitted to profession. If the Novice has been approved, the Provincial is to render the Superior General instructed concerning everything, who ... is to revoke or confirm the approval ... yet so that he can never permit the profession of a Novice who has been rejected by the Provincial Examiners.... If the Constitutions and rules of some Order and Institute further require anything in admitting Novices to profession, that also will have to be observed only in that part which is by no means contrary to the tenor of this Decree." Decree Regulari disciplinae of the S. C. on the State of Regulars, January 25, 1848.

As regards nuns of solemn vows, those things are to be observed which are established in their proper Constitutions. As regards more recent Institutes of simple vows, the Norms of the Sacred Congregation and their own Constitutions approved by the Holy See are to be observed.

As regards the rite of making profession and renewing vows, the General Decree of the S. R. C., August 14, 1894, n. 3836, and June 5, 1896, n. 3912, is to be observed. - E. M.

n. 278.

Can someone desert religion whenever he wishes because of nullity of profession? - R. In the negative. For he must object in the first five-year period, unless he is restored in full by the Holy See. But the cause of nullity must be examined by his own prelate and by the Ordinary of the place. While appeal is pending, he cannot go out after the first sentence. Trent s. 25, c. 19 de Reg.; Benedict XIV, C. Si datam, published on March 16, 1748; Ferraris v. Professio religiosa n. 65 ff.; Lugo, Resp. Mor. l. 3, d. 21.

n. 279.

Can a superior expel some religious? - R. In the affirmative, if however he has this power proper or delegated, according to the various constitutions of religious orders. For generally speaking, besides the major superior, other inferior superiors do not have this power. Bizzarri ed. 1855, p. 856. But a canonical process and judgment, and a legitimate cause, are required. Such is: to have kept silent about an essential impediment, or a defect harmful to the community; to have committed "grave external and public fault, and that the guilty one is also incorrigible" in grave sins. S. C. Bishops and Regulars, November 4, 1892. - St. Thomas Quodl. 12, a. 36; Benedict XIV, de Syn. l. 13, c. 11, n. 15 ff.; Ferraris v. Apostasia n. 8.

Infirmity is not a just cause for dismissing a professed person, nor is the sole petition of a professed person asserting that he does not have, or has lost, the mind and vocation for the religious state. S. C. on the State of Regulars, June 12, 1858; S. C. Bishops and Regulars, November 19, 1886.

The simple vows which are emitted before solemn vows for men are perpetual on the part of the one vowing, and can be dissolved on the part of the Order in the act of dismissal of the professed, after an examination has been held. For nuns [source print damaged here], these vows are likewise perpetual on the part of those vowing; dispensation concerning them is reserved to the Roman Pontiff. And for dismissing them, recourse is to be made to the Holy See. S. C. on the State of Regulars, March 19, 1857; June 12, 1858; February 7, 1862; S. C. Bishops and Regulars, May 3, 1902; July 15, 1902.

As regards more recent Institutes, for the dismissal of a religious or sister of temporary vows, a grave cause is required; a graver cause and incorrigibility, if they have perpetual vows. The dismissal of a Nun or Sister of perpetual vows is to be confirmed by the S. C. of Religious. Moreover, for a religious who has solemn, or perpetual, or temporary vows, but at the same time is bound to sacred orders, a threefold admonition or correction and a summary process are pre-required according to the Decree Auctis admodum of the S. C. Bishops and Regulars, November 4, 1892, and the Decree Quum singulae of the S. C. of Religious, May 16, 1911, which is reported here in the following number. - Norms 192 ff.; E. M.

279 bis. Decree - On the method to be observed in rendering a sentence of expulsion or dismissal from orders and religious institutes. "... 1. The competent Curia or competent Tribunal for rendering sentence is constituted by the Superior or Moderator General and the Definitors or Counselors or Assistants, not fewer than four; if any are lacking, in their place the same number of Religious are to be chosen by the President of the Curia or Tribunal, with the consent of the other Counselors.

In Congregations of Monks, the Tribunal is constituted by the Abbot General with his Council. If some Abbey is attached to no Congregation, recourse is to be made to the Holy See in individual cases.

In any Curia or Tribunal let there be constituted by the General Council a Promoter of Justice for the protection of right and law, who is to be a Religious of the same Order or Congregation.
Hereafter only a Summary Process is to be instituted in expelling or dismissing Religious who either have professed solemn vows in Orders, or perpetual vows in Congregations or Institutes, or, if they have emitted only temporary vows, are nevertheless constituted in Sacred Orders; special privileges by which some Order or Institute may enjoy being saved.
One cannot proceed to instructing the Process unless after a threefold admonition has been given and correction inflicted in vain, saving the exceptions under numbers 17 and 18.
The admonition is to be made by the legitimate Superior, even local, yet by mandate or license of the Provincial or quasi-Provincial Superior; he will join to the last admonition the threat of expulsion or dismissal. For the effect of expulsion or dismissal, an admonition or correction has no force unless it has been given for some grave delict.
Admonitions cannot be repeated unless the delict has been repeated; but in continuous or permanent delicts it is necessary that between one admonition and another there intervene a space of at least two whole days. After the last admonition, six whole days are to be awaited before progress is made to further steps.
From the Process there must be established the guilt of the accused, as well as the gravity and number of the delicts, the fact of the threefold admonition, and the defect of repentance after the threefold admonition.
In order that the guilt of the accused be established, such proofs are to be brought forward as would move the mind of a prudent man. These proofs can be taken from the confession of the accused, from the deposition of at least two trustworthy witnesses, confirmed by oath and strengthened by other supports, and from authentic documents.
The gravity of the delict is to be taken not only from the gravity of the law violated, but also from the gravity of the penalty sanctioned by law, from the gravity of the deceit, and from the gravity of the harm, whether moral or material, inflicted on the Community.
For the effect about which there is question, at least three grave crimes of the same species are required, or, if of different species, such that taken together they manifest a perverse will obstinate in evil, or only one permanent crime which by a threefold admonition virtually becomes threefold.
In order that the fact of the threefold admonition be established, ordinarily an authentic document must be brought forward concerning this. Therefore it is necessary: a) that this be done either before two witnesses, or by a letter registered by public record-keepers, with faithful proof of reception or rejection having been sought; b) that a document be drawn up concerning the admonition carried out, signed by the said witnesses and to be preserved in the Registers or Archive; or that a copy be made of the above-said letter, likewise signed before dispatch by two witnesses as testimony of conformity, and likewise to be kept in the Registers or Archive.
A new crime committed after the threefold admonition, or the obstinate and hardened manner of acting of the delinquent, proves the defect of repentance.
The Provincial or quasi-Provincial Superior of the delinquent Religious, after the admonitions and corrections have fallen out in vain, will diligently collect all acts and documents which exist concerning the guilt of this Religious and will transmit them to the Superior General, who must hand them over to the Procurator of Justice, so that he may examine them and propose his accusations, if he judges that any are to be proposed.
The accusations proposed by the Procurator of Justice and the results of the Process must be notified to the accused, and a suitable time, to be determined at the discretion of the Judge, must be conceded to the same, in which he may be able to present his defenses, either by himself or through another Religious of the same Order or Institute. But if the accused himself has not presented his own defenses, the Curia or Tribunal must constitute ex officio a defender who is a member of the respective Order or Institute.
The Curia or Tribunal, having diligently weighed the allegations both of the Promoter and of the Accused, if it has indeed judged them to be adverse to the accused, will be able to pronounce the sentence of expulsion or dismissal; nevertheless, if the condemned person has duly appealed to the Sacred Congregation of Religious within ten days from notification of the sentence, it cannot be handed over to execution until judgment has been rendered by the same Sacred Congregation.
But notwithstanding the appeal, the guilty one can be sent back to the world at once by the supreme Moderator or Abbot General, with the consent of his Chapter or Council, if from his presence there threatens danger either of very grave scandal or likewise very grave harm to the community and their members. In the meantime let him put off the habit and remain suspended, if he is constituted in Sacred Orders.
He who has been guilty of even only one delict, from which danger of grave public scandal or very grave detriment to the whole Community threatens, can likewise be sent back to the world even by the Provincial Superior or Abbot, the religious habit being immediately laid aside, provided that the delict itself and the guilt of the Religious to whom it is imputed have certainly been established; and meanwhile let the Process be instituted for rendering the sentence of expulsion or dismissal. Those who are constituted in Sacred Orders are likewise to remain suspended.
Likewise against certain delicts the penalty of expulsion or dismissal is judged as if brought by law. These delicts are: a) public apostasy from the Catholic Faith; b) apostasy from an Order or Institute, unless the Religious has returned within three months; c) flight from a Monastery, having taken a woman with him; d) and much more the contract, as they say, civil, or the attempt or celebration of marriage, even valid, or when the vows are not solemn or do not have the effect of solemn vows.

In these cases it is enough that the Superior General or Provincial, with his respective Council, issue a declaratory sentence of the fact.

A sentence of expulsion or dismissal, in whatever way brought, if it is a question of a Religious in Sacred Orders, is to be communicated at once to the Ordinary of origin and the Ordinary of the place where he is staying, or where he is known to wish to establish his seat.
All Religious about whom there is question, constituted in Sacred Orders, who have been expelled or dismissed, remain perpetually suspended until they have obtained dispensation from the competent Authority after amendment of life. Religious or Clerics not in Sacred Orders, expelled or dismissed, are prohibited from ascending to higher Orders without leave of the Holy See. But all expelled or dismissed, even if they have truly amended themselves, will not be able to be admitted to their own or to another Order or Congregation without special license of the Apostolic See.
For expelling Nuns who have professed vows, whether solemn or simple, in an Order properly so called, and for dismissing Sisters who have emitted perpetual vows in Religious Institutes, grave external causes are required, together with incorrigibility, by the judgment of the Abbess or Superiorissa with her Council, respectively to be manifested by secret votes, an experiment having first been had, so that hope of repentance has vanished and from the continual faults of the incorrigible Nun or Sister harms threaten the Monastery or Institute. Less grave causes are required for dismissing Sisters of simple vows in Religious Orders. Just and grave causes must be proved by the Ordinary of the place and, if the Monastery is subject to Regulars, also by the Regular Superior. Furthermore it is necessary that confirmation of the Sacred Congregation be added, so that expulsion or dismissal on the part of the Order or Institute does not obtain juridical effect before it has been confirmed by the Sacred Congregation. Only in the case of grave external scandal, the Bishop of the place approving, can a Nun or Sister be sent back to the world at once, yet in such a way that the confirmation of the Holy See be sought without delay." S. C. of Religious, May 16, 1911.

Those constituted in sacred orders and bound by simple vows, whether perpetual or temporal, who have spontaneously sought and obtained dismissal from the Apostolic See, or otherwise have been dispensed from simple, perpetual, or temporary vows by Apostolic privilege, cannot go out from the cloister until they have found a Bishop as benevolent receiver and have provided for themselves concerning an ecclesiastical patrimony; otherwise they remain suspended from the exercise of the orders received. This is extended to pupils of temporal vows who would already have been released from any bond of profession because of the elapsed time for which vows were pronounced by them. Decree Auctis admodum of the S. C. Bishops and Regulars, November 4, 1892.

Vol. III, On the Particular Obligati…, V. On the Vow of Poverty

n. 280.

What is the force of the solemn vow of poverty in relation to the ownership of goods? - A Religious, by force of the solemn vow of poverty, is rendered absolutely incapable of dominion in particular, or personally, over any temporal thing estimable by price, even with the license of the superior. - Absolutely incapable, i.e., incapable perpetually and immutably, both on the part of the religious and on the part of religion.

In particular, or personally: for the solemnity of the vow of poverty does not prevent the community from being able to acquire and possess goods, whether by itself or through subjects, unless its constitutions stand in the way. Hence the widely spread axiom of canon law: Whatever a monk acquires, he acquires not for himself, but for the monastery. Cf. Schmalzgr. l. 3, t. 27, n. 75 ff. Of a temporal thing estimable by price: because the religious retains dominion over spiritual goods, honor, reputation, and similar things.

Likewise he retains the right of electing, presenting, and conferring a regular benefice. Even with the license of the superior, namely of the regular superior: for this incapacity can be removed by the Supreme Pontiff, without the solemnity of the vow being thereby impeded. Cf. 248. Of dominion, i.e., of dominion both direct and also merely useful. Therefore the ownership of temporal goods, the right of enjoying, the right of using, the right of simply retaining or possessing, the right, i.e., in one's own name and by one's own judgment, is opposed to the solemn vow of poverty; but by no means the usufruct, use, and retention of mere fact, i.e., with the license of the superior, dependently on the superior, and also mere administration. For through this he acquires no temporal advantage for himself by which he might become rich or less poor, and disposes of no thing for his own temporal emolument. Lugo d. 3, n. 155. - C. Cum ad monasterium 6 de Stat. monach.; Trent s. 25, c. 2, 3 de Reg.; Bizzarri ed. 1885, p. 276, 279, 335, 336, 384; E. M.

n. 281.

You will resolve: A Religious solemnly professed is altogether incapable of any act of ownership, of donation, sale, etc. Therefore he cannot make a testament. Incapable, namely unless the dispensation of the Supreme Pontiff is added, which in fact was given to regulars of Belgium, so that they could acquire, retain, administer, and dispose of goods. S. C. Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs, July 31, 1878.

Act of ownership, by which he receives some advantage and emolument; but mere causing of damage is by no means against poverty, e.g., to kill at night a barking and troublesome or dangerous dog. D'Annibale p. 3, n. 222. All gifts which are made to religious solemnly professed are thereby acquired for the monastery, legacies and inheritances not excepted, unless a special rule or constitution of the Order stands in the way. Trent s. 25, c. 1 de Reg.; Lugo, Resp. Mor. l. 3, d. 14. - Manuscripts are proper to religious.

For they are something spiritual, since they are the offspring of their own intelligence. And this has already been introduced also by custom. Likewise holy Relics can be had, because they are not estimated by price. - The S. C. of Religious, July 13, 1913, declared that Religious, both of solemn vows and of simple vows, who during vows have written some manuscript do not have dominion over the same, so that they can donate it or alienate it by any title whatsoever. - "To have something proper is said to be against poverty, not because it is against some special virtue, for there is none, but because it is against the vow of poverty; and thus that sin is properly against religion." Suarez, de Rel. tr. 10, l. 4, c. 14. For indeed the virtue of poverty excludes only the affection and disordered use of earthly things, not ownership. This is not excluded unless, with a vow added, it is restricted and narrowed. Therefore the virtue of poverty can easily be reduced to modesty, a part of temperance. - L. 14, 22.

n. 282.

What is the force of the simple vow of poverty in relation to exterior goods? - A Religious bound by a simple vow of poverty can indeed have direct dominion of goods; but he can licitly dispose of nothing concerning them without particular or general license of the superior. Licitly, since a religious preserving direct dominion of goods can validly dispose of them without license, since he is truly lord of those goods. Yet the simple vow which formed coadjutors emit in the Society of Jesus renders one incapable even of dominion. Suarez, de Relig. tr. 10, l. 4, c. 6, n. 12; Lugo, de Iust. d. 3, n. 78; Schmalzgr. l. 3, t. 35, n. 9; E. M.

n. 283.

You will resolve: A Religious who is not solemnly professed has direct dominion: of temporal goods which he possessed before vows. The reason is that simple vows do not deprive one of dominion already had. - Of the fruits or revenues of the same goods. The reason is that a thing fructifies for its lord, and simple vows do not deprive one of the right of acquiring dominion. But cf. n. 274. - Of those things which come to him by law, without new acceptance, such as paternal inheritance, legacies, etc. The reason is clear from what has been said. - Of all goods which he receives from parents, relatives, friends, with the license of superiors; if however those donations are made specifically with regard to the private person, and not insofar as he is religious; otherwise donations come to the monastery. For that principle is also applied to these religious: Whatever a monk acquires, etc. - Of all goods which he receives from parents, relatives, friends, etc., given with regard to the private person, without license of superiors. The reason is that since he has the right of acquiring, the defect of license makes him acquire illicitly, not acquire invalidly, just as the defect of license makes him donate illicitly, not donate invalidly.

Manual works, whatever they are, which are made by religious pertain to the community. Therefore private persons, although craftsmen, cannot dispose of them, nor can they receive any emolument from them. The same is to be said of honoraria which are given to regulars for Masses or other spiritual ministries. Yet it is not against poverty, with material furnished by another, at his petition to paint, for example, a small panel, which he then receives. For it is gratuitous work, not an act of dominion from which advantage or emolument is acquired. The same is to be said if a religious gratuitously teaches another canon law, theology, etc. It is a gratuitous office, not an act of ownership. Likewise it is not against poverty to eat and drink at the house of an outsider, for this is the act of dominion of the outsider, not of the religious. Lugo d. 2, n. 51; d. 3, n. 149; Norms art. 126.

A Religious bound by a simple vow acts illicitly if at home, or also outside, even from those things which pertain to food and clothing, he receives, retains, consumes, exchanges, gives to another, lends for consumption, or lends for use, or makes any contract in which an act of ownership intervenes, without the consent of the superior. - He sins against the vow of poverty if he expends for another use anything from the things conceded for his use, or culpably loses or destroys it. The reason is that in these he has only use of fact, and that precariously, as long as it shall seem good to the superior; and it is at the same time an act of dominion to be able to destroy one's own or quasi-own thing by one's own decision. - He also sins against the vow of poverty if he usurps for himself things of the monastery, if he hides or subtracts some thing from the disposition of the superior; if he remits a debt; if he renounces an inheritance or legacy which would be in favor of the community. If he renounces a donation, he does not sin against justice or the vow, but he can sin against charity toward his own convent. L. 19, 20; Norms of the S. C. Bishops and Regulars, art. 124.

n. 284.

What is required so that a religious can receive or give a thing? - So that a religious may licitly, by reason of the vow of poverty, receive, donate, etc., a thing, the license of the superior is required and suffices, at least reasonably presumed or interpretative. - Presumed or interpretative license is distinguished from express and tacit license. Express is called that which is openly conceded by word or writing; and this can be formal express, or virtual, as if he says: I concede to you that you call a physician; this will be formal express license in order to consult the physician, virtual in order to apply the prescribed remedies. Tacit is called that when from custom, signs, or other circumstances, it is reasonably concluded that the superior approves the matter.

Presumed or interpretative is called that when, because of some occurring necessity or another just cause, it is believed or presumed that the superior would consent or give license if this were sought in these circumstances. Reasonably presumed: otherwise there is no license, since it is against the will of the superior. - Moreover, for acting against the vow of poverty it is required that the religious act in his own name and independently of the will of the superior. But one who acts from the consent of the prelate according to prudent interpretation does not act in his own name and independently. Therefore. St. Alphonsus 18 calls this opinion more probable, and St. Thomas teaches it expressly, 2. 2, q. 32, a. 8 ad 1, and 4 d. 15, q. 2, a. 5, q. 4.

n. 285.

You will resolve: If the prelate gives or permits to be given to a subject images, rosaries, etc., knowing that he does not need all these for his own use, he is judged tacitly to concede the faculty of giving them to others. - If to a religious for his support a certain quantity is assigned in such a way that neither is the monastery held to provide anything else to him, nor he himself to render an account, then whether he stays within the cloister or outside, whatever he has withheld for himself from that portion he will be able to expend at his good pleasure, provided he expends it for an honorable use.

But otherwise, if no certain quantity is assigned to him, but all necessary things are supplied by the monastery, because then it is not presumed, as in the first case, that the prelate concedes license. - By authors it is permitted to religious, because of the same presumed license, to make some moderate alms, likewise to make light donations for reconciling the love of others toward religion, as a sign of due friendship or due gratitude. And here attention is to be given to the Constitution Religiosae of Clement VIII, moderated by the Decree Nuper of Urban VIII, prohibiting to religious the giving of gifts, unless they are from causes containing by their nature an act of virtue and merit, yet modestly and discreetly, and with license of superiors. By this prohibition convents also and their chapters are comprehended; and those receiving are held to restitution. Illicit donations are also void from these Constitutions. If these exceed the sum of ten scudi, absolution cannot be given unless first, if it can be done, restitution be made. Innocent XII, C. Romanus Pontifex, 1692. - L. 17, 21, 23; E. M.

n. 286.

Note: License sought but unduly denied does not excuse from transgression of the vow, unless there is danger of grave harm in delay, e.g., if the superior denies things necessary for food and clothing, or to relieve the want of one in extreme need. For then the consent of the major superior is presumed to be present. Thus St. Alphonsus 33, and it agrees with the doctrine of St. Thomas 1. 2, q. 106, a. 6; 2. 2, q. 120, a. 1; Schmalzgr. l. 3, t. 35, n. 35, and of others. When the matter has already been done and consummated with reasonably presumed license, there is not given from the vow of poverty an obligation of manifesting the fact to the superior. Otherwise that license would serve for nothing, and can no longer serve for anything. Lugo d. 3, n. 128. - A superior cannot licitly and validly give permission for things extraordinarily superfluous and illicit. For these are unbecoming to the state of poverty of religious, and the superior is not the lord, but the simple administrator of the things of the monastery. L. 29 f.; Lugo d. 3, n. 139 ff.; Kenrick tr. 8, n. 75. - If the preceding superior gave license, it is valid even if he has departed from office. On the contrary, although a superior licitly accepts and retains during the time in which he himself is superior money given to him, nevertheless he will not be able to expend it when he has ceased from office without leave of his superior. La Croix l. 4, n. 116.

As already said, the giving of gifts is prohibited to Regulars of either sex, apart from a cause of virtue and merit, yet modestly and discreetly. And those doing otherwise incur infamy of law ipso facto, deprivation of active and passive voice, and perpetual inability for all offices and dignities. But restitution of things received is to be made to the Convents.

Economic obligations are to be undertaken by religious families according to the Decree Inter ea of the S. C. of Religious, July 30, 1909. - Without the consent of the respective council, obligations cannot be contracted for individual houses which exceed 500 lire and do not reach 1000 lire; for provinces, which exceed 1000 lire and do not reach 5000; for Generalitial Curias, which exceed 5000 lire; and for the sum of 10000 lire, besides license of the respective Council, the Apostolic good pleasure is needed. And no foundation of a house is to be made, and no amplification of a foundation, if the money to be paid is not had. Stipends accepted for Masses can in no way be expended before the celebration of the Masses themselves. And the dowries of Religious women are by no means to be alienated as long as they live. Cf. § 7, Second Supplement, E. M., p. 74 ff.

n. 287.

What is grave matter in transgression of the vow of poverty? - It is difficult to hand down some determined rule as regards the quantity required for grave sin, as is established from the very multiplicity of opinions concerning this matter. - Generally speaking, that matter is to be held grave which constitutes grave sin in theft. For an act of ownership which is grave by reason of matter against justice is also grave against religion when the vow of poverty is added. For the vow of poverty precisely impedes this, namely an act of ownership. But some say that only that matter is grave which is grave in thefts of children in the household, which others more probably deny. For their condition is altogether different as regards the goods of the monastery and as regards paternal goods. And since, as regards religious, it is a question of spiritual detriment, the superior must always be judged more unwilling than the father of a household. And hence it is clear that the aforesaid grave matter is not absolutely grave matter in theft, if the monastery is very wealthy, but only relatively grave matter, namely relative to a monastery moderately rich, as to the common rule, with attention given to the harm which Religion suffers from the sin of ownership. For if it is grave in the reason of an act of theft, it is already grave in the reason of an act of ownership against the vow of poverty. But here the harm of society or community, from which absolutely grave matter is determined, certainly cannot be attended to, but merely the act of ownership, and the grave matter of this act as respectively such. And if the harm of society or community had to be attended to here, since the harm to be attended to here is spiritual harm, it is clear that not only then must absolutely grave matter be rejected, but even on the contrary respectively grave matter must be restricted rather than extended. But this respectively grave matter as regards a monastery moderately rich is that very matter which is respectively grave as regards a person moderately rich. But it is altogether discordant to introduce, for constituting grave sin against the vow of poverty alone, a still greater quantity than that absolutely grave for theft.

Yet this grave matter, according to diverse circumstances, as in theft, can be still greater or lesser. More is required for rich convents than for other poor ones. - More also if a religious usurps things of the monastery for his own use, or for others of the same community, than if he were to expend them on outsiders; for in the former case the thing remains at home. More, if the thing is not from money, but from clothing, books, and similar things. It is not mortal to steal edible things on several occasions, even if they come to a great quantity, provided they are not reserved by the religious, and provided the damage to the convent is not excessive and in an extraordinary and more precious thing. More is also required in small thefts, which moreover, with a notable interval interposed, do not coalesce into grave matter, than in other ordinary thefts. Furthermore, more is required in sins against religion alone, or committed against the vow alone, than at the same time against justice; for in the former case the act of ownership, as is clear, is less. Hence also in the same case of sin against religion alone more is required for sinning gravely when gifts are received from outsiders to be expended on others in one's own name, than if these were retained for one's own uses; and more is also required if someone expends or retains goods of which he has radical dominion. For the whole malice of the act is in this, that it is an act of ownership without dependence on the superior, against his will. Finally more or less is required according as the act participates more or less in ownership. And thus generally a religious does not sin gravely when he secretly receives some thing from the community for his own use, or if he lends for consumption or lends for use to another a thing conceded to him for use. - L. 24, 25, 27; l. 3, n. 545; H. A. tr. 3, n. 10;

Lugo d. 3, n. 170 ff.

Those things which are light only against the vow of poverty, and therefore only against religion, do not coalesce to constitute at the same time a grave sin, because the reason of grave real harm inflicted is lacking, as in sins against justice.

…and 16 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Bucceroni, Cases of Conscience

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 149 passages

105. On the Religious State

1. Petrus and Paulus dispute between themselves concerning the more recent Institutes of Sisters. Petrus affirms that they are truly religious, as are Dominican nuns and Poor Clares. For nothing else is required for the true essence of the religious state than the profession of religious vows, in an Institute approved by the Church. Paulus, on the contrary, affirms that they are nothing except pious women. For they have often been so called by the Sacred Penitentiary itself, 26 November 1852. Indeed, for very many years the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars did not wish them to be called Religiosae, but Sisters. Moreover, these modern Institutes are wholly lacking solemn vows, without which the essence of the religious state cannot be had. Finally, the Church has never approved these more recent Institutes, but only tolerated them.

Question. 1. What is the Religious State? — 2. What is to be said in the case?

R. To the first. The religious state, considered as to its essence, is: A stable institute of life, approved by the Church for the faithful, who under a certain rule and common manner of living wish to tend to perfection through the three perpetual vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, with a handing over of oneself made to God and accepted by Him.

The religious state, namely, taken strictly. For “it must be supposed,” says Suarez, “according to the common usage of the Church, that the religious state, as if by antonomasia and in strict signification, is called the perfect state of monks or regulars, who totally consecrate and hand over themselves to God, by emitting the three vows concerning the three principal counsels, poverty, chastity, and obedience. Nevertheless, in a certain broader or more general meaning, the state of religion comprehends under itself other manners of living, in which men voluntarily offer themselves to divine worship and service, by obligating themselves to some observance of the counsels. And thus it comprehends, not only proper and complete religious, but also continent persons, who by the vow of chastity alone bind themselves specially to God. For thus the interpreters of canon law, in the rubric de Regularibus, teach that the name of religious or regular, taken strictly, signifies him who has professed the three substantial vows in an approved religion; but broadly it comprehends all who by some vow and special manner of living are consecrated to the service of God.” De Rel., tr. 7, bk. 2, c. 1, n. 1; Bouix, de I. Reg., t. 1, p. 47.

A stable institute of life. For firmness or stability pertains to the essence of a state.

Approved by the Church. For it is of the essence of the religious state that it not be prohibited by the Church. And indeed it is of the essence of the religious state that it be a state of perfection. But as soon as it is prohibited, it is no longer a state of perfection, but rather of rebellion. Now there exists a law of the Church prohibiting the beginning and entrance of any religion not approved. Hence, by the very fact that a religious institute has not been approved by the Church, it must be held as prohibited by her, and therefore wholly invalid, namely lacking the essence of the religious state. This approval can be given only by the Apostolic See, as is clear from Canon Law. But today it has been introduced by custom that various Congregations are instituted by the approval of the Bishop alone, which afterwards are praised and approved by the Church, first by a Decree of praise, then by a Decree of approval of the Institute, and by a Decree of approval of the Constitutions; and consequently these Congregations, if the other requisites are not lacking, can be held as containing those things which pertain to the intrinsic essence of the religious state.

To the intrinsic essence; for, in order that there be had the religious state or true religion in the Church, or in order that there be had the religious state according to canonical institution, it is not enough that the Institute be approved by the Church and at the same time the rules or Constitutions of the Institute be approved by the same Church; but it is required that the Institute be approved by the Church, and by that approval be constituted in the state of true religion, or of a religious order. “For if,” says Benedict XIV, Constitution Quamvis iusto, prid. Kal. May 1749, § 13, “for the essence of the truly religious state it is required that a religion or order be established in such a state by confirmation of the Apostolic See, according to the canonical sanctions concerning which in c. un., de Relig. dom., in 6, nor does it suffice to have obtained from the same Apostolic See only approval and confirmation of the rules which some society of men or women has prescribed for itself to observe; if the vows of poverty, obedience, and chastity emitted by the English Virgins according to the form of the rules approved by Clement XI cannot be said to be joined with express or tacit profession in some order approved by the Apostolic See in the state of true religion, as is said above, it clearly appears both that the state of the English Virgins is not the state of true religion, and that the vows which are made by them must be judged at most simple vows, not solemn, according to the paths of the Decretal of Pope Boniface VIII, which alone exists under the title de Voto et voti redempt. in 6.” Cf. ibid., § 14.

Wherefore there is one and another approval of the Church in this matter. There is a certain inferior approval, by which an Institute is approved as an Institute of Clerics or Sisters, as a Pious Society, as a Religious Congregation. There is a fuller and more solemn approval by which an Institute is approved as a Religious Order, as a true Religion.

For the faithful; for religious neither necessarily pertain to the hierarchy of jurisdiction, nor to the hierarchy of order, but are, or can be, simple faithful in the Church, and therefore of either sex.

Under a certain rule; for the manner and grade of observing the evangelical counsels can be various, and this is determined by the rule.

And common manner of living. For although, if only the nature of the religious state is considered, common life does not pertain to its essence, nevertheless today common life is required by the Church, namely under one common head and under one approved rule. Cf. Bouix, pt. 2, s. 1, c. 2, par. 2, prop. 10.

Wish to tend to perfection. There is indeed a twofold state of life. One is of common life, which intends nothing other than the observance of the commandments of God; the other is of perfection, which adds the observance of the counsels. But perfection is in charity. For the perfection of any thing is had from the fact that it attains its proper end. The end of man is God, to whom we are united by charity. Now to exclude those things which are repugnant to charity, namely mortal sins, pertains to the state of common life. But to exclude those things which impede man from adhering totally to God pertains to the state of perfection. The former is proper to essential charity; the latter, to the perfection of charity. Wherefore the perfection of which there is question here is not in essential charity as such, but in a certain peculiar grade of charity which surpasses the common charity of Christians. But this grade does not consist in some one or some transitory acts of charity, even if they are of great or greatest intensity, but in a mind so habitually prepared that man is proximately disposed to act easily and ordinarily according to the precepts and counsels of God, obstacles having been removed, so that he tends totally to God.

Tends. For the state of perfection is twofold: one is the state of perfection acquired; the other of perfection to be acquired. The former is proper to Bishops; the latter to religious. Bouix, pt. 1, s. 1.

Through the three perpetual vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience. For the state of perfection to be acquired is twofold: one incomplete or begun, the other complete. For the former the three principal evangelical counsels are not required; but some counsel suffices, whether it is one of those three principal ones, or another, for the counsels are very many in number. But for the latter the three evangelical counsels of poverty, chastity, and obedience are required and suffice. For through these three counsels all impediments of charity are removed, so that the affection of the mind is directed totally to God. But the religious state, strictly so called, is the complete state of perfection to be acquired. Now those counsels to be observed, in order that a state, and therefore stability, be had, must be strengthened by a vow, and that of itself perpetual.

Now, although those three vows must of themselves be perpetual, for this is required by the very nature of a state, nevertheless it is by no means truly required of itself that they be solemn, but it is enough that they be simple. This is openly clear from the Constitutions of Gregory XIII, Quanto fructuosius and Ascendente Domino, where it is established that those who in the Society of Jesus have emitted the three simple vows are true and proper religious.

The solemnity of vows is nothing other than a certain force added to them by the disposition of the Church, of constituting a religious properly and strictly such according to canonical institution, and of making certain acts of the religious concerning the matter of the same vows invalid or at least voidable, and of rendering the vows themselves wholly firm and stable. And that force is absolute, and not merely relative to the time during which the religious, free from the vows, is not dismissed by his superiors. Hence for the solemnity of vows not just any force of producing the aforesaid effects suffices; but that force must be absolute, that is, so perpetual and immutable that neither the religious nor even the religion itself can suspend or remove that force. But it is by no means required that that force cannot be removed by the Roman Pontiff; for that force is of ecclesiastical law, and therefore the Pope can dispense both from the effect of the solemnity of vows, the solemn vows remaining, and from the solemn vows themselves, and indeed validly, although no reasonable cause is present, with which, if it accedes, he will also dispense licitly. Bouix, t., p. 444 ff.; Decree of the Sacred Congregations for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs, 31 July 1878; Revue des Sciences Ecclésiastiques, 1879, p. 191.

Wherefore Busembaum very well says, bk. 3, n. 195, that a solemn vow “is that which is accepted as such by the Church. ... But simple is every other one, which does not have such solemnity.” Therefore a solemn vow is a vow which has this annexed force; a simple vow is one which lacks that force. Consequently the solemnity of a vow is an all-embracing dependence and subjection and plenary approval and confirmation of the vow made by the Church herself, or by the Supreme Pontiff, as to the being of the vow, as to its force of constituting in the Church a truly religious state, and as to the other aforesaid effects of invalidation.

And hence it appears why the Church does not approve in the state of true Religion, or as Religions or truly religious Orders, except Institutes which have solemn vows. For these perfectly display the nature of state and the nature of perfection, since through them man altogether totally and immovably tends to God and adheres to Him. But since this is wanting in simple vows from the limited acceptance of the Church herself, namely not to all the aforesaid effects, therefore Institutes with only simple vows, but not solemn vows, are approved by the same Church as Pious Institutes and also as Religious Congregations, but not as true Religions and true Religious Orders. Indeed, the essence or substance of the state of perfection, and consequently of the religious state, is also found in these Institutes, but in an inferior grade, as compared with true Religions and Religious Orders. Hence the pupils of these Institutes are truly and properly religious, but less strictly than the pupils of true Religions and Orders. Less strictly, namely as regards the very essence of the religious state, and as regards canonical institution. But in order that there be had a Religious Congregation, it is not enough that the vows have been approved by the Apostolic See; but they must be approved in such a way that the vows which are emitted in such a Congregation are accepted by someone in the name of the Congregation or of the Apostolic See.

For in order to have a formal Religion of solemn vows, or to have a true Religious Congregation of simple vows, it is altogether required that the vows emitted in it be not private, but public, accepted in the name of the Church by a legitimate Superior. S. C. EE. et RR., 11 August 1889. If the vows are only private and accepted by no one, there is had only a pious Sodality, S. C. EE. et RR., 11 August 1889, or a secular Congregation, such as therefore is the Congregation of the Mission, Alexander VII, Brief Ex Commissa, 22 September 1655. I. M. 248.

With a handing over of oneself made to God. In the pronouncing of the three vows, considering their nature, there is had a total handing over of oneself to God. But this handing over of oneself, if the vows are solemn, is far more perfect and is truly a certain handing over and donation of oneself. But if the vows are simple, that handing over is less perfect, and is not an altogether total handing over of oneself; and since it is not altogether firm and immovable, it is rather a simple promise. Through the former handing over of oneself, made by authority of the Church, there is had a certain consecration of the person devoted and bound to God; but through the latter promise there is had rather a simple blessing of the person.

And accepted by Him; namely accepted by God through the Church and through proper superiors, because from the approval of the Church they receive this power and authority through the canonical approval itself of the Institute; “because God, according to ordinary providence, does not undertake the peculiar care of governing a private person immediately by Himself, nor does He need these sensible things so as to use them immediately and without the intervention of secondary causes. And therefore a donation thus made to God would either be vain and idle, or as if tempting God by demanding immediate rule from Him; and for that reason it does not please Him, nor is it immediately accepted by Him.” Suarez, de Relig., bk. 2, c. 4, nn. 7, 8; Bouix, pt. 1, s. 2.

R. To the second. That which Petrus says concerning the Sisters of the more recent Institutes, that they are true religious, taken simply, is simply true. For they themselves judge themselves to be such; all Bishops judge them to be such, as is clear from their testimonial letters for the approval of these Institutes; and the Supreme Pontiff himself holds them as such, as is gathered from several Briefs of Approval, in which those Sisters are praised and approved as Religious. But Petrus seems to say and signify more. For he says that they are true Religious, as are Dominican nuns and Poor Clares. And this is false, since Dominican nuns and Poor Clares are not only truly, but also strictly Religious; for they have solemn vows, and consequently their Institute has been constituted and confirmed by the Church, as a Religion or Order in the truly and strictly Religious state, by the Approval of the Apostolic See. More recent Institutes, on the contrary, since they have only simple vows, are by no means approved and established by the Church in the state of strict and true Religion, although they are approved as Religious Institutes. That is, the Sisters of these Institutes are indeed Religious, but in an inferior grade, not in that superior and nobler grade in which nuns are truly and strictly religious. To the reason added by Petrus, the answer is that, in order that the essence of the religious state be had in some way, the profession of religious vows in an Institute approved by the Church indeed suffices; but for the essence of the religious state true and strictly such, there is altogether required the solemn profession of religious vows in an Institute approved by the Church in the state of true and strict Religion or Order.

But it is altogether false what Paulus says, that the Sisters of the more recent Institutes are nothing except pious women, and in no way are religious. When the Sacred Penitentiary, 26 November 1852, and at other times, called them pious women, it declared its mind more than sufficiently by denying of them that they were nuns strictly such, since they did not emit solemn vows. By that expression “pious women” it wished to deny this only, by no means that they were not even true religious. And if for several years the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars denied to these Sisters the denomination Religious, it did this only so as to deny them the character of Religious true and strictly such. Later, however, when the signification of the words had been better established, to these modern Institutes was conceded that denomination of Religious Institutes, and to their pupils the denomination Religious men and Religious women. And by the Decree of 11 August 1889, the Sacred Congregation openly recognizes in these modern Institutes true Religious Congregations, expressly distinguishing in the same Decree between formal Religions of solemn vows and true Religious Congregations of simple vows. Therefore without solemn vows there is not had the essence of the strictly religious state; but with merely simple vows the essence of the truly religious state is indeed had. Here note that that word “truly” is sometimes for increasing and restricting the signification, and is equivalent to “strictly,” as in the cited Constitution of Benedict XIV; sometimes it is merely for determining the correct signification, as in the cited Decree. Finally, it is altogether false that the Church does not approve these more recent Institutes but merely tolerates them, as is openly clear from the same cited Decree, and as is proved by the very fact of the various Decrees of Approval, first by praising and then by positively approving.

2. “Cunegunda, a nun, determined with firm mind to avoid all mortal sins, but no venial sin. Nor does she make it a matter of conscience not to induce another companion to lie venially.

Question. 1. Whether for religious there is an obligation of tending to perfection? — 2. Does Cunegunda sin mortally in each case?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M. 249. — To the second. In the first case, they affirm who, with Sanchez, bk. 1, in decalog., c. 5, and Bonacina, de peccatis, q. 3, p. 5, n. 13, contend that the will of committing, as the thing and occasion may allow, all venial sins, is not free from mortal sin. Many others deny this with Cajetan, Sylvester, Granados, Palão, Machado; to whom I myself willingly subscribe, led especially by this reason, that to commit in fact whatever venial sins occur is not mortal sin. And it pleases me to confirm this by the authority of St. Thomas, I-II, q. 88, a. 4: all the venial sins in the world cannot have so much guilt as one mortal sin, which is precisely to say that even all venial sins do not make one mortal sin, nor are they equivalent to it. Therefore to will to commit them all is neither mortal, nor equivalent to mortal. The consequence holds, because the malice of the act is taken from the object; therefore, if to commit them all in fact, or to avoid none, does not involve mortal malice, neither does the will of committing them all, or of avoiding none, involve it.

Master Petrus de Tapia, Archbishop of Seville, says that the mortal malice which he contends a will of this kind involves must be drawn, not from the object, which he himself also admits is not infected according to itself with mortal gravity, but from the proximate danger of sinning lethally, which he judges to be contained in that universal will. Truly, either actually to commit all venial sins, precisely according to itself, brings with it such a proximate danger of sinning lethally, and then actually to commit all venial sins will be mortal, which is false, and the adversary himself denies it; or, precisely according to itself, it does not bring such a danger, and then neither can the will of committing them bring it, since an act morally takes its species from the object.

Convinced by this reason, others contend that venial sins so proximately dispose to mortal sins, that he who brings his mind to multiplying venial sins must be judged altogether to will to sin mortally. This response I undertake briefly to refute under multiple heads. And first, if we consult St. Thomas, cited q. 88, in one case alone can that which is venial from its genus become mortal: namely insofar as an end is constituted in it, or insofar as it is referred to mortal sin as to an end. But the will of committing all sins, but only venial sins, with the exclusion of all mortal sins, is borne toward venial sins insofar as these are contained within the limits of venial sins; so that consequently it neither constitutes in them the notion of an end, nor refers them to mortal sins. Therefore venial sins do not pass into mortal sin from that intention alone.

To these things, yield to me: where do you place that formal and proximate danger? Namely, in the collection of all venial sins? But all cannot be committed by one person. Namely, in some from the collection of all? But among some of these there is none which, if it is venial, would according to itself cast one sinning venially into this destructive danger. Besides, if all according to themselves imply this danger, then we are bound to avoid some of them, otherwise we would sin mortally; from which this other thing absurdly, yet necessarily, follows: that for eternal salvation it is not enough if someone observes all precepts obliging under mortal sin, but it is further required that he also observe those which oblige under venial sin. For all are bound under grave obligation to that which according to itself is necessary for avoiding mortal sins; therefore, if the avoidance of all venial sins is necessary in itself for avoiding mortal sin, all are bound to avoid some venial sin in order to attain eternal salvation. But if you say that this holds true by reason of danger, it remains that you define what venial sin in species someone can commit without falling into this danger, lest, if you affirm that by any venial sin in species one falls into this danger, you must swallow this absurdity: all venial sins, each and every one, by reason of this danger, are so many mortal sins.

I certainly think thus: as long as malice is confined within the bounds of light sin, it less affects and less strikes the mind of him whom the malice of the object is accustomed strongly to urge and terrify when it transcends to grave sin, so that consequently there can stand together both the will of committing all sins that are only venial and the detestation of any mortal sin whatever. Thus it is not wonderful if we know several who are little or not at all solicitous about avoiding venial sins, yet shudder at the very name of mortal sin, much less flee its sight; whence they can join in the same seat of the will the intention of avoiding all mortal sins with the intention of committing all venial sins.

For answering objections, diligently observe first that these two things fight against each other: that a sin bring with it a formal danger, or a proximate danger, of sinning mortally, and that it be contained within the bounds of venial sin. Wherefore, if Cunegunda in the collection of venial sins apprehended some sin as bringing such danger with it, or if in practice she doubted whether it could bring this danger, she would without doubt sin mortally; and that intention of avoiding all mortal sins would destroy itself, just as it would destroy itself if she apprehended that this very intention of committing all venial sins induced a formal and proximate danger of sinning mortally. Observe moreover that, in order that that intention truly exclude every mortal sin, it ought to be such that she does not will to commit those venial sins which, if they are increased in number, grow into mortal sin, either by reason of matter, as several light thefts which, multiplied, finally constitute grave matter of theft, or by reason of effect, as moderate draughts of wine which, more often repeated, bring grave harm to health and cause drunkenness.

Finally, observe principally that a nun, by reason of her state, ought to tend toward perfection; nevertheless she is not therefore bound under mortal sin to avoid venial faults. For she sufficiently tends toward the perfection of her state if, besides the precepts gravely obliging every Christian, she also observes those things which gravely bind a religious under a special title. For it cannot happen that she observes the grave precepts which are either contained in the rule, or imposed by superiors, and by which she has bound herself by the bond of vows, without aspiring to the perfection proper to the religious state as much as is enough for avoiding mortal sin. And just as the other faithful, who also ought to aspire to the perfection proper to a Christian, are not said to sin gravely against an obligation of this kind as long as they commit only venial sins, so also religious, as long as they commit only venial sins, cannot be said to offend gravely against the perfection of their proper state. I would not deny that it can happen that those things which are judged venial in a secular person become mortal in a religious, indeed also in any ecclesiastic who ought to go before others by example, by reason of scandal; and thus certain scurrilous words and indecent trifles, which in the mouth of seculars lightly offend pious ears, in the mouth of a religious, or of anyone else dedicated to God by a special title, can easily in a certain way become blasphemies, which gravely strike the ears of hearers, not without great contempt and disgrace of the religious and ecclesiastical state. But if Cunegunda decided to commit sins of that kind, she would splendidly deceive herself if she thought that she willed no mortal sin.

Meanwhile let the priest inculcate this again and again to Cunegunda: that venial sins, although remotely, nevertheless certainly dispose to mortal sins, so that it is altogether to be feared lest venial sins little by little pave the way by which she may finally be hurled into the abyss of eternal damnation. “He who despises small things will fall little by little,” Ecclesiasticus 19. “Those who rush into the greatest things begin from the smallest,” St. Bernard. “Let him beware the fever of venial sins who wishes to avoid the death of graver sins.” Through venial sins the fervor of charity is diminished; and although God denies to no one, as long as he has lived both physically and morally, when the precept urges, sufficient graces by which, if he wills, he may be saved through fulfillment of the precept, nevertheless in punishment even of venial sins He can deny efficacious graces. Hence it happens that, although he can, he does not will to be saved, since, succumbing to the weight of some grave temptation, he finally falls into mortal sin, to be assigned to eternal punishments. If the priest places these things before Cunegunda’s eyes, she, the grace of God breathing upon her, will extend the will of avoiding mortal sins to venial sins, placing her eternal salvation more and more in safety.

Coming to the later case, Master Corradus, pt. 1, Respons., Response 89, § Sequitur, with Master Soto as guide, teaches that it is graver to induce someone to one venial sin than to commit homicide, because it is a greater damage and a greater loss to commit one venial sin than is the death of the body; for which reason it is said that one must not sin venially even for the life of the whole world. Therefore, in the judgment of Master Corradus, Cunegunda, who induced her companion to lie lightly, is guilty of mortal sin. But I pronounce that she is to be absolved from mortal sin, with the Angelic teacher as guide, who, treating of scandal in II-II, q. 43, teaches in express words thus: If active scandal is per se, for example, when someone intends to lead another to sin, if indeed he intends to induce his neighbor to sin venially through an act of venial sin, it is a venial sin. I do not see what could be said more clearly against Corradus for Cunegunda.

But what if she did not induce the companion to that light lie in just any way, but with the direct design that the companion herself suffer that ruin which results from a light lie? Not even then would she sin mortally, according to the opinion of St. Thomas in IV, dist. 38, q. 2, a. 2, q. 3, where, treating of formal scandal, namely the special sin by which one intends to scandalize another, or by which one intends the harm of one’s neighbor, he openly teaches that he sins only venially who intends to induce another to some venial sin. This seems hard to Father Vasquez, who judges that an intention of this kind of the spiritual ruin of one’s neighbor, however light it is posited, is a mortal sin contrary to charity; and in this sense he thinks the opinion of Corradus and Soto true, because spiritual damage, if it is directly intended, gives a special malice to the act, and there is no doubt that this damage is greater than any temporal evil. Thus Father Vasquez, whose reasoning I cannot approve; because damage to one’s neighbor, if it is grave, infects the act with mortal malice not only when it is directly intended, but also when it is indirectly intended, as no one denies. And therefore he becomes guilty of mortal fault who, compelled by no necessity, shoots an arrow at a wild beast, even if he does not directly intend it, provided he foresees that from it the killing of his neighbor, or some other grave evil, will follow. Wherefore either let Vasquez affirm with Corradus that he sins mortally against charity who in any way induces his neighbor into venial sin, from which spiritual ruin is certainly going to follow; or let him deny with the Angelic Doctor that he sins mortally who directly intends that spiritual ruin. It is added that the reason on which Father Vasquez relies, if it proves anything, proves that it is a mortal sin against charity, by which each one ought to love himself more than his neighbor; I say, that it is a mortal sin if someone himself sins venially, willing also in himself the light spiritual ruin which follows venial sin, and which certainly does not cease to be greater than any temporal damage from the fact that each one intends it for himself rather than for another. But the consequence seems absurd; therefore the principle from which it follows is also absurd.

But is not spiritual damage, if it is directly intended, a thing which gives the act a special malice? Either grave or light, I concede; necessarily grave, I deny, with St. Thomas openly supporting us. But is not the damage inflicted by venial fault truly greater than any other temporal loss?

Father Sanchez (de Matrim., bk. 1, disp. 5, n. 25), with whom Fagundez agreed (in Eccles. Praecept., precept 1, bk. 3, c. 8, n. 18), responds that, in judging the gravity of damage, spiritual is not to be compared with temporal, or temporal with spiritual, but spiritual with spiritual, and temporal with temporal. But that response, although true, does not remove the difficulty, unless an efficacious reason is given why spiritual damage ought not be compared with temporal, so that from that comparison we may weigh its gravity. Therefore this reason seems to me to be that the spiritual ruin inflicted on the soul by venial sin is free, since it could altogether be avoided by the very person who freely allows himself to be induced into venial sin, and furthermore can easily be repaired. Hence it is not wonderful if, although it is of a superior order and in itself a graver evil, nevertheless it is estimated less in relation to the subject than the evil of homicide, which is not free to the neighbor and is altogether irreparable. And truly, if the difficulty taken from the reason of greater evil in itself ought to terrify us, it would be a greater sin, even without express and direct intention of spiritual loss, to induce someone to venial sin than to kill, because the former is a greater detriment than killing; and it would be a greater sin to lie venially than to amputate one’s own hand or another member of the body, which no one would say. Therefore let it stand that Cunegunda, in the species of the case, the nature of the thing being considered, did indeed sin, but venially, not mortally.

Unless perhaps accidentally she induced the companion to lie through an act of mortal sin, as if from hatred toward God or toward the companion herself, or if from envy of the perfection to which the companion was applying herself more zealously, she induced her by force or deceit to commit this or any other venial sin. For just as in the matter of money it can happen that a theft in itself most light, of one iulius, becomes a mortal sin by reason of grave harm inflicted upon a very poor man; and in the matter of reputation, although falsely to impute to someone that he is vain or a liar is light, it can become mortal by reason of infamy derived upon a religious man of good reputation and known probity; so, according to Cardinal de Lugo (de Iust. et Iur., disp. 9, sect. 2, n. 20), if you induce a perfect and holy man by force or deceit into venial sins, by reason of the harm which you bring, you can be made guilty of mortal fault.

I admit that he whom you would induce to venial sin does not sin gravely; but neither does he sin gravely who throws his money into a river. Yet truly you would sin gravely if by force or deceit you induced him to throw his money into a river. Therefore, although Cunegunda’s companion would not sin gravely in the case, you badly conclude from this that neither would Cunegunda sin gravely, when by force or deceit she would cast down, unwilling, from the state of most excellent perfection to which the companion is applying herself. Let priests take care to keep this doctrine before their eyes, so that they show themselves severe judges with those who are accustomed craftily to draw young people outstanding in purity and integrity of morals into vain and impure conversations; and even if I unwillingly permit that such conversations can be free from mortal fault, so that they are only venial, nevertheless “this very thing,” says the cited Lugo, “is a grave harm which is inflicted upon these young people in that state and purity of life.” And with stronger right and reason I would extend this to those who have undertaken the charge of imbuing young people of this kind with piety and doctrine.” Ithur., case 35; I. M. 249, 250.

106. On the Novitiate and Profession

1. Caius, a novice, having obtained dismissal, put off the habit and the intention of remaining in religion. But at night, while still sleeping in the monastery, led by repentance, he asked again to be admitted into religion, which he immediately obtained.

…and 109 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Gury-Ballerini, Compendium of Moral Theology (8th ed., 1884)

Jean-Pierre Gury, S.J.; notes by Antonio Ballerini, S.J. — 49 passages

Vol. II, Treatise on Particular Sta…, Part Third. On the Religio…, Ch. IV, Appendix. On the Current State of Regulars in France

Very many Monasteries, both of men and of women, were numbered in France as the eighteenth century was drawing to its end. But by the monstrous disturbance of all things which followed, all were dissolved. When the storm had quieted, many houses of Nuns were restored. Several others were founded under various forms sanctioned by the Bishop. Afterwards some Convents of men also were restored, and we now see them multiplied day by day. But several doubts have arisen, which must be weighed by us. Difficulties occur especially concerning Nuns. Hence:

n. 177.

Questions. - QUESTION 1º. Do Nuns in France emit SOLEMN VOWS?

n. 177.

Resp. Negatively. For because of the difficulties of the times after the French disturbance, they preserved the faculty of possessing and acquiring goods, notwithstanding the vow of poverty. Thus it was declared several times by the Holy See. Therefore the vow of poverty which they emit is not solemn ¹. Therefore the other two also cannot be solemn; for according to the nature of solemn Profession and the laws of the Church, one vow cannot be solemn without another. Therefore the vow of chastity does not constitute a diriment impediment of marriage until it shall please the Supreme Pontiff to restore to Nuns the solemnity of vows, or to establish that a simple vow is a diriment impediment.

¹ ** This conclusion does not follow necessarily from the premises. For the Apostolic See can dispense so that, although bound by the solemn vow of poverty, they can possess, as is clear from the Response of the Sacred Penitentiary immediately subjoined. See what was said above in the note to n. 155.

n. 178.

- Response of the Sacred Penitentiary directed to the Bishop of Limoges, in the year 1820.

n. 178.

The Sacred Penitentiary, after diligently weighing the things set forth, responded to the Venerable Father in Christ, the Bishop of Limoges: That a solemn vow is that which is accepted by the Church as such, and renders the one vowing incapable, perpetually and immutably (with ordinary law considered and pontifical dispensation excluded), of contracting marriage and of acquiring or retaining ownership of things, as Father Pirhing speaks, with the other treaters of the sacred Canons, in the 3rd of the Decretals, tit. 54, § 1. Since therefore (as the things premised by the Bishop-orator signify) now the Nuns of the Gauls, in order to accommodate themselves to civil laws, emit the vow of poverty in such a way that they by no means abdicate dominion over their things, but retain them as their own, and intend to dispose of the same, when there shall be need, according to the civil laws, therefore this vow of theirs, whether it be quinquennial or perpetual, certainly is not solemn, nor is it accepted as such by the Church. But if a vow of poverty of this kind is not solemn, neither can the remaining two vows of chastity and obedience be considered solemn; since according to the nature of solemn religious profession, and the discipline of the Church, one vow cannot be solemn without another.

- QUESTION 2º. Can Nuns in France nevertheless gain all the Indulgences of the Religion in which solemn vows are emitted elsewhere?

Resp. Affirmatively. This is clear from the following response of the Sacred Penitentiary directed to D.D. Bouvier.

Most Blessed Father,

The Bishop of Le Mans, prostrate at the feet of Your Holiness, humbly asks a response to the following doubts:

1º Whether Nuns suppressed at the time of the French disturbance, afterwards restored, but transferred from other dioceses into that of Le Mans, nevertheless are truly Nuns enjoying their ancient privileges?

2º Whether Convents of Nuns recently founded according to the proper rules of the approved institute, with the authority of the Bishop alone, enjoy the spiritual privileges of their Order and other communicated privileges?

Most of the Monasteries now existing in the Gauls were not restored or founded. The Sacred Penitentiary judged that it should be responded to the Venerable Father in Christ, the Bishop-orator: that Nuns who before the French disturbance emitted solemn religious Profession are true Religious, and that they, as also the other Sisters of the Monasteries of France, can gain all the Indulgences which were conceded to the Religion or institute of other Nuns emitting solemn vows, according to the respective institute or rule; and this by Indult of the Holy Father Pius VII, and again confirmed by the Most Holy Lord Pope Gregory XVI. Given at Rome, in the Sacred Penitentiary, on the 3rd day of February 1841.

- QUESTION 3º. Can a Bishop in France dispense Nuns from vows?

Resp. 1º Affirmatively, as to Nuns pertaining to an Order in which solemn vows were formerly emitted, at least for the vows of poverty and obedience. For from an Apostolic Indult the Bishop, with attention given to the present circumstances of the times, can dispense from those vows as one delegated by the Holy See. A fortiori he can dispense from the same vows pious Congregations sanctioned by him or by his predecessors, and not yet approved by the Holy See.

I said, at least for the vows of poverty and obedience: because the vow of chastity, even simple, if it has been perpetual and absolute, is reserved to the Pope, and can still be kept among seculars. Nevertheless the case must be excepted in which a woman, in vowing, did not wish explicitly or implicitly to oblige herself except insofar as she would remain in the Monastery, or wished to oblige herself at the judgment of the Bishop, or also if the constitutions of the Congregation seem to be understood in this way; because then that vow would not be absolute nor perpetual.

Resp. 2º Negatively, if there is question of recent Congregations which are governed by a Superiorissa General; but recourse must be had to the Holy See. For if the Bishop could dispense these Nuns from vows, various Bishops having Communities of the same Order in their diocese would enjoy the same faculty as to them, and a conflict of jurisdiction would follow from this. Hence Bishops cannot dispense from vows the Nuns called of the Sacred Heart, etc.

Nor can a Bishop release Nuns from the bond of vows, although they emit only simple vows and do not depend on a Superiorissa General, if this Congregation has been approved by the Holy See.

QUESTION 4º. Is the vow of entering Religion reserved to the Pope in France?

Resp. Negatively. This is clear from the response of the Sacred Penitentiary to the Most Illustrious D.D. Bouvier, Bishop of Le Mans, on the 2nd day of January 1836 ².

² ** This seems to be understood of the vow of entering a Congregation which, by reason of circumstances of time and place, is not held by the Holy See as a religious order properly so called.

n. 181.

- QUESTION 5º. Must the laws of enclosure, as to Monasteries of Nuns in France, be rigorously observed, and do those violating enclosure incur canonical penalties?

n. 181.

Resp. to the 1st. By common Law those laws do not urge rigorously. For since Nuns in France are not now held as properly Religious, by that very fact they are not subject to strict enclosure. Therefore enclosure is to be observed there only from the Rule, which remains the same, and also from the authority of the Bishops, who prescribe it. This is clear from the response of the Sacred Penitentiary to D. Gely, Canon of Nantes, on the 23rd day of January 1821. Nevertheless the law of enclosure in monasteries in which, by force of the constitutions, it ought to exist, cannot be cast aside without fault per se mortal; because it seems commonly to be apprehended so, and the Bishops are judged to wish to oblige so, since this discipline has always been held supremely necessary. Thus Bouvier, on the second precept of the Decalogue, at the end.

n. 181.

Resp. to the 2nd. From what has been said it must also be deduced that the spiritual penalties laid upon Nuns departing from the monastery, or upon outsiders entering their monastery, have no place in the present circumstances of things. - P. X. Gautrelet, Traite de l'etat religieux, t. 1, 2nd part, ch. 2.

n. 182.

- QUESTION 6º. Does the obligation of the divine Office urge for Nuns in France?

n. 182.

Resp. Negatively, per se or by reason of the law of the Church. For since Nuns in France, with attention given to the present circumstances of things, are to be numbered only among Congregations, they do not seem rigorously to be obliged per se to the divine Office under grave sin, unless from the constitutions of the Order they are gravely bound to it, which is very rare ³. For although they may have pertained to an Order formerly (or even now elsewhere) approved by the Church for solemn Profession, now they no longer pertain to it. But the rigorous obligation of reciting the Hours does not urge except Religious women professed in an approved Order. Therefore, etc. Nor should the Church be judged to wish to impose so great an obligation upon those women whom it now does not acknowledge as strictly Religious. - P. X. Gautrelet, Traite de l'etat religieux, t. 2, c. 3, art. 2.

³ ** This ought to be all the rarer, because if they are not bound by ecclesiastical law, it does not appear how this grave obligation could flow from the Constitutions alone, or who imposed it or could impose it.

- This doctrine can be confirmed by the following response of the Holy See.

Postulate of the Bishop of Perigueux concerning the obligation of reciting the Breviary for Nuns in France.

Most Blessed Father,

The Bishop of Perigueux in the Gauls, prostrate at the feet of Your Holiness, most humbly asks from You the solution of the following doubt.

From several responses of the Sacred Penitentiary it is plain that Nuns in France are not truly and properly Nuns, but only congregations of pious women, and that their vows are not solemn. Hence it seems to many that those Nuns who by force of their Rule are held to the recitation of the divine Office, such as Carmelites, Poor Clares, Nuns of the Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary, etc., are not held to it under grave sin, since the gravity of this obligation seems not to reach any but Nuns emitting solemn vows. Others judge otherwise; because although they do not emit solemn vows, they seem to have taken upon themselves the obligations attached by law to the Rule which they have professed. In this variety of opinions, the Bishop-orator most humbly asks from Your Holiness:

Whether Nuns, with attention given to their condition in the Gauls, are held under grave sin to the recitation of the divine Office; or whether, since their vows are not solemn, they are not held to it more gravely than to any other point whatever of their Rule?

The Sacred Penitentiary, having maturely weighed the things set forth by the Venerable Father in Christ, the Bishop of Perigueux, judged that it should be responded, as it responds:

That Nuns bound by solemn vows are held under grave sin to recite the Office daily from custom already prescribed; but since concerning Nuns in the Gauls it has several times been responded that they neither emit solemn vows nor are Nuns strictly such, but only societies of pious women, therefore they are held by no other obligation than that which results from the respective constitutions. Given at Rome, in the Sacred Penitentiary, on the 26th day of November 1852.

- QUESTION 7º. Are the vows of Religious men in France now to be held as solemn?

Resp. Affirmatively. Thus the Collator of Le Puy (Conferences du Puy), P. Gautrelet, Traite de l'etat religieux, t. 1, c. 6, art. 3, etc., against some.

Proof. It must be admitted that vows of this kind can be given, unless it is shown that something now stands in the way, either from the civil power or from the ecclesiastical power; for if nothing stands in the way on either side, the integral right of emitting solemn vows conceded by the Church to strictly Religious Orders is preserved; but absolutely nothing stands in the way on either side. Therefore...

Bucceroni, Moral Enchiridion (4th ed., 1905), On Laws · Bucceroni, Moral Enchiridion (4th ed., 1905), On Particular States

1º Nothing stands in the way on the part of the civil power. For 1º the civil law, whatever it may be, cannot affect the vow of poverty either directly, since it is a wholly spiritual thing, which by its nature cannot be subject to secular power; or indirectly, since religious poverty, in whatever manner it may have been promised, can in no way injure the political regime. 2º This is also clear from the absurdities which would follow from it. For if this were admitted, solemn vows could not be emitted in regions which are subject to infidel or heretical Princes, which nevertheless is contrary to the constant practice and doctrine of the Church; indeed religious Profession would be impossible in the whole Church if legislation of this kind were admitted everywhere. Moreover a Religious, for example of the Society of Jesus, frequently changing domicile, today would be Professed in Italy, and therefore incapable of dominion, but tomorrow in France he would not be, etc., etc. But these things cannot be said. Therefore, etc. 2º Nothing also stands in the way from the ecclesiastical power. For if anything stood in the way on this side, it would be some law, or Decree, from which the express will of the Supreme Pontiff derogating from the condition of Religious would be clear. But no Apostolic Constitution, no Decree, nor any Declaration of any Congregation can be brought forward from which such a will of the Supreme Pontiff would become known. Therefore... - Indeed from authentic testimony it is clear that the Religious of St. Benedict of Solesmes emit solemn vows; therefore such vows can be given and are in fact given. Therefore the power of the Church does not stand in the way of the efficacy of the solemnity of vows. - See the note of R. P. Gueranger, Abbot of the monastery of Solesmes, against the opposite opinion of D. Carriere, in the public sheet l'Ami de la Religion, t. 106, 7 September 1840.

n. 185.

- It will be enough for us to report these few things: the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars, to the proposed question: Whether license should be conceded to the Superior of the monastery of Solesmes to admit to solemn Profession all subjects living with him for 4 years? responded: Affirmatively, for those who emitted SIMPLE VOWS, and for those actually existing in the monastery who completed 18 months in the novitiate, at the judgment of the Superior with his Chapter..., when two years and a day have been completed from the public reception of the cappa, they shall emit Profession...

n. 185.

Therefore the vows of the Regulars of the aforesaid Order assisting at choir are solemn; therefore the same must be said of the Regulars of other Orders.

n. 186.

Objections. - Obj. 1º The civil law in reality stands in the way of solemn Profession; for the law establishes that all citizens are capable of entering into contracts and receiving successions. Therefore, etc.

n. 186.

Resp. 1º The civil law can in no way stand in the way, neither of solemn vows nor of perpetual vows; because the matter of a vow, since it is merely spiritual, cannot be touched by civil law, not even indirectly; for otherwise the civil power could annul the laws of the Church, which is repugnant. - See P. Gautrelet in the cited work, and P. de Ravignan, in the work on the Institute of the Society of Jesus. Hence Pius VI protested against the civil Constitution of the Gallican Clergy, by which it was declared that the Government in no way recognized the SOLEMN vows of Religious (Brief Quod aliquantum, 10 March 1791). And very recently Pius IX, among the usurpations which he detests in certain places of America, sets down this, namely that Religious families can admit no one to the pronouncing of solemn vows without the permission of the Government (Allocution in Consistory, 15 December 1856).

…and 9 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Bucceroni, Moral Enchiridion (4th ed., 1905)

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 51 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Bucceroni, Moral Enchiridion (4th ed., 1905), On Laws

On the Exemption of Regulars

Council of Trent, sess. 23, De sacramento ordinis, can. 7.

St. Gregory the Great, Epistle III, bk. IX. - Benedict XIV, Decretal Epistle Apostolicae servitutis, the day before the Ides of March 1742.

Vatican Council, Constitution Pastor aeternus, chap. 3. "But since in reality they pass their lives within the boundaries of dioceses, the force of this privilege is so tempered that diocesan discipline is kept whole and intact, and thus that the regular clergy in many things must be subject to episcopal power, whether ordinary or delegated.... Moreover, by common law¹ it has been established that houses which do not contain at least six religious members must altogether be in the power of Bishops.... When a doubt had long ago been proposed to Clement VIII, whether religious men sent to the Indies for the cultivation of souls were to be considered as though living outside the enclosures of the monastery, and therefore were ordered by the Tridentine law to be subject to Bishops, that Pontiff, through the Constitution Religiosorum quorumcumque, 6 Ides of November 1601, had decreed that they were 'to be reputed as religious living inside the cloisters; wherefore in those things concerning the care of souls they are subject to the Ordinary of the place; but in the rest they remain subject not to the Ordinary of the place, but to their own Superiors.' Nor did Benedict XIV think and judge otherwise in his Constitutions Quamvis, 5 Kalends of March 1746; Cum nuper, 6 Ides of November 1751; and Cum alias, 5 Ides of June 1753. From all these things it is clear that even hospices and houses, however sparsely occupied because of the fewness of their inhabitants, are comprehended by the right of this privilege of which there is question, and this not only in places where Apostolic Vicars preside, but also where Bishops preside; for in the Constitutions which We have recalled, Bishops were being treated." Leo XIII, Constitution Romanos Pontifices, 8 Ides of May 1881.

Innocent X, Constitution Instaurandae, 15 Oct. 1652; Constitution Ut in parvis, 10 Feb. 1654.

"Let there be promised to the Ordinary of the place only that submission which is conformable to the character of each Institute. Consequently, without speaking of purely diocesan Congregations, which depend completely upon the Bishops, let Congregations approved by the Holy See and contemplated by the Apostolic Constitution Conditae a Christo, published by Our Holy Father Pope Leo XIII on 8 December 1900, promise submission to the Bishops within the terms of that same Constitution; as regards Regular Orders, let them promise submission to the Bishops within the terms of common law. Now, according to this common law, as you know very well, Regulars depend upon the Bishops for the erection of a new house in the diocese; for public schools, asylums, hospitals, and other establishments of this kind; for the promotion of their subjects to Orders; for the administration of the Sacraments to the faithful; for preaching; for the exposition of the Blessed Sacrament; for the consecration of churches; for the publication of indulgences; for the erection of a Confraternity or pious Congregation; and for permission to publish books. Finally, Regulars depend upon the Bishops in that which regards the care of souls in places where they are invested with this ministry." Letter of the S. C. EE. et RR., 10 July 1901.

Bucceroni, Moral Enchiridion (4th ed., 1905), On Particular States

On Testimonial Letters of Ordinaries to Be Sought Before the Admission of Novices

“1. In any Order, Congregation, Society, Institute, Monastery, or House whatsoever, whether solemn or simple vows are emitted in them, and even if Orders, Congregations, Societies, Institutes, Monasteries, and Houses are in question which, by a particular privilege contained even in the body of the law, or by any other title, are not comprehended in general decrees unless special, individual, and express mention is made of them, no one shall be admitted to the habit without testimonial letters both from the Ordinary of origin and also from the Ordinary of the place in which the Postulant, after completing the fifteenth year of his age, has remained for more than one year.

“2. In the aforesaid testimonial letters, after they have diligently inquired, even through secret information, into the qualities of the Postulant, the Ordinaries must report concerning his birth, age, morals, life, reputation, condition, education, and knowledge; whether he is under investigation, bound by some censure, irregularity, or other canonical impediment, burdened by debt, or liable to render an account of some administration. And let the Ordinaries know that their conscience remains burdened concerning the truth of the things set forth; nor is it ever free for them to deny testimonial letters of this kind; in the same letters, nevertheless, concerning each of the foregoing articles they must attest only those things which they shall judge in conscience that they can affirm in the Lord.

“3. The observance of this decree is strictly enjoined, even in virtue of holy obedience, upon all and each Regular Superior and other Religious whom it concerns, of whatever rank they may be and even of an exempt and privileged Institute and one requiring express mention; and whoever, contrary to the tenor of this decree, shall receive anyone into the religious habit shall by that very fact incur the penalty of deprivation of all offices and of active voice, and of perpetual incapacity for obtaining others thereafter, from which he can be dispensed only by the Apostolic See.

“4. By force of any privilege, faculty, indult, dispensation, or approval of rules and constitutions even in specific form which any Order, Institute, Superior, or Religious may obtain from the Apostolic See, it shall never be considered that derogation has been made from this decree unless derogation from it is made expressly and by name, even if general derogatory clauses, however broad, are appended in the concession. But if it should happen that a dispensation from the same decree is at any time granted expressly and by name to some Institute, it cannot be extended to others by force of any privilege or communication of privileges.

“5. On the first day of January in every year, this decree shall be read in the public refectory under penalty of deprivation of office and of active and passive voice, to be incurred by the Superiors by the very fact.

“But lest the observance of this decree be impeded by any reason, title, or pretext, His Holiness derogates wholly from any constitutions operating to the contrary...and any other things whatever to the contrary, and declares that derogation has been made from them.” Decree Romani Pontifices of the Sacred Congregation on the State of Regulars, 25 January 1848.

On the Qualities Required in Those to Be Admitted

The qualities required in those to be admitted are those which are prescribed “in the Constitution of Sixtus V Cum de omnibus, with the moderation of Gregory XIV, and in the Decree of Clement VIII Cum ad regularem disciplinam, as well as in the rules and Constitutions of the respective Order.” Sacred Congregation on the State of Regulars, 1 May 1851. In the aforesaid Decree of Clement VIII one has Instructions concerning the reception and education of novices in monasteries and convents designated or to be designated. Bizzarri, Collect., pp. 843 ff., 867 ff.

“Conversi shall not be received before the twentieth year of their age, and unless they know at least the chief heads of Christian doctrine.” Instruction concerning the reception and education of novices, issued by command of Clement VIII, 19 March 1693; Sacred Congregation on the State of Regulars, 1 May 1851, to the seventh; Encyclical Letter Neminem latet, 19 March 1857.

n. 268, 273.

On the Place and Duration of the Novitiate

“The mind of the Sacred Congregation is that henceforth the year of probation or novitiate and solemn profession be made in monasteries designated for the novitiate according to the form of the Constitution of Clement VIII Regularis disciplinae restitutioni…in such a way that, according to the prescription of the Council of Trent, Session 25, ch. 16, De Regularibus, when the time of the novitiate has been completed, Superiors shall admit to profession the novices whom they have found suitable, or shall eject them from the monastery.” Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars, 12 July 1793. On 19 September 1686, moreover, the Sacred Congregation had declared null any vestition and profession made in a convent not designated for the novitiate, adding that “the year of probation is to be computed from the day of arrival at the lawful place of novitiate.” Bizzarri, Collect., pp. 279 ff.

On Simple Vows Before the Solemn Profession of Men

“…With regard to religious families of whatever Order, Congregation, and Institute in which solemn vows are emitted, We establish and decree that any profession of solemn vows whatsoever, made either knowingly or unknowingly, in any manner, under any pretext and color, by any novices whatsoever, even lay novices and conversi, who, although they have completed probation and the novitiate as required by law, have not first emitted a profession of simple vows and remained in it for a complete three years, shall be wholly null, invalid, and of no force, even though either the Superiors, or the novices, or both respectively have the intention of receiving and being received to solemn vows and of emitting them, and all the rites prescribed for the profession of solemn vows are employed.” Brief of Pius IX Ad universalis Ecclesiae, 7 February 1862.—Solemn profession can for just causes be further deferred by the Superior General or Provincial, but not beyond the completed age of twenty-five years. Encyclical Letter of the Sacred Congregation on the State of Regulars Neminem latet, 19 March 1857, to which this Instruction was added for the territory of the Austrian Empire: “…But the particular circumstances of affairs require that in religious houses situated in the aforesaid territory the profession of solemn vows be deferred according to the custom and practice introduced there for some years past. Therefore, it is the mind and will of His Holiness that Regular Superiors ought to use the faculty attributed to them in the said decree, namely, of deferring the profession of solemn vows, according to the custom and practice mentioned above.” Cf. Franciscus Sentis, Clementis Papae VIII Decretales, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1870, p. 81.

From the declarations of the Sacred Congregation on the State of Regulars of 12 June, 6 August 1858, 25 February 1859, etc., the simple vows of which there is question are perpetual on the part of the one vowing, and dispensation from them is reserved to the Supreme Pontiff. On the part of the Order, however, they can be dissolved by the dismissal of those professed, in such a way that, dismissal having been given, those professed are by that very fact freed from every bond of the said vows. The faculty of dismissing them belongs to the Master General of the Order with his General Council, who, for extraordinary cases, can subdelegate at least three upright and prudent religious. Neither a process nor the form of a trial is required for decreeing dismissal; rather, it can be undertaken with the truth of the fact alone having been considered, yet with the greatest charity and prudence and for just and reasonable causes. No one, however, can be dismissed because of an illness arising after profession of simple vows.

“It sometimes happens that one simply professed petitions for his own dismissal, asserting that he does not have, or has lost, the spirit and vocation for the religious life. It is now asked whether this assertion of his, obstinately maintained, even if no other cause of dismissal is present, can be considered a sufficient ground and a just and reasonable cause, to the end that he, bound by a simple vow, can be dismissed from the Order?—Response. Negative, since the simple vows of which there is question are perpetual on the part of the one vowing, and dispensation from them is reserved to the Supreme Pontiff.” Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars, 19 November 1886.—Cf. M. E., vol. 6, part 1, p. 126.

“Can those who perhaps have donned the religious habit when already older than twenty-five years or near that age, after the year of novitiate has been completed, be admitted to solemn vows and profession, or must a further three years of probation be awaited also with such persons?—Response. Negative to the first part; affirmative to the second.” Sacred Congregation on the State of Regulars, 20 January 1860.

“In the case in which a secular priest who has long passed his twenty-fifth year petitioned for and obtained the habit, can solemn profession (namely, of solemn vows), after profession of simple vows has been emitted, be deferred for him beyond the customary three years, if, namely, within the three years of simple vows he has not given sufficient indications of his vocation?—Response. Negative; namely, it cannot be deferred.” Sacred Congregation, 16 August 1866. “They declared, nevertheless, that recourse must be had to the Sacred Congregation in particular cases in which some peculiar cause concurs.” Bizzarri, Collect., p. 867, ed. 1885.

On Simple Vows Before the Solemn Profession of Nuns

“…1. In all and each of the monasteries of nuns of whatever Order or Institute in which solemn vows are emitted, when probation and the novitiate have been completed according to the prescription of the Sacred Council of Trent, the Apostolic Constitutions, and the laws of the Order or Institute approved by the Holy See, let the female novices emit simple vows after they have completed the age of sixteen years established by the same Council of Trent, or another higher age which perhaps is required by the Constitutions of their own Order or Institute approved by the Holy See.

“2. After the completion of three years, to be computed from the day on which they emitted simple vows, let those professed in this manner, if they are found worthy, be admitted to the profession of solemn vows; with any power of dispensing in this matter being withdrawn, in such a way, namely, that if any should be admitted to solemn profession before the complete three years have elapsed, for any cause whatsoever, the profession itself would be wholly invalid and of no effect.

“3. Nevertheless, Indults already imparted by the Holy See, by force of which, in some places or Institutes, the profession of simple vows can be emitted for a longer time, are declared to remain in their full force. “4. Furthermore, for just and reasonable causes, concerning which both the Superior of the monastery and the Mistress of Novices must give testimony in writing, the Ordinary for monasteries subject to his jurisdiction, and the Superior General or Provincial for monasteries which enjoy the privilege of exemption, can permit, in particular cases, that the profession of solemn vows be deferred, but not beyond the completed age of twenty-five years.

“5. Simple vows emitted as stated above are perpetual on the part of the one vowing, and dispensation from them is reserved to the Roman Pontiff.

“6. Those thus professed in simple vows use and enjoy the same indulgences, privileges, and spiritual favors which those professed in solemn vows of each one’s own monastery lawfully use and enjoy; and insofar as they are overtaken by death, they respectively have a right to the same suffrages.

“7. They are bound to the observance of the rules and constitutions no less than those solemnly professed; likewise, they are bound to assist at choir; but insofar as they are lawfully impeded from assisting at choir, they are not bound to the private recitation of the Divine Office.

“8. The time prescribed by the constitutions of any Order or Institute for obtaining active and passive voice is computed from the day of the emission of simple vows; nevertheless, those professed in simple vows shall never have a vote, or indeed even a place, in chapters in which, and insofar as, there is question of admitting candidates to solemn profession. They can indeed be deputed to minor offices of the monastery; but they cannot be elected to the duties of Superior, Vicaress, Mistress of Novices, Assistant or Councilor, and Bursar.

“9. Those who first pronounced simple vows are considered to have preference by law, as being seniors; yet in such a way that any who, according to what was stated above, have deferred solemn profession beyond three years shall in the meantime yield place even to younger solemnly professed nuns, and shall receive again the rights acquired by reason of the earlier profession as soon as they themselves have also emitted solemn vows.

“10. The dowry established for each monastery must be delivered to the monastery itself before the profession of simple vows.

“11. Those professed in simple vows retain the radical dominion of their goods, concerning which they cannot dispose definitively except within the two months immediately preceding solemn profession, according to the norm of the Sacred Council of Trent, Session XXV, De Regularibus et Monialibus, chapter XVI. The administration of the same goods, as well as the disbursement and use of any revenues whatsoever, is wholly forbidden to them. Therefore, before profession of simple vows, they must cede, for the time during which they shall remain in the same profession of simple vows, the administration, usufruct, and use to whomever they please, and even to their own Order or monastery, insofar as nothing prevents this on its part and they themselves, with full liberty, judge it opportune. But if during the time of simple vows other goods come to them by a lawful title, they indeed acquire the radical dominion of them, but they must cede the administration, usufruct, and use as soon as possible, as above, while also observing the law of not abdicating radical dominion except within the two months immediately preceding solemn profession.

“12. For the dismissal from the monastery of the aforesaid women professed in simple vows, recourse must be had to the Holy See in individual cases, distinctly setting forth the grave causes which seem to counsel or demand dismissal.

“13. To a Sister professed in simple vows departing from the monastery, whether because of a dispensation from vows obtained from the Holy Apostolic See or because of a decree of dismissal issued as above, the dowry must be restored intact as regards the principal, the fruits being excluded.

“The Sacred Congregation strictly commands that all the things prescribed, declared, and sanctioned above be observed and put into execution, under precept of obedience, by all whom they concern, any contrary things whatsoever notwithstanding, even those worthy of special and individual mention, from which His Holiness declares that special and full derogation has been made for the effect of the foregoing.” Decree Perpensis of the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars, 3 May 1902.

“Those professed in simple vows are not bound to the recitation of the Divine Office outside choir.” Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars, 28 July 1902.

The chapter for admitting to solemn profession has a merely consultative vote. In it “a discussion concerning the qualities of the candidate can also have place; the scrutiny, however, must be conducted by secret ballots. Furthermore, if all or most of the ballots should be contrary to admission to solemn profession, so that, with article IV of the Decree itself also having been considered, there would be question of dismissing the Sister from the monastery, the matter would have to be submitted to the judgment of the Holy See, to which, therefore, the Ordinary—or, for exempt monasteries, the Regular Prelate—shall transmit a distinct report of all things.” Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars, 18 July 1902.

“By the Decree Perpensis temporum adiunctis of the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars, 3 May 1902, it was prescribed that in monasteries of nuns in which solemn vows are emitted, simple vows also be prefixed to them by the novices; moreover, by a Response of the same Sacred Congregation given in a case of Bologna on 28 July 1902, it is resolved that the rite or ceremonial received in each Monastery is to be employed in emitting the first profession, for which, with the words expressing the solemnity of the vows, if they are present, suppressed from the customary formula, it is to be added that the novice pronounces simple vows according to the Decree issued by the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars on 3 May 1902; but that the second profession can be emitted privately in choir or in an interior oratory before the community into the hands of the Superior, with the prior approval of the Ordinary or, as regards exempt Monasteries, of the Regular Prelate. These things therefore having been sanctioned—that in the first profession of simple vows the received rite is to be employed, with only the words expressing the solemnity of the vows suppressed, and that the second profession of solemn vows can be emitted privately—this doubt occurs to me:

“1. Does it belong to the Ordinary or, as regards exempt Monasteries, to the Prelate of the Regulars, after hearing the opinion of the Superior, to decree that the second profession also be made publicly before the Ordinary or the Ordinary’s commissioner?

“2. What ceremonial is to be employed in the second profession if it is made privately before the Superior, and what ceremonial is to be employed if it is made publicly before the Ordinary or his commissioner? 3. Whether and in what manner, in the latter case, the symbolic actions are to be retained: the blessing and bestowal of the veil, ring, and crown, which hitherto were employed in the rite of solemn profession and, according to the mind of the Decree Perpensis temporum adiunctis, henceforth will already be in use in the first profession of simple vows?

“Response. To the first: Affirmative, provided that the Superior and the Community request that the profession in question be made publicly. To the second: In either case of the second profession, it is required only that the Professed pronounce the formula of profession, employing the words which express the solemnity of the vows. To the third: Provision was made in the second.” Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars, 15 January 1903.

Vol. I, Matrimony, and Holy Orders, On Penance (Volume I), Moral Part — Chapter II: On the Confessor · Vol. I, Matrimony, and Holy Orders, On Penance (Volume I), Appendix: On Indulgences · Vol. I, Matrimony, and Holy Orders, On Holy Orders (Volume I), On Holy Orders

On the Place Designated for Those Professed and on Explicit Profession

“Those professed in simple vows must remain in houses of profession and studies and observe perfect common life. For validly emitting solemn vows after simple vows, express profession is required, and therefore tacit profession is wholly abrogated.” Sacred Congregation on the State of Regulars, 12 June 1858. “His Holiness…established and decreed that, notwithstanding the Apostolic Letters of Clement VIII and any other contrary things whatsoever, those professed in simple vows can lawfully and freely emit the profession of solemn vows at the proper time in the convent or house in which they are found, with the other things to be observed by law nevertheless being observed, without being bound to profess in the house in which the novitiate was completed.” The same Sacred Congregation, 9 December 1859. Cf. Decrees of Clement VIII Regularis disciplinae, 12 March 1596; Sanctissimus in Christo Pater, 20 June 1599; Nullus omnino, 25 June 1555; Constitution of Urban VIII Sacra Congregatio, 21 September 1624.

…and 11 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Bucceroni, Moral Enchiridion

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 9 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Bucceroni, Moral Enchiridion, On Particular States

n. ¶87.

On Simple Vows Before the Solemn Profession of Men

"... As regards religious families of whatever Order, Congregation, and Institute in which solemn vows are emitted, we establish and decree that the profession of solemn vows will be entirely null, void, and of no force, whether knowingly or ignorantly, in whatever way, pretext, and color, made by any novices whatever, even lay and conversi, who, although they have completed probation and novitiate as by law, do not first emit the profession of simple vows and remain in it for a full three years; although either by the Superiors, or by the novices, or by each, there is held respectively the intention of receiving to solemn vows and emitting them, and all the rites prescribed for the profession of solemn vows are employed." Brief of Pius IX Ad universalis Ecclesiae, 7 Feb. 1862. Solemn profession can for just causes be further deferred by the Superior General or Provincial, not however beyond the age of completed 25 years. Encyclical Letter of the S. C. over the State of Regulars Neminem latet, 19 March 1857, to which for the dominion of the Austrian empire this Instruction was added: "... But particular circumstances of things require that in religious houses constituted in the announced dominion the profession of solemn vows be deferred according to the custom and practice introduced there for some years now. Wherefore this is the mind and will of His Holiness, that Regular Superiors should use the faculty attributed to them in the said decree, namely of deferring the profession of solemn vows, according to the above-mentioned custom and practice." Cf. Francis Sentis, Clementis Papae VIII Decretales, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1870, p. 81.

n. ¶88.

"Those who perhaps have put on the habit of Religion when already older than 25 years, or near this age, can, when the year of Novitiate has already been completed, be admitted to solemn vows and profession, or must the three-year period of further probation also be awaited with such persons? Resp. In the negative to the first part; in the affirmative to the second." S. C. over the State of Regulars, 20 Jan. 1860.

n. ¶89.

"Whether in the case in which a secular priest, who has long since passed the year 25, has sought and obtained the habit, solemn profession, namely of solemn vows, can be deferred for him, after the profession of simple vows has been emitted, beyond the customary three-year period, if namely within the three-year period of simple vows he has not given sufficient arguments concerning his vocation? Resp. In the negative, namely, that it cannot be deferred." S. C. 16 Aug. 1866. "They declared nevertheless that recourse must be had to the Sacred Congregation in particular cases in which some peculiar cause concurs." Bizzarri, Collectanea, p. 867, ed. 1885.

n. ¶92.

On the Place Designated for the Professed and on Explicit Profession

"Those professed of simple vows must remain in the houses of the professed and of studies, and observe perfect common life. For the valid emitting of solemn vows after simple vows, express profession is required, and therefore tacit profession is entirely abrogated." Same Sacred Congregation, 12 June 1858. "The Most Holy Lord... established and constituted that, notwithstanding the Apostolic Letters of Clement VIII and any other contrary things whatever, those professed of simple vows can lawfully and freely emit the profession of solemn vows in their time in the Convent or House in which they are found, the other things to be observed by law nevertheless being observed, without being bound to profess in the house where the Novitiate was completed." Same Sacred Congregation, 9 Dec. 1859. Cf. Decrees of Clement VIII Regularis disciplinae, 12 March 1596; Sanctissimus in Christo Pater, 20 June 1599; Nullus omnino, 25 June 1555; Const. of Urban VIII Sacra Congregatio, 21 Sept. 1624.

n. ¶98.

N. 153. - On the Force of the Solemn Vow of Poverty

"So that the decrees of the Council of Trent concerning the vow of poverty to be guarded may be observed more faithfully, it is commanded that no one from among the Friars, even if he is a Superior, can possess as his own, or even in the name of the convent, immovable or movable goods, or money, revenues, alms, acquired either from sermons, or from lectures, or for Masses, whether to be celebrated in his own Church or anywhere whatever, or by another just labor and cause of theirs, and under whatever name acquired, even if they are subsidies of relatives, or pious largesses, legacies, or donations; but let all these things at once be handed over to the Superior and incorporated into the convent, and be mingled with the other goods, revenues, moneys, and proceeds of it, so that from this common food and clothing can be supplied to all. But of those things which had been conceded for necessity, let no one possess anything as his own, nor use it as his own. No dispensation of any Superiors whatever, no license as regards immovable or movable goods, can excuse the brothers from being liable to the fault and penalty imposed by the same decrees of the Council and to be incurred by the very fact, even if Superiors assert that they can grant dispensations or licenses of this kind, to whom We will that faith by no means be given in this matter." Const. of Clement VIII for the reform of Regulars, 20 March 1601, nn. 3, 5, 7.

n. ¶105.

On the Force of the Simple Vow of Poverty

"Those professed of simple vows in Orders in which solemn vows are emitted will be able to retain the radical dominion, as they say, of their goods; but the administration of them, and the spending and use of revenues, is altogether interdicted to them. Therefore before the profession of simple vows they must cede for the time during which they remain in the same profession of simple vows, the administration, usufruct, and use, to whomever they please, and even to their own Order, if they have so judged according to their own choice." S. C. over the State of Regulars, 12 June 1858.

n. ¶106.

"Concerning the vow of poverty the following disposition was established by the Apostolic See as regards some more recent institutes of this kind: 'The professed will be able to retain the radical dominion, as they say, of their goods; but the administration of them, and the spending and use of revenues, is altogether interdicted to them as long as they remain in the institute. Therefore before profession they must cede, even privately, the administration and use to whomever they please, and even to their own institute, if they have so judged according to their own choice. But this cession will no longer have force in the case of departure from the institute; indeed, there can be added the condition that it is revocable whenever, even if they have remained in the institute; but the professed during vows will be able by no means to use this right of revoking in conscience, unless the good pleasure of the Apostolic See accedes. This must also be said concerning goods which after profession have come to them by hereditary title. Nevertheless, they will be able to dispose concerning dominion, either by testament or, with the license however of the General Moderatrix, through acts among the living; nor is it forbidden to them to perform those acts of property, with the license of the same General Moderatrix, which are prescribed by laws.'" Bizzarri, Collectanea, pp. 793, 806, ed. 1885.

n. ¶114.

N. 173. - On the Exemption of Regulars

"... As regards the exemption of regulars, the prescriptions of canonical law are certain and known. Namely, although in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, which is constituted by divine ordination, presbyters and ministers are inferior to Bishops and are ruled by their authority ¹, nevertheless, so that in religious orders all things might better be apt and connected among themselves, and individual associates might enjoy a peaceful and even course of life, and finally that provision might be made for the increase and perfection of religious conversation ², not undeservedly did the Roman Pontiffs, whose office it is to describe dioceses and to assign to each his subjects to be ruled by sacred power, establish that the Regular Clergy is exempt from the jurisdiction of Bishops. The cause of this matter was not that it pleased them that religious societies should enjoy a better condition than the secular clergy, but that their houses were held by fiction of law as certain territories torn away from the dioceses themselves. From this it came about that religious families, which by common law ought immediately to be subject both to Bishops on account of hierarchical principate and to the Supreme Pontiff on account of pontifical primacy ³, continued to be in His power, and by privilege went out from the power of Bishops. But since in reality they pass life within the boundaries of dioceses, the force of this privilege is so tempered that diocesan discipline is kept whole and intact, and thus that the regular clergy in many things must be subject to episcopal power, whether ordinary or delegated... Moreover, by common law ⁴ it has been established that houses which do not contain at least six religious associates must altogether be in the power of Bishops... When a doubt had long ago been proposed to Clement VIII, whether religious men sent to the Indies for the cultivation of souls were to be considered as though living outside the enclosures of the monastery, and therefore were ordered by the Tridentine law to be subject to Bishops, that Pontiff, through the Constitution Religiosorum quorumcumque, 6 Ides of November 1601, had decreed that they were 'to be reputed as religious living inside the cloisters; wherefore in those things concerning the care of souls they are subject to the Ordinary of the place; but in the rest they remain subject not to the Ordinary of the place, but to their own superiors.' Nor did Benedict XIV think and judge otherwise in his constitutions Quamvis, 5 Kalends of March 1746; Cum nuper, 6 Ides of November 1751; and Cum alias, 5 Ides of June 1753. From all these things it is clear that even hospices and houses, however infrequent by fewness of inhabitants, are comprehended by the right of this privilege of which there is question, and this not only in places where Apostolic Vicars preside, but also where Bishops preside; for in the Constitutions which we have recalled, Bishops were being treated." Leo XIII, Const. Romanos Pontifices, 8 Ides of May 1881.

¹ Council of Trent, session 23, On the sacrament of Order, canon 7.

² St. Gregory the Great, Epistle III, book IX. Benedict XIV, decretal Epistle Apostolicae servitutis, the day before the Ides of March 1742.

³ Vatican Council, Constitution Pastor aeternus, chapter 3.

⁴ Innocent X, Constitution Instaurandae, 15 Oct. 1652; Constitution Ut in parvis, 10 Feb. 1654.

n. ¶130.

N. 181. - On the Enclosure of Nuns Without Solemn Vows

"1. Whether, if there are not solemn vows, nuns nevertheless are bound to observe the enclosure which they vow by a simple vow, under the censures enacted by Trent, where the Bishop has restored the enclosure. 2. Whether he also incurs the penalty of excommunication who without license enters the precincts of the monastery, where the enclosure has been restored by the Bishop? Resp. To the 1st, negatively as regards the penalties prescribed by the sacred canons and apostolic constitutions. To the 2nd, affirmatively with relation to censures perhaps imposed by the Bishop." S. C. EE. and RR. 1 Aug. 1839.

Tanquerey

Adolphe Tanquerey, S.S. — 9 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Vol. I, Matrimony, and Holy Orders, On Penance (Volume I), Moral Part — Chapter II: On the Confessor

n. 376.

II. Necessity. 1° According to the Code (can. 877), the judgment of suitability is necessary for all confessors, even regulars, for licitly hearing confessions: "Let both local Ordinaries not grant jurisdiction, and religious Superiors not grant jurisdiction or license for hearing confessions, except to those who have been found suitable through examination, unless there is question of a priest whose theological doctrine they have ascertained from elsewhere." This law has rightly been established, so that unskillful and unworthy ministers might be kept away from the sacred tribunal.

2° It was expressly declared by Pius V that doctors and lectors of Sacred Theology are not exempt from this law.¹ But those who possess a parochial benefice to which care of souls is attached do not need special approval; for by the very fact that they are deputed to this office, they are implicitly recognized as suitable for hearing confessions. Moreover, one who is not endowed with doctrine and prudence must not be assumed as pastor (can. 453), and the Ordinary can compel a pastor, and indeed even a canon, concerning whose suitability doubts arise, to a new test of doctrine.²

¹ Constitution Romani Pontificis, 8 Aug. 1571.

² "If after jurisdiction or license has been granted they prudently doubt whether a priest previously approved by them still remains suitable, let them compel him to a new test of doctrine, even if there is question of a pastor or penitentiary canon" (Can. 878).

3° Exempt regulars today need approval for receiving the confessions of regulars of their own order;³ but in this case let the religious Superiors judge concerning their suitability (can. 877).

³ Exempt regulars are those who pronounce solemn vows, such as Franciscans, Dominicans, Benedictines, and also certain Congregations enjoying this special privilege, such as the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer. - Concerning all those things which pertain to the approval of Regulars, Piat Montensis discusses fully, Praelect. Juris Regularis, Tournai, 1898, t. II, p. 170-205; cf. the compendium of the same work, by V. ab Appeltern, 1903, p. 549-560.

n. 380.

3° The Ordinary should not revoke approval from one who truly remains suitable, since in this matter he acts as judge, who is bound to pass judgment according to truth; therefore he sins if he revokes or suspends it without cause.² Nevertheless one to whom approval has been denied even unjustly cannot validly absolve, since jurisdiction also has been denied to him, without which absolution is invalid.³ - Besides, the Bishop is not bound to confer jurisdiction on every suitable person: for this is left to his judgment.

² Code, c. 880.

³ From the old law it was clear from the condemnation of proposition 13 by Alexander VII, 24 Sept. 1665, apud Denzing., n. 984; cf. Viva, op. cit. on proposition XIII; Vacant, Dict. de Theol., t. I, p. 736-737.

n. 392.

(d) Hence, once the Code had been promulgated, a controversy arose concerning the power of delegating belonging to pastors. 1) Some thought that pastors could, at least in urgent cases, delegate other priests to hear the confessions of their subjects, by force of the general principle that those having ordinary power can delegate it. 2) But the Pontifical Commission for authentically interpreting the Canons of the Code, on 16 Oct. 1919, declared that pastors, vicars of pastors, or other priests delegated for the universality of cases cannot delegate to secular or regular priests jurisdiction for receiving confessions, nor extend beyond the circumscribed limits jurisdiction to those already approved, but need for this a special faculty or mandate of the Ordinary of the place. And deservedly; for the Code designates no one except the Ordinary of the place as the source from which delegation is to be received, and positively denies this faculty of delegating to the penitentiary canon; hence by being silent about the pastor, it denies him the same faculty; - moreover, already for three centuries, the whole jurisprudence tends to this, that the Ordinary of the place be constituted, for seculars, the sole source of delegated jurisdiction.¹

¹ J. Creusen and A. Vermeersch, Summula novi juris, 1918, n. 346; A. Boudinhon, Rev. du cl. fr., 15 Apr. 1919, p. 96, and 1 July 1919, p. 73.

In practice, however, there is scarcely any difficulty; for Bishops are accustomed to grant to pastors living within the limits of the diocese the faculty of calling pastors exercising ministry in contiguous places of their diocese and of conferring jurisdiction on them; moreover recourse to the Bishop is easy today.

n. 394.

(B) From law, or from the Code: (a) Cardinals and Bishops, whether residential or titular, from the accepted authentic notice of canonical provision having been completed, can choose for themselves and their families a priest for receiving confessions; if he lacks jurisdiction, he obtains it by the law itself, even with respect to reserved sins and censures also, with the sole exception of censures reserved to the Apostolic See in the most special manner and those which are attached to the revelation of the secret of the Holy Office.²

² Code, c. 239 and 349.

(b) Any priests undertaking an overseas journey, provided they have from their own Ordinary, or from the Ordinary of the port, whether initial or intermediate, the faculty of receiving confessions, can during the whole journey validly and licitly absolve both the faithful sailing with them, and the faithful who for any reason come to the ship, and those who, when they themselves call at land in passing, ask to confess to them, and can validly and licitly absolve them even from cases reserved to the Ordinary of the place.³

³ Code, c. 883.

n. 406.

(A) Religious, even exempt, receive jurisdiction for receiving the confessions of seculars or religious from the Ordinary of the place in which the confessions are heard; but they cannot use the same without at least the presumed permission of their own superior. Moreover, Ordinaries are not to grant jurisdiction habitually except to religious presented by their own superior, nor are they to deny it without grave cause to those who are presented by the superior; nevertheless this ought not to be done without a previous examination by which they have been found suitable, except in the case of a priest whose theological doctrine has been ascertained from another source.²

² Code, c. 874, 877.

n. 444.

2° On Absolution from Papal Cases

From these cases the following can absolve: 1) by ordinary power, both the Supreme Pontiff and the Major Penitentiary; 2) by delegated power, Bishops and priests delegated by the Holy See, or by another Superior having the faculty of subdelegating: "From a censure reserved to the Apostolic See, these and others can absolve who have obtained from it the power of absolving, whether general, if the censure is simply reserved, or special, if it is reserved in a special manner, or finally most special, if it is reserved in a most special manner."² Thus delegation is always required also for absolving from a sin reserved to the Apostolic See without censure.

² Code, c. 2253, § 3.

Vol. I, Matrimony, and Holy Orders, On Penance (Volume I), Appendix: On Indulgences

n. 635.

1° On confession and communion. (a) Apart from a special concession, one cannot satisfy the paschal precept and gain the Jubilee by one confession and communion.⁶ Yet, with respect to confession, one can first confess in order to gain the Jubilee; and if afterwards, within the year, he has admitted no mortal sin, he will not be bound to confess, since the law of annual confession obliges only those who are conscious of grave sin (n. 245). Nor is absolution required, if one is in the state of grace, unless it is expressly said in the Bull, as in the year 1851, "having confessed their sins and having expiated them by sacramental absolution."

⁶ Sacred Penitentiary, January 25, 1875, in Acta S. Sedis, VIII, pp. 266-267; cf. p. 361.

(b) Confession and communion must be made during the time of the Jubilee, but not on the vigil, unless from first Vespers, when it is already customarily begun at Rome.

(c) He who, after confession has been performed, falls into mortal sin before he has completed the last work, must repeat confession, so that by sacramental absolution he may recover grace;¹ nor is it sufficient for him to elicit perfect contrition.

¹ Bull Inter praeteritos, n. 79.

n. 636.

2° On the visitation of churches. Which churches are to be visited, and how often, the Supreme Pontiff designates in the City, and the Bishop of each diocese outside the City.

(A) Thus for the year 1900, Leo XIII prescribed² that the four basilicas of Blessed Peter and Paul, St. John Lateran, and St. Mary Major should be visited at least once in the day for twenty continuous or interposed days, whether natural or ecclesiastical, by inhabitants residing at Rome; for at least ten days by pilgrims. But if those residing in the City, or on the journey itself, are prevented by illness or by another legitimate cause from making certain or all visitations, they can nevertheless gain the Jubilee by performing other works enjoined by confessors.

² Bull Properante, in Act. S. Sedis, XXXI, p. 644 sq.

(B) Outside the City, (a) Bishops determine, according to the Bull of the Pontiff, how many churches and how often they are to be visited. In places where there is one church, they can grant that all the prescribed visitations be made in this church; this power was given to them in the year 1852 in a general manner,³ so that they enjoy it even if the Bull of the Jubilee is silent concerning this matter. They can also designate a public oratory, if Mass is habitually celebrated in it.⁴

³ Decret. authent., n. 353, March 15, 1852.

⁴ Sacred Penitentiary, January 15, 1886, in Act. S. Sedis, XVIII, p. 334.

(b) If the same church must be visited several times, this can be done on the same day or on distinct days, unless in the Bull of the Jubilee it is defined otherwise. But visitations made in the same church must be so distinguished from each other that each time it is necessary to go out from the church in order that a new visitation can be made.

(c) Regulars cannot gain the Jubilee by performing the prescribed visitations in their own church, unless they have obtained a special privilege from the Roman Pontiff.⁵ But if they are legitimately impeded from visiting the churches designated by the Ordinary, each one can obtain commutation from his own confessor.

⁵ Sacred Penitentiary, 1875, in Act. S. Sedis, VIII, p. 554.

(d) Often also the number of visitations is diminished by instituting processions, with the license of the Bishop, from a special privilege granted by the Holy See. In which case the faithful who, because of the narrowness of the church or oratory, remain outside the doors and pray with the others, form one body morally, and therefore satisfy the visitation for gaining the Jubilee, provided, however, that all who can be contained in the church enter it. Likewise, if because of a legitimate reason processions are made with vestments not choral, without a cross, with psalmody in a low voice, or even without any chant, this is valid.¹

¹ Sacred Penitentiary, in Act. S. Sedis, VIII, p. 554; vol. XXXIV, p. 638; vol. XXXV, p. 43.

Vol. I, Matrimony, and Holy Orders, On Holy Orders (Volume I), On Holy Orders

n. 1154.

4° On the previous examination. (a) Anyone to be promoted, whether secular or religious, must undergo a previous and diligent examination concerning the very order to be received. (b) One to be promoted to sacred orders is to be examined also in other tractations of sacred theology designated by the Bishop. (c) Regularly, the local Ordinary who ordains by his own right or gives dimissorial letters receives this examination. (d) The names of those to be promoted to the several sacred orders are to be publicly announced in the parochial church of each candidate, and indeed on a feast day of precept during the solemnities of Masses or on another day and hour at which a greater frequency of people is had in the church. (e) All the faithful are held by the obligation of revealing to the Ordinary or pastor before the sacred ordination any impediments to sacred orders, if they know any. (f) But the Ordinary can prescribe other inquiries, according to his prudence and conscience¹.

¹ Codex, can. 996-1000.

Vermeersch, On Forbidden Books

Arthur Vermeersch, S.J. — 7 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Chapter IX: By What Power Books Are Prohibited · Tit. I, Ch. IX, Art. 25, I. On Ordinary Power · Tit. I, Ch. IX, Art. 25, II. On Delegated Power · Tit. I, Ch. IX, Art. 26, I. On the Former Part · Tit. II, Ch. I, Article 36 · Tit. II, Ch. I, Article 37 · Tit. II, Ch. V, Article 48

Chapter IX: By What Power Books Are Prohibited

n. 64.

Whether exempt Regulars are held by the prohibitions of Bishops

64. Hence you will ask whether or not exempt Regulars are held by Episcopal prohibitions.

Opinions of those who affirm, and arguments

Most affirm that they are held. And some indeed subject Regulars in this matter even to the ordinary jurisdiction of the Bishop, either because these Regulars do not demonstrate their exemption, or because this is a cause of faith, in which Regulars are subject to the Bishop.¹ So Pennacchi,² Ciolli.³

But others argue rather from the power of proceeding even as delegated by the Holy See, which is confirmed to Bishops by article 29 of the Constitution Officiorum. So Palmieri,⁴ who acknowledges that he is moved by this reason alone, and Wernz.⁵

But neither group seems to us to establish the matter.

General force of exemption

For Regulars properly so called - and also members of certain Congregations, for example of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer - have a general privilege of exemption which, as commending the authority of the Supreme Pontiff, receives a broad interpretation;⁶ and the houses of Regulars, by a fiction of law, are as if torn away from the Diocese.⁷ But outside the diocese, of himself, a Bishop has no power. Therefore that principle has force which we remember was handed down in the school of law at Rome: as regards jurisdiction, the Bishop has no power over Regulars except what is expressly granted to him in the law.⁸

But the contrary assertion of the distinguished Pennacchi, by which Regulars would have to bring forward an Indult concerning each exemption, plainly overturns the accepted notion of the exemption of Regulars, suppresses the generality of the privilege, and is repugnant to authors and to the Constitution Romanos Pontifices itself.⁹ For they propose the causes in which Regulars are subject to Bishops as exceptions and temperaments of the privilege that has been made. Nor do Doctors omit carefully to prove the individual derogations.

Moreover, among the exceptions, which nevertheless they have collected with most diligent care, the present case is nowhere indicated.¹⁰ Yet the doctors do not pass over this matter, since they expressly teach that Regulars are subject to Bishops in the publication of their own books, which, equally as those by seculars, are to be subjected to the previous censorship of the Bishop.

Nor is a stronger argument sought from the kind of prohibition which in some way concerns faith. For Regulars are subject to Bishops in causes of faith only insofar as judicial cognizance of causes which pertain to the Holy Office belongs privatively - that is, with regular Superiors excluded - to Bishops, who are born Inquisitors.¹¹ But from this it does not follow that Bishops have a general power of commanding things which are thought to benefit faith.

But that regular Superiors have their own role in this matter of books is clear from the authority which is given them by articles 15 and 36; it is clear from the Brief of promulgation of the new Index, by which Leo XIII, September 27, 1900, equally commits to Bishops and to Superiors of Regulars the care of urging the laws of the Index, each for his own subjects.

Force of the clause: "also as delegates of the Apostolic See."

Thus far concerning the former opinion opposed to us.

But those later authors who draw reasons from the delegated power of Bishops do not seem to bring us stronger arguments.

Certainly, Bishops need delegated power in order to be able to give precepts to Regulars as such.

The Holy Synod of Trent granted this power to them several times in the chapters De Reformatione. It also permitted Bishops to establish certain things concerning exempt persons and Regulars "even as delegates of the Apostolic See," as when it gave them the mandate of visiting monasteries in which regular observance does not flourish.¹²

But by what law do you infer from this: whenever this faculty of proceeding also as from Apostolic delegation is attributed to Bishops, any general act of theirs obliges exempt persons and Regulars? By what canon is this declared? Reverend Father Wernz himself¹³ does not deny the ambiguity of that clause. He brings forward three interpretations of it. "It can scarcely be denied," he himself continues, "that there are not lacking ancient and new authors who ... less rightly restrict that word also to signifying cumulative jurisdiction alone (over one's own subjects)." These, therefore, at least tacitly, disagree from Fagnani, whose support Father Wernz uses. But what of that interpreter of law? In chapter Ad audientiam 3, De ecclesiis aedificandis (III, 48), nn. 46, 47, 54, he sees contained in the clause "also as delegates" a delegated power by which Bishops can also dismember parishes subject to Regulars.

But if we wish to transfer this into our argument, we shall say by parity: by force of that clause the Bishop will be able to proscribe with a censorial mark the books of all, even of exempt persons and Regulars. But Fagnani himself has no universal opinion by which he contends: a Decree which the Bishop issues even as Delegate of the Apostolic See always affects exempt persons and Regulars.

Indeed, does not Fagnani himself, whom we know to favor the causes of Regulars little, nevertheless in chapter 19, De officio iudicis ordinarii (I, 31), n. 5, deny that a Bishop delegated by the Pope can proceed against exempt persons, if no mention of exemption has been made in the letters; and testify that this is the doctrine of Hostiensis and John Andrew?¹⁴ Moreover, in our age, neither De Angelis¹⁵ nor Santi¹⁶ attribute to this obscure clause, "also as delegate of the Apostolic See," efficacy of itself to widen the spaces of the ordinary power of the Bishop, but rather efficacy of warding off whatever impediments could obstruct the exercise of this authority.

Therefore we shall say thus: that clause gives Bishops a more expedited power and removes obstacles which could impede the end for which the delegation was made.

Was perhaps extension to Regulars demanded here by the intended end?

By no means. In the present case, there could of itself have been intended equally a greater and more certain efficacy of proscription for touching the books of all, rather than an extension of episcopal prohibition to exempt persons who are entrusted to the care of other Prelates. Now: a) if we consider the letters Inter multiplices, by which that faculty was first conferred, Pius IX, through these letters, stirred up Ordinaries to exercise their power of proscribing books, so that harmful writing might be met more swiftly in individual dioceses when evil was pressing.¹⁷ And once the necessity of prompt coercion had been declared, he immediately connects the granted delegation.¹⁸ But what could the exemption of Regulars do against this swift coercion, whose obstacles he wished to remove? Are not Regulars, outside rare cases of necessity, prohibited from dangerous readings by their own Superiors? But various pretexts of another kind could stand in the way, for example the lack of the condition required by Clement VIII (below here), approval received from one's own Bishop, etc., on account of which they might perhaps contend that jurisdiction was lacking in the Bishop for proscribing the book itself, and might hold his judgments "as not issued." And in truth, questions were being raised concerning the power of a Bishop to punish certain books. Cf. Albitius, De Inconstantia in Fide.¹⁹ And difficulty could be made by the declaration of Clement VIII, by which he had declared concerning this faculty of Bishops: "the case will be very rare, nor is this power to be used without a most grave cause, and the Holy See must be made more certain concerning its use."²⁰ Cf. also the letters of Propaganda Fide, August 11, 1855.²¹ Besides, when the exemption of Regulars is the cause or occasion of a delegation of this kind, the exemption is generally expressly derogated from. b) If we look to the present article 29, the delegation is joined with the indicated office, by which Bishops must see to it that harmful writings "be removed from the hands of the faithful." Who are those faithful if not diocesan subjects?

For this reason, until the Holy See defines the contrary, we judge that the opinion can be retained which makes Regulars immune from Episcopal prohibitions. With us Péries,²² Génicot,²³ Oietti,²⁴ Piat,²⁵ Van Coillie,²⁶ and practically Sleutjes²⁷ defend this. At the same time, however, Regulars, according to their prudence and humility, will beware lest by openly reading those things which the Bishop has prohibited, or even by openly receiving them within their houses, they be a scandal to diocesan subjects, or seem by some ostentation of immunity to undermine the authority of the Bishop.²⁸

¹ We omit certain futile reasons, as when they say that exemption ought not give a privilege of running into danger in faith or morals. By a similar reason you could demonstrate that the prohibition of one Bishop binds neighboring dioceses and perhaps the whole world. But the question looks to this: to which Prelate belongs the care of providing for the safety of Regulars. And if, from article 26, the faculty of reading books prohibited by the Holy See does not contain the faculty of reading books condemned by Bishops, it is clear that this regards those who are held by the prohibition of Bishops.

² Op. cit., n. 67.

³ N. 61, p. 60.

⁴ Op. cit. on articles 26 and 29.

⁵ Loc. cit., n. 111, note 82.

⁶ From the general principle of St. Alphonsus, Appendix De Privilegiis, n. 8. Cf. Suarez, De Legibus, book 8, chapter 27, n. 7.

⁷ Constitution Romanos Pontifices of Leo XIII, beginning.

⁸ Cf. Piat, Praelectiones iuris regularis, vol. 2, pp. 195, 196, question 9, end.

⁹ Loc. cit.

¹⁰ Even in recent catalogues and after Apostolic delegation has been granted. Cf., for example, Piat, Praelectiones iuris regularis, vol. 2, pp. 202-205; Oietti, Synopsis rerum moralium et iuris pontificii, s.v. Exemptio.

¹¹ A cause of this kind was the suspicion of heresy which those reading books of heretics incurred, but not those reading obscene books. Cf. Albitius, De Inconstantia in fide, chapter 30, nn. 414 and 417, 418.

¹² Session XXI, chapter 8, De Reformatione.

¹³ Ius Decretalium, vol. 2, n. 696.

¹⁴ Even in a favorable matter, it was much doubted whether or not a Bishop could aid Regulars by faculties delegated to him of dispensing, etc. Besides, the jurisdiction of a Legate is delegated and of itself is not extended to Regulars.

¹⁵ Praelectiones iuris canonici on book 1, title 29, n. 2.

¹⁶ Praelectiones iuris canonici on the same place, n. 3.

¹⁷ Cf. letters Inter multiplices.

¹⁸ For thus it states: "If due obedience responds to these [exhortatory letters], most grave evils will be removed, especially in those dioceses in which the necessity of prompt coercion is urgent. But lest anyone under the pretext of defect of jurisdiction or under some other sought-out color ... His Holiness has granted ... that in this matter they proceed also as delegates of the Apostolic See." Nor does he say under the pretext of exemption, as would have been natural if he had been thinking of Regulars; but he uses those words which are easily referred to jurisdiction lacking absolutely, or as regards books.

¹⁹ Chapter 30, nn. 164-186.

²⁰ Declaration of Rule X, related by Albitius, Inconstantia in Fide, n. 186, and by Arndt, op. cit., n. 163.

²¹ Collectanea C. Prop. Fidei, n. 1886.

²² Op. cit., p. 164.

²³ Op. cit., I, n. 451.

²⁴ Analecta Ecclesiastica, 1898, p. 383.

²⁵ Nouvelle Revue Théologique, vol. 31, pp. 572-582.

²⁶ Op. cit., p. 27.

²⁷ De prohibitione, p. 18.

²⁸ But we deny that this scandal can scarcely be avoided, as Reverend Father Wernz thinks; for even without scandal there are held in the houses of Regulars books proscribed by the Holy See. Nor must they constantly manifest the faculty they have.

Tit. I, Ch. IX, Art. 25, I. On Ordinary Power

n. 96.

Which Prelates possess this faculty

96. 2. Prelates to whom quasi-episcopal jurisdiction belongs are Nuncios,¹ Apostolic Vicars, Capitular Vicars, and Superiors of exempt Regulars, both Generals and Provincials, and also, as is probable, Locals,² provided they truly preside over a convent or monastery. Thus Guardians of the Friars Minor; Priors of the Friars Preachers; Provincials, Rectors, Vice-Rectors of the Society of Jesus, and Superiors of houses which are of their own right. But not Ministers, nor Priors who are subject to an Abbot.³

The same power belongs to the Vicar General, not as to a Prelate, but insofar as he exercises episcopal jurisdiction as one judge with the Bishop.

What power has been conceded to them

3. To these Prelates an ordinary power is made of conceding license, for individual books, and only in urgent cases.

For individual books

For individual books, strictly, would signify for certain books designated individually, and not by some general reason of books, for example, which might be useful for making this lucubration. Yet because the faculty can be taken broadly, a sufficiently special designation seems to suffice so as to contract the faculty to a few books, provided the other condition of an urgent cause is observed.

In urgent cases

In urgent cases only. A case will urge if a just cause of reading suffers no delay necessary for Roman recourse.⁴

But the cause ought not to be of so great necessity that it excuses from the law; but we seem able to be content with notable utility, on account of which a general license would deservedly be given by a competent Superior; indeed with less, since there is less danger in the reading of one individual book. Suppose, for example, that a rare occasion is offered of reading a book which is indeed prohibited but useful for studies.

It can be delegated

Since this power is ordinary, it can be delegated to Deans, Parish Priests, and Confessors themselves (for whom it will often be useful to have it).

It extends to obscene books

It is not circumscribed by object, so that, if nevertheless a just cause underlies it, it comprises a book obscene of set purpose.⁵

¹ The principle from which they could regularly do those things "which the Ordinary could do in his diocese" seems sufficiently to have force for this use. Pirhing and Schmalzgrueber on book 1, title 30, n. 4.

² Cf. Vermeersch, De Religiosis, etc., t. 1, n. 412.

³ The distinguished Pennacchi, A. S. S., n. 63, p. 385, whom Ciolli, n. 59, still follows, undeservedly excludes from use of this faculty all regular Prelates whose authority, circumscribed to monks, is not exercised over some people. He gives as reason that, in the latter part of article 25, the Legislator sets down the case in which Prelates of this sort have obtained from the Holy See the faculty of imparting to the faithful license of reading and retaining prohibited books. Therefore the Prelates must be understood only as those who would have faithful. But by the name of faithful there come only "secular men and those living in the lay state." But what prevents some expression in the two sentences from being taken in a sense accommodated to each sentence? Therefore in the former sentence, Prelates possessing jurisdiction as if episcopal will be all who are accustomed to come under this name; in the latter they will be those who "de facto" have faithful. Besides, why say more? Even if this article did not include regular Prelates in express words, it was not fitting to pass over the Constitution Romani Pontificis circumspecta of St. Pius V, which universally disposes: "The Regular Prelates themselves, by themselves, can do altogether the same toward Brothers and Nuns ... subject to them, which Bishops can do toward clerics and laymen subject to them, both as regards faculties of absolving and dispensing of this sort and as regards any other faculties whatsoever, by the same authority and tenor, even perpetually we concede and indulge, and also declare." That this Constitution still has force, Piat, Prael. Iur. regul., t. 2, p. 87, note 2, shows. This concession plainly suffices in the present species. Cf. also the general principle in Suarez, De Relig., tract 8, book 2, chapter 12. On the matter also very well Wernz, cited place, n. 111, note 78.

⁴ To Roman recourse, I say. For just as concerning reserved cases, so concerning this matter the impediment seems able to be estimated with respect to him who has the ordinary faculty, that is, in the case, with respect to the Holy See. Therefore the said superiors will enjoy the faculty of an urgent case although opportunity is at hand of approaching a Bishop furnished with a delegated faculty.

⁵ Nordin, Summa theol. mor., n. 694, note.

Tit. I, Ch. IX, Art. 25, II. On Delegated Power

n. 97.

Faculties delegated by the Holy See

97. Greater faculties are sometimes delegated by the Apostolic See to the same Prelates, by which they are permitted to concede to their subjects a general faculty of reading and retaining prohibited books.

Concerning the right interpretation of those faculties, these things occur to be observed.

Interpretation

a) These faculties are to be interpreted broadly.

Communication with successor and by delegation

b) From the new discipline introduced through the Decree of November 24, 1897, these faculties, which are conceded for a certain space of years, if they are handed to Bishops, also pertain to Vicars General; if they are given to Ordinaries of places, or to Superior Generals of Regular Orders, they pass (in the state in which they were) to their successors, substituted in their place by stable or passing title; and, from the decree of December 14, 1898, they are in themselves delegable.¹

Use in favor of themselves

c) Bishops can concede the faculty to themselves by force of the obtained Indult, since the act pertains to voluntary jurisdiction.²

And of Regulars

c) Bishops seem able to use those faculties which they have obtained in favor of Regulars, lest the favor of exemption yield to their detriment.³

Limits of a temporal faculty

d) Unless the formula restricts the power, the Bishop can make the permission perpetual. But if he cannot give perpetual permission, he does not seem to exceed his power if he gives the faculty until revocation. For this is numbered among temporal faculties.

What if the indult is temporary

But by no means must he circumscribe the faculties which he concedes by the same time by which he himself has the faculty of conceding. For it is well conceived that for a quinquennium a faculty is given to someone of giving even perpetual licenses; and there is no reason why you should restrict to the time of the indult the time of the faculty granted by force of the indult. Otherwise, a Bishop who obtained a quinquennial indult four years earlier could now make a faculty only for one year; and he whose indult would expire after a month could permit reading only for a month. Doctors adhere to our interpretation and the style of the Sacred Congregation of the Index accords with it.⁴

Yet this must be understood in itself. For in the Indult the time can be expressly defined beyond which permission cannot be conceded; and the present mind of the Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide⁵ seems to understand indults conceded by it in that manner which in itself we reject.

e) The modes and limits which are prescribed in the indult must be well observed.⁶

And so, in the use of the Indult the apostolic authority by force of which the faculty is conceded must be recalled.

The faculty must be conceded altogether gratis.

The power is not accustomed to extend to all books to be conceded, but certain ones designated by name, or certain classes of books, are excepted.⁷ For example, delegation is never given for permitting books obscene of set purpose.

Often, especially for books against Religion, Bishops can concede the faculty only to those persons who are furnished with a certain quality.

While it is always required that Bishops concede this permission only with selection, or with prudent discretion of persons and circumstances, and from a just and reasonable cause (article 25), the cause itself is sometimes indicated taxatively: "for the effect of attacking them (heretics)." Cf. n. 98, 5.

The form of the Indult which the Sacred Congregation of the Index grants to Bishops is this:

Most ample and Reverend Lord,

Our Most Holy Lord Pius Pope X, kindly receiving the suppliant prayers by which Your Amplitude asked the faculty of permitting to the Christian faithful committed to your pastoral care the reading of books prohibited by the Apostolic See, committed to this Sacred Congregation of the Index that it should impart to You, concerning whose religion, doctrine, and piety he has very great confidence, the aforesaid faculty, namely of conceding to the faithful of Your diocese, from a just and reasonable cause, license of reading and retaining prohibited books, with certain laws and conditions nevertheless preserved, until ...

Wherefore you can concede:

1°. To upright and learned men only, license of reading and retaining any books whatever (and periodicals) prohibited by the Apostolic See, excepting those which defend heresy or schism, or overturn the very foundations of religion; whose reading you can permit only to those whom you know to be more outstanding in doctrine, piety, and zeal for the faith; but you shall permit to no one the reading of books treating obscene things of set purpose.

2°. To youths who in public schools, gymnasia, lyceums, academies apply themselves to studies, you can similarly concede license of reading and retaining, for as long as they are placed in that necessity, books proscribed by the same Apostolic See which by command of lay power they are compelled to have at hand.

But the aforesaid licenses are to be conceded gratis under any title whatever, and without any emolument to be received by Your episcopal curia, under penalty of nullity; and in each letter of concession express mention must be made of the Apostolic faculty.

In faith of which, etc.

Given at Rome, from the Secretariat of the Sacred Congregation of the Index, on the ... day of the month ... in the year ...

To the Most Ample and Reverend Lord

Lord ...

¹ Some have been deceived by the prior law, for example Hilgers, p. 31, note 2, who deny that these faculties can be delegated.

² Sleutjes, De prohibitione, p. 32.

³ Vermeersch, De Religiosis, I, n. 382.

⁴ Zitelli, Apparatus iuris eccl., p. 541, note; Arndt, cited work, p. 252; Wernz, cited work, n. 111, note 79; Hilgers, cited work, p. 31, note 2.

⁵ The clause in the diocese is taken by the same Sacred Congregation in such a way that, when the faculty is made, the Bishop conceding it and the subject to whom he concedes it must both be present in the diocese.

⁶ The Sacred Congregation of Propaganda Fide has a longer Instruction, which we have copied in the fourth part of this work.

⁷ At least expressly. For in n. 2° of the formula just recited no books are excluded.

Tit. I, Ch. IX, Art. 26, I. On the Former Part

n. 98.

An apostolic faculty does not permit books prohibited by Bishops

98. 1. The Holy See does not lack the power of permitting someone books prohibited by Ordinaries, but the intention or will is lacking unless the indult gives express permission of reading and retaining books condemned by whomsoever. This clause is contained in no general formula. Therefore the Holy See is accustomed to act here in the same way as when it gives a faculty in reserved cases. Cases which the Bishop has reserved to himself have not customarily been contained by an apostolic faculty.

By their ordinary power

But this holds concerning episcopal proscription as it is a diocesan decree, not however as it is borne from delegated power. For the Holy See itself is judged to act through its delegate. Hence books proscribed by a delegate as such are judged condemned by apostolic authority. Wherefore the faculty of reading books disapproved by the Holy See must consequently comprehend these.

Corollary

Therefore exempt persons, for example regulars, if you contend that they are held by the prohibitions of bishops insofar as delegated faculty has been conceded to these,¹ will be able, once an apostolic indult has been obtained, actually to read works proscribed by Bishops.

One who can read a book can in itself retain it

2. The faculty of reading books seems in itself to comprise the faculty of preserving the same, yet circumscribed by the same limits. Wherefore, if the reading has been conceded only for a passing act, or if the one has permitted it who enjoys power only for an urgent case, a distinct faculty must be sought for habitual preservation, all the more because sufficient time is at hand to obtain it.

One who can read books can also read periodicals

2. The faculty of reading prohibited books comprises the faculty of reading periodicals. For attention is turned less severely to periodicals than to books.² It is confirmed indirectly from our article 26. For while it denies that one who has the apostolic faculty of reading books can read books or periodicals proscribed by Ordinaries of places, it indirectly says that periodicals condemned by the Apostolic See can in themselves be read by him.

But, on the contrary, the faculty of reading periodicals cannot be understood concerning books.

Clauses: excepting books against Religion

3. The clause, excepting books of set purpose against Religion, seems able to be understood concerning books which with direct intention have been written against every religion.³

Of this sort are those which of set purpose try to demonstrate that every religion is harmful or false; or which of set purpose blaspheme God and every worship; but not those which reject positive religion in order to preach natural religion.

Or which overturn the foundations of religion

4. The exception of books which in any way overturn the foundations of religion excepts books which defend materialism, atheism, positivism.

What of the clause: "for the effect of attacking."

5. The concession is sometimes clothed with this clause: "for the effect of attacking them (bad writers)." All admit that this clause is to be interpreted benignly and without scruple.⁴ Indeed, according to a very probable opinion, those words indicate the reason why the exception has been made, not a condition to which the use of the conceded faculty is tied:⁵ so that it is justified by any right end whatever. This is confirmed from the fact that at the same time the Superior judged that the danger of perversion was not imminent for the dispensed person. St. Alphonsus.⁶ Thus Zitelli,⁷ Planchard,⁸ Génicot.⁹ This will hold much more if there is added: and as an aid to one's own office and honorable studies.

Use outside the diocese

6. Unless the use is clearly more circumscribed, you can use everywhere the faculty of reading books condemned by the Holy See, whether the Holy See itself directly, or the Bishop from delegated power, has made this permission for you. For here holds the rule concerning dispensation, according to which dispensation from commission and dispensation from ordinary power are in themselves contained by the same limits. Schmalzgrueber, on book 5, title 33, n. 111. With us is Sleutjes, De prohibitione, etc., p. 31.

Moreover, the clause: in such a way that books are not taken out of this diocese, does not seem in itself to have the force of prohibiting use outside the diocese, since it rather looks to this, that books not be introduced into another diocese in a stable manner, although he who is endowed with the faculty can read also there books occurring there or brought with him there.¹⁰

¹ Cf. above, part I, n. 64.

² Cf. Arndt, cited work, p. 223, n. 166; Pennacchi, cited work, n. 64; Ciolli, cited work, n. 55.

³ Cf. above, n. 92.

⁴ Cf. Heymans, cited work, n. 345.

⁵ A condition sine qua non is customarily indicated more clearly: otherwise not; not otherwise; otherwise the whole will be void. Zitelli, Apparatus, p. 541, note.

⁶ Book 7, n. 291.

⁷ Apparatus, p. 541, note.

⁸ Rev. Th. Fr., 1897, pp. 31, 32.

⁹ Cited work, I, 457.

¹⁰ For reading, in another diocese, books prohibited by the Bishop of that diocese, the faculty of another Bishop cannot benefit those who are bound by this episcopal law, such as those would be who acquired at least a quasi-domicile in another diocese. Against Heymans, cited work, n. 343, and De Brabandere, cited work, n. 136.

Tit. II, Ch. I, Article 36

n. 113.

It confirms the disposition of Clement

113. 1. That clause reports, almost to the letter, the words of the Instruction of Clement VIII added to the Rules of the Index. From this:

Equally with the rest they are subject to the censure of the Ordinary

a) The doctrine, already certain before, is confirmed, according to which exempt Regulars are subject to the censure of the Ordinary of the place equally with the rest. Equally, I say, not more.¹ Therefore, only for books which from common law are subject to censure.

How far, besides, the faculty of the proper Prelate is required

b) There is also commemorated the decree of Trent, session 4, concerning the edition and use of sacred books, by which they are further bound to obtain the faculty of their proper Prelate. But because, in that decree, speech is only concerning books of Sacred Scripture, annotations, and commentaries, the pontifical law concerning the faculty of the proper Prelate to be sought seems to be circumscribed to the same things. Cf. Desjardins, Etudes, t. 71, p. 365.² But as to other works, they will stand by their proper Constitutions.

Which Regulars?

2. Regulars are to be understood as those strictly such.³ Those who are called such more broadly will much less escape the censure of the Ordinary. For the rest they will observe their proper Rules.

Each concession to be printed

3. Each concession is to be printed at the beginning or end of the work in that manner in which the sole concession of the Bishop is to be appended to the books of others. Cf. below, n. 116.

¹ Wernz, n. 121, note 103, also holds the same, against certain persons who, relying on I know not what reason, already wish all books of Regulars to bear testimony of a double approval.

² Most think that by the Instruction of Clement VIII that prescription was extended to every book. Thus C. Gennari (cited work, in this place), Genicot (cited work, 460), and Pennacchi (n. 73). But in the same words by which our article does, that Instruction appeals to the decree of the Council of Trent. Therefore we do not perceive the force of the inference made. Nevertheless Boudinhon also admits this in this article, and Wernz, note 103. For the rest the matter is of the smallest importance, since at least from their proper Constitutions the books of Regulars must be approved by their Superiors.

³ They are, however, the solemnly professed, and, from the Constitution of Gregory XIII, Ascendente Domino, also the simply professed of the Society of Jesus. Concerning the simply professed of other Orders this is doubted. Cf. Bizzarri, Collectanea, 1st ed., p. 801, note.

Tit. II, Ch. I, Article 37

n. 114.

The former law partly abrogated

114. 1. By the former law, by order of Alexander VII, those dwelling in the Pontifical State had to offer their books to be approved by the previous censure of the Cardinal Vicar of the City and of the Master of the Sacred Palace. Now the special obligation, if any remains, is circumscribed to the City alone.

Force of the present article. It imposes an obligation

2. Proceed now: the obligation seems to remain. For although the sentence of the law is in itself ambiguous and can be taken of a mere privilege,¹ nevertheless the reason of the former disposition remains in such a way that a correction of that law, which would be inexplicable, does not seem to have to be admitted. The usage of the City agrees, in which the Masters of the Sacred Palace urge their right in this way.²

But the reason of this sanction is drawn from a certain peculiar authority with which books that are considered to have been written under the eyes of the Holy See are vested, so that they seem to have to be fortified by the caution of Roman censure.

And it confers a privilege

3. At the same time, however, the article confers a most equitable privilege, by which these books, even if they are published elsewhere, need have no other approval. Thus the law is not made harsher for the inhabitants of the City, and fitting honor is given to Apostolic censure.

Whom it affects

4. Those properly dwell in the City who there have at least a quasi-domicile.³ Those, however, who actually stay at Rome even for a shorter time will be able, as pilgrims, to share in the privilege of the inhabitants.

¹ Cf. Palmieri, in this place; Ojetti, Analecta Eccl., 1898, pp. 383, 384.

² Cf. Wernz, n. 121, note 104.

³ Quasi-domicile is acquired by real habitation joined with the intention of staying in some place for the greater part of the year. Thus the opinion received in the curia, although some, as Lehmk. II, 775, are content with staying through a notable part of the year: as, for instance, through 4 months. Penn., A. S. S., cited place, n. 74, p. 495, judges that no space of stay is required for the use of that privilege.

Tit. II, Ch. V, Article 48

n. 126.

Difference from the Tridentine censure

126. 1. Thus, by expressing it more clearly, the Tridentine excommunication is renewed,¹ which nevertheless struck only anonymous books, while, according to interpreters of the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis (which confirmed the same censure), books which bear before themselves the name of the author are now also comprehended.

It is necessary only that the approval of the Ordinary was given

2. Without the approval of the Ordinary. It is enough, for escaping the censure, that it has been given, although perhaps not in writing nor appended in the book. And although regulars besides need the license of their Prelate, they do not commit the excommunication if the book is approved solely by the Ordinary of the place.

Who are printing?

3. Printing, in the present case, seem to be only those who either are owners of the typography or sustain their person, so that they conduct the matter in their name. For the Tridentine text in the cited place contains commands and penalties which cannot be accommodated to workers, etc. Cf. Pennacchi, Ballerini, Arndt,² Hollweck,³ against Piat (on Van der Velden), p. 861.

Causing to be printed

4. Causing to be printed: as the editor of the book, he by whose care the book is printed; not necessarily the author, for example, if he merely gave or sold the manuscript, caring nothing for the printing.

Who absolves from this excommunication?

5. Excommunication reserved to no one. Therefore every Confessor can absolve from it, provided that contumacy has ceased.

¹ Session 4 (Decree concerning the edition and use of sacred books). As Hollweck, Die Strafgesetze, etc., sec. 108, 1, wishes, also for this reason it is established a little more severely than in the Council of Trent, because the Tridentine decree did not clearly comprehend Sacred Scripture itself.

² Avanz.-Penn., t. 2, appendix 38, p. 232; note 62 on Gury, II, 789; cited work, pp. 246, 247, n. 180.

³ Cited place. This sentence, which earlier, by I know not what law, R. D. Van Coillie, Collat. Brugg., p. 551, had accused of too much benignity, he sincerely confessed in the Commentary in this place to be sufficiently pleasing to himself.

Vermeersch, Theologia Moralis

Arthur Vermeersch, S.J. — 7 passages

Vol. III, First Book: On Persons in …, Treatise II: On Religious · Vol. III, First Book: On Persons in …, Tr. II, Chapter V: On Departure from Religion

Vol. III, First Book: On Persons in …, Treatise II: On Religious

Utility. In moral theology, for the use of schools, only a small space can be reserved for the broad and difficult treatise on religious,⁽¹⁾ in which, besides a few notions concerning the religious state, religious institutes and houses, and the governance of religious, the rights and obligations of individual religious are chiefly explained. For these things are more moral and more useful for all priests to know. Wherefore we too have entered upon this manner of speaking.

⁽¹⁾ We undertake the treatise more broadly and more fully in the third edition of our work De Religiosis institutis et personis.

Vol. III, First Book: On Persons in …, Tr. II, Chapter V: On Departure from Religion

n. 154.

I. - On the Departure of Religious

— I. Licit departures (cc. 637-643). 1. When the time of vows has been completed, a professed religious can freely leave the religion.

Through an indult of exclaustration, dwelling outside the cloister is permitted for a definite time or while the cause subsists. Then the professed religious observes the obligations which can be composed with his state; in place of the Superiors of his own religion, he is subject to the Ordinary of the territory where he dwells, also by reason of the vow of obedience; nevertheless he must lay aside the exterior form of the religious habit, unless, because of a peculiar cause, he who grants the indult determines otherwise.

For religions of pontifical law only the Apostolic See can grant this indult; for religions of diocesan law, the local Ordinary also can grant it.

Through an indult of secularization, which the local Ordinary himself can grant for a religion of diocesan law, the religious is fully separated from his religion and, freed from vows and religious obligations, is fully assimilated to seculars. If he had been a religious in sacred orders, he must return to his own diocese; if he has lost this, he cannot, with another disposition of the Holy See saved, exercise sacred orders until he has found a bishop as benevolent receiver. But the bishop can receive the religious either purely and simply, or for experiment for three years; this time he can prolong once. After the second triennium has elapsed, the religious remains incardinated.

Nevertheless many offices cannot be conferred, without a new indult of the Holy See, on a secularized man who had been professed of perpetual vows; indeed, neither on one dispensed from temporal vows, or from an oath of perseverance, or from peculiar promises of his Institute, if he had been bound by them beyond six years.

n. 155.

— II. Illicit departures (cc. 644, 645, 2385, 2386). 1. Through apostasy from religion: this delict is committed only by a professed religious of perpetual vows, who illegitimately goes out from the religious house with the mind of not returning, or who, even if he has legitimately gone out, does not return, with the intention that he withdraw himself from religious obedience. And he is presumed an apostate who has not returned within a month, nor has manifested to the Superior his intention of returning.

Through flight, which he commits who, without the Superior's license, deserts the religious house with the mind of returning to the religion. Yet he is not considered a fugitive who merely goes out for a walk without license: it is necessary that for some time, for instance for two or three days, he wished to be his own master.

Fugitives and apostates are to be sought diligently, and the penitent must be received. Apostates, besides other penalties, contract by the fact itself an excommunication reserved to their own major Superior, or, if the religion is lay or non-exempt, to the local Ordinary in the place where they are staying.

Fugitives by the fact itself incur privation of office, if they had any in religion, and suspension reserved to their own major Superior.

Vol. I, TREATISE ON PARTICULAR STA…, PART THIRD: ON THE RELIGIOUS STATE · Vol. I, TREATISE ON PARTICULAR STA…, PART THIRD: ON THE RELIGIO…, CHAPTER I: ON THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE COMMON TO ALL RELIGIOUS · Vol. I, TREATISE ON PARTICULAR STA…, PART THIRD: ON THE RELIGIO…, Ch. I, ARTICLE I: ON THE NATURE OF THE RELIGIOUS STATE · Vol. I, TREATISE ON PARTICULAR STA…, PART THIRD: ON THE RELIGIO…, Ch. I, ARTICLE II: ON THE NECESSITY OF VOCATION TO THE RELIGIOUS STATE · Vol. I, TREATISE ON PARTICULAR STA…, PART THIRD: ON THE RELIGIO…, Ch. I, ARTICLE III: ON PROBATION OR NOVITIATE · Vol. I, TREATISE ON PARTICULAR STA…, PART THIRD: ON THE RELIGIO…, Ch. I, ARTICLE IV: PROFESSION ACCORDING TO SOME RULE · Vol. I, TREATISE ON PARTICULAR STA…, PART THIRD: ON THE RELIGIO…, Ch. I, Art. IV, § I. On the Obligation of Observing the Vows · Vol. I, TREATISE ON PARTICULAR STA…, PART THIRD: ON THE RELIGIO…, Ch. I, Art. IV, § II. On the Obligation of Observing the Rule · Vol. I, TREATISE ON PARTICULAR STA…, PART THIRD: ON THE RELIGIO…, Ch. I, Art. IV, § III. On the Obligation of Tending to Perfection

II. - On the Dismissal of Religious (cc. 643, 646-672)

Dismissal is one kind by the law itself, another pronounced by decree of the Superior.

n. 156.

— Those are held as legitimately dismissed by the law itself: 1. public apostates from the Catholic faith; 2. a religious man who has taken flight with a woman, or a religious woman who has taken flight with a man; 3. those attempting or contracting marriage, or even a bond, as they say, civil (c. 646, §1).

Then it suffices that the major Superior, with his Chapter or Council, declare the fact and preserve the proofs (c. 646, §2).

n. 157.

— By decree of the Superior. 1. When the time of vows has elapsed, professed religious can be dismissed for just and reasonable causes, but not because of infirmity, unless it is certainly proved that it had been fraudulently kept silent or dissembled before profession (c. 637).

While temporal vows endure, they can be dismissed for grave causes, whether on the part of the religion or on the part of the religious. In Orders or Congregations of pontifical law, the Superior General dismisses, or the Abbot of a monastery sui iuris, with the consent of each one's Council, manifested through secret votes; if there is question of nuns, there dismisses, according to the case, either the local Ordinary or the regular Superior to whom they are subject, after the Superioress with her Council has given attestation of the causes in writing; in Congregations of diocesan law, the local Ordinary in whose territory the religious house is situated dismisses: he is admonished not to use his right with the moderators unaware or justly dissenting.

If the dismissed religious has recourse to the Holy See in due time, while the recourse is pending the dismissal effects nothing.

A religious thus dismissed is assimilated to one secularized; if he had been a cleric in minor orders, by that very fact he is reduced to the lay state (cc. 647, 648).

After perpetual vows (cc. 649-672):

a) either there is question of a professed man. Then it is necessary that grave, external, certain delicts have preceded, three in number formally or virtually, from obstinacy after two warnings which, if there is question of a continued delict, must be separated by a space of at least three days, and must always be made with opportune admonitions and the threat of dismissal added. Then, in an exempt clerical religion, the process, every privilege having been removed, must be judged by the tribunal of the general moderator, yet in such a way that the sentence of expulsion must be confirmed by the Sacred Congregation for Religious before it is completed by execution. Yet for distant regions, the Superior General, with the consent of his Council, can commit judgment to three upright and prudent men. In a non-exempt religion of pontifical law, the supreme Moderator issues a decree of expulsion, which the Holy See must confirm before execution; in a religion of diocesan law, the whole matter to be decided is committed to the local Ordinary. A free exposition of his reasons must always be permitted to the accused, and his responses must be faithfully reported in the acts;

b) or there is question of a professed woman. Grave exterior causes also, and incorrigibility proved by experiment, are prerequisites. The Superioress judges concerning this matter; and place for the free defense of the religious woman to be blamed must be given. But she herself never pronounces the sentence or issues the decree of expulsion; rather, if there is question of religious women of diocesan law, or, as it seems to us, in Belgium and in France, of nuns who have been reduced to simple vows, the Ordinary issues the decree of dismissal; if there is question of nuns or of Sisters of pontifical law, the acts must be transmitted to the Sacred Congregation, which will decree what seems more expedient. The acts of nuns are transmitted by the local Ordinary with both his own vote and that of the regular Superior, if there is one; the acts of Sisters are sent by the supreme Moderatrix;

c) whether there is question of a man or of a woman, in the case of grave exterior scandal or of very grave harm threatening the community, the religious man or religious woman can be expelled immediately. If there is question of one professed of an exempt clerical religion, the major Superior, or if the matter is too urgent the local Superior, but he with the consent of his Council, sends the accused back to the world, the religious habit being laid aside at once, and the process is immediately made if it has not yet been instituted. If there is question of a professed man or woman of a religion of pontifical law, the major Superior, with the consent of his Council, or, if the matter is too urgent, the local Superior with the assent of his Council and of the local Ordinary, dismisses the accused man or woman, the religious habit being laid aside at once, yet in such a way that the matter is submitted without delay to the judgment of the Holy See through the Ordinary or major Superior. If there is question of a professed man or woman of diocesan law, or of a nun of Belgium or France, the matter seems able to be resolved by the local Ordinary;

d) a professed religious thus dismissed remains bound by the vows, unless the constitutions or indult of the Holy See provide otherwise. If he had been a cleric constituted in minor orders, by that very fact he has been reduced to the lay state. But if he had been in sacred orders and had committed a delict because of which he is dismissed by the law itself (c. 646), or which is punished by infamy of law, or deposition, or degradation, he is perpetually prohibited from wearing ecclesiastical habit. Otherwise he remains suspended by the fact itself until he has obtained absolution from the Holy See. If, as is established of itself, he has observed the vows, he may return to the cloister; and if for three years he has given arguments of full amendment, the religion must receive him. Grave reasons which stand in the way of admission are to be submitted to the Holy See.

n. 158.

Summary

— I. 1. A religious departs licitly when the time of vows has been completed; when an indult of exclaustration has been obtained for a definite time or while the cause subsists; or when an indult of perpetual secularization has been obtained, which the Ordinary can grant to a religious of diocesan law.

One departs illicitly through apostasy from religion, which delict is proper to one professed of perpetual vows; and through the flight of one who, without license, goes out so that for at least some days he may live as his own master. Apostates and fugitives are punished with penalties.

II. 1. Public apostates from the Catholic faith are held as dismissed by the law itself; also a religious man who takes flight with a woman or a religious woman who takes flight with a man; and those attempting or contracting marriage, or even a bond, as they say, civil.

By decree of the Superior, professed religious can be dismissed for just and reasonable causes when the time of vows has elapsed; for grave causes while temporal vows endure; and religious thus dismissed are assimilated to secularized persons; and, if in minor orders, they are reduced to the lay state. Infirmity not fraudulently kept silent is always excluded as a cause of dismissal.

After perpetual vows, the dismissal of a man must be preceded by grave, external, certain delicts, three in number formally or virtually, after two warnings to be made, with opportune admonitions and the threat of dismissal added. In an exempt clerical religion of pontifical law, the process must be instituted by the tribunal of the general moderator, yet in such a way that the sentence of expulsion must be confirmed by the Holy See. In a lay or non-exempt religion of pontifical law, the supreme moderator issues a decree of expulsion which the Holy See must confirm; in a religion of diocesan law, the matter to be decided is committed to the local Ordinary. - The dismissal of a woman of perpetual vows demands grave exterior causes and incorrigibility proved by experiment. If there is question of nuns or Sisters of pontifical law, the acts must be transmitted to the Sacred Congregation, which is to establish what seems more expedient. In a religion of diocesan law, the Ordinary issues the decree of dismissal.

Yet in the case of grave exterior scandal or of very grave harm threatening the community, a religious man or religious woman can be dismissed immediately.

One dismissed of himself observes the vows; in minor orders he is reduced to the lay state; in sacred orders, he is at least suspended, or is punished more gravely.

Having amended for three years, of himself he is again to be received.

Konings, Theologia Moralis

Anthony Konings, C.SS.R. — 67 passages

Vol. I, TREATISE ON PARTICULAR STA…, PART THIRD: ON THE RELIGIOUS STATE

Preliminary Matters.

n. ¶1147.

- Besides the way of the commandments, through which all men must tend to obtaining eternal salvation, there is given the way of counsels or of special perfection, which is of mere counsel, and is proposed by God Himself to only a few chosen, who, bidding farewell to the world, lead life in monasteries.

Christ Himself teaches us this double way in many places of the Gospel; for example, Matt. 19. 17, He says to the young man inquiring about the way of salvation: If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments. But to the same one, asking what was still lacking to him, He responds in v. 21: If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven; and come, follow me.

There is also present a certain third way, middle between each preceding one, namely the way of chastity, or continence preserved in the world.

Hence a triple class of men is established by reason of the means proposed for obtaining God, or a triple state of life, namely the state 1° of matrimony; 2° of celibacy; 3° of religious life. Hence also there is a triple grade of perfection; for celibacy, as St. Paul declared,¹ and the Council of Trent defined,² is more perfect than the matrimonial state; but religious life is, as is clear, the most perfect of all. The priestly state, although in dignity it is the most excellent of all, nevertheless by reason of perfection yields by far to religious life. But as God is wonderful in His saints, so also is He wonderful in the various modes by which He advances them to sanctity.

It must be treated 1° concerning those things which are common to all Religious; 2° concerning those things which are proper to Religious who profess solemn vows; 3° concerning those things which are peculiar to Nuns; 4° concerning the privileges of Regulars; 5° concerning Regulars dispersed by force; 6° concerning the condition of Regulars in our United States.

Vol. I, TREATISE ON PARTICULAR STA…, PART THIRD: ON THE RELIGIO…, CHAPTER I: ON THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE COMMON TO ALL RELIGIOUS

The things common to all Religious are: 1° the very nature or essence of the religious state; 2° the necessity of vocation to the religious state; 3° probation; 4° profession of the three vows according to some rule.

Vol. I, TREATISE ON PARTICULAR STA…, PART THIRD: ON THE RELIGIO…, Ch. I, ARTICLE I: ON THE NATURE OF THE RELIGIOUS STATE

n. ¶1148.

- The religious state is a stable mode of living in common of the faithful, tending under a certain rule to the perfection of Christian charity, the three substantial vows of perpetual chastity, poverty, and obedience having been emitted, approved by the Church with solemnity attributed to the vows. Thus, from the Law today in force in the Church, De Angelis.¹

n. ¶1149.

Corollaries. - I. The religious state according to itself and as to its substance was immediately handed down and instituted by Christ the Lord; for He Himself is the author of religious perfection, handing down the evangelical counsels.

This state in the Church is necessary as to the said substance, because she herself must be holy also by external and public sanctity, since sanctity is one of the notes by which she is discerned from false churches. But this public sanctity cannot shine without profession of the evangelical counsels. - But it is not necessary if it is considered as to peculiar forms by which it is determined to a certain Rule and Institute.

Whence as to substance the religious state is of divine law counseling; as to forms it is of ecclesiastical law.

II. For the essence of the religious state there is required some cause inducing permanence or firmness; otherwise it would not be a state. This cause of firmness is the vow. But for the essence of the religious state, considered by divine law alone, solemn vows are not required, but simple vows suffice. For all conditions necessary for the substance of Religion are also had in simple vows, and "the solemnity of the vow by the constitution of the Church alone" (according to De Angelis¹ a little before the middle of the eleventh century, as he argues from Cause 27. q. 1. Can. 40) "was invented" (cap. unic. L. III. T. XV. in 6°). This is also clear from the Bull of Gregory XIII Ascendente Domino, of the year 1584.

III. Although solemnity of vows is necessary for the religious state today even from the law of the Church, nevertheless already from the time of the Council of Trent another stable mode of living was introduced into the Church, which would include the three substantial vows, but would lack solemnity of vows, since in it simple vows were emitted, and it came under the name Congregation. Indeed another also supervened, which would not indeed have the essence of the religious state required by Christ, yet would imitate its form and retain something from it, namely only the vow of chastity, or the three vows, but temporary, or a similar mode of living without any vows; whence the former are called Congregations properly religious, the latter Congregations improperly religious (De Angelis L. III. T. XXXI. 6°). Religious Congregations are neither held by the laws nor enjoy the privileges of Regulars strictly so called, unless either the former were specially imposed on them or the latter were granted to them.

Therefore it is clear in what sense Congregations properly religious must be called such by ecclesiastical law, and in what sense not.

Vol. I, TREATISE ON PARTICULAR STA…, PART THIRD: ON THE RELIGIO…, Ch. I, ARTICLE II: ON THE NECESSITY OF VOCATION TO THE RELIGIOUS STATE

n. ¶1150.

- It is certain that divine vocation is given, namely that by most benign providence God calls some before others to a more excellent and more perfect state, and at the same time bestows endowments and graces for rightly executing and preserving it, especially as to the ecclesiastical and religious state. For all things in the natural order are governed by God in the mode proper to individuals; therefore a fortiori in the supernatural order. Otherwise, for embracing and pursuing the more perfect state, special endowments and graces are required, which can be granted by God alone, the supreme dispenser. It is clear besides from various places of Sacred Scripture. Thus concerning Priesthood in particular the Apostle says:¹ Neither does anyone take the honor to himself, but he who is called by God as Aaron. ... Moreover the same must be said of religious life, which is a more perfect and much more difficult state. (s) p. 483.

n. ¶1151.

Questions. - Query 1° Whether or how he sins who, feeling himself called to Religion, does not obey the divine vocation?

Resp. 1° Per se, rigorously speaking, he sins in no way, because divine counsels of themselves impose no obligation, since in this precisely they differ from precepts.

Resp. 2° Yet he can scarcely be excused from some fault on account of the danger of eternal salvation to which he commits himself. Indeed he would not be excused from grave sin who had been persuaded that this was the only means remaining for him of obtaining eternal salvation, that he flee from the dangers of the world.

But are those in a bad state who, morally certain concerning a divine vocation to Religion, strive to persuade themselves that they can obtain their salvation equally easily by remaining in the world, or by returning to it? It does not seem doubtful that these expose themselves to a great danger of salvation; because by remaining in the world against the vocation of God, they deprive themselves of those special helps which the providence of God had prepared for them in Religion, and therefore with difficulty they will resist the temptations of the world. Yet St. Alphonsus does not dare to bring a certain judgment on this; nevertheless he inclines much more to the opinion condemning this of mortal sin.²

n. ¶1152.

- Query 2° How does he sin who, not called, professes Religion?

Resp. He sins gravely if he clearly knew the defect of vocation, especially on account of the danger of salvation which he incurs while he undertakes obligations which morally he will not be able to satisfy. Fault will cease when he grieves over it, firmly proposing, grace having been implored, to fulfill the obligations of the state already undertaken.

n. ¶1153.

- Query 3° Whether those sin gravely who turn away sons, subjects, or any others from the religious state?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, if they turn them away unjustly through threats, force, fraud, or importunate prayers; because they impede them from the attainment of a great good to which they have a right, and expose them to the danger of eternal salvation. When those turning away through threats, force, fraud are held to restitution, see n. 805. 3°.

Resp. 2° Affirmatively, for the most part, even if they turn them away only by prayers and promises; because this cannot be without grave damage to them. - Thus commonly with St. Alphonsus,¹ who says that this opinion is altogether to be held against some. - Yet parents do not sin who oppose for a time the pious desires of younger children in order to prove their constancy, or on account of another just cause. But that cause can be judged just on account of which even the Superiors of the Order would not easily admit the candidate. Moreover even in proving the constancy of the younger, no small discretion is needed, lest the fragility of the candidate turn him away from a vocation otherwise true. Wherefore in this matter, to avoid illusions, one must stand by the counsels of a confessor or of an upright and learned man.

Query 4° Whether children entering Religion against the will or without the knowledge of parents sin?

Resp. Negatively, speaking per se, although in practice this ordinarily is not expedient, unless they rightly fear unjust vexation or impediment. The reason is that unless parents stand in the way for a just cause, children are altogether free concerning the choice of a state of life. - Recall the things said n. 425.

n. ¶1154.

- Query 5° What are the signs of religious vocation?

Resp. Generally speaking, or according to ordinary providence, two things are required and suffice for proving divine vocation, namely due aptitude and propensity of the will.

1° Aptitude is understood as suitability for the religious state in general, and in particular for the observance proper to such an Order. But it consists especially in right judgment, in good character, in a soul submitted to the yoke of obedience, in relatively sufficient knowledge, and in the absence of defects of body and soul which are opposed to the character of this life.

2° Inclination must be a) spontaneous, which generally arises from this, that the religious state is presented to the mind as congruent to one's own disposition, and suited to bringing about internal peace and happiness; b) constant, which therefore is not subject to frequent changes, notwithstanding otherwise some past delay arising from temptations of the devil or from a certain repugnance of nature. Yet it is not required that the inclination proceed from spontaneity or propensity more than from intimate persuasion of soul. Moreover that inclination c) must be right, namely proceed from a pure intention, from the mere desire of obtaining salvation more easily, of procuring the greater glory of God or also the salvation of souls, etc.

I said: generally speaking, or in ordinary providence; because there are more evident signs of vocation, namely 1° divine revelation, as St. Paul, St. Aloysius Gonzaga, St. Stanislaus Kostka, etc. were called; 2° a singular inspiration, which consists in an internal motion by which someone is vehemently impelled to a more perfect life and is, as it were, drawn.

Note. - Doubt concerning vocation persisting after long probation through protracted examination and fervent prayer, and the matter having been submitted to a prudent confessor and to Superiors constituted by God, one must remain in the inferior state; for no one ought to ascend to the superior state unless he is morally certain of divine vocation. Thus in the opinion set forth n. 1150.

n. ¶1155.

- Query 6° To what is he held who has vowed religion?

Resp. Distinguish. 1° He who vowed religion in general, that is, not determining either Order, or place, or laxer or stricter discipline, is held by ordinary means to seek some one in which discipline flourishes, at least as to the more principal observances. - If he is rejected from that one, he more probably must seek another, because his vow is general, concerning some Religion.

2° He who vowed Religion in species is held to enter some house of that Order, and where he is rejected by one, he is held to use ordinary means so that he can enter another.

3° He who vowed it individually, determining the place in such a way that he does not intend another, if he cannot be admitted into the fixed house, will be free; because he bound himself under this condition only.¹

Query 7° Whether one vowing religion sins gravely if, having entered, he departs?

Resp. Affirmatively, if he does not have a just cause; but negatively if he did not have the mind of professing, but only of trying. - If he is cast out as unfit, he must apply moderate diligence so that he may become fit for another; but if he has attempted this in vain, he commits no sin by remaining in the world, because the vow has been made impossible.¹

Vol. I, TREATISE ON PARTICULAR STA…, PART THIRD: ON THE RELIGIO…, Ch. I, ARTICLE III: ON PROBATION OR NOVITIATE

n. ¶1156.

- Novitiate is a mutual experiment, by which Religion, on the one side, tries the morals and qualities of the novice, so that it may see whether it is expedient to admit or reject him; and the novice, on the other side, tries the austerities and Statutes of Religion, and his own disposition, so that he may see whether it is expedient for him to profess it. - Thus Billuart.²

n. ¶1157.

Questions. - Query 1° Who are not to be admitted into the Novitiate?

Resp. 1° On account of defect of mind, those who are not masters of themselves, as is clear of itself.

2° On account of defect of liberty.

a) Slaves, on account of the injury which would be done to masters.

b) Those joined in Matrimony, concerning whom it will be treated in the Treatise on Matrimony.

c) Bishops, even only confirmed, unless with the permission of the Supreme Pontiff, on account of the bond by which they are bound to their Church in perpetuity.³

d) Those professed in some Religion, unless either they are previously dispensed from the vows emitted in it, or they pass to a stricter Religion, that is, such that its actual observance, not merely its primary institution, is stricter. Yet this transition must not be made rashly or from levity, or with grave damage to the Religion to be left. Besides, the permission of the Superior or of the Pope is to be sought, and, in the case of a privilege granted to the Order which is being left for this, it must also be obtained. But transition to a laxer Religion cannot be made except with permission of the Supreme Pontiff; but to an equal one by the same permission, or also, but with just cause, by permission of the Superior.⁴

3° Those whose parents are in grave or extreme necessity would be admitted illicitly, though not invalidly, if they can assist that necessity without being exposed in the world to proximate and grave danger of falling into mortal sin. Only grave necessity of brothers or sisters does not impede admission; indeed dispensation from the vow of entering is also necessary for someone to be able to defer entrance for a long time on account of it. But parents would illicitly enter Religion if they had unemancipated children constituted in grave necessity or destitute of sufficient education.¹

4° By natural law (concerning the dispositions of positive law, see n. 801. q. 4°), those burdened with debts would be admitted illicitly, if they were able to pay them in a notable part at least, and in a short time (say within two years), and without great difficulty or probable danger of sin or of losing vocation. - Thus St. Alphonsus² as more probable, although the opinion which denies absolutely and the opinion which affirms absolutely are also probable to him.

5° Those also would be admitted illicitly and most imprudently whom public acts show to have been accused or investigated before the secular court concerning some graver crime, unless they have been dismissed by the judge as innocent.³

6° Those are not to be admitted whose infirmity is such that they are not equal to bearing the burdens of common life and fulfilling the obligations of the Order.

7° Those would be admitted illicitly to the habit who had not sought and waited for a suitable time (three months) for testimonial letters both from the Ordinary of origin and from the Ordinary of the place in which, after the completion of the fifteenth year of their age, they stayed beyond a year, unless nevertheless the Institute which admits them has been dispensed by a special and non-communicable privilege from the Decree of Jan. 25, 1848,⁴ in which this disposition is contained.

8° The prepubescent (n. 911), against the will of parents or guardians.

n. ¶1158.

- Query 2° Whether clerics, especially those having care of souls, can be admitted to Religion without the permission of their own Ordinary?

Resp. Affirmatively, as is clear both from the unanimous opinion of the Doctors, and especially from the authority of Benedict XIV, Brief Ex quo, Jan. 14, 1747. Yet a priest exercising care of souls must make the Bishop more certain concerning his plan, lest the flock be left without guardianship. Besides, in the case in which the Church which the priest serves would suffer grave damage from his transition to Religion, the Bishop could recall him, even after profession, as is clear from the Brief just cited. - Which of our clerics are not absolutely able to enter Religion, see n. 374. 8°.

Vol. I, TREATISE ON PARTICULAR STA…, PART THIRD: ON THE RELIGIO…, Ch. I, ARTICLE IV: PROFESSION ACCORDING TO SOME RULE

n. ¶1159.

Principles. - I. For valid profession there is required:

1° Aptitude of the one vowing, namely that he have no impediment which is judged substantial either from divine law, or from canon law, or from statutes confirmed by the Supreme Pontiff.

2° Consent and acceptance of the Prelate of the Order, or, where it is required, of the Chapter. (B) p. 477. But error concerning the substance, both on the part of the one professing and of the one admitting, makes the Profession void.

3° Liberty of the one vowing, that is, that Profession be made spontaneously, grave fear being excluded, or even reverential fear joined with importunate prayers often repeated, flatteries, command, or grave offense or indignation of blood-relatives continued for a long time, also with threats added concerning subsidies to be denied if he leaves Religion. For these things singly, or certainly joined together, considered with the condition of a rude and timid man, can induce just fear and invalidate profession; as Laymann teaches with others.¹ (l) p. 477.

II. From religious Profession is born the obligation, of itself perpetual, 1° of observing the vows; 2° of observing the rule; 3° of tending to perfection. I say: of itself perpetual; because, as we shall say below, it can either cease or be changed.

Vol. I, TREATISE ON PARTICULAR STA…, PART THIRD: ON THE RELIGIO…, Ch. I, Art. IV, § I. On the Obligation of Observing the Vows

A) On the Obligations from the Vow of Poverty.

n. ¶1160.

- From the present discipline of the Church, the proper and necessary object of the vow of poverty is not 1) life, nor honor, nor reputation, nor knowledge, nor the right of conferring by election, presentation, or collation a regular benefice; 2) abdication of imperfect dominion (n. 590); but 3) dependent use, or only use of fact, of temporal goods, insofar as of themselves they are estimable by price (n. 675), is necessary. This is clear 1° from the fact that the possession of temporal goods estimable by price alone constitutes a man rich, in the proper sense of this word, and that from the lack of these alone he properly becomes poor. - 2° from those things which we taught with De Angelis n. 1149 under III; indeed also from the Pontifical Decree given by our Most Holy Lord Leo XIII for the Regulars of Belgium. - 3° from the fact that today there is no truly so-called religious Institute in whose rule independent use is permitted. Cf. Craisson¹ and St. Alphonsus.² Hence:

n. ¶1161.

- I. The following are not comprehended by the vow of poverty:

Manuscripts, whether one's own or accepted from another. For they are offspring of the intellect, which do not fall under the vow of poverty. Besides, common usage bears this, and it is clear from the Brief Postulat of Benedict XIII, year 1724, and the Declaration of Clement VIII. The continuator Tournely with others excepts if the contrary has been defined in the constitutions of the Order.³
Relics, since they are spiritual things.
Paintings, although offspring of the intellect, nevertheless cannot be made by a Religious, while the vow is preserved, with the intention of keeping them for himself, nor even (if they are made either by a lay-brother at the time in which he is held to work for the convent, or by any professed one with colors, etc. handed over by the convent) with the intention of giving them to outsiders.⁴
Peculium, that is, a temporal good destined for the uses of an individual and not for the common uses of the monastery, and this not only when necessaries are not supplied by the community, as is clear of itself; but also when they are supplied, provided in this case 1° it already exists by custom; 2° it is held dependently on the Superior, and therefore 3° with a mind prepared to renounce it at the nod of the same Superior; and 4° it is kept either in common, or in the cell even of the religious, but with permission of the Superior, and not locked with a key or so hidden that it is withdrawn from the free disposition of the Superior; 5° it is applied to uses neither illicit nor superfluous. - The first is required so that the prescription of Trent,¹ by which peculia are more probably prohibited,² may cease; the second, third, and fourth, that use of right, or independent use, may be guarded against; the fifth, as will be clear from what must soon be said.
An ecclesiastical benefice, for example an Episcopate, legitimately conferred. Namely he will be able to administer it and to dispose of its revenues independently of the Superior, since the thing is annexed to a spiritual thing; yet he cannot do this licitly except for his own support and pious uses.⁴

n. ¶1162.

- II. All acts of use independent of the rule or Superior, concerning temporal things, are comprehended by the vow of poverty, and therefore a Religious sins:

If he spends or lends something from things granted to him for use into another use without permission, or culpably loses, destroys, or makes it worse.⁵
If he accepts anything without permission, whether as a gift, or as a loan for consumption, or as a loan for use, or as a properly so-called deposit (n. 924), or refuses what is owed to Religion from a title of justice, for example inheritance, wages. Resolve otherwise concerning gifts, since the vow of poverty does not oblige one to acquire for Religion. Yet he who without just cause refused gifts of this kind would sin against charity toward the convent by impeding its good.⁶
If he buys anything without permission, even for the community.
If he asks or accepts something from an outsider to be spent on pious works not determined by the donor in the lowest species.⁶
If he hides something in such a way that it is withdrawn from the free disposition of the Superior.⁷
If a Procurator or Superior expends anything otherwise than the rule, the will of the Superior, custom, or reasonable cause permits. The reason is that these are not masters of common goods, but only administrators.¹

n. ¶1163.

Questions. - Query 1° What permission is required and suffices so that use is not independent?

Resp. to 1st. There is required: a) True permission, that is, not extorted by fear nor obtained by fraud, for example by feigning necessity. b) Reasonable permission, that is, not for illicit or vain uses, nor for superfluous, precious things unbecoming the religious state. For the Superior cannot give greater permission than he himself has; but he, since he is not master of the goods of Religion, cannot expend them at his own discretion and uselessly, but only for the necessity and utility of Religion.² Hence the opinion altogether pleases St. Alphonsus (although he does not dare to condemn the opposite) teaching that such permission is not merely illicit, but also invalid, except if it is a question either of superfluous things without notable excess, because otherwise the matter would be exposed to great scruples, or of a small sum to be exposed to a licit game, that is, not merely fortuitous.³

Resp. to 2nd. Tacit permission suffices, and more probably also permission presumed from certain probability of future concession; for each takes away independent use. Yet such presumption ordinarily is not without venial fault, because for the most part Superiors, at least as to the mode, are unwilling. (A) p. 477. Permission sought, but unduly denied, unless there is danger of grave damage in delay, does not excuse from transgression of the vow.⁴

Hence, that is, from presumed permission, a religious can assist a poor man laboring under great poverty when access to the Superior does not lie open; he can bestow moderate alms on the poor if with due permission he is living outside the convent; give them something edible when he is in the convent; make light donations to friends and blood-relatives as a sign of gratitude or due friendship, or for conciliating love toward Religion; make remunerative donations from goods granted to him for use, indeed give more than he received, up to an excess of a fourth part, because gratitude demands that more be returned than had been accepted; more probably also give those things which by living more sparingly he withdrew from himself from things granted to him for use, if a fixed quantity is assigned to him in such a way that neither the monastery is held to furnish more, nor he himself to render an account of what was assigned;¹ unless the contrary will of the Superior is clear; accept from outsiders something to be handed over to the Superior;² buy a thing if he knows that it will be very pleasing to the Superior and easy recourse to him is not open, for example on a journey; generally accept or expend something when the Superior cannot be approached and the occasion is urgent;³ give something to Peter, if he has permission of giving to Paul, unless the Superior gave permission for Paul on account of a peculiar reason, being going to deny it if it had been sought for Peter.⁴ Yet presumption would be illegitimate in a religious who, while traveling, turned aside to other places outside the way to see curious things, unless perhaps the distance were very short and no or very slight expenses had to be made, or unless in the particular case the permission of the Superior could rightly be presumed from the nature of the cause.

n. ¶1164.

- Query 2° What matter must be judged grave in violation of the vow of poverty?

Resp. 1° In sins which are at the same time against religion and justice, generally speaking, that is to be held as grave matter which constitutes mortal sin in theft.⁵

Moreover, that one may judge concerning the gravity of matter in thefts of this kind, it must be noted that moderately wealthy monasteries are commonly equated with quite wealthy private owners. Hence generally the same measure as for these constitutes grave matter. But if they are very wealthy, a greater quantity is required. A greater quantity is also required if a Religious usurps things of the Monastery for his own use, or gives them to others of the same Community, than if he spends the same things on outsiders, because thus they remain at home. Greater also in minute thefts, which besides, when a notable interval has intervened (see n. 698. q. 6°), do not coalesce into grave matter. Greater again in eatables, provided they are not reserved and the damaging of the convent is not excessive and in a more extraordinary and more precious thing.⁶

Resp. 2° In sins committed against Religion alone, or against the vow alone, the difficulty increases, and there is greater disagreement of Theologians. Yet more commonly they require no greater matter for mortal sin than in the preceding case, where justice is violated; because the act of proprietorship seems to be of the same gravity. Yet not improbably some grave Doctors require a greater quantity for grave sin. - Thus Elbel,¹ the Salmanticenses.²

But commonly they agree that a much greater value is required for sinning gravely when gifts are accepted from outsiders to be spent on others; because then the act of proprietorship is much less than if these were retained for one's own use.³

But generally a religious does not sin gravely by secretly accepting some thing from the Community, for example a book for his own use even for a long time (but not in perpetuity), unless he so hides it that it cannot be found by the Superiors; because then the Prelate is not judged unwilling as to the substance, but only as to the mode.⁴

As to things accepted or handed over by loan for consumption or loan for use without the permission of the Prelate, generally speaking he will not sin gravely against the vow of poverty if he gives the thing to outsiders for his own use or even other uses by loan for consumption or loan for use, provided he is certain of recovering them and does not therefore inflict grave damage on the Community, which for this reason, for example, lacks the use of a thing gravely necessary here and now. Much less will he sin gravely if he lends by loan for consumption or loan for use things granted to him for use to other religious of the same monastery. The reason is that although he posits some act of proprietorship in these things, nevertheless he does not sin gravely, according to the common interpretation of Theologians.⁵

n. ¶1165.

- Query 3° Whether a religious who has violated the vow of poverty is held to restitution, and whether one unable to restore is held to withdraw something from himself from the things granted to him for use?

Resp. to 1st Affirmatively, if by violating the vow he also violated justice at the same time. The reason is clear.

Resp. to 2nd. The negative opinion is truly probable to St. Alphonsus⁶ if the things granted for use are necessary. The reason is that it is not to be presumed that the Superior wishes to oblige the subject to this with so great an inconvenience.

n. ¶1166.

- Query 4° What is the difference between the vow and the virtue of poverty?

Resp. The vow regards only external acts of proprietorship; but the virtue also extends to internal affections of the heart. For the object of the vow is to despoil the Religious externally of temporal goods. But the virtue has as its end wholly to cut away every inordinate affection of the heart toward earthly things. Therefore the vow of poverty is like the means to the virtue, which is the end to be obtained. This being posited, everyone sees that the virtue of poverty extends much more widely than the vow; for as often as someone infringes the vow, at the same time he wounds the virtue also; but not vice versa.

I said that the vow affects only external acts of proprietorship; yet the vow could be violated by an internal act which regarded and touched an external act, namely by the desire of acting externally against the vow; since desire puts on every malice and species of the external act, as was said n. 228.

B. On the Obligations from the Vow of Chastity.

n. ¶1167.

- The vow of chastity must be judged much more excellent than the vow of poverty, since through it the Religious renounces not goods extrinsic to himself, but intrinsic, namely pleasures of the body and of the senses.

Its object embraces two things, namely those things which by natural and divine law are already prohibited, and also those things which could be done licitly in legitimate matrimony. Therefore this is the efficacy of the vow of chastity, that what otherwise could be licit becomes illicit for the Religious; but those things which are prohibited to all, he must avoid from a double obligation, namely of chastity and of Religion.

n. ¶1168.

Questions. - Query 1° Whether sins of lust even merely internal are opposed to the vow of chastity?

Resp. Affirmatively. The reason is that a Religious by force of the vow of chastity is held to abstain from every voluntary venereal delectation, whether internal or external, so that if he wounds chastity, he incurs a double guilt, namely of lust and of sacrilege.¹

n. ¶1169.

- Query 2° What is the gravity of sins committed against the vow of chastity?

Resp. This general rule must be established. The gravity of sin against the vow is entirely the same as against the Sixth and Ninth precept of the Decalogue, namely sin is mortal or venial against Religion according as it is mortal or venial against chastity. But smallness of matter is not to be admitted in sins of lust, nor can the fault be light except from imperfect consent, according to the things said n. 484, 485.

n. ¶1170.

- Query 3° Whether or what difference there is between the virtue and the vow of chastity?

Resp. 1° No difference is given by reason of object, since the vow extends as widely as the virtue itself. Yet they differ in this, that in those things which are prohibited by the virtue, two sins are given if the vow is violated, while one sin is committed in that which is interdicted by the vow alone. For if someone bound by a simple vow of Religion were to contract matrimony, he would perpetrate one sin, namely against Religion, in the use of marriage. Therefore the vow can sometimes be violated without the virtue itself being wounded.

Resp. 2° The virtue of chastity, besides the obligations which it imposes, also counsels mere counsels leading to greater perfection; while the vow affects only the matter of obligation.

C. On the Obligations from the Vow of Obedience.

n. ¶1171.

Principles. - I. A Religious from the vow of obedience is held to all things which the Superior prescribes according to the rules and constitutions of the Order, whether directly and expressly, or indirectly and implicitly.² Yet that there be sin against the vow, it is required that the Superior truly prescribe, and not merely advise; and this indeed will be clear from the words, mode of speaking, and various circumstances of things.

II. The Superior has the right of prescribing not only those things which are had explicitly in the rule or constitutions, such as abstinence, silence, etc., but also whatever things are implicitly contained in them, such as penalties against transgressors, and whatever pertains to the offices of the Community to be fulfilled rightly, or to its right administration. The reason is that a religious binding himself to observing the special constitutions of the Order obliges himself to all those things which are wisely established or prescribed for obtaining this end.

III. A Religious by force of his vow is not held to obey a Superior prescribing a thing a) impossible, or b) evidently illicit (as to reveal a secret which he is not held to reveal from another reason), or c) gravely harmful to himself. - And indeed he could not oblige himself to an impossible thing, since no one is held to the impossible; nor to a thing certainly illicit, since a vow cannot be a bond of iniquity; nor finally to a thing gravely harmful to himself, because this is foreign to the mind of Religion, and heroic acts commonly and implicitly do not fall under a vow, just as they do not fall under a precept. Yet except if it is a question of offices to be fulfilled within the limits of religious life, for example of caring for pestiferous religious of the same Order, etc.

Hence a subject is not held to obey a Prelate commanding that he walk upon waters, etc.; but if examples are reported by which it is clear that such obedience was approved by God and confirmed by miracles, it must be said that then the divine good pleasure had been manifested by a singular and supernatural light both to the one prescribing and to the one obeying.

n. ¶1172.

Questions. - Query 1° What difference intervenes between the virtue and the vow of obedience?

Resp. The same as was indicated above n. 1166 concerning poverty; namely the object of the vow is the external execution of the mandate of the Superior, while the virtue reaches even to internal submission, and effects perfect obedience itself.

But not only sins against the vow, but also against the virtue, must be carefully avoided by a Religious; and this indeed is usually wounded more frequently. For it happens (would that it were more rarely!) that a subject indeed obeys the mandate of the Prelate integrally by external action, but with a reluctant, sad, and bitter will. Then indeed, although he satisfies the vow, yet he recedes far from the virtue.

Therefore a Religious disobedient to a Superior truly prescribing more probably² commits a double sin, one against the natural precept which prescribes submission to a legitimate Superior, and the other against the vow. Hence in pious Congregations of men or women living a common life under the same Rule without the bond of vows, the disobedient are not exempted from sin if they are rebellious against Superiors, but they commit one sin.

n. ¶1173.

- Query 2° Whether a religious is held to obey in doubt whether the thing prescribed is licit, or exceeds the power of the Superior?

Resp. Affirmatively, because then presumption favors the Superior. Besides, the opposite opinion would disturb order in religious families. Except if the thing prescribed is either very difficult, or exposes the subject or a third party to danger of grave damage, provided that in this double case the subject acts from an opinion solidly probable. The reason is that then the morally certain right of the subject prevails over the uncertain right of the superior.¹

n. ¶1174.

- Query 3° When does a religious sin gravely against the vow of obedience?

Resp. He sins gravely in the following cases, which rarely occur, namely: 1° when he refuses to obey in grave matter a Superior prescribing in virtue of holy obedience, or in the name of Jesus Christ, or through other similar formulas, which must be used very rarely by Superiors; 2° when to a Superior prescribing he responds: I do not wish to obey, I do not wish to do it, I will not do it, or some other similar thing which smells of formal contempt of the authority prescribing; 3° when from disobedience there follows grave scandal of others, whether of subjects or of secular persons, or grave inconvenience either for the Community or for others, for example for the salvation of souls, etc.

In other cases disobedience does not exceed venial sin; but since the aforesaid cases of mortal sin rarely occur, commonly the sins of religious against obedience are to be reputed as venial. - Much more rarely still do sins committed against the virtue alone become mortal. - But a Rule ordering obedience in all things is to be understood of the perfection of obedience, not of obligation from the vow.²

n. ¶1175.

- Query 4° To whom must obedience be given?

Resp. Obedience must be given not only to greater Superiors, but also to lower ones, or ministers, or superiors prescribing from the mandate of Superiors, since the authority which enjoins the mandate is the same.

Query 5° How must obedience be given?

Resp. That the full perfection of obedience may be clear, obedience must be given: 1° from a supernatural motive, as the Apostle prescribes:¹ Not serving to the eye, as pleasing men.... Serve the Lord Christ. - 2° Cheerfully, or with joy and a willing soul: For God loves a cheerful giver.² - 3° Promptly, that is, either immediately, or at the prescribed time, and with due care, without sluggishness. - 4° Entirely, or by completing the whole prescribed work.

Vol. I, TREATISE ON PARTICULAR STA…, PART THIRD: ON THE RELIGIO…, Ch. I, Art. IV, § II. On the Obligation of Observing the Rule

n. ¶1176.

Questions. - Query 1° How great is the obligation of the rule?

Prelim. Under the name of rule in this question also come Constitutions or Statutes which proceed from the Prelates alone or the Chapters of Religions.

Resp. 1° "Rule ... is not mere counsel," says Suarez; since violations of rule can be punished by the Superior. See Bouix.³

2° There can be a rule which obliges under mortal sin, or under venial sin, or only to penalty.

"If the rule obliges under sin, its transgression is against the vow and sacrilegious; the reason is that such a rule is not less preceptive than the voice of the Superior; ... therefore ... a Carthusian, for example, eating meats, or a Franciscan not fasting on Friday, sins against obedience and against temperance." - Thus Busembaum apud St. Alphonsus.⁴

3° If in the rule it is expressly said that it obliges as much as it can, its violation will be a mortal or venial sin according as the matter is grave or light; because the rule is not less obliging than the voice of the Superior, and the Superior can oblige according to the gravity of the matter.

4° Rule of itself does not oblige even under venial sin if this is declared in it. But if the rule is altogether silent concerning this, it is disputed. The opinion is to be preferred, says D. Bouix after Suarez, which holds that the rule then does not oblige under grave sin, and that it must be discerned from circumstances and from the interpretation received in each Religion whether it obliges under light sin or only to undergoing penalty:¹ but if someone from a good end transgresses some rule, for example of silence so that he may console a sad companion, he in no way sins.²

Yet several Doctors rightly note that transgressions of this kind rarely lack every fault, on account of negligence, contempt, or another inordinate affection; indeed he would sin gravely who frequently and almost by custom transgressed the rule, gravely disturbing religious discipline, for example if he were never willing to observe silence, nor to pray, nor to walk modestly; if he were to enter the rooms of all the religious, and transgress similar statutes of Religion.³ - He also sins gravely who infringes the rule from formal contempt of the Superior, as, for example, that he may show the Superior to be despised by him and held as nothing; likewise if he does this from hatred against Religion or its persons, or from the will of resisting the Prelate; likewise if he exposes himself to the proximate danger of falling into mortal sin, or foresees that he will for this reason be expelled. But if someone proposes never to observe the rule, it can scarcely happen that contempt is not present. Thus Suarez apud D. Bouix,⁴ and St. Alphonsus.⁵ - But the mere frequency of infractions does not seem sufficiently to prove contempt, since this frequency can arise from great sloth, in which nevertheless the slothful man can still hold the rules, Superiors, and Religion in great esteem.⁶

n. ¶1177.

- Query 2° Whether those professed according to a mitigated rule are held to reformation if it is introduced?

Resp. Affirmatively, if the reformation is made through statutes at least indirectly pertaining to the mitigated rule, or is necessary for the conservation of the Order, for example because with the present observance either very few strive to arrive at perfection, or the religious live with scandal of secular persons, or the essential vows and other statutes of Religion would not otherwise be observed. Otherwise negatively, because profession is made according to the rule, whether primitive or mitigated. Thus as certain, if the mitigation was introduced by the Pope; as probable, if by custom.¹

n. ¶1178.

- Query 3° Whether a Prelate gravely sins at some time by neglecting to correct light defects of subjects?

Resp. Affirmatively, with St. Alphonsus² and the common opinion against Lorca, in the case in which there were several defects and such (for example concerning silence, fasts, etc.) that they can relax discipline: whence concerning these he must inquire in order to correct them, yet without excessive solicitude: sometimes prudently dissembling, if the defects do not bring scandal, or if he foresees that the subject will become worse from correction, or if a more opportune time must be awaited. - But just as the Superior is held to correct, so he who has the office of Zelator is held to warn him concerning the transgressions of others.

Vol. I, TREATISE ON PARTICULAR STA…, PART THIRD: ON THE RELIGIO…, Ch. I, Art. IV, § III. On the Obligation of Tending to Perfection

n. ¶1179.

Principle. - A religious is held, not indeed to be perfect, but to tend in some way to perfection.

I say: 1° He is not held to be perfect, as a Bishop, who by force of his duty is obliged to acts of perfection, for example to laying down life for the sheep, since a religious per se, or by force of his state, is not held to acts of this kind.

I say: 2° He is held in some way to tend to perfection. For obligation to the evangelical counsels implies obligation of tending to perfection, since once these are observed, by that very fact you tend to this. For by exercising himself in these counsels, on the one hand he removes from himself the obstacles of charity or perfection, namely the threefold concupiscence, of the eyes by poverty, of the flesh by chastity, and the pride of life by the exercise of humble obedience; but on the other hand the observance of the same counsels disposes man so that he may become wholly God's, by handing over to Him all the things which he has, namely the goods of fortune by poverty, the body by chastity, the soul by obedience.

n. ¶1180.

Questions. - Query 1° By what means is a religious held to tend to perfection?

Resp. 1° He is held to tend primarily through the essential means of the religious state, namely through the observation of the three vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience.

Resp. 2° He is held to tend secondarily also through accidental means, namely through the proper rules of the Order, at least by not contemning those helps. But then the religious is judged to omit the rules from contempt when he transgresses them with the mind of not subjecting himself to them or to his Prelates; or if he holds them as empty.¹

n. ¶1181.

- Query 2° When does a religious sin gravely against the precept of tending to perfection?

Resp. In this he offends gravely: 1° If he infringes the vows very often in a grave matter, as is clear; because he omits means essential and consequently altogether necessary for preserving this obligation. - Thus all. 2° If he generally transgresses the rules from contempt, as has just been said. But otherwise, if he violates them led by concupiscence, or because he thinks they are not necessary for him for salvation, or if he thinks that they are not prescribed under grave obligation. For to transgress rules in matters of slight moment, even from custom, contempt being set aside, does not exceed venial sin. - Thus expressly St. Alphonsus.²

…and 27 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Marc, Institutiones Morales

Clement Marc, C.SS.R. — 84 passages

Vol. II, Pt. IV, Treatise I: On The Religious State

There are five things concerning which we must treat in this Treatise, namely: 1. On the nature of the religious State; - 2. On entrance into Religion; - 3. On the obligations of Religious; - 4. On the privileges of Regulars; - 5. On Religious in a state of dispersion.

Vol. II, Pt. IV, Tr. I, Chapter I: On The Nature Of The Religious State

n. ¶2128.

Three things must briefly be weighed, namely the notion, origin, and distinction of the RELIGIOUS STATE.

1. Notion Of The Religious State.

DEFINITION. In general, State is a certain condition of life in which someone persists perpetually, or for a time. - Of this kind is the state of innocence, the state of fallen nature, the state of grace, the state of sin, the ecclesiastical state, the lay state, etc.

In a stricter manner, STATE is an immovable condition of life by which someone is firmly bound to another. Immovable absolutely, or movable only with difficulty; for state signifies persistence and a certain stability. - A state of this kind is THREEFOLD: episcopal, religious, and conjugal. For Bishops are obliged to service of their Church; Religious to divine service; married persons to mutual service. The two prior states are spiritual; and the first of them is the state of perfection acquired, the second of perfection to be acquired, but the third is a secular state.²

Now then,

The RELIGIOUS STATE is incomplete or complete, namely according as it is taken in a broad or strict sense.

The INCOMPLETE religious state, and taken in the broader sense, is the state of the faithful tending to the perfection of divine charity. - Under this definition not a few Institutes called Religious improperly are comprehended, as will be clear from the things to be said.

The COMPLETE religious state, and strictly so called, is defined: A stable manner of living by which one tends to the perfection of divine charity through the three perpetual vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, under a rule of common life approved by the Church.³

It is said 1. a stable manner of living; otherwise it would not be a state properly so called, as we have already noted.

It is said 2. by which one tends to the perfection of divine charity; for the end of the religious state is CHARITY, not indeed that common charity which belongs also to imperfect Christians who are in the state of grace, but that eminent charity by which someone is proximately disposed to act easily and ordinarily according to the precepts and counsels of God,⁴ namely in imitation of Christ the Lord saying (John 8:29): I always do those things which are pleasing to Him (cf. n. 467, III, and 690).

It is said 3. through the three perpetual vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience; because, according to all theologians, a complete religious state is not understood unless it makes one tend completely and permanently to perfection. But indeed, that a human being tend completely to perfection, it is required both that he remove from the midst all things which forestall this perfection, namely the concupiscence of the eyes, the concupiscence of the flesh, and the pride of life, and that he offer to God in perpetuity as a holocaust all that he has, namely external and internal goods, body and soul. But each is done, as is clear, through the observance of the three evangelical counsels, namely of voluntary poverty, chastity, and obedience. Then, that he tend permanently and firmly to perfection, a VOW is required; for since the prementioned perfection is of free election, scarcely any other means of stability can be thought of than a perpetual vow, which, from the virtue of religion, establishes a truly perseverable law.⁵

Hence, those are not Religious properly so called who indeed observe the three evangelical counsels, but who have pronounced no vow concerning them; nor those who have vowed only one or two of the three; nor those who have vowed all three, but only for a time. - Suarez indeed dissents,⁶ teaching that with the vow of conjugal chastity alone there can exist a religious state properly so called, so that the essence of the religious state remains in the case in which the Supreme Pontiff should dispense someone, in part, from the solemn vow of chastity, with the faculty of using matrimony already contracted, or of contracting future matrimony. But Doctors more commonly oppose this doctrine.⁷

It is said 4. under a rule of common life. And in this consists the accidental or secondary element by which the religious state is constituted. - For although the three vows by which the observance of the evangelical counsels is promised, accepted in the name of God by someone having power for this, suffice of themselves for the essence of the religious state, nevertheless, considering present ecclesiastical law, that state does not exist before the Church except in common or cenobitic life, under one head and under one rule which fittingly conduces to pursuing perfection.

Hence: "Those are not Religious who, after the vow of perpetual poverty and chastity has been made, vow obedience to a confessor or Bishop;⁸ nor are Hermits reputed such, unless they have a common prelate and rule with other members of the same Institute, according to the present custom of the Church."

It is said 5. approved by the Church, namely by the Holy See, to which today the matter is reserved, as being of greater moment. For although this approbation is not of itself of the essence of the religious state, as most theologians think against some, nevertheless it is required from ecclesiastical law. In antiquity indeed, for founding religious Institutes, e.g. of St. Basil, St. Augustine, St. Benedict, etc., the express institution and approbation of the proper Bishops sufficed, the Roman Pontiff not opposing but rather commending; but in the Fourth Lateran Council,⁹ and then in the Council of Lyons,¹⁰ it was established that a new Order could not be introduced, nor the habit taken in it, unless it had been expressly approved by the Supreme Pontiff.

Now the approbation of the Church imports two things, namely judgment concerning the honorableness and utility of the Order or rule, and power conceded to Superiors of receiving Candidates to the habit and profession, and of performing the other things which are according to the Rule or Institute.¹¹

Hence: 1. Those are not Religious properly so called who, although they emit the three vows and lead life in common, nevertheless do not profess a rule approved by the Holy See; such are the pupils of various Congregations which Bishops have instituted by their own authority alone. Although their merit before God can be plainly the same as the merit of the others who are properly Religious, since they exhibit to the Lord the same abnegation of themselves.

An Institute which would be reproved or prohibited by the Holy See would by that very fact be void and would exclude the essence of the religious state. For it would no longer be a state of perfection, but rather a state of rebellion, since God can never hold as accepted what the Church disapproves.

n. ¶2129.

Questions. QUESTION 1. What is the difference between SOLEMN and SIMPLE vows, and do simple vows SUFFICE for the essence of the state of religion?

Resp. 1. Authors do not agree concerning the difference which intervenes between solemn vows and simple vows. According to the opinion of St. Thomas,¹² Bellarmine, etc., which St. Alphonsus teaches as the more probable,¹³ the solemnity of the vow of chastity is from ecclesiastical law as regards the rite, i.e. the form essentially required that it be held by the Church as solemn, but from positive divine law as regards the essence and effect, i.e. of invalidating matrimony. The reason is, "because in a simple vow the body is promised only to God, but in a solemn vow through the legitimate acceptance of Prelates, the body is besides handed over to God." These are the words of St. Alphonsus.¹⁴ And a similar reason can be adduced for the vow of poverty and obedience.¹⁵ Nevertheless, the contrary opinion seems today to have become the more common among canonists. Philip de Angelis testifies to this,¹⁶ saying: "This is the canonical doctrine, that solemnity is not intrinsic or essential to vows, so that the simple and solemn vow differ in species; but that it is extrinsic and accidental to vows, proceeding from the disposition of the Church." And a demonstration having been added from various documents, the distinguished Canonist concludes "that the SOLEMNITY of the three vows consists in the force added to them by the disposition of the Church, of making void, or at least voidable, certain acts contrary to the accidental perfection of the vows of a Religious." But whether this opinion is also intrinsically more probable, let others judge. Cf. the things to be said in n. 2156, 2160, 2176.

Resp. 2. "For the essence of Religion solemn vows are not required. The reason is that those who in the Society of Jesus make simple vows are true Religious, as Gregory XIII defined in the Bull Ascendente Domino."¹⁷ And Benedict XIV writes: "By the authority of the Roman Pontiff it can be brought about that that also is a true Religion in which only simple vows are emitted."¹⁸

Nor does it stand in the way that the bond of solemn vows is greater; because, as Suarez rightly observes,¹⁹ greater and lesser do not vary species. And indeed, although simple vows do not induce of themselves, as solemn vows do, inability for matrimony, incapacity of dominion, and absolute or immutable stability, nevertheless they render matrimony illicit in perpetuity, strip the one vowing of every independent use and every arbitrary disposition of temporal things, which is the same as if the Religious possessed nothing at all; finally, they induce sufficient stability, while it is established that the professed can never withdraw by his own will, and the Order ought not to dismiss him except for a grave and just cause.²⁰

QUESTION 2. Whether for the essence of the religious state strictly taken, there is required a HANDING OVER OF ONESELF made to God and ACCEPTED in the name of God by some human being?

Resp. Affirmatively, according to the common opinion of authors. For the religious state properly so called has always been held in the Church of God as a true handing over or donation, by which a human being wholly binds himself to God, namely by abdicating that natural right which each one, the precepts being observed, has of disposing of himself and his things according to his will. And although the aforesaid handing over is customarily joined to the very emission of vows, nevertheless it is something different from the vows, which is superadded to them. For a vow, by its nature, is nothing except a promise, by force of which not the dominion of the thing itself, but only a right to having it, is conferred; but a handing over which is legitimately accepted in the name of God by someone is a true and perfect donation, which effects that the thing or person offered is irrevocably transferred under the dominion of the one accepting.

But that an acceptance of this kind is necessary is gathered from this, that through a donation of goods, right is not yet transferred to another unless the donation is accepted by the donee, as we saw in the Treatise on Contracts (n. 1063 sqq.). "But indeed a handing over or donation, although it can immediately be made in view of God, nevertheless is not accepted by Him, nor is it pleasing to Him, unless it is made to some human being by whom it can be accepted or repudiated, and who acquires a right over the thing handed over for using it or for commanding it and for bearing care of it. The reason of this is that God, according to His ordinary providence, does not assume the peculiar care of governing a private person immediately by Himself, nor does He need sensible things, so that He may use them immediately and without the intervention of secondary causes. And therefore a donation thus made to God would either be vain and odious, or as though tempting God by demanding immediate governance from Him; and for that reason it is not pleasing to Him, nor is it immediately accepted by Him."²¹

n. ¶2130.

From these things you will gather: 1. Vows which are made to God alone and are accepted by no one do not induce the essence of the Religious State. - And hence it was why Pope Alexander VII, in the Constitution Ex commissa issued on 22 Sept. 1655 in favor of the Congregation of the Mission, or Lazarists, which, although it intended to emit three vows, and these perpetual, nevertheless did not wish to be numbered among religious Orders, established these things most worthy of note, namely: "that, in the emission of their vows, no one be present who accepts them in the name of the Congregation, or in Our name and in the name of the Roman Pontiff existing for the time ... And that the said Congregation not on this account be judged among the number of religious Orders, but be of the body of the secular clergy." But unless the Pontiff had added this clause, the Congregation of the Lazarists would not be secular, but properly religious, namely having the essence and truth of the Religious State.²²

The handing over of oneself, concerning which we have spoken, does not necessarily presuppose the emission of solemn vows. And this is confirmed from the Bull Ascendente Domino of Gregory XIII, § 18, where the Pontiff notes: "that the three vows of the Society, i.e. of Scholastics, although simple, have been admitted by this See as substantial vows of Religion, and that those emitting them are truly constituted in the State of religion, since by them they dedicate and actually hand over themselves to the Society, and bind themselves to divine service in it."
On the part of the Order there can be some acceptance, without for that reason a reciprocal obligation arising between it and the Religious. - To the point, Schmalzgruber speaks thus:²³ "It must be said that, for someone to be truly and properly a Religious, it suffices if at least on the part of the one vowing there is given the obligation of remaining perpetually in Religion, although Religion does not have in turn the absolute obligation of retaining him perpetually." - And this is confirmed by the example of the Society of Jesus, in which "Scholastics bind themselves by vows to remain perpetually in the Order; but the Society reserves to itself the power of dismissing them, if this seems more expedient to it."²⁴

2. Origin Of The Religious State.

n. ¶2131.

- Some writers have taught that the religious State is of merely ecclesiastical institution, and consequently belongs in no way to the essence or integrity of the Church. Thus especially the Innovators, most hostile to Religious, against whom we establish the following:

Principles. I. The religious State, AS TO SUBSTANCE, although not as to accidental forms, was instituted by Christ the Lord; whence it must be said to be of DIVINE LAW, not commanding but COUNSELING.

"This," says Suarez,¹ "is the opinion of all Catholics who think rightly" (cf. n. 133). And in truth Christ must be called the author of the religious State as to substance, if He Himself is the author of religious perfection, to be acquired through the observance of poverty, chastity, and obedience; for the whole matter or substance of the religious State consists in this. Now then, that the matter is so is clear from the three oracles of the Lord; the first of which is: "If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven" (Matt. 19:21); - the second: "And there are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven. He who can take, let him take it" (ibid. 19:12); and the Apostle explains the mind of the Savior (1 Cor. 7); - finally the third: "If anyone wishes to come after Me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross daily, and follow Me" (Luke 9:23); which same counsel of obedience was given also in these words: "And come, follow Me" (Matt. 19:21).

The same is proved from the Holy Fathers; for they, Suarez bearing witness,² commonly teach that the state of Christians was distributed by Christ into two orders: into the order of those professing the common life of the commandments, i.e. the conjugal or secular life; and into the order of those professing the higher and angelic life of the more sublime counsels, i.e. the religious life. - And this was the life which the Apostles professed, as St. Thomas testifies,³ writing: "The Apostles are understood to have vowed the things pertaining to the state of perfection, when, having left all things, they followed Christ."

From these things you will gather: 1. Although the Pope, as Vicar of God, can dispense in the vows of Religion, he nevertheless cannot effect that someone be at once a Religious and loosed from the substantial vows; because these belong to the essence of the religious State divinely instituted.⁴

No Authority on earth is able to abolish the religious State without by that very fact wounding divine right.⁵

n. ¶2132.

II. The religious State is, as to substance, connatural to the Church and so NECESSARY that it must be said to belong to her integrity. - This is drawn not only from the evangelical words, but from the very nature of the Church. For Christ implanted in His Church the property and note of sanctity, namely so that she would be adorned not only with internal sanctity through sanctifying grace and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, but that she would shine also with external and public sanctity, by which she could easily be discerned from all false and spurious religions. Now then, this note of Sanctity comprises not only the exercise of those virtues which suffice for attaining salvation, but also the observance of the counsels and public profession, or the religious State. - Another argument can be taken from the necessity of evangelical workers; for St. Alphonsus⁶ does not hesitate to assert that Bishops and parish priests are unequal to supplying all the spiritual necessities of peoples. Hence, if God did not send to them other priests by whom they might be helped, He would not have sufficiently provided for His Church.

Hence: 1. In every age Religious have existed in the Church, although perhaps they were bound by no peculiar and common discipline during the first two centuries.

The religious State is indefectible in the Church, although some Order or Congregation in particular can fail.⁷

Note. The Ascetical writers discuss the EXCELLENCE of the religious State.⁸

3. Distinction Of The Religious State.

n. ¶2133.

- For the greater decorum and utility of the Church, various religious Orders have been raised up by God, which for that reason can be divided into various species.

I. By reason of their PECULIAR END, Religious are said to be contemplative, who principally tend to their own sanctification through prayer and solitude; - active, who principally apply themselves to works of charity toward the neighbor; - mixed, who with equal zeal tend to attaining both ends.⁹

The CONTEMPLATIVE life excels the ACTIVE, according to that word of Christ the Lord: Mary has chosen the best part. But the MIXED LIFE is most perfect, in which a Religious so gives himself to contemplation that, from the fullness of this, those things flow forth which through doctrine and other spiritual offices he expends in helping neighbors. For just as it is more excellent both to shine and to illuminate: so it is more excellent to join action with contemplation, and from charity to pour out into others, for procuring their salvation, the things which are drawn in contemplation. This was the life of the Apostles and of our Lord Jesus Christ Himself, than which none more perfect can be thought.¹⁰

n. ¶2134.

II. By reason of VOWS, they are divided into Religions, into religious Congregations, and into Religious Institutes.

A Religion, or religious Order, in the canonical and stricter sense, is constituted by solemn vows alone, so that only those who emit vows of this kind are strictly to be called Regulars.
For a religious Congregation there is required and suffices the essence of the religious State with simple vows, as is clear from what was said in n. 2129, q. 1. The members of such Congregations are sometimes comprehended under the name of Religious in Pontifical documents.
The word religious Institute extends more broadly than religious Congregation; for it is extended even to those modes of living which imitate the religious State without vows, e.g. the Oratory of St. Philip Neri.¹¹

From these things the manner of SPEAKING of the Supreme Pontiffs becomes clear, who name religious Institutes with simple vows sometimes religious Congregations, religious families, etc.; sometimes secular Congregations, according as they use those words either in the natural sense or in the canonical sense. - But the canons by which the common law of Regulars is constituted suppose and regard Religions properly so called, so that neither the laws nor the privileges given to Regulars belong of themselves to Institutes of simple vows.

n. ¶2135.

III. By reason of the Rule, there are FOUR principal SPECIES of Orders, according as they follow the rule of St. Basil, or of St. Augustine, or of St. Benedict, or of St. Francis. Most founders of religious Orders have embraced one of these four, with peculiar statutes added, by which each might direct his Institute more fittingly to its proper end.

n. ¶2136.

- Note. Religious Orders strictly so called, in which SOLEMN vows are emitted, are reduced to these supreme species:

MONASTIC Orders, which, by force of their own institute, are not ordered to the ministries of clerics, but profess in the first place a contemplative and solitary life. - Of this kind are: Basilians, Cassinese, Camaldolese, Vallumbrosans, Cistercians, Trappists, Olivetans, Sylvestrines, Hieronymites, Carthusians, Antonians, etc.
CLERICAL Orders, which by their own institute are held to spiritual ministries, to which they are deputed by ecclesiastical ordination. Such are: Canons Regular, e.g. of the Lateran Basilica, and Clerks Regular, e.g. Theatines, Barnabites, Somaschans, Jesuits, Minor Clerks, Ministers of the Sick, Clerks of the Mother of God, and of the Pious Schools.
MENDICANT Orders, under which name are comprehended those to whom, from the rule or constitutions approved by the Apostolic See, it is forbidden to have revenues and possessions in common, although they have them by dispensation of the Pontiff, as today, from Trent, sess. 25, de Regul. cap. 3, a dispensation is made with all Mendicants, except the Minors of the Observance and Capuchins. - Wherefore, to the Orders of Mendicants belong the four more ancient Orders of St. Dominic, the Minors, the Hermits of St. Augustine, and the Carmelites, of whom mention is made in cap. unic. § sane, de Relig. domibus in 6; and besides these the Orders of the Servants of Mary, of the Minims of St. Francis of Paola, of St. Jerome, as St. Pius V declared in Constit. 35a Romanus Pontifex, and 48a Apostolicae Sedis; the Society of Jesus, from the Bull Dum indefessae. Likewise, the Trinitarians reformed by Blessed J. B. of the Conception (Paul V, 15 Dec. 1609); the Mercedarians (Benedict XIII, 8 July 1725); the Discalced Carmelites (Clement VIII, 20 Aug. 1603), etc.¹²
MILITARY Orders, as the Knights of St. John and the Teutonic Knights, who are ordered to military service for the defense of the Church against Infidels and other enemies of the same.
HOSPITALLER Orders, e.g. St. John of God, who from the scope of the Institute are ordered to the exercise of hospitality, as regards the reception of pilgrims, care of the sick, etc.¹³

NB. To various Orders, especially those of St. Francis, St. Dominic, and the Blessed Virgin Mary of Mount Carmel, are joined Tertiaries, who live either in common under a rule, or privately in the world. - Concerning the Third Order of St. Francis of Assisi, see the Constitution of the Most Holy Pope Leo XIII, Misericors Dei Filius, issued on 30 May 1883.¹⁴

Vol. II, Pt. IV, Tr. I, Chapter II: On Entrance Into Religion

In this chapter we shall treat: 1. of those who can enter; 2. of those who are bound to enter; 3. of the Novitiate; 4. of Profession.

Vol. II, Pt. IV, Tr. I, Ch. II, Article I: On Those Who Can Enter Religion

n. ¶2137.

- Principles. I. "All and only those can enter Religion who are of their own right and not bound to others; but those who are bound to others CANNOT do so without their consent."¹ Each is clear of itself.

Hence: 1. Entrance is not licit for IMPUBERES, because they are subject to parents or guardians as regards the disposition of life. To them are to be numbered servants properly so called, if their masters refuse; and in many places, on account of civil laws, minors, unless with the consent of parents, which, for preventing future troubles, is prudently required to be set down in letters.

Entrance is not licit, regularly, for CHILDREN, even those bound by a vow of Religion, who would have to leave parents constituted either in extreme necessity or merely grave necessity. - But otherwise, if their necessity were common, or if they would suffer only a moderate diminution of state, or if the son, although he should remain in the world, nevertheless could in no way aid their necessity; otherwise also, if he himself could not remain in the world without grave and proximate danger of sin; because his spiritual salvation must be preferred to the temporal life of the parents.²

You will ask: Is a son already professed bound TO LEAVE Religion ON ACCOUNT OF THE NECESSITY OF PARENTS? - Resp. 1. If the necessity is only grave, he is not bound, nor can he; because just as a wife already taken, so also Religion already assumed must be preferred to parents. - 2. But if the necessity is extreme, he is bound, in the case in which he cannot aid them from the cloister. In doubt concerning the gravity of the necessity, judgment belongs to the Superior.³

"Outside the case of necessity," Luther used to say, "children sin by entering Religion without the consent of parents. - But the opposite has been taught by all the Holy Fathers and all Catholics, while it is certain, as the Angelic Doctor says,⁴ that children are free concerning the election of State. And although it is fitting, as the Doctors say, that children not depart unless they have first received the father's blessing; nevertheless this is understood when there is no danger that the father will turn them aside from a holy purpose; but because this danger is almost always present, therefore St. Thomas absolutely exhorts children not to use the counsel of blood-relations when the matter is about a religious vocation. But from this counsel, says the Saint,⁵ first indeed relatives of the flesh must be removed. But relatives of the flesh in this proposal are not friends, but rather enemies."⁶

Entrance is not licit for PARENTS who have children constituted in grave necessity or destitute of sufficient education, "unless it has been provided how they can be educated," as St. Thomas speaks.⁷ But this is not understood of emancipated children, unless they are in grave necessity.⁸
Entrance is not licit for THOSE who would have to leave brothers or sisters in extreme necessity. If their necessity is only grave, in this case, a brother who has vowed Religion needs dispensation so that he may defer entrance for a long time. - Otherwise, if he has not vowed; because "by reason of charity someone could defer and even omit the state of Religion in order to aid brothers gravely in need."⁹
Entrance is not licit for SPOUSES, when matrimony has already been consummated, unless with the consent of the other party, or unless because of his or her notorious adultery; for the matrimonial bond belongs to the order of justice, against which the virtue of religion does not prevail. That a ratified marriage is dissolved by solemn profession, and that two months are conceded to spouses for deliberating concerning entrance into Religion, or into an Order strictly regular, we have already said in the Treatise on Matrimony, n. 1981.¹⁰
Finally, entrance into Religion is not licit for BISHOPS. - For they cannot, without a just cause, leave their Churches, both on account of the vow which they emitted in accepting them, of serving them perpetually, and on account of the spiritual marriage with their own Church, which, as Innocent III says, "is dissolved not by human, but rather by divine power." But if a just cause intervenes, the Supreme Pontiff certainly can permit them entrance into Religion.¹¹

n. ¶2138.

- II. All clerics, parish priests, or beneficiaries CAN licitly enter Religion, even if the Bishop contradicts, unless they are held by another bond. This is clear both from the canon Duae sunt leges,¹² in which Pope Urban II established: "If any of these clerics holds people in his church under a Bishop and lives secularly, if, inspired by the Holy Spirit, he should wish to save himself in some monastery ..., even with his Bishop contradicting, let him go free by our authority"; and from the unanimous opinion of the Canonists, which Benedict XIV reports in the Bull Ex quo dilectus.¹³

Nor does the obedience promised to the Bishop stand in the way; because this is promised according to the liberty given by Christ the Lord and according to the laws of the Church. Nevertheless a parish priest, because he is about to resign his office, is bound, from natural law, to make the Bishop more certain concerning the counsel he has taken up, lest the flock be abandoned without a keeper. Clerics and other Beneficiaries are held to the same from decency and office, unless they are excused on account of reverential fear.¹⁴ Yet the benefice is not vacant except after profession. Indeed, if the benefice is not residential, it can be retained, but without use and administration, by those who emit simple vows.¹⁵

We have said: unless he is held by another bond, e.g. of justice, by which that cleric would be held who had been educated gratuitously under the condition that afterward he would exercise ministry in the diocese for a determined time; or by the bond of charity, for example if the Church would suffer grave damage from his departure; indeed, in such a case, the Bishop could recall a priest of this kind from Religion.¹⁶ Thus likewise those are prohibited from deserting missions who were ordained by title of mission with an oath (cf. n. 1923).

n. ¶2139.

- IT IS ASKED. Can those burdened by DEBT enter Religion?

Resp. 1. Considering natural law, the opinion which seems more probable to St. Alphonsus teaches that such persons cannot licitly enter if there is probable hope that in a short time, e.g. within two years, they will be able to satisfy creditors. - But if this hope is absent, or if from that brief stay in the world there threatens a probable danger of falling into grave sins or of losing vocation, they can enter immediately, a cession of their goods having been made to the creditors. "The reason is that the natural precept does not oblige when the debtor cannot satisfy except with so great a detriment to his liberty, and with the burden of undergoing danger to eternal salvation." But if the debts are uncertain, so that they can be restored to the poor or to pious places, he is not bound to wait even the least little while, since nothing is so pious as to dedicate oneself and all one's own things to God in Religion.

Resp. 2. From canonical law, the profession of those who, through the squandering of their goods, have fallen into enormous debt is indeed valid, but illicit; and also that of those who must render accounts, e.g. guardians, procurators, executors of a testament, if the accounts to be rendered are very litigious, intricate, fraudulent, and about to furnish occasion for lawsuits.

Vol. II, Pt. IV, Tr. I, Ch. II, Article II: On Those Who Are Bound To Enter Religion

n. ¶2140.

- Principles. I. In the first place, he is BOUND to enter Religion who has promised this by a LEGITIMATE vow.¹ It is clear from what was said concerning the obligation of a vow in general (n. 627). Hence it follows:

He who has vowed Religion in general, i.e. not determining Order, or place, or discipline more lax or more severe, is bound to seek by ordinary means some Order or some approved religious Congregation in which discipline is flourishing, at least as regards the more principal observances; and if he is repelled from that Order, he is bound, more probably, to enter some other Religion; because by a general vow he is bound to entrance into some Religion.
He who has vowed Religion in species is bound to enter some house of that Order, and after being repelled from one he must use ordinary means so that he may be admitted into another. - But after the third or fourth repulse, he is now free from fault if he remains in the world; because fulfillment of the vow has become impossible.
He who has vowed Religion individually, so determining the place that he intended no other, is free from his vow if he is not admitted into that house; because he bound himself under this condition only.
He who has vowed Religion and has entered it is bound to PERSEVERE in it; "because the vow of Religion obliges not only to taking up the religious habit, but also to serving God for the whole time of life."² - Whence he sins gravely if he withdraws without a just cause; "unless he had understood only that he would make trial of it. Moreover, there would be a just cause of going out if he should find there such a manner of living to which his powers were not equal; or if there he should experience grave and long sadness. - But if he had also vowed to profess, he is bound to execute this even with grave inconvenience to himself, provided the religious State does not turn out wholly intolerable to him."³

n. ¶2141.

II. Everyone who is morally CERTAIN OF HIS VOCATION to the religious life is bound to enter Religion, nor can he, with conscience safe, remain in the world. Certainly, not to obey a divine vocation, speaking of itself, is not a sin; for counsels do not of themselves bind to fault. - Nevertheless, unhappy is he who neglects such a vocation! For "if anyone gravely sins who draws another away from vocation on account of the harm which he inflicts on him: how will he be immune from fault who knows that he is certainly called by God to Religion, and wishes to remain in the world with danger to his eternal salvation? To expose oneself to such danger, the Holy Doctor adds, I will never be able to persuade myself is free from fault. But whether this fault is grave or light, I leave to the judgment of the wise."⁴

n. ¶2142.

For the fuller explanation of the matter, it will not be beside the point to add here some general questions ON DIVINE VOCATION to some state of life.

Questions. QUESTION 1. What is VOCATION to some state?

Resp. Vocation can be defined: An act of supernatural providence, by which God elects each human being to some kind of life, and adorns him with suitable gifts and helps for worthily and laudably fulfilling the offices which are proper to that kind of life. Certainly, many states, e.g. of advocate, of judge, etc., if they are considered in themselves, do not transcend the merely natural order; but if they are considered insofar as they are states of men destined to a supernatural end, there is none which is not subject to the supernatural order. Whence St. Paul says: "Each one has his proper gift from God" (1 Cor. 7:7).⁵ And St. Cyprian: "By His order, not by our judgment, the virtue of the Holy Spirit is administered."

QUESTION 2. What are the SIGNS of a divine vocation to some state?

Resp. THREE especially are enumerated, namely: 1. A certain constant and deliberate PROPENSION to that condition of life about which one is deliberating: a propension, I say, constant; for him whom God destines to some kind of life, He sweetly and strongly draws in a permanent manner to it, although at the same time there can be present a certain natural repugnance; then a propension deliberate, so that in the intellect of the one called there is an illumination of divine grace, in which he looks upon the state to be entered as going to be suitable for him for attaining his eternal salvation. - 2. SUITABILITY, or APTITUDE for fittingly fulfilling the offices of that state. This aptitude for the religious state consists chiefly in right judgment, in a good disposition, in a soul submitted to the yoke of obedience, in relatively sufficient knowledge, and in the absence of defects of body and soul which are opposed to the religious life or to the end of the Institute. - 3. ABSENCE OF IMPEDIMENTS, such as would be want of parents, bad health of body, etc. This last sign, although negative, is nevertheless of the greatest moment, since God is accustomed to manifest His will also through the circumstances of things and external events.⁶ Recall what was said n. 1849, 3.

QUESTION 3. How does one sin who, not called, embraces the state of Clericate or Religion?

Resp. 1. If he embraces the sacerdotal state, especially while intending to dwell in the world, without vocation, i.e. without aptitude or without right intention, he sins most gravely, because he casts himself and others into great danger of salvation.

Resp. 2. If he embraces only the religious state, he is certainly to be accused of great temerity, because he takes up obligations which he will be able to satisfy with difficulty, on account of the defect of special helps which are granted by God to those alone who are called. Whence Christ the Lord said (Matt. 19:11): "Not all take this word." Nevertheless, if one not called has a firm will of satisfying his obligations, he does not seem to sin gravely; because the religious state, by its own nature, will supply him with such helps by which he will be able to execute this will of his.⁷ Except if he knows that he lacks those conditions of soul or body without which he certainly will not be able to observe the vows and rules, or in fact will not observe them.⁸

QUESTION 4. What is to be done by him who has certainly ERRED in the election of state?

Resp. If it is still licit, let him choose for himself another suitable state by the counsel of his confessor. - But if Religion prohibits this, let him consider that word of St. Augustine said to him: "If you are not called, make yourself be called," i.e. live in such a way as if you had been called to the present state of life. Namely, necessity is to be converted into virtue, and special helps must be obtained from God through prayer; for God will never be lacking to one doing what is in him.⁹

QUESTION 5. Whether and how does one sin who DRAWS ANOTHER BACK from the religious State?

Resp. 1. If he draws him back by unjust means, namely by force, fraud, or grave fear, he offends gravely by a sin of injustice, both against that private person, whom he unjustly deprives of a great good, and against Religion, which has the right that it not be impeded by force or deceit from attaining its good. - Hence, he is held to reparation, both of the scandal which he gave and of the damage which he inflicted, according to what was said n. 514 and 921.

Resp. 2. If he draws him back by prayers or counsels, he indeed does not sin against justice, but he sins of himself gravely against charity, unless a just cause is present. Parents, however, can be excused from mortal sin, at least for some brief time, "by reason of ignorance or inadvertence, which can easily be in them on account of vehement carnal affection toward children."¹⁰

Vol. II, Pt. IV, Tr. I, Ch. II, Article III: On The Novitiate

n. ¶2143.

- The NOVITIATE is the probation of religious life, or the mutual experiment, by which Religion examines the qualities and disposition of the Novice, and the Novice examines the austerity or observance of the Order. - Hence there are diverse obligations, looking on the one side to the Superiors of the Order who admit novices, but on the other side to the novices themselves who ask to be admitted. Concerning these obligations only a few things are to be said. For it suffices here briefly to explain the common principles of the Law of Regulars, which can be modified by particular Statutes or Indults.¹¹

I. The RIGHT OF ADMITTING novices belongs to the ORDER which one desires to enter, in such a way namely that it is to be exercised not by the Prelate alone, but by the Convent, or capitularly. Now then,

As regards MEN, it is of common law that Religions approved by the Holy See, even those not exempt, do not depend on the Bishop in admitting novices; for the faculty of admitting them is contained in the approbation itself.¹²

But in the decree of the Sacred Congregation SUPER STATU REGULARIUM (25 Jan. 1848, Romani Pontifices)¹³ Pius IX established, and indeed under penalty of privation of offices, though not under penalty of nullity of profession, that: "In any Order, Congregation ... whether solemn vows or simple vows are emitted in them, no one be admitted to the habit without testimonial letters both of the Ordinary of origin and also of the Ordinary of the place in which the postulant, after the completion of the fifteenth year of his age, has stayed beyond a year; after they have diligently inquired concerning the qualities of the postulant, the Ordinaries must report concerning his birth, age, morals, life, reputation, condition, education, knowledge." And it is added: "Let the Ordinaries know that their conscience remains burdened concerning the truth of the things set forth, nor is it free to them to deny letters of this kind."

If the Ordinary refuses to testify concerning the qualities of the postulant, either because he does not know him, or because he is impeded by the civil authority, etc., it must be supplied by another accurate information, and the postulants, before they are admitted to the habit, are to remain at least for three months in the Convent, and there they are to be diligently proved. Thus the Sacred Congregation super Statu Relig., on 1 May 1851.¹⁴

But in another Decree of the same day (Regulari disciplinae), the same Supreme Pontiff enacted a twofold law concerning things to be observed: 1. in proving those who ask to be admitted to the Religious habit; 2. in admitting Novices to Profession. - The reason for the decree is that "it seemed necessary that in the admission of Novices to the habit and profession the parts to be conceded should belong not only to inferior Prelates and Superiors general, but also to certain other Religious men ... outstanding in counsel and gravity, so that they might accurately examine the disposition, talent, morals, and other necessary gifts of those who are about to give their name to the religious family," etc.

This second decree was issued only "for Italy and the adjacent islands"; but it furnishes an excellent norm also for other regions.

As regards NUNS, the Tridentine law (Sess. 25, de Regul.) continues to have force. - Therefore the Bishop, either by himself or through another, is bound, both before the reception of the habit and before profession, even in exempt monasteries, to examine the will of the virgin: "whether she has been forced, whether she has been seduced, whether she knows what she is doing, whether she is suitable for the monastery, whether this monastery is suitable for her."¹⁵ - This EXAMINATION is indeed commanded under grave obligation, at least before profession. Nevertheless, profession, if the examination has been omitted, is valid.

And here it must be NOTED that the aforesaid examination binds only nuns of solemn vows; but it is expedient that it also be instituted with nuns who pronounce only simple vows, although, at least from positive law, it is not commanded under grave obligation.

Furthermore it must be noted that nuns, although not exempt and professing only simple vows, can never be compelled by the Ordinary to admit some novice; nor can they be compelled to manifest the cause why they have not admitted someone.¹⁶ But they themselves sin, and indeed gravely, if they admit someone evidently not suitable; or if they exclude someone who "has had the conditions required according to the rule of the monastery and Order."

Note. From Trent, loc. cit., novices could be admitted to the habit when the twelfth year had been completed. - But today, from the decree of the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars issued on 23 May 1659, it is required that the fifteenth year be completed. Then indeed a name of a saint, not of a gentile woman, must be imposed on a nun ...; likewise, she is to be called by the title of sister, and not lady.¹⁷

n. ¶2144.

- II. NOVICES, before they are admitted to profession, must stand in probation for at least ONE YEAR, and this whole and continuous, and indeed in the religious habit and in houses destined for this, under penalty of nullity of profession. - Thus from Trent.¹⁸

A novice must observe the rule of Religion during the time of probation, at least from decency; he enjoys the privileges of Religion; nor can he be dismissed without a just cause, although he himself always enjoys full liberty of abandoning the proposal begun and returning to the world.¹⁹

Indeed, to provide for his liberty, the Council of Trent, under penalty of anathema, PROHIBITS that he himself, and his parents and relatives, give anything to the monastery, except food and clothing; and at the same time it commands that, to him when he departs, all things which were his be restored. - It further forbids, under penalty of nullity, that after vestition he make any irrevocable renunciation or contract an obligation, even in favor of whatever pious cause and even if an oath has been added, unless with the license of the Bishop, within the two months immediately before profession, and provided that profession follows. - And these things were most wisely established, lest on account of the said renunciations and obligations he be despoiled of his goods, and so be compelled against his will to dwell in the monastery, when, despoiled, only begging would remain for him in the world.²⁰ See more among the Canonists.

n. ¶2145.

- IT IS ASKED. When is the year of probation judged to be INTERRUPTED?

Resp. 1. It is judged to be interrupted chiefly when the novice goes out from the monastery without license, with the intention of not returning, even if he immediately returns, as is clear from a decree of the Sacred Congregation of the Council;²¹ when he is dismissed absolutely by the Superiors and afterward is again admitted; when he departs by private authority so that he may enter another house, or another province, although of the same Order.

Resp. 2. But it is not judged to be interrupted if the novice is sick in the monastery, even for a notable time, although he can by no means take part in the exercises of novices; - if he departs from the monastery compelled by violence; - if, license having been received, he goes aside to parents or others for a brief time for the sake of recovering health or conducting business; - if he is dismissed on account of a false accusation, and afterward, the truth having been known, is again admitted; - if he makes a journey ordered by his Superiors, because then he remains under their dependence.²²

Vol. II, Pt. IV, Tr. I, Ch. II, Article IV: On Religious Profession

n. ¶2146.

- DEFINITION. Religious profession, in the canonical sense, is customarily defined: "A promise freely made and legitimately accepted, by which someone constituted in due age, the time of probation having been completed, binds himself perpetually to a certain Religion approved by the Church, with solemn emission of vows." In a broader and improper sense, even the emission of simple vows is called Profession.

DIVISION. Profession is either express, which is enunciated by words; or tacit, which is expressed by deeds, e.g. when a novice, the time of probation having elapsed, knowingly wears the habit of profession and exercises acts proper to the professed. Today this is almost unusual; indeed, it has been expressly abrogated, if there is question of the emission of solemn vows to be made by male Regulars.¹

n. ¶2147.

I. For the VALIDITY of the profession either of Religious or of Nuns, THREE things are required, namely the aptitude of the one vowing, free consent, and the acceptance of the Superior.²

There is required 1. the aptitude of the one vowing, namely: that he not be of another's right, that he have completed the sixteenth year to the moment of the hour, that he have stood in probation for a whole year (in a leap-year the lapse of 366 days must altogether be awaited); that he have no impediment which, by Statutes confirmed by the Roman Pontiff, is judged substantial in that Order.³

There is required 2. free consent, i.e. that there be present in the one vowing the intention of making profession, free from every deceit, fraud, or error concerning substantial things; and that force or grave fear be absent, both on the part of the one professing and on the part of the monastery accepting (cf. n. 1044 sqq.). - And here there comes to be noted the Tridentine decree, by force of which they incur excommunication reserved to no one "whoever shall have forced some virgin, or widow, or any other woman, except in the cases expressed in law, to enter a monastery, or to receive the habit of any Religion whatever, or to emit profession"⁴ (cf. n. 1359, where concerning cases expressed in law, or excepted).

There is required 3. Acceptance of the Superior of the Order, with the consent or at least with the counsel of the Chapter, according to the Statutes of each Religion; for religious profession consists in a certain bilateral contract, for which true and legitimate consent is necessary on each side.⁵

In ITALY, the Decrees of the Holy See, concerning which n. 2143, must moreover be observed.

Further, a Religious unjustly denying a vote to a novice not only sins, but besides is held to restitution, as they most commonly say, unless there is present a grave cause for reproving, namely a cause of infirmity, bad disposition, defect of talents, and the like, so that the novice is thought going to be grave, i.e. burdensome, to Religion. Thus St. Alphonsus.⁶

n. ¶2148.

II. For the validity of the profession of MEN with SOLEMN vows, there is further required, according to the present discipline, that they first have emitted SIMPLE VOWS. - Namely, from the decrees of Pius IX (19 March 1857 and 7 Feb. 1862):⁷ all Religious of those Orders in which solemn vows are emitted, in the future, the tyrocinium having been completed, emit only simple vows, at least for three years; then, after at least the nineteenth year of their age has been completed, they are admitted to solemn vows, if they are found worthy by their Superiors. But for just causes solemn profession can also be deferred longer, although not beyond the age of twenty-five completed years. The decree does not regard nuns.

But from the declarations of the Sacred Congregation SUPER STATU REGULARIUM given on 12 June 1858, and regarding the aforesaid decree of 19 March 1857, the simple vows of which there is question are perpetual on the part of the one vowing, and dispensation from them is reserved to the Supreme Pontiff. - On the part of the Order, however, they can be dissolved by dismissal of the Professed, so that, dismissal having been given, by that very fact the professed become free from every bond of the said vows. But no one can be dismissed because of infirmity arising after profession of simple vows. - Moreover, the professed of these vows become participants of all the graces and privileges by which the solemnly professed in the same Order enjoy.⁸

n. ¶2149.

III. Concerning the profession of NUNS, the following things especially must be noted:

A novice CANNOT LICITLY be admitted to profession: 1) If the Bishop, by himself or by a delegate, even in an exempt monastery, has not examined her beforehand; wherefore the Superiorissa is bound, under penalty of suspension from office, to warn him at least one month before profession; but the Ordinary is bound, within fifteen days from the day of notification, to institute the examination according to the Tridentine rules (cf. n. 2143, 2).⁹ - 2) If, the year of probation having been completed, the Ordinary has deferred profession from a just cause. - 3) If the dowry of a choir nun, assessed by the Bishop and which is to be paid in money, has not been furnished (cf. n. 589, 5). But the dowry cannot be alienated, nor, if the nun is transferred into another monastery, be transferred to the same, unless this monastery is compelled to admit the nun. But it is to be restored to one departing from the monastery if only simple vows are emitted in it. - Nevertheless it is equitable that expenses incurred be deducted (cf. n. 2144).¹⁰
Profession is INVALID if a novice, having departed from the monastery because of infirmity, and, after she has recovered, having returned, has not begun the novitiate anew. - If a novice of sixteen years and constituted in danger of death wishes to emit profession, she can certainly emit it; but if she recovers, once the year of her profession has been completed, she must profess anew.¹¹
The profession of nuns must be made principally into the hand of the Ordinary or his delegate, not into the hand of the Superiorissa. - Nevertheless it is valid if it is made into the hand of the Superiorissa, with the consent of the greater part of the Chapter. Except if custom or approved Statutes of the Order require something else.¹²

n. ¶2150.

Questions. QUESTION 1. Can one RECLAMATE who has emitted an INVALID profession?

Resp. He can, from the Council of Trent,¹³ provided he does this within a five-year period; once this has elapsed, he is no longer heard, unless he is restored in full by the Apostolic See. - But the process must be made both by the local Prelate and by the Ordinary of the diocese, with the assistance of a defender of profession. Further, the professed, although he has the first sentence in his favor, cannot therefore withdraw from Religion, but must await the second, if an appeal is pending. But if he has already taken flight, he is repelled from judgment until he has resumed the habit of Religion. Thus Benedict XIV, Bull Si datam hominibus.¹⁴ See more among the Canonists.

QUESTION 2. What are the EFFECTS of valid profession?

Resp. The principal effects are the following:¹⁵

Remission of sins as regards penalty, if the professed is in grace and immune from every depraved affection, even lightly sinful; for profession is a holocaust offered to God, and exceeds every kind of satisfaction.¹⁶ 2. Extinction of vows previously emitted, as though through a certain commutation into something better.¹⁷ 3. Liberation from paternal power, notwithstanding civil law; whence it happens that parents who, relying on secular law, draw a son or daughter from the convent after profession has been emitted, stain themselves with grave sin. - 4. Dissolution of betrothals, according to what was said n. 1957. 5. Dissolution of a ratified marriage already contracted, and inability for contracting matrimony, if the profession is solemn (cf. n. 1981). 6. Cessation of irregularity from defect of birth; but only to the effect of receiving Orders, not however as regards obtaining Prelatures or Dignities (cf. n. 1935). - 7. Vacancy of Benefices, according to what was said n. 2138. 8. Participation in all privileges of Regulars, especially exemption, if the monastery has the required conditions (cf. n. 2183). 9. The obligation of tending to perfection and of observing vows, concerning which now at greater length.

Vol. II, Pt. IV, Tr. I, Chapter III: On The Obligations Of Religious

n. ¶2151.

- The obligations of Religious are: 1. to tend to perfection; 2. to observe the vows emitted; 3. to observe the rule of their own Order; 4. to persevere in the institute of life undertaken. Concerning the obligation of reciting the canonical Hours, see n. 2204, 3, and 2205.

Vol. II, Pt. IV, Tr. I, Ch. III, Article I: On The Obligation Of Tending To Perfection

n. ¶2152.

- Principles. I. A Religious is held, UNDER GRAVE obligation, to tend to perfection. - For by force of his profession he is bound to wish to preserve his State, which is a state of perfection, or a state of those tending to perfection; although this perfection, of itself, is not of precept but of counsel.¹⁸

n. ¶2153.

- II. A Religious is bound to strive toward perfection: - 1) through ESSENTIAL means, which are the exercise of virtues, assiduity in prayer, and frequentation of the Sacraments; - 2) through the GENERAL means of regular life, i.e. through observance of the vows, for by these the roots of worldly life are cut away; - 3) through the SPECIAL means of his Order, i.e. through at least imperfect observation of the rules, which are not only as it were the outer wall of the vows, but also means necessary for attaining the special end which each Religion has proposed to itself for serving God and perfecting its own members.¹⁹

Hence, a Religious sins gravely against the obligation of tending to perfection: 1. If he casts aside all the means of perfection; for then he is not in the way of salvation. 2. If he frequently infringes the vows in a grave matter; because the vows are to be observed not only by reason of themselves, but also insofar as they are essential means of perfection. - 3. If he violates the rules of the Order from contempt, or with grave detriment to common discipline, as will be explained below (cf. n. 2170).

n. ¶2154.

IT IS ASKED. Does a Religious sin gravely who wishes to observe only those rules which oblige UNDER MORTAL sin, and to neglect the others?

Resp. St. Alphonsus: "Many excuse him; but many do not. But Sanchez says knowingly that it will happen with difficulty that such a one be excused from mortal sin, at least from other heads, namely on account of the danger to which he exposes himself, either of offending against the vows or of inducing relaxation of the rule in the Community"²⁰ (cf. n. 343).

Vol. II, Pt. IV, Tr. I, Ch. III, Article II: On The Obligation Of Observing Vows

n. ¶2155.

- A Religious by force of the vows is bound to poverty, chastity, and obedience; and if he emitted other vows in profession, he is held to those similarly, according to the prescription of the rules and the custom of the Order.

Vol. II, Pt. IV, Tr. I, Ch. III, Art. II, § 1. On The Vow Of Poverty

DEFINITION. Religious poverty is placed in a certain abdication of dominion, whether radical or useful, over temporal goods.²¹

DIVISION. A FOURFOLD grade is distinguished by which evangelical poverty can be vowed: the first grade excludes the use of superfluous things; the second, the free and independent use of temporal things; the third, dominion over these things; finally the fourth, the very capacity of dominion. - This last grade is proper to Regulars who have bound themselves by solemn vow. But for the essence of the vow of poverty, in the religious state properly so called, the second grade is required and suffices, as is clear from the practice of the Church in approving various Institutes.¹ Hence we establish the following:

n. ¶2156.

- Principles. I. A Religious, through the SOLEMN vow of poverty, so ABDICATES the right of ownership over every temporal thing estimable by price, that 1) he can licitly have neither independent use nor independent disposition; 2) nor can he possess anything as his own; 3) nor does he retain the very capacity of possessing. This is clear both from cap. Cum ad monasterium 6, de Statu monach., and from Trent, sess. 25, c. 2, de Regul., and from the common interpretation of Canonists as regards the capacity of dominion. - But he retains dominion over spiritual goods, e.g. reputation, honor, etc. And the same is commonly taught concerning sacred Relics enclosed in cases of small value, and concerning manuscripts whether his own or received from another: both because they are fruits of genius, although of another, and therefore something spiritual; and because they pertain to knowledge, which does not fall under the vow of poverty; and because such is the common custom. But otherwise if the work has in any way been printed by type.²

It is said 1. neither independent use nor independent disposition...; for this is first and essential in every vow of poverty, whether solemn or simple, that it take away the free use of goods; and consequently the one vowing cannot, without the consent of the Superior, use any thing, or dispose of any thing, even if conceded to him for his own use. - Indeed, in order that Regulars and Nuns can, after solemn vows have been emitted, make a testament, cede their leases or a sum of money to blood-relations, or in turn receive rich revenues from them, they need not only the license of the Superior, but also of the Holy See.³

But it must be NOTED: 1) Although a Religious can neither donate nor remit the things which are owed to him, e.g. legacies left to him, the wage owed for his labors, an annual pension to be paid by parents, because the right to these is with the monastery; nevertheless he can refuse gifts offered to him without wounding the vow of poverty; but one refusing without a just cause sins against charity, namely by impeding the good of his Religion. - 2) It is not prohibited to Religious to invite outsiders to banquets, and to bestow gifts on them moderately, if a just cause suggests this: e.g. so that they may free the monastery from some vexation, so that they may conciliate benevolence toward it, indeed so that they themselves may testify their benevolence to friends.⁴

It is said 2. nor can he possess anything as his own. For the Council of Trent, loc. cit., c. 2, decreed thus: "Let it be licit to no one of Regulars, both men and women, to possess or hold immovable or movable goods as their own, or even in the name of the Convent; but let them immediately be handed over to the Superior and incorporated into the Convent." - And this is the ancient rule: that no one be reputed an owner, but that all ownership pertain to the monastery itself. - Nor indeed is it opposed to the vow of poverty if Religious have goods, even immovable, in common. Except Capuchins and Minors of the Observance, from Trent, l.c., c. 3, de Reg. (cf. n. 2136, 3).

It is said 3. nor does he retain the capacity of possessing. For this, by unanimous consent of the Doctors, is imported by the very solemnity of the vow: not that one professed with solemn vows cannot acquire, e.g. from labor, from donation, or even from inheritance, for he is capable of acquisition; but that he acquires not for himself, but for the monastery or Religion, according to that celebrated saying of law: "Whatever a monk acquires, he acquires for the monastery."

And this incapacity of dominion in a solemnly professed Religious is indeed so absolute and immutable that it can never be taken away by the Superior of the Order; because it is annexed, by the law of the Church, to the very solemnity of the vow, whose effects can be taken away by the Supreme Pontiff alone, through dispensation from a most urgent cause⁵ (cf. n. 2176).

n. ¶2157.

II. A Religious, through the SIMPLE vow of poverty, circumscribes the right of ownership for himself by such limits that, although he retains direct dominion of his goods, nevertheless he cannot licitly dispose of them or use them according to his own will and without legitimate license. This is clear from various Rules approved by the Holy See, and from the Declarations already cited (n. 2148) made on 12 June 1858, in which⁶ these things are read: "The professed of simple vows will be able to retain radical dominion, as they say, of their goods, but administration of them and expenditure and use of revenues are altogether forbidden to them. Therefore before profession of simple vows they must cede, for the time in which they shall have remained in the same profession of simple vows, the administration, usufruct, and use to whomever they please, and even to their own Order, if they shall have judged thus according to their choice."

We have said 1. although he retains direct dominion: which dominion indeed extends: 1) to temporal goods which he possessed before the vows; 2) to the fruits or revenues of the same goods; 3) to those things which come to him by right, as paternal inheritance, legacies of relatives, etc.; 4) to all goods which he receives from parents, kin, friends, with the license of Superiors and of the Constitutions.⁷ But such dominion is retained by Religious especially for this end, that the Institute may be able with greater liberty to dismiss them when it shall have been necessary, as Gregory XIII said in the Constitution Ascendente Domino.⁸ Today another end also has been added, namely the end of avoiding difficulties which civil law creates when it does not recognize religious vows.

We have said 2. they cannot dispose according to their own will; for the things said in n. 2156 concerning Regulars and Nuns are also valid concerning Religious emitting simple vows; with this difference, however, that the former dispose both illicitly and invalidly without license, but the latter only illicitly. Nevertheless dispositions of this kind seem to be voidable through the Superior, because all Religious are subjected to the dominative power of Superiors.⁹

We have said 3. nor can he use according to his own will; for to Religious of whatever Order or Congregation there is forbidden the active use of any thing, or use as of one's own thing; but to them there is conceded only use of fact, and indeed precariously, that is, as long as it shall seem good to the Superior. Hence a Religious sins when he uses a thing as his own, or beyond the use legitimately conceded to him.¹⁰

n. ¶2158.

Questions. QUESTION 1. What is the PECULIUM of Religious, and is it licit?

Resp. 1. By PECULIUM is understood whatever from stable or movable goods, e.g. from leases, pension, alms, sermons, Mass stipends, is conceded by the Superior to some member of the Community, and is permitted to him to have, without any right of ownership (in those solemnly professed), and for mere use of fact, and therefore revocably at the nod of the one conceding.

Resp. 2. The Council of Trent indeed prohibited it, by forbidding that a Religious possess, etc., even in the name of the Convent; likewise Clement VIII, Const. Nullus, 25 July 1599. But from a custom long since tolerated by the Apostolic See, it is licit, in some Religions, to have a moderate peculium for necessary and honest uses, e.g. for obtaining food, clothing, and books; provided the subject does not hold it hidden, and is ready, at the nod of the Superior, to deprive himself of it. For thus the use of a temporal thing is not independent, and the substance of poverty remains safe.¹¹

But St. Alphonsus admonishes, saying:¹² 1) "In practice, let all Prelates persuade themselves as certain, that if they introduce the use of peculium anew in monasteries, scarcely the name of poverty will survive there, and from this innumerable evils will supervene upon the Community as regards observance. - Wherefore, even if they themselves can be excused from grave sin by conceding the use of peculium with respect to the vow of poverty, nevertheless they will not be excused on account of the relaxation of the rule, to which by this concession they will without doubt give their work." 2) Subjects cannot refuse common life if Superiors wish to erect it; because although not to observe common life is not against the vow of poverty, nevertheless it is against the vow to reject common life, when nothing which is necessary is denied by the Convent; because this is to have goods independently of the will of Superiors.¹³

Nor must there here be passed over in silence what Pius IX, in the decree of 22 April 1851, enacted on this matter:¹⁴ "In all novitiate houses let perfectly common life be introduced; but in other houses let money be deposited in the common chest."

QUESTION 2. Of what kind must the Superior's LICENSE be, so that a Religious can legitimately use it?

Resp. 1. License expressly conceded can bring with it no difficulty, provided it is true and reasonable: true, i.e. conceded by a legitimate Superior, immediately or mediately through another, and neither extorted from the one conceding by fear nor by fraud; reasonable, i.e. conceded for honest uses. But whether one conceded for illicit or vain uses is valid? - The absolutely more probable opinion denies this, since the Superior is not the owner of the goods of the monastery, but only the administrator of them, nor is Religion ever to be judged to wish to concede anything unto the spiritual ruin of its own members. Whence, if a Prelate concedes to some Religious a general license of spending a sum of money at will, he can by no means spend it for illicit or vain uses. - Nevertheless he can validly, from that license, expose it to play, provided the game is licit and not of mere chance, and the sum moderate, and provided he himself does not belong to an Order of stricter observance.¹⁵

They commonly say that tacit license, or presumed license concerning the present, suffices: namely when the Superior knows and sees the subject receive, give, spend something, etc., and does not prohibit it, although he easily could; for then by being silent he is judged to consent. - Except if something else must be gathered from the circumstances.¹⁶
It is indeed doubted whether interpretative license, or license presumed concerning the future, is valid, namely that to which the Superior is presumed going to consent if he were asked; but the more probable opinion holds that it suffices whenever the presumption is reasonable, "because then the subject already proceeds with dependence on the will of the Superior, and this effects that he himself is freed from the fault of ownership."¹ And St. Thomas favors this opinion, when he teaches: "A monk ought not to give alms, except in extreme necessity, or, the Abbot being absent, something small under hope of ratification."² "Moreover," says St. Alphonsus, "such dispositions by subjects from presumed license, for the most part, are illicit at least venially; because the Superiors, at least as regards the manner, are unwilling, and not rarely even gravely, and especially when those dispositions have been expressly prohibited by them."³
License sought and undeservedly denied does not excuse from transgression of the vow, unless there is danger of grave harm in delay; because in such a case at least the license of major Superiors is presumed to be present, or one can act from epikeia, because necessity has no law.

QUESTION 3. What things are commonly permitted to a Religious from PRESUMED license?

Resp. Generally the following things are permitted: - to succor a poor person reduced to great want, when access to the Superior is not open; - to bestow moderate alms on the needy, if he is staying outside the Convent with due license; and if he is in the Convent, to give them something of food; - to make slight donations to friends and blood-relations as a sign of gratitude, or of due friendship, or for conciliating benevolence toward Religion; - likewise, to make remunerative donations from goods conceded to him for use, because they are as it were payments of debts; - to donate, according to the more probable opinion, those things which he subtracts for himself by living more sparingly, if a certain quantity is assigned to individual subjects, in such a way that neither the monastery must furnish more, nor are the subjects bound to render an account of the assigned thing; - to accept from outsiders, unless it is clear concerning the contrary will of the Superior, a thing to be handed over to the Superior; - to buy a thing which he judges will be pleasing to the Superior, if recourse to him is not easy, e.g. on a journey; - to give something to Peter, if he has license to give to Paul, unless the Superior gave license for Paul because of a peculiar reason and would have denied it if it had been sought for Peter. - Thus commonly.⁴

NB. Concerning the LICENSE of the Superior, it is also helpful to note the following: - 1. In obtaining or conceding it, account must be taken of each Institute; for what is permitted in one is often reproved in another. In stricter ones certain general and tacit faculties are not admitted which are tolerated in mitigated ones. 2. When the Superior gives license to one to give, although in the rigor of law license to receive is also required in the one receiving, in fact he is judged to give it to his own subject. 3. License conceded by one Superior perseveres under his successor, unless it has been explicitly or implicitly revoked by this successor.⁵

QUESTION 4. What QUANTITY is required for GRAVE sin against the vow of poverty?

Resp. 1. As regards the goods of the monastery or of others, this is the rule: that quantity which suffices in theft for constituting mortal sin against justice also suffices for constituting mortal sin against Religion, or against the vow. Nevertheless it must be noted that more is required in these thefts than in thefts from outsiders, but less than in thefts by children; for these have at least hope of dominion, but Religious do not; and Prelates are certainly more unwilling than parents, because the detriment which is inflicted on the monastery is at once temporal and spiritual. - Account must besides be taken of the very material harm really inflicted, which indeed is had less: 1) if the monastery is wealthy; 2) if the Religious does not give a thing of the Community to outsiders, but converts it to his own use; or if the thing is bestowed on Religious of the same monastery, because thus the thing remains at home;⁶ 3) if there is question not of money, but of eatables, or of other things consumable by use; for minute thefts in this last case do not coalesce unless they bring great detriment to the monastery.⁷ And "regularly a Religious does not sin gravely by secretly receiving, for example, a book for temporal use, even for a long time, but not in perpetuity; because then the Prelate is not judged unwilling as regards the substance, but only as regards the manner."⁸

As regards goods whose dominion a Religious with a simple vow retains, grave matter for violation of the vow is not easily determined; for in this case not justice itself, but only the vow is violated. Concerning this matter St. Alphonsus speaks thus: "But if something is received from outsiders, to be furnished to others, and therefore without wounding justice, still more is required; for then Jerome Garcia with others among the Salmanticenses assigns for grave matter a value greater than sixty silver pieces."⁹ Today we would say: greater than 60 francs.

QUESTION 5. Does a Religious violate the vow of poverty who expends money IN ANOTHER'S NAME?

Resp. Distinguish. 1) If he has received money with at least some designation of the persons to whom it is to be distributed, he does not violate the vow, because then he is a naked minister and like a servant; nevertheless he can offend against the rule of his Order. - 2) If he has received it with an indeterminate faculty of expending, so that he can confer it, according to his own judgment, on any good work whatsoever or on any needy person whatsoever, he violates the vow: "for, as Azor says,¹⁰ even to the vow of poverty there is opposed a use or administration from which the Abbot cannot remove the monk by his nod."¹¹

QUESTION 6. Whether and when must RESTITUTION be made to the monastery?

Resp. 1. He who without license, in a grave matter, donates or consumes, etc., goods of the monastery is certainly bound to restitution; nevertheless he is not bound to restore from the things given to him for use, unless they are superfluous; because the Prelate is not presumed to wish to oblige the subject with so great an inconvenience.¹²

Resp. 2. One receiving from a Religious a gift of great moment is bound to restore it, not indeed to the Religious from whom he received it, but to the monastery (cf. n. 1772 concerning the case reserved to the Supreme Pontiff).

n. ¶2159.

From what has been said you will resolve: 1. A PRELATE sins against the vow of poverty "if he permits a subject to expend goods coming from whatever cause or title for vain or illicit uses; or to have with him things superfluous, precious, and indecorous to his state."¹³ Indeed, it is more probable that this license is of itself invalid, according to what was said n. 2158, q. 2. - Likewise a procurator, economus, administrator, or official sins if he expends anything against the statutes or custom of the Order, or against the will of the Superior.¹⁴

A RELIGIOUS sins: - 1) By receiving or possessing illicitly: namely if he receives, possesses, or retains as his own something estimable by price, even something pertaining to food or clothing; or if he receives gifts, if he is a Religious not solemnly professed, without due license; - likewise, if without license he receives from outsiders, by loan or commodate, money or other things estimable by price; - likewise, if he retains a peculium, or things obtained from it, as owner, against the legitimate will of the Superior; - likewise, if he hides anything for the end of withdrawing it from the disposition of the Superior: nor can he be excused in this by the fact that he had previously obtained license.

By disposing illicitly: namely, if without the license of the rule or Superior he alienates, exchanges, lends by commodate, or donates anything estimable by price; - if he remits to others things owed to him, e.g. the wage of his labor, or, if he has solemn vows, an inheritance, a legacy left to him; - if he culpably loses or destroys things conceded to him for use; for it is the act of an owner to neglect a thing, or to make it worse at will; - if he gives things given to him for use to others by commodate or loan; this, however, is a light sin if he is certain concerning restitution, and there is not question of a thing necessary to the Community here and now.
By using illicitly: namely if he uses things against or apart from the will of the Superior, e.g. by retaining a thing beyond the limits of time fixed by the Superior; - by applying a thing determinately conceded for one use to another, even honest, use: for with respect to the other use, license is lacking; - much more by expending it on vain, base, or indecorous uses for a Religious. - Likewise he sins against the vow if he eats or drinks among outsiders without the permission of the Superior; if, while making a journey, he turns aside from the straight way to see curious things, unless perhaps the distance is brief and no expenses, or very moderate expenses, must be incurred.¹⁵

Note. A Religious sins against the VIRTUE of poverty, although the vow remains uninjured, if toward the things which he holds from legitimate license he fosters excessive affection; if he indulges his own comforts more than is fitting, etc. Concerning this we note that the vow, of itself, regards external acts alone; but the virtue, which is the end of the vow, is extended even to internal acts, and labors for the extirpation of every inordinate affection toward earthly things. - We have said that the vow regards only external acts; nevertheless, if someone should conceive a desire or purpose of acting externally against the vow, he would violate this very vow:¹⁶ as is clear from what was said concerning Internal Sins (n. 347 and 348).

Vol. II, Pt. IV, Tr. I, Ch. III, Art. II, § 2. On The Vow Of Chastity

n. ¶2160.

- By the VOW OF CHASTITY a Religious forbids to himself every voluntary venereal delight, even that which could become licit in legitimate matrimony.¹ Hence,

I. By force of the vow of chastity, a Religious is held UNDER GRAVE obligation to abstain from every voluntary act of luxury, both internal, as from base joy, desire, morose delectation; and external, as from immodest speech, sight, touch, etc.; and at the same time from probable danger of sinning against chastity. For he has vowed chastity both of mind and of body; and therefore, as often as he offends against this vow, he incurs the guilt of a twofold malice to be opened in Confession, namely guilt against the virtue of chastity and guilt of sacrilege against the virtue of religion.² "And most probably he also sins against the common good, if there is danger that by his sin Religion be defamed."³

Two things WORTHY OF NOTE are to be added here, namely: 1) From the simple vow of chastity, subsequent matrimony is prohibited, but is not invalidated; whence if a Religious, notwithstanding this vow, should enter nuptials, he would commit only one sin, namely against religion, in the petition of the conjugal debt. - 2) From the solemn vow, matrimony is both prohibited and invalidated, and therefore one bound by such a vow, in the use of an attempted marriage, would be stained by a twofold sin, i.e. the sin of fornication and the sin of sacrilege.

II. For the custody of chastity, the LAW OF ENCLOSURE has been established for monasteries, both of men and of nuns.

…and 44 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Merkelbach, Pastoral Questions

Benedict H. Merkelbach, O.P. — 30 passages

Ch. I, Question VIII: Concerning Religious and Nuns

n. ¶4433.

I. Special obligations of religious. - Religious of either sex are bound by reason of their state:

n. ¶4434.

To tend to perfection conformably to their rule and constitutions.

n. ¶4435.

To observe the three vows of obedience, perfect chastity, and poverty.

n. ¶4436.

To devote themselves to mental prayer, daily assistance at the Sacrifice of the altar, and other offices of piety.

n. ¶4437.

At least every week to make sacramental confession, and frequently to approach Holy Communion.

n. ¶4438.

To recite the divine office in choir, if this belongs to their religious institute; but those who have emitted solemn vows are bound in conscience also to private recitation.

n. ¶4439.

To wear the habit of their religious institute.

n. ¶4440.

To observe cloister.

n. ¶4441.

To lead the common life.

n. ¶4442.

To abstain from secular affairs, unbecoming arts, and worldly delights which are unbecoming to them, in the same way as was said for priests.

n. ¶4443.

Superiors are bound to watch over all these things, and are moreover bound by special precepts.

n. ¶4444.

II. Religious are to be questioned and admonished concerning their obligations, if any are of neglected conscience:

n. ¶4445.

A. A religious of any kind: whether he has admitted any defect against the vows: against poverty, by receiving, giving, or using without permission; against perfect chastity, even by indulging impure fantasies or desires, by not avoiding occasions of sin, or by not sufficiently guarding his heart; against obedience, by not obeying special precepts of superiors or by despising them; whether he has not indulged tepidity or has not contemned the perfect life.

n. ¶4446.

B. A nun in particular: whether she has recited the divine office; whether she has not nourished some dangerous friendship, for example if there have been at least words, or amorous letters, or dangerous familiarities; whether she is not held by some aversion toward her sisters; whether she has carefully fulfilled a particular office, if she has any, and does not abuse it.

n. ¶4447.

C. A superior: whether she employs due diligence when men enter the monastery or stay there; whether she shows great goodness together with firmness in governing the monastery; whether she does not connive at abuses, especially new ones; while observing, says St. Alphonsus,¹ that although individual nuns sin lightly by transgressing a light rule, nevertheless superiors who do not take care to impede, when they can, the relaxation of observance, sin in a grave matter.

¹ Praxis Conf., n. 54.

n. ¶4448.

III. The superior is especially to be admonished: 1. that she love all the religious without distinction as most dear daughters, and willingly hear each one and assist her; 2. that she not show herself credulous to denunciation, but inquire cautiously, and if she must correct, that she do this for the most part privately; 3. that she procure regular observance and herself go before all by her example; 4. that she take pains prudently to cut off abuses, if there are any; 5. that she have at heart that the sick be well cared for and often visited by their fellow sisters; 6. that she abstain from avarice and at the same time from luxury and superfluity; 7. that she use great consideration in admitting or dismissing novices; 8. that in extraordinary circumstances she consult the Ordinary in good time; 9. that she not prohibit to her subjects the liberty, sanctioned by the canons, of approaching an outside confessor for tranquility of conscience (can. 522); likewise that she not prohibit them from frequent or daily communion, except in the case of grave scandal until they have approached the sacrament of Penance (can. 595, sections 2 and 3).

n. ¶4449.

IV. Counsels for the confessor of religious women, especially nuns.² - Certain things are to be observed by the confessor of religious women, certain things to be avoided.

² Aertnijs, Th. P., nn. 149-150.

n. ¶4450.

A. Things to be observed. 1. Let the confessor strive to know those things which pertain to the perfection of the religious state, and those which pertain to the proper vocation of the respective religious institute.

n. ¶4451.

Let him provide that religious women lay open their conscience to him with full confidence, which is supremely necessary, since they have almost their only refuge, especially if they are nuns, in the confessor; and if they are deprived of this, they are exposed to various anxieties and temptations like sheep destitute of a shepherd. Hence let his patience and paternal meekness be great; and if a religious woman shows signs of shame, let him earnestly help her.

n. ¶4452.

Let him strive that religious women advance in virtues, such as: love of God, not sensible, but strong, impelling them to do the will of God even in arduous things; humility and modesty, both internal and external, joined with spiritual joy; obedience toward the rule, constitutions, superiors, and confessor, so that they obey promptly, faithfully, cheerfully, and blindly; charity toward sisters, so that they offend or sadden no one, forgive from the heart offenses received, bear the defects of others patiently and meekly, and help them when they can; chastity, which guards against every affection and familiarity.

n. ¶4453.

Let him procure regular observance, exhorting them to perform all prescribed things accurately and from a true religious spirit.

n. ¶4454.

Let him guard safe and intact the authority of the superior.

n. ¶4455.

B. Things to be avoided. 1. Let the confessor converse with nuns rarely rather than frequently, and, where conversation is necessary, let him strive for brevity.

n. ¶4456.

In giving responses let him not be too hasty, but in graver or doubtful questions let him take time for reconsidering.

n. ¶4457.

Let him be too familiar with no one, nor show himself favoring one rather than another; otherwise dangers, aversions, and disturbances are apt to arise.

n. ¶4458.

In hearing confessions let him disclose no weariness, impatience, or haste, because this diminishes confidence.

n. ¶4459.

Let him not be disturbed or scandalized if at times he hears that graver sins have been committed, for example of the flesh or sacrilege; persons consecrated to God are more vehemently tempted, whence they are worthy of compassion rather than indignation.

n. ¶4460.

Let him give no suspicion that he uses knowledge from confession for doing something external.

n. ¶4461.

In no way let him involve himself in domestic governance, or in affairs pertaining to the Ordinary or to the superior, but let him remain within the limits of his office. Let him remember that he enjoys no authority in the external forum; wherefore let him beware lest he introduce novelties, unless perhaps for grave reasons and with the counsel and will of the superior and of the greater part of the community.

n. ¶4462.

V. Observation concerning directing penitents in piety and perfection. - In this direction the confessor will be able to use those things which we have said in our little work Concerning Various Categories of Penitents, where concerning the pious and devout, and concerning the perfect and contemplative, c. 3, q. 1 and 2.

Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis

Benedict Henry Merkelbach, O.P. — 9 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Vol. II, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On the Cardinal …, First Part: On Justice in …, Ch. II, Question Four: On the Subj…, Article V: On the Dominion of Religious

197. Principles. - Religious of themselves preserve entire rights in the internal goods of body and soul and in reputation, although they must satisfy special obligations of obedience. But as to external goods of fortune, they are bound by the vow of poverty; by reason of which:

The solemnly professed are incapable of private dominion, so that the goods which they possess they cannot keep, and other goods they cannot acquire (can. 579, 581, 582); yet they can possess in common, unless by their special constitutions they are prohibited from this, as the Friars Minor and Capuchins.

Yet by dispensation they can in certain regions, as in Belgium, acquire and retain goods in particular, but only in order to civil law (S. Poen., Dec. 1, 1820; and Leo XIII, July 31, 1878).

The simply professed remain capable of possessing goods (c. 580, § 1), but they cannot dispose of them without the express or tacit consent of the superior; consequently:

a) before profession, they must cede the administration of their goods to whom they wish, and, unless the constitutions provide otherwise, freely dispose of their use and usufruct (c. 569);

b) in a religious congregation, the novice must, before the profession of temporary vows, freely make a testament concerning present goods or goods perhaps to come (c. 569, § 3), which, when vows have been emitted, he cannot licitly change without the permission either of the Holy See or, if a cause is urgent, of the Superior (c. 583);

c) the professed in a religious congregation cannot licitly abdicate dominion of their goods by gratuitous title through an act among the living (c. 583);

d) whatever any professed acquire by their own industry or in view of religion, they acquire for the religion (c. 580, § 2).

Vol. I, Tr. X, Part III. On the Particular Obligations of Religious · Vol. I, Tr. X, Pt. III, Chapter I. On the Nature of the Religious State · Vol. I, Tr. X, Pt. III, Chapter II. On Religious Vocation · Vol. I, Tr. X, Pt. III, Ch. III, Article I. On the Vow of Poverty

More particular matters pertain to canonical legislation concerning religious.

Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis

Dominic M. Prümmer, O.P. — 1 passage (filed under the subtopics)

Vol. I, Pt. I, Tract IX. On theological c…, Ch. III, Art. III, Appendix on Spiritual Perfection and on the State of Perfection

n. 624.

624. 1. St. Paul admonishes: "Above all things have charity, which is the bond of perfection";¹⁵³ for charity is the form of all the virtues, orders them to the supernatural end, and gives to them their proper notion of meriting eternal life. On account of this reason also our spiritual perfection depends upon the habit of charity, and the more perfect the degree of charity in a man is, the greater is his spiritual perfection. Wherefore St. Augustine says fittingly: "Charity begun is justice begun, charity advanced is justice advanced, great charity is great justice, perfect charity is perfect justice."¹⁵⁴ According to St. Thomas, the perfection of charity in this earthly life is exercised by man in two ways, namely in the first way, "that he appoint his zeal to having leisure for God and divine things, other things being passed over, except so far as the necessity of the present life requires; and this is the perfection of charity which is possible in the way; nevertheless it is not common to all having charity. In another way so that someone habitually places his whole heart in God, namely in such a way that he thinks or wills nothing which is contrary to divine love; and this is the perfection common to all having charity."¹⁵⁵ Therefore according to St. Thomas there are two grades of charity: the first common to all having sanctifying grace; the second belongs only to those who pass over all worldly things, insofar as is possible, and with all their powers devote themselves to divine things.

Charity, as an infused virtue, cannot be increased from our acts except through an increase of sanctifying grace, which we merit by our acts. Nevertheless, by our acts we can also remove impediments of charity and thus increase it indirectly. This indeed happens in this way. Manifold disordered cupidity prevents man from adhering to God with all his powers. Hence man is bound by repeated acts gradually to restrain that cupidity, and the more disordered cupidity has been subdued, the greater is the perfection of charity. Hence St. Thomas¹⁵⁶ says: "Perfection is considered as to this, that those things are excluded which are repugnant to the movement of love into God, as Augustine says in the book 83 Questions, q. 36, that the poison of charity is cupidity, perfection is no cupidity." But the acts by which passions are mortified and virtues are exercised pertain to the perfection of charity, not because they constitute it formally, but because they are commanded by charity and eliminate all opposed impediments. Therefore it cannot be concluded absolutely that those saints who exercised greater mortifications had greater charity and sanctity.
Whoever has a permanent disposition of loving God above all things and of committing no mortal sin can rightly be said to be in the state of perfection, because every permanent and stable disposition can be called a state. Nevertheless, under the state of perfection theologians are accustomed to understand something else, namely a certain kind of life in which the three evangelical counsels and a certain Rule approved by the Supreme Pontiffs are observed. But first of all it must be noted that the state of perfection accepted in this sense is not the same as perfection itself; for someone living outside that state can be most perfect; and conversely someone living in the state of perfection can be most imperfect, indeed even dwell in the state of mortal sin. Nevertheless this state is deservedly called the state of perfection, because a) its members are bound by profession to tend toward perfection and because b) they ought to employ the best means for attaining this perfection. For the obstacles of charity are disordered cupidity 1. of one's own excellence, 2. of carnal delights, and 3. of material goods. Furthermore this threefold cupidity is most efficaciously mortified by the vows of obedience, chastity, and poverty; and these three vows are perfectly observed in the state of religion according to Rules approved by the Supreme Pontiffs. Hence also the history of all ages proves that the most splendid examples of sanctity have shone forth in religious orders.

¹⁵³ Col. 3, 14.

¹⁵⁴ De nat. et grat. c. 70 (Migne, Patr. lat. 44, 290).

¹⁵⁵ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 24, a. 8.

¹⁵⁶ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 184, a. 2.

Palmieri, On Christian Marriage

Dominic Palmieri, S.J. — 17 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Ch. I, Thesis V

n. ¶107.

Although marriage is according to the right of nature, and at times was deservedly commanded by God to some, nevertheless from the right of nature there is no obligation properly so called, made either to individuals or to the community, of procuring offspring.

n. V, I.

I. What we state in the first place was denied by the ancient heretics, namely certain of the Gnostics and the Manichaeans, who, as we have already observed in the preface, approved indeed the mingling of flesh, but said that the generation of offspring and the perpetual obligation of one to the other were evil, brought in by Satan. There will again be a place for disputing about these in Thesis VII. To them are added those more recent pseudo-philosophers who acknowledge no other legitimate nuptials except those which genial love has brought together, to endure as long as that love survives; for in reality they take away the covenants of nuptials and deny that these are from the right of nature. But no sane man fails to understand that marriage is according to the right of nature. That certainly is according to the right of nature whose principles are in nature itself and which, for attaining a certain end for which nature itself supplies the powers, is either counseled or required by nature itself. Now the principles of marital union are in nature itself: that is, the diverse sexes ordered to each other, and in the mingling of both the native force of producing offspring. But for the production of offspring and its right education, which nature requires, there is either required, or, to say now at least the minimum, since we shall dispute about this later, there is at least fitting, the mutual obligation of man and woman to stable union; and in this Marriage consists. Besides, to speak of this bond itself in itself, it must be said to be according to the right of nature if it is conformed to the principles of natural law; but such is this union. For friendship and society founded on a mutual communication of power, of which each party is capable, for the mutual communication of goods and mutual consolation and help, is approved by the same natural law by which there is approved both friendship and society generally among all, and especially that friendship and society whose seed and principle has been sown by nature itself. But the stability of union is the perfection of friendship according to the same law; therefore the conjugal bond is according to nature. Indeed, that cannot fail to be according to the right of nature which the author of nature instituted for a natural work, such as the propagation of the human family. But that God instituted marriage from the beginning is clear from Genesis II compared with Matthew XIX, testimonies which we shall explain afterward. Cf. canon 1, session XXIV, Council of Trent. But lest we dwell too long on a matter very clear in itself, the consensus of the human race is also a reason for proving this; for although passions might suggest something else, nevertheless when the human race made laws, it approved that union between man and woman which either truly was marriage or had some appearance of marriage.

n. V, II.

II. But because not everything that is according to the right of nature is commanded, the question follows whether marriage and the use of marriage in the procreation of offspring is a thing commanded. That marriage was commanded to the first human beings, Adam and Eve, is certain; for God himself joined them and willed them to be husband and wife. But the question is properly about the use of marriage for the procreation of offspring, or about the propagation of offspring itself to be procured, in an honorable way, of course: whether those first authors of the whole race, and also the rest who followed, were therefore ordered by a true precept to procure it; whether the precept affects individuals or at least the community of men; and whether, if it is not a positive divine precept, it is at least natural.

n. ¶110.

Therefore appeal is made to the words of the Lord (Gen. I, 28): "Increase" (פרו, fructify, bear fruit, so that the act of copulation is thereby signified), "and multiply and fill the earth," said to the first parents. These words seem to contain a divine precept issued not only to those first human beings, who surely could not alone, by offspring received, fill the earth, but also indefinitely to their descendants, who were contained virtually in that first pair. Therefore the question concerns the sense of these words of the Lord.

n. ¶111.

We judge that this question must be answered thus: by those words is signified the intention of the end which God appointed for himself in the creation of the first male and the first female; this manifestation of an end in itself does not have the force of a precept, but accidentally it also exercised the force of a precept toward those first human beings and perhaps their children, as long as and insofar as they were situated in a condition similar to that of the first parents. This is proved, first, because those words "Increase and multiply" were said in the same way as the words immediately following: "and subdue it," the earth, "and have dominion over the fish of the sea and the birds of heaven and all living things which move upon the earth." But these do not express a precept, but a certain destination of men according to the dignity implanted from the beginning, whether by the natural order or beyond the order of nature. Indeed, the same words "Increase and multiply" were also said to living things in Genesis I, 22; but then the natural destination of these things, or the intention of God creating them distinct according to their kind, was signified. Thus also Cornelius a Lapide on this place. Likewise Chrysostom, homilies X and XXVI, takes these not as a command but as a blessing of God.

n. ¶112.

This is proved, second. The manifestation of some end intended by God, which is not essential to man and can be obtained without obligation imposed on man, does not in itself assume the account of a precept, unless from elsewhere it is clear that an obligation is generated. This is evident, because if that end can be obtained without obligation imposed on man, the will of God to obligate is not yet established merely by that end having been manifested; and where this is lacking, there is no precept. But in the words of the Lord we have the manifestation of an end which, first, is not essential to man; for offspring is not necessary to man in order that he be, or in order that he be perfect and blessed. Generation is indeed necessary to future men in order that they be; but these in themselves have no right to be, nor can the question now be about them, for we are speaking of those on whom a precept is imposed, and of this sort certainly are not those who do not yet exist. Now, second, in order that this end be obtained, the cooperation of men is indeed necessary, but it is not necessary that they be obligated. For they are sufficiently borne toward it by the propensity of nature, so that in a multitude of men it is morally impossible that there not be many who will it. These things being posited, what need is there, I ask, of a precept?

n. ¶113.

It is proved, third. We have said that a manifestation of an end of this kind does not in itself assume the account of a precept unless from elsewhere it is clear that an obligation is generated. This, moreover, first had place for the first parents, who were the one pair from which the human race could proceed. If they, indeed, had been unwilling to devote effort to generation, it would have been over with the end intended by God when he created them male and female and united them in marriage. Nor can it be said: even if they were not obligated, there would have been no fear lest generation follow; for what wonder would it be that two should consent to continence? To continence even the first parents could have been moved after sin, lest they procreate an unhappy stock subject to sin. Do you think that those first two human beings would have acted rightly if they had decreed this? Did this obligation then also exist for others? We suppose that Adam and Eve left several children, whom they were able to bring forth in so long a span of life, and that from these many other children arose.

n. ¶114.

Now, when they were very many, while natural propensity exercised its force, it was, as we said, morally impossible that many would not devote effort to generation; and therefore a precept concerning this matter was superfluous. And even if few had procreated children, this one thing would have followed: that the human race would have been propagated over the whole earth later. But this would not have been unfitting; for God had not signified that he intended the human race to be multiplied quickly. But when from the beginning they were few, or if this happened later also, so that it would not be morally impossible for all, from the choice of the will, to abstain from generation, they would have been situated in the same condition as the first parents. Therefore, lest the human race fail, an obligation pressed them to devote effort to generation; and this obligation in itself affected not all distributively but disjunctively, for it was enough to preserve the human race, since full multiplication was not immediately to be pursued. But the diverse circumstances in which those men were situated could determine those who would satisfy this obligation. Outside this case I do not see the necessity of any precept; for if men are very many, it is morally impossible, even without any obligation, that all, indeed that many of them, cease from generation. Thus, therefore, we understand a precept issued by the Creator concerning this matter: that a beginning be made for human generation, and provision be made lest the human family cease. The rest did not fall under the precept.

n. V, IV.

IV. And let these things have been said concerning the obligation which someone might wish to have existed before the subsequent increase of men, which nature can rightly demand. But once that increase had been obtained, and even, if you wish, after some space of time, was there some law of God commanding the conservation or continuation of the human family? Certainly I do not know whether appeal is rightly made to that law issued in creation which we have just weighed. For we hold as certain that at some time this whole human race on earth will cease, but we do not know when and how God has determined this. Therefore, if you have regard only to the account of that primitive law, by what argument will you establish that the human race occupying the whole earth is bound by divine precept to procreate its successors? The end has already been obtained in multiplication. Procreation continued without end is not intended by God. Of course, if no one generates, shortly afterward the human race will cease; but in itself this can be one of the ways by which this human race will at last depart from the earth, although it belongs entirely to God, anticipating, to impose another end. You will say that the human family, as long as it lives, ought to observe that command: "Increase and multiply." But Augustine did not perceive such a necessity by force of those words. When the objection of certain persons was proposed to him in this very question, "If all wished to preserve continence, the human race would cease," he responds: "Would that all wished it"; for thus, as he himself says, the number of the elect would be filled more quickly (On the Good of Marriage, chapter X). And indeed, provided that the act is not evil in itself, since that divine will concerning the continuation of the human race for that determinate age is not certain, why would sin be admitted by ceasing universally from generation?

n. ¶116.

But even if not by force of that divine will expressed by the words "Increase and multiply," still at least by force of another will, namely concerning the future advent of the Redeemer, was it not necessary that men, until he should come, devote effort to generation? It was certainly necessary; but for this there was no need of any precept. First, indeed, it can be said that the promise of the Messiah was made on the supposition of the foreseen future propagation of the human race by force of natural inclination, just as the promise of the sacrifice of the cross was made on the supposition of the foreseen evil will of those who would crucify Christ. Indeed, in order that the truth of the promise concerning Christ to come at a certain age might remain firm, these two elements were sufficient: on the part of men, a certain natural inclination to generation; but on the part of God, a certain gentle and efficacious providence which would moderate the free affections of men. These, however, in themselves abstract from a precept; therefore there was no need of any precept. Nevertheless, at that time, because of the very expectation of the Messiah to come in the flesh, it happened that those from whose family he was to arise were more inclined to procreate offspring. But the others from the Jewish people were borne into nuptials "by a love not only legitimate but holy," because this was the mode of propagating and conserving the people of God and the true worshippers of God, since then one people proceeding carnally from Abraham was guarding the true religion instituted by God. But it is false that in that age nuptials were commanded to individuals; for nowhere does this mandate exist. For what Augustine, On the Good of Marriage, chapter 22, reports from Deuteronomy XXV, 5-10, as it seems, that he was cursed in the law who did not raise up seed in Israel, is not expressed in the law in this way, nor is there any law made for individuals concerning nuptials. Rather, it is a law concerning taking the wife of a brother left without children; and this law indeed did not obligate the brother of the deceased unwillingly, except if he wished to possess the goods of the deceased by right of inheritance.

n. V, V.

V. And these things said thus far concerning a divine precept are valid whether you speak of a precept made to individuals, or at least to the community. But because we have spoken of a divine precept insofar as it is positive and is distinguished from the natural, it certainly can happen that someone observes that we have in some way played or wasted labor in the demonstration of this matter; for the words of the Lord are an expression of natural right, and this truly commands the procreation of offspring. But on the contrary we reply with two points. First, the words of the Lord, if they express a precept, about which matter we have already spoken, express a precept formally divine, and only foundationally natural. Second, no natural precept properly so called exists, either for individuals or for the community, concerning the propagation of offspring.

n. ¶118.

The first of these, as you see, depends on the second. For if there is no precept from nature itself, that is, if nature in itself does not require that this be furnished by men, it will follow that if a precept is asserted, it arises immediately from the free will of God, with only a certain natural capacity or propensity supposed; but this is a precept formally divine, and only foundationally natural. Therefore we prove the second, of which that will be the necessary consequent.

n. ¶119.

Therefore, as regards the second, men can be considered both as individuals separately and in community. We affirm, a) first, that individuals are not obligated, or that nature does not require from them that they attend to the procreation of children. For if there were in individuals any obligation by natural right to procreate, it would have to be derived from the end, which is the procreation of children; for from that end those who press this obligation derive it. But the other ends of marriage can plainly be compensated and surpassed by other goods. Yet from that end there is, by natural right, no exigency and obligation of procreating in individuals. For an active capacity for it is not a sufficient reason of moral obligation. Propensity, if there is any, is free rather than necessary; and therefore that propensity to having children is not found in all. But naturally there is present a disposition, which is nothing but the active capacity we have mentioned. The good itself, which is offspring, if it is compared to individuals, is not for them the more excellent good which they can attain, but on the contrary it impedes goods more excellent both for individuals and, through them, for the community. For the more excellent good for man is that in which his perfection is chiefly situated; of this sort is the study and contemplation of truth, the exercise of charity toward God and neighbor, from which the greatest benefits redound to society. Yet the full and at least excellent attainment of these goods is impeded by the care of children. But the good of offspring, that is, its procreation, if it is compared with the offspring itself, is certainly an immense good for it and the principle of the rest; but before offspring exists, since it has no right, what obligation can there be toward it? Besides, we have seen that the state of continence is more perfect than the state of marriage, in which effort is given to generation; and this would also be so in the state of pure nature. But the right of nature cannot obligate men to that which is more imperfect with the loss of what is more perfect.

n. ¶120.

b) Nor by the right of nature is there any obligation of procreating children imposed on the community of men. For besides the things already said, which are also valid here, observe that the community cannot be obligated to this act insofar as it is a community; for this is an act which can be posited only by individuals, namely by pairs made one flesh from male and female, and insofar as they are such. Therefore the natural obligation which is called that of the community will come back to this: that some persons disjunctively from the community, either these or those, are obligated. But what sort of obligation is this, which can affect men only one by one, and yet from which individuals are immune? Do we not see in this matter the very same thing that happens in several other offices of society? For in society there must be farmers, physicians, teachers, artisans, etc. Is there need of any natural law morally obligating, in order that such men exist in society? The diverse natural disposition in individuals, the variety of occasions, advantage, profit, praise, and honor, which offer themselves for different things only in different conditions, are more than sufficient that there never be lacking those who perform those offices. Likewise, if it is necessary for the community that successors exist, which indeed is rather the good of future society than of present society, unlike the other offices enumerated, the propensity to nuptials, which unfolds itself in so many, in suitable circumstances, of which there is abundant supply, will effect that there is never lacking a generation of men succeeding a declining generation. Therefore in this matter we see only a certain instinct of nature, which besides is more vehement than the others, so that it needs restraint rather than impulse; by it nature, and the author of nature, sweetly obtains what he intends.

n. V, VI.

VI. But you will say: does not nature require her own continual propagation and the perpetual conservation of human society? Moreover, are not men, either taken distributively or at least disjunctively, bound by a true moral obligation to that which nature requires of them and which they can furnish only in a human and free manner? We concede this latter, but we deny the former: namely, that nature requires continual propagation from men. For nature first requires in individuals, and then in society, but by reason of individuals, in whom alone nature itself inheres, that which is necessary for them in order that they be and be well, so far as is needed for the ultimate end. But generation is not necessary for those in whom nature inheres, nor for existing society, but for future society, which nevertheless now can exercise no right. Therefore it is false that nature requires it; but nature confers the power and also the propensity. But if the author of nature wills a certain perennial series of generations, he knows by what modes he may use this inclination and the affections of men for attaining this end without any moral law.

n. ¶122.

Yet you will insist: no one would blame a king who, in certain circumstances, lest society be diminished and lest suitable men be lacking for certain offices, commands procreation; but he would make this law by the right of nature; therefore the right of nature commands procreation to society.

n. ¶123.

I answer: granting the antecedent, about which we do not wish to dispute, we deny the consequence. Namely, in order that a law issued by the community be just, there is no need that the very same thing which the positive law commands already be commanded by nature itself; rather it is enough that it be consonant with nature, and that nature teach that it is fitting in those circumstances.

Sabetti-Barrett, Compendium of Moral Theology

Aloysius Sabetti, S.J., and Timothy Barrett, S.J. — 66 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Vol. I, Tr. X, Part III. On the Particular Obligations of Religious

Tr. I, Disputation XXVII: On Thef…, Question VII: On the thefts of religious · Tr. IV, Disputation I: On the Vow, Question VI: Whether fear inflicted on another makes a vow invalid · Tr. IV, Disputation II: On the Religious State, or on Solemn Vows · Tr. IV, Disputation II: On the Rel…, Section I: On the Vows of Religious in Common · Tr. IV, Disputation II: On the Rel…, Sect. I, Question I: In what solemn vows differ from simple vows

The obligations by which religious, as such, are held are reduced especially to the observance of the vows and of the other rules of each Order. But before something is said concerning the force of these obligations, it is useful to intimate something concerning the nature of the religious state, and concerning vocation to it.

Vol. I, Tr. X, Pt. III, Chapter I. On the Nature of the Religious State

n. 608.

The religious state, or a stable manner of living in common, by which the faithful, besides the common precepts, also undertake the evangelical counsels to be observed through vows of obedience, chastity, and poverty, is to be held in honor by all (Can. 487).

n. 609.

In the canons which follow, there come under the name:

1st. Of religion, a society approved by legitimate ecclesiastical authority, in which the members, according to the proper laws of the society itself, pronounce public vows, perpetual or temporary, yet to be renewed when the time has elapsed, and in this way tend toward evangelical perfection;

2nd. Of Order, a religion in which solemn vows are pronounced; of monastic Congregation, the union of several monasteries of their own right among themselves under the same Superior; of exempt religion, a religion, whether of solemn or simple vows, withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the local Ordinary; of religious Congregation, or simply Congregation, a religion in which vows only simple, whether perpetual or temporary, are emitted;

3rd. Of religion of pontifical right, a religion which has obtained either approval or at least a decree of praise from the Apostolic See; of diocesan right, a religion which, erected by Ordinaries, has not yet obtained this decree of praise;

4th. Of clerical religion, a religion of which most members are advanced to the priesthood; otherwise it is lay;

5th. Of religious house, a house of some religion in general; of regular house, a house of an Order; of formed house, a religious house in which at least six professed religious dwell, of whom, if there is question of a clerical religion, at least four are priests;

6th. Of province, the union of several religious houses among themselves under the same Superior, constituting a part of the same religion;

7th. Of religious, those who have pronounced vows in some religion; of religious of simple vows, those who have pronounced vows in a religious Congregation; of regulars, those who have pronounced vows in an Order; of sisters, religious women of simple vows; of nuns, religious women of solemn vows or, unless something else is established from the nature of the matter or from the context of speech, religious women whose vows from their institute are solemn, but for some places by prescription of the Apostolic See are simple;

8th. Of major Superiors, the Abbot Primate, Abbot Superior of a monastic Congregation, Abbot of a monastery of its own right, even if belonging to a monastic Congregation, the supreme Moderator of a religion, provincial Superior, the vicars of these, and others having power after the manner of provincials (Can. 488).

Canon 489 is of the highest moment:

The rules and particular constitutions of individual religions, not contrary to the canons of this Code, keep their force; but those which are opposed to them are abrogated (Can. 489).

§1. Bishops, but not the Capitular Vicar or Vicar General, can found religious Congregations; but let them not found them, nor permit them to be founded, without consulting the Apostolic See; but if there is question of tertiaries living in common, it is moreover required that they be aggregated to their religion by the supreme Moderator of the first Order.

§2. A Congregation of diocesan right, although in course of time spread through several dioceses, nevertheless, so long as it lacks the testimony of pontifical approval or praise, remains diocesan, wholly subject to the jurisdiction of the Ordinaries according to the norm of law.

§3. Neither the name nor the habit of a religion already constituted can be assumed by those who do not legitimately belong to it, or by a new religion (Can. 492).¹

¹ Cf. Addenda, p. 1088, n. 7.

n. 610.

Questions

Question 1. Who can be admitted into religion?

Resp. Any Catholic can be admitted into religion who is detained by no legitimate impediment, is moved by a right intention, and is suitable for bearing the burdens of religion (Can. 538).

Therefore immunity from obstacles, right intention, and suitability for carrying burdens are required for admission. The necessity of these three is established from the very nature of the matter of which there is question.

n. 610, Q. 2.

Question 2. What is the law concerning postulancy according to the new Code?

Resp. §1. In religions of perpetual vows all women and, if there is question of a religion of men, lay brothers, before they are admitted to the novitiate, must complete a postulancy for at least six full months; but in religions of temporary vows, as regards the necessity and time of postulancy, one must stand by the constitutions.

§2. The major Superior can extend the prescribed time of postulancy, yet not beyond another six months (Can. 539).

§1. The postulancy must be completed either in the house of novitiate or in another house of the religion in which discipline is accurately observed according to the constitutions, under the special care of an approved religious.

§2. Let postulants wear modest clothing and clothing different from the clothing of novices.

§3. In monasteries of nuns, aspirants, while they are completing the postulancy, are held by the law of enclosure (Can. 540).

Before they begin the novitiate, postulants should attend to spiritual exercises for at least eight full days; and, according to the prudent judgment of the confessor, they should make beforehand a general confession of their past life (Can. 541).

Thus a distinction is made between religions of perpetual vows and religions of temporary vows: in these latter one must stand by the constitutions, both as regards the necessity and as regards the duration of postulancy; in the former, women and lay brothers are held to make a postulancy of six months. The major Superior can extend this time, but not beyond another six months.

The postulancy must be made either in the novitiate or in another house where discipline flourishes under the care of an approved religious. The garments are to be modest, different from the clothing of the novitiate. In monasteries of nuns, aspirants are held by the law of enclosure. Before the novitiate, postulants should complete spiritual exercises through eight solid days and, at the judgment of the confessor, make a general confession.

n. 610, Q. 3.

Question 3. Who are admitted to the novitiate invalidly, and who illicitly?

Resp. With the prescription of can. 539-541 remaining firm, and other prescriptions in the proper constitutions of each religion:

1st. They are admitted to the novitiate invalidly:

Those who have adhered to a non-Catholic sect;

Those who do not have the age required for novitiate;

Those who enter religion induced by force, grave fear, or fraud, or whom the Superior, induced in the same way, receives;

A spouse, while the marriage lasts;

Those who are bound, or have been bound, by the bond of religious profession;

Those upon whom a penalty is impending because of a grave delict committed, concerning which they have been accused or can be accused;

A Bishop, whether residential or titular, even if he has only been designated by the Roman Pontiff;

Clerics who, from an institute of the Holy See, are bound by oath to devote their work to the good of their diocese or of the missions, for that time for which the obligation of the oath endures.

2nd. They are admitted illicitly, but validly:

Clerics constituted in sacred orders, without consulting the local Ordinary, or with the same Ordinary contradicting because their departure would turn to grave detriment of souls, which cannot be avoided otherwise;

Those burdened with debt who are not able to pay;

Those liable to render an account, or entangled in other secular business, from which the religion could fear lawsuits and troubles;

Children who must assist parents, that is, father or mother, grandfather or grandmother, placed in grave necessity, and parents whose work is necessary for feeding or educating children;

Those destined for the priesthood in religion, but from which they are removed by irregularity or another canonical impediment;

Orientals in Latin religions without permission given in writing by the Sacred Congregation for the Oriental Church (Can. 542).

Invalidity arises first from the fact that someone previously adhered to some non-Catholic sect. In the new Code, non-Catholics are called either baptized or not baptized: baptized outside the Catholic Church and adhering to some sect; baptized in the Catholic Church and afterwards defecting from it and adhering to some sect; baptized nowhere but adhering to some sect, for example of Quakers, Unitarians.

The words of canon 542, those who have adhered to a non-Catholic sect, are not to be understood concerning those who, moved by the grace of God, have come to the Church from heresy or schism in which they were born, but concerning those who have defected from the faith and adhered to a non-Catholic sect. Thus C. A. C. C. A. I., 16 Oct. 1919.

n. 610, Q. 4.

Question 4. With whom is the right of admitting to the novitiate and to profession?

Resp. The right of admitting to the novitiate and to subsequent religious profession, both temporary and perpetual, belongs to the major Superiors with the vote of the Council or Chapter, according to the peculiar constitutions of each religion (Can. 543).

n. 610, Q. 5.

Question 5. What testimony must aspirants present?

Resp. §1. In any religion, all aspirants, before they are admitted, must present testimony of received baptism and confirmation.

§2. Male aspirants must moreover present testimonial letters from the Ordinary of origin and of each place in which, after completing the fourteenth year of age, they have stayed beyond a morally continuous year, any contrary privilege being removed.

§3. If there is question of admitting those who have been in a Seminary, college, or the postulancy or novitiate of another religion, testimonial letters are moreover required, given for the different cases by the rector of the Seminary or college, after the local Ordinary has been heard, or by the major Superior of the religion.

§4. For clerics to be admitted, besides the testimony of ordination, testimonial letters of the Ordinaries in whose dioceses after ordination they have dwelt beyond a morally continuous year suffice, with the prescription of §3 being safe.

§5. For a professed religious transferring to another religion by apostolic indult, the testimony of the major Superior of the prior religion is sufficient.

§6. Besides these testimonies required by law, Superiors to whom the right belongs of enrolling aspirants into religion can also require other things which seem necessary or suitable to them for this end.

§7. Finally, let women not be received unless accurate investigations concerning their character and morals have been made beforehand, with the prescription of §3 remaining firm (Can. 544).

§1. Those who must give testimonial letters from the prescription of law should give them not to the aspirants themselves, but to the religious Superiors gratuitously within the space of three months from their requisition, closed with a seal and, if there is question of those who have been in a Seminary, college, or the postulancy or novitiate of another religion, confirmed by the oath of the Superior.

§2. If for grave reasons they have judged that they cannot answer these, let them explain the causes to the Apostolic See within the same time.

§3. If they have replied that the aspirant is not sufficiently known to them, the religious Superior should supply by another accurate investigation and a trustworthy report; but if they have replied nothing, the requesting Superior should inform the Holy See of the response not received.

§4. In their testimonial letters, after they have instituted diligent investigation, even through secret information, they must report, their conscience being gravely burdened concerning the truth of the things set forth, concerning the aspirant's birth, morals, talent, life, reputation, condition, knowledge; whether he has been investigated, whether he is entangled by some censure, irregularity, or other canonical impediment, whether his own family needs his help, and finally, if there is question of those who have been in a Seminary, college, or the postulancy or novitiate of another religion, for what cause they were dismissed or departed of their own accord (Can. 545).

n. 610, Q. 6.

Question 6. When does the novitiate begin, and what is required for its validity?

Resp. The novitiate begins with the reception of the habit, or in another manner prescribed in the constitutions (Can. 553).

§1. Besides the other things enumerated in can. 542 for the validity of the novitiate, in order to be valid the novitiate must be completed:

1st. After completion of at least the fifteenth year of age;

2nd. Through an entire and continuous year;¹

3rd. In the house of novitiate.

§2. If a longer time is prescribed for the novitiate in the constitutions, it is not required for the validity of profession, unless something else is expressly said in the same constitutions (Can. 555).

The novitiate begins in the manner prescribed in the religion; for validity it must be completed after the fifteenth year is completed, in the house of novitiate, through an entire and continuous year. Without these three, or without any one of them, the novitiate is not validly completed; the minimum age is the completed fifteenth year; the house of residence is the house of novitiate; the minimum and necessary time is one complete and continuous year.

¹ Cf. Addenda, p. 1111, n. 53.

n. 610, Q. 7.

Question 7. What is to be said concerning interruption of the novitiate?

Resp. §1. The novitiate is interrupted, so that it must be begun anew and completed, if the novice, dismissed by the Superior, has left the house, or has deserted the house without his permission, not intending to return, or has remained outside the house, even intending to return, beyond thirty days, whether continuous or not continuous, for any cause whatsoever, even with the permission of Superiors.

§2. If the novice has remained beyond fifteen, but not beyond thirty, days, even not continuous, outside the enclosure of the house under obedience to the Superior, with the permission of Superiors or compelled by force, for the validity of the novitiate it is necessary and sufficient to make up the days spent in this way; if not beyond fifteen days, the supplement can be prescribed by Superiors, but is not necessary for validity.

§3. Let Superiors not impart permission to remain outside the enclosure of the novitiate except from a just and grave cause.

§4. If a novice is transferred by Superiors into another house of novitiate of the same religion, the novitiate is not interrupted (Can. 556).¹

¹ Cf. Addenda, p. 1088, n. 8.

n. 610, Q. 8.

Question 8. What is required for the validity of profession?

Resp. §1. For the validity of any religious profession it is required that:

1st. The one about to emit it have the legitimate age according to the norm of can. 573;

2nd. A legitimate Superior admit him to profession according to the constitutions;

3rd. A valid novitiate according to the norm of can. 555 have preceded;

4th. The profession be emitted without force or grave fear or fraud;

5th. It be expressed;

6th. It be received by a legitimate Superior according to the constitutions, by himself or through another.

§2. But for the validity of perpetual profession, whether solemn or simple, it is moreover required that temporary simple profession according to the norm of can. 574 have preceded (Can. 572).

n. 610, Q. 9.

Question 9. What age is required for profession?

Resp. Anyone about to emit religious profession must have completed the sixteenth year of age, if there is question of temporary profession; the twenty-first, if of perpetual, whether solemn or simple (Can. 573).

When the sixteenth year of age has not been completed, no profession is valid for which that completed year is required, if namely there is question of temporary profession; but if of perpetual, whether simple or solemn, the twenty-first year, and indeed completed, is required.

n. 610, Q. 10.

Question 10. When the novitiate has been completed, must the novice immediately be admitted to profession?

Resp. §2. When the novitiate has been completed, if he is judged suitable, the novice is to be admitted to profession; otherwise he is to be dismissed. If doubt remains whether he is suitable, the time of probation can be prolonged by the major Superiors, yet not beyond six months (Can. 571).

n. 610, Q. 11.

Question 11. Must temporary simple profession always be placed before solemn and perpetual profession?

Resp. §1. In any Order both of men and of women, and in any Congregation which has perpetual vows, after the novitiate has been completed, the novice, in the house of novitiate itself, must place before perpetual vows, whether solemn or simple, with the prescription of can. 634 being safe, a profession of simple vows to last for three years, or for a longer time if the age required for perpetual profession is farther distant, unless the constitutions require annual professions.

§2. The legitimate Superior can prolong this time, after temporary profession has been renewed by the religious, yet not beyond another three years (Can. 574).

n. 610, Q. 12.

Question 12. When the time of temporary profession has been completed, what must be done?

Resp. §1. When the time of temporary profession has been completed, the religious, according to the norm of can. 637, either emits perpetual profession, solemn or simple according to the constitutions, or returns to the world; but also, during the time of temporary profession, if he is not held worthy to pronounce perpetual vows, he can be dismissed by the legitimate Superior according to the norm of can. 647 (Can. 575).

The highest care of the Church is in saving the liberty of the subject vowing, lest they unwillingly lead the religious life.

n. 610, Q. 13.

Question 13. When the time for which the vows were pronounced has elapsed, must renewal be made immediately?

Resp. No delay is to be interposed to the renewal of vows, when the time for which they were pronounced has elapsed. Indeed, Superiors have the faculty of permitting that the renewal be anticipated for some time, yet not beyond a month. Cf. Can. 577.

n. 610, Q. 14.

Question 14. Do those professed by temporary simple vows enjoy the privileges, etc., and are they held to the obligations of others professed by perpetual and solemn vows?

Resp. Those professed by temporary vows, of whom in can. 574:

1st. Enjoy the same indulgences, privileges, and spiritual graces by which those professed by solemn vows or those professed by perpetual simple vows rejoice; and if they are overtaken by death, they have a right to the same suffrages;

2nd. They are held by the same obligation of observing the rules and constitutions; but where the obligation of choir flourishes, they are not bound by the law of reciting the divine office privately, unless they are constituted in sacred orders or the constitutions expressly prescribe something else;

3rd. They lack active and passive voice, unless something else is expressly provided in the constitutions; but the time prescribed for enjoying active and passive voice, the constitutions being silent, is computed from first profession (Can. 578).

n. 610, Q. 15.

Question 15. To what is the Bishop held with regard to girls about to enter religion?

Resp. The Superioress must inform the local Ordinary, at least two months before, concerning the approaching admission to the novitiate and to profession, both temporary and perpetual, whether solemn or simple. The local Ordinary, or if he is absent or impeded, a deputed priest, at least thirty days before the novitiate and before profession as above, should examine the will of the aspirant, whether she has been coerced or seduced, whether she knows what she is doing; if it is established concerning her pious and free will, then the aspirant can be admitted to the novitiate or the novice to profession. Cf. Can. 552; S. C. de Religiosis, 19 Jan., 1909. The Church wills that it be authentically established that the aspirant was not coerced, and that she understands what she is doing; only then is it lawful to admit her to the novitiate or to profession, when both the liberty and the knowledge of the aspirant are plainly evident.

n. 610, Q. 16.

Question 16. How does profession affect acts contrary to the vows?

Resp. Simple profession, whether temporary or perpetual, renders acts contrary to the vows illicit, but not invalid, unless something else has been expressly provided; but solemn profession, if they are irritative, renders them also invalid (Can. 579).

We have an example of the former in relation to those who, for example, in some religious congregation with simple vows only, although perpetual, enter marriage without dispensation: the marriage is valid, although surely a most grave sin; but if a Scholastic of the Society of Jesus with his simple perpetual vows did the same thing, the marriage would be invalid. Cf. Const. Ascendente Domino, Greg. XIII.

n. 610, Q. 17.

Question 17. By what means and under what obligation is a Religious held to tend toward perfection?

Resp. He is held to tend primarily through the essential means of the religious state, namely through the observance of the three vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience. And since the obligation of tending to perfection is grave by force of the state in which he is found, he will sin gravely if in a grave matter he infringes those vows. But secondarily he is held to tend toward perfection also through accidental means, namely through the proper rules of the Order; and he will sin gravely if he infringes them from formal contempt, namely by spurning their authority as such and their known wisdom. It is otherwise, however, if he violates them, led by concupiscence, or because he thinks they are not necessary for him unto salvation, or if he thinks that they are not commanded under grave obligation. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 10.

n. 610, Q. 18.

Question 18. Does a Religious sin gravely who intends to observe only commands obliging under grave obligation, and to care nothing for the rest?

Resp. Negatively, more probably; and the reason is that by this very fact, that the Religious wills to fulfill those several things which oblige under grave obligation, he already tends toward perfection, since he wills to fulfill several things which, with respect to others, do not oblige but are merely of counsel. St. Alphonsus calls this opinion the more common and more probable; nevertheless he warns that a Religious disposed in this way can be in grave danger of sinning mortally from other heads, for example, by reason of the danger of transgressing the vows or of bringing grave damage upon the Religion as regards discipline, etc. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 10 and seq. - Bouix, de Regul., vol. 2, pp. 550 and 551.

n. 610, Q. 19.

Question 19. Whether, or how far, does a rule oblige under sin, taken distributively, or considering individual rules in particular?

Resp. In very many Orders the rule, generally speaking and of itself, does not oblige under sin, not even venial sin. This is established from the constitutions themselves of various Orders and from the common interpretation of theologians. Those Orders are to be excepted in which the constitutions expressly establish the opposite. I said 1st, generally speaking, because whatever things fall under vows or express precepts of Superiors are not without fault, and indeed grave fault according to the gravity of the matter, as we shall say below concerning vows. - I said 2nd, of itself, because theologians teach that transgression of the rule very rarely is free from all fault because of extrinsic reasons, since almost always there will be some fault by reason of negligence, concupiscence, scandal, laziness, or any other disordered movement. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, ibid.

n. 610, Q. 20.

Question 20. To what is a novice held in relation to the cession of administration of goods and to a testament?

Resp. §1. Before profession of simple vows, whether temporary or perpetual, the novice must, for the whole time for which he will be bound by simple vows, cede the administration of his goods to whom he prefers and, unless the constitutions provide otherwise, freely dispose concerning their use and usufruct.

§2. That cession and disposition, if it was omitted because of lack of goods and these afterwards came, or if it was made and afterwards other goods by any title came, is to be made or repeated according to the norms established in §1, notwithstanding simple profession emitted.

§3. A novice in a religious Congregation, before profession of temporary vows, should freely make a testament concerning goods present or perhaps to come (Can. 569).

The whole novitiate is to be completed in the habit which the constitutions prescribe for novices, unless special circumstances of places require something else (Can. 557).

Vol. I, Tr. X, Pt. III, Chapter II. On Religious Vocation

n. 611.

I say. Certainly Christ willed that in His kingdom there be a state of voluntary poverty, celibacy, and obedience. For the Lord Himself shows the way by which someone may enter into life and by which he may attain perfection. "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments." Matt. xix, 17. He set before these words others: "One is good, God": the observance of the commandments is indicated as necessary in order that someone may become a sharer of the highest good, God. And to the young man asking, "Which?" namely, commandments, the Lord explains them. To the young man answering that he had kept all these from his youth, and asking, "What is yet wanting to me?" Jesus said: "if thou wilt be perfect, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven, and come follow me." Therefore here the Lord sets forth two states in His kingdom, namely one enjoined on all, the other voluntary for them: the observance of the commandments; the voluntary taking up of poverty, celibacy - for he who sells all his things and gives the price to the poor cannot enter marriage - and obedience, "come follow me." Therefore He says to the young man: if thou wilt supply what is lacking to thee and come to perfection, I now show thee the way: "sell, give to the poor," and, lest thou fear, I set before thee the reward, "treasure in heaven, and come follow me." And so He excites the will of the young man by this treasure and by the attainment of perfection arising for him from voluntary poverty, celibacy, and a certain excellent obedience under the yoke of Christ. - Cf. v. 12.

Therefore Christ wills that such a state be in the Church. Now come, all these things strike the hearts of men with wondrous efficacy. - Cf. Commentary on the Gospel according to St. Matthew; Knabenbauer, pp. 154 and seq. Let it be noted that between this doctrine of Christ concerning the more perfect way in His kingdom and the doctrine concerning matrimony and virginity (xix, 1-12), there is commemorated by the Evangelist the most tender love of Our Lord toward little ones: for of such is the kingdom of heaven. These easily lay up the things of God in the heart. Suffer the little ones to come unto me. The time will come when many of them will have to answer for themselves whether they ought to follow Christ by the common way rather than by the more perfect way. At the age of twelve and living the Apostolic life, He gave them a most efficacious example; He will also give grace. For them also a choice must be made between these ways: "Lord, what wilt thou have me do?" The will of God, not our own, is the norm of any Christian. Right intention of divine service is necessary, especially in choosing a state of life. And therefore it is necessary that the one about to choose, according to his powers, free himself from every disordered affection, and will nothing except what is from above. These things being posited, how will the young man know what is the good-pleasing will of God? Our Lord shows His will in this matter to men in various ways. First, indeed, He does this in such a way that no doubt can be present concerning it - which happens in the case of Saint Paul, Saint Matthew, and others in the Church of God. This way is extraordinary and not to be expected by all. Secondly, when the soul is moved by inspirations and motions in such a way that with almost no discourse of the mind the will is borne into the service of God; but in this method too great difficulties can arise. Finally, a third way remains, the ordinary one, safer and more secure from illusions, namely when someone with tranquil mind seriously considers the question, What shall I do? shall I follow the religious state? (a) by weighing the advantages and disadvantages arising to him from it; by taking from the desire of divine service reasons for the state and against it; and by not admitting merely human considerations; by placing himself in indifference of heart; let him ask light from God; then let him see to which side reason inclines him more, and finally let him choose that side. Or, with the same tranquil mind, (b) let him propose to himself a man hitherto unknown, who asks counsel in this matter; by desiring the perfection of this man, he chooses this state for him, and let him judge that the same will be best for himself. Or again, with the same tranquility of soul, (c) let him place himself at the article of death or on the day of judgment, and ask what way he would then wish to have held, and let him now take for himself the one desired; for he will be able sincerely to hold that his vocation is that which that weighing and prayer under (a), or that counsel under (b), or the longed-for way under (c), indicates. Therefore divine vocation seems able to be called the divine good-pleasure morally securely manifested to a man by the light of reason aided by faith; in the man himself it is a complex of right intention, of natural and supernatural gifts, by which he may seem suitable for duly carrying out the duties of the religious state. But the judgment of all these things in this or that case belongs to the Superiors, so that their assent and admission of the candidate is, as it were, the authoritative complement and perfection of religious vocation.

n. 612.

Questions

Question 1. Whether, or how, does one sin who, sensing that he is called to Religion, does not obey the divine vocation?

Resp. Of itself and rigorously speaking, he sins in no way; because divine counsels impose no obligation, since precisely in this they differ from precepts. Yet he can scarcely be excused from some fault because of the danger of eternal salvation to which he commits himself. Indeed, he would not be excused from grave sin who was persuaded that this one means of attaining eternal salvation remained for him, that he flee from the dangers of the world. - But truly, are they in a bad state who, morally certain concerning a divine vocation to Religion, strive to persuade themselves that they can attain their salvation just as easily by remaining in the world or by returning to it? It does not seem to be doubted that they expose themselves to great hazard of salvation; because, by remaining in the world against the vocation of God, they deprive themselves of those special helps which the providence of God had prepared for them in Religion, and therefore they will resist the temptations of the world with difficulty. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 78. Others, however, judge more mildly.

n. 612, Q. 2.

Question 2. Do parents or superiors sin gravely who turn away children or subjects from the religious state?

Resp. Affirmatively, and indeed against justice, if they turn them away by threats, force, frauds, etc.; but against charity, if they only employ prayers and persuasions. The reason is that they deprive them of a great good and heap up many damages. Nevertheless parents do not sin who oppose, for a time, the pious desires of younger children in order to test their constancy or because of another just cause. Yet in this matter, to avoid delusions, they must stand by the counsels of a confessor or of an upright and learned man. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 77.

n. 612, Q. 3.

Question 3. What are the signs of a religious vocation?

Resp. Generally speaking, or according to ordinary providence, two things are required and suffice for proving a divine vocation, namely due aptitude and inclination of will.

1st. Aptitude is understood as suitability for the religious state in general, and in particular for the observance proper to such an Order. It consists especially in right judgment, in a good disposition, in a soul submitted to the yoke of obedience, in relatively sufficient knowledge, and in the lack of defects of body and soul which are repugnant to the reason of this life.

2nd. A constant and right inclination, which therefore is not subject to frequent changes, notwithstanding, otherwise, some past shifting about arising from temptations of the devil or from a certain repugnance of nature. Yet it is not required that the inclination proceed from spontaneity or propensity rather than from an intimate persuasion of the soul. Furthermore, that inclination must be right, that is, proceed from a pure intention, from the mere desire of attaining salvation more easily, of procuring the greater glory of God, or also the salvation of souls, etc.

I said generally speaking or in ordinary providence, because more evident signs of vocation are present, namely: 1st, divine revelation, as St. Aloysius Gonzaga and St. Stanislaus Kostka, etc., were called; 2nd, singular inspiration, which consists in an interior motion by which someone is vehemently driven and as it were drawn to a more perfect life.

Vol. I, Tr. X, Pt. III, Ch. III, Article I. On the Vow of Poverty

n. 613.

I say. 1st. A Religious bound by the solemn vow of poverty, at least by force of ecclesiastical law, and therefore, with dispensation of the Roman Pontiff excluded, is altogether incapable in particular, or personally, of any dominion over a temporal thing estimable by price, even with the permission of the superior. - I said personally, because the community can acquire and possess goods either through itself or through subjects, unless its constitutions stand in the way. Hence the common axiom of canon law: "Whatever a Monk acquires, he acquires not for himself, but for the monastery." - This is established from the Council of Trent, sess. 25, cap. 2.

I say. 2nd. A Religious bound by the simple vow of poverty can indeed have direct dominion of goods; but he cannot licitly dispose of anything concerning them without the particular or general permission of the superior, although he can validly. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 18 and seq.

n. 614.

Questions

Question 1. What is the difference between the vow and the virtue of poverty?

Resp. The vow regards only external acts of ownership; but the virtue extends also to the internal affections of the heart. For the object of the vow is to despoil the Religious outwardly of temporal goods. But the virtue has as its end to cut away entirely every disordered affection of the heart toward earthly things. Therefore the vow of poverty is, as it were, a means to the virtue, which is the end to be obtained; and consequently the virtue of poverty extends much more widely than the vow: for as often as someone infringes the vow, at the same time he also wounds the virtue; but not vice versa. - I said that the vow affects only external acts of ownership; nevertheless the vow could be violated by an internal act which would regard and touch an external act, namely by the desire of acting externally against the vow; since desire takes on all the malice and species of the external act, as was said in the tract on sins, n. 136.

n. 614, Q. 2.

Question 2. To what things does the direct dominion of a Religious not solemnly professed extend?

Resp. §1. Any professed of simple vows, whether perpetual or temporary, unless something else has been provided in the constitutions, preserves the ownership of his goods and the capacity of acquiring other goods, with those things safe which are prescribed in can. 569.

§2. But whatever he acquires by his industry or in view of religion, he acquires for the religion.

§3. The professed can change the cession or disposition of which in can. 569, §2, not indeed by his own judgment, unless the constitutions allow this, but by permission of the supreme Moderator, or, if there is question of nuns, by permission of the local Ordinary and, if the monastery is subject to regulars, of the regular Superior, provided that the change, at least concerning a notable part of the goods, is not made in favor of the religion; but through departure from the religion a cession and disposition of this sort ceases to have force (Can. 580). - Cf. Above, n. 611, Q. 20.

n. 614, Q. 3.

Question 3. Can a Religious, without permission of the superior, keep his own manuscripts and transfer them to another?

Resp. Affirmatively, according to the common opinion; for manuscripts, as offspring of the mind, are held as something spiritual. Moreover they pertain to knowledge, which does not fall under the vow of poverty; but the more powerful reason is that the common and received custom among Regulars so bears. And the same is to be said, according to many, concerning Relics of the Saints. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 14.

n. 614, Q. 4.

Question 4. Does a Religious sin against the vow of poverty if he expends something from things granted for a determinate use into another use?

Resp. Affirmatively; and the reason is that in these things a Religious has only use of fact, and that precariously, as long as it shall seem good to the superior. But to dispose of some thing according to one's own judgment is an act of ownership or dominion; and otherwise the will or permission of the superior, unless something else is manifest, is restricted to the use assigned. Wherefore a Religious cannot, without permission, give to others or in any way alienate those things which by living more sparingly he has taken away for himself from the things granted for use. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 19 and 23.

n. 614, Q. 5.

Question 5. Does a Religious sin against the vow of poverty who receives money from an outsider to be spent at pleasure upon pious works?

Resp. Affirmatively, if he receives it as given absolutely to himself, in order that he may distribute it in his own name. The reason is that by acting thus the Religious would make an act of ownership. But otherwise it must be said if he received it as to be distributed in the name of the donor, even if there is left to him the faculty of choosing the poor or some pious work, or how much is to be distributed; and a fortiori if a faculty of this sort is not left to him. The reason is that then the Religious would indeed make an act of prudence, but not of ownership; for he would be as it were the channel and mandatary of the donor. Hence a Religious does not sin against the vow of poverty who receives from an outsider money to be expended upon such a poor person, such a monastery, church, such a pious cause, etc. Indeed he does not sin if he himself, without the permission of the superior, asks money from an outsider to be handed over to another determinate person, although, if there is question of a matter of great moment, prudence counsels and the right order of religious discipline requires that the subject do nothing unless first he has obtained the assent of the superior, even if he incurs no danger of violating poverty. Cf. Sanchez, Decal., lib. 7, cap. 30. - Lugo, de just. et jure, disp. 3, n. 155. - Salmant., de Restit., cap. 6, n. 15. - Baller., note (a), p. 97; note (a), p. 99; and note (b), p. 104.

n. 614, Q. 6.

Question 6. Does a Religious sin against the vow of poverty who refuses those things which are offered to him by outsiders?

Resp. Negatively, if there is question of mere donations, alms, or gifts to which he does not have a strict right. The reason is that the vow of poverty does not oblige him to receive those things which he has not yet acquired, or to which neither he himself nor the monastery has a strict right. Nevertheless, if the Religious has no reason for refusing, he sins against charity by impeding the good of his Religion. - But otherwise one must answer if there is question of things owed by title of justice, or indeed donated but already accepted; for once acceptance has been placed, the monastery immediately acquires a right. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 20.

n. 614, Q. 7.

Question 7. Does a Religious sin not only against the vow of poverty, but also against justice, who unduly expends or consumes things of the monastery?

Resp. If he expends or consumes without any, not even tacit or presumed, permission of the superior, he is guilty of violated justice, because he commits true theft by converting another's thing to his own use against the reasonable will of the owner. But if he expends or consumes, the superior permitting or conniving, but for illicit or notably superfluous uses, he certainly sins against the vow; but whether he sins against justice is controverted. St. Alphonsus with others affirms it, because such permission is invalid and void; for the superior is not the owner, but a simple administrator of the goods of the monastery. De Lugo, Elbel, and many others deny it, because, although the Prelate is only administrator of the goods, it is not established by any law, at least universal law, that the owner himself, namely the community or religious Order, wished to invalidate permission of this sort, although it altogether disapproves it. Either opinion seems probable. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 30.

n. 614, Q. 8.

Question 8. What matter is to be judged grave in violation of the vow of poverty?

Resp. 1st. In sins which are at once against religion and justice, generally speaking, that is to be held as grave matter which constitutes mortal sin in theft; and although a few theologians say that that matter alone is grave matter which is judged grave in thefts of sons of a family, namely matter about twice greater than in thefts against outsiders, nevertheless this in no way seems to be admitted. The reason is that sons are in hope of the goods of the father of the family, but Religious are not. Moreover Superiors are more, and indeed reasonably, unwilling as regards thefts of subjects than parents are concerning thefts of sons. Besides, graver detriments follow as regards the soul in the former than in the latter. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 24. - Lugo, de just. et jure, disp. 3, n. 172. - Sanchez, Decal., lib. 7, cap. 20, n. 3.

But in order that judgment be made concerning the gravity of matter in thefts of Religious, it is to be noted that monasteries moderately wealthy are commonly equated with private masters sufficiently wealthy. Hence the same measure as for them generally constitutes grave matter. But if they are very wealthy, a greater quantity is required. A greater quantity is also to be required if a Religious usurps things of the monastery for his own use or gives them to others of the same community, than if he expended them upon outsiders, because in this way they remain at home. Greater also in petty thefts, which moreover, with a notable interval interposed, do not coalesce into grave matter. Greater again in foodstuffs, as we said concerning servants.

Resp. 2nd. In sins against religion alone, or committed against the vow alone, the difficulty increases and there is greater disagreement of theologians. Nevertheless more commonly they generally require the same matter for mortal sin as in the preceding case, where justice is violated, because an act of ownership seems to be of the same gravity. Nevertheless not improbably some grave Doctors require a greater quantity for grave sin. Cf. Elbel, n. 646. Salmant., tract. 15, cap. 6, n. 12.

But they commonly agree that a much greater value is required for sinning gravely when gifts are received from outsiders to be expended upon others, because then the act of ownership is much less than if these were retained for one's own use. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 24.

n. 614, Q. 9.

Question 9. When can one professed by simple vows not validly renounce, when can he validly renounce, and when must he renounce the goods which he actually has?

Resp. §1. One professed by simple vows cannot validly do so before, but within sixty days before solemn profession, with peculiar indults granted by the Holy See being safe, he must renounce all the goods which he actually has, to whom he prefers, under the condition of profession to follow.

§2. After profession has followed, all those things are to be done at once which are necessary in order that the renunciation obtain effect also in civil law (Can. 581).

Therefore he must, within sixty days before solemn profession, with indults being safe, renounce conditionally all goods which he actually has; before that time he cannot validly make that renunciation.

n. 614, Q. 10.

Question 10. To whom do goods fall which come in any way to a regular after solemn profession?

After solemn profession, peculiar indults of the Apostolic See likewise being safe, all goods which in any way come to a regular:

1st. In an Order capable of possessing, fall to the Order, or province, or house according to the constitutions;

2nd. In an incapable Order, are acquired as property for the Holy See (Can. 582).

n. 614, Q. 11.

Question 11. What is not lawful for those professed by simple vows in religious Congregations in relation to the abdication of dominion and the change of a testament already made according to the norm of can. 569, §3?

Resp. 1st. By an act among the living it is not lawful to abdicate the dominion of one's goods by a gratuitous title;

2nd. It is not lawful to change a testament made according to the norm of canon 569, §3, without the permission of the Holy See; or if the matter is urgent and time does not suffice for recurring to it, without the permission of the major Superior, or, if even he cannot be approached, of the local Superior. Cf. Can. 583.

n. 614, Q. 12.

Question 12. How is an invalid religious profession validated?

Resp. §1. A religious profession invalid because of an external impediment is not validated by subsequent acts, but it is necessary either that it be sanated by the Apostolic See, or that, the nullity having been known and the impediment removed, it be emitted legitimately anew.

§2. But if it was invalid because of a merely internal defect of consent, once this has been furnished, it is validated, provided that on the part of the religion consent has not been revoked.

§3. If there are grave arguments against the validity of the religious profession and the religious refuses, for safety, either to renew the profession or to seek its sanation, the matter is to be referred to the Apostolic See (Can. 586).

Wherefore a subsequent renewal would not validate the profession, but this must be emitted legitimately when at last the nullity has been known and the impediment removed.

…and 26 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Bontempi, Palladium Theologicum V

Gaudentius Bontempi of Brescia, O.F.M. Cap. — 1072 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Tr. I, Disputation XXVII: On Thef…, Question VII: On the thefts of religious

BASSEUS, v. Furtum, 2. num. 6., says that a religious who takes things of the monastery that are not necessary, or without leave, is a thief to the same extent as laymen stealing their own goods.

Religious indeed do not undergo the lot of servants, but of sons, as D. Bonaventure teaches in Apolog. pauperum, respon. 3. cap. 1., and it is clear ex C. litteris, de sepultur. in 6. et Leg. qui in potestate, ff. de testamen. et Authent. Ingressi. Cod. de Sacrosanctis Ecclesiis, Nauar. cap. Non dicatis 12. quaest. 1. num. 61., Sanchez l. 7. de Relig. cap. 21. num. 31., Rebell. p. 1. lib. 3. quaest. 15. s. 8. 3. num. 22. Hence the jurists do wrong when they count them among their own, wishing that whatever they acquire should accrue to the monastery, in the manner of servants.

From these texts the Doctors deduce, as is indicated quaest. 4. in fine, that thefts of religious are to be considered in the manner of thefts of sons of the family, not of the very rich, but of the middling, and consequently that five silver pieces, or thereabouts, are grave matter; although Caspensis, cited there, requires something more, and Fagundez l. 7. cap. 5. num. 15. two hundred denarii, that is, ten crowns.

n. 4.

ONE of the conditions excusing religious from theft and from proprietary guilt is that it be of edible things for one's own use; if this is licit for servants, as I showed quaest. 5., much more is it licit for sons to consume some edibles.

n. 5.

But for giving away, they held that one ought not exceed the value of three giulii: so thought Bartholom. a S. Fausto Thesauro, l. 8. quaest. 218. and Paulinus Berti on the Bull of Clement VIII on the giving of gifts. See also Fabrum in 4. disput. 45. cap. 5. num. 122. and Diana p. 1. Tract. de paupertate Religiosa, resol. 14.

n. 6.

IN MY judgment the opinion of Suarez seems discerning, T. 3. de relig. l. 8. cap. 11. num. 41., where he thus asserts:

n. 7.

Of the goods of the monastery, consumable in use, namely those pertaining to food and drink, if something is taken by religious for their own actual, so to speak, and transitory use, it does not regularly seem to be mortal sin, unless the damage to the Religion would be excessive, and in something extraordinary and more precious; outside a case of this kind, the things are considered of lighter condition. And although the prelates dislike this, they are not yet so unwilling that they regard it as grave matter in respect of poverty, but only in respect of decorum and religious perfection.

n. 8.

IT IS ADDED that religious are treated as sons as regards the use of such things; but between parent and son a similar act is not considered grave; it would be otherwise, however, if such things were taken in great quantity, and retained secretly, and little by little consumed, for that could be grave sin, although great prudence is necessary to discern it in the particular case. So Suarez, with whom Diana is pleased, p. 1. Tract. 6. de paupertate, resol. 30. See also Sanchez T. 2. l. 7. cap. 19. num. 53., Tanner 2. 2. disp. 7. quaest. 1. dub. 4. num. 106., where he says: Not even all the severity of Prelates can render such takings, as regards the substance of the thing taken, unjust. See again Diana ibi, resol. 35.

n. 9.

LEDESMA in addit. ad Summam, Tom. 2. cap. 4. and Cenedo tract. de paupertate Religiosa, dub. 20. num. 10. place eight or nine reales as matter deadly for religious; but they require a greater quantity in edibles.

n. 10.

RODRIQUEZ, however, Summa Tom. 4. cap. 118. num. 27. et 29., prescribes the sum of two gold coins for religious; the same Sotus taught, de Iust. l. 4. quaest. 3. ad 3., as did Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 66. art. 6. conclus. 3.; but Diana is not pleased with it, resol. 36.

n. 11.

BASSEUS, with Miranda, in Manuali prael. t. 1. quaest. 28. art. 17., thinks that a notable quantity in the thefts of religious is to be determined in the particular case, according to the difference of times, places, persons, Religions, and other circumstances, at the judgment of a good man. But Mendoza quaest. 8. posit. de paupertate, concl. 9. num. 12. teaches that two silver pieces are not a notable quantity. Ioan. de la Cruz de statu relig. l. 1. c. 3. dub. 5. and Sanchez Summa Tom. 1. l. 7. cap. 20. num. 3. et 6. think it to be four silver pieces. Diana subscribes. Bartholomaeus a S. Fausto l. 8. quaest. 193. num. 2. says that in the richest monasteries three silver pieces, in monasteries moderately endowed two silver pieces, but in poor ones one suffices for mortal proprietary guilt.

n. 12.

But our SANCTES, most poor, set one giulio, in cap. 6. Regulae; he did not remember that these thefts are committed against the most wealthy Pontiff. I confess, however, that they are committed from the pantry of the poor.

n. 13.

This is indeed a most poor opinion; for no one so religious is oppressed by it, nor does he himself rightly cite Navarrus. But this Doctor, in this as in many other decisions of the Rule, is severer than is altogether just.

n. 14.

Diana ADDS, resol. 41., ex Ioan. Cruz de statu relig. lib. 1. comp. 3. dub. 3. concl. 3., that a religious may take a meal or other edibles, from Lopez in Instruct. p. 1. cap. 6., who says: A religious may receive from laypersons some gifts of electuaries, or of heartening confections, two little vessels, or a pair of partridges, or hens, or something similar; but because in edibles of great value leave is not so easily presumed to be granted by the Superior, therefore one must proceed cautiously in such a case.

n. 15.

These things seem to me to be in the mind of D. Bonaventure, in 4. dist. 15. p. 2. art. 2. quaest. 1., and in this way is to be understood canon. 12. quaest. 1., where it is said: It is certain that a monk ought to have, or give, or receive nothing without the leave of his superior, unless perhaps he who is in need is in extreme necessity; then he ought not obey the Abbot, for he would plainly act against God. There he also teaches that there is no proprietary guilt unless it is expressly against the will of the Prelate. And he adds, cap. 2. speculi animae, these words: Fourthly, concerning the theft of religious in the retention of their own property, it must be noted what Augustine says, serm. 1. ad Fratres in Eremo, about religious: If anyone conceal a thing entrusted to him, he shall be condemned by judgment of theft; but I understand this concealing, and having as one's own, when it is so concealed that, even if the Prelate should command in virtue of holy obedience that it be revealed, it would still be concealed. Nor do I otherwise understand it as mortal, unless when it is retained against the preceptive will of the Prelate. This must also be noted of religious, and stewards, and sons of the family, and wives, that they can commit theft if they notably damage the owners of goods in dispensing, against the will and intention of the owners; but when, out of an eye to piety, and even in procuring the common good, without evil intention, they give or dispense some things, it is not to be judged mortal. The same, from D. Augustine, he reports in speculo disciplinae ad Novitios, p. 1. cap. 4.

n. 16.

Where you have, first, that religious are numbered together with sons and wives in this matter. Secondly, that not only is presumed leave not necessary to avoid theft and religious proprietary guilt, but that retention against the will of the Prelate is required, even if it were preceptive, for him to be a proprietor.

n. 17.

This is indeed a tacit leave, while the prelates do not forbid, and it suffices, because tacit and express leave have the same force, Leg. cum quod, ff. de rebus creditis, et cap. 2. de rescriptis, and so teach Sanchez l. 7. de Relig. cap. 9. num. 7. and Fagundez lib. 7. cap. 5. num. 12., who add that the use and received custom introduced in religion, of giving and receiving without leave for licit uses, excuses religious. The same must be said with respect to retention.

n. 18.

WHEREFORE the principal sign of proprietary guilt, which is to retain something without legitimate leave, as Navar. teaches, C. non dicatis, 12. quaest. 1., Suarez de Relig. T. 3. l. 8. cap. 12. num. 2., as is had in C. Monachi, de statu Monachorum, is removed, if he receives and retains with this intention, that if the Prelate should command, he would not wish to retain it.

n. 19.

For the S. Doctor considered that the grave penalties there enjoined are not to be imposed for any omission whatever of leave. For there it is ordered that they be removed from the altar unless they repent, and that in death they be deprived of suffrages and of Ecclesiastical burial if they die in that state, and in life be deprived for two years of active and passive voice, and formerly they were expelled from the monastery, as is had in cap. cum ad Monasterium. It is true that this penalty was corrected by cap. Finale de regularibus, as Sanchez notes, l. 7. de Relig. cap. 20. num. 77., and Abbas on the aforesaid C. Cum ad Monasterium, num. 13., and Fagundez cap. 5. num. 13.

n. 20.

Sanchez notes very well, however, that the penalties of proprietary guilt are not incurred by those who give or receive without leave, but only by those who possess their own property; of these the C. Monachi speaks.

n. 21.

It must also be noted, in order to incur these penalties of proprietary guilt, that any private property whatever, or proprietary guilt, does not suffice, but it is required that a monk be found to have a great private store. But how great that store ought to be is not found treated among the Doctors, as Fagundez says, num. 4.; it is only found in Ioannes Andreas, C. cum ad Monasterium, de statu Monach. numer. 4., Hostiensis numero 7., Anchar. num. 10., and others, that a proprietary monk is to be buried outside the Church with some part of money and of his own store found, in these words: Let thy money be with thee unto perdition. And they add that this part ought to be thirty silver pieces, because Christ the Lord was sold at that price, that is, three ducats. From this you have that the quantity ought to be much greater for one to be a proprietor; and thus Fagundez thinks it could be thirty ducats.

n. 22.

Secondly, a religious is EXCUSED from proprietary guilt by the presumed will of the superior for that occasion, and a certain epieikeia is said to apply. For this, however, it is necessary that the matter be pressing, and that the Superior be absent, so that he cannot be approached. So teaches D. Bonavent. p. 1. Speculi disciplinae ad Novitios, cap. 4. in fine, D. Thom. 2. 2. quaestione 32. articul. 8. ad 1., Lessius Tom. 1. lib. 2. cap. 41. de statu religion. dub. 9., Lopes p. 1. cap. 156., Rodriquez Tomo 2. summae, cap. 31., whom Fagundez cites and follows, in septimum Praeceptum, l. 7. cap. 5. num. 20. Hence Suarez says, Tomo 3. de Relig. lib. 9. cap. 9. num. 28.: If a necessity of relieving a parent, gravely suffering and in need, should befall a Friar Minor of St. Francis, by accepting money offered by someone, and then he has no opportunity of going to his superior, and there is no hope of having another similar occasion, he may accept that money by epieikeia; he affirms the same moreover if the superior should unjustly deny him leave.

n. 23.

But they ASK: whether one who has applied epieikeia in this manner is bound afterwards to report to the superior. It is answered with D. Bonav.: if the thing still exists, and the superior can revoke or amend it, he is bound to report to the superior, that he may not be a proprietor. The same thought Sanchez de Relig. lib. 7. cap. 19. num. 8. and Fagundez num 22.

n. 24.

But if he would probably not believe that the superior would revoke or amend it, he is not bound to approach him, even if the thing still exists. So Sanchez and Fagundez loc. cit., Nauar. in commentario, 2. num. 20. de regular. mendic. quaest. 8. quodlib. concl. 8., Graffius p. 1. l. 3. cap. 5. num. 54.

n. 25.

Further, to receive or to give with this intention, that afterwards we may wish to ask leave, the S. Doctor judges not altogether safe, loco adducto.

Tr. IV, Disputation I: On the Vow, Question VI: Whether fear inflicted on another makes a vow invalid

n. 100.

I assert that a Vow emitted in grave fear justly struck is valid.

n. 101.

It is proved by the reason of D. Bonavent. there, because then no fear falling upon a constant man is struck into him by another, but he rather strikes fear into himself, as is found in leg. si mulier 21. at the beginning, ff. de eo, quod metus causa. For he is himself to himself the cause of fearing sin, or the evil of penalty, one of which looms to be chosen. Which reason Sanchez uses, lib. 4. de matrimonio, disp. 13. num. 3.

n. 102.

This doctrine destroys the foundation of the adversaries; for the vow is voluntary, since the fear was struck from within, duly, and is therefore not coercing; for coercion and force are from without.

n. 103.

From these you can gather that Vows extorted by light fear are valid; for liberty is not gravely assailed thereby.

n. 104.

Here Sanchez discourses at greater length on the excommunication of the holy Council of Trent, sess. 25. de regul. cap. 18., which is fulminated first against those compelling women to enter a monastery, or to take on the habit of Religion, or to make profession.

n. 105.

Secondly, against those giving aid or favor to that end.

n. 106.

Thirdly, against those who, knowing that a woman does not enter or take the habit or emit profession spontaneously, interpose in any way whatever power, or consent, or authority to that act.

n. 107.

Fourthly, against those impeding, without just cause, the voluntary act of the woman willing to emit Vows and enter religion. On this Suarez, Tom. 5. in 3. part. disp. 23. sect. 5., where he treats of Censures, which is the place of this disputation, and which will be treated by us in the 3. part. Tom. 2. Tract. de Censuris.

Tr. IV, Disputation II: On the Religious State, or on Solemn Vows

AMONG the other advantages of solemn vows this one especially shines forth, that in this state not fewer vows are joined together among themselves than of lives of many persons joined together; Hence, as the Seraphic Doctor teaches tit. 4. Diaetae, cap. 1., many gathered together into one walk more securely, resist more strongly, and take their comfort more sweetly: hence also it is said in Psalm 49.: Gather together unto him his saints, seeing that, it is better that two be together than one, for birds flying apart are either rapacious, like hawks; or mourning the loss of their companion, like turtledoves; nor does the Lord suffer anything but a pair of Turtledoves to be offered in the Temple, that we may know that, if the soul is alone, having no one to be joined to, it has not even that bond of perfection, namely charity, by which it is joined; wherefore the Holy Spirit descended not upon the Disciples scattered, but assembled together Act. 2., as the Saintly Doctor observes in the place cited, where he illustrates the conventual life with many other and most beautiful similitudes.

HE treats of these things also in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, and more broadly in many little works, after the exposition of the Rule of the Friars Minor, where he disputes against the assailants of religion. But since this disputation is broad, we shall divide it into many Sections; and first concerning the state of Religion in general: Then indeed we shall treat of the individual Vows: in which disputation Suarez and Sanchez speak excellently and at length. Waldensis Tom. 1. Doctrinalis fidei., Bellarm. Tom. 2., with Valentia disput. 10.

Tr. IV, Disputation II: On the Rel…, Section I: On the Vows of Religious in Common

As in ancient times in the Mosaic law there were some sacrifices which the people offered to God in part, and others which they offered totally; so in the law of grace the Church dedicates some to God in part through simple vows, but devotes others totally through solemn vows; for those are accustomed to fall upon some particular thing; but these heal the whole man, by taking away those three sicknesses with which almost the whole world is infected, according to the saying of D. John, everything that is in the world is either the concupiscence of the eyes, or the concupiscence of the flesh, or the pride of life; yet the solemnity or simplicity of vows does not arise from this totality or partiality alone, as will be discussed shortly.

Tr. IV, Disputation II: On the Rel…, Sect. I, Question I: In what solemn vows differ from simple vows

Famous is this question, and exceedingly necessary, all the more so as new decrees of the Pontiffs are in force for deciding it.

¶ The first opinion is, that Solemn and simple vows differ from the very nature of the vows themselves, with all ecclesiastical law set aside; and that the essence of solemn vows consists in the handing over of oneself and of one's goods into the hands of God and of those who act in God's place: Brought forward by Sanchez for this opinion are D. Thomas in 4. d. 38. quaest. 1. art. 2. quaestiuncula 3., D. Bonaventura same dist. art. 2. quaest. 1., Durandus there quaest. 1. and 2., Richardus there art. 7., Mayro quaest. unic. part. 4., Capreolus 4. d. 33. quaest. unic. art. 1. concl. 2. and art. 3., Deca there quaest. unic. art. 3., Carthus. 4. d. 3. quaest. 2., Fortunius Garcia cap. 1. de pactu, num. 13., Turrecrem. cap. presbyterus, num. 1. and 2. d. 27., Tabiena dispensatio quaest. 7., Sotus 7. de Iust. quaest. 2. art. 5. and 4. d. 38. quaest. 2. art. 1., Petrus Soto lect. 5. de matrim., Couarr. 4. decret. 2. part. cap. 7. § 4. num. 7., Ledesma 2. part. 4. quaest. 55. art. 5., Alex. Carterius lib. 3. de sponsal. cap. 6., Celatia 4. d. 37. quaest. 3. and d. 38. quaest. after the seventh argument, Viguerz Instit. cap. 16. § 7., Stunica lib. 5. recopil. tit. 1. rubr gloss. 1., Vega in summa, cap. 49., Henriquez lib. 1. de matrim. cap. 5., Barbosa Rubrica, ff. soluto matrimonio 2. part. from num. 93. up to 100., Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 7., Hugolinus de Sacramentis, where on marriage cap. 19., Valentia 2. 2. d. 6. quaest. 9. puncto 5. and 4. puncto d. 10. de matrimonio quaest. 5. puncto 3., Candelabr. p. p. num. 129., Petrus Ledesma de matrim. quaest. 53. art. 2., Barthol. Ledesma de matrim. dub. 32. and dub. 33., Ludovicus Lopez 2. part. Instruct. de matrim. cap. 48., Graffi 2. part. decis. lib. 2. cap. 12., Vega 2. Tomo summa, cap. 57. casu 21.

¶ Certain other, older authors also acknowledged this same difference between a solemn and a simple vow, though they assert that the subsequent marriage can be dissolved by mere human law through the profession. These are Ioan. Andr. cap. unico de voto. in 6., there Abb. Anchar., Dominicus Archid., who has the same thing cap. finali. num. 5. d. 27., Cardin. Clementina unica de consang. num. 19. quaest. 42., Altisiodor. lib. 3. summae, Tract. 28. cap. 1. quaest. 3., and Brunellus de sponsal. concl. 31.

n. 4.

¶ As to D. Bonaventure, who is brought forward for this opinion, I say that in that question he only asserts that it cannot commonly be said that the Church dispenses in a solemn vow of chastity for entering marriage, and that therefore it seems false to him that its illegitimacy comes from her, because she can dispense in her own constitutions.

…and 1032 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Concina, Theologia Christiana III

Daniele Concina, O.P. — 46 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Diss. II, One Extorted by Fear or Er…, Chapter IX — On the vow of assuming the religious state

I. St. Thomas treats of the vow of assuming the religious state (II-II, q. 189, art. 2 — not art. 88, as Leander writes, correcting Prado, since he wrote art. 89), where he shows that a vow of professing the religious state is a laudable work, and full of merit — since, whatever a vow concerns pertains to God, and the profession of the religious state pertains to God in the highest degree; for by this profession a man offers himself as a holocaust in the service and honor of God.

II. It follows from this that one who made a vow to enter religious life ought to apply every diligence, as the Angelic Doctor teaches (loc. cit., art. 3, ad 1). Nor, however, is it required for the observance of the vow that the one vowing actually enter religious life, and actually carry out the entrance — since many things can prevent such an entrance from being carried out, and it does not depend on the one vowing that these be removed; but it is only necessary that the one vowing omit nothing, on his own part, of those things which can pave the way toward entering the Order. If, however, the one vowing had any impediments, he ought to reveal them to the Superiors of that religious order which he vowed to enter. For such a revelation, even if it should impede the entrance, is necessary for the validity of the contract between the religious order and the one vowing. For a religious order has the right not to receive those who are bound by a grave impediment, and can, by right, insist that hidden impediments be revealed. So authors commonly teach. The diligence, however, which we have said must be applied by the one vowing, need not be extraordinary — such as having recourse to intercessors, and the patronage of great men, to secure entrance — but it suffices that he use those means which prudent men are accustomed to employ in matters of graver import. We consider less probable what the theologians of Salamanca write (tract. 15, ch. 2, punct. 1, n. 2) — namely, that the one vowing is not bound, when he seeks to be received into the habit, to reveal his vow to the Prelate, even though he might hope, by this manifestation, to be admitted to religious life more easily — since, they say, this manifestation is not necessary for the execution of the vow: for the one vowing is bound only to apply the necessary means. They praise, for this opinion, Cajetan (II-II, q. 189, art. 3, near the solution to the second objection). But this is falsely alleged, as often happens with them. For Cajetan has not a word in the place cited to exempt the one vowing from the manifestation of such a vow. They also praise Bonacina, and others, whose examination, since the matter is of lesser moment, I pass over. I say this manifestation is necessary for the execution of the vow: for the one vowing is bound, by virtue of the vow, to apply those means which he prudently judges to conduce to obtaining the end of the vow. Given, then, that such a means is fitting for obtaining the end of the vow, and can be employed without grave inconvenience to himself, I do not see why he should not be bound to use it in such a means. What, indeed, is easier than this manifestation of the vow? Once it is known, entrance into religious life is more easily obtained; nor, indeed, does it not sometimes happen that this is the case. Although we grant that this manifestation is not, by its own nature, necessary for the execution of the vow, nonetheless, in this circumstance, it is necessary that the one vowing act in good faith, and apply those means which present no difficulty, and are efficacious for the attainment of the end. For in what business of any importance similar to this would such an easy diligence be omitted? Nor does it follow from this that the one vowing is bound to implore the aid and favor of patrons — since such means carry with them a grave inconvenience, and it is prudently presumed that the one vowing did not bind himself to them. So that this matter, somewhat entangled, may be more clearly explained, we shall devote the following paragraphs to it.

§I. How the following vows are to be interpreted

I. Question I. What is to be said of this vow: "I promise to enter religious life, unless God should decide otherwise concerning me"? Response: This vow can have a twofold sense, as Sánchez, following Córdoba, notes (Bk. IV, on the Decalogue, ch. 16, n. 2). The first is: "I vow religious life, unless God should render me unfit for entrance by some illness, or other obstacle" — this impediment removed, the vow will still oblige. The second is: "I vow religious life, unless God should decree something more expedient for my salvation." In this case, they say, the vow ceases. And in doubt as to whether some other state than religious life is more expedient for the salvation of the one vowing, they add that upright men should be consulted, and, the doubt remaining, a dispensation from the vow should be sought. For the rest, to state what I think: this attached condition seems to me inept, and superfluous — since, whenever an impediment occurs, or a state of greater perfection presents itself, it would be understood even if the condition had not been attached. I likewise consider this other condition superfluous: "I vow to enter religious life, if I shall be able" — since no one is bound to enter religious life unless he is able. And although all have physical power, not all have moral power. Nonetheless, in any vow whatsoever moral power too is included, so that grave impediments render the one vowing unfit. But if someone wishes to defend the aforesaid condition as reasonable, I do not consider it a matter of such importance that I should contend sharply about it — especially since, in similar vows, the intention of the one vowing must always be looked to first of all.

II. Question II. How is this vow to be explained: "I vow to enter this religious order, if I shall have entered any"? Response: St. Antoninus proposes this vow (Part II, tit. 11, ch. 2, §1, note 15), in these words: "If someone should swear, or vow, to enter this religious order — if he enters any, it is valid; because by this, no other order is principally excluded, but this one is principally included. And if not purely, yet under a condition — namely, if he wishes to enter any. But if he were to promise that he would enter no other, and would not promise to enter this one, he would not be bound to enter it, either purely or conditionally; nor would he sin by not entering it." When, then, the one vowing designates some particular religious order, even though he casts aside the condition, the vow is valid; if, however, he excludes every religious order, the vow is null, and impious. To make the nature of this vow clearer, however, the intention of the one vowing must be examined. For if, led by a particular affection toward this religious order, he vowed entrance into it as something set before him principally, the vow is valid, even though conditional — since the entrance into religious life, even though bound by a condition, is good and fit matter for a vow. On the contrary, if he had principally vowed that he would enter no religious order at all, then the whole matter of the vow would be a pure negation, unsuited to a vow; and consequently the vow itself would be null. So authors commonly teach.

III. Question III. Is this vow valid: "I vow that no person shall be an obstacle to me, from entering religious life, or from doing something else"? Response: Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 16, n. 3), Trullench (Bk. II, ch. 2, dub. 17, n. 4), Leander (tract. 1, q. 5) pronounce this invalid. It seems valid to me, however; for it yields this sense, unless the express intention of the one vowing indicates otherwise: "I vow that I will enter religious life, unless someone's prayers or objections are an obstacle to me" — that is, "I vow that I will overcome, as much as I can, the impediments of all persons, so that I may enter religious life." What of the fact that the cited authors affirm that a vow conceived in this manner is valid: "I vow that nothing shall be an impediment to my entering religious life"? And yet there is no difference at all, save in the words, if it is compared with the other.

IV. Question IV. Is one who made a vow of wishing to enter religious life bound to enter it? Response: Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 16, n. 8) answers negatively, and Navarrus (Bk. III, Consilia, on vows), to whom Leander, Pellizzari, Azor (Bk. XI, ch. 20), Bassaeus, and others subscribe. If this vow is considered absolutely, disjoined from any circumstance, it is certain that it does not induce an obligation to enter religious life, for the reason the cited authors assign — namely, that a vow to wish is one thing, a vow to do is another. One who vows only to wish does not vow to do. But this one vowing does not vow to enter, but vows to wish to enter. For this, it suffices that he sometimes have a firm and good will to enter — which will not at all obstruct his entering marriage. But these are, in a certain metaphysical consideration, all true. For the rest, if someone had really made such a vow, there would scarcely be any foundation for presuming that such a one vowing did not have the intention of vowing entrance into religious life. What prudent man would vow that he would have the will to enter religious life, while at the same time having a purpose of contracting marriage? The will to enter religious life is good, since it looks to a good. But, while a contrary deliberate will to marry is present, there are two acts that collide with one another. Wherefore, if this case occurred to me, I would seriously investigate the intention of the one vowing — since in practice either the vow is ill-considered, and null for want of due knowledge, or the one vowing is certainly bound to entrance into religious life. The same must be said of one who vowed that he did not wish to live in the world — namely, the intention of the one vowing must be investigated. The cited authors say that, for the observance of such a vow, it will suffice that the one vowing behave negatively, and elicit no contrary act — "I wish to live in the world" — and therefore he can enter marriage. Such vows seem ridiculous to me; and those who would make them, too imprudent, and ill-considered. Wherefore, if I were to find that prudent men had made such vows, and expressed them thus, I would seriously investigate their intention: since commonly one who vows... wishes to enter religious life is presumed to intend that entrance in earnest. Nor is it so much from the words as from the intention of the one vowing that the obligation and nature of the vow are to be drawn. If the matter of the vow were a mere negation, and included nothing positive, the contrary opinion would be true. And therefore the cited authors say that such a one vowing must behave negatively, by virtue of such a vow. But I, all things weighed, would judge either that the vow is null, or would oblige the one vowing to entrance into religious life.

V. Question V. Is a vow of dying in religious life a vow of religious life? Response: All commonly affirm this. For no one can meet death in religious life unless he first enters it. Indeed, by virtue of such a vow, he is bound to persevere in it. Authors dispute only about the time by which the one vowing is bound, by virtue of such a vow, to make his entrance. Some maintain that such a vow does not induce an obligation to enter so quickly, as with an absolute vow of entering religious life; and this must be investigated, as regards this vow and other similar disputed points, with the intention of the one vowing and the circumstances considered. If the force of the words is attended to, it seems probable enough that such a vow does not press an entrance as swift as an absolute vow to enter religious life would. That, on the contrary, it does not admit a long delay, likewise appears likely enough. Wherefore this should be left to the judgment of a prudent man, so that, the circumstances inspected, he could either anticipate, or moderately defer, the time of execution.

VI. Question VI. Does a vow of eremitic and solitary life induce an obligation? Response: Authors agree that this is not a true vow of religious life. They differ concerning its obligation. Lest we linger longer than is just on questions of lesser moment, it does not seem to be doubted that this vow is valid. If those vowing do not fully hold the eremitic and solitary state and perfection of life (which is not to be undertaken without a special vocation, and celestial illumination), they will be able to obtain a dispensation. This too is common ground among authors.

§II. On the obligation of the vow to assume the religious state

I. Question I. Does one who vowed religious life absolutely fulfill the vow, if he assumes the habit of the Knights of St. James, of Calatrava, of Alcántara? Response: Some affirm this; but the common opinion denies it — both because it is highly controverted whether these are true Religious, since they do not vow chastity absolutely, but only conjugal chastity; nor do they pledge to God either absolute poverty, or obedience; and also because, granting them to be truly in the religious state, those who vow "entrance into religious life" do not intend such orders, but those which profess the cenobitic life.

II. Question II. Is a vow of religious life at least fulfilled if the habit of the Knights of St. John is assumed? Response: Several not undistinguished writers say that these Knights make three absolute vows — poverty, chastity, and obedience — and are true Religious; and, as far as the religious state is concerned, some of these same Knights insist to me that, by the assumption of the habit, they turn to an apostolic life approved by the Church. But the common opinion denies that the absolute vow of religious life of the aforesaid Knights of St. John is fulfilled — since, according to the common estimation of those who vow entrance into religious life, the ordinary meaning intended is one of the orders in which, wholly separated from the tumult of the world, a common life is led.

III. Question III. Would such a vow at least be fulfilled by entrance into an order of military Clerics of chastity, such as the Knights of Malta living there, and observing common life? Response: All commonly affirm this — since these do lead a truly regular life in convents, in the manner of other Regulars; and it is beyond controversy that, as long as they live under a rule approved by the Holy See, they are true Religious, since the Knights of Malta dwelling there lead a common life, just as other Religious do.

IV. Question IV. Does the one vowing religious life satisfy the vow, if he enters a relaxed religious order? Response: All authors commonly deny this. But it must be explained what is meant by "relaxed" religious order. For relaxation admits of greater or lesser latitude. Some religious order (would that it were only some!) has diminished from its ancient rigor in food, and in its garments, observing neither the abstinence, nor the austerity, which it observed from its beginnings; it takes care, however, that the laws and constitutions, though now milder, are observed by all. Moreover, the observance of the vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience flourishes exactly in it, having remitted nothing of the ancient rigor, not only in its chief points but in every particular. This religious order, however, though somewhat diminished in its common estimation, and in fact, is not relaxed; but can only be called milder.

V. That religious order is commonly called "relaxed" which is deficient, as they say, in substantial matters. Now the substantial laws, or the first and chief constitutions and precepts, which must be observed, are the three necessary vows, and those things which are proximate to these vows, and without which — or scarcely without which — the observance of these vows can stand at all. Thus the vow of poverty cannot possibly be reconciled with private property; the vow of chastity with free egress from the cloisters; the vow of obedience with the free faculty of advancing one's own private interests. Hence those religious orders whose Religious have their own private property, now richer, now poorer, according to what fortune brings, and inhabit dwellings not infrequently more spacious and comfortable than secular men, feast on delicacies, and, if they wish, eat meat at their own pleasure and appetite, and where the leaders and Superiors, with tacit connivance, impune violate the other constitutions, in which, finally, the subjects conspire against the transgression of the laws; leave the monastery, indulge in games, break silences, fasts, and — although with their mouths they boast of observing their vows — most manifest experience nonetheless suggests the opposite.

VI. It must also be noted that scarcely any religious order is found which has collapsed in all its convents; rather, nearly every order has some monasteries, or Congregations, or Provinces, in which firm regular observance persists.

VII. We say, then, that one who vows entrance into religion not only does not fulfil his vow if he enters a religious order relaxed in the way we have described; but we add that even a vow of entering such religious orders is null, because it is not of a better good. Religious orders approved by God make the way of salvation easier; the relaxed Orders which I have described make the attainment of the blessed life more difficult, indeed most difficult. Therefore a vow of entering them is not of a better good, and so is null. The minor premise, about which alone there can be doubt, has been plainly shown in our Apostolic-Monastic Discipline, where we asserted, with all the theologians and casuists, however benign, that one who enters such religious orders casts himself into the gravest dangers of his eternal perdition. We will now recount only some of them: St. Antoninus (Part III, tit. 16, ch. 2); Thomas Cajetan (II-II, q. 189, art. 9, and Vol. I of the Opuscula, the last tract, resp. 7); Seraphinus Porrecta in the same place; Martín Navarrus (in the Manual, ch. 12, nn. 45 and 46); Paul Nazarius (on the state of religion, concl. 14); Nyder (on the reform of religious orders, ch. 9, part 1); López (in the Instructions, ch. 43); Lezana (on the obligations of religious, ch. 7, n. 16); Lessius (on justice and right, Bk. II, ch. 41, dub. 5); Cassiano a S. Elia (decis. 1, n. 2); Sánchez (Bk. IV on the Decalogue, ch. 16, n. 14); Passerini (q. 189, art. 2, n. 6); Leander (tract. 1 on oaths, qq. 14 and 15); the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 15, ch. 2, punct. 1, n. 3); Rotarius (Vol. I, Bk. I, ch. 7, punct. 2, n. 2); Martínez de Prado (Vol. II, ch. 31, q. 7, n. 2); Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 5, §6, n. 3); Layman (Bk. IV, tract. 5, ch. 6, n. 5). The reason is obvious enough, and occurs to everyone at once. For whoever vows entrance into religion intends chiefly and solely that state in which, far removed from the dangers of the world, he may serve God and work out his eternal salvation more safely. But when he enters a collapsed religious order, he casts himself into more and graver hazards, and into a kind of necessity, as it were, of violating the new obligations he has taken on, above all the vow of poverty, which he will pronounce to God with solemn rite. Consult what we have said in the aforesaid Apostolic-Monastic Discipline, dissert. 5, ch. 13.

VIII. Question V. Does one who vowed to enter a stricter religious order satisfy his obligation if he enters a laxer one? Response: By no means, and this is certain among all — since a solemn vow renders it impossible to commute a lesser thing for a greater. What if he makes profession in a laxer institute? Will the profession be valid? I do not deny it. But does he satisfy the vow? No one, however, promised a greater vow. This is certain and holds among all. Is the profession valid? It will certainly be valid, though it does not satisfy — since one solemn vow, such as monastic profession is, dissolves another simple vow, such as that of entering a stricter Order. This holds among all.

IX. Question VI. Can one who vowed a stricter religious order, but professed in a laxer one, lawfully persevere in it? Response: Authors speak too obscurely, and confusedly, about this matter. For they commonly assert that, in one sense, it is true, according to what St. Thomas holds (II-II, q. 189, art. 8, ad 3), where he says: "A solemn vow by which someone is bound to a lesser religious order is stronger than a simple vow by which someone is bound to a greater religious order. For if someone, after a simple vow, should contract marriage, it would not be dissolved, as a solemn vow would be. And therefore one who has already professed in a lesser religious order is not bound to fulfill the simple vow which he made of entering a greater religious order." From this doctrine the theologians of Salamanca gather (tract. 15, ch. 2, punct. 1, n. 4) that someone can, on his own authority, commute a vow of entering a stricter religious order into that of persevering in a laxer one — since to persevere in the laxer is more perfect than to dissolve the vow only of entering the stricter. This they teach, and several authors praise it, who really do gather this doctrine. This, however, unless it is explained, is a cause of error, and matters must be resolved apart from doubts. It is certain that a solemn vow extinguishes a simple vow; and consequently one who made a vow to enter a stricter religious order, if he made profession in a laxer one, is no longer bound, by virtue of his simple vow, to embrace the stricter — since that simple vow is dissolved, and utterly extinguished, by the solemn vow of profession. And, as to this point, the cited authors, along with St. Thomas, speak excellently. But if the religious order is relaxed in substantial matters, although he is not bound, by virtue of the past and extinguished vow, to enter the stricter order; he is nonetheless bound by reason of the divine law, which obliges all to avoid the dangers of eternal damnation. It has already been shown that a vow of entering a relaxed religious order is null, and that the one vowing gravely sins, unless ignorance excuses him, when he fulfills it by entering such a religious order — as we have said, and as the theologians of Salamanca themselves teach, in agreement with all other theologians. Such a one vowing, then, cannot lawfully persevere in a religious order relaxed in substantial matters. St. Thomas, however, in the place cited, speaks of a religious order which is truly "lesser," in relation to a greater religious order which is stricter — each of which, however, observes its own proper laws, as I have shown at length in the aforesaid Discipline. But one who vowed a laxer order, without doubt, elicited a valid vow of such a lesser order.

One who vows the assumption of one religious order cannot, by his own authority, commute the vow into another, even equally strict, by entering it: for no one, without dispensation, can, as we more probably consider, commute a vow into an equally good, but only into an evidently better, one.

n. X.

X. Question VII. Does one satisfy the vow of entering a stricter religious order, if he enters a laxer one which has a pontifical privilege of receiving all who have vowed the stricter one? Response: The Doctors commonly affirm this, and report that the Benedictines, Augustinians, and others really do have such a privilege. Whatever the truth about these privileges, the distinction given above must always be kept before one's eyes — namely, understanding by "laxer religious order" one that is milder, gentler, and less severe, which nonetheless truly observes its own milder laws; the privilege having been granted, this is the true, common opinion. If, however, by "laxer religious order" is meant one collapsed in substantial matters, the aforesaid opinion would be false. For we deny that any legitimate privilege is found which grants collapsed Orders the faculty of receiving those who have vowed a stricter religious order. Indeed, we assert that pontifical decrees deprive religious orders of this kind of the faculty of receiving anyone at all for profession.

n. XI.

XI. Question VIII. What is one bound to who vowed religious life indefinitely? Response: St. Thomas (II-II, q. 189, art. 3, ad 2) says this: "That man is bound to go to a specific religious order, who intended simply to bind himself. Therefore, if he is not received into one religious order, he is bound to seek entrance into another; and, if he is indeed received into some religious order, he ought to do what he intended by such a vow. And if he vows himself specially to one religious order, he is bound only according to that mode of obligation which he vowed. But if he determinately vowed one religious order alone, he ought to apply the diligence that he would apply in any other matter of graver moment, so that he may be received in it." Thus, as the Doctors commonly say, if he has been refused by one monastery, he ought to seek out four or five others; just as, if he vowed religious life indefinitely, he is bound to explore four or five orders, and five or six convents of each order, so that, if rejected by all, he may be free of the vow. So teach Sánchez, Castropalao, Trullench, Leander, and others. They also dispute whether he is bound to go outside his own nation and homeland, and to approach convents of another language and region. But this is commonly denied — it seeming preferable to leave the matter to the judgment of a prudent man. This alone should always be noted: that the entrance into a collapsed religious order is neither to be attempted, nor carried out. If the one vowing is free of impediments, entrance into one or another religious order will be easy for him; if he is entangled with impediments, he will find none. One who is unfit for one may be fit for another. All these matters depend on many circumstances. For this reason no fixed rule can be assigned, but the matter must be left to the judgment of a prudent man.

From this it is gathered that the opinion of Sánchez, Castropalao, Leander, and the theologians of Salamanca, who assert that one who vowed religious life indefinitely is not to be compelled to enter the strictest Order — such as the Capuchins, Carthusians, Camaldolese, and Minims — is not absolutely true. Since it can occur, and indeed not infrequently, that one vowing possesses all those qualities that render him fit, and apt, for one of the aforesaid Orders. If, however, he is unfit for others, and this one vowing is healthy and robust, if he experiences no aversion to such an Order, if he is instructed with the best character, if he burns with the ardor of virtue — why should he not be advised toward the entrance into such an Order? Rather, this matter, as we have said, ought to be left entirely to the judgment of a prudent and learned man, and, alongside him, a pious man, when it comes to the assumption of the religious state. Absolutely, then, the rule of these Doctors seems false. And this must equally be affirmed of women as of men. As for the diversity of homeland and province, however, women are commonly not to be compelled to seek a convent outside their own city, or at least too far removed from their parents. Men who have vowed religious life indefinitely, if they have been commonly refused by all religious orders, are by no means bound to enter the military Order of the Knights of St. John, of Calatrava, or of Alcántara — since such military Orders are not comprehended under the term "religious order" in general, as has been explained above.

n. XII.

XII. Question IX. One who vows to enter this or that convent, if he suffers a refusal, is he bound to approach other monasteries? Response: The resolution must be gathered from the intention of the one vowing. If, moved by some peculiar reason, he first and principally set before himself such a monastery, and suffered a refusal, he remains free from the vow. Cautiously, however, and seriously, the intention of the one vowing must be investigated. For if a peculiar affection alone toward such a monastery moved him only to elicit the vow, and no solid reason for such a specific choice shines forth, then he is not free from the debt of seeking acceptance in other monasteries of the same Order — since in these circumstances it is clear that this one vowing intended, first and per se, entrance into religious life, and then, secondarily, into this particular monastery. In similar cases, the whole judgment depends on the one vowing's own account of the matter.

n. XIII.

XIII. Question X. One who has once been legitimately rejected by a monastery, or religious order, is he bound, if invited afterward to embrace it, or the monastery, to do so? Response: If someone is repelled on account of a temporary impediment, once the impediment is removed, he is bound, by virtue of the vow, to seek re-entry. This is agreed upon by all. This must be said first, which is certain among all: namely, that if the one vowing was rejected on account of some apparent impediment, which in fact and in truth was not one — as, if one to be received were reckoned to be burdened with debt, or illegitimately born, or afflicted with some hidden disease, which was in fact not true — then, certain, I say, it is that he would be bound, if that same Order should later admit him.

n. XIV.

XIV. What is brought into dispute, however, is whether one legitimately, and perpetually, rejected remains free of the vow, if he is invited later, or is not bound to entrance. Authors commonly declare that such a person is free of the bond of the vow; and this opinion seems to me more probable, and absolutely so — since, otherwise, if he were invited anew by a religious order, and did not enter, he would be forced to remain anxious and suspended for his whole lifetime; nor is it in any way to be presumed that the one vowing intended to bind himself to so uncertain a fate when he made the vow of religious life; nor can such a grave burden be prudently gathered from the nature of a vow. Less probable to us, however, seems what the theologians of Salamanca teach (n. 11), along with Castropalao, Aragón, Pellizzari, Diana, and others, in the place cited — namely, that the one vowing, having made his petition for admission to the religious habit, is not bound, by virtue of the vow, to await the consent of the religious order; since, they say, this vow is presumed to have been made under this condition: "If, due diligence having been applied, the religious order should wish to admit me" — for this time is required for deliberating, or if it defers the deliberation as long as it wishes. This opinion, I say, seems to us both less probable, and false — since scarcely any religious order is so cautious and prudent in receiving candidates that it does not defer acceptance for some period of time, so that it may ascertain whether it is expedient to admit, and make trial of whether the postulant's will is constant and firm. So far, then, is it from being true that, in the vow of acceptance, a tacit condition of a sudden acceptance is included, that rather a fitting delay is always presumed. It must be said, then, that if such a delay is such as to provide a solid foundation for despairing of obtaining entrance, then the one vowing is to be declared free from the vow; otherwise, if the delay is moderate, and leaves hope of obtaining acceptance at a suitable time.

n. XV.

XV. Question XI. Can a regular Superior lawfully reject, with the same facility, one bound by a vow of religious life, as one bound by no vow? Response: The common opinion affirms this, and rightly — since the obligation of the one vowing in no way affects the Prelates, or the religious order accepting him. For the vow was made under this condition — namely, if the Prelate should wish to accept.

n. XVI.

XVI. Question XII. One who vowed religious life, so that he might be a Cleric in it, is he free from the vow, if the religious order refuses to admit him except as a lay Brother? Response: He is altogether free — since a vow does not oblige beyond the intention of the one vowing; but the one vowing expressly intended, when he made the vow, to profess as a Cleric. Therefore, this condition failing, the vow remains dissolved. But if, when he made the vow, he thought nothing about the clerical or lay state, and is fit for either state — namely, both clerical and lay — he is bound to accept whichever grade the religious order shall prescribe. One who expressly vowed to assume the priestly state can commute the vow, and become a lay Brother, and vice versa, if, however, the religious order consents — since this is an accidental change within the same religious order. All this is common ground among all. From the condition of the one vowing, however, it will generally be easy to discern which state he intended for himself, whether expressly, or at least tacitly. But if this can in no way be discerned, the one vowing must abide by the judgment of the religious order, as we have said.

n. XVII.

XVII. Question XIII. An illegitimate son, aware of the constitution of Sixtus V, by which illegitimate sons are excluded from ranks and dignities, vows religious life; knowing the constitution, is he bound to fulfill the vow? Response: The Doctors commonly deny this — since, since an illegitimate son is unfit to attain such dignities and ranks, he suffers grave ignominy on account of such a penal deprivation; and they assert the same of one vowing a religious order which has a similar law, if he was ignorant of it at the time he made the vow. So teach Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 16, n. 55), Pellizzari (Vol. I, tract. 4, ch. 1, sect. 1, q. 9, n. 55), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 21, q. 43), Castropalao (tract. 16, disp. 1, punct. 3).

This opinion causes me no small difficulty, since not every inconvenience, or difficulty, is sufficient to dissolve a vow. One who despises the world, and all that the world can give — whether riches or dignities — in order to profess evangelical perfection, so as to exercise himself in the virtue of humility, which seems, by its own nature, to include a renunciation of all worldly ranks and dignities — is most prudently presumed, when he made the vow of religious life, to have renounced all such things. Add to this that the aforesaid deprivation of ranks brings ignominy to worldly men, not to Religious; since the more devout, and the more approved, Religious are, the more this renunciation of the vow will bring them praise, the more they will excel among other Religious, however great the worldly dignity from which an illegitimate son is barred. Wherefore this opinion just cited seems to me to accede more to human affections than to the evangelical counsels, to whose observance one who vows religious life pledges to conform his whole life. I myself, indeed, on account of this difficulty alone, unless peculiar circumstances occurred, would not exempt from entrance into religious life one who had made such a vow while ignorant of the aforesaid law.

n. XVIII.

XVIII. Question XIV. One who vowed religious life in the priestly state — is he bound to learn grammar, when, on account of his ignorance of it, he is not admitted? Response: The common opinion affirms this: Sotus (Bk. VII, q. 2, art. 1, ad 3), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 16, n. 61), Suárez (Vol. III, on Religion, Bk. IV, ch. 15, n. 11), Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 3, n. 14), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 21, q. 44), Aragón, Ledesma, Rodríguez, Azor, and others. For whoever wills the end must will the means that conduce to attaining it. If, however, when he made the vow, he thought he could learn it within the religious order, he is not bound to learn it outside it — since his express intention is established, beyond which a vow does not oblige. If he does not wish to learn grammar, he can become a lay Brother, with the consent of the religious order — since then he is judged to fulfill his vow more perfectly, on account of the peculiar humility and labor of such a state. What if, at the time he made the vow of embracing religious life in the priestly state, he was ignorant that a knowledge of grammar was necessary? Is he bound to learn it? The cited authors deny this, on the grounds that this supervening difficulty is grave enough to be sufficient for the dissolution of the vow. This, however, must be gathered from the circumstances. For if the one vowing was so affected toward the religious order that, had he known of this difficulty, he would nonetheless have made the vow, he would surely be bound to learn grammar. If, on the contrary, it is prudently presumed that he would not have made the vow, had he had a clear view of such an impediment, he remains free of the vow, nor is he bound to embrace the lay state in the aforesaid religious order — just as one who vows religious life, knowing that this state requires learning grammar, is not bound to become a lay Brother, if, the risk having been made, he is afterward found altogether incapable of learning it — since moral incapacity dissolves the debt of a vow. On the other hand, the lay state, besides being the state of the one vowing, was, when he made the vow, doubted, whether or not it required grammar, then he is bound to learn it — since, when he was in doubt, he ought to have made himself more certain. Indeed, if he had doubted whether a knowledge of the liberal arts was required for acquiring Philosophy or Theology, he would be compelled to learn those arts, for the reason given — since, when he made the vow in such doubt, he is presumed to have bound himself to carry out all those things which are necessary for obtaining the end. When, however, it is doubted whether the one vowing knew or did not know, at the time of the vow, that grammar was required for the clerical state, it must be presumed that he did know — since there is no religious order which does not require this knowledge; and consequently this is commonly known to all. One who vowed the lay state is not bound to learn a mechanical trade, so that he may be received, if the religious order would exclude him on account of this defect, when, in making the vow, he thought nothing at all about such a trade. On the contrary, if he knew that some trade was necessary for entrance into religious life, then he ought to learn some trade. Sotus notes, however (Bk. VIII, on justice, q. 2, art. 1), that the one vowing is bound to learn the trade which the religious order requires, even if he thought nothing of it, provided, however, that the trade is of such a nature that it can easily be learned; and otherwise the one vowing would scarcely be useful to the religious order without such a trade. For whoever vows is bound to carry out easy means, so that he may become possessed of his vow. This opinion is true.

n. XIX.

XIX. Question XV. One who, after having made a vow of religious life, contracts marriage; or, having contracted and consummated marriage, vows religious life — what must he do? Response: If the vow of religious life preceded the marriage, the one contracting marriage sins mortally. For the entire first two months, he can neither lawfully request the debt, nor render it — since, within these two months, he can still fulfill his vow, by assuming the religious state; wherefore he would sin mortally, both by rendering and by requesting. Once the two months have passed, he is bound to render it, but by no means can he request it. If, however, the marriage is consummated, whether with or without fault, he is then held, by Lessius, Palao, Bonacina, Sánchez, and the theologians of Salamanca (loc. cit.), to be able both to render and to request the debt. If, however, after the marriage is consummated, the spouses, by mutual consent, make a vow, they can both render and request it — since the use of marriage does not impede the vow of taking up religious life; the vow of religious life is understood to be contracted under this condition: unless a better state is chosen. And if someone, after a marriage ratified but not consummated, has the right to enter religious life, he enjoys an even stronger right after the betrothal has been contracted; for betrothals are held to be contracted under this condition. A vow of religious life made after betrothal is valid — since betrothal does not impede a vow of undertaking religious life. But more on all this at greater length when we come to discuss marriage.

n. XX.

XX. Question XVI. Does one who accepts the Episcopate thereby fulfill a vow of religious life? Response: The common opinion denies this. This is gathered from the chapter "Per tuas," on vows, where Innocent III answers this case: "We are confused as to why, if you desire to heal your conscience, you should resign the governance of the Church, rather than accede to it, unless compelled; and render your vows to the Most High." The reason too is clear: for no one is bound to a more perfect state, unless led by peculiar inspiration; and although the episcopal state is absolutely more perfect than the vow of a religious man, nonetheless, excluding the case of necessity, it is better — as far as it concerns embracing and promoting perfection — to have embraced the religious state, and, as it were, called from above, and constrained by superiors, to accept the Episcopate, to which he is called by vocation, rather than to seek it out. This is the common opinion.

§III. On the debt by which one who has vowed it is bound to persevere in religious life

I. One who vows religious life is bound, by virtue of the vow, not only to enter it, but also to persevere in it, unless he otherwise indicates, so that he is bound to one, not to the other. He, however, who vows absolutely to enter religious life, is bound to try it, in the year of probation, as they call it, with a sincere mind of professing it, if he recognizes it as expedient for his eternal salvation. Wherefore, if he is expelled without his own fault, he remains free of the vow, nor is he bound to seek entrance into another religious order. Nor is it to be presumed, when this is not openly established, that one who vowed religious life also vowed perseverance in it — since this is a distinct burden, which is not to be added to the one vowing beyond his intention. St. Thomas treats of this (II-II, q. 189, art. 4).

II. Question I. Does one who enters religious life with the intention of leaving satisfy the vow? Response: St. Thomas, in the place cited, ad 3, answers that one who enters, so as to leave immediately, does not seem to satisfy his vow — since in vowing this he did not intend it; and he is therefore bound to change his purpose, so that at least he wills to make trial of whether it would be expedient for him to remain in religious life; he is not, however, bound to remain there in perpetuity. The reason is clear. For one who vowed religious life... did not vow only the reception of the habit, but the religious state, in which he might be able to serve God; wherefore, unless he tries this state, he cannot lawfully abandon it, if he finds this state less suited to him. So all teach commonly.

III. Question II. One who entered religious life with the intention of leaving, together with the resolve to pray to God that he might change his heart — would he satisfy the vow? Response: Leander affirms this (tract. 1, disp. 21, q. 47), where he cites Angles, Richard, Sylvester, Sánchez, and Bassaeus. Sylvester (s.v. Religio, q. 19) actually reports the opinion of one holding this view; and Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 16, n. 74), with several others, defends this same opinion, on the grounds that he would, in good faith, apply all that is necessary, on his own part, to obtain the effect of his vow. But when the one vowing enters with the intention of leaving, the purpose alleged — of trying to get God to change his heart — is presumed false and mendacious. Wherefore he ought, first of all, to lay aside his intention of leaving; and then pray to God to soften his heart. For how can he, in good faith and sincerely, pray to God to change his heart, if he enters with the deliberate intention of leaving? Wherefore it seems to me more probable, and more consonant with sincerity, that the one vowing ought first to lay aside his depraved intention of leaving, and then apply himself to obtain that God might break the hardness of his heart. If, however, having entered with the aforesaid intention of leaving, and with the purpose of persevering (which two things fight against each other simultaneously), he really did leave the religious order — I would urge him anew that, his intention of leaving having been laid aside, he make trial of the matter in the customary way; and then, if, the experiment made in good faith, he should leave the religious order, because he found that state less suited to him, I would declare him free of the vow. Hence it is to be said, by a stronger right, and authors commonly teach, that one who enters with the intention of not persevering does not satisfy the vow of religious life, even if he leaves for a just cause — since he does not enter in good faith; and therefore he is bound to carry out the business with a sincere mind, so that, having made trial, he may satisfy his vow.

IV. Question III. One who made a vow of entering, and of immediately leaving, or of entering with the express intention of leaving, or of enjoying the liberty granted to Novices by law — to what is he bound? Response: The vow is null, and inept, when both the entrance and the departure equally constitute the matter of the vow. If, however, the vow were, in itself, a valid vow that regarded the entrance, and the departure were an attached circumstance, then the one vowing would be bound to the entrance, and the circumstance, as unjustly attached, need not be observed. One who vows with this express intention of enjoying the liberty which Novices making trial enjoy, can, without doubt, once the trial is made, leave religious life without any bond of vow, and has satisfied his vow. So St. Thomas expressly says (II-II, q. 189, art. 4, in the body): "If, however, he intends to bind himself to entrance into religious life for the sake of making trial, with liberty of remaining, or not remaining, it is manifest that he is not bound to remain. If, however, he leaves without any just cause, he would sin against his vow — provided he held the divine mercy, whose kindness he thus scorns and contemns, as of no account. But if, in vowing, he simply thought of entrance into religious life, without thinking of liberty of departure, or of the perpetuity of remaining, he seems to be bound to entrance according to the common form of law — namely, that a year of probation be given to those entering — whence he is not bound to remain perpetually in religious life. And so, if, the trial having been made beforehand, he leaves for a just cause, he has satisfied his vow."

V. Question IV. One who vowed religious life absolutely, thinking nothing either of perseverance or of departure — does he satisfy the vow if he enters religious life, and, the trial having been made, without any cause, but merely with the liberty granted to other candidates freed of the vow, he leaves? Response: Not a few affirm this. Henry of Ghent (Quodlibet 3, q. 9; Quodlibet 14, q. 15), Navarrus (Bk. III, Consilia, on vows, consil. 25 or 3), Angles (s.v. Votum, n. 18), and others whom Sánchez cites (Bk. IV, ch. 16, n. 89). The reason for this opinion is that a vow, just like an oath, takes on all the limitations and exceptions which the law grants — final chapter, on undue condition. Therefore the vow of religious life is understood to be only for the sake of trial, according to the rules of law.

VI. The contrary opinion, which is more probable, and which authors commonly teach, we embrace. The reason is evident. For one who vows religious life vows that he will lead his life in such a state, granted that this state, the trial having been made, is agreeable to himself, and no sufficient reason occurs why he should withdraw from it. If, indeed, he vowed a religious life to be abandoned at mere whim, with no cause pressing at all; this entrance would be vain and futile, and the matter of the vow inept. Indeed, all who enter religious life set before themselves that they will persevere in it. Therefore, if they act prudently, as we ought to presume, they intend, and this the law grants to the candidates for the sake of making trial within the year of probation — so that, if the state, once tried, is found agreeable, no sufficient reason for departure occurring, they will remain in it fully free of departing. Since, then, all who prudently make the vow of religious life intend, so that they fulfill their vow, to persevere in the religious order, unless some cause of departure arises, the one vowing is bound to persevere in religious life. Nor does the reasoning of the contrary opinion stand in the way — namely, that the law grants full liberty of withdrawing within the year of probation in the external forum, so that, that is, no action lies against departing Novices. For it by no means follows from this that a Novice, though freed of the vow, can, without any cause at all, and by mere caprice, withdraw from religious life which he had once seriously embraced, without at least venially sinning against the gratitude owed to divine goodness. Moreover, if this holds for those free of the vow, whenever they depart without any cause, they would not sin against the vow, but would sin the sin of levity, rashness, and ingratitude against divine kindness — the same, with even stronger reason, must be said of those who would be bound by a vow, and are by no means free from it: for although those freed of the vow would sin, if, having taken up religious life, they departed, they would sin only venially; but these would sin, and gravely, by departing, and would themselves be bound, in good faith, to seek entrance and trial again. So teach Cajetan (II-II, q. 189, art. 4, dub. 3), Armilla (s.v. Novit., n. 10), Sotus (Bk. VII, q. 2, art. 1, ad 3), Aragón (II-II, q. 88, art. 3), Toledo (Bk. IV, Summa, ch. 17, n. 12), Valentia (disp. 6, q. 6, punct. 4), Manuel Rodríguez (Vol. II, Summa, ch. 95, n. 1), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 21, q. 57), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 16, n. 90), and several others.

VII. Question V. What are the just causes for leaving religious life, whether one freed of the vow, or bound by the vow? Response: As is clear from what has been said, according to the common opinion, if, without any legitimate cause, but by mere whim, he abandons the religious order which he had entered, he sins. There is, however, this difference: that one free of the vow would sin venially, one bound by the vow would sin mortally. Sufficient causes must now be assigned, by which both one who vowed, and one who did not, can lawfully withdraw. And, first, it is certain that a greater cause is required in one who made a vow of religious life than in one who assumed religious life without a vow. For a Novice free of the vow can lawfully leave religious life for any reasonable cause whatsoever — say, that the religious order does not suit him, that he foresees that he will not lead a happy life in it, etc. It suffices that he can probably fear such evils. For the rest, one who entered religious life by a vow can withdraw from the religious order which he vowed only for grave, and morally certain, causes. Such are: grave danger of some notable harm, whether temporal or spiritual; the gravest temptations, which such a state would bring upon him; incapacity for sustaining the burdens of religious life; a grave necessity of one's parents, and the like — all of which are to be submitted to the judgment of a prudent man, so that, the circumstances inspected, he may decide what he judges expedient for the one vowing. One who vowed not only religious life, but also perseverance in it, cannot withdraw even for otherwise just causes. Only incapacity, and being expelled from the religious order without his own fault, can exempt him from the vow. If, however, he were rejected through his own fault, he would by no means be free of the vow.

VIII. Question VI. One who, beyond the vow of religious life, also vowed perseverance in it — is he bound to persevere in such a way that, if he happens to leave for just causes, he must enter it again? Response: One who vowed two things — namely, entrance and perseverance — does not satisfy the vow by entrance alone, unless he also adds perseverance: therefore, if he withdraws, even for an otherwise just cause, he is bound to attempt entrance again. For only, as has just been said, evident incapacity for profession, or expulsion from the religious order without the one vowing's own fault, can free him from the bond of the vow. If, however, some most grave difficulty were to supervene, unknown at the time of the vow, such that, had he known of this difficulty, he could have withdrawn — this opinion seems to me more probable: that, the difficulty ceasing, he would be bound to embrace religious life again — and although many authors defend the contrary, several nonetheless... uphold this opinion — St. Thomas (II-II, q. 189, art. 4), Cajetan there, Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 16, n. 91, citing Navarrus, Covarrubias, Azor, Valentia, Rodríguez, who defends it too), Layman (Bk. IV, tract. 5, ch. 6, n. 42), Pellizzari (Vol. I, tract. 11, ch. 6, n. 11), Candido (s.v. Votum, art. 2, punct. 5, §6, n. 13), Portel (s.v. Votum, n. 21), Toledo (Bk. IV, ch. 17, n. 12), Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 1, n. 28), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 21, q. 51), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 15, ch. 2, n. 1), Bassaeus (Vol. II, s.v. Votum), Suárez (Vol. III, on Religion, Bk. IV, ch. 4, n. 1), Trullench (Bk. II, ch. 2, dub. 20, n. 2), López (Part I, Instructions, ch. 4), and several others.

IX. Question VII. Is one bound by a vow of persevering in religious life, who has been expelled, obliged to preserve chastity while remaining in the world? Response: First of all, if he was expelled without his own fault, it seems certain that he is not bound to preserve chastity — since chastity is not included in the vow of entrance, but only in solemn monastic profession; therefore, since this profession was not made, the vow of chastity does not oblige. This reasoning also establishes that he is not bound to chastity even if he was expelled through his own fault. This opinion is taught by Cajetan (II-II, q. 189, art. 3, ad 2), Armilla (s.v. Votum, n. 21), Navarrus (ch. 12, n. 63 and 45), Azor (Bk. XI, ch. 22, q. 3), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 16, n. 111), John of St. Thomas (disp. 29, art. 11), Trullench (Bk. II, ch. 2, dub. 20), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 21, q. 45). If, however, someone had vowed religious life and chastity simultaneously and principally, he would be bound to chastity, even if he remained in the world — since it did not perish as an accessory, its principal having failed. If, however, one had vowed chastity dependently upon religious life, then, the vow of religious life ceasing, the vow of chastity would likewise cease. When doubt arises as to whether chastity was vowed dependently upon religious life, the intention of the one vowing must be investigated from the words in which the vow was conceived; for from these the doubt arises. If, however, the intention of the one vowing is itself doubted, and cannot be resolved from the circumstances, then the rule must be observed, which asserts that in doubtful matters the safer part is to be chosen.

§IV. On the time by which the necessity of fulfilling the vow of religious life presses

I. One who vowed religious life absolutely, with no time prefixed, is bound to fulfill his vow as soon as he can conveniently, as is declared (Deut. 23): "When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it: because the Lord thy God will require it. And if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin." This too is impressed upon us (Ecclesiastes 5): "If thou hast vowed anything to the Lord, defer not to pay it: for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth him." When it is said "as soon as he conveniently can," the sense is by no means that any difficulty whatsoever is sufficient to defer the entrance into religious life; but it indicates that only some grave obstacle can lawfully excuse the delay. For if any difficulty whatsoever sufficed to justify delays, scarcely any time would ever be opportune and fitting for fulfilling the vow. That time, then, is reckoned opportune for the execution of the vow in which the one vowing can, morally speaking — that is, without an urgent and grave impediment — leave the world, and embrace religious life. Just as, then, other indefinite promises made to men oblige to execution at the first opportunity offered, so too it must be said of a promise made to God. For one who has prescribed no time for himself has no reason why he should await a future time; otherwise, once it were granted that he could defer his promise into future time, no time at all could be defined for its execution. This, however, I would not have you take too strictly, so as to reduce the one vowing to straits. But the law "What we say" on solutions must be kept before one's eyes: "'Immediately' is to be understood with the tempering of some allowance of time." Likewise, "at once," "immediately," "continuously," in the law "Since so," on the meanings of words, on obligations. Such adverbs, then, admit some interval of time, which is neither the smallest nor the greatest, but a fitting one. What span, however, is to be called fitting, cannot be absolutely defined, but must be left to the judgment of a prudent man. Now a shorter, now a longer span may be granted, according to the diversity of the circumstances observed. If the matter is conducted in good faith, anyone can most easily define such an interval of time.

II. Question I. Does one bound by a vow of religious life sin mortally if he defers his entrance for an entire year? Response: Some authors, such as Ledesma (Vol. II, tract. 10, ch. 3, dub. ult.), Rodríguez (Vol. II, ch. 95, n. 9), consider that a delay of two or three years is required in a vow of religious life, for it to be called a notable delay, and for the one vowing to sin mortally; but in other vows, such as of fasting, alms, pilgrimage, etc., which do not look to perpetual divine service, they hold that a greater delay of execution is admissible; and that only then does the one vowing sin mortally, when he exposes himself to the danger of not fulfilling the vow. This opinion is too lax.

Although a longer span of time is required in other vows besides religious life, its execution can nonetheless not be deferred, without grave fault, for so long a span without risk to the promise. Authors commonly hold, then, that one bound by a vow of religious life sins mortally, if, opportunity given, he procrastinates the execution of his vow beyond half a year. They permit more time for the execution of other vows, since, in these, less is subtracted from the divine service by delay. If someone protracted their execution beyond a year or two, he would sin mortally, unless grave impediments excused him.

Dissertation V — On the religious state · Diss. V, Chapter I — The notion of the religious state, and its obligation of aspiring to evangelical perfection · Diss. V, Chapter II — On the vow of poverty · Diss. V, Chapter III — Regulars vowing evangelical poverty vow the very community of goods · Diss. V, Chapter IV — The decrees of the Council of Trent and the constitutions of the Supreme Pontiffs urge Regulars to an exact common life, private purses being driven out · Diss. V, Chapter V — Community being taken away, neither the vow of obedience nor the observance of regular discipline can long stand

III. Question II. If someone has defined a time for the execution of his vow, is he bound to fulfill his vow within the interval of the prefixed time? Response: All affirm this. The only difficulty that arises is whether, if he foresees an impediment which would render the observance of the vow impossible at the designated time, he is bound to anticipate that time. Authors commonly deny this, and rightly — since a vow does not oblige beyond the intention of the one vowing; but the one vowing did not wish to bind himself before the defined time: therefore he is by no means bound — just as one is not bound to anticipate hearing Mass before a feast day, nor to fast at the time of carnival, even if he foresees impediments by which he would be prevented, both on the feast day, and in Lent, from hearing Mass, and from keeping the fast. Suárez (Vol. II, on Religion, Bk. V, on life, ch. 7, n. 3), Bonacina (Vol. II, disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 5, §1), Castropalao (tract. 15, punct. 14), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 15, ch. 2, punct. 3, n. 33), and others.

…and 6 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Concina, Compendium

Daniele Concina, O.P. — 117 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Dissertation V — On the religious state

Prologue

I have published four volumes upon this argument, of which the first is entitled Historico-Apologetic Commentary, and so forth; the other, Apostolico-Monastic Discipline. Against this Apostolico-Monastic Discipline two volumes came forth: one entitled The Vindication of Regulars; the other marked with this epigraph, The Cloistered Life. These two little books, truly famous and full of erroneous comments, fables, and jeers, I ground down and utterly shattered in the work entitled A Defence of the Decrees of the Council of Trent, distributed into two volumes, and published by the command of the most wise Pontiff Benedict XIV. From these I shall cull a few things.

Diss. V, Chapter I — The notion of the religious state, and its obligation of aspiring to evangelical perfection

I. QUESTION I. What is the religious state? ANSWER. It is a way of arriving more easily at evangelical perfection. From the virtue of Religion, which is eminent among the moral virtues, this sacred state draws its name; and therefore it is called religious. It brings with it stability and immobility. That it may be such, it requires an approbation made by the Church, as is had from the Fourth Lateran Council, chapter Nimia. Necessary also is the profession of three vows according to some one of the rules approved by the Apostolic See. Hence individual Orders have their own proper rule and constitutions, to whose norm they compose the religious state.

II. QUESTION II. Whether Religious are bound under a grave precept to tend to perfection? ANSWER. This question needs perspicuous explication. All Christians, whether lay or ecclesiastical, whether secular or cloistered, are bound by a precept of aspiring to perfection. Perhaps to the unskilled this truth will be impassable. Let them know therefore that this perfection of which our discourse now is, is set in charity, as the Gospel and all the Fathers teach. Hence St. Thomas, II-II, q. 186, art. 2, describes the religious state as being a certain discipline or exercise of arriving at perfection. For that Religious might more easily and expeditiously attain this goal, they vow the three evangelical counsels, to which the rest are reduced. These three vows are instruments and as it were the wheels of the chariot which pave the way for attaining this prize. All the evangelical precepts are necessary means; the counsels are free instruments ordained to the precept of charity. This precept is the end and goal of all the precepts and counsels. Neither in the counsels therefore, nor in the other mandates, but in charity alone is evangelical perfection set, to which under precept all, both Christians and religious men, are bound to aspire. When Christ said Be you therefore perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect, Matthew 5, he intoned this not to monks, not to the cloistered, but addressed utterly the whole human race, since then there were neither monks nor cloistered.

III. With a gross error therefore are those Christians wrapped about who, reckoning this evangelical perfection to be something of supererogation and of counsel, and to belong only to religious men, attempt nothing for the attaining of it. Charity here separates the soul from the love of the world and of those things which are in the world, and joins it to God. And the more the soul is separated from the concupiscence of the flesh, from the concupiscence of the eyes, and from the pride of life, as St. John says, 1 epistle, chapter 2, the more intimately is it coupled to God. To this union with God all Christians are bound by precept. Therefore all Christians are obliged to tend to the perfection of charity. This only is the difference, that Christians are bound to run to perfection by the way of the precepts alone; but religious men, that they might more easily address that same goal, have embraced also the evangelical counsels, and by three solemn vows have imposed the same upon themselves to be observed.

IV. Christians therefore must needs be vigilant in observing the precepts, which enjoin a study of prayer, custody of the senses, compression of the flesh, equity, and purity of heart: because these and all the other mandates are, as has been said, necessary instruments for arriving at the perfection of charity, or union with God. And because this union is greater and more intense in one and less in another, therefore one becomes more perfect than another.

V. On the contrary religious men, besides these precepts, are bound to observe the three vows and their own rule and constitutions, which the holy Patriarchs, the divine Godhead breathing upon them, prescribed as means which help and more easily conduce to the goal set before them.

VI. Whence, you will say, can we gather that men, whether Christians or religious, fulfil this precept of aspiring to perfection? Christians who vigilantly abstain from vain pomps, from luxury, from display, from the occasions of violating the precepts of the Decalogue; who apply themselves to the study of prayer; who preserve justice and equity, and attribute to each what is his; who do to others what they would wish done to themselves; who fulfil the duties of their own state: these give signs that they walk by the way of evangelical perfection.

VII. If Christians themselves must fulfil the duties of their own state and the offices of ruling a family, of educating sons, of providing necessaries for their household, and all the rest; how much more are religious men bound to execute the duties, vows, rites, statutes, and laws of their own Religion? But whence can it be gathered that religious men bestow their labour with a sincere mind upon the study of perfection? Perhaps from the observance of silence, from assiduity of prayer, from the compression of the senses, of the flesh, and of the appetitions, from the execution of the vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience? Assuredly all these are signs. These are probable enough, but sometimes fallacious. For all these can be the fruits of hypocrisy. That a man may prepare himself a way to government, to prefectures, that he may procure for himself the estimation of a religious man and of an observer of his own institute, he can execute all the aforesaid, and under the cloak of sacred Religion become a martyr of the devil. What then are the arguments of a soul aspiring to Christian perfection? The exercises of charity; love toward all; patience and tolerance of injuries; candour of soul; sincerity of tongue; docility of mind; contempt of worldly things; the trampling down of political respects; the fortitude of an evangelical breast; a study of professing openly the discourses of Christ, hostile and adverse to flesh and blood; a neglect of one's own estimation and of worldly things. These are the indications which show a soul running in the stadium of Christian perfection. Since indeed means can be found without an end; but an end cannot subsist without means. Ceremonies therefore and observances of vows, constitutions, and other rites can appear outwardly destitute of the nuptial garment and covered with the mask of hypocrisy. But the exercises of charity, which are their end, cannot stand without the same.

VIII. Hence you may gather that those superiors of Regulars do not sufficiently satisfy their own office who in their Chapters continually cry out against certain transgressions of ceremonies, and scarcely inculcate anything else upon their subjects than the custody of silence, frequency of choir, and the observance of fasts and of certain genuflexions. I praise all these things; but I grieve at this, that they omit to exhort, persuade, and urge to the exercises of charity. For this flame being kindled in the souls of Religious, all the rest flow of their own accord. Charity indeed is a most fruitful plant bearing fruits ripe for eternity. Charity is kind, is patient, envieth not, dealeth not perversely, is not puffed up, beareth all things, endureth all things, seeketh not the things that are her own but the things which are Jesus Christ's, dreads not the power of the age, fears not the calumnies of adversaries; but with undaunted breast in word and work fulfils exactly the law of Christ and the duties of her own profession. That heavenly fire always burns where it is present, and continually emits flames. If it burned in the hearts of Superiors, beyond doubt it would send its sparks into the souls of subjects. Let those therefore who, the preaching of charity being neglected, inculcate only the observation of ceremonies, fill themselves with charity, that, pouring this into others, they may procure for themselves the best subjects.

IX. Charity joins souls with the sweetest covenant of benevolence, and makes them one heart and one soul. In that community in which aversions, dissensions, and contrary factions boil; in which Superiors put on the mask of prudence with craft and cunning, a double heart and an amphibological tongue, candour, sincerity, and affability being driven out — there assuredly the flame of charity does not burn, but a lying and worldly spirit, and that knowledge which St. James calls diabolical, dominates. If superiors play with words, tergiversate in deeds, deny, answer, delude, trim their sails, and set themselves against, as the reckonings of times bear, between subjects and the superiors themselves, their craftiness being detected, no sincerity, no candour of soul, no charity flourishes. But on the contrary murmurs, dissensions, aversions, and perpetual wars are carried on. Superiors who with open soul, sincere heart, and ingenuous tongue gather and embrace their subjects bind them to themselves and oblige them at that very time at which they deny favours, when they cannot impart them with the law safe. But let us return to the path from a digression otherwise opportune.

n. X.

X. Those Religious therefore who, the exercise of prayer, mortification, penance, abstinence, and of their own rule and constitutions being neglected, perform only those things which they cannot omit; who indulge in games, storytelling, idleness, solaces, and diversions; who, taking up cape or cloak, go about the cities and follow after curious things; who, if the table be not furnished to their palate, murmur; who deride the exhortations and mandates of superiors, and jest, tell tales, and dispute about them — these run not the way of evangelical perfection, but of eternal damnation.

n. XI.

XI. That I may contract many things into few: all Christians, whether lay or religious, are bound to aspire to evangelical perfection by force of a precept binding under mortal sin, but by various means, which all lead by one and a narrow way to the same goal. Lay Christians by the exact observation of the precepts alone; Religious add to the execution of the precepts the observance of the three vows and of their own constitutions. These vows, these constitutions and rules are not, say the Fathers, packs and weights which oppress, but are wings which lighten the journey and raise upward. Wherefore the religious state is named a school of arriving more easily at the perfection of charity, to which all Christians are bound to tend. More gravely assuredly and more wickedly do Religious sin who violate this precept than lay Christians. Since religious men, instructed by God with a richer store of graces and gifts, can more easily and conveniently tread the narrow evangelical path. Therefore these are held sacrilegious, ungrateful, and most worthless servants of God, when they squander and dilapidate so many talents received from God. Since indeed, segregated from the cares of the world and from the dangers of the world to which wretched Christians are obnoxious, compelled to think nothing of food and clothing, they can most easily be free for God alone and for the observance of their own institute. Wherefore they will be beaten doubly, if they omit, much more if they contemn, the attaining of evangelical perfection.

n. XII.

XII. Theologians are wont to dispute whether the observance of the three vows suffice, the other laws being neglected which do not oblige to grave fault; and again they debate whether a continued transgression of those laws induce a virtual and interpretative contempt. But I settle the matter in few words. The three vows are common to all sacred Orders. Every religious Order is distinguished from another by its own peculiar statutes, rules, and constitutions. Therefore besides the three vows common to all, the observance of one's own institute is necessary; otherwise that Religious would be of no determinate Order who kept only the three vows. Necessary therefore is the observance of one's own rule and constitutions, that a man may be said to be free for the study of evangelical perfection.

n. XIII.

XIII. Does the transgression of this or that monastic constitution intercept the way of Christian perfection? A constant and firm mind of fulfilling one's own profession is to be distinguished from the transgression of this or that law proceeding from a subreption of soul and from weakness. Daily we all fall. Those who from infirmity violate some law not obliging to fault, at least grave, stumble and in some manner limp on the way; but they rise again at once, and restore their mind and strength that they may run more swiftly; and because we are weak and infirm, we limp anew, and at the same time anew take up wings, more or less, according as the fire of charity burns more or less in the heart. Those therefore who from common infirmity violate some constitution are not outside the way of perfection, provided they keep a firm and constant mind of observing their own profession. On the contrary those who everywhere violate the peculiar laws of their own institute, caring nothing for the transgressions of the same, and persevering in the same corruption, are outside the narrow path, and run the broad and spacious way of perdition. Nor does it avail them at all that they dwell in Convents where the observance of the laws, at least for the greater part, has passed into desuetude, since no corruption prescribes against a law. In brief, the vows and the constitutions are joined by a reciprocal knot. The constitutions are the safeguards of the vows; the vows are the bulwark of charity. Charity, the vows, and the constitutions hold out mutual hands to one another. This knot being gravely injured and broken, the whole edifice must needs fall. Those who with deliberate mind violate their own constitutions indiscriminately lie, if they boast either the observance of the vows or the exercise of charity.

n. XIV.

XIV. Three vows are necessary for constituting the religious state, and indeed emitted with a solemn rite in the face of the Church: for that state includes firmness and stability. These three vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience denounce perpetual war upon the three evils of the world which St. John describes, 1 epistle, chapter 2: All that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh, the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life. Of these three vows the discourse will presently return. Meanwhile if you desire more on this matter, read St. Thomas, II-II, q. 186, articles 6 and 8.

Diss. V, Chapter II — On the vow of poverty

I. The vow of poverty is the first foundation of the regular life. The matter of that vow is the abdication of temporal things, manifested by Christ the Lord, Matthew 19: If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor. The other two counsels — of cultivating virginity, and of abnegating one's own will and subjecting oneself to a man's authority — the divine Master expressed in few words. But the very method by which the Apostles and the first Christians committed to execution the evangelical counsel of poverty the Evangelist Luke describes clearly and distinctly, Acts 2: And all they that believed were together, and had all things common. Their possessions and goods they sold, and divided them to all, according as every one had need. More fully does the holy Evangelist express this form of poverty in chapter 4: And the multitude of believers had but one heart and one soul: neither did any one say that aught of the things which he possessed was his own; but all things were common unto them. … For neither was there any one needy among them. For as many as were owners of lands or houses sold them, and brought the price of the things they sold, and laid it down before the feet of the apostles. And distribution was made to every one, according as he had need.

II. This is that poverty propped by the community of goods, which Christ set forth in his apostolic College as the foundation of heavenly perfection, which, being set in charity, joins men with the bond of the concord of love mutually with one another and with God. For the propriety of goods kindles cupidity, and like a seditious citizen stirs up tumults, quarrels, and dissensions, sunders hearts and souls, and drags them apart into contrary factions. But community, since it takes away all propriety, tears up also the root of contentions, quarrels, and dissensions, and induces a communion of heavenly goods. For these two things are connected: 1. They were one heart and one soul; 2. All things were common unto them.

III. Poverty taken generally admits several degrees: of which one excludes the dominion and use of any thing whatsoever as one's own; another rejects dominion and proper use, yet retains the capacity for dominion; a third neither absolutely abdicates dominion nor becomes incapable of dominion, but only uses no thing as its own; a fourth betrays a privation neither of dominion nor of use, but admits only that measure of goods which is necessary for the sustentation of life, and rejects all the rest. To these four degrees all the others are reduced. The first degree of poverty Regulars now vow. The third the scholars of the Society name. The other two anyone can vow.

IV. Very many theologians exhibit this definition of monastic poverty: The vow of poverty is a voluntary abdication of temporal goods, by which the one vowing is deprived of the propriety of the same. Others say more compressedly: It is the abdication of dominion. Which definitions, exactly squared to the rule of Metaphysics, describe poverty taken generally, but not as to be committed to execution. Two things they distinguish in this vow. The first they call essential, set in the abdication of dominion. The other they call accidental, which regards the use of goods. Hence they infer that the connexion of the vow of poverty with the community of goods is accidental — which holds true of poverty taken generally: whether that suffice for explaining monastic poverty I shall presently say.

Diss. V, Chapter III — Regulars vowing evangelical poverty vow the very community of goods

I. All theologians and canonists teach that Regulars are bound by force of an ecclesiastical precept gravely obliging to the community of goods, private purses being driven out. But whether this precept enter the very essence of the vow, or range outside it, comes to the same thing as regards that which is the head of the disputation. For whether Regulars violate the vow directly, while they retain a private purse, necessity being taken away, or the precept, they perpetrate a mortal sacrilege. Wherefore even if what I am about to say were false, they would not on that account perceive any emolument thence, since according to all theologians and canonists Regulars are bound by a most grave ecclesiastical precept of observing the common life.

II. And that what I am about to say may be more evidently plain, we must have before our eyes that the vow of poverty taken generally, precise from every circumstance, admits several degrees, mention of which was made in the preceding chapter; and that in this acceptation it betrays neither one before another, nor includes nor rejects community. Another thing is no less manifest, namely that any solemn vow whatsoever claims for itself a certain and predetermined matter. These things being constituted, I evince what I proposed.

III. All Regulars vow poverty to God — not an uncertain poverty, not one squared to the rule of some metaphysical definition which some have fashioned for themselves; but they vow that poverty which is determined in their own rules. This first proposition is inescapable. For poverty admits a latitude and very many degrees, as all confess and as in fact is established; therefore it must be determined by the intention of the one vowing. But this determination cannot be made by individual Regulars; otherwise there would be as many kinds of poverties as there are men vowing, and all things would be confused and disturbed. Wherefore all the sacred Orders have their own rules, in which is defined the poverty which all of the same Order ought to keep. But all the Rules — of Sts. Basil, Augustine, Benedict, Francis, and of all the holy Patriarchs — determine for the matter of the vow of poverty the common life. Therefore Regulars vowing poverty vow the common life. Unless the second proposition be true, I am willing that the cause should fall of its own accord. I could here transcribe the texts of all the Rules, which from a study of brevity I pass over. Let it suffice to indicate in passing that in all the aforesaid rules like things are had: Let all things be common to you, as you read in the Acts of the Apostles.

IV. But although this argumentation were false, not on that account, as I have said, would a private purse be lawful to Regulars, since according to all, both theologians and canonists, they are bound by a most grave ecclesiastical precept to observe the common life void of every private purse. Hence a Religious places all his goods, both present and future, under the dominion of the Religion, on this condition and agreement, that the Religion may dispose of those goods for the common use of the Religious as shall have seemed to it expedient; and the Religion in turn binds itself by the same bond to furnish food and clothing and all necessaries to the Religious. Further, just as in any contract whatsoever, one party failing in fulfilling its own duty, the other also necessarily fails; so likewise if the Religion be lacking to its own office in the congruous provision of food and clothing, forthwith there arises in the professed Religious a right of nature, antecedent to any contract whatsoever, of procuring that food and clothing which the Religion ought to bestow. This is the whole that can be said in favour of Religious and of a private purse. For the rest, the superiors of Religions as much as the Religious are bound by a most grave precept either to reintegrate the contract, if it be broken, or to observe it, if it stand, as I shall say below.

Diss. V, Chapter IV — The decrees of the Council of Trent and the constitutions of the Supreme Pontiffs urge Regulars to an exact common life, private purses being driven out

I. Of the decrees of the Councils and of the Pontiffs which prescribe the common life to Regulars, I shall transcribe only those which Trent prescribes, session 25, chapter 1: “Since the holy Synod is not ignorant how much of splendour and of utility arises in the Church of God from Monasteries piously instituted and rightly administered, it has judged it necessary, that the ancient regular discipline may the more easily and maturely be instituted where it has collapsed, and may more constantly persevere where it has been preserved, to command, as by this decree it does command, that all Regulars, both men and women, order and compose their life to the prescript of the Rule which they have professed; and above all that they faithfully observe those things which pertain to the perfection of their profession — as the vows of obedience, poverty, and chastity, and if there be any other vows and precepts peculiar to some Rule and Order, respectively pertaining to their essence, AND ALSO TO THE COMMON LIFE, FOOD, AND CLOTHING to be preserved; and let all care and diligence be employed by superiors, as much in general and provincial Chapters as in their visitations, which at their own times they should not omit to make, that they depart not from these things: since it is established that these things which pertain to the substance of the regular life cannot be relaxed by them. For if those things which are the base and foundations of the whole regular discipline be not exactly observed, the whole edifice must needs fall.”

II. Again the same Council, chapter 2, adds: “Let it therefore be lawful to no Regulars, whether men or women, to possess or to HOLD as their own, or even IN THE NAME OF THE CONVENT, immovable or movable goods of whatsoever quality they be, and in whatsoever manner acquired by them; but let them straightway be delivered to the superior and incorporated into the Convent. Nor let it hereafter be lawful for superiors to grant stable goods to any Regular, even for USUFRUCT, or USE, ADMINISTRATION, or COMMENDAM. But the administration of the goods of Monasteries or Convents shall belong to the officials of the same alone, removable at the nod of superiors. But the use of movables let superiors so permit that their furniture may befit the state of poverty which they have professed; and let there be nothing superfluous in it, nor let anything which is necessary be denied them. But if anyone be found or convicted of holding anything otherwise, let him be deprived for a biennium of active and passive voice, and let him also be punished according to the constitutions of his rule and order.”

III. Clement VIII confirmed the decrees of Trent by a constitution given in the year 1599, in which these things are prescribed: “I. That the decrees of the Tridentine Council concerning the guarding of the vow of poverty may be more faithfully observed, it is commanded that no one of the brethren, even if he be a superior, can possess immovable or movable goods, or money, proceeds, rents, ALMS, whether from sermons, or from lectures, or for MASSES to be celebrated both in his own Church and anywhere, or acquired by any other just labour of theirs, and by whatsoever cause and name, even if they be the subsidies of blood-relations, or the largesses of pious persons, legacies, or donations, as his own, or even in the name of the Convent; but let them straightway be delivered to the superior and be incorporated, and be confounded with the other goods, revenues, moneys, and proceeds of that place, that thence common food and clothing may be supplied to all. II. Nor let it be lawful IN ANY WAY to superiors, whosoever they be, to grant to the same Brethren or to any of them stable goods, even for USUFRUCT, or USE, ADMINISTRATION, or COMMENDAM, even under the name of DEPOSIT or CUSTODY. III. But of those things which shall have been granted for necessity, let no one possess anything as his own, nor use it as his own. IV. He who shall have offended in any of the aforesaid, let him incur not only the penalties prescribed by the Tridentine Council, but others also much graver to be imposed at the arbitration of superiors. V. NO DISPENSATION of any superiors whatsoever, NO LICENCE as regards immovable or movable goods, can excuse them from being obnoxious to the faults and penalties imposed by the decrees of the same Council and to be incurred by that very deed, EVEN IF SUPERIORS SHOULD ASSERT THAT THEY CAN GRANT DISPENSATIONS OR LICENCES OF THIS KIND: to whom in that matter we will that credence be by no means given. VI. Let the clothing of the brethren and the furniture of the cells be procured from the common money, and let it be altogether uniform for the brethren and for superiors whosoever they be, and befit the state of poverty which they have professed. Nor let anything which is necessary to anyone be denied. VII. Let all the garments of the brethren, whether woollen or linen, and all other furniture, be carried to some convenient place of the Convent, and there be diligently guarded by one or two brethren deputed to this office, that thence, at the superior's arbitration, they may be opportunely supplied according as each shall have need. VIII. Let all superiors also, whosoever they be, feed on the same bread, the same wine, and the same relish, or (as they say) portion, at the common table, first or second, unless they be hindered by cause of infirmity; nor let anything singular be able in any way to be offered, which anyone may use privately for food. If anyone shall have sinned in that matter, let him receive no nourishment that day save bread and water. IX. Let all superiors, even Generals, or those who have particular revenues or provisions by reason of their offices, take care that their receipts and expenses be faithfully and diligently noted in a distinct book; nor let them expend anything for other uses than those necessary by reason of their office. But when it shall happen that they tarry in some Convent, let them confer into the common stock that quantity of money out of which food may be supplied to themselves and to those who shall be with them according to the prescript of the rule and constitutions. X. Let no one of the superiors of places be able by himself to have or exercise the administration of goods or of other things, and the dispensation of moneys and of the revenues of his Convent; but let this whole burden be so committed by the General to three brethren of the same Convent, that one may have the care of collecting and exacting things, goods, and revenues; another, as depositary, may faithfully and exactly keep the moneys and the rest collected and exacted by the former; another may provide from the moneys and things received from the depositary for the Prior and the Brethren and the whole Convent in necessaries, the Prior nevertheless commanding, not according to his own affection but according to the rule of charity, as a good dispenser — the confusion of offices of this kind being utterly interdicted. XI. But let these three render an account of expenditure as well as of receipt every month to the local Superior, two or three Brethren of the same Convent, of the more approved and skilled in the use of things, being also employed. Then let them again render it in the presence of the Prior and the aforesaid skilled men to the General when he shall have come. Lastly let the General himself in any next general Chapter, at least before three Judges to be constituted by the Chapter itself for this, be bound to render an account of all these things, and of his whole administration both public and private, of which also an authentic copy shall be written out from the acts of the Chapter, to this end that it may be transmitted at every mandate of ours or of the Apostolic See. XII. In each Convent let that number of Brethren henceforth be constituted and retained which either from its own proper revenues, or from common ones, or even from the alms of individuals and any other receipts whatsoever to be conferred into the common stock as aforesaid, can conveniently be sustained. But let the revenues and all the aforesaid be diligently kept in a common and safe place. XIII. But to superiors we interdict and forbid that they can declare, interpret, or relax in any way at all the decrees of the Tridentine Council or these ours, decreeing, and so forth. But if anyone shall have presumed to attempt the contrary, let him by that very deed be deprived of every grade and office, and remain perpetually unfit for them.”

IV. Urban VIII confirmed the aforesaid constitution of Clement VIII, as is had in the Roman Bullary, Vol. IV, page 63. And Paul V, Gregory XV, Alexander VII, and Innocent X confirmed the constitutions of Clement and Urban. The testimonies of these Pontiffs I pass over, that I be not long.

V. Lastly Innocent XII confirmed the decrees of Trent and the constitutions of the preceding Pontiffs, and strengthened them against false and erroneous comments, and rooted out every root of tergiversating and cavilling. These decrees are had in the Bullary of the same Pontiff, page 167 and following. The beginning of the decrees is this: His Holiness, and so forth. That regular discipline may be kept whole and entire and may flourish for the salvation of Religious and for the edification and utility of the whole Christian people, and that if anywhere it has collapsed it may, the Lord helping, be repaired; he constituted and declared that the licence of receiving Novices in individual approved Orders was benignly granted, provided nevertheless that those things which have been salutarily constituted for the right instituting of the regular life, both by the most holy Tridentine Synod and by the Roman Pontiffs our Predecessors, chiefly by CLEMENT VIII of happy memory in his general decrees for the reformation of Regulars, and also by INNOCENT X and ALEXANDER VII for the reception of Novices and the education of the Professed — to all which His Holiness firmly adheres, and so far as need be confirms and renews them, saving nevertheless in this part the statutes or ordinations of individual Orders approved or published by the Apostolic See in FORM SPECIFIC after the same decrees — be exactly and inviolably observed.

VI. That clause (saving nevertheless in this part, and so forth) was omitted in the Apostolico-Monastic Discipline as not necessary, both because it does not regard the exact community, and because the discourse is of an approbation in specific form, by which approbation it is established that no constitutions of Regulars permitting a private purse were confirmed after Clement VIII. This will now be more clearly plain. The things therefore which follow settle the cause.

VII. Wherefore the sacred Congregation specially deputed by the same most holy Lord of ours upon regular discipline … by mandate of His Holiness announces by the tenor of the present decree to the Superiors of all and singular the regular Orders … both Generals and Provincials, by whatsoever name they be named, and to the rest whom it concerns, that in each Province throughout Italy and the adjacent Islands they depute as soon as possible some Convents, such as they shall have judged more fit, or at least one, and there establish by apostolic authority the entire observance of the Rule and Constitutions of each Order, and of the apostolic decrees, but chiefly of the EXACT COMMON LIFE. But after it shall have sufficiently appeared to the same Congregation that the regular observance, signally as regards the exact common life, has been WITH EFFECT established, both from the report of the same Superiors General or Provincial, and from the testimony confirmed by oath of the Superior and of the brethren dwelling in the aforesaid Convents, then His Holiness will benignly grant the aforesaid licence, which he has hitherto deferred, of receiving Novices there. …

Further, lest regular discipline, while it is established in Convents already erected, be relaxed in those to be erected, and what is constituted on the one part be at the same time destroyed on the other, the sacred Congregation, His Holiness likewise approving, willed and decreed that no Monasteries, Colleges, Houses, Convents, or other places of Religious ought henceforth to be founded, erected, or in any way instituted, save under the EXPRESS OBLIGATION of the exact COMMON LIFE to be perpetually and inviolably observed by all the Religious dwelling there; and moreover that no foundations of this kind are henceforth to be admitted, unless, besides the other things required for it, it be first lawfully established that there are annual revenues, or a certain hope of alms, by which at least twelve Religious can conveniently be sustained in the EXACT COMMON LIFE.

VIII. Let him now weigh the things which follow, who writing against me says that I of set purpose passed over the above-indicated clause saving nevertheless, and so forth — let him weigh, I say, what follows in the Innocentian decree.

IX. Notwithstanding as regards ALL and SINGULAR the aforesaid, apostolic constitutions and ordinations, and also the STATUTES, customs, and privileges of any Orders whatsoever, and all other things whatsoever to the contrary. At the last the same sacred Congregation seriously admonishes and beseeches all Regulars, of whatsoever Order and Institute they be, in the words of HIS HOLINESS, that, all delay being postponed, as befits sons of obedience, they institute and compose their life to the prescript of the Rule which they have embraced, and sincerely and faithfully obey the apostolic decrees published FOR THEIR ETERNAL SALVATION. Nor let them suffer themselves to be led away from this obedience by empty interpretations or fallacies, OR UNDER PRETEXT OF RELAXATIONS, TO EXCUSING EXCUSES IN SINS. But, mindful of their profession, by which they made themselves wholly over to God's service, let them briskly pursue the way of Christian perfection which they have undertaken — arduous indeed, but sprinkled with the sweetness of divine charity — the cares of earthly things being cast away.

n. X.

X. Lastly, lest under pretext of the silence or toleration of the Apostolic See anyone should be able to follow a corruption contrary to honesty, the same Supreme Pontiff Innocent XII published the following decree, inserted in the cited Bullary, page 309, whose beginning is Debitum pastoralis officii, in which among other things these things are had:

n. XI.

XI. As we have not without grave trouble of soul learned, although the observance of decrees of this kind has been prosperously and happily introduced in very many Monasteries or Convents of religious men, and thence a richer harvest of holy works daily arises there, the Lord blessing it; yet the same seed does not elsewhere bear the same fruits: for neither has the enemy of the human race ceased, nor does he yet cease, to oversow in the field of the Lord cockle which chokes the mind of the Father of the family: hence it is that we, mindful of that prophetic admonition, Cry, cease not, lift up thy voice like a trumpet — that our constant and unshaken will of pursuing a work of this kind with peculiar study and the highest contention of soul may more and more become known, and that to ALL TRANSGRESSORS every occasion of excusing themselves UNDER THE VAIN AND FALSE PRETEXT OF OUR SILENCE may utterly be cut off — of our own motion approve in perpetuity by the tenor of the present the aforesaid Congregation of Cardinals and Prelates upon regular discipline, and so forth. … But let the faculties of the same Congregation thus confirmed by us be these … of designating and deputing Convents, Monasteries, Colleges, and Houses for Noviceships and Professorships, and so forth. … Of promoting the decrees both of CLEMENT VIII of happy memory, our Predecessor … chiefly upon the reformation of Regulars, and above all the observance of the EXACT COMMON LIFE; and to this effect alone of diligently examining new foundations of any Convents, Monasteries, Colleges, and Houses of this kind, lest henceforth it happen that places of religious men be founded, erected, or in any way instituted, save in those in which the same COMMON LIFE according to the prescript of the last of the said decrees can be perpetually and exactly observed, and so forth. Notwithstanding, and so forth, the statutes and customs of any Orders, Congregations, Societies, and Institutes whatsoever, and any others whatsoever strengthened even by oath, APOSTOLIC CONFIRMATION, or any other firmness whatsoever, and also privileges, indults, and apostolic letters granted, confirmed, and renewed to the same Orders, Congregations, Societies, and Institutes, and to their superiors and persons, and to others whatsoever, under whatsoever tenors and forms of words, and with any derogatory clauses whatsoever, even derogatory of derogatories, and other more efficacious, most efficacious, and unusual annulling clauses, and with other decrees in general or even in special, or in any other way whatsoever to the contrary, and so forth.

n. XII.

XII. Lastly Innocent XII instituted a peculiar Congregation which should receive the oath of the exact community to be observed, to be furnished by Regulars, before it impart the faculty of admitting to Religion. I reckon it worth the labour to subjoin the form of that oath. It is of the following tenor:

A copy of the formulary which Regulars swear concerning the exact community to be observed

We the undersigned make faith, and testify IN THE WORD OF TRUTH, that in this Convent of N. a perfect community of goods has been established, and that all the goods of the particular Brethren, both as regards ALL MONEYS, and as regards clothes and other things, whether they be life-rents, or alms, whether proceeding from sermons or from whatsoever source, ARE ALL CONFOUNDED with the goods and revenues of the Convent, and incorporated with them, according to the decrees of Clement VIII of holy memory and of Innocent XII and of the sacred Congregation of Discipline, so that out of all these provision is equally made both in time of health and in time of infirmity. And a common Wardrobe has been established, in which are laid up the garments of all the Brethren, and all things which are for common use: out of which Wardrobe provision is equally made for all according to the need of each Brother. In this Convent also, besides the perfect community of the aforesaid goods, regular observance flourishes according to the rigour of our constitutions. And the Novices in this Convent are religiously nourished and educated in all the exercises pertaining to the state of our Religion, and are proved both by day and by night. Wherefore the undersigned humbly supplicate, affirming all the aforesaid WITH AN OATH, the sacred Congregation of regular Discipline for licence of receiving youths to the habit. Done on the day, and so forth, in the year, and so forth.

n. XIII.

XIII. This is the oath which the Superiors of Regulars exhibit to the sacred Congregation upon regular Discipline every second or third year, that they may obtain from the same sacred Congregation the faculty of receiving youths to the habit of Religion. Let us form a hypothesis in which the Roman See could and would prescribe a common life void of every private purse. In this hypothesis could it have employed clearer words, more luculent and more urgent clauses, than those which it employed in the recounted decrees? Whither therefore will those who opine the opposite betake themselves? Can they themselves find either more luculent expressions or more efficacious formulas of prescribing the observance of an exact community? Will they deny to the Roman Church the power of prescribing a perfect community of things? No chink lies open here for escape.

Diss. V, Chapter V — Community being taken away, neither the vow of obedience nor the observance of regular discipline can long stand

I. The violation of poverty is the rock upon which cloistered men most easily strike. Hence Religions both ancient and later have suffered more or less relaxation. Nevertheless the Institutors of the sacred Orders not only did not mitigate this poverty circumscribed by an exact common life, but fortified it with stronger safeguards. The mendicant Orders, seeing monastic discipline collapsed on account of redundant riches, rejected riches and revenues even to be possessed in common, and determined to live by begging. To these succeeded the Clerks Regular, who, beholding the collapsed discipline of the Mendicants, that they themselves might not be obnoxious to this vicissitude, prescribed a poverty so severe that some determined not even to receive offerings for the celebration of Masses, others not even to seek alms. Why this? The counsel of poverty is free. To possess riches absolutely brings no evil. The Patriarchs of the sacred Orders learned by the experiment of so many ages that the observance of that common life is most difficult and most easily violated by those vowing it. It would have been of their charity to temper this poverty, to permit private purses and life-rents, that by this way they might remove from their subjects the occasions of sinning. For when a law concerning a free and innocuous thing is with difficulty observed by subjects, it is the part of a wise legislator either to take the same away, or to temper it and accommodate it to common use.

II. On the contrary, all the Patriarchs to a man not only did not relax the law of poverty, but strengthened it more severely and fortified it with new safeguards. Why did none of the holy Patriarchs grant private purses and revenues to individual Religious? Why did all without exception most severely forbid them? Let them object to me even one Patriarch who granted private purses and revenues, and I am willing to submit the fasces to them and to sing their victory.

III. What therefore is the cause why all the holy Patriarchs conspired to this, that by unanimous consent they should restrict, straiten, and by every conceivable mode confirm this vow of poverty? Because, the poverty of the common life being taken away, the vow of exact obedience and the observance of regular discipline must needs fall. Since indeed the profession of the regular life, as regards poverty, is a mutual contract, as I have indicated, by force of which subjects with a solemn rite cede all their goods, both present and future, to the Religion; the Religion in turn binds itself by the same sacred bond of feeding and clothing its subjects, both healthy and infirm. If the Prelates of Religions do not discharge their pledged faith, by ministering all necessaries to their subjects, it necessarily follows that subjects are loosed from the bond of obedience, as regards the procuring of those things which are necessary for food and clothing. Therefore, community being taken away, the vow of obedience, and consequently the regular discipline itself, falls in ruins.

…and 77 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Slater, Cases I

Thomas Slater, S.J. — 12 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Slater, Cases I, The Second Commandment, Case 4. A Dispensation in the Vow of Poverty

Caius, born in Belgium, entered a religious order of solemn vows in the English province with the intention of devoting himself to the foreign missions. When his studies were completed, he made solemn profession, and after a year received news of his father’s death in Belgium and of the legitimate portion of his father’s goods falling to him according to Belgian laws. But since regulars in Belgium, notwithstanding even a solemn vow of poverty, remain capable of ownership by a pontifical dispensation, Caius doubted whether he himself could enter upon the inheritance or not. Hence it is asked:

What is a vow?

What are the effects of the vow of poverty, and which of these are from the nature of the vow and which from ecclesiastical law?

How is the solemnity of the vow of poverty compatible with the capacity to have ownership?

What is to be said of the case?

Solution

This question is answered in “Manual of Moral Theology,” vol. i, p. 246.

What are the effects of the vow of poverty and of these which follow from the nature of the vow, and which follow from positive ecclesiastical law?

By the vow of poverty the Religious makes a voluntary renunciation of temporal goods that have pecuniary value.

It belongs to the essence of such a vow that the Religious should not retain any independent use of such temporal goods, and the unlawfulness of such use independently of the will of the Superior is therefore a necessary effect of the vow of poverty. Ownership of property is not necessarily repugnant to religious poverty, provided that there be no independent use of it. But by ecclesiastical law the solemn vow of poverty makes the Religious incapable of possessing property as his own individually; he becomes civilly dead; individually he can neither own, acquire, or dispose of property that has pecuniary value. As a member of a corporation he remains capable of corporate ownership.

How is a solemn vow of poverty compatible with capacity for ownership ?

As has just been said, the incapacity for ownership is not a necessary effect of the vow of poverty by itself; it is a creature of positive ecclesiastical law. The whole distinction between solemn and simple vows, and therefore their different effects, are derived from positive law (C. un. de voto et voti redemp. in 6to). Hence if the Pope so wills it, for good reason a Religious may be under a solemn vow of poverty, and yet by special provision he may be capable of owning property, provided that he has not the independent use of it.

Slater, Cases II, Duties of Religious, Case 1. A Vocation to Religion · Slater, Cases II, Duties of Religious, Case 2. Impediments to Entering Religion · Slater, Cases II, Duties of Religious, Case 3. Obstacles to Vocation · Slater, Cases II, Duties of Religious, Case 4. Religious and Seculars

The case. Caius was born in Belgium, but entered the English province of a Religious order with solemn vows. After his profession he heard that his father was dead and that the legitimate part of his father's property had devolved on him according to Belgian law. Even solemnly professed regulars in Belgium are capable of succeeding personally to such property by dispensation, as Leo XIII declared, July 31, 1878.¹ Caius doubted whether he could accept his legitim or not. The words of the Pope’s decree are: “All and each of the regulars of Belgium of both sexes, even those who have pronounced solemn vows, validly and lawfully exercised and exercise all the aforesaid acts (to acquire, retain, and administer goods, and to dispose of them).” However, Caius belongs to the English province of his order, and he can not be called a “regular of Belgium.” “Moreover, the regulars of Belgium appear to be all those who are admitted into a community of Belgium,” says Fr. Vermeersch.² Therefore the legitim of Caius lapses just as if he were dead.

1 Lehmkuhl, vol. i, no. 524.

2 De Relig. Instit., vol. i, n. 243.

Slater, Cases II

Thomas Slater, S.J. — 119 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Slater, Cases II, Duties of Religious, Case 1. A Vocation to Religion

Part III

Caius, a young man of excellent ability and good morals, educated in a certain Catholic College, as the time for leaving the College approached, went to his confessor and asked what he ought to do. For he fears that he may be called to the religious state, since for almost an entire year the thought of entering religion has very frequently come into his mind, and he is persuaded that he would easily attain salvation in that state, whereas this would be rather difficult in the world because of his lively disposition and inclination to pleasures; nevertheless, his spirit shrinks from the austerity of religious life. He therefore wishes to know whether he is bound to enter religion. Hence it is asked:

What is a divine vocation, and how is it known whether someone has a vocation?

Does one who is called sin if he does not follow the vocation, or one who is not called if he thrusts himself into the religious state?

What is to be said of the case?

Solution

This question is answered above, p. 23.

Does one who is called to religion sin if he does not follow his vocation, and does he sin who enters religion without a vocation?

The answer given above with regard to vocation to the priesthood may be applied to this question. With regard to religious life which does not involve the priesthood, many divines hold with St. Thomas that a general vocation is given by God to all who are free and suited to the religious state. So that any such persons who choose to enter religion for some supernatural motive are in fact called thereto by God. As a vocation to a religious life is a call to perfection and to the practising of the counsels of the Gospel, which do not bind under sin, no sin is committed per se by one who does not follow such a vocation. If, however, he is conscious that by remaining in the world he would expose his salvation to serious danger he would of course commit sin by neglecting the necessary means to save his soul. 1

The case. Caius, a young man of excellent disposition and good morals, is afraid that he has a vocation to the religious life. The thought of it has often been in his mind during the past year; he is persuaded that he could easily save his soul in that state of life, while he is afraid that on account of his lively disposition and inclination for pleasure he would find it difficult to do so in the world. What deters him is the austerity of religion. Caius manifests some of the ordinary signs of a religious vocation. His fear of the austerity of the life does not militate against his having a genuine vocation, and should not be reckoned when trying to come to a decision. The confessor therefore should tell Caius that a religious vocation is a great grace which God gives to those whom He specially loves, 1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, p. 642.

as He did to the young man in the Gospel. He might tell him that he has many of the signs of a religious vocation, but he should not attempt to settle the question himself; he should let Caius do that, recommending him to make a retreat for the purpose.

Slater, Cases II, Duties of Religious, Case 2. Impediments to Entering Religion

Caia, a nun who recently professed simple vows, discloses to Titius, her confessor, that before entering Religion she had contracted with Paul a debt of twenty pounds that was not yet paid, of which she had made no mention to the superiors. Furthermore, she says that she brought fifty pounds with her into religion and gave it to the Order to compensate for the board and clothing furnished to her during the novitiate. Titius indeed knows that debt is an impediment to religion and that justice must be observed; nevertheless, he does not know what is to be done in the case. Hence it is asked:

Who may enter religion?

How do substantial and secondary impediments to entrance into religion differ?

Is a religious Order bound to pay the personal debts of its members?

What is to be said of the case?

Solution

Who may enter Religion?

All those who have the aptitude for the duties of religious life and who ar£ not prevented by any special obstacle may enter religion. The chief obstacles are: the necessity of supporting parents, consummated marriage, and debts. Bishops can not become Religious without the leave of the Holy See. The different Religious Orders have special impediments in addition to these.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, p. 643.

How do substantial impediments differ from secondary?

The former make religious profession invalid if they are not removed beforehand, the latter only render it unlawful. Debts constitute a secondary impediment.

Is a Religious Order bound to pay the personal debts of its members?

Certainly not. Personal obligations of this sort only affect him who contracted them.

The case. Caia did wrong to enter Religion without paying her debts. She has given all the money she had to pay for her own support during the novitiate to her superiors, who know nothing about the debt. She has no money left to pay the debt now. If she obtains any afterwards by inheritance or otherwise she will be obliged to pay the debt with the customary interest. In the meantime it will be sufficient if she repents of her fault, and resolves to fulfil her obligations when she can do so.

Slater, Cases II, Duties of Religious, Case 3. Obstacles to Vocation

Patrick, a secular priest and a missionary in England but born in Scotland, seeks the counsel of Caius, a regular, in these circumstances. A few years ago Patrick entered a certain diocesan seminary in England and, after taking the oath of the Mission, was at length ordained under the title of the Mission. Afterwards, serving a certain Mission for two years, he brought forth much fruit in the vineyard of the Lord. Nevertheless, having experienced the dangers of such a life and having been captivated by love of religious perfection [a conjectural restoration of one corrupt printed word], he asks the Bishop for permission to return to his native country with the intention of entering a certain monastery there. The Bishop refuses; indeed, he asserts that Patrick is already in a state of perfection and that there is no reason for desiring religious life. So that he may forget it more easily, the Bishop orders him to go to another, very poor Mission, where neither labor nor poverty will be lacking. Patrick therefore asks Caius:

What obligations to serve the Mission rest upon him?

Is it true that the state of a secular priest is a state of perfection?

Can he enter religion, and under what conditions?

Is he bound to obey the Bishop with regard to the other Mission?

Solution

Under what obligations does Patrick lie of serving the Mission?

Patrick is bound to serve the diocese for which he was ordained by the very fact of his ordination and by his promise of canonical obedience to the Bishop. He is also bound by the terms of the missionary oath which he has taken.¹

1 Trent, xxiii, c. 16 De Ref.; Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, p. 634.

Is it true that the state of a secular priest is a state of perfection?

A certain stability of life is necessary to constitute a state of life in the strict sense, and that it may be a state of acquiring perfection it should impose the obligation and offer special means to attain perfection. The secular priesthood is not a state of acquiring perfection, as there is not the requisite stability, nor does it offer special means of acquiring perfection. On account of the want of stability it can not strictly be called a state in which perfection is exercised like the state of bishops, but in the opinion of Suarez it may be called an imperfect and inchoate state of exercising perfection on account of the priest's duty of working for the sanctification of others.²

2 Suarez, De Relig., tract, vii, lib. i, cc. 14, 15, 17.

Can Patrick enter Religion and under what conditions?

If Patrick can get the leave of the Holy See he may enter Religion, but that leave is required by the terms of the missionary oath. He should therefore be advised to make up his mind whether as far as can be known he has a true vocation, and then if he wishes to follow it he must ask leave from the Holy See, which will doubtless first consult the Bishop and then grant leave or not as it judges to be for the best.

Is he bound to obey the Bishop and accept the poor Mission assigned to him?

n. ¶13.

It may reasonably be doubted whether Patrick is so obliged if he does not wish to leave his present post. To transfer him to a poorer and harder Mission has the appearance not of promotion but of degradation, and Patrick has done nothing to deserve that. When the First Council of Baltimore laid it down that priests were obliged to obey the bishop when he bade them accept any mission within the diocese, the S. Cong, de Prop. Fide substituted for it this clause: “ We admonish priests that mindful of the promise made at their ordination they should not refuse to accept any mission assigned to them by the bishop ” (Collectio Lacensis recent. Concil., Ill, p. 22). Which is much less peremptory.

Slater, Cases II, Duties of Religious, Case 4. Religious and Seculars

Caius, a secular priest ordained under the title of the Mission for a certain English diocese, having experienced in himself not slight signs of a vocation to the religious state, and not for a brief time, consults his missionary Rector about the matter. The Rector says that he does not understand what Caius lacks for acquiring the highest perfection, since it is written in the Fourth Council of Westminster, decree XII, no. 7: “Moreover, by the Lord, who has compassion on our weaknesses, exceptional aids are granted to us in England, who fight for the kingdom of truth, for acquiring priestly perfection. To the priesthood with which missionaries are distinguished is entrusted the care of souls and therefore spiritual gifts of every kind that are attached to the pastoral state; furthermore, pastors are especially pastors of the poor, the friends of Jesus, ‘who have nothing with which to repay us,’ and they themselves also are poor, and are nourished and contented by the alms of the poor. There is added also the daily and almost perpetual denial of one’s own will in lightening the burdens of others, in comforting the sick, and in assisting the dying by day and night. Finally there remains the remarkable grace and privilege of the missionary oath, by which, on the threshold of the apostolate they have undertaken, after the likeness of the offering of Jesus made on the Cross, they freely offer themselves day by day as a living and pleasing sacrifice to God the Father.” “Behold for you,” says the Rector, “a state of perfection, and indeed one made stable by virtue of the oath of the Mission; poverty also, chastity, and obedience. What else can you have in religion that conduces to acquiring perfection?” Caius, however, still not content, secretly consults Julius, a regular, who, recognizing an excellent vocation, affirms that nothing prevents Caius from passing immediately to religion, since this privilege is granted in law to secular priests, nor does the oath of the Mission stand in the way, because, insofar as it is contrary to the evangelical counsels, it places an obstacle before the Holy Spirit, according to St. Thomas, in III, distinction 39, question 1, article 3, minor question 3, reply to 2, where the Angelic Doctor [correcting an evident omitted-letter printing error] adds these words: “By the very fact that someone swears that he will not enter religion, he is perjured.” Hence it is asked:

Is the state of a secular priest with the care of souls a state of perfection?

Is at least the religious state a higher state of perfection than the state of a secular priest with the care of souls?

Which state is of greater dignity?

What is to be said of the case?

Vol. II, Case LXXII: Members of Religious Orders and Personal Property · Vol. IV, Case XLIV: The Sense of the Words “Pure Virgin” in the Constitution of a Religious Order · Vol. V, Case XXXIV: Forcing a Person to Enter the Convent · Vol. V, Case XXXV: A Gift Unlawfully Made by a Religious · Vol. V, Case XXXVI: Dispensation from Solemn Vows

Solution

This question is answered above, p. 59.

…and 79 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

The Casuist

Various; ed. S. Woywod, O.F.M., and J. A. McHugh, O.P. — 34 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Vol. II, Case LXXII: Members of Religious Orders and Personal Property

The following case is presented for solution: Cornelius, now a secular priest, but formerly belonging to an order, sic confitetur: While still in the order I was called one day to the deathbed of a woman whose regular confessor I had been. Upon having confessed she presented to me, as a token of gratitude for my long years of endeavor with her, a bank book for six thousand dollars. Even then I had the intention of leaving eventually the order and so I asked her whether I might keep the money for my own use for the event of my leaving the order. She answered: I do not give this + money to the order, but to you personally; do with it as you will, keep it for the time when you will have left the order. Accordingly I kept the bank book, without the knowledge of my superiors. Three years after that I left the order, and drew the six thousand dollars, together with interest. Since, however, I belonged to a rigid order with solemn profession, and had taken the vow of poverty, I feel worried and beg you, as my confessor, to advise me whether I may keep the money. To decide this case we must answer the following questions:

May a religious, in anticipation of the fact that he will positively obtain permission to leave the order, put away some means (as in our case) for his future use?

If this were not lawful in general, would our case perhaps form an exception, the benefactress having expressly declared that she presented the bank book to Cornelius, and not to the order?

If his (Cornelius’) action was sinful, was it an offense against poverty, or also against justice?

Has the sin against justice ceased through the dispensation from the vows, and may Cornelius now keep the money in good conscience?

What is to be done in case of death of this ex-religious? Must the money revert to the relatives, or heirs, of the benefactress, or to the order, or may Cornelius dispose of it as he pleases?

I reply to the questions as follows:

Ad. 1. No; a religious, before his dismissal, must certainly not possess himself of anything to make use of it after his dismissal; for he is hic et nunc still fully bound by the vows of holy poverty.

Ad, 2. As the benefactress expressly agreed that the presentation take place only pro tunc, not at once, it appears to me that the religious may have meanwhile considered himself as depositarius; this of itself is not against poverty, but may certainly be against the rules of the order; whether venialiter or graviter, depends upon rules and circumstances.

‘Ad, 3. As the order had obtained no right to the amount, and the benefactress having renounced her title to it, Cornelius does not violate justice, nor poverty per se (except perhaps secundum desiderium et actum internum; if he per fas et nefas, without a reason valid before God, seeks release from his vows); he may have violated the rules of the order, or also the obedience, perhaps grievously. In this answer, denying the violation of poverty, I am presuming that Cornelius really had reason and prospect to be released from the vow of poverty. Compare, however, my answer Ad. 5.

Ad. 4. This answer is given in the preceding argument.

Ad. 5. The money is not to be given to the heirs of the benefactress, as she has invalidated her and their right to it by voluntary cession. Nor is it to be given to the order, as, according to the will of the benefactress, it has no claim to it. Still it does not follow that Cornelius can freely dispose of it. In secularizing a professed of solemn vows there remains generally intact the substance of the vows; the secularized is and remains disqualified from possessing property, he may have, and acquire, property ad usum suum, quantum eis ad sustentationem indiget; whatever is over and above that he must in his lifetime, or mortis causa, give up to the purposes mentioned in the Indult of Secularization. If a certain work is mentioned to which the legacy of the secularized religious should revert, then all his property must be so disposed of; if, however, the Indult of Secularization gives the right of free disposal, ad pias causas, then the secularized religious in regard to this money may freely choose among the piae causae.

n. ¶13.

Aug. Lehmkuhl, S.J.

Vol. IV, Case XLIV: The Sense of the Words “Pure Virgin” in the Constitution of a Religious Order

Miss X. applies to the superior of a convent for admission. The superior answers that she may come, but only on condition that she is a pure virgin. X. goes to her confessor, and tells him that she was once so unhappy as to be seduced, but the sinful act had no results, and she repented of it and confessed it long ago. She asks anxiously whether she can describe herself as a pure virgin.

It can scarcely be doubted that the constitutions, to which the superior referred, meant, by the words " a pure virgin," to designate one who is pure in the ordinary acceptation of the word, and in the eyes of her fellow creatures—only those who had " fallen " were to be excluded from admission. It is possible, and is said to have actually happened, that a superior, misunderstanding the text of the rules, has meant really vera virginitas coram Deo, and in this way has made the mistake of making admission depend upon a condition not based upon the rules. In this case X. can with a clear conscience call herself a pure virgin, for she is such, according to the constitutions to which the superior has referred. The mistake is on the part of the superior, whose wrongly imposed condition must be regarded as non adjecta (cf. Gury, 795 nota). How would matters stand, however, if the rule really required virginity in the eyes of God, and absolute innocence of at least any outwardly dishonorable action?

We can safely assume that the rule of no religious order of women would receive the approval of a Bishop, and still less of a Pope, if this interpretation were to be placed upon it, as such a point would inevitably give rise to many embarrassments and scruples. We can hardly be wrong in believing that the ecclesiastical authorities would not be justified in attaching such a condition to the admission of postulants, for it would be injurious to the community life, and a morally impossible condition.

In an analogous case, St. Alphonsus writes: The authors say that a bride corrupted by another man, even if she is asked by her bridegroom whether she has been known by another, may dissemble and deny it by a restriction that is not purely mental, replying that she is not corrupted, understanding this in the common estimation (1. vi. 865). X's confessor may set her mind completely at rest.—Georg Freund, C.SS.R.

Vol. V, Case XXXIV: Forcing a Person to Enter the Convent

Case.—Mrs. M. was entrusted with the care of two nieces who had as an inheritance the sum of ten thousand dollars. She was very fond of the younger niece, who was attractive and much sought by suitors. She had no affection for the older, who was not attractive, though good and gentle, and unsought in marriage. Mrs. M. finally concluded that the best place for her elder niece Alice was a convent. This scheme did not meet with Alice’s favor and thereafter the homely relative was subjected to petty annoyances, which in time became persecution and made her life unbearable in the home of her aunt. After a few years of patient suffering, no longer able to bear such ill-treatment, she decided to enter the convent, hoping to have there a happier life than she had so far enjoyed. In this she was disappointed. Hence in the course of a few years she returned to the world. Meanwhile her sister had married and received what remained of the money of Alice, which the married sister now refuses to return, leaving Alice penniless and without a home.

Question.—What should be done?

Solution.—The aunt in question has certainly proved herself an unjust steward. She has a very grave account to settle with the Just Judge. She undertook to be a mother to the orphans and failed miserably. She sinned gravely by her schemes to force her gentle, though homely, niece to enter the religious life against the inclinations and wishes of the girl. She no doubt consoled herself with the conclusion that she was doing great good to the luckless girl, unsought in the world, by compelling her to accept the religious life—forcing her to accept the “better part.” In reality she was doing her ward a positive injury in driving her to act against her will, to take up the burdens of a life for which she had no fitness. The lack of the qualities needed for the successful and peaceful life in the convent could have but one result. Alice found herself even more unhappy in her new life than in the old one. She could not but feel that she was not doing God’s Will and was in consequence running the risk of endangering her soul’s eternal welfare. Therefore she gave up the convent life. For this she is to be praised.

Secondly, the worldly-minded aunt, for this is what she was, sinned against justice by the constant harassing to which she subjected a young girl, who was unable to protect or defend herself in her circumstances. She made the life of her niece unbearable, and although the vexations were in themselves petty, yet by reason of the relations between the two and the utter friendlessness and dependence of the girl, they became relatively grave. A girl’s life for the most part is spent at home and she has a strict claim to proper treatment. A violation of this right may be a grave injustice and in the present case does constitute a serious fracture of the virtue of justice, since it forced the girl in question to leave what should have been her home, and compelled her to seek refuge in a convent where she was absolutely out of place. The liberty of Alice was interfered with in the choice of a vocation. This, indeed, is a serious matter. The Church demands positive freedom for all on this important point and to secure it she has placed heavy penalties on all who break so weighty a law. If the convent in question were one where solemn vows were taken, then this faithless aunt would incur the sentence of excommunication as inflicted by the Council of Trent. Now as to the conduct of the sister of Alice, we must say it is indefensible. She has no right to the money —never had any right to it; she sins in keeping it, and, of course, is bound to restitution. She sins again in not helping her sister who is penniless and homeless. She cannot be absolved until she does her duty by the maltreated and defrauded Alice.

Vol. V, Case XXXV: A Gift Unlawfully Made by a Religious

Case.—Hildegard, a professed lay-sister of an Order whose lay-sisters take simple but perpetual vows, desired to make to one of the servants a small present as a token of appreciation. Since the Mother Superior would neither give, nor allow, anything for this purpose, Sister Hildegard, without the Superior’s knowledge, asked a woman friend for five dollars, pretending that she wanted it for a pious object. The friend made her a present of this amount, for her free use, and Hildegard in turn gave it to the servant, without the knowledge, and against the will, of her Superior.

Question.—To what extent has Sister Hildegard transgressed the vow of poverty? The matter of giving scandal, of disobedience, etc., in an act of this kind, is not taken into consideration here, but merely the violation of the vow of poverty, and relatively of justice, in the case.

Solution.—1. Through the Votum simplex paupertatis, as distinct from the solemn vow of poverty, Hildegard neither lost the dominium radicale suorum bonorum, nor the ability to acquire for herself temporal goods (bona temporalia pretio aestimabilia), but she had renounced all independent use of such goods, and all free and voluntary disposition of temporal possessions as a grave obligation (sub gravi). Hence Müller (Theol. Moral., 1, II, 216) holds: “Therefore a solemn vow renders every act of ownership not only unlawful but at the same time invalid; a simple vow makes such an act only unlawful, not invalid.” The same views are expressed by Marc, and other authorities who deal with the difference between solemn and simple vows. The acceptance of the gift by Sister Hildegard, asked for and received without permission, even against the wish of the Superior, was, therefore, valid but illicit. Cardinal Gousset writes: “A Religious sins against the vow of poverty if, without permission, he receives money for his own use, or for use according to his intentions, even if employing it for pious ends” (Moral Theol., 540).

Sister Hildegard renounces this property by presenting the money to the servant, acting again without either the expressed or presumed permission of her Superior, another action manifestly against the vow of poverty. But is this not also stealing money from the convent? The canonical principle: Whatever a monk acquires, he acquires not for himself but for the monastery, would seem to decide that the gift acquired by Hildegard became the property of the convent, and that her unauthorized disposition thus deprived the convent. This view must be rejected, however, because in the case of Religious of simple vows the principle quoted does not cover all possible manners of acquiring property, as is the case with solemn vows, but extends merely to the special work which such Religious practice as members of the community, as is apparent from the form of the profession. In regards to purely personal gifts this principle does not therefore apply in the case of simple vows of poverty. (See Gury II, n. 162 [9], and others.) In our case the justitia commutativa was not violated; the servant, though she sinned, if acting mala fide, by cooperating in transgressing the vow, still acquired possession of the money lawfully, and for this reason is not obliged to restitution.

Another question is whether the amount of five dollars forms a materia gravis contra votum, and hence whether Hildegard sinned grievously?

Moralists generally agree that the same amount that constitutes a grave sin against justice is to be considered materia gravis when a Religious violates the vow of poverty. In a case of theft, five dollars would not be a sum sufficient in every case to inflict a grave injury on the loser (materia absolute gravis). In the present instance, Sister Hildegard did not take the money from the Monastery, and consequently, even though the Monastery were very poor, there cannot be question of materia relative gravis. Furthermore, since she received the money for the benefit of another, her act of proprietorship was much less than it would have been had she taken the five dollars for her own personal use. Hence we consider that her sin against holy poverty was not mortal.

Finally, if Hildegard had merely begged her friend to give five dollars to the said servant, and the latter had presented the money herself, then there would have been no actus proprietatis, and, therefore, no violation of the vow of poverty, though the nun’s presumption and disobedience would call for censure.

Vol. V, Case XXXVI: Dispensation from Solemn Vows

Case.—Anthony had made his solemn profession as a lay brother of a religious Order, having taken simple vows three years before, upon completing his novitiate. At that time he gave evidence of being quite scrupulous, otherwise he was perfectly satisfactory. Soon however he began to suffer so severely from melancholy that he had to be placed in an insane asylum. After two years in that institution the officials declared him in condition to leave, but warned against his resuming the religious life. Anthony now petitioned the Ordinary to obtain for him a dispensation from the vows, asserting that he made his profession unwillingly, and that ever since he had been troubled with great scruples. He could not possibly stay in the Order. It was ascertained, moreover, that both his father and his sister had died as inmates of an insane asylum.

The Ordinary made application to the Holy See, submitting full details of the case, stating also that Anthony had correctly made his solemn vows, and had testified in writing that he was acting without compulsion, and fully conscious of what he was doing. Nevertheless, he may have been suffering even then from a hereditary taint of insanity; it was stated, also, that the physicians feared that he would again incur his melancholy if he returned to the Order.

Question.—May solemn vows be dispensed?

Solution.—Solemn vows may be dispensed, but the dispensationis reserved to the Holy See. Infirm health is considered a sufficient reason for granting the dispensation from simple vows. A graver reason is required to dispense from solemn than from simple vows.

But if the nature of an infirmity were very serious, it might constitute the very grave cause that is required for a dispensation from solemn vows. In the present case the S$. Congr. Inquisitionis, by virtue of papal authority, granted to the Ordinary power to dispense the lay brother from his solemn vows, so that he could enter the married state, with a Catholic, lawfully and validly. The condition was imposed that in case his wife died before him a second marriage was prohibited; he was to be informed also that every violation of chastity, outside of marriage, would be a sin at the same time against the vow of chastity.