Integrity: What Must Be Confessed

272. Definition and necessity. Confession is entire if it comprehends all sins which by the will of Christ must be declared in sacramental confession.¹

A twofold integrity of confession is distinguished, material and formal. Material integrity is had when all mortal sins which have been committed and not yet directly remitted are manifested; formal integrity is had when all mortal sins are explained which here and now, considering the circumstances, can and must be accused. Now if those things which can be enumerated are enumerated, in reality all are present, and formal and material integrity are had together; but if one or another sin is omitted from a just cause, the confession will be formally but not also materially entire.

1. Material integrity is not always required for a valid confession: for Christ in his goodness and wisdom was unwilling, for valid reception of this sacrament, to demand something which very often is morally or even physically impossible; material integrity is of this kind.

2. But formal integrity is altogether required for a valid confession: for the divine precept of declaring all mortal sins committed certainly refers at least to those sins which the penitent here and now can and must declare. Hence he sins gravely who omits some sin which he here and now can and must declare.

Whether it is licit to divide confession. He is said to divide confession who manifests some sins to this confessor and others to another confessor. Now the integrity of confession requires that all mortal sins be manifested to the same confessor, since all are remitted together. Hence divided confession is not licit if through it the formal integrity of confession is not preserved; but if by dividing confession formal integrity is preserved, to divide confession is of itself licit.

a. From a just cause it can happen that someone confesses mortal sins to one confessor and venials to another; thus a penitent can manifest some grave sin unknown to the confessor, and then ordinary venials, in order that, on account of shame, he may more easily and without danger of sacrilege confess to a confessor who is known to him. Likewise if someone here and now is not bound to confess some mortal sin, e.g., one reserved to him who does not have the power of absolving, he can be silent about that to one confessor and manifest it afterward to another.

b. Therefore it is not licit for a superior, because he is occupied by many labors, after hearing only reserved sins, to absolve a penitent and to send him to another confessor so that he may be absolved from non-reserved sins, because he cannot be absolved from reserved sins unless he is absolved from the others; but sacramental absolution cannot be validly and licitly conceded to him who has confessed in divided manner, unless there is present a cause excusing from the integrity of confession. Nor is the lack of laborers a cause excusing from integrity. But a penitent can be absolved by the superior, after hearing only the sins reserved with censure, from the censure and be sent to another confessor so that he may be absolved from the sins, because absolution from censure is not sacramental and therefore does not suppose an entire confession of sins. Once the censure and reservation have been removed, the penitent can be absolved sacramentally from sins by another confessor.

¹ Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 5 and can. 7. Cf. Pesch VII, n. 176.

273. What is required for the integrity of confession. In order that confession may be entire, there must be declared all mortal sins committed after baptism and not yet directly remitted or not declared in due manner, according to species and number, and also external acts, but not the effects of sin.

274. 2. According to species: namely the lowest moral species of mortal sins must be declared: for according to the Council of Trent, in confession there must be declared all and each mortal sin, i.e., according to the proper sense of these words in species and number.¹

a. Therefore the divine precept is not satisfied by the confession of sins only in general (I have sinned mortally), nor by confession of them in generic species (I have sinned against justice), but any sin must be declared in its lowest species (I have stolen grave matter from my neighbor).

b. But he who, whether from ignorance or from forgetfulness, cannot declare a sin in its lowest species, is not therefore excused from manifesting the sin insofar as he can manifest it. Therefore he who would know that he had committed mortal sin but would be wholly ignorant of what sort it was is bound at least to say this, that he has sinned mortally; and he who would know that he has offended against justice but cannot further recall by what reason, ought at least to indicate this, that he has sinned gravely against justice. For even a sin which can be declared only generically constitutes necessary matter of confession and sufficient matter of valid absolution. Nevertheless, once this absolution has been obtained, the specific confession of the same sin remains to be supplied if it can later be done.

¹ Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 5 and can. 7. Cn. 901.

275. 3. According to number: for from the Council of Trent all and each sins, and from the Code (cn. 901) all mortal sins of which after diligent examination of oneself one has consciousness, must be accused.

a. The integrity of confession demands that, as far as can be done, the certain number of mortal sins be explained; wherefore he sins in like manner, both he who knowingly or from culpable negligence expresses a greater number, and he who expresses a lesser number, and finally also he who, knowing a determined number, indicates only a probable one with the particle about added: for all lie in a grave matter and disturb the sacramental judgment, unless scrupulosity, good faith, or zeal for greater security excuses them.

Therefore they do not satisfy the obligation of confessing integrally who confess only the species of sins but not the determined number in this way: I have blasphemed often or several times; I have often omitted Mass on Sunday; several times I ate meat on days of abstinence, etc. These indeed are to be instructed by the confessor that they must confess integrally also as to number.

b. When after diligent examination of conscience the certain and exact number of sins cannot be found, the probable number must be expressed, namely that which approaches more closely to the truth, with the particle about added. By this particle about there is not comprehended a notable excess or defect, but only a modest one, yet one proportioned to the number expressed according to this rule: a modest defect or excess will be, relatively to about five sins, to add or subtract one unit here or there; relatively to about ten, two units; relatively to twenty, three or four; relatively to forty, four or five; relatively to one hundred, five or six. Therefore in the first case the penitent will be judged to have sinned four, five, or six times; in the second, eight, nine, ten, eleven, or twelve times; and similarly in the others.¹

c. If the penitent afterward finds the exact number of sins, and the sins which he does not remember are certainly more than the number comprehended together with the particle about declared in confession, he must afterward manifest the excess in confession, because these sins had in no way been set forth; but he is bound to nothing when he finds that he had expressed a number notably greater: for in the greater number indicated there is already contained and absolved that lesser number, supposing that the penitent did not lie but in good faith exaggerated the number.

But if no number, not even a probable one, can be had, as almost happens in habitual sinners, these things must be noted:

a. St. Alphonsus (n. 466) warns that the confessor ought not to be too anxious in investigating the number of sins where it cannot be indicated: for it suffices that the penitent open the habit of sinning and the delay of time during which he persevered in the state of sinning, and how often in a day, in a week, in a month he was accustomed to sin. From these things the prudent confessor will know the state and conscience of the sinner better than from the probable number which the latter utters more by guessing than by seriously weighing.

b. If the penitent could not even know and indicate this, the confessor should induce him to open his state, manner of living, habit and occasions of sinning, and by this reason the state of conscience is sufficiently manifested so that he can be absolved. Wherefore if a penitent of this kind afterward remembers his sins more distinctly, he is not bound to confess them more accurately: for in that confused accusation all things were sufficiently known by the confessor, so that the penitent could have been directly absolved from all of them. Therefore it suffices if, for example, a prostitute says: For two years I remained in a brothel and as often as there was occasion, even to married men, etc., I gave power of my body; or if a concubinary says: For three years I lived in concubinage; or another: I desired any women whomsoever I encountered, even relatives, married women, sacred persons; or: About most shameful things, whenever any occasion was given, I spoke with any companions, etc., etc.²

Note. If one sinful act contains two malices specifically diverse, as if one having a vow of chastity pollutes himself, the divided sin can be accused in confession thus: I sinned by pollution; I violated my vow, and that gravely. Likewise if one sinful act contains two malices distinct in number, as if someone by one theft gravely injured two owners, the divided sin can be accused in confession thus: I committed grave theft; likewise I committed grave theft against another man. Those who concede that malices can be divided in confession bring forward as the reason that the penitent explains the sin as to each malice, which suffices in confession. Those who deny this say that the confessor hearing these things conceives that the penitent has committed two sins distinct in number, which is not true. Nevertheless this error of the confessor does not alter the sacramental judgment.

¹ Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, n. 97; St. Alphonsus, n. 466.

² Sporer-Bierbaum III, pr. 3, n. 451 ff.

276. 4. External acts, by which internal acts are completed in the ratio of sin: for we must confess sins; but by the name of sin there is properly understood not only the internal act, but also the external one, which is its natural complement.

a. For although the external act does not of itself have its own malice, nevertheless it participates in the malice of the internal act and, with the internal act which by its nature it perfects and completes, constitutes one moral act, namely the sin completed and consummated in its species.

b. If the external act were not declared, the gravity of the injury inflicted upon the neighbor would not be understood, nor the obligation of restitution, censure, irregularity, etc.

c. Finally, the Church has always understood and interpreted the Lord's precept concerning confession of mortal sins in this way; wherefore it does not suffice for him who committed theft to say in confession: I had the purpose of stealing or I wished to steal, but one must say: I stole.

277. 5. Not the effects of sin. Namely, there are sinful external actions from which sometimes effects follow which, once the external action has been placed, no longer depend on the will of the agent: if someone, for example, with gravely evil intention gives poison to his neighbor, or gives a girl a means for procuring abortion, sometimes there follows, whether he wishes it or not, death and abortion. Moreover, to declare these effects, even if they followed, is not necessary for the confession to be formally entire: for by divine precept sins alone must be declared; but those effects are not sins, since they are in no way free. Wherefore it suffices to set forth the depraved will and the efficacious action for producing that effect.

Nevertheless it is expedient, and sometimes for another reason plainly necessary, that the effect which followed from the external sin be set forth, namely when the confessor needs to know whether there is an obligation of restitution, irregularity, censure, or reservation: for external sins are usually not punished with these penalties unless the effect also followed, lest a penalty so grave be inflicted more often than by itself it ought to be.

278. Concerning doubtful sins the question is asked whether they are necessary matter of confession. Moreover, a threefold different doubt can be distinguished: a. concerning the sin itself; b. concerning the gravity of the sin; c. concerning the confession of the sin. It is supposed that the doubt is not merely negative, but positive, or resting on a probable foundation. Now, although it is to be advised that penitents confess doubtful sins, nevertheless, from strict obligation, they are not bound to confess them, whatever the doubt may be: for a doubtful obligation is no obligation. Therefore:

1. He who doubts whether he really committed a sin, if the doubt remains after diligent examination, is not bound to confess it: for an obligation is not to be imposed unless it is certainly established. Moreover, from the Council of Trent,¹ mortal sins of which consciousness is had must be accused, i.e., those of which certain knowledge is had; but there is not certain knowledge of doubtful sins.

2. He who doubts whether a sin which he certainly committed is grave, whether on the part of the matter or on the part of consent, is not bound to confess it for the same reasons.

In practice, however, according to St. Alphonsus (n. 476), the two following rules are to be observed:

a. In doubt whether the matter of sin is grave, rather rude penitents ought ordinarily to accuse doubtful sins, both because they cannot of themselves form conscience for themselves and because very often they do not know how to distinguish venials from mortals. Nevertheless scrupulous persons, who are not accustomed to commit mortal sins, must be excepted. But those who are not rude but sufficiently instructed are ordinarily to be gently exhorted, not obliged, to accuse doubtful sins.

b. In doubt concerning full consent: a. if penitents are of timorous conscience and are not accustomed to sin gravely, they are in no way bound to confess doubtful sins, because presumption favors them, which is had from things ordinarily occurring; indeed they must be impeded from this accusation if they seem prone to scruples. b. If penitents keep a middle way between a timorous and a lax conscience, they are not indeed to be obliged, but they are to be induced to declare doubtful consent, because this is profitable for tranquility of conscience. c. If penitents are of lax conscience, generally they ought to declare doubtful sins, because the presumption deduced from things ordinarily occurring, which is against them, reaches moral certitude concerning the sin committed.

3. He who doubts whether a sin certainly committed and certainly also grave has already been confessed is, for the same reasons, not bound to confess it again: for a law which has probably already been satisfied is no longer certain, and therefore cannot beget a certain obligation. In practice indeed confession is to be advised in order to procure tranquility of conscience; nevertheless no strict obligation exists.

He who has confessed a mortal sin as doubtful, which afterward he discovers certainly to have been committed, is not bound to confess the same sin again as certain, because he has already satisfied the precept of confession: for he who confesses a sin according to species and number as it is in conscience, and is directly absolved from it, has already satisfied the precept of confession.²

This solution, which more recent authors judge probable³ against the more common opinion of the older authors,⁴ is confirmed from another question which is almost commonly solved by authors from the same principle. He who set forth a doubtful number of sins with the particle about is no longer bound in confession to declare the certain number if he later finds it, unless the excess is notable; therefore neither is he bound in this case, since even in a probable number certain sins are declared as doubtful.

¹ Sess. 13, c. 7.

² Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, n. 77.

³ Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri V, n. 226; Lehmkuhl II, n. 318 (n. 422); Gury II, n. 480; Genicot, Theol. mor. inst. II, n. 291.

⁴ Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 478.

279. On the circumstances of sins. Some circumstances of sins are species-changing, which add to the act a new malice distinct in species from that which the act has by reason of its object; thus the circumstance of a sacred place from which a thing is taken adds to theft the malice of sacrilege against the virtue of religion. Others are aggravating or diminishing, which only increase or diminish the malice of the sinful act within the same species of sin, whether by reason of duration or intensity, mode, time, person, place, etc. These circumstances are either lightly or notably aggravating or diminishing, according as they lightly or notably increase or diminish the malice of the act.

1. Species-changing circumstances must necessarily be explained in confession:¹ for unless they are declared, all mortal sins are not accused in their proper species, which is required by divine precept. It scarcely needs to be mentioned that a new malice added to a sinful act must be mortal in order to constitute necessary matter of confession.

Which circumstances change species is declared, with regard to individual sins, in the tractate on the precepts. In this place only a few things must be added. In sins of scandal (induction, cooperation), the circumstance of superiority or office sometimes adds a new malice against piety or justice, as if a parish priest is a scandal to his parishioners, parents to their children, a teacher to a pupil committed to his special care. This obtains when the superior by force of his office is bound, from piety or justice, to care for the spiritual welfare of the subject. Therefore a base sin of a confessor with his penitent, which has relation to confession, takes on the new malice of real sacrilege; but a sin which is not referred to confession does not take on a new malice, because outside confession the confessor is not bound to procure the spiritual welfare of the penitent. Finally, other superiorities or dignities, such as that of a magistrate, priest, master, etc., can increase the malice of a sin committed with a subject, layman, servant, but they do not change the species.²

¹ Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 5. Cn. 901.

² Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, n. 309.

280. 2. Circumstances only aggravating do not have to be explained necessarily in confession: for no precept exists which obliges one to declare circumstances only aggravating. Indeed sins alone must necessarily be declared in confession; but circumstances which do not change species do not add a new sin to the sinful act. Hence the Council of Trent, which enumerates all conditions required for the integrity of confession, speaks only of circumstances which change species, with no mention made of circumstances which only aggravate,¹ and the new Code likewise.

a. With all agreeing, no obligation exists of confessing circumstances that are only lightly aggravating or diminishing; today, however, the opinion that there is no obligation of confessing circumstances even if they are notably aggravating has become almost common, especially because the Council of Trent not only is silent about this obligation, but seems positively to exclude it. For where, in the cited place, it accurately declares what must be manifested in confession from the precept of Christ, after it had taught that all and each mortal sins and the circumstances which change the species of sin must be manifested, it adds: "nothing else is to be required of penitents in the Church." As regards the difficulty which the Roman Catechism makes in this question,² it is not improbable that its words are to be understood concerning circumstances which change the theological species, namely which cause a light sin to become grave, or a grave sin to become light.³ Nor does the reason taken from this have force, that otherwise a fitting penance could not be imposed; since it suffices that the penance be proportioned to the specific substance of the sins and their number, but exact equality between penance and the gravity of sin as to circumstances is not required. For if exact equality were required, circumstances notably diminishing would also have to be declared in confession, which nevertheless no one demands.⁴ Finally, if these circumstances had to be declared necessarily, an intolerable burden would be imposed on both confessors and penitents, and thence innumerable anxieties and difficulties would arise, since it is very difficult, not to say impossible, to distinguish which circumstances are notably and which are lightly aggravating.

b. Moreover, the faithful ordinarily tend to declare circumstances at least the more notable, which indeed can be recommended to them, because it greatly contributes both to tranquility of conscience, to more abundant fruit of the sacrament, and to more suitable direction. Yet if it concerns circumstances of sins against the sixth precept, penitents are not only not to be questioned about them, but they are not even to be permitted to set them forth, on account of the danger which would thence be created both for the confessor and for the penitent.

c. Nevertheless, when the confessor asks about circumstances only aggravating, the truth must be candidly opened. For the confessor has the right of asking not only those things which are necessary for procuring the integrity of confession, but also several other things, of which kind are: a. aggravating circumstances; b. conditions necessary for incurring censure, irregularity, or a reserved case; c. the habit of sinning;⁵ d. relapse; e. a proximate occasion of sin; f. grave obligations; g. the disposition necessary for valid absolution. Hence he who has sinned with several diverse persons satisfies the precept by declaring the species and number of the sin, even if he does not declare that he committed it with several persons; for example, he who has fornicated with three persons satisfies by saying: I committed the sin of fornication three times, even if he does not add whether with the same person or with different persons. Nevertheless he must respond to the confessor asking about this matter, because he is more easily kept in proximate occasion who has sinned several times with the same person.⁶

¹ Sess. 14, c. 5. Cn. 901.

² De poenitentia, n. 47.

³ Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri V, n. 209.

⁴ Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, n. 120.

⁵ Therefore this proposition (58) was condemned by Innocent XI: We are not bound to confess to a confessor asking about it the habit of some sin.

⁶ Cf. Lacroix, l. 6, pr. 2, n. 18.

281. Whether he satisfies his obligation who accuses a recent sin as if committed formerly. Since a sin as to substance is not changed, whether it is said to have been committed at this or that time, or is said to have been remitted or not remitted, he who accuses a recent sin as if already remitted of itself satisfies the obligation of confessing integrally. Therefore he satisfies the obligation of confessing integrally who mixes new sins with old, or who in a general confession does not distinguish from other sins the mortal sins committed since the last confession, even if he does this deliberately in order to disguise the time at which he committed the sin. But if the penitent, being asked about the time, lies and declares a sin committed today to have been done at a remote time, he seems to commit a light sacrilegious falsehood; nor does the opinion of those seem to be approved who think that a penitent of this kind does not satisfy the obligation of confessing.

Among more recent authors, several favor the opinion just set forth,¹ since the circumstance of time does not pertain to the necessary matter of confession: for any mortal sin must be declared according to its whole essential and specific malice; but the circumstance of time is external and accidental to a sin considered according to its specific essence. What is usually objected, namely that a sin committed at this time is different from a sin committed at another time, is solved by this distinction: it is another individual sin, but not another specific sin; but it suffices that the species of the sin be declared in confession. Therefore he who by lying denies that he committed the sin since the last confession does not deny the specific sin itself, which must necessarily be declared in confession, but the accidental circumstance of time of the sin, which does not have to be declared necessarily. On the contrary, he wishes to confess and in reality confesses that same sin which he committed, to which through falsehood he adds a false external circumstance (already accused, already remitted, committed at another time), which nevertheless does not change the species of the sin. The confessor thinks the same sin was done at another time or already remitted; and he thinks this either from his own error or from the falsehood of the penitent. But the error of the confessor, whether his own or induced by deceit of the penitent, does not obstruct the validity of the sacrament, provided the confessor rightly judges, or at least can rightly judge, concerning the species or specific essence of the sin, which alone is the necessary matter of confession and the object of absolution. Nor should it be said that the confessor is in this way impeded from imposing a fitting penance: for it is not required for valid absolution that the confessor, through the accusation of the penitent, be in the state of imposing a fitting penance, provided the penitent is disposed to accept and perform a fitting penance.

¹ Gury II, n. 488 note; D'Annibale III, n. 309 note 60; Bucceroni, Inst. theol. mor. II, n. 715. Cf. Genicot, Theol. mor. inst. II, n. 288; Lugo, disp. 16, n. 46 ff.

It is not sufficient to confess one’s sins in general terms, and if they are grievous the law of God requires that they be confessed according to number and species, as the Council of Trent teaches.t As we have seen, venial sins are sufficient matter for absolution, but there is no necessity to confess them.

But supposing that a penitent has only venial sins, and he wishes to confess them, what kind of confession is necessary and sufficient¹ Will it be enough to say, “I accuse myself of some small sins and ask for absolution ”’; or ‘‘ I accuse myself of all the sins of my past life, and I have nothing serious ” All divines agree that it will be sufficient to mention some one sin in particular in this case, or to mention the virtue or obligation which has been violated, as by saying, ‘I accuse myself of slight negligence in prayer,” or ‘“‘ of small faults against charity.” They differ about the lawfulness of using a mere general formula. Such a method of confessing is against the practice of the Church, which, as St Thomas says, we should always follow; it is also liable to abuse, for penitents cannot always decide what is serious and necessary matter for confession or not, and shame might easily lead them to be content with generalities when they should give particulars. However, there is something to be said for the other view, inasmuch as some sort of confession is all that is required for the essence of the sacrament, and when there are only venial sins to be confessed there is no certain law which prescribes confession according to number and species, or even more than in general terms. This opinion is at any rate sometimes of use, as it may at times enable confessors to be satisfied with generalities when they cannot get more.

¹ Sess. xiv, c. 5.

The solution of questions about the obligation of confessing doubtful sins largely depends on what system of moral theology is followed. The following principles are generally approved by probabilists:

(a) When the penitent doubts whether he has been guilty of some sinful act or not, he is not bound to confess it, for he cannot be said to be conscious of sin, and a certain obligation cannot arise from an uncertain source.

(b) When the doubt is as to whether full consent was given to what would have been a grave sin if that were the case, the question should be settled by recourse to presumptions. If in other cases consent has usually been given, the presumption is against the penitent, and he should confess the sin as it is in his conscience; otherwise there will be no obligation to do so, (c) If the doubt is whether the sin were mortal or venial, there is no obligation to confess it, for the penitent is not conscious of mortal sin; and only such are bound to confess.

(d) If the doubt is whether a mortal sin which was certainly committed has ever been confessed, we must distinguish; if there be no good ground for thinking that it has been confessed, the obligation will still remain; if, on the contrary, there be good ground for thinking that the sin has been confessed, there will be no obligation of confessing it again.

(e) It is generally better for penitents, unless they are scrupulous, to confess doubtful sins, as it conduces to peace of conscience, and is a meritorious act of humility.

When a doubtful sin has once been confessed as such there will be no obligation to confess it again, even though subsequently the penitent becomes sure that he committed the sin.

The sin was confessed as it was on the penitent’s conscience, and it was absolved directly.

According to the common opinion, although there is no strict obligation to confess a mortal sin which is doubtful, or which has probably been confessed, yet one should not go to Holy Communion in such a state of doubt without either going to confession and confessing at least some sin, or making an act of contrition. For a man should prove himself before receiving Holy Communion, and have a well-grounded belief that he is in a state of grace.

If a penitent mentions only doubtful matter for absolution, the confessor should secure certain matter before giving absolution. Although a penitent may confess only optional matter, yet he has a right to absolution founded on the tacit contract which the confessor entered into with him when he admitted him to confession.

A full, entire, and specific confession of all the mortal sins which have been committed after Baptism is prescribed by divine law. According to the Council of Trent,¹ “ If anyone saith that in the sacrament of Penance it is not necessary by divine law for the remission of sins to confess all and singular the mortal sins which after due and diligent previous meditation are remembered, even those mortal sins which are secret, and those which are opposed to the two last commandments of the Decalogue, as also the circumstances which change the species of a sin ... let him be anathema.”

Theologians distinguish between the material and the formal integrity of confession. The material integrity consists in making known each and all the mortal sins which have been committed and which have not yet been confessed; the formal integrity consists in confessing all the mortal sins which occur to the mind after a diligent examination of conscience, or at least of all the sins which the penitent is bound under the circumstances to confess to the priest. It is formal integrity which is prescribed by divine law, and to procure it the penitent is bound before confession to make a diligent examination of his conscience. He should not be too anxious in making this examination; it will be sufficient if he employ that diligence which prudent men employ in worldly matters of importance. No general rule can be given to measure the length of time which the examination should occupy. Much depends upon the character of the individual, the length of time which has elapsed since the last confession, whether the penitent is accustomed to commit grave sins or not, and on similar circumstances. If the penitent cannot recollect the number of times that he has fallen into serious sin, he should mention the number as nearly as he can, and if he has fallen very frequently and almost continuously over a long period of time, it will be sufficient to mention the approximate number of times that he has fallen in the day or week, together with the length of time during which the habit has lasted.

¹ Sess. xiv, c. 7.

A number of special questions must here be considered which touch on the integrity which is required in confession.

The Council of Trent, as we have just seen, teaches that those circumstances which change the nature of a sin must be made known; the theft of a consecrated chalice, which is a sacrilege, would not be adequately confessed by simply saying, “I committed theft.” Not only circumstances which change the specific nature of a sin must be confessed, but also those which make a venial sin mortal and vice versa. The quantity in theft, then, must be indicated sufficiently to enable the priest to judge whether it was a mortal or a venial sin. Divines are not agreed whether circumstances which merely increase the malice of a sin but do not otherwise change its nature or moral quality are necessarily to be confessed. Many, with the Catechism of the Council of Trent, teach that there is an obligation to confess them, but as they give no convincing reason for their opinion and the contrary is held by many approved theologians, we may safely follow the more easy and the more lenient view.

It is not sufficient to confess as an internal sin one which was completed in external act. It would not be sufficient for a penitent to say that he desired to steal when he actually stole. For although the malice of sin is in the internal act of the will, and the external act adds nothing to it per se, yet, considered as human actions, an internal is different from an external act, and therefore as sins are bad human actions, an internal sin is specifically different from the same sin completed in external act.

It is a matter of controversy whether the mere effect of a sin must be confessed. If a man wounds another with the intention of killing him, and then repents and confesses unlawful wounding with the intention of killing, but afterward the man dies, will his assailant be obliged to go to confession again and confess homicide? The opinion is more probable that there is no such obligation, for such an effect of sin is not a sin, and we are only bound to confess sins; a sin is a human action, and when the victim dies his assailant does not act; he would now prevent the death if he could, and so he does not sin.

A vicious habit or custom of committing sin is a cause of sin rather than sin itself, and as sins are the matter of confession, per se it is not necessary to confess a sinful habit. If, however, the penitent did not use sufficient diligence to correct his bad habit, and this caused him inadvertently to commit sin, to blaspheme, for instance, then although the blasphemy, because inadvertent, is not sinful in itself, it is nevertheless voluntary and sinful in its cause, and so the uncorrected bad habit must be confessed. It is sometimes of importance for the confessor to know whether his penitent has contracted a habit of sin in order to be able to direct him, and so the confessor has a right to ask in confession whether a habit has been contracted, and the penitent is then under an obligation to tell the truth.

If many sins have been committed with others it is usually immaterial whether they were committed with one and the same or with different persons. However, if a sin against chastity is committed with a married person, that circumstance must be mentioned, as it causes the sin to be against justice as well as against chastity. Similarly, if one or both accomplices in such a sin are bound by a vow of chastity, that must. be mentioned. A religious who is a priest, and even if he is solemnly professed, would satisfy his obligation of confessing a sin against chastity by mentioning it, and adding that he is under a vow of chastity. For it is probable that there is no specific difference between the violation of a solemn and a simple and even private vow of chastity, and a priest, like a religious, is bound to chastity by vow.

Sins against chastity committed with relations have the special malice of incest, but with the exception of the first degree in the direct line of consanguinity, it is probable that the several degrees of kindred or affinity do not constitute a specific difference in the sin. There is a special malice and difformity in a sin of impurity committed with parent or child, but among civilized peoples this is happily of rare occurrence. Hatred against relations is not only against general charity, but is also contrary to piety, which binds relations to love each other with a special affection. Grave hatred will be a serious sin also against this virtue of piety if it is indulged in against near relations, not if it is against more remote kindred with regard to whom the obligation is not so strict.

Mere superiority or position of itself does not change the nature of a sin committed by rulers, magistrates, and people in authority. And so if a master sin with his servant, the sin does not of itself differ from ordinary fornication. If, however, the sin is also a violation of a special duty, then of course it will have a special malice, and so if a schoolmaster corrupt a youth committed to his care, he must mention this circumstance in confession.

The time at which a sin was committed does not change its nature, and so even though a sin which has been committed recently be confessed as though it were a sin of one’s past life, the confession will be valid, but of course the practice is not to be commended, nor should it be indulged in.

Integrity of confession is prescribed by divine law, but as even divine law does not bind to what is impossible, physical or moral impossibility of making a full confession will excuse the penitent from obeying the law. And so danger of death when the dying person has not the strength or time for making a full confession, or ignorance of any language known to the priest, or danger of violation of the seal of confession, or danger to life from pestilence or other cause, will excuse the penitent from making a full confession of all his sins. Innocent XI condemned the proposition that a large concourse of penitents on some great feast is a sufficient reason for absolving them without requiring a full confession. When a penitent has been absolved without making a full confession on account of the physical or moral impossibility of doing so, there always remains the obligation of supplying the defect in the next confession, unless the impossibility continues. A proposition asserting the contrary was condemned by Alexander VII. Moreover, that a penitent may lawfully ask for absolution without making a full confession, the following conditions must be verified:

(a) There must be some sort of necessity for making the confession here and now, as, for instance, the obligation of receiving the sacraments at Easter, or the hardship of remaining long without the sacraments or in a state of mortal sin.

(b) There must be no other confessor at hand to whom a full confession could be made without grave inconvenience.

(c) All sins must be confessed which can be mentioned without grave inconvenience, extrinsic to confession, which affects the penitent, the confessor, or some third person. The reason of this is because it cannot be supposed that Christ our Lord intended to bind penitents to make a full confession when it would entail such a hardship, whereas we know that he did command a full confession in spite of shame or other difficulties which are the natural accompaniments of confession of sin to a fellow-man.

We shall treat first of the notion, division, and necessity of integrity; then of the scope of material integrity; then of the causes excusing from material integrity; finally of the means of procuring integrity, or of the examination of conscience.

I. Notion. Integrity consists in this: that in confession someone declares those things which must be declared by him.

II. Division. Integrity is distinguished as twofold, material and formal. Material integrity is had when someone declares those things which of themselves must be declared; in other words, all mortal sins committed after Baptism and not yet duly declared and directly remitted (n. 294). Formal integrity is when someone declares those things which he is bound to declare here and now.

III. Necessity. 1. Material integrity is required of itself. This is clear first from these words of the Council of Trent: "From the already explained institution of the sacrament of Penance, the universal Church has always understood that the complete confession of sins was also instituted by the Lord, and that it exists as necessary by divine right for all who have fallen after Baptism"¹ (cf. canon 901). Next, it is deduced from the fact that the sacrament of Penance was instituted after the manner of a judgment. But it belongs to a judge to have distinct knowledge of the matter - in the case, of sins - concerning which sentence is to be given; both lest he be constituted a blind instrument, and so that he can impose an equitable punishment.

Corollary. Material integrity is necessary by necessity of means. For, to apply to integral confession what we said of confession as such, it is necessary, as follows from what has been said, from the fact that the sacrament of Penance was instituted by Christ after the manner of a judgment. But what is required because of the nature of a sacrament instituted by Christ is necessary by necessity of means, because the sacrament itself is required by necessity of means.

2. Accidentally, material integrity sometimes is not required in reality, namely if it is physically or morally impossible; in that case material integrity in desire, or formal integrity, suffices. This is deduced from the fact that otherwise the sacrament of Penance would have been instituted unfittingly. Hence the Council of Trent: "For it is established that nothing else is required in the Church from penitents than that, after each one has examined himself more diligently and has explored all the folds and hidden places of his conscience, he confess those sins by which he remembers that he mortally offended his Lord and God; but the remaining sins which do not occur to one thinking diligently are understood to be included universally in the same confession."² And again: "If anyone shall say that in the sacrament of Penance for the remission of sins it is not necessary by divine right to confess all and individual mortal sins, of which memory is had with due and diligent premeditation... let him be anathema."³

¹ Session 14, chapter 5.

² Session 14, chapter 5.

³ Session 14, canon 7.

Must Confession be integral; what is this kind of integrity; what is its force? - Resp. Confession must be integral. The reason is that no judgment can be exercised when the cause is unknown; because the confessor must impose salutary penances and prescribe efficacious remedies; because the whole infirmity must be known in order that it may be healed. Trent, sess. 14, C. 5, c. 7; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 9, a. 2. - Integrity is one thing material, another formal. Material integrity is situated in the accusation of all mortal sins which were simply committed, or which after diligent examination of oneself occur to the mind. Formal integrity consists in the accusation of all sins which, after diligent examination of oneself, occur to the mind, and which one here and now, with the circumstances considered, morally can or is bound to confess. Material integrity is not always necessary; for sometimes it is morally impossible because of inculpable forgetfulness; and although sins occur to the mind, from other just causes Confession becomes morally impossible. Wherefore only formal integrity is necessary. Trent, sess. 14, C. 5. - By reason of integrity, the lowest species of sins and their exact number are to be accused under grave obligation, so that it is lawful neither to increase nor to diminish sins. If someone cannot confess the lowest species of sins, he must confess them according to the higher species or genus which he can. Likewise, if someone cannot confess the precisely determined number, he must confess the number which comes nearer to the truth, using, e.g., the particle "about," or, if he cannot even do this, he must say how often approximately in a year, in a month, in a week, in a day, whether frequently, whether rarely, etc. "Sporer rightly notes that the confessor should not be too anxious about seeking the number of sins in a habitual penitent, because it is often impossible to have such a certain number." L. 466; Ithur., Cas. 38, n. 3. - But the particle "about" is generally understood by theologians in this way: about three is 2-4; about ten is 8-12; about thirty is 27-33; about one hundred is 95-105; about one thousand is 950-1050. L. 466; Lugo, d. 16, nn. 78, 81, 94 ff., 644. - E. M.

Resolutions: If someone in Confession has omitted a circumstance necessary to be explained, he must afterward confess it. Wherefore he must again confess the substance of the sin if he cannot otherwise explain it, e.g., if he sinned with a married woman; by no means, however, if he can explain it without that, e.g., if he sinned with a person consecrated to God. "Long-lasting hatred, just as also carnal concupiscence toward a woman, must necessarily be expressed in Confession... because of the number of sins which are repeated in that long delay." L. 467. One who has declared the number of sins around about as much as he can, afterward finding a notable excess, must declare it, because a greater number is not contained in a lesser; but if, on the contrary, he afterward finds a number notably lesser, he is bound to nothing, for the true number was comprehended in the greater. - One who has confessed the number of sins confusedly, as the uneducated, children, and habitual sinners for the most part do, if afterward the sins distinctly come into memory, or only some in particular, must not confess them again; for he already explained all sufficiently in that confused way in which he then could. And therefore he is much less bound afterward either to confess again with greater diligence applied, or with the help of a more learned confessor, in order to explain those sins more distinctly; which would also be exposed to innumerable scruples and anxieties. - For the integrity of Confession, diligent examination is prerequired, Trent, sess. 14, C. 5, according to the capacity of the penitent, the delay of time, and the other circumstances. But for this a moderate diligence suffices, such as a prudent man applies in difficult affairs, such as, morally speaking, learned and fearful persons are accustomed to apply, even if someone thinks he would find more things with greater diligence. Bonacina, t. 1, d. 5, q. 5; Laymann, l. 5, tr. 6, c. 8. But by reason of inadvertence it rarely happens that Confession is sacrilegious because of defect of previous examination. This examination can prudently be supplied by the confessor through discreet questions, and with no greater diligence than the penitent himself is bound to have, according to his condition, especially as regards the uneducated and others concerning whom there is reason to fear that, once dismissed, they will not return again. But it is not necessary to write down sins lest they fall from memory; nor is this to be counseled, because of the danger of publication. - L. 471, 504; Lugo, d. 16, n. 573 ff.; E. M.

Must the external act of sin necessarily be accused? - Resp. In the affirmative, because it is one and the same thing with the internal act in the moral genus, and these two constitute one total act. Besides, the external act is directly prohibited by divine law, e.g., You shall not commit homicide. Moreover, without the declaration of the external act, the confessor for the most part could not perform his office as is fitting, concerning admonitions to be offered, etc. This is also established from the universal custom of the faithful, which explains the law in this sense, and from proposition 25 condemned by Alexander VII. - E. M.

Must the effect of sin necessarily be expressed in Confession? - Some affirm it, because it is evil or a sin at least in its cause; others deny it, because it is evil or a sin only denominatively.

St. Alphonsus affirms it, l. 5, n. 10. "A voluntary omission in its cause," says the holy Doctor, "is also imputed as sin, even if afterward the will cannot operate; for example, if someone makes himself drunk, foreseeing that by reason of the drunkenness he will omit Mass, then he is bound to confess the cause and its effect, namely drunkenness and the omission of the sacred rite, as Salm., etc., with others commonly, better say against Vazquez, etc., provided the will is not retracted before the effect follows, as Sanchez, etc., probably teach; for then it is probable that he is not bound to confess the effect which followed. From this it is also deduced that if the effect happens after retraction, a censure imposed against sinners is not incurred, because this requires contumacy in the act of sin." Cf. also l. 4, n. 149, and l. 7, n. 40.

But Lugo denies it, who has these things: "It must be supposed in a sin, e.g., by which you killed another with poison, that there intervenes first the internal act of the will by which you wished to give him poison; then the external action by which you prepared and gave the poison; then the effect which followed, namely his death.... The first and sufficiently common opinion affirms that the external effect must be explained.... The contrary opinion is broadly defended by Fr. Vazquez, etc. This opinion has always seemed truer to me.... The more common reason... is that the external act, which is denominated free from the actual freedom of the internal act, is truly and properly a sin; but the effect afterward following, e.g., in sleep, is not properly a sin..., but the effect of sin. But in Confession all and only sins must be explained; therefore the external act must be explained when it is a free act, but not the effect afterward following..., because there cannot be actual sin in one who does not actually sin, nor can he actually sin who does not actually act. But the one who sleeps, while his enemy dies from the poison, then does nothing; therefore he does not then sin." De Poen., d. 16, nn. 437, 439, 440, 449. - But this opinion must be limited, unless the penitent has incurred a censure or reserved case because of the effect which followed. Lugo himself has this limitation; indeed he adds: "It can also happen that a censure is incurred by one who has already been justified from the past sin through contrition, or through attrition with the sacrament," n. 453. Cf. also n. 460 and Laymann, l. 1, t. 2, c. 2, n. 5. But, as Ithur., Cas. 40, n. 31 ff.; Cas. 50, n. 26 f., excellently observes, there is no reservation where there is no subject of reservation, or sin, since it has already been absolved. For of no being there are no properties. What is not, is not such. But where only retraction of the will preceded, the cause having been retracted through the will, the effect is no longer culpable in itself. But reservation or censure cannot be incurred when one does not sin through the act.

The same opinion must besides be limited unless the confessor, performing not only the office of judge but also of teacher and physician, prudently questions the penitent about the effect which followed. Instr. pro parv., etc., p. 4, at the end of the Roman Council, published by command of Benedict XIV.

Does it harm the integrity of Confession if someone accuses venials to his ordinary confessor, but mortals to another? - Resp. In the negative, speaking of itself, provided he never receives absolution unless he has first manifested all mortals to one confessor and is absolved by the same. The reason is that grave sins are necessary matter of Confession, and that Confession is integral which embraces all mortals, since venials are not necessarily to be accused. - But in practice attention must be given to the circumstances of penitents and to the motives by which they are led. For those are not to be condemned who sometimes confess graver sins to an unknown confessor, but subject lighter ones to the ordinary, if from shame, by which they would be overwhelmed with a confessor familiarly known, they would commit themselves to the danger of confessing sacrilegiously. Wherefore the confessor would inquire about this matter only from imprudent curiosity; "unless nevertheless on that occasion the penitent remains in a moral occasion of sinning, or goes around for this reason, that he may sin more freely; for then he will sin gravely, and because of defect of attrition the Confession will be null." Hence, although neither occasion nor habit is of itself necessarily to be accused, the confessor nevertheless has a right to inquire both about proximate occasion and about habit, both if there is a prudent suspicion that he is deceived by the penitent concerning his dispositions, and if from this there is a special sin, and so that he may impose a salutary and suitable satisfaction. - Prop. 58 condemned by Innocent XI; Lugo, d. 14, nn. 172, 173; d. 16, n. 57; Suarez, d. 22, s. 3, n. 10; L. 471. Cf. here 707.

Does it harm integrity if someone disguises another voice, lest he be recognized by the confessor? - Resp. In the negative, of itself. Provided he opens all mortals, he performs an integral Confession. Nor is it necessary that he be known by name by the confessor; for it suffices that the confessor intend to absolve the present sinner. But the intention of the confessor of itself is always determined to the penitent. La-Croix, l. 6, p. 1, n. 68.

Must circumstances of mortal sins which notably aggravate them necessarily be confessed? - "There are three opinions, all very probable. - The first opinion affirms it. It is proved, 1. from the Roman Ritual, de Sacram. poenit., from the Roman Catechism, p. 2, c. 5, n. 47.

It is proved, 2. by reason, because the same reason which persuades that circumstances changing the species are to be confessed also urges for circumstances notably aggravating, since both notably change the judgment of the confessor. - The second opinion says that the circumstance what must necessarily be confessed, namely that which touches the substantial integrity of the sin in the individual, as is the quantity of theft. The reason is that otherwise the confessor will not be able to form a due judgment about the substance of the sin. - The third opinion, more probable to me, denies that there is an obligation of confessing aggravating circumstances. It is proved, 1. from St. Thomas, 4 d. 16, q. 3, a. 2, q. 5, who by his authority has indeed given great weight to this opinion. It is proved, 2. by reasons. The first reason: because from the words of Trent, sess. 14, C. 5, the Council seems not obscurely to exclude the obligation of confessing circumstances other than those changing the species, because it sufficiently suggests that these suffice for this: that the confessor form a right judgment about the gravity of crimes and about the punishment to be imposed. The second reason: because otherwise penitents would always fluctuate amid anxieties, since they could always doubt about the integrity of their Confessions in determining which circumstances are or are not notably aggravating. St. Thomas, l. c., q. 5, ad 2. Hence Lugo assigns a reason a priori for this opinion, saying that Christ prescribed nothing other than Confession of sins; but one who explains the circumstances changing the species of sin already truly confesses and explains the essence of the sin, since the quiddity or essence of sin is taken from its specific nature. The third reason: because if we were bound to manifest circumstances notably aggravating, we would also be bound to confess those notably diminishing, namely if someone sinned from anger, fear, more intense passion, from the inducement of others, and similar things, which obligation even the adversaries deny. The last and stronger reason: because no one is bound to observe a doubtful law; hence since the law of confessing aggravating circumstances is very doubtful, we are not bound to it. And therefore, Lugo rightly says, Trent did not explain this obligation of confessing them because the Council could not sufficiently gather it from the words of Christ and the institution of the sacrament." L. 468. - Except: "if the circumstance brings in a censure or reservation, or if the penitent is prudently questioned by the confessor for his necessary direction." L. 467. - Instr. pro parvul., etc., p. 4, at the end of the Roman Council, published by command of Benedict XIII; Lugo, d. 16, s. 3.

Does the circumstance of habit of sin change the species; and must it be manifested in Confession? - Resp. To the first: "It must be said that duration is not a circumstance drawing into another species; similarly neither frequency nor assiduity, unless perhaps by accident from something supervening. For something does not acquire a new species from the fact that it is multiplied or prolonged, unless perhaps in the prolonged or multiplied act something supervenes which varies the species, such as disobedience, or contempt, or something of this kind." St. Thomas, 1. 2, q. 88, a. 5, ad 1.

Resp. To the second: "It is necessary to distinguish a twofold habit: one which induces to perpetrating similar sins with one's freedom and advertence; the other which induces to perpetrating sins without freedom and advertence, and therefore in such a way that they are not a new sin, but the sin (in its cause) consists in this, that the habit was freely acquired, or in this, that due effort is not applied to obliterate it; as happens when someone from habit blasphemes or perjures himself without adverting here and now to the malice of blasphemy or perjury. This latter habit, freely induced or not uprooted, must be confessed as a special sin; for we are gravely obliged to lack it. For although one who perjures himself or blasphemes without advertence does not sin here and now, nevertheless he sins if he does not strive to uproot the habit of perjuring or blaspheming thus. But the former habit is then also to be subjected to the keys when someone adverts that through it he is placed in proximate danger of perpetrating new faults; for since exposing oneself to proximate danger of sinning is a sin, one who adverts that through the habit of sinning he is in that danger commits this special sin: that he subjects himself to this danger, or that he does not strive to turn himself away from it. But because men rarely advert to this, for this reason they rarely accuse themselves of this habit, and therefore rarely is there an obligation of manifesting it before the confessor questions about it. "It is indeed true that one who exposes himself to danger of sinning and immediately sins sufficiently explains both sins by confessing the sin committed, with which that other sin, by which he exposed himself to the danger of sinning, morally makes one. But when a notable delay intervenes between one sin and the other, sufficient for a moral interruption, or when someone only exposes himself to the proximate danger of committing some sin, yet does not commit it, then that by which one exposed himself to proximate danger of sinning must be explained separately; for in that very thing there is sin, according to that of Ecclesiasticus 3: 'He who loves danger will perish in it.'" Viva, on prop. 60 condemned by Innocent XI, last part. - Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 200 ff.; cf. here 704; E. M.

Must the penitent declare the diverse persons with whom he sinned? - Resp. In the negative, of itself. The reason is that it suffices that the number of sins and their species be declared; but sins do not change species for this reason, that they were committed with several persons. - Hence one who fornicated with three different persons, or three times with the same person, satisfies by saying that he fornicated three times; nor is he bound spontaneously to say whether the accomplice was one or several, whether they were prostitutes or others. Nevertheless, if the confessor asks about this, the penitent is bound to respond, because it is expedient that the confessor know whether perhaps there is a proximate occasion of sinning, as is likely if the sin was committed several times with the same person. But different satisfaction and different remedies will have to be prescribed by the confessor according to the multiplicity and diversity of the persons with whom one has sinned. - La-Croix 1040; Bonacina, de Integr., diss. 3, n. 14; Tamburini, in decal., l. 7, c. 7; Elbel, de Act. hum., 103.

Is one bound by a vow of chastity who sins with another similarly bound required to declare both circumstances? - Resp. In the affirmative. The reason is that there are two plainly distinct sins there, namely a sin against one's own vow, and a sin of cooperation with another toward violating that person's vow. - The very same must be said of a married man having relations with another's wife. "Different in species is the obligation by which he himself must not violate his own marriage, and that by which he must not bring it about that the other violate his own." Lugo, d. 16, n. 258. - La-Croix 1063; Salmant., c. 6, n. 63; L., l. 1, n. 46.

Must a priest or religious sinning against chastity disclose his condition, or only the circumstance of the vow of chastity? - It probably suffices that each manifest the circumstance of the vow, because the species of obligation does not seem to be changed by the special condition either of priest or of religious. For the vow of each is solemn. Therefore the sin of each pertains to the same species of personal sacrilege. The controversy can only be about a simple vow, concerning which cf. vol. 1, n. 500. - Lugo, d. 16, s. 4, § 2.

Must one who has committed incest explain the quality, namely: 1. with one related by blood, or with one related by affinity; 2. the degree of consanguinity or affinity; 3. the line in spiritual relationship; 4. the line and degree in legal relationship? - Resp. To the first: Lessius, l. 4, c. 3, n. 79, and others affirm. Lugo, d. 16, nn. 313-316, and others deny. This opinion is judged more probable by St. Alphonsus, 469, and is proved by authority and reason from St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 154, a. 9, ad 2. "A person related by affinity," he says, "is joined to someone on account of a person joined by blood; and therefore, because one is on account of the other, consanguinity and affinity make an unbecomingness of the same nature."

Resp. To the second: Suarez, d. 22, s. 3, n. 12, Diana, t. 1, tr. 7, r. 107, and others, from St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 154, a. 9, and Cajetan there, think that all incests are of the same nature, and that as concerns degree, from this there is had only an aggravating circumstance because of the same virtue of piety and the reverence due to relatives, which is harmed; but greater or lesser connection does not change the species. Ballerinius apud Gur., 486, seems to approve this opinion. - Navarrus, Man., c. 7, n. 4, and others hold that the species of incest is changed from the various degree of connection, because between degree and degree there is special reverence. St. Alphonsus, 470, says this opinion is less probable. - Salmant., de 6 Dec. praec., c. 5, nn. 28, 36, and others, relying also on the authority of the Angelic Doctor, hold that incest differs in species only in the first degree, both of the direct line and of the transverse line, because the reverence due to relatives in that first degree is of a different nature. St. Alphonsus in the cited place says this opinion seems equally probable as the following. - Tamburini, Meth. Confess., l. 2, c. 5, § 2, n. 6, and others judge that all incests among blood relatives, except only the first degree in the direct line, are of the same species. The reason is that only in the said first degree is there present a special nature of connection and of reverence due. "And for this opinion," says St. Alphonsus in the cited place, "St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 154, a. 9, seems undoubtedly to stand," and he says that it seems altogether to be held, and he adds: "indeed Lugo, d. 16, n. 314, etc., rightly teach that one must explain whether a father sinned with a daughter, or a son with his mother, whose fault has a diverse malice by reason of the special reverence due to the mother." Indeed the first degree of the direct line invalidates marriage by natural law. - But Tamburini, ibid., c. 7, n. 48, states that any incest, whether on account of consanguinity or on account of affinity, whatever the degree may be, does not differ in species. And by reason of parity he affirms that the same is to be said not improbably also about other injuries inflicted as regards parents, brothers, and wife, concerning which he had treated properly, c. 5, § 2, n. 6.

The Angelic Doctor, l. c., ad 3, says: "In the mingling of related persons, there is something which is unbecoming in itself and repugnant to natural reason, such as when mingling is made between parents and children, whose kinship is of itself and immediate.... But other persons, who are not joined according to themselves, but through order to parents, do not have unbecomingness in this way from themselves, but fittingness or unfittingness varies about this according to custom and human or divine law, because the use of venereal things, which is ordered to the common good, is subject to law." But it must be noted that by reason of superiority and the obligation arising from it, the sin is truly different if a father seduces a daughter, stepdaughter, or daughter-in-law, from that which a son commits when seducing his mother, stepmother, or mother-in-law.

Resp. To the third: The line in spiritual relationship does not change the species, whether one sins with her whom he held in baptism, or with her mother. L., l. 3, n. 450.

Resp. To the fourth: As for consanguinity and affinity, so consequently and much more for legal relationship the matter is disputed. - Cf. vol. 1, n. 798.

Must the nearness of persons be declared in sins of hatred or injury? - Resp. To the first: As to hatred, in the affirmative, if it is a question of nearer relationship on account of the strict bond of the virtue of piety. Hence grave hatred toward parents, children, grandparents, grandchildren, a spouse, brothers, sisters, and relatives by affinity in the first degree must be declared. - But in the negative, more probably, if it is a question of more remote relationship, namely among other blood relatives or relatives by affinity. For when the connection is more remote, there is had only an aggravating circumstance, and not also one changing the species and necessarily to be expressed in Confession. - Lugo, d. 16, n. 303 ff.

Resp. To the second: Lugo has these things, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 299 ff.: "I think that one universal rule cannot be given on this point; for sometimes the circumstance of the related person against whom one sins will have to be explained; sometimes it will not. This indeed depends on the quality of the offense and on the degree of connection. Hence if parents are struck by a child, if they are killed, if they are affected with insults, if they are defamed, those sins without doubt have a special circumstance against piety, love, and reverence due to parents, which are gravely harmed by sins of this kind. From this, however, it does not follow that every grave injury which is against a father has that other specific malice against piety and must be explained in Confession. For if a son steals from his father that which suffices for a mortal sin of theft against justice, he does not always sin gravely against piety or is bound to explain that circumstance... because... it is not... gravely opposed to that which piety and reverence toward a father demands."

Must the circumstance of dignity and office of the person necessarily be accused, e.g., if the sinner is a superior, magistrate, priest, etc.; if he is a confessor? - Resp. To the first: In the negative, more probably, of itself, i.e., the reason of scandal or office or particular obligation being excluded. The reason is that the circumstance of the dignity of the person sinning does not of itself change the species of sin, but at most aggravates the sin. - But the crime of injured majesty is equated with parricide, e.g., if someone kills the Pope, Emperor, King, or Prince, on account of the same virtue of observance and piety to which it is opposed. - Lugo, d. 16, nn. 309-311.

Resp. To the second: Resp. In the negative, more probably, provided it has no relation to Confession. The reason is that the confessor from his office is bound only to right direction in the tribunal of penance; from this direction no spiritual relationship arises. Moreover no injury is done to the sacrament through this sin, since it has no respect to Confession. Nevertheless it is easily evident that both a penitent of this kind must be entirely deterred from confessing further to that priest, and a confessor of this kind from admitting that penitent further to Confession. - Lugo, d. 16, n. 351 ff.; L., l. 3, n. 451.

Therefore a distinction must be made between the excellence and dignity of the person and his office. The circumstance of excellence and dignity of the person is of itself only aggravating, because from this no special virtue is gravely harmed. But the circumstance of office changes the species if the office induces a peculiar obligation of procuring the spiritual good of another. "For a Bishop, e.g., or a parish priest, from his own office, is pastor and physician of his subjects, and therefore is specially bound to impede their sins and to procure their salvation. Therefore they sin against the duty of their office if they positively attempt to stain those souls for whom they ought specially to watch. This sin not only pertains to the species of scandal, but is also specially against the duty of satisfying the proper office of Bishop or pastor, etc.... On the contrary, this malice is not found in any confessor whatever. For although in the very act of Confession he is pastor and physician, and has a peculiar obligation of governing and caring for the penitent, afterward, however, one who from office does not have that duty does not retain some peculiar obligation by this alone, that he once heard that person's Confession.... This could more easily be conceded in one who, although he is not parish priest or prelate, has nevertheless been specially chosen and assumed by the penitent himself as spiritual father by whom he is governed, which duty he has habitually accepted and retains, and therefore from the habitual duty itself seems to be obliged at least to moderate diligence concerning the salvation of his client, and much more to not positively bring upon him so grave a danger of eternal damnation." Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, nn. 356-358, 179-181; L., l. 1, n. 451; Elbel, de Act. hum., n. 97.

Must the circumstance of sacred time necessarily be accused? - Resp. In the negative. This is evident from the universal practice both of confessors and of penitents; since it is established that neither are the former solicitous about questioning concerning such a circumstance, nor are the latter accustomed to declare it.

Therefore the circumstance of sacred time does not seem to have to be explained, unless certain things are specially prohibited on account of reverence for the time, e.g., lest someone on Good Friday exhibit public games, comedies, or theatrical spectacles. - Lugo, d. 16, n. 520; L., l. 3, n. 273.

Does one satisfy the integrity of Confession who accuses a recent sin as if committed formerly? - "Resp. 1. In the affirmative, of itself, because the circumstance of time by no means pertains to Confession. Hence a penitent satisfies the obligation of Confession who mixes new sins with old ones, or who, making a general Confession, does not distinguish from the others mortal sins committed since the last Confession, even if he does this intentionally to cover the time at which he committed the sins. - 2. But if the penitent lies about the time, e.g., if he denies that he sinned today and declares the sin as if committed at another determined and remote time, the doctors more commonly think that he does not satisfy his obligation. The reason is that the act which the penitent placed today is not an act placed in the preceding year. Hence he lies in two ways, namely by concealing the sin committed today and by accusing a sin committed at another time. Thus Tamburini, l. c. - Nevertheless there are not lacking theologians who think this lie light." Thus Fr. Gury, 488. - The reason which is adduced for the second case does not exceed mere probability. And indeed it seems to prove too much; for then a lie about any accidental circumstance whatever would render Confession void. Moreover Gury himself in the first case says: "The circumstance of time by no means pertains to Confession." And rightly indeed: for the intrinsic substance of sin, which pertains to Confession, is one thing; the extrinsic accident of sin, which of itself is irrelevant to Confession, is another. Hence the aforesaid reason, insofar as it is urged for denying the sufficiency of that Confession, Lugo himself, d. 16, n. 53, calls merely probable. - Baller., ibid.; D'Annibale, ed. 3, p. 3, n. 309; Lugo, d. 16, s. 2, § 1.

Busembaum apud St. Alphonsus, 425, also affirms it as probable, "unless some circumstance, e.g., changing the species, or reservation of the case, or proximate occasion of sinning, requires otherwise, and sufficient penance is imposed." And St. Alphonsus himself implicitly affirms the same, H. A., tr. 16, n. 4.

Is it always a mortal sin to lie in Confession? - Of itself one sins mortally only when the lie concerns necessary matter of Confession concealed without a just cause, or grave matter falsely supposed, namely by accusing a grave sin not committed. Therefore a lie about matters not pertaining to Confession or to the conscience of the penitent is not of itself mortal, because it is neither gravely harmful to the penitent, as is supposed, nor gravely injurious to the sacrament, since it is not referred to it. "Hence the denial of a venial sin committed, or of a mortal sin already confessed, does not exceed the malice of a simple lie," L. 496, and therefore of itself is neither mortal nor invalidates the sacrament.

Of itself: for "it is sacrilege and the absolution is null... if you deny or lie about sins otherwise duly absolved, when the confessor, as judge or physician, asks something about them as necessary for the present Confession, Lugo, d. 14, s. 10; Tamb., l. 2, c. 10, § 2; otherwise, if it does not concern the present Confession." - "If someone affirms a mortal sin which he did not do, or denies having done what he did, he commits a twofold mortal sin: one of sacrilege against the virtue of religion because of the reverence due to the sacrament, the other of a lie gravely pernicious to himself against the virtue of truthfulness." L. 495-497; H. A. 28; Lugo, d. 16, s. 2, § 6.

Is the penitent bound to unfold the whole Confession again if he notices that the confessor, because of sleep or distraction, did not perceive some sins and he does not know which ones; or did not judge rightly about them? - Resp. To the first: In the affirmative, if the Confession was brief, because he can prudently doubt about each one whether it was understood by the confessor or not. But otherwise if the Confession was lengthy and only a few things seem not to have been perceived; because then he can presume that each thing was understood, nor does it appear likely that Christ imposed the precept of integrity with so great a burden. If, however, the doubt concerned only one or another sin, that would have to be repeated. But the Confession will be invalid if the confessor understood no sin, whether because of sleep, or because of deafness or distraction.

Resp. To the second: "Salmanticenses, etc., teach that a Confession made in good faith to a confessor who does not know how to discern species and number, nor between mortal and venial, even in obvious cases, is not to be repeated. The reason is that... absolution is valid when on both sides the things required for the validity of the sacrament already concur. For thus one must judge that Christ the Lord instituted this sacrament, since such defects happen everywhere. Nevertheless I say this must be understood unless it is established that the number or species were not explained; otherwise the integrity of Confession must certainly be supplied." L. 500. In good faith, because if in bad faith, when the penitent knows that the confessor is of insufficient knowledge, or when he clearly sees that the confessor does not perceive the gravity of his sin, the Confession is to be repeated. For a sin which the confessor did not hear, or did not understand, and consequently about which he did not pronounce sacramental judgment, cannot be remitted by the power of the keys. - L. 198-499.

Are there sometimes causes excusing from the integrity of Confession? - Resp. In the affirmative, because sometimes that integrity is physically or morally impossible.

In order that someone be judged excused from the integrity of Confession by reason of moral impotence, although sins occur to the mind, these conditions are to be observed: 1. That only those sins be omitted which cannot be declared, or from whose manifestation there would follow a most grave extrinsic inconvenience, whether spiritual or temporal, either to the penitent, or to the confessor, or to some third person. 2. That another confessor cannot be found to whom an integral Confession may be made without such inconvenience. 3. That Confession is here and now necessary. From the common opinion of the doctors, this necessity is judged to be present if the precept of annual Confession or Communion must be fulfilled; if the reception of the Eucharist or the celebration of Mass cannot be omitted without disgrace or scandal; if otherwise someone must long lack the benefit of the sacraments; indeed, as Suarez adds, de Poenit., d. 23, s. 2, n. 7, if someone otherwise would be deprived of the great utility which the sacrament of itself brings. Wherefore the penitent's fear suffices lest he remain in the state of mortal sin for one or another day.

But a difficulty intrinsic to Confession never excuses, however grave it may be. The reason is that Confession from its own nature is essentially laborious; and therefore, if a grave difficulty, e.g., great repugnance or shame or the loss of one's own reputation before the confessor, excused from integrity, the faithful would for the most part be excused from accusing mortal sins, and therefore the institution of the sacrament of penance would collapse for the greatest part. Besides, the Church could not reserve atrocious crimes, because it creates no light inconvenience for penitents.

When the cause excusing from material integrity ceases, the divine precept of confessing all omitted mortal sins urges again; for when an impediment occurs, the obligation of Confession does not cease simply, but is only suspended. Therefore, when the excusing cause ceases, the obligation of the law revives integrally; and since the precept of confession is not fixed to a time or to a circumstance, but affects the whole life, therefore sins not yet accused are afterward, if it can be done, necessarily to be accused. This is established besides from proposition 11 condemned by Alexander VII. - L. 487, 490; Lugo, d. 16, s. 13.

Resolutions: The following chiefly excuse from the integrity of Confession: 1. Extreme infirmity, i.e., when a dying person can express only one or another sin, or, already deprived of the use of the tongue, shows penance and asks absolution only by some sign. - 2. Defect of speech and hearing; thus mutes and deaf persons who cannot confess integrally by signs are exempted from integrity; likewise foreigners wholly or almost wholly ignorant of the language of the region in which they confess. - 3.

Defect of time, e.g., if soldiers must immediately proceed to battle. But the mere multitude of penitents does not excuse. - 4. Danger to the life of the penitent, confessor, or a third person, e.g., if enemies arrive, if many are in danger of shipwreck or contagion. - 5. Danger to reputation, e.g., if a priest soon about to celebrate, and needing general Confession, could not confess integrally without the bystanders suspecting the matter. - 6. Danger of revelation or violation of the seal, e.g., if a confessor cannot confess integrally without manifesting sins heard in Confession, or if the penitent, from a grave cause, fears that the confessor will break the law of the seal. - 7. Danger of scandal or fall, both on the part of the penitent and on the part of the confessor, e.g., if a woman certainly knew the very great frailty of the confessor. - 8. Another grave extrinsic harm, whether one's own or another's, whether spiritual or temporal, deservedly feared, e.g., in a scrupulous person who is perpetually distressed about forgotten sins. - L. 479, 488-494.

Is there an obligation of confessing a mortal sin which cannot be explained without manifestation of the accomplice? - "For explaining a venial sin, or a mortal sin otherwise confessed, it is not lawful to manifest the grave crime of another. But the penitent is bound, when he can conveniently do so, to seek another confessor to whom the person of the accomplice is unknown, so that his reputation may be preserved; nor does the opinion seem sufficiently probable... that this is only of counsel; for commonly they say that this is of precept." L. 489. - Therefore the proposed question regards only the case in which it is a question of necessary matter, and someone cannot conveniently go to another confessor to whom the accomplice is unknown. And for this case there are two opinions: one affirming that he is bound to confess the sin; the other affirming that he is bound to keep it silent until another confessor is found.

The reason of the second opinion, which Ballerinius apud Gury, 499, holds, is that the natural precept of preserving the neighbor's reputation must be preferred to the precept of preserving the integrity of Confession. The reason of the first opinion, which St. Alphonsus follows in the cited place, is "because the precept of confessing integrally must be observed whenever it can be observed licitly; but it can be observed sufficiently licitly in our case, since the manifestation of another's crime is not illicit when it is made from a reasonable cause, as St. Thomas teaches, 2. 2, q. 73, a. 2. Therefore it must be observed. And thus answer is made to the opposite reason of the contrary opinion." L., l. c.; Suarez, d. 34, ss. 1, 2; Lugo, d. 16, s. 7.

What are the causes excusing from seeking another confessor to whom the accomplice is unknown? - 1. If danger of death urges, or the precept of annual Confession; 2. if it is grave for the penitent to omit Confession or Communion; 3. if someone would open his conscience to another confessor only with difficulty; 4. if someone otherwise would have to remain in sin even for one day; 5. if someone otherwise would be deprived of the benefit of some extraordinary indulgence; 6. if, by going to the confessor to whom the accomplice is known, better direction and notably greater consolation would be had. - Hence by reason of seeking counsel, of lessening sorrow, etc., mothers and wives are often excused when they manifest to a confessor the sins of sons or husbands, although he knows them. For it would be too hard for those women to be bound to seek another confessor. But generally there is not held to be a grave obligation of going to another confessor for the purpose of hiding the accomplice, unless perhaps it is a question of a very grave crime. L. 490.

What is the necessity and utility of general Confession? - General Confession must be judged necessary whenever preceding confessions were morally certainly invalid or sacrilegious, either on the part of the penitent because of a defect of contrition or integrity, or on the part of a confessor lacking jurisdiction; but in other cases it can never be prescribed.

The reason for each is clear. - It can be advised when, although the invalidity of preceding confessions is not established, nevertheless grave doubt can be had about this. For then it is useful for removing anxieties of soul which harm both peace of conscience and the exercise of virtues. General Confession is to be permitted, or even prudently advised, although not necessary, when, the circumstances considered, the penitent is going to perceive notable spiritual fruit from it, e.g., by reason of humility, devotion, fervor, knowledge of himself, manifestation of conscience for more perfect direction, or greater purity of soul, for obtaining divine helps more efficaciously, etc.; because the confessor from charity ought to promote the greater spiritual good of the penitent when he easily can. - It is to be prohibited in other cases as useless, and even harmful, when other inconveniences besides loss of time are prudently to be feared, namely scruples, anxieties, disturbance of conscience, etc. For if so great a burden for confessor and penitent is not to be undertaken without hope of notable fruit, all the more not with fear of notable harm. - Benedict XIV, Constitution Apostolica Constitutio, June 26, 1749, §§ 16, 17; Lugo, d. 16, s. 15.

Resolutions: General Confession is easily to be permitted, indeed advised, in the principal epochs of the Christian life, namely before first Communion, before the choice or reception of a particular state of life, e.g., before priesthood, religious profession, or even before marriage; likewise when someone resolves to lead a more perfect life. Besides the Confession made at the time of first Communion, generally speaking, another general Confession of the whole life is easily to be permitted; but another would be conceded only with difficulty when the prior one was made rather accurately, in good faith and with good will, unless perhaps it was made already a long time before. - A partial general Confession is easily to be permitted to devout persons, namely of one year, or from the time of the last general Confession, according to the custom observed among many religious families. - General Confession is not to be permitted even in doubt about the validity of preceding Confessions where notable inconveniences of disturbance of conscience are to be feared from it, because grave and certain inconveniences are not to be undergone because of a doubtful obligation. - Regularly general Confession is not to be permitted to scrupulous or fearful persons, because if one is permitted, when this has been finished they will immediately wish to make another, and after the second, they will seek to undertake even a third by importunate prayers, with the greatest detriment to the soul. For experience establishes that often in these persons general Confession generates many more scruples than it destroys.

How is general Confession to be performed? - Supposing that the confessor prudently judges that there is place for making a general Confession, if the penitent is sufficiently instructed and desires himself to declare his sins, it is altogether better to hear him, without questioning, insofar as can be done. If he judges some questions necessary or opportune, let him ask them as often and then when there is need, lest afterward they fall from the mind. Nevertheless, here it must be noted that if the confessor patiently and attentively hears the penitent, both the confessor himself and the penitent will be freed from the burden of many questions; since often penitents, explaining other sins afterward, are accustomed to add circumstances necessary as regards sins previously stated, and which the confessor would have had to ask. - If the penitent either is not sufficiently instructed or desires to be helped by the work of the confessor, he will be able especially to ask these questions: 1. About past Confessions and Communions, whether and how often they were sacrilegious, so that it may be known whether the present general Confession is necessary or only useful. If it is only useful, then both confessor and penitent can be less solicitous about the integrity of Confession, since it is altogether free for the penitent to declare the sins he wishes. But if it is necessary, then the penitent will have to be heard, questioned, and helped with much greater diligence. 2. About his age, about the condition of marriage and office, for judging the number and species of sins. 3. About the general precepts of the Decalogue and of the Church, and about the special obligations of his own state, selecting questions concerning sins into which it is prudently judged the penitent could have fallen, his condition being attended to and the circumstances of the person considered. 4. Let this be added in the last place: whether the penitent has anything else to say about which he experiences remorse of conscience.

1. Crispinus, a young man, thus makes his confession: 1.º I have been given to intemperance, gaming, and blasphemies with various companions; 2.º I have rather often revolved impure thoughts in my mind concerning various persons; 3.º once I spent the whole night conversing with a girl; 4.º several times I nourished enmities in my mind, detracted from an enemy, and wished evil to him.

2. Elodia, a querulous woman, accuses herself that she had uttered imprecations against her husband about ten times; afterward, however, she discovers that she had uttered imprecations eleven times, or even fifteen times. Likewise she confesses some sin of detraction as doubtful, saying: I believe that I detracted, but I doubt about this. Afterward, however, she finds that that sin was certainly committed by her. Therefore she doubts whether the confession of the same sins must be repeated in both Cases.

It is asked: What is to be said to the Case?

R. "The confession of Crispinus lacks integrity in all points, since he declares neither the number of the sins nor their species, nor sometimes sufficiently expresses whether the matter is grave or light. Therefore the confessor must supply by questioning in the following manner:

1.º How have you violated temperance? Was it by excess in food or in drink? Was it to the point of surfeiting, or to full drunkenness? And how many times? - To what game did you give yourself? Was it a prohibited game? An unjust one? Was it with great prodigality? Was it several times? - How many times did you blaspheme? In what way? This last question will often be necessary for discerning whether the penitent really blasphemed.

2.º How many times did you deliberately give assent to wicked thoughts? Did you also foster wicked desires? What was the object of your concupiscence? Were the persons free, or married? Were they related by blood, or by affinity? Were the sins consummated or not?

3.º In conversing the whole night with the girl, did you sin several times, and how many times, or did you consummate the sin?

4.º How many times, or for how long, did you foster enmities? Did you wish grave evils to your neighbor, or how many times?

Elodia, however, is not bound to accuse the eleventh sin, as being comprehended in this accusation, about ten times. She is truly bound to express the fifteenth number, as not contained in the aforesaid expression. She is bound, at least speaking practically, to accuse again the sin of detraction according to the common opinion, because a certain sin is not contained in a doubtful accusation. See Comp. n. 472-480." Thus Fr. Gury 428, 429.

But it is to be noted here that, since the various questions to be asked by the confessor are not without burden and inconvenience for the confessor and for the penitent, the confessor can often abstain from them: first, because he is bound to judge concerning what has been heard according to the obvious sense, and he is not bound to search out subtle things; then because often, although the sufficiently ultimate species of sins is not expressed, nevertheless it is understood quite sufficiently from other circumstances of a well-known penitent, or from other sins which are afterward declared. And thus the confession is sufficient "if one whom the confessor knows to be married, or a priest, says that he has had intercourse with another woman." D'Annib. 303.

Then, as to the confession of Crispinus, some of those questions which Fr. Gury teaches are to be asked under n. 1.º can in reality be omitted, since they do not contain a grave species of sin, as, for example: How have you violated temperance? By exceeding in food, or in drink? To the point of surfeiting or to full drunkenness? More briefly and more fittingly the confessor would ask: Did you commit excess in drink to the point of perfect drunkenness, or in food to the grave harm of health?

As to the other questions to be asked of Crispinus under n. 2.º, it must be noted that one must proceed with great caution, so as to remove every scandal, especially if there is question not of a man, but of a woman. Besides, as is established by experience itself, when the faithful simply accuse wicked thoughts, they distinguish them from wicked desires; whence they seem to accuse simple delight or complacency. And when they thus generally accuse these wicked thoughts or wicked delights or complacencies, it seems that then there is given only an indeterminate consent to venereal delight in common, or to copulation in common, and not to this or that determinate object. Hence the confessor seems to satisfy his obligation if he only asks the penitent, where there is need, whether he was delighted concerning some other person of the other sex. For the various objects apprehended do not pour back their malice into simple delight except insofar as they delight. But ordinarily they do not delight except either merely insofar as they stir the genital spirits, or insofar as they are referred to carnal copulation, toward which that stirring naturally tends. Besides, since it is better to fall short as to the integrity of confession than that the penitent be scandalized, this indeed is the practice of pious confessors: namely, to abstain from further questions. "This doubt," says Reuter 209, "creates no light annoyance for confessors who strive to discharge their office exactly; for on the one hand the more common opinion in the schools holds that simple delights, for example concerning copulation, a kiss, sodomy, bestiality, are distinguished in species... on the other hand it is dangerous to ask penitents about what object they thought and were delighted. For they will easily be scandalized, they will accuse confessors of excessive curiosity, and they will give responses which offend the ears. And perhaps for this reason the common practice of confessors... holds that they do not order penitents to declare the venereal objects about which they were simply and nakedly delighted... nor is reason lacking for this. For... although the objects are diverse - adultery, incest, fornication - nevertheless simple delights concerning them, not as such, but precisely as they are carnal copulation, do not differ in species. Now indeed simple venereal delights seem ordinarily to be borne precisely toward the delectability arising from the motion of semen and of the spirits serving generation, which is the same whether it arises from this or from that object thought of; therefore they seem not to differ in moral species." Cf. I. M. vol. 1, 291. But as to the question: whether of a blood relative, of an affine; since probably incest with blood relatives and with affines does not differ in species, the question can be omitted as to this precise distinction of a person related by blood or by affinity. I. M. 711.

But what of Elodia, if in good faith she had erred otherwise in the number, namely by notably exaggerating it? Would she have to declare this afterward in confession? R. Negatively. For the confession would have been good, since the smaller number is contained in the greater, and, since she acted in good faith, that exaggeration lacked every sin. - But as to a doubtful sin, afterward known as certain, and to be accused again, Fr. Gury himself, in the cited place of the Compendium, namely n. 480, says that the opinion denying that the confession must be repeated is sufficiently probable. And he concludes: "Thus Lugo d. 16, n. 78, Sporer n. 397, Elbel n. 274, Reuter n. 332, etc." Therefore, speaking practically, Elodia cannot be obliged to repeat the confession. I. M. 674.

3. A recent sin declared as ancient. Paulina, a clever woman, if at any time she sins more gravely, finds a way of confessing the sin with less shame, as will be clear from the things to be said.

1.º Once, when she had become guilty of a base sin, she made a brief general confession of several years, and she mingled and confused that sin recently committed and not yet declared with other sins already accused in preceding confessions.

2.º At another time, stained with recent lethal guilt, after accusing venial sins, she adds: I accuse myself also of such a sin, which I unhappily committed in the past year.

3.º At another time, the same Case recurring, after likewise accusing venial sins, she concludes thus: I accuse myself of all faults committed in my whole life, especially of such a base sin.

It is asked: What is to be said to the Case?

R. In the first Case Paulina satisfies the integrity of confession. For, speaking of itself, there is no obligation of declaring that she had not previously confessed such a sin. The reason is that the sin is the same whether someone had previously confessed it or not, unless perhaps a change of time brings with it a circumstance diverse in species. Speaking of itself, namely, unless the sin is reserved, unless there are adjuncts of proximate occasion or of wicked habit, which need the peculiar care of the confessor. Nor indeed does it stand in the way that the penitent says she wishes to make a general confession. For by this she does not say that she wishes to confess ancient sins alone, but that she wishes also to comprehend those. For a general confession embraces all sins up to this hour. Nor does it matter that the confessor understands that sin to be ancient; for the penitent did not say this, and therefore the intention of absolving is not regulated by the private estimation of the confessor, who intends to absolve from the sins which the penitent has brought to judgment, whatever they may be. Finally, it does not matter that the penitent seems implicitly to indicate that they are ancient sins; for she herself truly has the mind of speaking about new sins, and wishes to speak about them, although she desires not to be understood as to this by the confessor. Lugo d. 16, n. 47, 54.

"In the second Case," says Fr. Gury 435, "Paulina did not satisfy the integrity of confession, because she denied that she had sinned recently, which is false, and therefore equivalently concealed the sin committed in this last time."

"In the third Case," says the same Fr. Gury, l. c., "there was also lack of integrity of confession, because she accused a recent sin as ancient; for this formula, ordinarily uttered at the end of confession: I accuse myself of the sins of my whole life, in the commonly accepted sense, signifies sins committed before the last confession. Therefore the confessor understands the sin specified by the penitent to pertain to the former life, and already to have been accused. Therefore that confession lacks integrity. Therefore it is to be repeated. See Comp. n. 488."

Moreover, in the cited place of the Compendium it is noted that there are not lacking theologians who think the aforesaid lie light. And then the distinguished Ballerini observes that the argument adduced does not exceed the limits of mere probability insofar as it is urged for denying the sufficiency of such a confession. "And indeed, as Tamburinus notes, Exped. Conf. l. 2, c. 1, n. 6, a disorder of this sort, by which you seem to accuse a sin never committed and to be silent about one truly committed, equally happens, even the adversaries freely admitting it, from other circumstances also which are falsely added. Thus, for example, if you say that you killed Paul, when you killed Andrew, or that you sinned with a stranger, when you sinned with an inhabitant, or that you stole from Lucius, when you stole from Caius, or that you detracted from someone at home, when you detracted on the road or in the theater, or that you read a heretical book of the author Melanchthon, when the book was by Osiander, or that you struck a Capuchin, when you struck a Carmelite: indeed, that these lies do not stand in the way of sufficient integrity of confession is clear also from this, that if perhaps they were uttered inadvertently, no one compels the penitent to amend the error in the following confession." Baller., Comp. P. Gury, l. c.; D'Annib. 309; I. M. 715.

1. In general; 2. concerning doubtful sins; 3. concerning the circumstances of sins; 4. concerning forgotten sins.

469. I. All mortal sins committed after Baptism must be accused by divine law, insofar as it can morally be done.

This is evident: 1. from the very words of the institution of the Sacrament of Penance; for Christ the Lord says thus, John 20:22: Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained. Hence thus: By these words Christ conferred judicial power concerning the remission of sins upon both the Apostles and their successors. But He would have conferred this power upon them uselessly unless all sins were to be declared to them individually. For a judge can in no way exercise such power when the case is unknown, nor discern whether sins are to be remitted or retained. Therefore, from the very institution of confession in the form of a judgment, there follows the strict obligation of declaring all mortal sins as to number and species.

This is evident: 2. from the words of Trent, sess. 14, ch. 5: The universal Church has always understood that the complete confession of sins was instituted by the Lord and is necessary by divine law for all who have fallen gravely after Baptism; because our Lord Jesus Christ, when about to ascend from earth to heaven, left Priests as His own vicars, as presidents and judges, to whom all the mortal crimes into which the faithful of Christ had fallen were to be brought, so that, by the power of the keys, they might pronounce the sentence of remission or retention of sins. For it is evident that Priests could not have exercised this judgment when the cause was unknown, if penitents had declared their sins only in general and not rather in species and individually. From these things it is gathered that all mortal sins of which penitents have consciousness after a diligent examination of themselves must be recounted in confession, even if they are most secret. - And canon 7 defined thus: If anyone says that in the Sacrament of Penance, for the remission of sins, it is not necessary by divine law to confess each and every mortal sin which is remembered after due and diligent consideration, even secret sins and those which are against the last two Precepts of the Decalogue, and the circumstances which change the species of sin, let him be anathema.

470. II. Material integrity is not always necessary for the validity and fruit of confession; for sometimes it is morally impossible, whether from inculpable forgetfulness or from other causes; but God does not command impossibilities. Therefore, etc. This is evident also from the Council of Trent, loc. cit., in these words: But the remaining sins which do not occur to one thinking diligently are understood to be included universally in the same confession; for these we faithfully say with the Prophet: FROM MY HIDDEN SINS CLEANSE ME.

III. For the integrity of confession, a diligent examination, according to the capacity of the penitent, is prerequired concerning sins committed since the last valid confession; for he who is bound to the end is also bound to the necessary means. - See the Appendix on the examination of conscience, below, no. 507.

471. Resolutions. - 1. In the confession of mortal sins, we are bound to accuse not only the generic species of sins but also the lowest species; for these are properly called species, and Trent requires the accusation of all species.

2. He who cannot disclose the lowest species must manifest the higher or generic species; for example, if someone, knowing that he sinned against chastity, does not remember the specific sin, he must say that he sinned gravely against chastity.

3. He who knows that he sinned mortally but is ignorant of, or does not remember, even the generic species of his sin must say in general that he sinned gravely, but does not remember of what sin he is guilty.

4. He who cannot remember the certain number is bound to accuse the more probable number, or that which approaches nearer to the truth, adding the word about; because where certainty is lacking, he ought to accuse that which is more likely.

5. He who cannot give even a likely total of the sins is bound to say whether he sinned frequently or rarely; about how many times in a month, in a week, in a day, etc.

6. The Confessor cannot exempt from the obligation of confessing integrally because of a great concourse of penitents, for example, on some more solemn feast day. This is evident from what has been said and also from Proposition 39 condemned by Innocent XI, which is as follows: It is lawful to absolve sacramentally those who have confessed only by halves because of a great concourse of penitents, such as, for example, can occur on the day of some great feast or indulgence.

7. A defect of sincerity concerning even one mortal sin which is omitted constitutes a grave sin, because the divine precept of confession is violated in a grave matter.

472. Questions. - QUESTION 1. What number is judged to be comprehended in the word ABOUT?

Reply. This cannot be determined by an altogether certain rule; nevertheless, not every excess, nor a notable deficiency, is comprehended, but only a moderate one, greater or less in proportion to the number expressed. Theologians commonly determine it thus: a moderate excess or deficiency relative to about five sins will add or subtract one unit on either side; relative to about ten, two; relative to twenty, three or four; relative to forty, four or five; relative to one hundred ¹, five or six.... And it will prudently be judged ², in the first case, that the penitent sinned four, five, or six times; in the second, eight, nine, ten, eleven, or twelve times; and resolve similarly concerning the others. - See St. Lig., no. 466.

¹ But when it is believed that the number of sins has increased to these limits, the Doctors aptly warn (see St. Alph., bk. 6, no. 466) that the state of the penitent can be known better by inquiring about falls by days, weeks, months, etc., than if the Confessor should wish to form a judgment concerning the number, which will easily be fallacious.

² The Confessor would judge thus prudently when it was established that penitents use these calculations accurately. But penitents generally do not know those rules, and in an uncertain matter more often answer rashly. Otherwise, moreover, the Confessor cannot undertake the wearisome labor of always inquiring whether the penitent answers according to those rules. Therefore, the foregoing admonition of St. Alphonsus (bk. 6, no. 466) must be kept before the eyes, namely, lest the Confessor think that some more exact judgment is to be sought or hoped for in these circumstances.

473. QUESTION 2. Must a notable excess be declared afterward if it is discovered after confession?

Reply. Affirmative. The reason is plain from what has been said; for since a notable excess is not comprehended in the number declared with the word about, the penitent does not satisfy the obligation of confession as regards that excess. Therefore.... - Thus all.

QUESTION 3. If someone has erred notably by exaggerating the number, must he afterward declare this also in confession?

Reply. Negative, if in good faith he expressed that notably larger number. The reason is that he fully and integrally satisfied the obligation of confession; for the true number was comprehended in the larger one, and therefore remitted. - Reuter, no. 313, and others commonly.

474. QUESTION 4. Is it always a mortal sin to lie in confession?

Reply. Of itself, a mortal sin is committed only when the lie concerns matter necessary for confession concealed without a just cause, or grave matter falsely supposed, namely, by accusing oneself of a grave sin not committed.

Therefore a lie concerning matters not pertaining to the confession or conscience of the penitent is not of itself mortal; because, as is supposed, it is neither gravely harmful to the penitent nor gravely injurious to the Sacrament, since it is not referred to it. - Thus commonly with St. Lig., Homo Apostolicus, no. 28; Billuart, against the few who say that every lie in confession is mortal.

475. QUESTION 5. Does it injure the integrity of confession if someone accuses himself of venial sins to his ordinary Confessor, but of mortal sins to another?

Reply 1. Negative, speaking of itself, provided he never receives absolution without having manifested all mortal sins to one Confessor and being absolved by the same. The reason is that the confession which embraces all mortal sins is integral, since venial sins need not necessarily be accused.

Reply 2. In practice, however, attention must be given to the circumstances of penitents and to the motives by which they are led. For those who sometimes confess graver sins to an unknown Confessor but submit lighter ones to their ordinary Confessor are not to be condemned if, from the shame with which they would be suffused before a Confessor known to them familiarly, they would expose themselves to the danger of confessing sacrilegiously ³. - St. Lig., no. 474.

³ Therefore, the Confessor should never inquire curiously about this, and much less vex with questions a penitent perhaps attempting to conceal it; nor, if he knows, should he show that it displeases him, but rather that he approves the use of the liberty which the Church most amply permits when she provides the faithful access to several confessors.

476. QUESTION 8. Does it injure integrity if someone feigns another voice so that he is not recognized by the Confessor?

Reply. Negative, of itself; for provided that he discloses all mortal sins, he makes an integral confession. Nor is it necessary that he be known by name to the Confessor; for it suffices that the Confessor intend to absolve the sinner who is present: but the intention of the Confessor is of itself always determined toward the penitent who is present. - Lacroix, De Sacramentis in Genere, no. 68.

494. • Sins omitted through inculpable forgetfulness must be accused if they return to the memory of the penitent ¹. For by divine precept all sins committed after Baptism must be declared in sacramental confession; nor can present forgetfulness excuse from so great an obligation even for the future. This is established from Proposition 11 condemned by Alexander VII, to be reported below at no. 497.

¹ This must be understood, as is evident of itself, with regard to necessary matter of confession, namely, sins certainly grave.

495. Questions. - QUESTION 1. Must sins omitted through forgetfulness or another just cause be accused AS SOON AS POSSIBLE?

Reply. More probably, negative. For an obligation of this kind is to be understood morally, especially since these sins have already been blotted out and consequently there is no danger to the soul in delay. - Thus more commonly. - Sporer; Laymann; etc.

Indeed, according to several grave Theologians, the penitent can probably defer the confession of these sins until he is again bound to confess by virtue of another obligation. Thus it could be deferred for several months and even until the time of annual confession. - Thus Bonacina, disp. 5, q. 5, sect. 2, point 4, no. 32. Nevertheless, no other confession can intervene while those sins are omitted. The reason is that it pertains to the integrity of confession to declare in the present accusation all mortal sins not yet accused which occur to the memory, or of which one has consciousness, as Trent says, sess. 14, ch. 5. Moreover, according to Suarez, De Poenit., disp. 22, sect. 1, no. 1: Those sins are in the present consciousness which, having been committed after Baptism, have not been duly subjected to the keys through another confession ².

² In fact, it does not appear whether the words of Suarez pertain here. For he gives as the reason (ibid., no. 6), with St. Thomas, that one sin cannot be remitted without another. But here the question concerns sins already remitted.

QUESTION 2. Must sins omitted through forgetfulness be accused before Communion if they first occur to the mind?

Reply. More probably, negative, even if the penitent can confess without inconvenience. - Recall what was said in the Treatise on the Eucharist, no. 326.

QUESTION 3. Is a penitent who remembers a forgotten sin, but cannot (or does not wish to) confess, bound to elicit an act of contrition before Communion?

Reply. Negative, with St. Lig., no. 257; Lugo, De Eucharistia, disp. 14, no. 122; and with others commonly against certain others. The reason is that no foundation appears for why this contrition should be required. For it is not required by precept, because this is nowhere found prescribed; nor from a necessity of purification, because the sin has already been indirectly blotted out through the preceding confession and consequently does not need remission.

496. • QUESTION 4. Must a penitent who accuses a grave sin omitted in the preceding confession through forgetfulness or another legitimate cause, and already indirectly remitted, necessarily be absolved again?

Reply. Affirmative, with the most common opinion. The reason is that by the institution of Christ all mortal sins must be subjected to the keys so that they may be directly remitted. For although they have already been remitted, they were nevertheless not remitted by virtue of the Sacrament, or by virtue of absolution, but only by virtue of the grace infused through the sacrament, and concomitantly with the other sins. - Sporer, no. 627; Collat. Andeg., 35, q. 3; etc., against the few who are not to be heard.

Although the Confessor can omit absolution with penitents who are accustomed to return to the same Confessor, since they will be directly absolved in another confession, it is nevertheless better to impart absolution to all when this can easily be done, for the consolation and tranquility of soul of the penitent, and also on account of the fruit to be received from the Sacrament. Add the danger that the penitent may no longer be able to approach the same Confessor.

“8. The soul ought not to wish to know whether it proceeds according to the will of God or whether it now remains resigned to that same will; nor is there need for it to wish to know its state, nor anything of its own, but it ought to remain as a lifeless body.—9. The soul ought to remember neither itself, nor God, nor anything whatsoever; and in the interior way every reflection is harmful, even reflection upon its human actions and its own defects.—10. If by its own defects it scandalizes others, it is not necessary to reflect, provided the will to scandalize is absent; and not to be able to reflect upon one’s own defects is a grace of God.” Propositions of Michael de Molinos condemned by Innocent XI.

268. Principle: For the integrity of confession it is required that mortal sins be accused according to their lowest species, insofar as this can morally be done. It is certain.

(A) It is proved: (a) For Trent declares:¹ "priests could not have exercised this judgment when the cause was unknown, nor indeed could they have preserved equity in imposing penalties, if they [penitents] had declared their sins to them only in general, and not rather in species and individually." Now the expression in species is properly understood of the ultimate, or the lowest, species.

¹ Sess. XIV, ch. 5.

(b) The reason is that sins diverse in species carry before themselves an entirely distinct malice, as is explained in the Treatise on Sins; thus, for example, the malice of rash judgment is diverse from the malice of detraction or insult; but the confessor cannot judge rightly concerning the state of the penitent unless he knows the special malice of the sins which are declared; therefore.

Consequently it does not suffice to say: I have sinned against charity; but it must be set forth whether someone sinned by rash judgment, or hatred, or discord, or scandal, etc.

269. (B) It is explained. Yet I said "insofar as this can morally be done"; for (a) there are many penitents who, on account of ignorance, do not distinguish the more minute species of certain sins; these cannot accuse the special malice which they do not know, and of which very probably they are not guilty, since they did not apprehend it. Whence the confessor is not bound to question them minutely about these things, lest he render confession hateful, contrary to the intention of Christ.

This especially occurs with respect to sins of the heart and of the mouth; thus, for example, many do not distinguish among morose delectation, complacency in a sin committed, and desire of committing sin, and think that they accuse all these sufficiently if they say: I had shameful thoughts in my mind and gave consent to them; likewise, with respect to depraved conversations, they establish no distinction among obscene narration, boasting about sins committed, and provocation to evil, and they comprehend all these under this general accusation: I had shameful conversations. Now, if it is clear that they did not apprehend the diverse malices of these sins, and it is feared that minute questions would disturb them or afflict them with weariness, the confessor can for the time abstain from these questions;¹ afterward, however, when occasion is given, he will try to instruct them better.

¹ Thus Berardi, Praxis, n. 4505; Genicot, 284; Morino, note 1 to n. 453. Lugo had already gone before them, who in the Preface to the Treatise on Penance writes: "For the practice of this sacrament there must be considered not only what is in some way true as though in the abstract, but also what can and ought to be done morally and in a human way; so that this remedy, full of sweetness and gentleness, not by its difficulty become impossible, or bring excessive horror upon human frailty."

(b) Sometimes also the penitent is excused from accusing the lowest species on account of defect of memory. But he who does not remember the lowest species is bound to declare the generic species; for example, he who knows that he sinned against charity, although he does not remember how, is bound to say: I have sinned gravely against charity. Again, he who is conscious that he has sinned mortally, although he does not remember what kind of sin he committed, must say: I have sinned gravely.

270. Corollaries: (a) For the integrity of confession it does not suffice to express the internal act, but the external act of sin must be declared; for example, he who unjustly killed his neighbor does not satisfy the precept of integrity by saying: I had the desire of killing an innocent person. For although the internal act, with respect to malice, is of the same species as the external act, nevertheless, according to the common estimation of wise men and of the faithful, it differs morally from it; and deservedly, for words or deeds certainly differ from thoughts and desires, and suppose greater malice; moreover they frequently increase the internal malice, as was said in De Actibus Humanis, n. 162. Besides, without declaration of the external act, the confessor can scarcely fulfill his office concerning occasions to be avoided, restitution to be imposed, and remedies to be provided: for all these depend on the external act.

This is true not only of sins of commission, but also of sins of omission; for example, he who omitted Mass on a feast day would not satisfy by saying: I had the desire of omitting Mass.

271. (b) But it is controverted whether an effect mortally evil, foreseen from sin, must be expressed, for example, blasphemy uttered in drunkenness, death following from poison administered. - According to all, per accidens there is an obligation of confessing such an effect, if from the effect that followed a censure, or reservation, or obligation of making restitution is incurred; thus if someone procured an abortion, with the effect following, he must declare this, on account of the censure annexed to this effect.

With these cases set aside, there is a threefold opinion; others more probably with St. Alphonsus (n. 149) affirm, provided the evil effect was foreseen, at least confusedly,¹ and the depraved will was not retracted before the effect was produced; for such an effect, as foreseen, is voluntary in its cause, and consequently a sin. Thus he who becomes drunk while foreseeing that he will omit Mass is bound to confess both the drunkenness and the omission of Mass. Yet the case is excepted in which the evil will was retracted before the effect, for example, if a drunken man, before he has lost the use of reason, has already retracted his sin, although afterward, on account of the absorbed liquor, he loses the use of reason and omits Mass: for then the effect is only materially evil; therefore it suffices to declare: I was drunk and wished to omit Mass.

¹ Yet it must be noted that what is foreseen only confusedly is not as sinful as what is foreseen clearly and distinctly. Cf. Vieux Moraliste, apud Ami du Clerge, t. XX (1898), p. 1025-1030 and 1121-1129.

Others, with Lugo,² probably deny this, because the whole malice of the act is in the cause, but not in the effect which follows from it; since he cannot actually sin who does not actually act morally; but he who placed the sinful cause does not morally act at the time when the effect is produced, since he is actually sleeping or distracted; therefore that effect is not properly a sin; therefore it suffices to accuse the cause, without the effect being declared.

² Lugo, disp. XVI, sect. 9, with the authors whom he cites, n. 440.

272. Some, with D'Annibale,¹ distinguish thus: if an effect of this kind introduces a new sin, and is such that it could follow or not follow from the cause placed, it must be declared; for example, if someone, on account of drunkenness, omitted Mass on a feast day, or blasphemed, or killed, he must signify that, by indulging in wine, he foresaw these dangers, and that in truth while drunk he omitted Mass, blasphemed, killed. Otherwise, the evil effect is not necessarily to be declared: for example, for him who set fire to another's house, or administered poison to a man, it will be enough to say: I set fire to another's house, or I gave poison to someone.

¹ D'Annibale, n. 303 and note 23; Morino, n. 453.

In this variety of opinions, penitents are not to be compelled, but only exhorted, to declare the evil effect. In practice there is scarcely any difficulty, since most of the faithful, ignorant of these distinctions, generally declare those evil effects of which they are conscious.

273. (A) Principle: For the integrity of confession, the penitent is bound also to manifest distinctly the number of mortal sins, insofar as it can morally be known. It is certain.

This is clear from Trent, which defines that all and each mortal sin, of which memory is had with due and diligent premeditation, must be accused; and which declares that those who do otherwise and knowingly retain anything obtain pardon of no sin.²

² Trent, sess. XIV, can. 7 and ch. 5.

274. (B) Corollaries: (a) When the penitent certainly knows the number of sins, he must sincerely confess it, neither greater nor lesser; otherwise it would be a sacrilegious lie. Hence one must not say: I blasphemed about six times, when the number is certainly known; for the word about makes the matter doubtful, and so the confessor is deceived.

(b) When, after diligent examination, he does not know the certain number, he must accuse the more probable number, that is, the one which comes closer to the truth, adding the particle about, or more or less. But this clause, according to St. Alphonsus (n. 466), does not have an absolute sense, but a relative one with respect to the number to which it is added; namely about three times is understood as 2-4; about ten times: 8-12; about thirty: 27-33; about one hundred: 95-105; about one thousand: 950-1050. Now if the penitent afterward knows that he erred by lessening the number, he is not bound to correct the error in another confession unless the number notably exceeds the approximate number, so that it cannot be included under the particle about; thus, if he said about ten, and afterward knew that he had sinned twelve times, he is bound to nothing; otherwise, if in fact he had sinned fifteen times. - But he who in good faith notably exaggerated the number is not bound to repeat the confession, because the greater contains the lesser.

(c) If the penitent cannot even recall the approximate number, because he long fostered a habit of sinning, it suffices that he indicate the duration of the habit, adding, if it can be done, about how often in a day, or week, or month he sinned: for this is more easily recalled than the whole sum of sins. - Indeed, when the habit is such that the individual acts are indeliberate, although the habit itself is gravely culpable, as being not retracted, as often occurs in those who blaspheme, it is not necessary to explain the number of blasphemies, but it suffices to say: I have an inveterate habit of blaspheming inadvertently whenever the occasion presents itself.¹ Likewise, according to Lugo,² when rustic or common men confess conversations about shameful matters with companions, which certain men are accustomed to mix in here and there through the whole day while they labor together, both concerning men and concerning women, both concerning married persons and unmarried ones, it suffices to explain the habit and the principal species, without the number being declared, since this is morally impossible.

¹ Thus Sporer, Theol. Sacram. de Paenit., n. 455; Genicot, n. 285.

² Lugo, disp. XVI, n. 575.

275. (d) When there is question of internal sins, whether thoughts or desires, which were very frequent daily, it suffices to express this frequency in a general way, by saying, for example: for one month I frequently in a day called down grave evils upon an enemy; or, for two months, often in a day I gave consent to depraved desires. For then the confessor, having heard the space of time, morally speaking, can conjecture what the number of sins was. - Speculatively speaking the penitent would have to say how often, approximately, desires of this kind were interrupted; but in practice the uneducated cannot do this, since they do not advert to this.

276. (e) Those who in good faith accused their sins in an indeterminate and confused way with respect to number, because at that time they could not explain them better, probably are not bound to repeat the confession, if afterward, having become more instructed, they apprehend this

number more distinctly; for the sins which they declared, according to the knowledge which they had at that time, were directly remitted, as being sufficiently contained in this confused accusation; but there is no obligation of again confessing a sin already directly remitted through absolution.¹

¹ Thus Lugo, disp. XVI, n. 577-588; Genicot, n. 285.

1. INTEGRITY. —Confession is entire or complete if the penitent avows all the mortal sins he has committed since Baptism or his last previous confession, together with their number and spe- cific circumstances.⁸ To be able to do this properly he must examine his conscience.

⁸ Conc. Trident., Sess. XIV, De Poenit., c. 5, can. 7; Cat. Rom., P. II, c. 5, qu. 40 sq.

The integrity of confession (integritas confessionis) may be material or formal. It is material (integritas materialis) if the penitent actually confesses all his mortal sins; it is formal (integritas formalis) if he is willing to make a complete avowal, but is prevented by physical or moral causes. a) The material integrity of confession requires:

α) That the penitent mention all those mortal sins which he has not yet validly confessed. When he is in doubt whether or not he has confessed a mortal sin, or whether some particular sin is mortal or venial, the penitent is not bound, but (cases of scrupulousness and urgent necessity excepted) earnestly advised to mention it. If the existing doubt is founded on weighty reasons (dubium prudens), it is advisable that the sin (peccatum dubium) be confessed. Mortal sins which have been inadvertently omitted (forgotten) in one confession, must be declared in the next. If a penitent has purposely concealed a mortal sin, his confession is invalid, and he must, besides confessing his sacrilege, repeat all the mortal sins mentioned in his invalid confession, unless the confessor has at least a dim recollection of them.

0. That the number of mortal sins committed be given as accurately as possible. If the exact number cannot be ascertained, it is sufficient to give an approximate estimate, declaring, for instance, how many times the sin has been committed each day, week, or month. y) That the circumstances be mentioned which change the species of a sin or add a new species (circumstantiae speciem mut antes vel addentes), and especially those by which a venial sin becomes grievous (e. g., scandal). Circumstances that merely increase the guilt of a sin within the same species (circumstantiae notabiliter aggravantes) as a rule need not be confessed, though it is advisable to do so. They must be expressly mentioned if they entail a censure or reservation, or if the confessor inquires about them with a view to ascertaining the disposition of the penitent or deciding whether restitution has to be made.⁹

⁹ Cfr. Prop, Damnat. sub Innoc. XI., prop. 58: "We are not bound to disclose to a confessor who asks us a habit of some sin." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1208).

Circumstances which might change an objectively grievous sin (i. e., one that is grievous merely from its object) into a venial sin should also be mentioned. This is not necessary for the integrity of the Sacrament, but advisable because it may enable the confessor to form a better idea of the penitent's state of mind.

The mortal sins a man has committed, together with their number and specific circumstances, constitute the necessary matter of Penance (materia necessaria). Venial sins are merely materia libera et sufficiens, that is to say, they need not be, but may and, considering the importance of the Sacrament, should be confessed. Previously confessed sins, whether mortal or venial, may be confessed again, and if properly regretted, constitute sufficient matter for absolution. All "the other sins, which do not occur [to the penitent] after diligent thought, are understood to be included as a whole in that same confession," and are summarily included in the usual declaration: "For these and all other sins of which I am not now conscious, I am heartily sorry," and so forth.¹⁰

¹⁰ "The remaining sins which do not occur to one who thinks diligently are understood to be included as a whole in that same confession."—Conc. Trident., Sess. XIV, De Poenit., c. 5; cfr. Ps. XVIII, 13.

In order to be able to confess his sins properly, the penitent, before approaching the sacred tribunal, should carefully and earnestly examine his conscience.¹¹ No time limit can be set for this important task. Circumstances of individuality, time, place, etc., must be taken into consideration. The only general rule that may be laid down is that the time and care devoted to the examination of conscience should be equal to that which is usually bestowed by prudent men upon important matters of business, and that there be no exaggeration or carelessness, lest the validity of the Sacrament be endangered and it become what Protestants have unjustly called it,—a "slaughter-house of consciences."

¹¹ "A diligent examination of oneself or due and diligent forethought." (Conc. Trident., Sess. XIV, De Poenit., c. 5, can. 7).—Cfr. Noldin, Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. III, pp. 339 sqq.

Material integrity of confession in the strict sense is not always possible because God alone knows the hearts of men and can judge them infallibly.¹² b) Confession is formally complete or entire if the penitent tells all the sins he is able to remember and confess, thereby proving his willingness to make a full avowal.

¹² Acts I, 24; XV, 8; 1 Cor. IV, 4.

The obstacles to material integrity are partly physical and partly moral. Physical obstacles are, e. g., deafness or inability to speak, impossibility of finding a confessor who understands one's language, immediate danger of death, inculpable ignorance or forgetfulness. Moral obstacles are: extraordinary difficulty, grave spiritual or temporal injury threatening the penitent, the confessor, or a third person; e. g., the danger of losing one's good name (not, however, before the confessor), serious scandal, violation of the seal, etc. Such obstacles dispense from material integrity, provided, of course, it is morally impossible for the penitent to wait or to find another priest to whom he could make a full confession. Physical exertion, crowding of the confessionals,¹³ intense shame¹⁴ or the necessity of indirectly revealing an ac- complice do not excuse a penitent from making a full confession of his sins.

¹³ The following proposition was condemned under Innocent XI: "It is lawful sacramentally to absolve those only partially confessed because of a great concourse of penitents, such as can occur, for example, on the day of some great feast or indulgence." (Prop. Damnat. sub Innoc. XI., prop. 59; Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1209).

¹⁴ Conc. Trident., Sess. XIV, De Poenit., c. 5: "The very difficulty of such confession and the shame of disclosing sins might indeed seem grave were it not relieved by so many and such great advantages and consolations, which are most certainly conferred through absolution upon all who worthily approach this Sacrament." —Cfr. Gury, Comp. Theol., Mor,, II, n. 377: "A difficulty intrinsic to confession never excuses, however grave it may be. The reason is that confession by its nature is essentially laborious, and therefore, if a grave difficulty—for example, great repugnance or shame—excused from integrity, the faithful would very often be excused from accusing themselves of mortal sins, and consequently the institution of the Sacrament of Penance would for the most part collapse. Moreover, the Church could not reserve atrocious crimes, because that creates no slight inconvenience for penitents."

Under no pretext is the confessor permitted to inquire formally for the name of an accomplice or associate in crime (complex peccati aut socius criminis), his place of residence,¹⁵ or any circumstance that might reveal his identity. Nay, more, the penitent should not be allowed to disclose the name of his accomplice because confessor and penitent are both under obligation to protect the good name of others. But the penitent must divulge the degree of relationship of his accomplice if this is rendered necessary by some circumstance changing the species of his sin, e. g., incest, and the fact that a priest is involved when the confessional has been abused for soliciting to impurity. The laws of the Church require that a priest guilty of this crime be reported by name to the ecclesiastical authorities. If a penitent can, without great inconvenience, choose a confessor to whom his accomplice is unknown, he is in duty bound to do so.¹⁶

¹⁵ Benedict XIV., Const. "Suprema omnium," July 7, 1745; "Ubi primum," June 2, 1746; "Ad eradircandum," Sept. 28, 1746; "Apostolid ministerii," Dec. 9, 1749 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1474). —Cfr. Gury, II, 379, 382.

¹⁶ Cfr. Gopfert, III, 235 sqq. — Noldin, III, 338 sq.

If for some physical or moral reason the penitent has forgotten or otherwise omitted a mortal sin in confession, he must mention it in his next confession, —not to obtain forgiveness (as such sin has been forgiven indirectly by the grace of absolution), but to submit the forgotten sin formally to the power of the keys.¹⁷

¹⁷ Gury, II, n. 377: "When the cause excusing from material integrity ceases, the divine precept of confessing all omitted mortal sins again becomes urgent; for the excuse from the divine law of confession does not cease merely when an impediment occurs but is only suspended. Therefore, when the excusing cause ceases, the obligation of the law revives in its entirety; for the precept of confession is attached neither to a time nor to a circumstance but affects the whole of life, so that sins not yet accused must afterward necessarily be accused if this can be done. Nor is it an objection that the Church has determined the time of confession, for this determination is not for ending but for enforcing the obligation. It is evident, moreover, from the proposition condemned by Alexander VII, which reads thus: “We are not bound in a subsequent confession to disclose sins omitted or forgotten in confession because of imminent danger of death or another cause.” Therefore the contradictory of this proposition is true: consequently sins passed over through forgetfulness must necessarily be accused, although they have already been blotted out."

The assertion of a recent Protestant writer that the Church in the Middle Ages compelled the faithful to "confess each and every sin they had committed" is false.¹⁸

¹⁸ Cfr. E. Fischer, Zur Geschichte der evangelischen Beichte, Vol. I, pp. 24, 34, 47; P. A. Kirsch, Zur Geschichte der katholischen Beichte, pp. 186 sqq.

— Confession is required to be integral at least formally.

For integrity is distinguished as material and formal.

Material integrity, strictly taken, supposes an accusation so completed that it embraces all mortal sins truly committed and not yet directly remitted. But because no obligation is imposed except one tempered to human powers, he satisfies the obligation of material integrity who confesses all mortal sins of which, after diligent discussion, he has consciousness, with the circumstances which change the species (c. 901). He is said, in the broader sense, to make a materially integral confession.

And by a similar reason, formal integrity properly belongs to any penitent who truly accuses the sins to be accused by him, so that he who fulfills the obligation of material integrity furnishes at least formal integrity. But more strictly, a formally integral confession is often understood to be one which is knowingly but legitimately incomplete. Therefore it is furnished by him who, on account of a just cause excused from complete confession, makes the accusation which here and now he ought to make.

— On material integrity. Therefore the following must be indicated of themselves:

1. The lowest theological and moral species of sins. It suffices to indicate these spontaneously, with circumstances, even enormously aggravating ones, omitted. This now is clearly established from c. 901 itself, which is silent about these, while the controversy which remained before the Code was not unknown to the legislator. And besides, once the species has been declared, the whole substance of the sin has been accused.

And observe that species not known are not contracted and therefore are not to be accused.

But it is within the power of the judge to perfect his knowledge of the cause by opportune questions. Therefore, when asked about an aggravating circumstance, as about the quantity of theft, about a custom of sin, the penitent will have to confess it sincerely, and this under grave obligation, unless the slight utility of the question is evident to him. He who does not know or does not remember the lowest moral species should state the higher species or the genus which he knows.

2. The certain number. If this is not established, let the probable number be stated, adding more or less. He who has thus declared the number afterward does not have to repeat the certain number, unless it was notably greater.

St. Alphonsus estimates the matter thus: "about three is understood as two or four; about 10, as 8 or 12; about 30, as 27 or 33; about 100, 95 or 105; about 1000, 950-1050."

But these things are not to be taken rigorously, but are to be left to the judgment of the prudent man. Thus from Lehmk. himself, II, 407, "about a hundred" can perhaps but at most be understood as 90-110. If not even a probable number can be had, let there be stated the custom of sinning, the time, the frequency usual in a day, week, month, year. This is often more expedient with a habitual sinner. Nor let us torture penitents about stating the number, especially since little faith is to be had in the more certain numbers which, pressed by the confessor, they recite. Indeed a habitual sinner who sinned very frequently will be able to satisfy by indicating the space of time during which he was accustomed daily, on any occasion, to consent to sin.

And besides, when guilt consists only in the negligence by which a custom, for example of blasphemies, is maintained, because the individual acts are only material sins, solicitude is not to be had about their number.

Nor is it lawful to increase the number. Yet he who in good faith has increased it will not have to repair the error.

The more difficult accurate accusation is, the less is required: for the obligation must remain human, nor can confession become a "butchery" of souls. Wherefore concerning a prostitute some, for example Navarrus, Summa, c. 6, n. 5, judged it sufficient that she indicate the time during which she had exercised her trade. Yet something more can be furnished easily enough, by indicating the usual frequency, the principal species (whether with married persons, with sacred persons, and how often the rarer species occurred). Concerning internal sins it will be enough to indicate the time. By a similar reason the following will satisfy: one who everywhere lusts after women meeting him; one who fosters hatred or shameful thoughts; one who keeps a concubine at home; one who is accustomed to abuse marriage onanistically; one who habitually converses about shameful things; one who is a habitual thief.

3. Material integrity supposes diligent examination, according to the capacity of the penitent, according to the distance from the last confession, and according to the other circumstances. Moderate diligence suffices, such as a prudent man applies in serious affairs, or such as, morally speaking, learned and timorous persons are accustomed to have, even if you know that with greater diligence you would find more things. Confession can be rendered odious or too troublesome to no one. Wherefore today we require from no one an examination prolonged through several days, and we judge that a diligent examination for an hour suffices even for those who have not confessed for many years.

How the penitent is to be prudently helped by the confessor in this matter, and often also is to be left in good faith, we saw above, n. 539.

Already Lugo himself observed that "it can happen that a confessor finds that a penitent needs a general confession because of preceding invalid confessions, and yet the person is such that he can immediately be examined and heard about the whole life, because there is no hope that, left to himself, he will make a better examination than that which, with the confessor helping, he will be able to make there" (cf. Lugo, d. 16, n. 593; d. 22, n. 20).

— On completing confession. 1. He who, having forgotten a grave sin which he in no way accused, afterward remembers the same, will have to accuse it with the others in the next following confession. Meanwhile, however, he will be able to approach the sacred table, nor on that account does he have to make a new confession sooner.

2. But he who applied moderate diligence in examining conscience ought in no way to think back over his former life. Indeed, if something occurs which merely seems not to have been explained in confession, he can act as if the thing had been accused, from the presumption of confession integrally made.

3. He who has confusedly manifested the state of conscience as, morally speaking, he could according to the things said above, afterward does not have to accuse more distinctly the sins whose number and species he remembers, because in that confused narration those sins were sufficiently understood by the confessor (cf. Reuter, 4, 313). Wherefore there is no obligation that a theologian repeat the confessions which, as an unlearned youth, he made according to his former capacity.

For this reason also a prudent confessor will be able to render secure a penitent who, after many sins, would scarcely dare to open his soul to another in such a way that he would be exposed to making a sacrilege: that nothing now has to be declared to another, "since he himself by his questions has procured so complete a confession that it needs no supplement. This is morally certain. If any necessity seems to arise, it will not be true but supposed from the ignorance of the penitent."

— But that confession will have been invalid and of itself sacrilegious which, from mortally culpable ignorance or negligence, was not integral.

If the negligence was light, or was not apprehended as mortal, the confession will be valid, at least on account of good faith, yet in its own time to be perfected by a better examination (cf. Suarez, d. 23, s. 4). Indeed, if the negligence was truly light, even then it seems to suffice that those sins be accused which recur to memory without a repeated examination.

— 1. Sins doubtfully committed are not necessarily to be accused, because concerning these there is no consciousness. Yet their accusation will have to be advised to those to whom in this way greater quiet of conscience will be obtained.

2. Sins certainly committed but doubtfully grave do not of themselves produce a certain obligation of accusation. In practice, from presumption, the lax penitent will have to be directed to accuse them, but the timorous one to consider himself immune from obligation.

3. Sins certainly grave and probably accused, and directly remitted, need not meanwhile be subjected to the keys, since in practice there must be said to be no obligation which you have probably satisfied. But if they cannot be judged probably accused and directly remitted, the obligation of accusation must be urged, since this has remained morally certain.

Several who do not know how to estimate these things prudently are driven by practical necessity to proposing their doubts, except the scrupulous, to whom accusation of things which are not most certain, like 2 + 2 = 4, must often be prohibited.

— On formal integrity. Integral confession is not essential to this sacrament, but is divinely prescribed. That positive precept admits its exceptions, at least in this way, that an accusation which at present cannot be made complete, or which would be too burdensome, can be deferred to another subsequent confession.

Therefore formal integrity suffices:

1. in those who labor under physical impotence of confessing integrally, either simply or through ordinary means.

By such an impediment are excused the mute, unless they confess to a priest with whom they can speak by signs, which occasion they ought of themselves to use; the deaf or half-deaf, whose accusation prudently, with the law of the seal attended to, cannot be completed by questions of the confessor in the course of confession, but from the beginning are of themselves to be brought to a more secret place; those ignorant of the language, who have some necessity of confessing; the dying, who are deprived of use of the tongue.

And note that, according to a probable opinion, writing and an interpreter are placed among extraordinary means, which no one is compelled to use. And if someone confesses through an interpreter, it is enough that he declare one venial sin. Yet there is a way of obtaining a complete accusation without an extraordinary means, if one who knows the language, turned to the other side, recites the individual precepts, and the penitent by a sign first defined indicates to the confessor that he has sinned and how often, for example by a nod of the head or by pressing the hand. In a similar way someone could, in a public place, for example in a hospital, even with a loud voice question the penitent; let the questions be read from a book, lest they seem to have been adapted to the conscience of the penitent;

2. in those who are impeded from material integrity by moral impotence, that is, when either danger of life threatens the confessor or the penitent, which does not permit materially integral confession.

Cases are: a sick person who, after one or another sin has been stated, fails or is in danger of failing; a sick person who, wishing to confess while Viaticum is being brought to him, is discovered to have made many invalid confessions, if the gravity of the illness does not allow delay of absolution; a priest who, placed in danger, seems about to die before the penitent is absolved; in time of plague, if the confessor, lest he be infected, asks only an incomplete confession; when a conflict or destruction of many is imminent, for example in shipwreck. Then it is enough that, turned to soldiers or to those soon about to perish, the confessor ask from them some external sign of penitence, for example by striking the breast or by lifting the hand, and then absolve them with common absolution: "I absolve you from all censures and sins," unless time is at hand for pronouncing the complete form collectively. Yet it is better, if it can be done, to hear individuals even incompletely.

The case can also happen in foreign missions, if Christians who are rarely visited by a missionary present themselves to the confessor in too great a number for the individuals to be able to be heard before the one Mass, during which they wish to communicate. Then it will be better to hear several; then, with Mass pressing, to absolve others generally, and to take care that in following visits those confess distinctly who could not use the preceding occasion;

3. in those who from materially integral confession have grave damage to be feared either for themselves, or for the confessor, or for another: the divine but positive precept concerning confession does not oblige with so great an inconvenience.

Understand inconvenience not as connected of itself with the confession of such a sin, as would be confusion, blush, the reproof of the confessor, but as extrinsic to confession.

Let examples be: a founded fear of violation of the seal of confession, if, for example, the confessor, having been warned, goes on speaking too loudly, so that by his questions he seems about to reveal to bystanders the genus of sins; danger of spiritual ruin, of consenting to depraved delectation on account of examined sins of the flesh; founded danger lest the confessor, from the sins heard, be incited to depraved solicitation. But the dangers of the confessor are not to be easily imagined. Wherefore it rather pertains to the confessor to restrain the penitent lest he turn certain matters over for too long; grave danger to reputation, if from peculiar, not common, adjuncts, for example from an urgent necessity of communicating or celebrating, a lengthy confession would be an almost certain argument of several sins; danger or grave damage of life or of temporal good to be feared, for example from the grave exhaustion of a sick person (D'Ann., III, 305 [33]); danger of violating the seal in accusing a sin, if ever there is such a case. For that he may accuse his own sin, it is enough that, the species of the sin having been manifested, the priest add that he is besides guilty of sacrilege in the administration of the sacrament. For example, one who unduly excused someone from restitution should say: I sinned gravely against justice and in exercising the office of confessor. For another example, cf. Ball.-Palm., V, 252.

4. On account of moral impotence understood more broadly, those are excused from material integrity who have a reserved case from which the confessor cannot directly absolve, namely the sin of an accomplice in a shameful matter; the scrupulous person concerning past confessions or faults; one who, before confession is finished, is absolved by an impatient confessor.

N.B. 1. That someone may confess incompletely, some necessity of confessing must be present: from the precept of annual confession or Communion, if the penitent has other grave sins or doubts about his perfect contrition; from the necessity of communicating or celebrating, to avoid scandal or disgrace; from a longer privation of the sacraments; from the great spiritual utility which the sacraments bring, for example lest the penitent be deprived of indulgences; from the inconvenience of remaining in the state of sin even for one day (St. Alph., l. 6, 490).

2. If the damage or inconvenience depends on the person of the confessor, it is required that opportunity of another priest be lacking, for example on account of distance, to be estimated from the various adjuncts (cf. D'Ann., III, 305 [36]).

3. One who, conscious of mortal faults, cannot confess integrally, must first, in secret confession, set forth necessary matter, that is, what falls under the precept, but he is not compelled, among grave matters, to choose the graver ones, since they are equally affected by the law of confession.

— What if a sin cannot be accused without defamation in the eyes of the confessor either of an accomplice or of another person?

Since defamation in the eyes of one discreet man is not of itself grave, and one sinning tacitly permitted confession to the accomplice of the sin, confession seems to have to be made integrally: a just cause is present for permitting this light detriment. And the mere consolation of confessing to a confessor whom one venerates then suffices so that another does not have to be sought. In a case of extraordinary defamation, if the cause is altogether special why the revelation of sin, made to such a one, is very hateful, then with the other probable opinion we shall respond that the natural precept of not defaming prevails over the positive precept of integral confession. For the opinion is twofold and probable: one commands, the other forbids this revelation, unless nevertheless it is necessary for spiritual direction. But often penitents disclose an accomplice without scruple.

— On free matter. Although, by that reason which we stated in t. I, n. 448, venial sins, even outside confession, in one who is in the state of grace, are remitted through formal penitence, or the opposite act of charity or of another virtue, nevertheless use of the sacrament of Penance always has these utilities: a) of increasing sanctifying grace ex opere operato; b) of conferring sacramental grace for avoiding sins in the future; c) of remitting temporal punishments.

— On sufficient matter. The penitent ought of himself to bring matter certainly sufficient for absolution. Such is a sin already directly absolved, since in this forum nothing prevents the same cause from being judged twice, and a new absolution always profits the penitent. Such is not a doubtful sin. Wherefore then the penitent should add a general accusation of the sins of his former life. Although the general formula, "I accuse the sins of my whole life," added to the present accusation, suffices, yet it is better, so that attrition may be more certain, to indicate some species. The confessor will usefully suggest this to the penitent according to his condition or the knowledge which he has of him, lest the penitent hesitate in doubt.

It also seems sufficient to accuse simply in a general way one's whole life, with no sin indicated. Yet this is alien to received usages. Wherefore, outside necessity, it is better that the confessor demand some distinct accusation in order to give absolution.

Even positive imperfections, if such exist, are not in themselves sufficient matter. Yet we will not therefore prohibit pious penitents from declaring them, both on account of the venial sins very often mixed in, and on account of a fuller manifestation of themselves.

— On the remaining qualities of confession. 1. On account of the usage of the Church, which several, at least before the Code, judged to oblige gravely, let confession be vocal, unless a just cause is present, for example difficulty of confessing otherwise than in writing or by nod or another sign. Yet this obligation is pressed in silence in the Code; and confession is already vocal enough if the penitent, after handing over a written confession to be read, adds by voice: "I accuse all these things."

2. That it be secret is the right of the penitent, so that in the very article of death the penitent can be content with accusing a venial sin, if he cannot confess mortal sins secretly.

3. Let it also be true. Yet not every lie committed in confession is reputed a grave sin, by which confession becomes sacrilegious. But it would be grave in substantial and necessary matter, as if you deny a mortal sin to be accused, or state it so low that you are not heard. It would also be grave to deceive the confessor in a notable matter, when the confessor, as judge or physician, asks something about past sins or about a custom of sin or time of sin as necessary for the present confession.

Of itself, indeed, he cannot be reprehended, at least gravely, who deliberately mixes recent and old sins in a general confession. But one who positively declares recent matter, and that grave, to pertain to past confessions seems to us the author of a grave deception and therefore gravely sacrilegious. Yet there is one who judges more benignly the case of one lying about time, when it does not matter for knowing a custom or relapse.

N.B. Already in the time of St. Thomas, Suppl., 3 p., q. 9, art. 4, 1 obi., the sixteen qualities of confession were rendered in these verses:

"Let confession be simple, humble, pure, faithful, And frequent, naked and discreet, willing, shamefaced, Integral, secret, and tearful, hastened, Strong and accusing, and let it be prepared to obey."

— On repeating confession. 1. On necessary repetition. It is not only confession invalidly made that must be repeated as to grave sins not directly remitted by force of the keys; indeed, in another confession there must be repeated sins accused in vain, because the confessor did not hear them or could not directly absolve the same.

A confession will have been invalid and sacrilegious if it was made in bad faith to a confessor half-asleep or unaware, or by him who, in making confession, deliberately concealed a censure which was impeding the licit reception of the sacrament. A confession of this kind must be repeated whole.

On the part of the confessor, absolution will be invalid if it was given without jurisdiction, or with a substantially vitiated formula, or by a priest who understood nothing. To have understood nothing distinctly does not impede validity, since absolution can fall upon a general accusation. Yet that absolution will be illicit outside a case of necessity, or unless the priest can conjecture sufficiently that the penitent is guilty of no grave fault.

Indeed the absolution is valid, but confession must be repeated in part, if, without fault of the penitent, it was not perceived wholly because of deafness, sleep, or distraction, so that certain mortal sins were not understood.

If the penitent knows with moral certitude which they were, it is established that these alone and all of these must then be repeated. But if he does not know which they are, a brief confession must be repeated; a long one, according to Tamb., whom several approve, is not to be repeated, both because, if many things were accused and few not understood, the individual sins can probably be said to have been accused, and also, which seems the better reason, from a certain equity, lest the penitent have to bear twice the grave burden of accusing all things. Then it will be enough in another confession to say that certain sins were not understood by the confessor: for in the same way you would have accused sins which were known to you only by genus; but in the present case, the sins to be accused again are known only by genus. Yet if you hesitate among a few species, these will have to be indicated. Lugo, d. 16, n. 610.

But a penitent who has uttered a clear accusation can presume that the same was perceived, so that he ought not to be solicitous about this matter, unless it is morally established to him that the matter escaped the confessor. Nor, because the confessor erred in his judgment, judging light what was grave, is the burden of a new accusation therefore imposed on him. Yet if, concerning a connected obligation of denouncing or restoring, the sentence of the confessor was gravely suspected by him of error, then prudence will demand that he seek counsel from a skilled man, especially if the confessor is not of outstanding doctrine.

— You ask, what memory of the accusation must the confessor bear at the moment of absolution?

All agree that it is not necessary that he distinctly remember the sins accused, but that a confused knowledge either preserved or then resumed suffices (cf. Lugo, d. 16, n. 639; St. Alph., l. 6, n. 502; D'Ann., III, 327 [II 10]). And because he could judge about the individual sins when they were being declared, nothing more seems to have to be required except that the confessor know that absolution is to be given, that a connected obligation, if there is any, is to be imposed, and that such a mode of penance is opportune.

Indeed, although several, St. Alphonsus and D'Ann., l. c., contradict it, if someone has distinctly narrated his sins to a priest as to a friend and then confesses to the same priest, Lugo, d. 16, n. 638, appealing to received usage itself, judges that the confused accusation which the penitent refers to the memory which the confessor had of those sins previously distinctly heard is sufficient. This will certainly be able to come into use if the priest, while he was hearing the narration, already thought in some way about a probable confession. For then the narration gave judicial knowledge to the recipient.

— On the manner of repeating an invalid confession.

1. Before another confessor the accusation previously made in vain must be repeated from the beginning. This is manifest. - 2. But before the same confessor, on account of the reason just explained in n. 594, it is enough in a few words to recall the sins previously known to him, provided the confessor has preserved a confused knowledge either of the sins, or of the state and tenor of life, or remembers the penance given by him (cf. St. Alph., l. 6, n. 502). Indeed several, to whom Ball.-Palm., V, n. 276, adheres, think it enough that the priest "know that he has already formed the judgment and judged that absolution was to be given." St. Alph., l. c. dub. 3, does not admit that the penitent can thus be absolved by a confessor who does not remember at least the penance given. Yet even in this case the reason which the holy Doctor himself gives for the prior cases seems to have force: "The ratification of the preceding confession, which was sacramental, while the penitent then in general accuses himself of the faults confessed, joined with the knowledge antecedently had by the confessor, is reputed well sufficient."

But if the confession was invalid because it was made to a confessor not yet a priest or lacking jurisdiction, then it is necessary that the confessor have retained at least a confused memory of the distinctly made accusation, so that this, at least through confused recollection, can direct him to a truly sacramental judgment now first to be effected. Therefore to such a confessor who has preserved no memory of the past confession, a distinct accusation will have to be made. Cf. Suarez, Paen., d. 22, s. 6, n. 6; Lugo, Paen., d. 16, n. 141; Ball.-Palm., V, n. 275.

But legitimate confessions which were made in good faith after an invalid confession, as is clear, are in no way to be repeated.

Finally observe: since in doubt one must stand for the value of the act, confession is not to be repeated unless it is morally established that the former was invalid. And, on account of the difficulty of the matter, those who in good faith think that they have confessed rightly are for the most part not to be disturbed.

— On the manner of supplying an incomplete confession. 1. It is established that it suffices for omitted things to be supplied. Wherefore if a circumstance changing the species was omitted, the sin which it surrounded is not to be repeated if the specific malice can be declared without mention of that sin. Wherefore, one who, bound by vow, sinned against the sixth precept will be able to supply the defect by accusing either personal sacrilege or a grave violation of a certain vow; but one who violently knew a married woman will not be able to accuse the circumstance of violence separately, since this is specified by the very right violated.

He who accused a sin merely in genus will have to accuse the species which he afterward remembered; but nothing is to be supplied by him who indicated the few species among which he was hesitating in doubt. For in the latter case the true species was indicated as doubtful and was directly absolved; the contrary holds in the former case.

Nor does a habitual sinner who accused his sins confusedly as he could afterward have to accuse more distinctly the species which could sufficiently have been understood by the confessor in the confused narration.

If, what is not to be presumed, it is established that confessions were made by an unlearned person whose life was sufficiently uniform in such a way that certain species were not perceived, a prudent confessor, from a present confession of one month, or half-year, or year, will easily gather what the penitent did through the rest of life.

— On general confession to be prudently advised.

General confession, or repetition of all or several confessions, is useful and to be commended: a) when it seems likely to bring greater peace and quiet to a non-scrupulous penitent to whom a grave doubt has occurred about the value of past confessions; b) so that past things may be more perfectly expiated; so that, from more perfect knowledge of oneself, greater fervor may be conceived; so that, before acts of greater moment in which an immense outpouring of graces is deservedly hoped for or is more necessary, a man may dispose himself better and adapt himself to the grace to be received.

Wherefore in the principal periods of life, before first Communion, before the assumption of a state, in dangerous illness, a general confession of the whole life is prudently advised: this counsel is strengthened by the authority of the Code itself for those entering religion.

That greater fruit may be gathered, let it be made as if it were going to be the last: this, at the point of death, will be a great consolation. Yet confession of the whole life does not seem to have to be repeated more often.

But it is better after stated intervals, for example after individual years, to make a general confession from the last general confession.

Approach to a new confessor furnishes no cause for repeating an accurate confession of the whole life. Insofar as it helps spiritual direction, certain principal notes can usefully be indicated.

But a general confession will be harmful if it would be for a penitent prone to anxiety a cause of disturbance or scruples, or if, for one tempted, from past facts being rubbed raw again, it would nourish passions.

Asked for counsel, the confessor should inquire why the penitent wishes to make a general confession. Then he will decline or admit the proposal. If it is made for the sake of devotion, let him immediately warn the penitent that he is held by no necessity to declare all things.

— 1. Concerning the manner of making a general confession, cf. the things said above, n. 539. Several, after Gobat, tr. 6, n. 498, who transcribes Stoz, advise that he who has led a life of sufficiently uniform tenor consider three times: one weekday, or week, what he did in it; similarly one feast day; extraordinary times of journeys, business, weddings, banquets, occasions. Often it will profit to divide life into a few stages, and to explain what kind he was in each, noting if anything extraordinary besides occurs (cf. Lehmk., II, 442).

That it may be briefer, let it be made in an ordered way according to the precepts and offices; that he may perceive the consolation of a confession completely made, let the penitent help his memory by certain written notes.

2. In a less extensive accusation, let the penitent "consider thoughts, words, works, in order to God, neighbor, himself." Lehmk., II, 449.

3. By the sick a less complete examination is to be made than by the healthy; indeed, sometimes, on account of weakness of head, they are to be relieved from every preparation of examination.

4. To the timorous a graver sin will occur of itself if any has been committed. Wherefore they have no strict obligation, if they confess frequently, of an examination properly so called. Yet they are to be exhorted that they piously discuss conscience and signify habitual propensities. Nor is it of itself to be tolerated that habitually, every accusation of present life having been omitted, they merely accuse past faults against some virtue. Gen., II, 262, judges that a confessor sins venially who permits this to happen, since he habituates penitents to receiving the sacrament perfunctorily.

— On absolving a dying person. 1. A dying person possessing the use of the senses is to be treated according to his disposition. If he is a non-Catholic who cannot prudently be warned about the error of his sect, let him be stirred up to eliciting an act of perfect contrition; then let him declare himself a sinner before God and the priest, and, with sorrow conceived, let him also declare that it is pleasing to him that the priest, insofar as he can, help him. This done, let him be absolved under condition. Those acts which the penitent makes absolutely are judged better and more useful than a conditioned will expressed thus: "if I knew that this was necessary, I would wish to confess and be absolved" (Lehmk., II, 651). Yet the non-Catholic will be helped more certainly by perfect contrition and Extreme Unction.

2. A dying person deprived of the senses, if others can testify to an express will of absolution from him, can be absolved absolutely, although the condition "if you are capable" can also be added. For he is judged to have confessed as it were through interpreters. From present usage, all other Catholics must be absolved under condition. And even those who rejected the sacraments, or baptized non-Catholics, can be absolved under condition.

In the age of Suarez, Lugo, etc., they denied that, with accusation lacking, an absolution of this kind, given to him who had made no confession, could have validity or be conferred. They explain the present usage in various ways: often there is present a sign of confession not perceived; confession, in that case of impotence, is not of the necessity of the sacrament; but in these extreme matters, a lesser probability suffices for administering the sacrament licitly.

366. A. Necessity. As is evident from the text of the Council of Trent cited above, a man is bound to confess all mortal sins committed after baptism, insofar as this can morally be done. Hence a twofold integrity is distinguished: a) material, which comprises absolutely all mortal sins committed after baptism and not yet directly remitted, according to species, number, and circumstances changing the species; b) formal, which comprises all those mortal sins which the penitent, here and now and with all the circumstances considered, can and must confess.

Principle 1. The material integrity of confession is not always necessary for the valid and licit reception of the sacrament of penance.

For Christ in His merciful benignity did not wish to require from sinful man something which is morally or physically impossible, as material integrity sometimes is. Moreover, the law concerning the integrity of confession is a positive law. But a positive law ordinarily does not oblige in a case of grave inconvenience, as was said above in the treatise on laws. Hence the Council of Trent¹⁸⁶ also says: "But the remaining sins which do not occur to one thinking diligently are understood to be included universally in the same confession; for these we faithfully say with the Prophet: From my hidden sins cleanse me." What holds for sins omitted through forgetfulness also holds for sins not accused because of another grave cause. What the just causes excusing from material integrity are will be stated below, n. 378.

Principle 2. Formal integrity is altogether required for a valid and licit confession.

This integrity is equally as necessary for the sacrament of penance as water is for the sacrament of baptism. For the divine precept of declaring all mortal sins committed certainly refers to those sins which here and now can and must be declared. The same is evident from the Council of Trent,¹⁸⁷ which declares it necessary by divine law to confess all and each of the mortal sins of which memory is had with due and diligent examination beforehand, even hidden sins and those which are against the last two precepts of the Decalogue, and the circumstances which change the species of the sin.

B. The extent of integrity is to be considered as regards 1. the species of sins, 2. their number, 3. their circumstances, 4. the external act, 5. the effects, 6. doubtful sins.

¹⁸⁶ Sess. 14, c. 5, On Penance (Denz., n. 900).

¹⁸⁷ Sess. 14, c. 5, On Penance (Denz., n. 899).

367. 1. The lowest species, both theological and moral, of mortal sins must be declared. This follows manifestly from the Council of Trent,¹⁸⁸ which says: "... Priests could not have exercised this [sacramental] judgment without the cause being known, nor indeed could they have preserved equity in imposing penalties, if they [the penitents] had declared their sins only in general and not rather in species and individually." These words "in species" are to be understood of the lowest species, because the name of species is always to be understood thus unless the contrary is altogether apparent. The reason for this precept is that otherwise the confessor cannot judge sufficiently concerning the state of the penitent.

Therefore the divine precept of making confession is not satisfied if, outside a case of necessity, the penitent accuses himself in the following ways: I have sinned mortally; I have sinned against justice, against chastity, and so forth. I say: outside necessity; for if the penitent cannot, because of forgetfulness, danger of death, scandal, and so forth, confess the lowest species of mortal sins, a generic accusation now suffices, as was said above, n. 325.

Sometimes it is morally impossible to ascertain from penitents who are little instructed the lowest species especially of internal sins. For they are unable to distinguish, for example, between morose delectation, joy, and desire, or between obscene words and words which are merely filthy. But in these cases the confessor should abstain from inopportune questions, since they are useful for nothing and instead disturb the penitents or affect them with weariness. The same holds for ascertaining the exact number of these sins. For, as St. Alphonsus rightly observes, such penitents then answer whatever comes into their "mouth."

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

368. 2. The number of mortal sins must likewise be declared in confession, insofar as this is morally possible. For the Council of Trent¹⁸⁹ says that all and each of the sins are to be accused. Therefore the penitent does not confess sufficiently by saying, for example: I have fornicated often; but he is bound according to his strength to accuse himself of the correct and certain number of sins. Likewise, he sins if he notably increases or diminishes the number. Hence, if a false number of grave sins was indicated, the penitent must declare the true number in the following confession. Theologians nevertheless teach that a penitent who in good faith expressed a notably greater number is not bound to correct this error, because the true number is contained in the greater number indicated. It is otherwise if the number was notably diminished.

A penitent who, after making a diligent examination of conscience, could not find the exact number of sins must determine it in the best way he can by employing the word "approximately." What number is judged to be comprehended in the particle "approximately" cannot be determined by an altogether certain rule. Certain authors say: approximately three is understood as 2 or 4; approximately ten as 8 or 12; approximately thirty as 27 or 33; approximately one hundred as 95 or 105; approximately one thousand as 950 or 1,050.¹⁹⁰ But if not even a probable number can be had, the habit of sinning, the duration, and the frequency in a day, week, or month are to be stated. Hence Noldin,¹⁹¹ from Sporer-Bierbaum, notes that it suffices, for example, if a prostitute says: For two years I remained in prostitution and, as often as there was an occasion, I made my body available even to married men, and so forth; or if a man given to lust says: I lusted after any women who came my way, even relatives, married women, and so forth; or: On every given occasion I spoke with any companions about most filthy matters. A penitent who in confession in good faith indicated the number of mortal sins approximately is not bound to confess again if afterward he should happen to find the accurate number. The reason is that the confessor was already able to judge sufficiently concerning the state of this penitent.¹⁹²

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 466.

¹⁹¹ De sacr.¹⁷, n. 277.

¹⁹² St. Alphonsus, l.c., n. 478.

369. 3. Circumstances changing the species of mortal sins must be declared in confession. This is evident from the Council of Trent.¹⁹³ Which circumstances change the species of a sin was stated above, I, nn. 117 and 373. The general rule is: a circumstance changes the species of a sinful act when it adds a new malice gravely repugnant to another virtue. Thus, for example, theft injures the virtue of justice; but theft committed in sacred things additionally injures the virtue of religion; fornication injures the virtue of chastity, but fornication committed with blood relatives additionally injures the virtue of piety. Besides these circumstances which change the moral species of the sin, there are still others which change the theological species, that is, which render mortal a sin per se venial; for example, the theft of a small coin is a venial sin, but the circumstance of a large quantity in theft, for example, the theft of 1,000 francs, constitutes a grave sin. These circumstances are also customarily called "aggravating unto infinity," and it is evident of itself that they are to be declared in confession.

There is, however, a grave controversy as to whether other circumstances which change neither the moral nor the theological species, but only aggravate the malice, must also be manifested in confession.

All indeed agree that circumstances which aggravate only slightly need not necessarily be accused; but if there is question of notably aggravating circumstances, theologians do not agree. Some, for example, Suarez, Billuart, Concina, Lacroix, and others, defend the affirmative opinion; others, for example, St. Antoninus,¹⁹⁴ St. Thomas,¹⁹⁵ St. Bonaventure,¹⁹⁶ St. Alphonsus,¹⁹⁷ and almost all modern authors, deny such an obligation, although in practice they counsel the confession of all notably aggravating circumstances. Neither opinion is certain, but the negative opinion seems better, whatever Concina may say.¹⁹⁸

For a) the Council of Trent maintains a profound silence concerning this matter in that place where it accurately declares what must be manifested in confession, namely, all and each mortal sin and the circumstances which change the species of the sin. It is altogether impossible to understand why the Council, explaining ex professo the necessary matter of confession and designating circumstances changing the species, should have omitted notably aggravating circumstances if their confession were absolutely necessary. Moreover, nothing is had concerning such an obligation either in Sacred Scripture, in tradition, or in the Code of Canon Law, c. 901. Therefore it can be said with moral certainty that notably aggravating circumstances need not per se necessarily be manifested. Per accidens such an obligation will often be present, as will be explained below.

b) St. Thomas also denies that notably aggravating circumstances must always necessarily be accused. For he says: "Certain persons say that all circumstances which add some notable quantity to a sin must of necessity be confessed if they occur to the memory. But others say that only circumstances which draw the act into another genus of sin must of necessity be confessed, and this is more probable, ... the reason for which is that venial sins need not of necessity be confessed, but only mortal sins, which in a certain manner have an infinite quantity."¹⁹⁹ And elsewhere he writes: "A man is not bound to confess aggravating circumstances which do not draw the act into another genus of sin, just as neither is he bound to confess venial sins, although it is praiseworthy that a man confess them."²⁰⁰ Certain persons respond to these texts that St. Thomas indeed taught thus when he was younger, but that it was more likely that he would have changed this opinion if he had lived longer. But to answer thus is to divine rather than to teach. Others say that the Angelic Doctor speaks only of those circumstances which are after the manner of a venial sin and therefore aggravate the malice only lightly, but not of notably aggravating circumstances. This explanation also pleases little, because it is difficult to reconcile with the texts themselves which were adduced.

Since these things are so, a strict obligation always to declare notably aggravating circumstances is not to be asserted. For confession is already sufficiently burdensome of itself, and therefore the burden of accusing notably aggravating circumstances is not to be added unless a clear divine or ecclesiastical precept is present. But no one can prove the existence of such a precept, whatever Concina may assert.²⁰⁰ Nor should anyone say that the very nature of sacramental judgment necessarily requires such a manifestation. For sacramental judgment cannot be perfect in every respect, since the confessor often cannot judge clearly, for example, when hearing the confession of a sinner who has not confessed for a long time, or when giving absolution to a dying person deprived of his senses, to those who are half-witted, to children, and so forth. Therefore, from the will of Christ alone depends the degree to which perfection must be present in sacramental judgment. But the will of Christ has not been manifested to us concerning the confession of notably aggravating circumstances.

Almost the sole argument for the affirmative opinion is taken from the Roman Catechism,²⁰¹ whose authority is assuredly the greatest and which seems to defend this opinion: "Nor is it necessary only to explain grave sins by recounting them, but also those things which surround each sin and greatly increase or diminish its depravity." Diverse explanations of this text have been devised, namely, that the Roman Catechism speaks only of those circumstances which change either the moral or theological species; or, if it speaks also of other circumstances, that it establishes this obligation only per accidens, or rather counsels it than inculcates it. Whatever the case, a strict obligation to confess such circumstances cannot be established from the cited text alone.

¹⁹³ Ibid.; cf. Code of Canon Law, c. 901.

¹⁹⁴ S. theol. P. 3, tit. 14, c. 19, § 7.

¹⁹⁵ IV Sent., dist. 16, q. 3, a. 2, sol. 5.

¹⁹⁶ IV Sent., dist. 17, P. 3, a. 2, q. 3.

¹⁹⁷ Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 468.

¹⁹⁸ De sacr. poenit., diss. 4, c. 6.

¹⁹⁹ IV Sent., dist. 16, q. 3, a. 2, sol. 5.

²⁰⁰ Opusc. 12, Ad lectorem Bisuntinum. Blessed Albert the Great, the teacher of St. Thomas, says concerning the same matter: "I answer without prejudice, according to the ancient doctors, that circumstances need not be confessed except those which draw the act into another genus of sin; it is safe also to state the others, especially if conscience pricks someone, but nevertheless they say that he is not bound by precept" (IV Sent., dist. 16, a. 24, sol.).

²⁰¹ P. 2, c. 5, q. 47.

370. Per accidens, notably aggravating circumstances must often be manifested, for example:

a) By reason of reservation.

Thus the striking of a religious or of a cleric not constituted in a dignity, at the instigation of the devil, is a case reserved to the proper Ordinary; but the striking of a bishop or Cardinal is punished with excommunication specially reserved to the Supreme Pontiff. Therefore the penitent must confess the character of the striking, although this circumstance of the sin of sacrilege is only aggravating and does not change the species.

b) By reason of the occasion or habit of sinning.

For although the occasion or habit of sinning does not essentially change the sin itself, for example, the sin of fornication committed from habit does not differ essentially from fornication rarely committed, nevertheless it is certain that the confessor can question the penitent concerning the habit and occasion, and that the penitent must then answer truthfully. This is evident from proposition 58 condemned by Innocent XI on March 2, 1679: "We are not bound to confess to a confessor questioning us the habit of some sin." The reason is that otherwise it is impossible for the confessor to form a right judgment concerning the state of the penitent and the means to be employed.

c) By reason of satisfaction and of other things to be performed after confession.

This occurs especially in restitution to be made. Thus, for example, the confessor will act differently with a penitent who stole 50 francs and with one who defrauded another of 50,000. He will impose one satisfaction upon him who, once aroused by anger, hated an enemy, and another upon him who has already had implacable hatred for an entire year. Billuart²⁰² treats excellently the controversy concerning the obligation of confessing notably aggravating circumstances.

²⁰² De poenit., diss. 7, a. 2, § 3.

371. Admonition. In practice penitents are to be strongly exhorted to confess notably aggravating circumstances, both to render the judgment of the priest easier and to exercise humility and avoid errors in their own cause. In the matter of the sixth commandment, however, it is commonly better to manifest nothing except the species and the circumstances changing the species. For there are in this matter certain notably aggravating circumstances whose manifestation penitents dread, and which the confessor himself ought to forestall, since it is not altogether necessary, because of the sanctity of the sacrament and for other grave causes.

372. Solutions. From what has been said, practical solutions easily follow.

a) Incest between blood relatives and relatives by affinity do not differ in species, and therefore it suffices simply to accuse oneself of incest.²⁰³ According to the most common opinion, the first degree of the direct line must be expressly declared in confession, namely, carnal sins between father and daughter, mother and son, father-in-law and daughter-in-law, son-in-law and mother-in-law. In practice at least the first degree of the collateral line must also be manifested because of the proximate occasion of sinning, which is then customarily present.²⁰⁴

b) The circumstance of a sacred time need not per se necessarily be manifested, unless, however, the sinner specially intended the violation of the sacred time. Therefore it need not necessarily be stated whether, for example, lust was committed on a Sunday or on Easter, and so forth.²⁰⁵

c) The number of persons with whom someone sinned need not per se necessarily be accused. It suffices to state the number of sins.²⁰⁶ Therefore one who fornicated with three different prostitutes confesses sufficiently by saying: I fornicated three times. But if the confessor suspects that the penitent lives in a proximate occasion or that a multiple injury arose from the sin, he has the right to ask whether there was one accomplice or more than one. The penitent is then bound to tell the truth.

d) A religious priest sinning against chastity confesses sufficiently by saying: I sinned against the public vow of chastity. The reason is that the vow emitted in the subdiaconate and the public vow emitted in religion are made from the same motive. Theologians commonly teach, however, that in this case the public vow must necessarily be manifested; hence an accusation of the transgression of a simple private vow would be insufficient. The reason is that the transgression of a public vow, even a simple one, is true sacrilege, which cannot be said so certainly of the violation of a simple private vow.²⁰⁷

e) In sins of hatred the condition of the person held in hatred must be declared if from the hatred not only charity but also another virtue is gravely injured. Therefore the penitent must confess, for example, hatred of his father.

²⁰³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 154, a. 9 ad 2.

²⁰⁴ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 470.

²⁰⁵ Cf. above, II, n. 492.

²⁰⁶ Thus the more common opinion, which Concina (De sacr. poenit. l. 1, c. 31) nevertheless thinks too lax.

²⁰⁷ Cf. above, II, n. 544.

373. 4. An external act is often joined with an internal sinful act. Although sin is essentially situated in the internal act of the will, nevertheless all theologians teach that not only the internal but also the external act of sin must necessarily be declared. Therefore it does not suffice, for example, if an adulterer confesses: I had the intention of committing adultery; but he must say: I committed adultery. The reason is that otherwise the confessor cannot judge rightly concerning the state of the penitent. For he will judge differently concerning a penitent who actually committed adultery and concerning a penitent who only intended adultery. Under the name of an external act is understood not only a positive act perpetrated, but also the omission of a prescribed external act. Therefore neither does it suffice to confess: I had the intention of omitting Mass; but one must say: I omitted Mass.

374. 5. The external and foreseen effect of a sin is commonly to be accused in confession, and thus also holds the universal custom of the faithful who confess. The reason is the same; for even the foreseen effect of a sin, although it does not have a malice proper to itself, just as neither does the external act, nevertheless participates in the malice of the internal act and constitutes with it one moral whole. All theologians teach that the effect of a sin must sometimes be accused per accidens, for example, if from the effect a censure or reservation or obligation of restitution is incurred. But even per se such an obligation more probably exists when the effect was not retracted to the extent possible and was foreseen at least in a confused manner. For such an effect is the completion of the internal act and is voluntary at least in its cause.²⁰⁸

Thus, for example, a young man reading an obscene book and foreseeing that pollution would thence follow must confess: I read an obscene book with foresight of the future pollution, which also actually occurred; or a man making himself drunk and foreseeing that omission of Mass would thence follow must say in confession: I was drunk with foresight of the omission of Mass, which also actually occurred; or more briefly: I was voluntarily drunk and thence omitted Mass. But if the effect of the sin was retracted in the mind, although it could no longer be retracted externally, certain authors, especially Lugo,²⁰⁹ deny that a strict obligation of confessing it is present. The reason is that such an effect is not properly a sin but only something physical following from sin. But sins alone are to be manifested in confession. Thus, for example, according to these authors, one who administered deadly poison to an enemy must confess: I gave deadly poison to an enemy, and he can remain silent about the death which actually followed from it. Nevertheless, in practice this opinion is to be abandoned, and in fact it is customarily abandoned both by confessors and by penitents.

²⁰⁸ Several theologians, according to Lugo (De poenit., disp. 16, n. 440), teach the contrary.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.; cf. Gury-Ballerini, Comp. Theol. mor. II, n. 490.

375. 6. Doubtful sins need not necessarily be accused if the doubt concerning the existence of a mortal sin or concerning its confession not yet having been made is negative or little founded. Thus all authors. The reason is that otherwise a broad way would be prepared for innumerable scruples and anxieties. On the contrary, doubtful sins which are much more probably mortal and not yet confessed are to be accused, although some slight reason exists that they are not mortal or have already been accused. The reason is that so slight a reason does not excuse from confession, and otherwise the reins would be given to laxism.

But if the doubt is positive and truly founded, then one must act otherwise. The doubt can concern: a) the very act of sin; b) the gravity of an act certainly committed; c) the confession of a certainly grave sin. Therefore a threefold question can be proposed:

Must sins necessarily be accused which are: a) doubtfully committed, b) doubtfully mortal, c) doubtfully confessed?

There are authors, such as Ballerini,²¹⁰ Noldin,²¹¹ Génicot,²¹² and Tanquerey,²¹³ who answer all three questions simply in the negative, or deny that there is a strict obligation of confessing them; but these authors and all theologians also counsel the confession of doubtful sins unless the penitent is scrupulous. For the sake of clarity, each question must be answered separately:

a) If there is question of a sin doubtfully committed, there is not per se a strict obligation of confession. Thus the more common and more probable opinion.²¹⁴ The reason is that a sin doubtfully committed is not even sufficient matter for absolution, since absolution cannot be given, at least absolutely, concerning a sin doubtfully committed. Therefore, a fortiori, such a sin is not necessary matter of confession. Moreover, the Council of Trent requires only the confession of mortal sins of which the penitent has consciousness. But it cannot be said absolutely that the penitent has consciousness of a sin if a true doubt exists.

Nor does St. Thomas seem to be opposed to this opinion, although this is said by its adversaries. Behold the words of the Angelic Doctor:²¹⁵ "When someone doubts concerning some sin whether it is mortal, he is bound to confess it while the doubt remains. For he who commits or omits something concerning which he doubts whether it is a mortal sin sins mortally by exposing himself to danger. And likewise he exposes himself to danger who neglects to confess that which he doubts to be mortal; nevertheless, he should not assert that it is mortal, but should speak doubtfully and await the judgment of the priest, whose office it is to discern between leprosy and leprosy." For the Angelic Doctor does not seem here to speak of a sin doubtfully committed, but of a sin certainly committed yet doubtfully grave, because a sin doubtfully committed is not certainly leprosy; nor does the confessor then discern between leprosy and leprosy, but between leprosy and non-leprosy.

Per accidens, however, sins doubtfully committed must be manifested: a) at the point of death, and an act of contrition does not seem to suffice if there is then an available confessor,²¹⁶ for a man is then bound to choose that which is safer; b) in a practical doubt, in order to seek counsel for the future.

²¹⁰ In the notes to Gury, Comp. Theol. mor. II, 477 sqq.

²¹¹ De sacr.¹⁷, n. 280.

²¹² Theol. mor. II, 290.

²¹³ Synopsis Theol. mor., De poenit., n. 289.

²¹⁴ Cf. Gury, Comp. Theol. mor. II, n. 477.

²¹⁵ Suppl., q. 6, a. 4 ad 3.

²¹⁶ St. Alphonsus (Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 473) thinks that an act of contrition alone then suffices.

376. b) If there is question of a sin certainly committed but doubtfully grave, the following practical rules are to be observed, according as there is question either of doubtfully grave matter or of perfect consent doubtfully given. For this doubt cannot arise except from this twofold source; for example, someone took 5 francs and doubts whether this matter of theft is grave; or someone lingered for some time in morose delectation and doubts whether he gave full consent.

Rule 1. In doubt concerning the gravity of the matter, penitents, especially the uninstructed, must declare sins of this kind. For it is almost impossible for the penitent alone then to form a right conscience for himself.

Rule 2. In doubt concerning full consent or perfect advertence, the principle admitted by all is to be employed: "One must stand for that for which the presumption stands."²¹⁷ If the penitent is of a timorous conscience and is not accustomed to sin gravely, the presumption stands for him, and therefore he is not bound to confess a sin to which he did not certainly give consent. But if the penitent is of a lax conscience and often falls into mortal sins, the presumption stands against him, and therefore he is bound to confess that doubtful sin. Finally, if the penitent keeps a middle way between scrupulosity and laxity, then, unless it is much more probable that sufficient consent or advertence was lacking, the doubtfully grave sin must be manifested, "because this seems to be the universal and inveterate practice of the faithful, and therefore it is supposed to have emanated from the institution of Christ and to have been observed through tradition until now."²¹⁸

²¹⁷ St. Alphonsus very well observes: "Likewise, those who are of a timorous conscience and are not accustomed to sin gravely and deliberately must be exempted from the obligation of confessing doubtful mortal sins. For these, in doubt, can reasonably, indeed with moral certainty, believe that they did not consent, because the presumption is taken from things which commonly occur.... The a priori reason for this is that he who habitually adheres to God and greatly fears lest he be deprived of divine grace, if it happens at some time that he turns away from Him, must inflict great violence upon himself in order to despise the remorse of conscience and cast himself deliberately into sin. But he cannot do this unless he certainly adverts to the evil which he embraces, for, as the most learned Father Alvarez says: Full consent in mortal sin is such iniquity that it cannot be hidden or unknown, but while recent it is easily recognized. Hence the Lord said to St. Teresa: No one loses Me unless he certainly knows it.... Conversely, the opposite is to be judged concerning one who is accustomed easily to fall into mortal sins, because in doubt this man is presumed to have consented; for if he had resisted, he would certainly remember that effort which he made to repel the temptation. Hence Croix rightly concludes that scarcely ever in men of this kind, of both the first and the second class, is there a merely negative doubt. For the presumption establishes the probability of consent given or dissent" (Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 476).

²¹⁸ St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 474.

377. c) If there is question of a mortal sin certainly committed but doubtfully confessed, it must be accused, unless, however, the doubt concerning the confession having been made is very slight. The reason is that, since the mortal sin is certain, the obligation of confessing it is also certain. But a certain obligation cannot be satisfied by a doubtful fulfillment.

Thus authors commonly teach who are not pure probabilists, with St. Alphonsus,²¹⁹ who nevertheless adds: "Nor do I reject ... that one who was diligent in confessing his sins, if afterward he doubts whether he omitted some sin after much time has elapsed since he committed it, is not bound to confess it, since in that case he can believe with moral certainty that he has already confessed it. And Father Concina adds that if someone previously fell into many sins from a depraved habit and afterward was truly converted through constant integrity of life; if he then doubts whether in a general or particular confession made with due diligence he omitted some sin or circumstance, the confessor should forbid him even to think again about his past life, but rather should command him to spend his time in pious meditations." Therefore, in practice, a penitent who seriously and with foundation doubts whether he omitted a mortal sin or a specific circumstance in his last confession, made not so long before, must declare this sin or circumstance in the following confession. But if the penitent doubts about the confession of some sin committed a long time ago and always had the custom of confessing well, he is not bound to manifest this doubtfully confessed sin. The confessor should not permit scrupulous penitents to accuse again sins doubtfully confessed, because otherwise their scruples are customarily increased still further.

²¹⁹ Ibid., n. 477.

There are two means for obtaining the integrity of confession, namely, one per se, which is the examination of conscience, and the other per accidens, namely, the repetition of confession or general confession, when some sin was omitted in previous confessions. We shall treat this second means in the following paragraph.

383. 1. Necessity of the examination of conscience. The penitent is regularly bound under grave obligation to make a diligent examination of conscience before he confesses.

Hence the Council of Trent²³⁷ admonishes penitents to recount in confession all mortal sins of which they have consciousness after a diligent examination of themselves. The reason for this obligation is evident of itself. For how could the penitent accuse himself of all mortal sins according to species and number unless he had first diligently recalled them to memory? I said, however: he is regularly bound, because a) if time or strength is lacking, as in grave illness or at the point of death, so great an examination of conscience is not required, just as neither is so great an integrity of confession then necessary. Likewise b) there is no grave obligation of examining the conscience for those who are morally certain that they have not sinned gravely since their last confession. Therefore they should strive rather to elicit true contrition concerning the free matter adduced than to search their conscience at length concerning the smallest sins or imperfections.

²³⁷ Sess. 14, c. 5, On Penance (Denz., n. 899).

384. 2. In this examination there is required not the greatest diligence, but that which prudent men are accustomed to employ in a grave matter.

Therefore this diligence is to be measured: a) According to the length of time which has elapsed since the last confession. For a greater examination of conscience is required, for example, to find sins committed during an entire year than during two months. b) According to the condition of persons. Thus, for example, uninstructed men are not bound to make as great an examination as instructed and cultivated men. Hence an uninstructed man coming into the confessional without a sufficient examination of conscience is not to be dismissed, but is to be assisted by the confessor himself. For if he were dismissed, either he would lose heart and perhaps no longer return, or, if he did return, the result of the examination made would scarcely be better. Therefore the confessor himself should then assist the penitent in making the examination by putting a few but well-adapted questions. But if a well-instructed penitent has failed from mere negligence to make an examination of conscience, he is ordinarily to be dismissed and exhorted to make a better examination. Concerning this matter the Roman Catechism²³⁸ writes: "If the priest recognizes men of this kind to be altogether unprepared, he will dismiss them from him with most humane words and exhort them to take some time to think over their sins and then return. But if perhaps they affirm that they have devoted every effort to this matter, since the priest must especially fear lest, once dismissed, they no longer return, they are to be heard, especially if they show some zeal for amending their life and can be induced to accuse themselves of their negligence, which they promise to compensate at another time by an accurate meditation." Those who lie gravely ill and because of lack of strength or the bitterness of their pains cannot think over their past life are neither to be obliged to a longer examination of conscience nor to be examined excessively by the confessor himself. It is much better that, after accusing themselves of the sins which came to mind without great labor, they strive according to their strength to elicit perfect contrition. But afterward, if perhaps health is recovered, the confession of those sins which were omitted must be supplied. Moreover, pastors and preachers should often admonish the faithful that the sick not defer making confession until the extremity of life, when the powers of soul and body are already most diminished.

Those who with grave negligence make an examination of a conscience burdened with mortal sins sin gravely, because they cannot then obtain that integrity of confession which is required under grave precept. Moreover, one who negligently makes the examination of conscience is also accustomed to elicit contrition negligently and thus to receive the sacrament of penance sacrilegiously.

Several theologians taught that a penitent who because of a weak memory foresees that he will forget some sins in confession nevertheless is not bound to write his sins on paper. The reason is that such writing is an extraordinary means and, moreover, can easily be lost or come to the knowledge of others. But the ancient moralists indeed seem rightly to have called writing an extraordinary means, because at that time fewer men knew the art of writing; today, however, in our regions almost anyone can write without any difficulty, and scarcely any danger of losing the writing exists for a diligent man. Therefore writing is no longer always an extraordinary means for obtaining the integrity of confession.²³⁹

²³⁸ P. 2, c. 5, q. 60.

²³⁹ Cf. above, n. 365, and St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 6, nn. 429, 479, 493.

385. 3. The method to be observed in the examination of conscience is determined by no positive precept.

Therefore let each one follow whatever method he prefers. The following things seem worthy of observation:

a) The best custom is to make an examination of conscience every day. For then a man will know very well the state of his soul and at the time of confession will easily obtain the necessary integrity.

b) When the time of confession approaches, the penitent should invoke the Holy Spirit, who enlightens human hearts. Then in a quiet place he should think over his life since his last confession, preserving a clear order. Simple faithful who do not confess so frequently can usefully employ the so-called catalogue of sins,²⁴⁰ such as is found in many books of devotion. But the faithful who confess frequently will better recognize the state of their conscience if they think over how they have fulfilled the obligations of their state, their obligations toward their neighbor, their religious obligations, and so forth.

²⁴⁰ Commonly, Beichtspiegel.

1691. Principles. I. MATERIAL integrity in confession is NECESSARY from divine precept, but not from the necessity of the Sacrament.

Thus all. The FIRST is clear: 1. From Trent, sess. 14, can. 7: "If anyone shall say that, in the Sacrament of Penance, for the remission of sins, it is not necessary by divine law to confess all and each mortal sin of which memory is had with due and diligent premeditation, even hidden sins, and those which are against the last two precepts of the Decalogue, and the circumstances which change the species of sin: let him be anathema." 2. From reason; for without such integrity, neither can sacramental judgment rightly be exercised, nor equity be preserved in establishing punishments.²³ The SECOND is proved from these words of the same Council (sess. 14, cap. 5): "The other sins which do not occur to one thinking diligently are understood to be included in the same confession in general." From this declaration it is clear that formal integrity sometimes suffices, and material integrity is not always required (cf. n. 1697).

From these things you will deduce: 1. Since the precept of material integrity is positive, it sometimes admits excusing causes, and to it, as to other positive precepts, that general rule can be applied: "A doubtful law does not oblige." 2. Nevertheless accidentally, or indirectly, material integrity is also required for the value of the Sacrament, as often namely as it can be had physically and morally. The reason is that transgression of the precept, when it becomes voluntary and culpable, also takes away formal integrity, and thus redounds into an essential defect and renders the confession invalid and sacrilegious.

1692. II. In order that confession be materially integral, there MUST BE EXPRESSED the species and number of all mortal sins, the circumstances changing the species, the external act of sin, and the morally evil effect of sin. This is clear from the praised words of Trent and from other arguments to be expounded below.²⁴

We said, 1. species, namely the lowest species, such as is set forth in the Treatise on Sins (n. 324); otherwise mortal sins would not be declared as they are, since not all agree in one genus of malice. Hence the 25th proposition was condemned by Alexander VII: "He who has had intercourse with an unmarried woman satisfies the precept of confession by saying: I committed with an unmarried woman a grave sin against chastity, without explaining intercourse."

But he who cannot reveal the lowest species

is bound to reveal the superior, or generic, species; for example if someone knows that he sinned against chastity, but does not remember the specific sin, he is bound to say that he gravely offended against chastity. Likewise, he who knows that he sinned mortally, but is ignorant even of the generic species of the sin, ought to say that he sinned gravely, but does not remember of what sin he is guilty.

We said, 2. number; for the Council says that individual sins are to be confessed. Therefore, if a certain number can be had, it must be indicated so that it is neither increased nor diminished. - If a certain number cannot be had, the more likely number must be indicated, with this word added: about. If the more likely cannot be had, it suffices to say about how often the sin was committed in a day, in a week, in a month, or even in a year. - But if even this cannot be indicated, at least it must be said whether consent was always given, and whether the temptation or occasion of such sin often occurred.¹ (cf. n. 1705.)

But it must be noted: 1. He who, after a confession made in good faith, discovers that the true number is greater than the approximate one which he denoted with the particle about, is not bound to confess the true number again as often as it was contained in the approximate one. But this is to be judged from the arbitration of the prudent. Behold the NORM which St. Alphonsus hands down:² "About three, understand two or four; about 10, understand 8 or 12; about thirty, 27 or 33; about one hundred, 95 or 105; about one thousand, 950 or 1050." From this general norm you will conclude that the included number increases the more, the greater the number denoted by the particle about has been. 2. He who discovers that the number is less is not bound to retract himself, both because by exaggerating the number in good faith he did not sin, and because thus he harmed no one except himself alone. 3. He who expressed a certain number without the particle about, saying for example, I blasphemed three times, and afterward remembers that he blasphemed four times, is bound to declare this omitted time, because it was not included in the accusation.

We said, 3. circumstances changing the species; for it is of faith that these also must be declared with the number and species of sins, as is clear from Trent (loc. cit.); and the reason is that they constitute a special malice. Understand this if the malice of a diverse species which the circumstance induces is grave; for if it is light, for example the light irreverence of one who in church steals another's book, it is not necessary to express it in confession, as is established concerning venials.

And this same thing must be said of those circumstances which are called general, such as ingratitude toward God, disobedience, sloth, etc.; for from the very fact that they are general and common to any mortal sin, they are already understood of themselves. It is otherwise, however, if they were formally and reflexively intended.³ (cf. n. 180, q. 2, and n. 302.)

We said, 4. the external act of sin; because it perfects the internal act and differs from it morally; hence, without declaration of the external act, for example fornication, the confession of sin would not be integral.⁴ - Besides, without declaration of the external act the confessor could not, for the most part, discharge his office as is fitting concerning absolution to be granted or deferred, admonitions to be given, etc. This is also clear from the universal custom of the faithful, which explains the law in this sense (cf. n. 328).

We said, 5. and the morally evil effect, namely one which followed from a cause advertently placed and not retracted. Thus, for example, he who inflicted a lethal wound from which death followed must say: I committed homicide. Likewise, he who made himself drunk, foreseeing that because of drunkenness he would omit Mass, is bound to confess both the drunkenness and the omission of the Sacrifice. The reason is that such an effect, as being evil and indirectly willed, is a sin in itself according to the truer opinion, and therefore the same reason stands for its accusation as for the accusation of the external act of sin (cf. n. 314). Exception is made if before the effect the perverse will had been retracted; because in this case the effect follows merely materially and is not morally evil; hence it is probable that the penitent is not bound to confess it.⁵ (cf. n. 322, q. 2; n. 760, q. 5; n. 796.)

These things having been explained, it remains that we weigh two questions of great moment: namely, 1. whether notably aggravating circumstances within the same species must be declared; 2. whether doubtful sins must be declared.

1693. Circumstances are called notably aggravating when they increase not lightly the malice of the sinful act within the same species, for example by reason of duration, intensity, degree, manner, time, person, place, etc.

Now, it is certain that aggravating circumstances must sometimes be declared: 1. by reason of censure or reservation, for example if theft is reserved when it reaches such a quantity, if the striking of a cleric was grave or enormous, etc.; - 2. by reason of the number of sins, and thus the circumstance of length of time through which hatred or concupiscence toward a woman endured must be declared; because, from the nature of passion, a longer space becomes a circumstance multiplying sins, as was seen in the Treatise on Sins (n. 328); - 3. by reason of necessary direction, namely when the confessor asks about custom, occasion, or even the obligation of restitution. Thus all (cf. 1689).

But, apart from a reason of this sort, which is accidental, Theologians dispute gravely on both sides whether circumstances NOTABLY AGGRAVATING must be opened necessarily and of themselves. - There are three probable opinions. - The FIRST, which Suarez, Soto, Gonet, Sanchez, Concina, etc., hold, and which the Roman Catechism with the Ritual seems to favor, affirms, saying that the same reason which obliges one to open circumstances changing the species also obliges one to open aggravating circumstances, because both notably change the judgment of the confessor. The SECOND, which Laymann, Sporer, Busenbaum, etc., hold, similarly affirms, but restricts the obligation only to those circumstances which regard the substantial integrity of the sin in the individual, as is the quantity of theft and the degree of conjunction in incest; otherwise, they say, the confessor cannot form for himself a due judgment concerning the substance of the sin. Finally the THIRD opinion, more common and more probable, absolutely denies with St. Thomas, St. Antoninus, St. Bernardine of Siena, Scotus, Navarrus, Lugo, the Salmanticenses, and not a few others. The reason is: 1. because the Council of Trent mentions no other circumstances to be opened except those which change the species of sin; therefore it seems not obscurely to intimate that their manifestation suffices for this, that the Confessor form for himself a right judgment concerning the gravity of crimes and the punishment to be imposed. For here not every equality, but only a certain equality, is required; 2. because otherwise penitents would always fluctuate among anxieties, since they could always doubt about the integrity of their confessions in determining which circumstances are, and which are not, notably aggravating; - 3. especially because no one must be obligated to observing a doubtful law, as we have often said; but the law of confessing notably aggravating circumstances is at least doubtful, since very grave Doctors dispute on both sides; therefore.⁶

Nor is it an obstacle here to say that in the matter of the Sacraments we cannot follow only probable opinions; because this proceeds when the value of the Sacrament is at issue, but otherwise concerning integrity; and as regards value, it is certain that formal integrity suffices.⁷

1694. We note: 1. Ordinarily it is expedient to open the more notable circumstances in confession; for this contributes not only to greater peace and humility of soul, but also to obtaining more abundant grace. Therefore the Christian faithful are usefully exhorted to open such circumstances generally, although they are not obligated to this. - Yet except shameful matter, in which this is very rarely expedient. Indeed the confessor would be a scandal to the penitent and would create danger for himself if, without just cause, he inquired about circumstances of this sort.

2. "Of diminishing circumstances, only those must be explained which either altogether remove malice, or make mortal into venial, as smallness of matter, indeliberation, etc., for example if on Friday, in ignorance, you had eaten meat, or which otherwise notably change the judgment of the confessor, at least as to species."⁸

It is asked: Whether the penitent must declare the number of PERSONS with whom he sinned?

Resp. No, of itself. The reason is that it suffices to declare the number of sins with their various species; but a sin does not change species from the fact that it was perpetrated with several persons. Hence, he who has fornicated with three different women, or three times with the same woman, satisfies by saying that he fornicated three times; nor is he bound to say whether they were prostitutes or others. Yet if he is in a proximate occasion of sin, for example because he sinned several times with the same person, he is bound to open such a circumstance. Thus commonly with Bonacina,⁹ Croix,¹⁰ etc.

Note. Whether the circumstance of sacred time in which a sin was committed must be manifested, see n. 580, end. - Whether the degree in incest must be manifested, see n. 786.

1695. The penitent can doubt: 1. Whether he has confessed a sin certainly committed; 2. Whether he has committed a grave sin certainly to be confessed, namely being uncertain either about the fact itself or about the gravity of the fact. Wherefore the following rules must be established:¹¹

Rule 1. If it is doubted whether a sin certainly committed has been declared in confession, it must be declared. The reason is that the certain obligation of confession possesses in this case, and therefore satisfaction is not made to it by doubtful confession. And all agree in this opinion if a negative doubt is at issue. - But if the doubt is positive, namely so that the confession of the sin is equally probable with its omission, although several deny the obligation of confession, St. Alphonsus nevertheless affirms it, relying on this reason, that satisfaction is not made to a certain obligation except by fulfillment at least morally certain.¹² (cf. n. 96 and 97.) "Nor yet do I reprove," the Blessed Doctor adds,¹³ "what those authors hand down, namely that he who was diligent in confessing his sins, if afterward, after much time has elapsed from when he perpetrated it, he doubts whether he omitted some sin, is not bound to confess, since he can believe, in that case, morally certainly that he has already confessed it. And Concina adds: 'Those who have led a right life for a longer time, although before they had been habituated in vices, if afterwards they doubt that they omitted some sin or circumstance in a general or particular confession, due diligence having preceded, the confessor ought to impose that they no more confess concerning those things, and that they never apply the mind to them.'" If scruples are at issue, see n. 1838.

Rule 2. If it is doubted whether a sin was committed, or whether it reaches mortal sin, and after due inquiry the doubt cannot be overcome: from the more probable opinion, whether the doubt is negative or even positive, from nearly equiprobable conjectures, there is not, I say, an obligation of itself of confessing such a sin. The reason is: 1. because the Council of Trent does not impose, as the adversaries suppose, the confession of sins as they are in conscience, but of sins of which penitents have consciousness, that is, certain knowledge or memory; - 2. because a certain burden is not to be imposed for a doubtful offense, nor, in doubt whether a law exists, is the obligation of the law present, as Benedict XIV wisely says.¹⁴ And this runs even if someone wished to communicate, as we have already said (n. 1548, dic. 2).¹⁵

It was said of itself, for: 1. in the article or danger of death, if someone positively doubts whether he is guilty of grave sin, "he must either elicit contrition, or receive absolution, by confessing at least other certain matter."¹⁶ - 2. In a practical doubt whether something is licit or not, the penitent must seek counsel, lest afterward he act in bad faith and sin gravely (cf. n. 42).

1696. St. Alphonsus admonishes,¹⁷ writing: 1. In practice, ordinarily speaking, it is more advisable to persuade penitents, for greater quiet of their conscience, to confess all doubtful sins, provided they are not scrupulous. 2. Those who are of a timid conscience, and for a long time have never, or only very rarely, sinned mortally, when they doubt whether they consented to a temptation, especially if they remember that, when the temptation rushed in, they resisted; or when they doubt whether they were in perfect wakefulness: these can hold as certain that they did not sin mortally, since it is morally impossible that the will, confirmed in a good purpose,

is changed without such a change becoming clearly known.

3. If sinners who from an evil habit consent to temptations doubt whether they consented, they are presumed to have consented and are bound to confess; because, if they had resisted, they would certainly remember the effort in repelling the temptation. Therefore a mere doubt about consent given or denied scarcely ever subsists (cf. n. 337, q. 3).

It is asked: Whether he who has confessed some mortal sin as DOUBTFUL is bound afterward to repeat it when he recognizes it as CERTAIN?

Resp. Distinguish. 1. If the doubt was about the existence of the fact, he is bound to repeat it, according to the very common and true opinion. And the reason is that the whole substance of the sin was not explained; for it was declared only as doubtful, although it was certainly committed. Hence Dominicus Viva writes:¹ "The negative opinion, which Father Pellizzarius followed, although it has not been condemned, nevertheless was expurgated from that codex (tr. 5, c. 3, n. 56) by the S. Congregation of the INDEX, which does not wish to tolerate it; wherefore in practice one must abstain from it."

2. If the doubt was about the quality of the sin, that is, if the penitent confessed a sin whose gravity either he himself, or the confessor, or both did not know, but afterward, having read or heard Theologians, recognized it to be mortal, he is not bound to repeat it; because no circumstance occurs which was not expressed, nor is it necessary that the confessor determinately know whether the sin which he hears is mortal or not. Thus very commonly.²

1697. FORMAL integrity, as was said (n. 1660), consists in this: that the penitent confess all sins which, in view of the circumstances, he can morally confess. This, as is evident, does not fulfill the whole law, but the part of the law possible here and now, with the burden of supplying the defect once the impediment has been removed.³ The following things will make the matter clear.

Principles. I. Formal integrity suffices whenever the penitent is in PHYSICAL inability of furnishing material integrity. The reason is that no one is bound to the impossible (recall what was said at n. 221 sqq.). - Moreover, ON ACCOUNT OF PHYSICAL INABILITY, besides those who are ignorant of sins or have forgotten them, the following are excused:

1. The dying, or others placed in danger of death, on account of defect of time or failure of mind.⁴ We shall treat of these in particular below (n. 1720, 2, and n. 1854, 5).

2. Mutes, on account of defect of speech. Therefore these, having signified by nods one or another sin, can be absolved both at the time of death and at the time of the paschal precept. Yet if by writing or signs they are able to reveal all sins, they are bound to this, provided danger of manifestation or another grave inconvenience is absent, as was already said (n. 1687).

3. The deaf, who cannot respond to the confessor, nor know how to declare all their sins. - But otherwise the hard of hearing; for these must be led into some remote place, yet with due cautions used as to time and place, if women are at issue.

4. Those ignorant of the language of the region in which they are, and who do not have the availability of a confessor by whom they can be understood. These, if they manifest sorrow for their sins by signs, can, like mutes, be absolved in the time of precept or of another necessity. Nor are they bound to use an interpreter, as was shown above⁵ (n. 1688).

1698. II. Formal integrity likewise suffices if the penitent is in MORAL inability of making a materially integral confession. The reason is that the precept of confession, since it is positive, does not oblige with grave inconvenience extrinsic to confession (cf. n. 223). - We say extrinsic; for no difficulty intrinsic to confession itself, however grave, ever excuses, because confession is by its own nature laborious. Hence, if intrinsic difficulty excused, its precept would vanish.

Moreover, MORAL INABILITY is then judged to be had when two conditions are verified. The first is when the necessity of confessing presses: for example because the paschal precept must be satisfied, or because the reception of the Eucharist or the celebration of Mass cannot be omitted without note of infamy or scandal; or even because otherwise the penitent would have to remain in mortal sin, even if only through one day. The other is if, from the declaration of all mortal sins to this priest, grave spiritual or temporal damage would threaten the penitent, or the confessor, or some third person.⁶ Therefore, in the aforesaid necessity, the following EXCUSES:

1. Danger to the life of the penitent, confessor, or third person; for example if in time of plague the priest himself prudently fears infection, and therefore does not allow the penitent to confess integrally; if enemies arrive, for example immediately before battle, in which case all, after exhibiting some general sign of contrition and confession, could be absolved by this single form of absolution: I absolve you [plural], etc.⁷

2. Danger of scandal or fall, both on the part of the penitent and on the part of the confessor; for example if a woman certainly knew the very great frailty of the confessor, etc.

3. Danger of revelation, or violation of the seal; for example if the confessor cannot confess integrally without manifesting the sins of some person heard in confession; - likewise if one who is hard of hearing confesses while others stand by; or if a gravely wounded man or a woman giving birth confesses, who cannot be left by those serving them; or if the penitent from grave cause fears that the confessor may break the law of the seal. But this case, if it must ever be said to happen, is very rare.

4. Danger to reputation; for example if a priest about to celebrate immediately, and needing general confession, could not confess integrally without those standing by suspecting the matter. Say the same of a sick person who has confessed before the carrying of the Most Holy Sacrament, and is now just about to be refreshed through Holy Communion, if he then, because the past confessions were invalid, had to make a more lengthy confession. In this case, the confessor, having heard some sin, should absolve the sick person, give him Communion, and afterward return to receive the integral confession.⁸

5. Danger for the scrupulous person of grave detriment, both in spiritual progress and in health of body and mind (cf. n. 28 and 1835).

6. Reservation of sin or censure, according to those things which are found at n. 1551 and n. 1775, note 2. But:

The multitude of affairs does not excuse. For the 59th proposition, which sounds thus, was condemned by Innocent XI: "It is licit sacramentally to absolve those who have confessed only by halves, by reason of a great concourse of penitents, such as, for example, can happen on the day of some great festivity or indulgence."⁹ Nor can an exception be admitted if, on account of the prolixity of confession, others would easily suspect that the penitent is burdened by many faults.¹⁰ But whether danger of manifesting an accomplice excuses will be weighed below (n. 1702).

1699. III. When the excusing cause ceases, the penitent is bound to SUPPLY the defect of confession, not immediately, but when he will again be obliged or will wish to confess.¹¹ The reason is that an actual impediment does not simply remove the obligation of integral confession, but only suspends it. Hence, when the impediment has been removed, the divine precept revives in whole. It is otherwise clear from the 11th proposition condemned by Alexander VII, which said: "Sins omitted or forgotten in confession, on account of imminent danger of life or on account of another cause, we are not bound to express in the following confession."

It was said, 1. not immediately; for the obligation must be accepted morally, especially because sins inculpably omitted have already been destroyed, and because delay brings the soul into no danger. Thus commonly.

It was said, 2. but when he will be obliged or will wish. For: - 1. The obligation of supplying is not affixed of itself to a time or circumstances, and therefore does not of itself press, except when the precept of confessing again presses, for example at the time of annual confession (cf. n. 1548). - 2. When the impediment ceases, it is not licit to keep silent sins forgotten or omitted in the confession which first follows. For the Doctors more commonly interpret thus the sense of the proposition condemned by Alexander VII;¹² and the reason is that it pertains to the integrity of the subsequent confession to declare all mortal sins of which consciousness is had, as Trent speaks.¹³

1700. It is asked: To what are those bound who in GOOD FAITH have made confessions lacking integrity?

Resp. They are not indeed bound to repeat them integrally, "because for such confessions all things essentially required were already present. - Yet they are bound to explain the species and number omitted, so that they may at least make the present confession integral." Thus commonly.¹⁴

But let it be noted: 1. He who held a uniform manner of living and inculpably omitted declaring the number of sins satisfies the law of integrity if "at the beginning of confession he has revealed to the present confessor that in past years he has always confessed badly by omitting number, and the confessor, by receiving the confession of that year from the beginning, at the same time forms a judgment concerning past years." Likewise, if, after the confession has been received, the confessor has distinct knowledge of the sins of the present year, "he will indeed be able, without the prior confessions being repeated, at the same time to form for himself a distinct judgment concerning past years." 2. Otherwise it must be said "if from the present confession he has only confused knowledge of the faults confessed, as often happens in longer and involved confessions; in that case, as Lugo well says,¹⁵ he is bound to take distinct knowledge of the species and number omitted in past confessions."¹⁶

1701. It is certain, 1. That an accomplice must be concealed as often as confession can be materially integral without his manifestation. Therefore it is not licit, for declaring a venial sin or a mortal sin already confessed, to reveal the grave sin of another.¹⁷

It is certain, 2. That a penitent guilty of mortal sin not yet confessed is bound to go to a confessor to whom the accomplice is unknown, if he can go to him

without temporal or spiritual inconvenience. - For then the precept of guarding the reputation of the neighbor presses, especially if a more infamous crime is at issue.

It is certain, 3. That, generally, it is not licit for the confessor to inquire for the name of the accomplice, even for a good end, for example for correction; for this is opposed to charity and renders the Sacrament of Penance odious. - This is clear from the Bull of Benedict XIV Ubi primum, in which the Pontiff, speaking of confessors who under penalty of denying absolution require the name of the accomplice, declares: 1. that they sin gravely and incur suspension from hearing confessions, but only of ferendae sententiae; 2. that they are to be denounced within a month, not indeed by the penitent himself, but by another who knows them, if nevertheless on account of this they denied absolution and did not act from simplicity; 3. that those teaching this detestable practice to be licit incur by the fact itself excommunication reserved to the Supreme Pontiff,¹ which same thing Pius IX sanctioned in the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis (cf. n. 1328). These things having been premised, let the following be:

1702. Questions. Q. 1. Whether there is an obligation of confessing a mortal sin which CANNOT be explained without manifestation of the accomplice?

Resp. Yes, when another confessor to whom the accomplice is unknown cannot conveniently be had. Thus the common opinion against some who say that the natural precept of preserving the reputation of the neighbor must be preferred to the positive precept of preserving the integrity of confession. But the reason for the affirmative opinion is "because the divine precept of confessing integrally must be observed whenever it can licitly be observed; and it can be observed sufficiently licitly in our case, since the manifestation of another's crime is not illicit when it is done from a reasonable cause"; and therefore the natural precept then ceases (cf. n. 1198). - Add that "the accomplice, by consenting to the sin, has already lost the right to his reputation in order to the confession of that sin."²

Q. 2. What are the CAUSES EXCUSING from seeking another confessor to whom the accomplice is unknown?

Resp. According to the opinion of very many, they are the following: - 1. If danger of death or the precept of annual confession presses. - 2. If it is grave for the penitent to omit confession or Communion. - 3. If he would open his conscience with difficulty to another than his accustomed confessor. - 4. If otherwise he would be deprived of the benefits of some extraordinary indulgence. - 5. If otherwise he would have to remain in sin even for one day. - 6. If, by going to a confessor to whom the accomplice is known, he will have better direction or will receive notably greater consolation. - 7. If it is believed that the accomplice has yielded the right to his reputation, as if a brother sinned with a sister whom he knows cannot be separated from the company of the mother in order to go to another confessor. Hence, mothers and wives are often excused who manifest the sins of husbands and sons to a confessor who knows them, by reason of seeking counsel, alleviating sorrow, etc.; for it would be too hard for them if they were bound to seek another confessor.³ - Yet the advantage of direction must be compared with the infamy.⁴

Q. 3. Whether it is EVER licit for the confessor to INQUIRE for the name or knowledge of the accomplice?

Resp. 1. The confessor can, indeed must, although from this he comes into knowledge of the accomplice, inquire about circumstances which change the species of sins, or which are necessary for better consulting the conscience of the penitent; for example, whether the accomplice in a shameful sin is in the first or second degree of consanguinity or affinity, whether he is bound by a vow of chastity, whether he lives in the same house, etc.

Resp. 2. A penitent who would not wish to reveal the accomplice cannot be absolved when this is necessary for averting or repairing public damage. Therefore in a case of this sort, the confessor will be able to impose on the penitent in general that he reveal the accomplice to him who can avert the damage or scandal. But while the prohibition of Benedict XIV stands, that is, as often as revelation can usefully be made to another,⁵ it will never be licit for the confessor to say: Reveal him to me. But if the penitent of himself and by his own will asks the confessor that he himself take these parts upon himself and reveal the accomplice voluntarily, the confessor does not sin, and can certainly use that knowledge for applying a remedy; but for the most part this is not expedient on account of the danger of scandal and offense of the sacred ministry.⁶

The obligation of procuring the integrity of confession pertains both to the penitent and to the confessor. - Wherefore the following things are established:

1703. Principles. I. The PENITENT is bound, and indeed, speaking of itself, under grave obligation, to premise before confession a diligent EXAMINATION of all mortal sins which he has committed. The reason is that without such an examination he could not, to use the words of Trent, search out all the recesses of his soul.⁷

The diligence of this examination is to be estimated according to the capacity of the penitent, the delay of time, and the other circumstances. "For this a middling diligence suffices, such as a prudent man employs in arduous affairs; or such as, morally speaking, learned and timorous persons are accustomed to employ, even if someone thinks that by greater diligence he would find more."⁸ The penitent can satisfy this obligation without excessive labor if, after imploring God's help, he recalls to mind the precepts of the Decalogue and the precepts of the Church, the capital sins, the obligations of his own state, and at the same time inquires whether and how often he offended regarding all these things, by thought, word, and deed. - And he will more easily attain this if he turns over in his mind the places to which he went, the persons with whom he conversed, the business which he transacted, and the affections of soul to which he was accustomed to yield.⁹

Let it be noted FOR PRACTICE: 1. Danger of publication being removed, it is useful to write sins, lest they slip from memory; but excessive anxiety is to be avoided; and therefore this should be prohibited to the scrupulous.¹⁰

2. Those who are morally certain that they are immune from mortal sins are not bound to spend much time in searching their conscience, provided they can supply matter which truly suffices for the Sacrament. - Nevertheless they are to be exhorted not to hurry too much through the examination of conscience, and to spend at least five minutes on it, by which they may be better able to recognize their defects and to extirpate those recognized.¹¹

3. Those who are scrupulous ought not to search their conscience much; indeed, diligent investigation must sometimes be interdicted to them; for if they had sinned gravely, they would always have the sin before their eyes.

4. The sick are not bound to an accurate examination as the healthy are, as is clear. Therefore one must watch carefully lest they defer their confession under the pretext that they have not yet sufficiently searched their conscience; let the confessor himself examine them. For it is better to restore them to the state of grace through absolution, even if they have confessed imperfectly, than, the Sacraments of the Church being delayed, to expose them to certain danger of damnation.¹² (cf. n. 1854.)

1704. II. The CONFESSOR can, indeed sometimes MUST, supply the examination of conscience, and himself procure the integrity of confession. To the point the Holy Doctor says thus: "Although the duty of examining conscience is principally the penitent's, nevertheless, whatever other Doctors may have said, it must not be doubted that if the confessor has recognized that the penitent has not discussed his conscience diligently enough, he himself is bound to question him, first about sins into which he could likely have fallen, and afterward about their species and number, as is proved from chapter Omnis utriusque on Penance and from the Roman Ritual."¹³

But he is bound to this as judge, that he may know the cause, and as minister of the Sacrament, that he may procure its integrity (cf. n. 1834).

1705. It is asked: What must the confessor do if penitents approach without sufficiently discussing their conscience?

Resp. 1. If they are sufficiently instructed, they are to be sent away to another time: "With most humane words," says the Roman Catechism,¹⁴ "he will send them away from himself, and will exhort them to take some space of time for thinking over their sins, and then to return." The reason is that it can scarcely happen that someone, at least if a longer confession is at issue, being suddenly asked, remembers all things.¹⁵ Except if circumstances suggest otherwise.

Resp. 2. If they are rude, they are not easily to be sent away. "They act wrongly," says St. Alphonsus,¹⁶ "who dismiss the rude, that they may examine themselves better." And he gravely adds: "Fr. Segneri calls this an intolerable error, and by the best right, because men of this sort, however much they labor, will with difficulty examine themselves as is fitting, and as exactly as the confessor himself can examine them; and on the contrary, when they have been dismissed, there will be danger lest, terrified by the difficulty of examining themselves, they be drawn back from confessing and harden in sins. - Nevertheless let the confessor notice that he is not bound to question these so minutely; let him ask only about sins into which they can easily fall, in view of their condition and capacity. Indeed, when the penitent, although rude, seems to be sufficiently instructed and diligent in confessing his sins with circumstances..., then the confessor is bound to ask nothing else."

Resp. 3. If they are customary sinners, the confessor should not spend too much time by anxiously inquiring about the number of sins; because often it is impossible to find such a number. Many, because of the importunity of the confessor, respond only by guessing: one hundred times, one thousand times; but what prudent man will give faith to them? - The confessor does better if he diligently inquires into the state of the penitent, "namely the manner of living, the application which he expends on other affairs, the time of the custom with the accomplice, the place where he especially stayed; and then he should inquire about the number by asking the penitent about how often he sinned in a day, in a week, or month, proposing to him several numbers, for example three or four times, eight or ten times, so that he may see to which number he rather adheres. And if the penitent adheres to the greater number, it will be best done if he is again asked about a greater number." But in this the confessor should take care not to form a certain judgment about the number; let him note the frequency in general, and make judgment confusedly, apprehending the sins, whatever number they are before God.¹⁷ (cf. n. 1805.)

1359. - Integrity is distinguished as twofold, one material, the other formal.

1° That integrity is called material to which in reality nothing at all is lacking of those things which, speaking per se, are to be exposed, that is, of those things which of themselves constitute the necessary matter of Confession.

2° But that is formal to which nothing of the things said is lacking through grave fault of the penitent.

Hence whenever material integrity is had, formal integrity is also had; but not vice versa.

We shall speak 1° concerning the necessity of integrity; 2° concerning the causes excusing from it.

1360. - I. All mortal sins, committed after Baptism, must be accused by divine law, as far as this can morally be done.

It is clear 1° from the very words of the institution of the Sacrament of Penance; for thus Christ the Lord says: Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained. Hence the Council of Trent concludes in these words: "Our Lord Jesus Christ, when about to ascend from earth to heaven, left priests, His own vicars, as presidents and judges, to whom all mortal crimes should be brought, into which the faithful of Christ have fallen; that, according to the power of the keys, they might pronounce the sentence of remission or retention of sins. For it is clear that priests could not have exercised this judgment, the cause being unknown, if they themselves had declared their sins only in general, and not rather in species and singly. From these things it is gathered that all mortal sins, of which, after a diligent discussion of themselves, they have consciousness, must be enumerated by penitents in Confession, even though they are most hidden."

It is clear 2° from the same Council of Trent, which thus defined: "If anyone shall say that in the Sacrament of Penance, for the remission of sins, it is not necessary by divine law to confess all and each mortal sin, of which memory is had after due and diligent premeditation, even hidden sins and those which are against the last two precepts of the Decalogue, and the circumstances which change the species of the sin, ... let him be anathema."

II. To material integrity belong grave sins as to - number, - moral species, - certain circumstances, - the external act, - bad effects joined with the action and morally imputable. This is clear from what has been said and from what is to be said below.

III. Material integrity is not always necessary for the validity and fruit of Confession; for sometimes it is morally impossible, either from inculpable forgetfulness, or from other causes. But God does not command impossible things. Therefore, etc. It is also clear from these words of Trent: "But the other sins, which do not occur to one who thinks diligently, are understood to be included in the same Confession universally; for these we faithfully say with the Prophet: From my hidden sins cleanse me, O Lord."

IV. For the integrity of Confession there is prerequired a diligent examination, according to the capacity of the penitent, concerning sins committed since the last valid Confession; for he who is held to the end is held also to the necessary means.

1361. Resolves. - 1° We are held, in the Confession of mortal sins, to accuse not only the generic species of sins, but also the lowest species; for these are properly called species; and the Council of Trent requires the accusation of all species.

2° He who cannot disclose the lowest species must manifest the higher, or generic, species: e.g. if someone, knowing that he sinned against chastity, does not remember the specific sin, he must say that he sinned gravely against chastity.

3° He who knows that he has sinned mortally, but is ignorant of, or does not remember, the species, even the generic species, of his sin, must say in general that he sinned gravely, but that he does not remember of what sin he is guilty.

4° He who cannot remember the certain number is held to accuse the more probable number, or the one which more nearly approaches the truth, adding the particle about. But he who cannot even give a likely sum of sins is held to say how often approximately in a month, in a week, in a day, etc. He who cannot even indicate this should say whether he always consented to the temptation and whether it occurred often. Cf. what was said n. 216-227 and what is to be said n. 1424. III. c).

5° The confessor cannot exempt from the obligation of confessing integrally on account of a great crowd of penitents, e.g. on some more solemn feast day. This is clear from what has been said, and also from the 59th proposition condemned by Innocent XI. See p. XVII.

6° A defect of sincerity concerning even one mortal sin, which is omitted, constitutes a grave sin; because the divine precept of Confession is violated in a grave matter.

1362. Questions. - Query 1° What number is judged to be comprehended in the particle about?

Resp. This cannot be determined by an entirely certain rule; nevertheless not every excess is comprehended, nor a notable defect: but only a moderate one, greater however or lesser proportionately to the number expressed. Thus Theologians commonly establish it: a moderate excess or defect will be, relatively to about five sins, to add or subtract one unit on either side; relatively to about ten, two; relatively to twenty, three or four; relatively to forty, four or five; relatively to one hundred, five or six; ... and prudently in the first case the penitent will be judged to have sinned four, five, or six times; in the second, to have sinned eight, nine, ten, eleven, or twelve times; and resolve similarly concerning the others.

Query 2° Must a notable excess afterward be declared, if it is found after Confession?

Resp. Affirm. The reason is clear from what has been said; for since a notable excess is not comprehended in the number declared by the particle about, the penitent has not satisfied the obligation of Confession as to that excess. Therefore... Thus all.

Query 3° If someone has erred notably by exaggerating the number, must he afterward declare this also in Confession?

Resp. Neg., if in good faith he expressed that notably greater number. The reason is that he fully and integrally satisfied the obligation of Confession; for the true number was comprehended in the greater one, and therefore remitted.

Query 4° Is it always a mortal sin to lie in Confession?

Resp. Of itself one sins mortally only when the lie is concerned with necessary matter of Confession concealed without a just cause, or with grave matter falsely supposed, namely by advertently, not from scruple or simplicity, accusing what was not committed, or what is doubtful as certain, or by exaggerating the number.

A lie therefore concerning things not pertaining to Confession or to the conscience of the penitent is not of itself mortal; because neither is it gravely harmful to the penitent, as is supposed, nor gravely injurious to the Sacrament, since it is not referred to it. - Thus commonly with St. Alphonsus against a few who say that every lie in Confession is mortal. - But if the penitent lies concerning sins, even sins already confessed and absolved, when the confessor as judge or physician asks something about them, as necessary for the present Confession, he sins gravely, because he deceives in substantial matters. Cf. pp. 58a. among the propositions condemned by Innocent XI, p. XVII.

Query 5° Does it prejudice the integrity of Confession if someone accuses venial sins to his ordinary confessor, but mortal sins to another?

Resp. 1° Neg., speaking per se, provided that he never receives absolution unless he has manifested all mortal sins to one confessor and is absolved by the same. The reason is that that Confession is integral which includes all mortal sins, since venial sins are not necessarily to be accused.

Resp. 2° In practice, however, attention must be paid to the circumstances of penitents and to the motives by which they are led. For those are not to be condemned who sometimes confess graver sins to an unknown confessor, but submit lighter sins to the ordinary one, if, from the shame with which they would be suffused with a confessor familiarly known, they would put themselves in danger of confessing sacrilegiously. Wherefore the confessor should never inquire curiously about this, and much less vex with questions a penitent perhaps trying to conceal it, nor, if he knows it, show that this displeases him, but rather that the use of the liberty which the Church permits most amply is approved by him, while she makes available to the faithful an abundance of several confessors. - Nevertheless they would sin gravely, and because of defect of due disposition would confess invalidly, who for that reason remained in the occasion or habit of sin, or went around for this reason, that they might sin more freely. Say the same with Bouvier concerning a seminarian who with a base habit (n. 1523. q. 13°) wishes to ascend to Holy Orders and for this reason approaches an unknown confessor, lest he be troubled.

Query 6° Does it prejudice integrity if someone feigns another voice, lest he be recognized by the Confessor?

Resp. Neg. per se; for provided that he opens all mortal sins, he accomplishes an integral Confession.

Doubt here can be concerned chiefly, 1° with the act of sin, or with the sin committed; 2° with the gravity of the sin, both on the part of the matter and on the part of consent; 3° with the Confession of a sin certainly committed.

1363. Questions. - Query 1° Must mortal sins doubtfully committed necessarily be accused?

Resp. Neg. most commonly, if, after a diligent examination has been made beforehand, the doubt perseveres: and this holds even if the doubt is truly positive, or if a true probability is given concerning the sin committed. The reason is that here there is question of a doubtful law, which consequently does not oblige. And indeed from Trent those mortal sins must be accused of which consciousness is had; but there is not consciousness of doubtful sins; for to have consciousness imports certain knowledge of sin, since conscience is nothing other than knowledge of the heart and judgment concerning a sin committed. Therefore.

Others nevertheless contradict; because, as they say, it is gathered from the words of Trent that all mortal sins are to be accused as they are in conscience; and therefore, if they are doubtful in conscience, they are also to be confessed as doubtful. - But indeed it must be answered that in Trent it is not said that sins are to be accused as they are in conscience, but of which we have consciousness. In practice, however, an accusation of this kind is to be advised, says St. Alphonsus.

It is more common to teach that negatively doubtful sins are to be accused; but the denying opinion of St. Alphonsus is more probable; for there cannot be given an obligation of confessing negatively doubtful sins, since a doubt of this kind rests on no solid foundation, nor does it arise except from an empty suspicion, or fear of a sin committed, as frequently happens to the scrupulous or to those of timid conscience. - If however someone is in a positive doubt in the article of death, - knowing that he has not received the Sacrament of Penance or another Sacrament in good faith and being attrite after such a sin, - in order to escape the danger of damnation he would certainly be obliged either to receive absolution (yet he is not held to confess that doubtful sin), or at least to elicit an act of contrition.

What if he wishes to receive Communion? See n. 67. 12 a); 1307. q. 3°.

Query 2° Are sins doubtfully grave to be accused?

Resp. Neg. more probably per se, at least speculatively, even if a true probability is given concerning the gravity of the sin. The reason is the same as for the preceding question: for it is not established that a grave sin was committed; nor therefore can the obligation of Confession be established.

In practice, however, a twofold rule is to be followed:

Rule I. - In doubt whether the matter of the sin is grave. Boys and the unlearned ordinarily must accuse doubts, 1° because they can scarcely form a conscience by themselves; 2° because for the most part they do not know how to distinguish venial sins from mortal. Except, however, the scrupulous, who do not frequently tend to commit mortal sins. But instructed penitents are not held to accuse doubtfully grave sins, because they can form a conscience by themselves; nevertheless they are ordinarily to be gently exhorted to accuse these also, so that the confessor, observing the dangers in which the penitent is placed, may be able both to warn him and to remove them.

Rule II. - In doubt concerning full consent or perfect advertence: 1° if the penitents are of timid conscience and are not accustomed to sin gravely, they are by no means held to confess doubtful sins, because the presumption favors them which is had from things ordinarily occurring; indeed they are often to be prevented from this accusation if they seem inclined to scruples; 2° if the penitents keep a middle way between a timid and lax conscience, they are indeed not to be obliged, but certainly to be induced to declare doubtful consent, because it profits for tranquility of conscience, etc.; 3° if the penitents are of lax conscience, they scarcely ever ought not to declare doubtful sins, because the presumption scarcely ever is not opposed to them.¹

Query 3° Must grave sins, indeed certainly committed, concerning which however you doubt whether you have confessed them, necessarily be accused?

Resp. Affirm. See n. 67. 1°. Except, 1° if doubt occurs concerning the omission of a sin already committed long ago in one who was diligent in confessing his sins, because the presumption taken from things commonly occurring favors him; 2° if there is question of a scrupulous person, to whom the rule handed down in n. 44. II. 8° must be applied.

Query 4° Must he who confessed some sin as doubtful repeat it, if afterward he knows it as certain?

Resp. It is controverted. The "true and most common" opinion, says St. Alphonsus, "affirms." The reason is that that sin was not truly accused as to substance: for a certain accusation is not included in a doubtful one. - Otherwise, if someone afterward recognizes as mortal what, without any doubt added, he confessed.²

Circumstances of various kinds are distinguished in sins. (See n. 27.)

1364. Principles. - I. It is certain that circumstances changing the species are to be accused, if the malice of a diverse species which the circumstance induces is grave (for if it was light, e.g. a light irreverence of him who in a Church steals the image of another, it is not necessary, as is established concerning venial sins, to express it in Confession). The reason is that they constitute a new sin, and indeed a mortal one, of itself; and this is clear from Trent.¹

II. It is certain that circumstances lightly aggravating, or diminishing, are not necessarily to be accused, although to expose them is of itself better. The reason is that venial sins are not necessary matter of the Sacrament of Penance.

III. It is also certain that circumstances must be expressed by reason of which a sin venial from its kind becomes mortal. Likewise circumstances are to be opened which so diminish the sin that what, with them set aside, would have been mortal, becomes by reason of them either no sin, or only venial (n. 204).

1365. Questions. - Query 1° Must circumstances notably aggravating the malice of mortal sins within the same species necessarily be accused?

Resp. There is a twofold probable opinion.

Opinion I, the more common and more probable, denies absolutely. The reason is: 1° because Trent requires nothing else than the Confession of the number and species of sins, and therefore seems to exclude the obligation of confessing other circumstances.² 2° Because otherwise Confessions made in good faith would have to be repeated, and penitents would have to be commonly admonished for the future about explaining aggravating circumstances. But a precept so doubtful does not oblige.

But per accidens even aggravating circumstances are also to be declared, namely by reason - either of number, and thus the circumstance of quantity of time through which hatred or concupiscence toward a woman endured is to be declared; - or of censure or reservation; - or of necessary direction, as in the case of those in habit, those in occasion, and generally when there is question of the obligation to restitution.³

Opinion II affirms. The reason is, 1° because the same reason holds for accusing aggravating circumstances as for accusing circumstances changing the species; 2° because a sin increased by notably aggravating circumstances is equivalent to several sins; 3° because, if they were not accused, the confessor could not impose a proportionate penance; 4° because the Roman Catechism teaches thus.¹ - But the patrons of the first opinion reply:

To the 1st reason: "If the reasons proved equally concerning both circumstances, without cause the Council would have limited that whole doctrine to the circumstances which change the species: for it ought to have spoken concerning both in general without limitation and discrimination." Thus Lugo.²

To the 2nd. No one ever sought the multiplication of sins in the same act from the possible division of the matter.

To the 3rd. "So exact an equality is not always required in the penance to be imposed." Thus the same Lugo.³

To the 4th. The text objected here is: "Nor indeed is it necessary only to explain grave sins by narrating them, but also those things which surround each sin and greatly increase or diminish its depravity." But it can be replied that these words are explained in the same place in such a way that it is not necessary to understand them concerning merely aggravating circumstances. And indeed - a) immediately the Catechism adds: "For some circumstances are so grave that the nature of mortal sin consists from them alone: wherefore it is always necessary to confess all these." But the nature of lethal fault is not had from a circumstance alone, unless this changes either the moral or the theological species. - b) This is confirmed from the fact that it prescribes that circumstances greatly diminishing are to be confessed. For even the adversaries concede that this holds only when the diminution changes the theological species.⁴ - c) The Catechism confirms its doctrine from the necessity of expressing the circumstance of a sacred person in homicide, and of Matrimony in intercourse. But these pertain to circumstances changing the moral species.

Query 2° Must the circumstance of the degree of incest committed with blood relatives or relatives by affinity be declared?

Resp. 1° More probably, incest between blood relatives and relatives by affinity does not differ in species, since it makes no difference whether the conjunction arises from blood or from Matrimony; for intercourse with blood relatives is prohibited from the same motive from which it is prohibited with relatives by affinity: therefore the circumstance of consanguinity or affinity is not necessarily to be expressed.¹

Resp. 2° According to the common opinion of Doctors, the circumstance of conjunction in the first degree of the direct line is to be opened, namely between father and daughter; mother and son; father-in-law and daughter-in-law; mother-in-law and son-in-law; stepmother and stepson; stepfather and stepdaughter (p. 258), on account of the debt of reverence. Indeed it must be explained whether a son has sinned with his mother, by reason of the special reverence owed to the mother. - They say the same concerning the circumstance of the first degree of consanguinity in the collateral line, namely between brother and sister. Nevertheless St. Alphonsus calls the contrary opinion equally probable.²

Resp. 3° More probably, however, the other degrees of consanguinity or affinity are not necessarily to be declared.³ Cf. n. 495.

Query 3° Must the circumstance of the dignity of the person necessarily be accused, e.g. if the one sinning is a Superior, Magistrate, Priest, etc.?

Resp. Neg. more probably per se, i.e. with the reason of scandal, of office, or of a particular obligation set aside. The reason is that the circumstance of the dignity of the person sinning does not change the species of sin per se, but at most aggravates the sin.

Query 4° Must the circumstance of a sin committed by a confessor with a penitent necessarily be declared?

Resp. Neg. more probably, provided that it has no relation to Confession. The reason is that by this sin no injury is done to the Sacrament, since it has no respect to Confession.⁴ Nevertheless it is easily clear that both such a penitent is wholly to be deterred from further confessing to that priest, and such a confessor from further admitting that penitent to Confession.

Query 5° Must the circumstance of sacred time necessarily be accused?

Resp. Neg. This is clear from the universal practice both of confessors and of penitents; indeed it is certain that the former are not solicitous about asking concerning such a circumstance, nor the latter accustomed to declare it. The circumstance of sacred time does not seem to have to be explained, unless certain things are specially prohibited on account of reverence for the time, e.g. lest someone on Good Friday present public games, comedies, or ludicrous spectacles.¹

Query 6° Does he who accuses a recent sin as committed long ago satisfy the integrity of Confession?

Resp. 1° Affirm. per se. "The reason,... because the sin is the same, whether he had confessed it before or not, unless perhaps the change of time brings with itself a circumstance diverse in species," or the reservation, as regards this confessor, of a sin not confessed, or the occasion or habit of sin demands something else, and provided that a sufficient penance is imposed. ... "Nor is it an obstacle that" the penitent "says that he wishes to make a general Confession; for by this he does not say that he wishes to confess only old sins, but that he wishes also to comprehend those," i.e. old ones; "for a general Confession includes all sins up to this hour. Nor also does it matter that the confessor understands that that is an old sin, for the penitent has not said this. ... Finally it does not matter that the penitent seems implicitly to indicate that they are old sins; for he truly has the intention of speaking about new sins, and wishes to speak of them, although he desires not to be understood as to this by the confessor," ... who "intends to absolve from the sins which the penitent has brought forward."²

Resp. 2° But if the penitent lies about the time, e.g. if he denies that he sinned today; and declares the sin as committed at another determined and remote time, the Doctors more commonly think that he does not satisfy his obligation. The reason is that the act which the penitent placed today is not an act placed in the past year. Hence he lies in two ways, namely by concealing the sin committed today, and by accusing a sin committed at another time. - Thus Tamburinus.³ Yet Theologians are not lacking who think this lie light. - See Lugo.⁴

Query 7° Must the external act of sin necessarily be accused?

Resp. Affirm., because it is one and the same thing with the internal act in the genus of morals, and these two constitute one total thing. Moreover the external act is directly prohibited by divine law, e.g. You shall not commit homicide. Besides, without the declaration of the external act the confessor generally could not perform his office, as is fitting, concerning admonitions to be given, etc. This is also clear from the universal custom of the faithful, which explains the law in this sense.

Query 8° Must the penitent declare the number of persons with whom he sinned?

Resp. Neg. per se. - Thus Bonacina,¹ Tamburinus,² Lacroix,³ and others commonly.

The reason is that it suffices that the number of sins and their species be declared; but sins do not change species because they were committed with several persons. Hence he who fornicated with three different persons, or three times with the same, satisfies by saying that he fornicated three times; nor is he held spontaneously to say whether the accomplice was one, or several; whether they were prostitutes, or others. - Nevertheless the penitent is held to declare it if there is a proximate occasion of sinning, as because sin was committed several times with the same person.

Query 9° Must the nearness of persons be declared in sins of grave hatred?

Resp. 1° Affirm., if there is question of nearer nearness, on account of the strict bond of piety. Hence hatred against parents, children, grandparents, grandchildren, spouse, relatives by affinity in the first degree of the direct line, and, at least if very grave evil is wished, brothers must be declared.⁴

Resp. 2° But neg. more probably, if there is question of remote nearness, namely among the other blood relatives or relatives by affinity. - Lugo,⁵ and others, against others who think the circumstance of nearness must be declared even in the fourth degree of consanguinity.

Sins omitted from inculpable forgetfulness must be accused, if they return into the memory of the penitent. For by divine precept all sins committed after Baptism must be declared in Sacramental Confession; nor can present forgetfulness excuse from so great an obligation even for the future. This is clear from the 11th proposition condemned by Alexander VII. See p. XIII.

1366. Questions. - Query 1° Must sins omitted from forgetfulness or another just cause be accused as soon as possible?

Resp. Neg. more probably. For an obligation of this kind is to be understood morally, especially since these sins have already been blotted out, and therefore there is no danger to the soul in delay. - Thus more commonly.

Indeed according to several grave Theologians the penitent probably can defer the Confession of these sins until from the force of another obligation he is held to confess again. Thus it could be deferred for several months, and even to the time of annual Confession. Bon.¹ (6) p. 405. But more probably another Confession, with these omitted, cannot be interposed. The reason is that it belongs to the integrity of Confession to declare in the actual accusation all mortal sins not yet accused, which occur to memory, or of which consciousness is had, as Trent says.²

Query 2° Must sins omitted from forgetfulness be accused before Communion, if they first occur to the mind?

Resp. Neg. very probably, even if the penitent can confess without inconvenience (n. 1307. q. 3°).

Query 3° Is a penitent, who remembers a forgotten sin and cannot, or does not wish to, confess before Communion, held to elicit an act of contrition?

Resp. Neg. with St. Alphonsus,³ Lugo,⁴ and with others commonly against certain others. - The reason is that no foundation appears why this contrition should be required. For it is not required from precept, because this is found prescribed nowhere; nor from the necessity of probation, because the sin has already been indirectly blotted out through the preceding Confession, and therefore does not need remission.

Query 4° Must a penitent accusing a grave sin, omitted in the preceding Confession from forgetfulness or another legitimate cause and already indirectly remitted, necessarily be absolved again?

Resp. Affirm. with the most common opinion. The reason is that all mortal sins, from the institution of Christ, must be subjected to the keys, so that they may be directly remitted. For although they have already been remitted, nevertheless they have not been remitted by the force of the Sacrament, or by the force of absolution, but only by the force of grace infused through the Sacrament, and concomitantly with other sins. - Sporer,¹ Collat. Andeg.² - Yet it happens that penitents confess as omitted from forgetfulness sins which, through the accusation of other sins in which they are necessarily contained, have already been sufficiently declared; in which case there will be no obligation of absolving.

The confessor may omit absolution with penitents who will return to him; since they will be directly absolved in another Confession; nevertheless it is better to impart absolution to all, when this can easily be done, for the consolation and tranquility of the penitent's mind, and also on account of the fruit to be received from the Sacrament. Add the danger lest the penitent may not be able to approach the same confessor any more.

1367. Principles. - I. Causes are sometimes given which excuse from the material integrity of Confession, because sometimes that integrity is physically or morally impossible.

II. In order that someone be judged excused from the material integrity of Confession by reason of moral impotence, although the sins occur to mind, these conditions must be observed: 1° that only those sins be omitted which cannot be declared, or from the manifestation of which grave harm would follow, whether spiritual or temporal, either to the penitent, or to the confessor, or to some third person; 2° that another confessor cannot be found to whom an integral Confession may be made without such harm; 3° that Confession be necessary here and now, as it is judged to be, a) if the precept of annual Confession or Communion must be fulfilled; b) if the reception of the Eucharist or the celebration of Mass cannot be omitted without notice or scandal; c) if otherwise someone would have to be deprived for a long time of the benefit of the Sacraments; d) if someone otherwise would have to remain in mortal sin, even for only one day.

III. Difficulty intrinsic to Confession itself, however grave it may be, never excuses. The reason is that Confession from its nature is essentially laborious, and therefore, if grave difficulty - e.g. great repugnance, or shame, or the loss of one's own reputation before the confessor - excused from integrity, the faithful would for the most part be excused from accusing mortal sins, and therefore the institution of the Sacrament of Penance would fall in greatest part. Moreover the Church could not reserve atrocious crimes, because this creates no light inconvenience for penitents.

IV. When the cause excusing from material integrity ceases, the divine precept of confessing all omitted mortal sins urges again; for when an impediment occurs, the obligation of Confession does not simply cease, but is only suspended; therefore, when the excusing cause ceases, the obligation of the whole law revives: and since the precept of Confession is not affixed to a time or circumstance, but affects the whole life, therefore sins not yet accused must afterward necessarily be accused, if this can be done. This is clear also from the 11th proposition condemned by Alexander VII. See p. XIII.

1368. Resolves. - The following chiefly excuse from the material integrity of Confession:

1° Grave infirmity, namely that in which integral Confession would bring great fatigue, or the proximate danger of it or of some other grave inconvenience, as for example often happens to women in childbirth when laborious delivery is imminent. Concerning the dying, n. 1370.

2° Defect of speech; thus from integrity are exempt the mute, who cannot confess integrally either by signs, or by writing, without danger of manifestation or without grave extraordinary inconvenience or great labor; likewise travelers wholly or almost wholly ignorant of the language of the region in which they confess. Hence, if there is question of a confessor who does not know sufficiently the language of the penitent, Kenrick learnedly teaches these things: once diligence has been applied to perceiving everything, "it is not necessary that one be more solicitous who has a less perfect knowledge of the language, provided there is a fair cause for exercising the sacred office, with another lacking who may execute it. Missionaries for this reason are not to be distressed in mind for the most part if, not knowing very well the language of the faithful, they do not fully understand Confessions; for necessity very often compels that they administer the Sacrament of Penance."

3° Defect of time, e.g. if soldiers must go immediately to battle. But the mere multitude of penitents does not excuse, as was said above, n. 1361. 5°.

4° Danger of life of the penitent, confessor, or a third person: e.g. if enemies arrive; if many are in danger of shipwreck or contagion; if in a contagious disease there is probable danger that the confessor be infected. Indeed sometimes in the highest danger of several persons, all, after some general sign of contrition and Confession has been shown, can be absolved by one utterance of the form thus: I absolve you, etc.

5° Danger of reputation, e.g. if a priest about to celebrate immediately, and needing general Confession, could not confess integrally without those standing by suspecting the matter. Say the same if there were question of a sick man confessed before the carrying of the Most Holy Sacrament and now on the very point of being refreshed by Holy Communion, who, because past Confessions were invalid, asks again for Confession, which, since it would be rather lengthy, would expose the sick man to danger of infamy. Likewise concerning a boy prepared now to receive First Communion, and concerning one to be ordained prepared now to receive Orders, if they declare to the confessor that they have hitherto confessed sacrilegiously.

6° Danger of revelation, or violation of the seal, e.g. if the confessor could not confess integrally without manifesting sins heard in Confession, etc.; or if the penitent from a grave cause fears that the confessor may break the law of the seal. But this latter case, if indeed it should ever be said to occur, is most rare.

7° Danger of scandal or fall, both on the part of the penitent and on the part of the confessor, e.g. if a woman certainly knew the very great frailty of the confessor, etc. The case of the scrupulous person in n. 44 is related.

1369. Questions. - Query 1° Is there an obligation of confessing a mortal sin which cannot be explained without the manifestation of an accomplice?

Resp. Affirm. more probably, with the common opinion, which we follow, says St. Alphonsus, provided that there is question of a mortal sin, and one not yet, or not yet rightly, confessed. The reason is, 1° because no legitimate excuse is given by which derogation would be made from the precept of integrity: for it cannot be said that a positive precept is restricted by the natural precept of not defaming one's neighbor; for this precept only prohibits that the crime of another be manifested without cause; but here there is a cause, and indeed a grave one, namely the procuring of the integrity of Confession, and the direction of conscience; 2° the accomplice, by committing the sin, loses every right to reputation which he could have had before the confessor, in order to the Confession of this sin; and he himself implicitly consents of his own accord to this harm to reputation, when he sins.

But the penitent is held, if he conveniently can, to approach another confessor to whom the person of the accomplice is unknown.

Query 2° What are the causes excusing from seeking another confessor to whom the accomplice is unknown?

Resp. 1° If danger of death urges, or the precept of annual Confession or Communion; 2° if it would be grave for the penitent to omit Confession or Communion; 3° if someone would with difficulty open his conscience to another confessor; 4° if someone otherwise would have to remain in mortal sin, even for one day; 5° if someone otherwise would be deprived of the benefit of some extraordinary indulgence; 6° if by approaching the confessor to whom the accomplice is known, there would be better direction, notably greater consolation, etc.

Hence by reason of seeking counsel, of relieving sorrow, etc., mothers and wives are often excused when they manifest to the confessor the sins of sons or husbands, even though he may know them. For it would be exceedingly hard that they should be held to seek another confessor. Therefore, generally, there is no grave obligation of approaching another confessor for the sake of concealing the accomplice, unless perhaps there is question of a very grave and extraordinary crime.

Query 3° Is it lawful for the confessor himself to ask the name of the accomplice, e.g. for correction, etc.?

Resp. Neg., at least speaking generally, because this both induces one without just cause to detract from the neighbor, and makes the Sacrament of Penance odious. This is clear from Benedict XIV: C. Suprema omnium ecclesiarum, 7 July 1745, and Ubi primum, 2 July 1746, both of which were given for the kingdoms of Portugal and the Algarves, but which afterward through C. Ad eradicandum, 28 Sept. 1746, he extended to the whole world, and in which the Pontiff, speaking of confessors who under penalty of denying absolution require the name of the accomplice, declares that they sin gravely, and incur suspension from hearing Confessions, but only ferendae sententiae.

Query 4° Through the aforesaid letters of Benedict XIV has asking the name of the accomplice been so forbidden that in no case is it lawful?

Resp. Neg., 1° because Benedict XIV himself supposes cases in which this is lawful according to true, as he says, and sound opinions; 2° because sometimes the penitent must necessarily reveal the accomplice, and nevertheless cannot furnish this except through the confessor.

Query 5° Is there an obligation of confessing a sin which cannot be declared without the defamation of another, who was the occasion of the sin, e.g. if someone killed his own sister pregnant from a crime?

Resp. Affirm., according to the opinion set forth above in this number, q. 1°.

Query 6° Are the deaf and mute at the same time held to confess, and how?

Resp. The mute and deaf are held in some way to confess, at least by signs, unless they are so ignorant and dull that nothing can be drawn out from them. The reason is that the precept of Confession regards all the faithful who can manifest their sins by some means. - It will be best that the confessor inquire from the relatives of such mute persons to what vices they are given, and what mode is to be held so that he may be understood by them and he himself may understand them.

Hence: 1° Mute persons sufficiently instructed are held to confess integrally, at least by signs, if these are understood by the confessor; but if they are less instructed, or could with difficulty be understood by the confessor, it will suffice for them to manifest only one or another sin, or to signify in general that they are sinners and wish to avoid sin; but these, unless there is present a certain moral certitude concerning their disposition, are to be absolved conditionally.

2° The deaf, having the use of speech, are held on their own part to confess the sins which occur to memory; but the confessor is scarcely, or hardly at all, held to question them for procuring the integrity of Confession, on account of the excessive difficulty of questioning; which reason of excessive difficulty would not exist where they could easily be questioned in writing. - But the partially deaf, or those who are not wholly deaf, should either confess with an acoustic horn employed, or be led to a remote place, whether at once or at another suitable time. But if this cannot be done without danger of the seal, because the deafness became known not at the beginning but only in the progress of Confession, after a light penance has been imposed, those certainly disposed are to be absolved absolutely, those doubtfully disposed conditionally.

Query 7° Are mute persons who know how to write held to confess by writing for procuring the integrity of Confession?

Resp. See n. 1368. 2°.

Query 8° Are those ignorant of the language of the place in which they wish to confess held to confess, and how?

Resp. Those ignorant of the language of the place in which they are staying, and lacking a confessor by whom they can be understood, are held, when the precept of annual Confession urges and in the article of death, to confess in some way, at least by general signs. The reason is that the divine and ecclesiastical precept urges. For although they cannot confess materially integrally, nevertheless they are held to that which they can do.

Query 9° Are those ignorant of the language held to confess through an interpreter, if they can?

Resp. Neg., because to confess through an interpreter is a very grave burden and subject to many dangers, e.g. of revelation, mockery, etc. Except if in danger of death the penitent ignorant of the language doubts concerning perfect contrition, because in that case Confession would be a means altogether necessary for salvation; but then it will suffice to confess one venial sin, so that in this way the other sins may be indirectly remitted.

1370. - I. Any dying person who in some way, by voice or sign, confesses, or asks for absolution, can and must be absolved, and indeed absolutely. The reason is that all requisites are present for the Sacrament and for Confession formally integral.

II. Any dying person in whom attrition and Confession can be presumed in some way, however slightly probable, can and must be absolved, but conditionally; because in a case of extreme necessity, even in the administration of the Sacraments, it is lawful to use even a slightly founded opinion. - St. Alphonsus and others more commonly against others.

III. A dying person who altogether refuses the Sacrament of Penance, or who can in no way be presumed attrite or to have wished or to wish Confession, can in no way be absolved. The reason is most plainly clear.

1371. Resolves. - 1° All dying persons not yet deprived of the senses and consenting to absolution, and obeying the commands of the confessor, are to be absolved: absolutely indeed, if they spontaneously ask for Confession, or if with a willing mind they propose to confess; but conditionally, if with difficulty they are scarcely induced to some Confession, or if there is prudent doubt concerning their sufficient disposition. - Thus commonly.

2° All dying persons deprived of the senses, who before the deprivation of the senses expressly showed a desire of Confession, e.g. by ordering a priest to be called, etc., are to be absolved, but more safely conditionally. The reason is that in the case Confession becomes known sufficiently sensibly to the confessor through the testimony of another, even of one person or mediately. This is clear from Councils and from the Roman Ritual.

3° All dying persons wholly destitute of the senses, who lived as Christians, are to be absolved under condition, even if at that time they gave no sign either of sorrow or of desire for Confession. The reason is that in these persons sorrow and the desire of absolution can be presumed through sensible signs, e.g. through sighs, motions of the body, anxious breathing, which were manifested although not perceived by the confessor.

4° For the same reason other dying persons destitute of the senses, who lived little as Christians, are also to be absolved conditionally.

5° For the same reason, sufficiently probably, a Catholic dying person, destitute of the senses in the very act of sin, e.g. in a duel, adultery, theft, etc., can and must be absolved under condition.

6° "Those who, although they have never professed the Catholic faith, have shown a will inclined toward it, can in that crisis," i.e. if they are dying and destitute of the senses, "be absolved under condition, ... if they have already been baptized in their sects" (but in doubt concerning the value of this Baptism, after Baptism has been repeated under condition); "for there is some reason for conjecturing that they wish to finish life in the communion of the Church. But if no indication of his will has been given, they are not to be absolved, even if they give signs of sorrow": because such persons can never prudently be presumed to give those signs in order to Confession, from which they greatly abhor.

Note. - Absolution is usefully conferred several times on a sick person still enjoying his senses after a brief Confession; for thus he is rendered more secure concerning the state of grace, he receives an increase of grace, and purgatorial punishments are diminished for him. - But to one destitute of the senses and giving no sign of sorrow and of desire for absolution, "it is not expedient to impart absolution very often within the same day," i.e. more often than every three or four hours, even if only conditionally; for the grave and urgent cause which is required in order that a Sacrament be administered under condition does not exist per se for this kind of absolution "repeated very often within the same day."

I say: per se; for it could be given more frequently to a dying person habituated in evil thoughts, or entangled in some passion of hatred or impure love, or not bearing a very bitter infirmity with a willing mind, or also now on the very point of dying. - "Moreover, it will not be beside the matter to warn the sick man, while he is in possession of mind, that" when "he will not be able to speak," he should "give some determinate sign," or one agreed upon with him, "when he seeks absolution, or when the priest wishes" to confer it "upon him," e.g. to close or open the eyes, lift the hand, incline the head, and the like. Thus St. Alphonsus in Praxis Conf., where he treats the matter more explicitly than in Theol. Mor. or in Hom. Apost.

St. Th., Suppl., q. 9, a. 2.

521. Principle I. Confession must be integral, so that to one and the same confessor all necessary matter not yet rightly subjected to the keys is subjected at once, i.e., all and each mortal sin are declared which must be declared.

Integrity is twofold: 1) formal or subjective, which consists in the accusation of all mortal sins which the penitent here and now, with all circumstances considered, according to his capacity, after diligent examination, morally can and ought to confess according to the practical dictate of conscience, although he omits some things from a just cause; 2) material or objective, which absolutely embraces all mortal sins which after Baptism have really been committed and have not yet been rightly subjected to the keys. From these things it is clear that confession can a) be integral materially and not formally, as if someone confesses all mortal sins with the due circumstances, but erroneously thinks that a venial sin which he committed is mortal and conceals it; b) on the contrary, be integral formally and not materially, as if someone confesses all the mortal sins which after diligent examination he has found, but omits one from inculpable forgetfulness; c) finally, be integral materially and formally at the same time, as if someone after diligent examination remembers all the mortal sins which he has committed and accurately confesses them.

Now each integrity is necessary by divine right for the validity of the sacrament of Penance, yet in such a way that formal integrity is necessary by necessity of means, and in reality, and therefore is always necessary, and is always of precept; material integrity is necessary by necessity of means only in desire, and by necessity of precept of itself and regularly, so that excusing causes can exist. Hence, speaking of itself, confession must be materially integral; accidentally formal integrity suffices; so that he sins gravely who omits some sin which here and now he can and ought to declare. Each point is clear from the Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 5.

The said integrity is required:

1. On the part of the remission of sins: for confession is necessary by divine right for the remission of mortal sins, just as contrition is. But one mortal sin cannot be remitted without another. Therefore confession, just as contrition, must extend itself to all mortal sins. "The priest," says St. Thomas (ad 2), "hearing confession bears the place of God, and therefore confession must be made to him in the same way as contrition is made to God. Hence just as there would not be contrition unless someone were contrite for all sins which occur to memory, so neither would there be confession unless someone confesses all things which have occurred to memory."

2. On the part of the office of judge and physician with which the confessor is marked, because without the integrity of confession he can neither a) rightly exercise the sacramental judgment, namely by estimating that the dispositions of the penitent are proportioned to the quantity of fault, nor b) preserve equity in establishing punishments (Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 5). St. Thomas declares this thus, in the body of the article: "In bodily medicine it is necessary that the physician know not only one disease, against which he must give medicine, but also universally the whole condition of the sick person himself, because one disease is aggravated by the addition of another, and a medicine which would befit one disease would bring harm to another. And similarly it is with sins, because one is aggravated by the addition of another, and that which would be suitable medicine for one sin would furnish an incentive to another, since sometimes someone is infected with contrary sins... And therefore it is of the necessity of confession that a man confess all sins which he has in memory; but if he does not do this, it is not confession, but a simulation of confession."

522. Principle II. For the integrity of confession by divine right, all mortal sins must necessarily be declared according to number, lowest species, and circumstances changing the species. - Thus the Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 5, can. 7. And indeed they must be declared:

1. according to number, for each mortal sin by itself alone constitutes a distinct cause, which must necessarily be brought before the tribunal of the keys;

2. also according to species, and circumstances changing the species: for things which are subjected to a judicial sentence must become known to the judges, at least speaking of themselves and regularly, not only in common, but in particular and according to the lowest species;

3. finally, all mortal sins at once, because it is impossible to seek remission of one mortal sin without at the same time seeking remission of all which burden the conscience.

Therefore there must be declared:

A. The mortal sins themselves, says the Council, l. c., and not only their malices, and indeed:

1. According to the interior act of reason and will.

2. And according to the act itself, even external, if the sin has been consummated by an external work, because

a) this also is prohibited by God, e.g., you shall not kill, you shall not steal;

b) it is one thing in the genus of morals with the internal act and is a true sin, an inordinate voluntary act, although not distinct in number and malice from the internal sin; indeed the external act integrates the sin and is the part finally consummating the other co-part, namely the internal act, from which it differs as the complete species from the incomplete and the consummated work from the work begun;

c) because universal custom understands the law of integrity in this way. Hence it does not suffice to accuse: I had the intention or purpose of committing theft or adultery, but: I stole or committed adultery.

3. Indeed also, for similar reasons, according to the external effect foreseen in some way at least, voluntary and culpable, e.g., death from a wound inflicted or poison administered, abortion from a drug taken, pollution from bad reading, blasphemies or omission of Mass from drunkenness, because this itself either is the external sin or at least completes and finally terminates the act of sin, and thus is a voluntary disorder. But a merely materially evil effect, as altogether involuntary, or efficaciously retracted before it has occurred, is not to be declared, unless accidentally by reason of a penalty, irregularity, reservation to be incurred, or by reason of reparation to be made.

B. Sins according to number: all and each, says the Council, i.e., as many must be accused as have been committed, for otherwise something would be hidden. Hence:

a) If someone remembers a certain and precise number, this must be said; e.g., of itself it does not suffice to confess: I blasphemed several times, I more often omitted Mass, etc.; and he sins gravely who knowingly or from culpable negligence sets forth a greater or lesser number.

b) If someone after diligent examination remembers only an approximate number, this must be said with the addition of the particle about or more or less; this particle signifies that the number said differs from the real number by a small quantity by excess or defect, and indeed according to proportion to the quantity of the number: thus, e.g., according to St. Alphonsus, about 3 is understood as 2-4, about ten times as 8-12, about thirty as 27-33, about one hundred as 95-105, about one thousand as 950-1050.

c) If someone cannot recall even an approximate number, he should state the approximate number of sins committed on individual days or weeks or months or years. This is verified especially among sinners who have a habit of sin; e.g., it suffices that a prostitute say: for two years I remained in a brothel and as often as there was occasion, even with married persons, or also sometimes with clerics, I offered myself; or a concubinary: for three years I lived in concubinage; or another: I desired any women who came my way, even relatives, married women, sacred persons; or: concerning base matters, on any given occasion, I spoke with companions. In various cases he should at the same time indicate in some way the greater or lesser frequency of the sin.

d) If the penitent can recall nothing precisely or approximately, he should say whether he sinned very frequently, frequently, or sometimes with determinate sins, from childhood, before or after marriage entered, on occasion of living together, etc. Thus, e.g., for very frequent merely internal sins: for several hours I indulged in depraved thoughts; for a month I frequently wished grave evil; for two months I was in depraved desires.

e) If after an approximate confession a notable excess is discovered, so that the accusation was notably less, it is necessary to correct it; but not if the excess is small, because this is included in the approximate number, or if a defect is discovered, so that the accusation was notably greater, because the lesser is included in the greater. On the contrary, he who expressed a certain number, if afterward he remembers that he sinned even one more time, is bound to declare the omitted instance because it was not included in the accusation.

C. Sins according to the lowest moral species: not in genus but in their species, says the Council, i.e., not the supreme species but the lowest, according to the obvious and proper sense of the words, or according to their formal malice by which they are distinguished from others, insofar as some sin is constituted by its own complete object and is distinguished from others, or insofar as it is opposed to a virtue or precept in particular and in its own proper formal mode is opposed. Otherwise they would not be declared as they are. Thus, e.g., it does not suffice to declare that one has sinned mortally, or against justice, or against chastity or charity, but what kind of sin was committed against them: whether theft, insult, or detraction; whether rash judgment, hatred, discord, or scandal; whether fornication, adultery, deflowering, pollution, etc. Cf. Alexander VII, prop. 25.1

But if someone has not sufficiently distinguished the lowest species or does not remember it, it suffices for him to confess the supreme species or genus, or only that he sinned mortally, according as he has distinguished or remembered more or less concerning the sin. Thus, e.g., he who does not distinguish between depraved thoughts and desires should say: I gave consent to base thoughts; he who does not distinguish bad speech about obscene things, impious things, sins committed and joyfully recalled, provocation to evil, sufficiently accuses by saying that he had base speech.

D. Sins according to circumstances changing the species, as the Council of Trent expressly has it, and can. 901, which, namely, add a new and diverse moral species and constitute a sin of a diverse species. This evidently must be understood of only those circumstances which add a grave or mortal species. Thus, e.g., the circumstance of sacredness for theft of a sacred thing or from a sacred place; for scandal, the circumstance of a superior person who from piety or justice has spiritual care over someone; the circumstance of a married person in a sin of lust, etc. On these things cf. the treatise on Human Acts and Sins and the special treatises on the virtues and precepts.

Circumstances lightly aggravating or diminishing are not to be accused; indeed, it is not proved that even notably aggravating circumstances are to be accused, both because they do not substantially change the state of the sinner, and because the Council of Trent recalls only circumstances changing the species. And this is the opinion of St. Thomas.¹ Yet except:

¹ On IV Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 2, sol. 5.

a) of itself, if circumstances so aggravate that they make a venial sin mortal, or vice versa, because thus the state of the sinner is substantially changed and free matter becomes necessary, or conversely;

b) accidentally, if it is necessary by reason of a penalty or inability or reparation; or if the confessor as judge interrogates about them in order to know, or better know, the state, dispositions, and obligations of the penitent, or as physician in order to indicate remedies, e.g., about habit, occasion, relapse, effects, complicity, etc. Cf. prop. 58 condemned by Innocent XI.²

² "We are not held to confess to the confessor asking the habit of some sin."

For the rest, the faithful are accustomed to declare circumstances notably aggravating, and they are to be exhorted to this unless they are scrupulous, because such declaration conduces both to procuring peace of conscience, and to promoting humility, and to the fuller manifestation of the soul of the penitent, whence the confessor will be able perfectly to exercise toward the penitent the office of judge and physician. - Yet except sins against chastity; in this matter, at least ordinarily, those things which are strictly necessary are to be declared, and indeed in a shamefaced manner.

But it should be noted that all the aforesaid things are to be declared not according to the greater or theological knowledge and science which someone later acquired, but according to the knowledge and science which he had concerning the sins at the moment in which he committed them, because according to this alone they are voluntary. For nothing is willed unless it has first been known.

1. "He who has had copulation with an unmarried woman satisfies the precept of confession by saying: I committed with an unmarried woman a grave sin against chastity, without explaining copulation."

I. Obligation of the penitent. - The penitent is bound regularly, and indeed of itself under grave obligation, to premise to confession a diligent examination of all mortal sins which he has committed.

It is said: a) of itself and regularly. For exception is made 1) if time is lacking, as can occur in the dying; 2) if the examination is not necessary, the dispositions of the penitent being considered;

b) mortal sins: for one who is morally certain that he has not sinned mortally since his last confession is not strictly bound to a diligent examination, but only to discovering sufficient matter for the validity of the sacrament; although he is also to be exhorted to a diligent examination concerning venial sins, that he may receive more abundant fruits from the sacrament.

It is proved: 1) from the Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 5: "From these things it is gathered that penitents must recount in confession all mortal sins of which, after diligent examination, they have consciousness." And surely, without such an examination they could not explore all the recesses of their soul, as the same Council says;

2. by reason: He who is bound to the end is, by that very fact, bound to the means of itself necessary for attaining the end. But a diligent examination, regularly speaking, is a necessary means for procuring the integrity of confession for those who have sinned gravely; for if they have committed several mortal sins, generally they cannot remember them all, because of the weakness of human memory, unless for some time they have diligently explored their conscience. Therefore one who has sinned gravely is regularly bound to a diligent examination of conscience.¹

¹ Cf. Reuter, Neo-Conf., p. I, c. 3, n. 4; St. Alphonsus, Th. M., l. VI, n. 471; Marc, Th. M., II, nn. 1703-1704; Theol. Mech. (4), de Poen., nn. 47 and 48; Lehmkuhl, Th. M., II, nn. 446-450; Tanquerey, de Poen., nn. 312-316; Genicot, Th. M., II, nn. 301-303; Noldin, Th. M., III, nn. 277-278; Prummer, Th. M., III, nn. 383-385.

II. The diligence required is not the highest, than which no greater can be given, and which is used by the most cautious men in matters of the greatest moment: for this would be too burdensome and would render the sacrament odious; but ordinary or moderate diligence, which prudent men are accustomed to use in a grave matter. "For this," we read in St. Alphonsus, Th. M., l. VI, n. 471, 1°, "moderate diligence suffices, such as a prudent man uses in arduous business; or such as, morally speaking, the learned and God-fearing are accustomed to use, even if someone should think that, with greater diligence, he would find more."

This, however, must be estimated according to the capacity and condition (or diversity of state) of the penitent and other circumstances. Greater diligence is required a) the longer the penitent has abstained from confession; b) the more numerous and diverse the mortal sins he has committed; c) the less account he has kept of things committed; d) the more learned and instructed he is: for the rude, unlearned, and uncultivated are incapable of an accurate examination.

Hence 1) ordinarily it suffices successively to run through the precepts of God and of the Church, the capital sins, and the obligations of one's proper state (on which one must insist, since there are many who scarcely think of the duties of their proper state); but if someone has confessed a short time before, it also suffices to examine himself concerning duties toward God, neighbor, and himself.

2. Those who confess frequently, rarely commit mortal sins, and daily examine their conscience, can be content with a shorter examination, because grave sins, if they have committed them, will easily occur to memory. Although they are to be led to a diligent examination, that they may discover venial sins, and also their causes and occasions, so that they may more easily extirpate defects.

3. The scrupulous ought not spend a long time in examination, because they are not accustomed to sin gravely, and moreover a minute examination can increase scruples and doubts; but if they had sinned gravely, this surely would be before their eyes.

4. The sick are not bound to an examination as accurate as those in good health; indeed sometimes they are excused from every examination, because of excessive weakness. In that case they are to be questioned briefly by the confessor himself concerning substantial matters. When they have survived, afterward they can complete their confession, if it is necessary.

III. Office of the confessor. - The confessor can, indeed sometimes must, direct penitents in the examination of conscience or supply for it, and also himself procure the integrity of confession.

He can act thus from charity; although, that they may examine their conscience more accurately, he can kindly dismiss those who are sufficiently instructed, especially if it is a question of a long confession, since it is almost impossible that they respond accurately to a questioning confessor without a previous examination. Besides, penitents of themselves are bound to the examination of conscience; to the confessor belongs only the judgment concerning the sufficiency of the examination. But from charity he must act thus toward those who otherwise are foreseen not to be going to return, especially toward the rude and ignorant, who cannot examine themselves otherwise.

IV. Catalogue of questions concerning sins to be accused. - Since certain moralists construct a long catalogue of sins and series of questions, useless and inept, lest the sacrament of Penance be rendered odious, it is pleasing here to add a schema of questions which can be proposed to penitents for supplying for the examination of their conscience and which, in ordinary circumstances, are abundantly sufficient.²

² Not only is the strict manner of questioning to be disapproved, such as was in use among certain Rigorists and can be found in Dens, in the appendix to the treatise on Penance; but even among recent authors, longer questions or inopportune questions are sometimes handed down: thus several, in Noldin and in Gury, as to the theological virtues or religion, and, for the latter, as to homicide and duel (!); indeed in Aertnijs, in Th. Past., questions concerning the sixth seem to descend into excessively minute circumstances.

They are to be questioned opportunely according to the circumstances:

A. Concerning the sacraments previously received: concerning the penance fulfilled; and, if they rarely receive the sacraments, concerning sacrileges on account of concealment, concerning their number, concerning the time during which they adverted to the sacrilege, and concerning the paschal communion not performed. But it is better to ask in this way: Have you any anguish of conscience concerning your past life? Now make a good confession; say everything ingenuously; do not fear; unload your conscience.

B. Concerning the precepts of the Decalogue. Regarding the 1st: whether the penitent knows the four principal mysteries of faith; whether he knows those things which are of necessity of precept; whether he has for a long time omitted all prayer; whether he has not exposed the faith to danger (by reading, association, conversations, occasion), or cooperated in works against the faith.

Concerning superstitions (e.g., Spiritism), one must not ask unless in regions where they are common, or unless there is a special reason for estimating that the penitent is guilty of them.

Regarding the 2nd: whether he has blasphemed; whether with the intention of blaspheming, and whether he has thus given scandal; what formula he used; but if he has erred concerning the sense of the formula, he is to be instructed; likewise whether he has murmured against God and the dispositions of Providence.

Likewise, whether he has sworn vainly or falsely, and whether he has thereby brought harm to his neighbor.

They are not to be questioned concerning vows unless they are pious penitents, who still more often confuse these with resolutions.

Regarding the 3rd: whether he has omitted hearing Mass deliberately, or because of some necessity; whether he has not been negligent in coming late to Mass; whether he has done or commanded servile works without necessity, and for how long, whether also publicly.

Regarding the 4th: children concerning love, reverence, and obedience toward parents, and whether they have not gravely failed against them, treated parents harshly, or saddened them; parents concerning the education of children, religious instruction, correction and vigilance, and good example, etc.

Regarding the 5th: whether the penitent has held anyone in hatred; whether he has wished or imprecated evils upon him, and whether seriously, and what things he wished to inflict upon him. Whether he has not given bad example, induced another to sin, used another for executing sin, cooperated in another's sin. Whether he has been angry with his neighbor, and if he says yes, whether he committed anything by deed (quarrel, striking, wounding). Whether he has given himself to drunkenness.

Regarding the 6th and 9th: whether he has a tranquil conscience as to modesty and purity; whether he has taken delight in impure thoughts, and voluntarily; whether he has had desires, and to do what sort of act; whether he has had or willingly heard obscene conversations, or read obscene books; whether he has been indecently dressed; whether he has had looks or touches, lascivious kisses or embraces, and whether they were mutual; whether he experienced an effect, e.g., more or less vehement motions of the flesh, seminal emission in a man, full satisfaction in a woman; whether he has committed a shameful act, alone, with another, of the opposite sex or of the same sex (a free or bound person), e.g.: whether he sinned with a boy or with a girl; whether he did the conjugal act ("have you committed the sin?"); whether the act has had consequences or will have fruit ("has that had consequences?") and why not?

Concerning sodomy and bestiality, questions are not to be made, lest penitents learn them or be scandalized; unless there is altogether a grave reason for estimating that the penitent has committed such things (e.g., if the presence of an animal was an occasion of sin; or, for those who have accused themselves of seminal emission had with another: whether they did something worse).

Concerning onanism, however, spouses are to be questioned: whether they have rightly fulfilled the duties of matrimony, and if they hesitate or deny, whether they have conformed themselves to the laws of nature; whether they have done nothing against the end of matrimony, the fruitfulness and sanctity of matrimony; whether they do not abuse matrimony; whether they have committed themselves totally to divine providence concerning the generation of children, conformed themselves to the will of God as to the number of children, and did not intend to limit the number of infants; whether they have not distrusted divine providence from fear of increasing offspring (how many children do you have?), etc., where precise and well-determined questions are to be preferred to indeterminate and excessively vague ones.

Regarding the 7th and 10th: whether the penitent has committed injustice, retains anything unjustly; whether he has unjustly brought about harm; whether he has deceived; whether he has neglected to pay debts (restitution).

Regarding the 8th: whether he has spoken evil of his neighbor, whether great or small, false or true, hidden or widely known (reparation); whether he has thought evils concerning his neighbor; whether he has affected him with injurious words, whether with grave injuries; whether he has lied.

C. Concerning the precepts of the Church: concerning the observance of feasts, abstinence from meats, annual confession and communion.

D. Concerning duties of state: parents concerning children, as has been said; spouses concerning mutual fidelity, love, peaceful life, and duties (e.g., whether perhaps they have anything which gnaws the conscience concerning marriage, whether they are of one mind between themselves, whether the husband keeps faith with his wife, whether the wife obeys her husband in all honest things, whether she does not render life troublesome to her husband, whether she has care of the domestic matter, whether the husband does not squander goods); masters concerning vigilance exercised over servants and concerning negligence in removing scandals from them, and concerning the just wage paid; servants and workers concerning work performed or neglected, harm brought about, petty thefts, labor on Sunday; children, whether they have concealed anything out of shame, and have had dishonorable games, e.g., things which they would not dare to do under the eyes of others; likewise adolescents and girls, especially if they love adornment: then they are to be questioned whether they have associated familiarly, too freely, etc., with persons of the other sex; tavern-keepers, whether they have tolerated sins (blasphemies, foul speech, detractions), whether in some way they have cooperated in the sins of others (by giving drink, obscene pictures, a room); merchants concerning exaggerated price, deceit and fraud in commerce, with grave harm of neighbor; soldiers concerning blasphemies, omission of the duties of religion, quarrels, sins of lust and thefts; tailors concerning little pieces of cloth retained, etc.

These questions are not always all to be made, but according to the state, condition, and capacity of the penitent, and the answers which he has given.

V. Observation. - It is best to institute an examination of conscience every day.

A twofold integrity is distinguished, one material, the other formal. The first is situated in the accusation of all mortal sins which have been committed; but the other, namely formal, consists in the accusation of all mortal sins which someone here and now, with the circumstances considered, morally can or is bound to confess. Hence as often as material integrity is had, formal integrity is also had; but not vice versa.

I say. Although material integrity is not always required, because it is sometimes either physically or morally impossible, and God does not command impossibilities; nevertheless formal integrity is absolutely necessary by divine law. This is clear from the Council of Trent, sess. 14, chap. 5, where these things are had: "The universal Church has always understood that the entire confession of sins was instituted by the Lord, and that it exists as necessary by divine law for all fallen after Baptism; because our Lord Jesus Christ, about to ascend from earth to heaven, left priests, His own vicars, as presidents and judges, to whom all mortal crimes into which the Christian faithful have fallen are to be brought; so that, according to the power of the keys, they may pronounce the sentence of remission or retention of sins. For it is clear that priests could not have exercised this judgment, the case being unknown, ... if they had declared their sins only in general, and not rather in species and one by one. From these things it is gathered that all mortal sins of which penitents have consciousness after diligent examination of themselves must be recounted in confession, even if they are most hidden." And in can. 7 it was defined thus: "If anyone shall say that, in the sacrament of Penance, for the remission of sins it is not necessary by divine law to confess all and individual mortal sins of which memory is had with due and diligent premeditation, even hidden sins and those which are against the last two precepts of the Decalogue, and the circumstances which change the species of sin ... let him be anathema."

He who after baptism has perpetrated mortal sins, which have not yet been directly remitted through the keys of the Church, must confess all of which he has consciousness after diligent examination of himself, and explain in confession the circumstances which change the species of sin (Can. 901).

Question 1. Whether the necessity of integrity requires accusation of sins according to the lowest species? Resp. Affirmatively, altogether, because the lowest species are properly called species, and the Council of Trent speaks properly of their accusation; and consequently it does not suffice to manifest only generic species, namely that you have injured chastity or religion, but it is necessary to add all circumstances inducing a proper species. But this does not import that if someone cannot or is not bound here and now to manifest the lowest species, he is also excused from manifesting the generic species. Therefore if someone, knowing that he has sinned against chastity, cannot or is not bound here and now to say whether it was with a male or female, with an unmarried or married person, nevertheless he is bound to say that he sinned against chastity. The reason is that otherwise formal integrity would not be had.

Question 2. In what way is satisfaction to be made to integrity, when someone cannot arrive at a precise number? Resp. He who cannot remember a certain number is bound to accuse the more probable number, or the number which comes nearer to the truth, adding the particle about; because where certainty is lacking, that which is more likely must be accused. Moreover St. Alphonsus well admonishes that the confessor ought not be too anxious about inquiring into the number of sins in a customary penitent, because it is often impossible to have such a certain number. Rather, let him diligently inquire into the state of conscience, by asking whether he has sinned frequently or rarely; how many times about in a month, in a week, in a day, etc. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 466. - Lehmkuhl, nn. 304 and 305.

Question 3. What number is judged to be comprehended in the particle "about"? Resp. This cannot be determined by an altogether certain rule; nevertheless not just any excess is comprehended, nor a notable defect, but only a moderate one, yet greater or lesser in proportion to the number expressed. Thus, however, it is established by St. Alphonsus: a moderate excess or defect will be, relative to about five sins, to add or subtract one unit on either side; relative to about ten, two; relative to twenty, three or four; relative to forty, four or five; relative to a hundred, five or six ...; and prudently in the first case the penitent will be judged to have sinned four, five, or six times; in the second, however, to have sinned eight, nine, ten, eleven, or twelve times; and similarly concerning the others you will resolve. Observe, however, that sometimes from the very state of the penitent the number of sins can easily be drawn out. Thus, for example, where a man accuses himself that he lived for three years in concubinage, or a woman that for six months she practiced the gain of the body, there is nothing for which the number of sins committed in that state should be inquired further. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 466.

Question 4. To what is a penitent bound who, after completing a confession in which he used the particle about, finds the exact number of sins? Resp. A distinction must be made: if the sins which he now remembers are certainly more numerous than the number accused together with the particle about, then in the next confession he must add the exceeding number, because that number was in no way manifested; otherwise he is bound to nothing. Likewise he is bound to nothing if he finds that the sins committed were fewer and he exaggerated the number in good faith. I said in good faith; for if he acted in bad faith, he committed, per se, a grave sacrilege. For although a lie uttered in confession itself, and which does not touch the necessary matter of the confession itself, is excused from grave sin because it is neither harmful to the penitent nor gravely injurious to the sacrament, nevertheless one must speak otherwise if the lie is concerned with matter necessarily to be expressed in confession itself. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, Hom. Ap. n. 34. - Reuter, n. 313.

Question 5. Whether it hinders the integrity of confession if someone accuses venial sins to the ordinary confessor, but mortal sins to another? Resp. Negatively, provided that he never receives absolution without having manifested all mortal sins to one confessor and being absolved by the same. The reason is that that confession is entire which embraces all mortal sins, since venial sins do not have to be accused necessarily. Therefore in practice those are not to be condemned for integrity not preserved who sometimes confess graver sins to an unknown confessor, but subject lighter sins to their ordinary one, if from shame, with which they would be suffused with a confessor familiarly known, they would commit themselves to danger of confessing sacrilegiously. - I said for integrity not preserved, because certainly they would have to be condemned for another reason, for example, if young men about to embrace the clerical or religious state acted thus, deceiving their own confessor. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 471.

Question 6. Whether it hinders integrity if someone feigns another voice, lest he be recognized by the confessor? Resp. Negatively, per se; for provided he opens all mortal sins, he makes an entire confession. Nor is it necessary that he be known by name by the confessor; for it suffices that the confessor intends to absolve the present sinner: but the intention of the confessor is per se always determined to the present penitent. Cf. Lacroix, de Sacram. in genere, n. 68.

Doubt here can be concerned chiefly 1°. with the act of sin or with the sin committed; 2°. with the gravity of the sin, both on the part of the matter and on the part of consent; 3°. with the confession of a sin certainly committed.

Question 1. Whether mortal sins, not certainly but only probably committed, must necessarily be accused? Resp. Negatively, more probably, if, after a diligent examination has been previously made, the doubt perseveres. The reason is that an obligation cannot be imposed unless it is certainly established concerning it. And indeed from Trent, mortal sins of which consciousness is had must be accused; but consciousness of doubtful sins is not had; for to have consciousness imports certain knowledge of sin, since consciousness is nothing else than certain knowledge and judgment concerning sin committed. Therefore ... - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 473 and 476. - Sporer, n. 389. - Roncaglia, chap. 2, question 7. - Reuter, n. 305.

Question 2. Whether sins certainly committed, but concerning whose gravity only probable reason is had, are to be accused? Resp. Negatively, more probably, per se, namely with the principles of probabilism inspected. The reason is the same as for the preceding question; for since it is not established concerning a grave sin committed, neither can it be established concerning the obligation of confession. But in practice attention must be paid to the two following rules:

Rule I. In doubt whether the matter of sin is grave, rude penitents ordinarily must accuse doubts, 1°. because they almost cannot form conscience by themselves, 2°. because for the most part they do not know how to distinguish venial sins from mortal sins. Except, however, the scrupulous, who are not often accustomed to commit mortal sins. But instructed penitents are not bound to accuse doubtfully grave things, because they can form conscience by themselves; nevertheless they too are ordinarily to be gently exhorted to accuse these things.

Rule II. In doubt concerning full consent or perfect advertence, 1°. if the penitents are of a fearful conscience and are not accustomed to sin gravely, they are in no way bound to confess doubtful sins, because the presumption which is had from things ordinarily happening favors them; indeed often they are to be hindered from this accusation if they seem inclined to scruples; 2°. if penitents keep a middle way between a fearful and lax conscience, they are not indeed to be obliged, but certainly are to be induced to declare doubtful consent, because this is useful for the tranquility of conscience, etc.; 3°. if penitents are of a lax conscience, generally they must declare doubtful sins, because the presumption is opposed to them. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 476.

Question 3. Whether sins certainly committed and certainly also grave, but only probably confessed, must necessarily be accused? Resp. It is greatly controverted: some, among whom is St. Alphonsus, say that sins of this kind must be declared, because the obligation of confession is certain, but its fulfillment doubtful. But several other Doctors deny it, so that Lugo could affirm: "All commonly teach that [someone] is not bound to confess a sin which he probably judges that he has already confessed." But the reason is that a law to which satisfaction has probably already been made, since it is no longer certain and entire, cannot claim entire obedience for itself and bring forth a certain obligation. Thus indeed as to obligation; for in practice the repetition of confession is to be advised for procuring peace of conscience and removing anxieties of soul: unless, however, it happens that in this way anxiety is added to anxiety. - Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, nn. 58 and seq. - Baller. note (c) p. 367; and note (a) p. 368. - St. Alphonsus, n. 477.

Question 4. Whether one who has confessed some sin as doubtful must repeat it if afterward he knows it as certain? Resp. Formerly the Doctors commonly affirmed; but today it is greatly controverted, and the negative opinion appears solidly probable. The reason is deduced from those things which were said above about declaring the number of sins; for just as, after the doubtful number of sins has once been exposed with the particle about, you are no longer bound to declare in confession the certain number which you afterward discovered, provided the excess is not notable; so neither are you bound to repeat in confession a sin which you accused as doubtful, afterward known as certain. For there is no difference between either case, since also in a doubtful number certain sins are declared as doubtful; nor must the species be opened more than the number of sins. Besides, the doubtful sin was directly remitted, since it was remitted by force of absolution, to which, as it was in conscience, it was subjected. Therefore it is not necessary to subject it again to the keys. - Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, n. 78. - Sporer, n. 397. - Elbel, n. 274. - Reuter, n. 332. - Baller. note (b) p. 368.

The circumstances of sins are distinguished in various ways. For 1°. some change the species, namely those which by reason of themselves add to the act a malice distinct in species from that which the act has by reason of its object; thus the circumstance of a vow or of marriage adds to fornication the malice of sacrilege or adultery; 2°. others are only aggravating, but notably or lightly, according as, notably or lightly, within the same species they increase the malice of the sinful act by reason of duration, intensity, degree, mode, time, person, place, etc.; and finally 3°. others are diminishing, as those which render the malice of sin less, for example, defect of advertence, etc. - Consult what was said above, n. 26.

I say. Just as it is certain that circumstances changing the species are to be accused, if they draw the sin into another species of lethal sin, so it is likewise certain that circumstances lightly aggravating do not have to be accused necessarily, although to expose them is sometimes better. The reason for the first is that then there is properly a new mortal sin; but the reason for the second is that venial sins are not necessary matter of the sacrament of Penance.

Question 1. Whether circumstances NOTABLY aggravating the malice of mortal sins within the same species must necessarily be accused? Resp. Negatively, more commonly and more probably. The reason is that the Council of Trent speaks only of circumstances which change the species of sin, and consequently seems to exclude the obligation of confessing other circumstances. Add that otherwise both penitents and confessors would always fluctuate amid straits, since it is difficult to distinguish which circumstances are notably aggravating; for no rule, at least for the most part, can be assigned by which they are discerned, for example, for duration, intensity, mode, etc. Besides, the reasons on which the affirmative opinion rests are easily dissolved. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 467. - Baller. note (d) p. 372; and notes (a) and (b) p. 373.

Moreover in practice the faithful ordinarily, speaking ordinarily, are wont to declare the more notable circumstances; and this indeed contributes, as to greater peace of conscience, so also to receiving more abundant fruit, both by reason of humility in the confession itself and by reason of the direction which they receive more suitably. - But if the discussion is about circumstances of sins against the sixth precept, not only is inquiry not to be made about them, but it is not even to be permitted that they be exposed, on account of the danger which both the confessor and the penitent could suffer in treating this muddy matter. Indeed Doctors commonly warn that this danger can sometimes require that even inquiry into the species be spared. Cf. Baller. note (c) p. 373.

Question 2. Whether the circumstance of the custom of sin must necessarily be accused? Resp. Negatively, more probably, whether under this name a bad habit is understood, or whether the simple repetition of the same sin is understood: for custom taken as a habit introduced from repeated evil acts, although it is a vice, nevertheless per se is not a sin; but custom taken as repetition of the same sin already declared elsewhere does not make the sin again admitted, and here and now to be confessed, either graver on the part of the object or different in its species. - Except, however, if the confessor asks, as is clear from prop. 58 condemned by Innocent XI, which is read thus: "We are not bound to confess to a questioning confessor the custom of some sin."

Question 3. Whether the circumstance of the degree of incest committed with blood-relatives or relatives by affinity must be declared? Resp. The circumstance of conjunction in the first degree of the direct line, whether by reason of consanguinity or by reason of affinity, must certainly be declared, as is clear per se and as theologians more commonly teach: namely between father and daughter, mother and son, father-in-law and daughter-in-law, mother-in-law and son-in-law, or stepmother and stepson, stepfather and stepdaughter; but it is not necessary to declare the origin of that incest, namely whether it proceeds from affinity or from consanguinity, nor the circumstance of other degrees, even including the first degree in the collateral line. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 469 and 470; and Hom. Ap. tract. 9, nn. 17 and 18.

Question 4. Whether the circumstance of the dignity or office of the person must necessarily be accused, for example, if the sinner is a superior, magistrate, priest, etc., or a physician, confessor, etc., or the circumstance of sacred time?

Resp. Negatively, to all, with the reason of scandal or of an altogether particular obligation or of deceit and force on the part of the physician excluded; likewise, on the part of the confessor, with any relation of the sin to confession excluded. The reason is that all the said circumstances at most aggravate the sin, but do not change its species. - Cf. St. Alphonsus on the third precept of the Decalogue, n. 273; and on the sixth precept of the Decalogue, n. 451. - Lugo, disp. 16, nn. 359, 451, and 520.

Question 5. Whether he satisfies the integrity of confession who accuses a recent sin as committed formerly? Resp. Affirmatively, per se, because the circumstance of time in no way pertains to confession. Hence a penitent satisfies the obligation of confession who mixes new sins with old ones, or who, establishing a general confession, does not distinguish from the others the mortal sins committed since the last confession, although he does this deliberately to cover the time at which he committed the sins. Yet he must explain whether, by reason of the time at which he admitted the sin, he is still subject to reservation or censure, or whether by force of some circumstance, for example, of a vow or of marriage, the sin itself is different. But if the penitent lies concerning the time, for example, if he denies that he sinned today and declares the sin as if committed at another determinate and remote time, the Doctors more commonly think that he does not satisfy his obligation. The reason is that the act which the penitent placed today is not an act placed in the past year. Hence he lies in two ways, namely by concealing a sin committed today, and by accusing a sin as admitted at another time. Yet theologians are not lacking who, probably, as it seems, think this lie to be light, and their opinion pleases us. - Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, nn. 53 and seq. - Tamburini, Method. conf. lib. 2, chap. 1. - Baller. note (a) and (b) p. 376.

Question 6. Whether a penitent must declare the different persons with whom he sinned? Resp. Negatively, per se, because it suffices that the number of sins and their species be declared; but sins do not on that account change species because they were committed with several persons. Hence one who fornicated with three different persons or three times with the same person satisfies by saying that he fornicated three times; nor is he bound spontaneously to say whether the accomplice was one or several, whether they were prostitutes or others. Yet if the confessor asks about this, the penitent is bound to respond, because it is expedient that the confessor know whether perhaps there is present a proximate occasion of sinning, as is likely if the sin was committed several times with the same person. - Cf. Bonac. disp. 5, q. 5, sect. 2, punct. 2, § diff. 3, n. 14. - Tamburini, in Dec. lib. 7, chap. 7. - Lacroix, n. 1040.

Question 7. Whether a priest or religious sinning against chastity must open his condition, or only the circumstance of the vow of chastity? Resp. It is controverted, but probably it must be said that it suffices if each manifests the circumstance of the vow, because the species of obligation does not seem to be changed by the special condition either of priest or of religious. - Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, n. 149.

Question 8. Whether nearness of persons in sins of hatred must be declared? Resp. Affirmatively, if there is question of nearer kinship, on account of the strict bond of the virtue of piety. Hence grave hatred against parents, children, grandparents, grandchildren, relatives by affinity in the first degree, godparents, godchildren, a spouse, and siblings must be declared; but otherwise if there is question of remote kinship, namely among the other blood-relatives or relatives by affinity. Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, nn. 303 and seq.

I say. Mortal sins omitted from inculpable forgetfulness must be accused if they return to the memory of the penitent. The reason is that by divine precept all mortal sins committed after Baptism must be declared in sacramental confession; nor can present forgetfulness excuse from so great an obligation even for the future. This is also clear from prop. 11 condemned by Alexander VII, which has itself thus: "Sins omitted in confession, or forgotten because of imminent danger of life or because of another cause, we are not bound to express in a following confession."

Question 1. Whether sins omitted from forgetfulness or another just cause must be accused as soon as possible? Resp. Negatively, more probably; for an obligation of this kind must be taken morally, especially since these sins have already been destroyed, and consequently there is no danger of soul in delay. Indeed, according to several grave theologians, the penitent probably can defer the confession of these sins until he is bound to confess again by force of another obligation, and consequently he could defer it for several months and even to the time of annual confession. Yet no other confession can be interposed with these omitted. The reason is that it pertains to the integrity of confession to declare in the actual accusation all mortal sins not yet accused, which occur to memory or of which consciousness is had, as the Council of Trent speaks. But, as Suarez says, "those sins are in present consciousness which, committed after Baptism, have not been duly subjected to the keys through another confession." Therefore. Cf. Suarez, disp. 22, sect. 1, n. 1. - Bonac. disp. 5, q. 5, sect. 2, punct. 4, n. 32.

Question 2. Whether a penitent accusing a grave sin omitted in the preceding confession from forgetfulness or another legitimate cause, and already indirectly remitted, must necessarily be absolved again? Resp. Affirmatively, with the most common opinion. The reason is that all mortal sins from the institution of Christ are to be subjected to the keys, that they may be directly remitted. For although they have already been remitted, nevertheless they have not been remitted by force of the sacrament or by force of absolution, but only by force of grace infused through the sacrament and concomitantly with other sins. And although, absolutely speaking, the confessor could omit absolution with penitents who are accustomed to return to the same confessor, since these would be directly absolved in another confession; nevertheless it is better to impart absolution to all when it can easily be done, for the consolation of the penitent and tranquility of soul, as well as on account of the fruit to be received from the sacrament. Add the danger that the penitent may not be able to approach the same confessor again. - Cf. Sporer, n. 627.

I say. A difficulty intrinsic to confession itself, however grave it may be, never excuses from the integrity of confession; but a grave extrinsic difficulty excuses, or rather suspends the obligation, namely some moral inability, and a fortiori physical inability. The reason for the first is that, since confession by its nature and essentially is laborious, if any difficulty intrinsic to it, for example, great repugnance or shame, excused from integrity, for the most part the faithful would be excused from accusing mortal sins, and consequently the institution of the sacrament of Penance would collapse in great part. But the reason for the second is taken from the general principle that those things which are from positive institution do not oblige with a most grave inconvenience, as often as that inconvenience is extrinsic and is joined to them per accidens. - Yet it is required 1°. that only those sins be omitted which cannot be declared; 2°. that another confessor cannot be found, with whom present that extrinsic inconvenience would cease; 3°. that confession be necessary here and now, for example, because of Easter communion or the necessity of celebrating, or if someone living in the state of mortal sin would have to wait for another confessor for several days or even for one day. The reason for these conditions is that otherwise true moral inability would not be present. - Yet I said excuses, or rather suspends the obligation, because, when that most grave inconvenience ceases, the whole obligation of integrity again revives and presses. The reason is that the precept of confession is not fixed to some determinate time, but affects the whole life. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 487; and Hom. Ap. tract. 16, n. 39. - Baller. note (a) p. 381. De Augustinis, part. 2, Thes. 21, p. 266. Viva, on prop. 11 condemned by Alexander VII.

Question 1. What are the chief examples of inability, whether physical or moral? Resp. They are the following: 1°. Extreme infirmity, that is, when a dying person can express only one or another sin, or, already deprived of the use of the tongue, shows penance and asks absolution only by some sign. 2°. Defect of speech, as happens in the mute, who cannot confess integrally even by signs; or in foreigners, who are entirely or almost entirely ignorant of the language of the region in which they confess. 3°. Defect of time, for example, if soldiers must immediately go to battle. But the multitude of penitents alone does not excuse; for prop. 59 was condemned by Innocent XI, which has itself thus: "It is lawful to absolve sacramentally those only half-confessed, by reason of the great concourse of penitents, such as, for example, can happen on the day of some great festivity or indulgence." 4°. Danger to the life of the penitent, the confessor, or a third person; for example, if enemies arrive, if many are in danger of shipwreck or contagion. Indeed sometimes in the supreme danger of many persons, all, after exhibiting some general sign of contrition and confession, can be absolved thus by one utterance of the form: I absolve you all, etc. The Sacred Penitentiary responded on 6 Feb. 1915:

"Nothing prevents those thus absolved in the aforesaid circumstances from being admitted to receiving the sacred Eucharist. But let the chaplains of soldiers not omit, when opportunity is given, to teach them that absolution thus to be imparted will not profit unless they have been rightly disposed, and that the obligation remains for the same persons to make an integral confession in its own time, if they escape the danger."

5°. Danger to reputation, for example, if a priest about to celebrate soon, and needing a general confession, could not confess integrally without those standing by suspecting the matter. 6°. Danger of revelation or violation of the seal; for example, if a confessor cannot confess integrally without manifesting sins heard in confession, etc.; or if a penitent from a grave cause fears that the confessor may infringe the law of the seal. But this latter case, if nevertheless it should ever be said to happen, is very rare. 7°. Danger of scandal or fall, both on the part of the penitent and on the part of the confessor; for example, if a woman certainly knew the greatest fragility of the confessor, etc. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 479 and seq.

Question 2. Whether there is an obligation of confessing a mortal sin which cannot be explained without manifestation of the accomplice? Resp. Affirmatively, more probably, and the reason is that no legitimate excuse is given by which derogation may be made from the precept of integrity: for a positive precept cannot be said to be restricted by the natural precept of not defaming one's neighbor; for justice and charity prohibit only that another's crime be manifested without a reasonable cause; but here a cause is had, and indeed a grave one, namely the procuring of the integrity of confession and the direction of conscience. Besides, the accomplice, by committing sin, loses every right to reputation which he could have with the confessor in order to the confession of this sin; and he implicitly consents of his own accord to this detriment of reputation when he sins. Thus St. Alphonsus, n. 489, with many others. Yet other Doctors probably deny it, teaching that the circumstance from which the accomplice would be detected can, indeed according to some must, be omitted until another confessor is found; nor are they moved by the reasons of the prior opinion, which they say are a begging of the question. - But the patrons of both opinions agree in affirming the obligation of seeking another confessor. - Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, n. 395. Baller. note (b) pp. 382 and seq. Lehmkuhl, nn. 333 and seq.

Question 3. What are the causes excusing from the obligation of seeking another confessor, to whom the accomplice is unknown? Resp. They are the following: 1°. if danger of death or the precept of annual confession presses; 2°. if it would be grave for the penitent to omit confession or communion; 3°. if someone would open his conscience to another confessor with difficulty; 4°. if someone otherwise would have to remain in sin even for one day; 5°. if someone otherwise would be deprived of the benefit of some extraordinary indulgence; 6°. if by approaching the confessor to whom the accomplice is known there would be had better direction or notably greater consolation. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 490. - Baller. note (b) p. 383.

Question 4. Whether it is lawful for the confessor to ask the name of the accomplice, for example, for correction, etc.?

Resp. Negatively, at least generally speaking, both because this without a just cause induces one to detract from one's neighbor, and because it renders the sacrament of Penance odious. Thus the Code: Let him beware altogether lest he inquire into the name of the accomplice ... Can. 888, §2. It is further clear from Benedict XIV, Const. Suprema Omnium, Const. Ubi primum, Const. Ad eradicandam.

Question 5. Whether by the aforesaid declarations of Benedict XIV it is so forbidden to seek the name of the accomplice that in no case is this lawful? Resp. Negatively, both because Benedict XIV himself supposes cases in which this is lawful according to true, as he says, and sound opinions; and because sometimes the penitent must necessarily reveal the accomplice, and nevertheless cannot do this except through the confessor. - Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, nn. 424 and seq. Baller. note (a) p. 386.

Question 6. Whether and in what way the mute and the deaf are bound to confess? Resp. The mute are certainly bound to confess in some way, at least by signs, unless they are so ignorant and dull that nothing can be drawn from them. The reason is that the precept of confession regards all the faithful who can manifest their sins in some manner. Hence the sufficiently instructed mute are bound to confess integrally, at least by signs, if these are understood by the confessor; but if they are less instructed or can be understood by the confessor only with difficulty, it will suffice for them to manifest only one or another sin, or to signify in general that they are sinners and wish to avoid sin. But the deaf, having the use of the tongue, are bound on their part to confess the sins which occur to memory; but the confessor is not bound to question them for procuring the integrity of confession, on account of excessive difficulty of questioning and danger of revelation.

Question 7. Whether mute persons who know how to write are bound to confess by writing for procuring the integrity of confession? Resp. No one doubts that this can be permitted; but theologians warn that then care must be taken that the writing be destroyed. But if there is question of obligation, not a few very probably deny it, both on account of the danger of revelation, and because writing is an extraordinary means which has never been held in the Church as prescribed, and also because such a mode of confession is of itself public, since writing is of itself public. - Cf. Baller. note (a) p. 388.

Question 8. Whether and in what way those ignorant of the language of the place in which they wish to confess are bound to confess? Resp. Those ignorant of the language of the place in which they are living, and lacking a confessor by whom they can be understood, are bound, when the precept of annual confession presses and in the article of death, to confess in some way, at least by general signs; because although materially they cannot confess integrally, nevertheless they are bound to that which they can do. - But they are not bound to confess through an interpreter, because this is a most grave burden and liable to many dangers, for example, of revelation, ridicule, etc. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 479. - Baller. note (a) p. 389.

Question 9. Whether it is lawful for those who cannot confess otherwise to confess through an interpreter? Resp. Those who cannot confess otherwise are not prohibited, if they wish, from confessing through an interpreter, with abuses and scandals being guarded against, the prescription of can. 889, §2 remaining firm (Can. 903).

I say. Although in no way can a dying person be absolved who altogether refuses the sacrament of Penance, or who can in no way be presumed attrite; nevertheless any other dying person can and must be absolved, either absolutely or conditionally; absolutely indeed if in some way by voice or sign he confesses; conditionally, however, if attrition and confession can be presumed on some foundation, however slightly probable. The reason for the first is that otherwise the form of the sacrament would be placed without the dispositions essentially required. The reason for the second is that then confession would be formally integral. Finally, the reason for the third is that in extreme necessity it is lawful to administer a sacrament conditionally with an opinion even slightly probable. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 480 and seq.

You Will Resolve. 1°. All dying persons not yet deprived of the senses and consenting to absolution, and obeying the commands of the confessor, are to be absolved: absolutely indeed if they ask for confession of their own accord or if with a willing soul they propose to confess; but conditionally, if they are with difficulty and scarcely induced to some confession, or if there is prudent doubt concerning their sufficient disposition.

2°. At least conditionally, all dying persons deprived of the senses are to be absolved who before the privation of the senses expressly showed a desire for confession, for example, by ordering a priest to be called, etc. The reason is that they are judged truly to confess through the testimony of those standing by; for then it seems to be done as if a confession through an interpreter. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 481.

3°. Under condition all dying persons altogether deprived of the senses who have lived as Christians are to be absolved, even if then they gave no sign either of sorrow or of desire for confession. The reason is that these can always be presumed to have or to have had some lucid interval, in which by truly sensible signs, such as sighs, motion of the body, etc., they sought absolution. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 482. - Lacroix, n. 1162. - Elbel, n. 208.

4°. Other dying persons deprived of the senses who have lived little as Christians are also to be absolved conditionally; because in them too penance and a desire for confession, which they may have signified outwardly, can still be presumed in some way. - Cf. Lacroix, ibid. - Baller. note (b) p. 390.

5°. A dying person deprived of the senses in the very act of sin, for example, in a duel, adultery, theft, etc., can probably be absolved under condition. The reason is that even he can be sufficiently disposed. This especially has place for one who perhaps was led to the sin by fear, human respect, etc. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 483. Elbel, n. 211.

6°. Indeed, probably and under condition, those can be absolved who up to the privation of the senses rejected the ministry of the priest. For these sometimes even in that state can know those standing by, indeed even perceive the things which are said, and wish sighs, etc., to be taken as signs of a petition for absolution because of their evil will changed through divine help. More strictly, Bucceroni, n. 754bis.

7°. It is also lawful to give absolution to a dying schismatic existing in good faith, scandal being removed; for thus the Holy Office responded to a certain case. A schismatic woman made a confession in a Church before a priest who found that she was not of the body of the Church, but was very well instructed in the principal truths of faith, and evidently existing in good faith. Fearing lest further inquiry would be harmful to her, he absolved her as confessed and contrite. To the question: "Whether material schismatics, who are in good faith, can ever be absolved?" the response was: "When scandal cannot be avoided, Negatively, except in the article of death; and then with scandal effectively removed." 20 July 1898. Gennari, Consultazioni, v. 1, p. 563.

8°. Conditional absolution can be given to a material heretic deprived of the senses. Thus altogether many. Gury, Cas. n. 488. "Because it can be presumed in some measure that here and now, recognizing the truth, he wishes to die in the Catholic religion, and consequently to confess and to be absolved. For this can happen absolutely. ..." "Then, in a case of necessity," says Bucceroni with Gury, "it is lawful to use even a slightly probable opinion in favor of one in danger." Bucceroni, Casus 2, n. 127. 5. Lehmkuhl, n. 651. Gennari, ibid.

9°. With a heretic not deprived of the senses a zealous priest can act thus, according to Lacroix:

"If a Catholic priest understands that a non-Catholic man has been brought to extremes, he acts prudently, unless something else prevents, if he approaches him ... he can elicit with him acts of faith, hope, and charity, and of perfect contrition for sins. But if the circumstances allow, he can afterward ask whether, if he knew that he was not in the true faith, he would not wish to embrace another, and to do all things necessary for salvation, whether he would not wish to confess and be absolved, if this were necessary for salvation. If he assents to this ... he can be absolved under condition." Lacroix, l. 6, p. 2, n. 1866. - Cf. Bucceroni, Cas. 2, n. 127, 6. - Lehmkuhl, 11th ed. n. 651. - Gennari, Consultazioni, v. 1, 260. - Varceno, Com. Theol. Mor. De Poen. art. v. - Ball.-Palm. Op. Mor. v. 5, n. 394, 4°.

Let Saint Augustine be heard, "de Conj. adult." lib. 1, chap. 26, n. 33 (M. 40, c. 469): "Therefore for catechumens placed at the end of this life, if by illness or some accident they are so oppressed that, although still alive, nevertheless they cannot ask Baptism for themselves or respond to the questions, let the fact that their will is already known in the Christian faith profit them, so that they may be baptized in the same way in which infants are baptized, whose will has not yet appeared at all. Yet not on that account ought we to condemn those who act more timidly than it would seem to us ought to be done. ... But not only is it incredible that a catechumen should not wish to be baptized at the end of this life; but also if his will is uncertain, it is far better to give to one unwilling than to deny to one willing, where whether he wishes or does not wish is not apparent, yet in such a way that it is more credible that he, if he could, would say that he would rather receive those Sacraments without which he already believed he ought not to go out from the body." And chap. 28, 35: - "I think that not only other catechumens, but even those themselves who, being joined to living spouses, retain adulterous unions, although when sound in body we do not admit them to Baptism; nevertheless, if they lie desperate and cannot respond for themselves, must be baptized, so that even this sin may be washed away by the laver of regeneration. For who knows whether perhaps they had determined to be detained by the enticement of adulterous flesh up to Baptism? But if, having recovered from that desperation, they are able to live, either they will do what they determined, or, having been taught, they will obey, or there will be done concerning them as contemners what ought to be done concerning such baptized persons. But the same reason which belongs to Baptism belongs also to reconciliation, if perhaps the danger of ending life has overtaken one doing penance. For Mother Church ought not to wish even these to go out from this life without the pledge of their peace."

And these principles of solutions can indeed be most useful in this tremendous moment of death. Think of a priest called to a dying man who lives with a concubine, he himself now separated by divorce from his true wife: he repents of the deed; he promises separation, which now becomes impossible; the priest has before him one disposed. But if he can obtain the assistance of witnesses so that his repentance may be publicly established, so much the better. But if he cannot obtain even this, let him absolve the dying man, visit him frequently, and strengthen his dispositions. - Cf. "Nouvelle Rev. Theolog." v. 46, n. 415.

I say. The penitent is bound per se under grave obligation, before he approaches confession, to institute a diligent examination of mortal sins. But this diligence, although it ought to be serious, and as great as is usually employed in affairs of great moment, nevertheless is not required equal for all, nor so exact that it should be prolonged as long as there is hope of finding some new sin. The reason of the first is, both because the Council of Trent expressly requires a diligent discussion of oneself, and because the obligation of the end imports the obligation of the means: but diligent examination is a means essentially ordered to procuring integrity in confession. But the reason of the second is that, from the very nature of the matter, those who confess frequently or lead a private and tranquil life need less examination than those who rarely approach this sacrament or are wholly entangled in worldly affairs. Finally, the reason of the third is that, as Card. de Lugo wisely admonishes, a most exact examination is not required, but a human one, that is, such that the sacrament is not rendered too grave and burdensome. - Cf. Council of Trent, sess. 14, chap. 5. - Lugo, disp. 16, n. 590. - Baller. note (b) p. 392.

11. Sins omitted or forgotten in confession on account of an instant danger of life, or on account of some other cause, we are not bound to express in the following confession.

XI. Fr. Dominic Viva in his Treatise on Proposition 15 of Alexander VIII, no. 10: “Nor would the law of grace excel the ancient or Mosaic or natural law, in which contrition without sacramental confession sufficed; whence THE YOKE OF CHRIST COULD NOT BE CALLED SWEET AND THE BURDEN LIGHT. … Therefore it must be said that contrition is not prerequired to the sacrament, but that mere attrition conceived from the mere fear of punishments suffices.”

XXI. Fr. Gobat, tract 7, no. 324: “The malice of a circumstance changing the species is not contracted, and consequently is not to be confessed, unless the penitent, when he was committing the sin, at least doubted whether such a circumstance were not present, and whether on account of it a peculiar sin were not contracted. So the common sense of theologians holds. Use, my good man, this rule FREQUENTLY, especially in hearing the confessions of rustics, and namely when the malice of the circumstance is known to the learned alone.”

XI. Merbesius: If a penitent should fall frequently into mortal sins, he could be proved for two months, or for a whole three months; at whose expiry, if a true amendment were foreseen, proceeding from his entire fidelity and from the force by which he endeavoured to tear out from his soul sins implanted by long custom, he could be absolved. Page 141, column 1.

IV. QUESTION II. What diligence is to be employed in the examination of conscience? ANSWER. Two extremes are to be guarded against in this most grave business. Excessive diligence, which brings anguish and torture to the mind and disturbs the soul, is to be avoided. For confession is not a butchery of souls, as the Calvinists blurt out, but an emptying of wounds and a remedy for future ones. The other extreme of negligence is also to be avoided. Let us seriously and maturely recall the sins committed. A few admonitions I shall add.

VIII. If therefore he has found that he had forgotten a third or a fourth part of his sins, he can then persuade himself that he did send before the due examination. False therefore and vain is the aforesaid rule. The quantity of time to be spent in the examination of conscience cannot be prescribed. The more a conscience is wounded with graver outrages, the more diligently is it to be inspected.

I. That is called a circumstance which accidentally stands about a human act, which takes its species from an object either good or evil. One circumstance is physical, as if a man kill another with a dagger, with poison, with a firearm; another moral, which in the genus of morals changes the species, or adds a new species of malice, as if a man kill his father, a religious, and so forth. For besides homicide there is added the crime of parricide, of sacrilege, and so forth. There is an obligation of confessing circumstances not physical but moral, which change the species, as all confess. Seven circumstances are enumerated, contained in this verse:

Who, what, where, by what helps, why, how, and when.

II. The circumstance who betrays the state, qualities, and profession of the penitent, as if he be a cleric, a priest, a monk, married, bound by a vow, an advocate, a judge, a father of a family, and so forth.

III. QUESTION I. What is to be said of the opinion denying the duty of confessing circumstances changing the species, when the sinner does not doubt of them? ANSWER. Fr. George Gobat, tract 7, no. 524, says: “The malice of a circumstance changing the species is not contracted, and therefore is not to be confessed, unless the penitent, when he was committing the sin, at least DOUBTED whether such a circumstance were present or not, and whether on account of it a peculiar sin were not contracted. So indeed the COMMON SENSE OF THEOLOGIANS. Use, my good man, this rule frequently, especially in receiving the confessions of the rude, and namely when the circumstance is known to the vulgar of the Doctors alone.”

IV. What vulgar of the Doctors is that? Sinners commit adultery, fornicate, or perpetrate incest, having their soul absorbed with the delight of the outrage, and think of nothing else besides the circumstance changing the species. Is no one therefore bound to confess circumstances changing the species, unless the penitent, says Fr. Gobat, at least doubted when he was committing the sin? That after the deed committed with his sister, with another's wife, with a virgin consecrated to God, he should know the duty of manifesting a circumstance specifically diverse, matters nothing. He must, when he sins, at least doubt, in order to be bound to confess. Use, my good man, this rule frequently. Beware, all confessors, I subjoin, of this false rule.

V. QUESTION II. Is a religious initiated in sacred Orders bound to explain the circumstance of the solemn vow? ANSWER. The Salmanticenses, Diana, Malfesius, Castropalao, and Antony of the Holy Ghost deny it. But other grave theologians affirm it, whose opinion is true. He who sins with a novice, male or female, in the year of probation is bound to confess this circumstance, whatever some say to the contrary. Since although they have not emitted a vow, they are nevertheless first-fruits, victims destined to be immolated to God in sacrifice. To violate these hosts and victims pleasing to God bears before the common sense an enormous deformity. A bride and bridegroom knowing one another carnally, or knowing themselves with others, ought according to the more probable opinion to manifest this circumstance.

VI. A virgin who spontaneously fornicates for the first time ought to lay open this circumstance: because this virgin inflicts a peculiar injury, as upon her parents, so upon God, from whom she received the gift of virginity, when she squanders such virginity.

VII. QUESTION III. Is a confessor who sins with a penitent bound to confess it? ANSWER. The discourse is not of a confessor soliciting, but of a confessor absolutely sinning with a penitent. Some deny it, as the Salmanticenses relate. But other grave theologians affirm it, whose opinion is true. What? A confessor is a judge, a teacher, and a physician. He becomes a wolf devouring the sheep; and is this not to be manifested in confession? Our opinion is favoured by the reservation made to themselves by bishops in various dioceses concerning an act, or an attempt, toward base things with a spiritual daughter.

VIII. If a bishop or a prelate of a Religion fornicate, commit adultery, get drunk, and so forth, he is bound to explain the circumstance, on account of the grave scandal which he brings at least to his accomplice, whatever some say to the contrary. Similarly governors of a city, judges, rectors, and the like, who by office are bound to hinder thefts and crimes of injustice, if they themselves steal, are not bound, as some say, to manifest this circumstance, although they ought to lay open the omission by which they did not hinder others' thefts. But this opinion is to me false. For they are bound to confess this circumstance. Similarly false to me is the opinion teaching that a priest striking a layman with shedding of blood is not bound in confession to manifest that he is a priest. For a priest by reason of his dignity perpetrates a malice distinct from the malice of simple striking. A eunuch, or a frigid fornicator, is bound to explain the circumstance of impotence for natural copulation, because he perpetrates a sin against nature.

IX. QUESTION IV. What is to be said of the opinion of those denying the duty of confessing a habit of sinning? ANSWER. Fr. Claude La Croix, Book 6, part 2, no. 968, answers that, speaking of itself, such a habit is not to be laid open; and for this opinion he cites Suárez, Vásquez, Reginald, and Lupus. The same opinion the Salmanticenses defend, and cite Diana and Castropalao. This is the reason which Fr. La Croix assigns: “No one, speaking of itself, is bound to confess the same sin twice. But past sins, by which the habit was caused, have been confessed heretofore, as is supposed; and the present sin is not aggravated but rather diminished BY REASON OF THE PRECEDING HABIT, which in some manner diminishes liberty. Therefore it is not necessary to make mention of past sins, or of the habit.”

X. Fr. Dominic Viva in his Course of Theology, Vol. II, part 6, question 5, no. 2: “Although a penitent be bound to answer a confessor questioning him concerning a habit of sin, since the opposite opinion was condemned by Innocent XI … nevertheless, speaking of itself, a habit of this kind is not to be laid open.”

XI. Speaking of itself, this doctrine is false and condemned, contained in proposition 58 condemned by Innocent XI. Speaking of itself, is a sick man not bound to lay open to his physician the state, the habit, and the length of his bodily infirmity? If crowds, if husbandmen, if plebeian men themselves and minds not learned in the academies but rude, polished by the light of nature alone, were to read doctrines of this kind, they would suffer grave scandal. What? Is sin diminished by an inveterate habit? Do obstinate, hardened, and inveterate sinners therefore sin less than those who sin once or twice? A habit, you say, diminishes liberty. What of this? This diminution is voluntary. The sinners themselves freely fabricate their own fetters. All the Fathers affirm that those who sin from habit sin from a depraved malice. Here the diminution of liberty in those who from habit perjure themselves, blaspheme, and fornicate is consequent, not antecedent, as the true theologians teach with St. Thomas, I-II, q. 78, art. 2, and question 76, article 4, reply 1. It aggravates therefore, and does not diminish, the malice of the sin.

XII. I prove that the described doctrine of Frs. La Croix, Viva, de Lugo, and others is contained in this condemned thesis 58: We are not bound to confess to a confessor questioning us a habit of some sin. A confessor can by right question only concerning those sins which a penitent is bound to manifest. Therefore if a confessor can by right question concerning a habit of sinning, a penitent is bound to manifest it. What to this? He ought to manifest it, reply the casuists, if he be questioned, but otherwise if the confessor keep silence. A vain cavil. The duty of manifesting precedes the right of questioning. For unless there were in the penitent a duty of manifesting, the confessor could not question; since he can question only concerning those things which the penitent is bound to lay open. But, reasonings being dismissed, let the common sense of all Christians be consulted, who, being sincerely contrite, first of all set forth the state, the habit, and the custom of sinning. Scarcely would the recounted doctrine have come into the mind of any Christian, had not the casuists devised it. Hence gather how true it is that which I have more often indicated, namely that by one arbitrary little distinction the theses condemned by the Church are eluded, and the most clear testimonies of holy Scripture itself.

XIII. QUESTION V. What is to be said of sins perpetrated from habit? ANSWER. Fr. Claude La Croix proposes this question, namely whether sins which from a morally evil habit are afterwards done inadvertently are to be confessed. He answers, Book 2, part 1: “If we suppose that when those things are done there is present no advertence at all to the malice, such things will have no new malice, as is established from what is said in Book 5, question 2, no. 16 and following; and consequently, since these things are not sins of themselves, nor externally complete any internal sin, but are only effects of sin according to what is said at no. 974, there is no obligation of confessing them. … Which is true according to many with Dicastillo, although that habit be not retracted.”

XIV. When therefore Christians blaspheme, perjure themselves, and desire to commit adultery from a habit not retracted and morally evil, if there be present no advertence, are these crimes not to be confessed? Why? Because they are not new sins. Therefore the precepts of not perjuring oneself, of not blaspheming, of not desiring another's wife are impossible to those who sin from a habit not retracted. Therefore you defend Jansenism. Concerning this opinion let the wise judge.

XV. QUESTION VI. What is to be said of the opinion of Fr. Tamburini saying that the degrees of consanguinity of a sin perpetrated with a mother, or with a cousin, are not to be manifested? ANSWER. Fr. Tamburini, Book 2, Method of Confession, chapter 7, § 7, no. 48, writes these things: “I say it is probable, from St. Thomas, II-II, q. 16, art. 9, and Cajetan in the same place, that consanguinity does not differ in species from affinity, nor one degree of these from the others. So Filliucci, saying that it is the opinion of St. Thomas, Cajetan, Soto, and almost the Thomists; Gregory; Megala — both in Diana. Whence, although without doubt it be graver to offend against one degree, for example against the first with a mother, than against another, for example with a cousin, nevertheless because the species is not changed, I think that these are not specially to be manifested in confession.”

XVI. Scarcely is it possible to find any one of the rustics or idiots who, if he lay with his mother or with his sister, would not conceive a horrid malice, and would not be exceedingly ashamed to manifest so great a crime. And does Fr. Tamburini with Fr. Filliucci exempt Christians guilty of so great a crime from the obligation of laying open so enormous a circumstance? Will it be enough for these to say, I have committed incest, without declaring whether with a mother or with a sister? There is no need that I should refute this false opinion at greater length. Let the wise judge. Most injuriously is this opinion here fastened upon St. Thomas, as will presently be plain.

I. With a full pen I have treated this question in Vol. IX, Book 6, part 1, dissertation 4, chapter 4. In few words I shall here touch upon it. You steal one gold piece, or a hundred, or a thousand. The sin is within the same species of theft. But a theft of a thousand gold pieces is notably graver than a theft of one gold piece. Theologians dispute on either side whether penitents are bound to confess circumstances of this kind morally aggravating within the same species.

II. First of all the doctrine of St. Thomas is to be vindicated. The Salmanticenses Scholastici, most excellent maintainers of the doctrine of St. Thomas, object the following testimony from Book 4 of the Sentences, distinction 16, question 3, article 2: For some say that all circumstances which add some notable quantity to a sin are of necessity to be confessed, if they occur to the memory. But others say that they are not of necessity to be confessed, unless they be circumstances which draw to another genus of sin. And this is more probable. Here those illustrious theologians stop, and determine that St. Thomas stands on their side. But if the whole doctrine of the Angelic Doctor be regarded, I do not see whence the Salmanticenses can glory in his patronage in this cause. For thus St. Thomas straightway goes on: But it must be added, those which draw to another species of mortal sin. … OF WHICH THE REASON IS (N.B.) that venial sins are not of necessity of confession, BUT ONLY MORTAL, which have in a certain manner an infinite quantity: because circumstances which do not give another species to a sin, or which do indeed give one, BUT NOT OF MORTAL SIN, are not of necessity of confession; and yet to confess these belongs to the perfection of confession, as has been said of VENIAL SINS.

III. A threefold malice can lie in a circumstance: first, that which changes the species; second, that which increases the malice within the confines of venial sin; third, that which mortally increases the malice. St. Thomas in the testimony adduced teaches that circumstances which either do not change the species, or do not mortally increase the malice, are not necessarily to be confessed. For if it increase only venially, within the limits of venial sin, even notably, their confession is not necessary. For one venial sin is graver than another, as is plain in the theft of one farthing and of one chicken. These circumstances are not of necessity to be confessed, says the Angelic. For what do these words betray, which govern the whole doctrine of the article? OF WHICH THE REASON IS, that venial sins are not of necessity of confession, but only mortal, which have in a certain manner an infinite quantity. Our opponents cry out that St. Thomas expressly treats of circumstances which add some notable quantity. It is true that he teaches this at the beginning of the article; but these words, which bear an ambiguity as to whether St. Thomas is speaking of a notable quantity venial or mortal, the same holy Doctor forthwith in the course of the article expounds as to be understood of a notable venial quantity. THE REASON IS, because venial sins are not of necessity of confession. Tell me: is one venial sin given notably graver than another? All affirm it. By what daring therefore do you wrench this notable quantity by main force to the mortal, when the Angelic plainly asserts that he speaks of a notable venial addition? The reason is, because venial sins, and so forth. But that the mouths of our adversaries may be utterly stopped, these other words of the Angelic are to be recalled beneath the eyes: Aggravating circumstances which do not attribute another species to a sin, or which do indeed attribute one, BUT NOT OF MORTAL SIN, are not of necessity of confession. Of which the reason is, that we are not bound necessarily to confess venial sins. So decisive, so peremptory are these things that they leave no place for arguing and cavilling. If you desire more, consult Vol. IX, in the place cited.

IV. The doctrine of St. Thomas being briefly vindicated, I say that circumstances mortally aggravating within the same species are to be manifested in confession. I prove this opinion, which the graver theologians defend, by the authority of the Tridentine Catechism, which, part 2, chapter 5, § 43, teaches these things: “The circumstances of sins are to be laid open when a man confesses. But in confession that highest care and diligence is to be employed which we are wont to put forth in the gravest matters; and all study is to be conferred upon this, that we may heal the wounds of the soul and tear out the roots of sin. Nor is it enough only to explain grave sins by narrating them, but also those things which stand about each sin, and greatly increase or diminish its depravity. For certain circumstances are so grave that from them alone the character of a deadly sin is constituted. Wherefore all these things it behoves always to weigh. For if a man kill another, it must be explained whether that man was initiated in sacred things, or profane; and likewise if he lay with a woman, he must needs lay open whether she was free by the law of matrimony, or another's wife, or a kinswoman, or consecrated to God by the promise of some vow. For these constitute diverse kinds of sins: so that the first indeed is called by the Doctors of divine things simple fornication, the second adultery, the third incest, the fourth sacrilege. Theft also is to be numbered among sins. But if a man steal a gold coin, he sins altogether more lightly than he who steals a hundred, or two hundred, or some vast quantity of gold, and especially he who has carried off sacred money. The same account pertains also to place and to time, whose examples are better known from many books than that they should be enumerated by us. These things therefore, as we have said, ARE TO BE ENUMERATED. But those which do not greatly increase the depravity of the matter can be omitted without crime.”

V. As the Fathers of Trent, so the authors of the Catechism always followed the doctrine of St. Thomas, which you see here declared and confirmed. This doctrine the most learned Salmanticenses, to be looked up to by me under many titles, ought to have meditated.

VI. The Venerable Innocent XI condemned this thesis: We are not bound to confess to a confessor questioning us a habit of some sin. These two things — the right of questioning and the duty of manifesting — are so conjoined that the one cannot subsist without the other. Nay, the duty of manifesting precedes the right of questioning, as I have said. A habit of fornicating or of perjuring oneself does not change the species, but only aggravates the malice within the same species. The doctrine denying the duty of answering has been condemned. Therefore the doctrine denying the duty of manifesting an aggravating circumstance has been condemned.

VII. Our opinion is demonstrated by reason. He who knowingly keeps silence about an accession of mortal malice does not make a formally whole confession. He who steals a hundred gold coins, of which each constitutes the matter of a mortal theft, perpetrates a theft which is equivalent to a hundred deadly thefts. Therefore he who confesses only the grave matter, namely of one gold piece, keeps silence about ninety-nine mortal sins. By a single act of the will you covet ten persons specifically diverse in the genus of morals — suppose a mother, a daughter, a nun, a married woman, a virgin, a boy, and so forth. Does he make a formally whole confession who does not confess these persons morally diverse in species coveted by a single act? You deny it. Therefore he does not make a formally whole confession who by a single act perpetrated a hundred mortal thefts numerically distinct; or who by a single act coveted several persons distinct by moral number alone. I prove the consequence. You are equally bound to confess mortal sins distinct by number and by species, as all teach. Therefore a virtual numerical multiplication is equally to be confessed as a virtual specific multiplication. See more in the place cited.

I. QUESTION I. What are the significations of the circumstance what? ANSWER. It signifies the quantity and quality of the sin, and of the person with whom one sins. They dispute whether the person is to be expressed concerning whom a man takes morose delight, which would have to be manifested if the deed followed. The affirmative opinion is to me true, the negative false: since common sense itself execrates as something most enormous a venereal delight conceived from lying with a mother.

II. Fr. La Croix, Book 6, part 2, no. 1030, writes: “He who without any desire looks upon a person with a lustful eye is not bound to say (in confession) of what sort the person was.” He subjoins there at no. 1031: “He who without desire touched a girl lustfully, according to Diana, satisfies by saying that he touched her so many times basely, saying nothing of the parts in which he touched her.” He subjoins again: “Others say PROBABLY that it is to be expressed if he touched a shameful part.” He leaves it to the reader, after the sceptical manner, to choose for himself what pleases him more. And why ought he not to express that he looked lustfully upon his mother, his sister, a nun, and so forth? Why ought he not to manifest that he touched a hand, cheeks, breasts, or shameful parts? What is the reason of the silence? The opinions probably denying the duty of manifesting the aforesaid circumstance are false.

III. Fr. La Croix goes on in the same place, no. 1040: “He who has fornicated with three at one time, or thrice with one, satisfies by saying that he has thrice fornicated; nor is he bound to say whether it was one or several, whether they were harlots or others, provided he has not cooperated to the hindering of generation. Bonacina, Tamburini.”

IV. Unless the casuists had devised figments of this kind, any Christian by the light of nature would express the three women, because they are three most grave and diverse scandals. But why ought he not to express the three women? Because the yoke is sweet, they say, and it ought not to be made heavy. The aforesaid opinion is false and improbable.

V. The same La Croix in the same place, no. 1041: “If a priest fornicate with a daughter of confession, St. Thomas, Soto, Sánchez, and other most grave authors, whom he relates and follows, and Aversa, part 16, § 14, still say that a new species of malice is contracted: because canon law calls it a certain adultery or incest; and in fact it seems to be a species of irreverence and sacrilege against the sacrament. On the contrary, that it is simple fornication, and that it can be kept silent that she was a daughter of confession, teach Ledesma, Vásquez, Sá, Bonacina, Filliucci, Sánchez, Pontius, Hurtado, Ochagavia, Dicastillo, Tamburini, Diana, Lupus — because from confession no spiritual kinship arises, and so forth. … Each opinion is probable. The first is more conformable to canon law; but the second seems from reason the more probable.”

VI. Probabilism creeps everywhere. Each is probable, the true and the false. The first is more conformable to canon law; the second from reason more probable, says Fr. La Croix. And why? Because Vásquez, Bonacina, Filliucci, Hurtado, Ochagavia, Dicastillo, Tamburini, and Diana comprehended the rights of reason more deeply than the Fathers, than the Councils, than the Pontiffs founders of canon law. This opinion, which Fr. La Croix calls the more probable, is false and lax, as the most wise Pontiff Benedict XIV declared it, when he took away from confessors the authority of absolving from this crime. Do the Pontiffs then publish canons without reason? Is there an appeal from the sacred canons to the tribunal of reason? Is not reason darkened by original sin? More things would occur to be said of this first circumstance; but see them, Vol. IX, dissertation 4, chapter 7.

VII. QUESTION II. What does the circumstance where betray? ANSWER. It indicates the place, and changes the species, as if a man in a sacred place shed human blood, fornicate, pollute himself, steal, or violate ecclesiastical immunity. He who in a sacred place steals a sacred thing perpetrates a sacrilege on a twofold title, and this ought to be expressed in confession. He who steals in a sacred place a profane thing — suppose a purse from a rich man — perpetrates a sacrilege, as authors commonly teach. Fr. Viva nevertheless after his manner adverts, citing de Lugo, Lessius, and Henríquez, that it can probably be thought not to be sacrilege, save when the thing has been placed in the Church for custody. But this figment is arbitrary and false. Fr. La Croix, Book 6, part 1, no. 1090, introduces Dicastillo, who acknowledges an almost equal probability in each opinion, yet nevertheless inclines to the first. The first alone is true, the other false.

VIII. Homicide perpetrated in a church without shedding of blood is sacrilege. He who, being in a church, kills another outside the church is sacrilegious. Similarly he who, being outside a church, kills with a missile another within the church is sacrilegious. He who strikes another with shedding of blood commits sacrilege. It is required nevertheless, says someone, that the shedding of blood be great, because shedding signifies a copious flow. A mortal wound made with a dagger emits only a few drops of blood. He therefore who strikes with a dagger unto death will not be sacrilegious. What will be the measure of that great flow? But why do I waste time in refuting a false opinion? False also is the opinion of others teaching that a pollution secretly done in a church is not sacrilege.

IX. QUESTION III. What is to be said of the opinion denying that immodest touches in a church are sacrilegious? ANSWER. That it is false is certain to me.

X. For whence will you gather that to kiss women and to touch their breasts and other parts, even publicly in a church, is not sacrilege? This doctrine terrifies me. Timorous and pusillanimous the probabilists have said I am. Be it so. But I reject this opinion as altogether false. Then only, subjoins Fr. La Croix, would sacrilege be committed, when a man should publicly touch a harlot immodestly in the presence of the altar. But if a man, behind the altar, or further from the altar, in the middle of the church, should publicly touch a harlot or another woman immodestly, would he not commit sacrilege? Ought it not to be expressed that the deed was done in a sacred place? Whether these be paradoxes repugnant to common sense, let the judgment be others'.

XI. QUESTION IV. What do the circumstances by what helps and why indicate? ANSWER. The circumstance by what helps signifies the counsels, persuasions, and means which a man uses for sinning. Why betrays the end on account of which a man sins, as if he steal for the sake of committing adultery. A sin of itself venial can become deadly on account of a mortally depraved end, as when a man lies that he may induce a woman to fornication.

Caius, a missionary priest, is called very early in the morning to a certain house where several families live, to administer the sacraments to the sick. He is led to a certain room, not large but the only one they have, where he finds two old people, husband and wife, in the same bed suffering from influenza and, as it seems, in danger of death. He decides first to hear their confessions, but does not know how this can be done while preserving the seal. After deliberating about the matter, he approaches the side where the husband lies, asks whether he wishes to confess, and, when he assents, whether he is sorry for all the sins of his life; when he likewise assents, Caius absolves him, imposing the obligation of confessing integrally if he afterwards recovers. Approaching the other side of the bed, he does almost the same thing in the same words for the wife; finally, after administering the other sacraments, he leaves the sick with a blessing. Hence it is asked:

1. Is an integral confession required in the sacrament of Penance, and by what law?

2. Can someone be excused from an integral confession, and when?

3. What is to be said of Caius’s manner of acting?

1. Is a full confession required in Penance and by what law?

A full confession of all mortal sins that have not been directly absolved before is required in the sacrament of Penance by divine law, as the Council of Trent defined.¹

1 Seas, xiv, can. 7; Manual of Moral Theology, vol. ii, 164.

2. Can one be excused from a full confession and when?

Yes, physical and moral impossibility excuse a penitent from making a full confession. By moral impossibility is meant that a full confession could not be made without grave inconvenience, extrinsic to confession, affecting the penitent, the confessor, or some third person.²

2 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. ii, 168.

3. The case. The danger of a violation of the seal of confession, or the danger lest some one other than the confessor should hear the confession of the penitent, is considered by divines to be a sufficient inconvenience to excuse a penitent from making a full confession. There was, as is clear, this danger in the case proposed, and so Caius was justified in absolving the old couple without requiring a full and specific confession from them. If Caius thought that the suggestion of some venial fault, such as impatience, which they would find no difficulty in acknowledging in the hearing of the other party, would serve to make their contrition more definite and certain, there would, we think, be no objection to his mentioning such a sin, and asking them if they had been guilty of it, and were now sorry for it, and for all the other sins which they had committed.

Titia, who is thought to be near death, but nevertheless is quite sanae mentis, although of very weak memory, is not able to remember any sin, while trying to make her Confession to Cajus, her confessor. To all questions put to her by her confessor, in his endeavor to discover materia absolutionis, she answers: "I can not recollect any sin, not even from my past life." But she desires very much to be absolved, and to receive the Holy Viaticum and Extreme Unction. As there would evidently be danger in delay, Cajus accedes toher wishes, and absolves her, afterward giving her Holy Communion and anointing her.

Quaeritur.—Did Cajus do right? Or should he have absolved her on the explicit condition, "Si peccata commisisti?"

Solution.—I. Principles.—Material integrity is not always required for a good Confession. Formal integrity is always required; that is, as complete a Confession of mortal sins as is morally possible for the penitent at the moment of Confession. Very often this formal integrity is the only integrity possible, and therefore the only integrity required for a good and sufficient Confession. The Council of Trent, in the 5th chapter of the 14th session, speaks of the integrity required for a good Confession, and meets the objection of the Reformers that Confession as required by the Church is an impossible thing. Following are the words of the Council: “For it is established that nothing else is required of penitents in the Church than that, after each has examined himself more diligently and explored all the folds and recesses of his conscience, he confess those sins by which he remembers having mortally offended his Lord and God. But the remaining sins which do not occur to one who reflects diligently are understood to be included collectively in the same Confession, for which we faithfully say with the prophet: Cleanse me from my hidden sins.

” The reason of this, of course, lies in the fact that Almighty God does not require anything impossible of us. The Confession is formaliter integra, when the penitent is honestly minded to confess all mortal sins, according to their number and their kind and the circumstances that change their nature, and does his best to make as full a Confession as he can, although for some reason, beyond his control, v. g., oblivio inculpabilis, he does not make a materialiter Integra confession. Only, it is required of him that when the obstacle to a materially complete Confession is removed, he must make his Confession materially complete. Pope Alexander VII, on September 24, 1665, condemned the following proposition: “We are not bound to state in a subsequent Confession sins omitted or forgotten in Confession because of imminent danger of death or for another reason.”

Further it must be remarked that no difficulty intrinsic to Confession, inherent in its very nature, as for instance, the shame or confusion experienced in confessing our sins, is ever a sufficient reason for making a materially incomplete Confession. For since our blessed Lord has ordained that we must confess all mortal sins to his lawfully ordained representatives on earth, therefore he has also ordained that we must take upon ourselves whatever hardships are inseparable from such Confession, which hardships may serve as a penance for sin, and are very wholesome and salutary for the penitent. Thus the shame and confusion that a penitent may feel while confessing his sins, or the hardships that we are known personally to the confessor and that there may be a falling off in his esteem for us, would be no excuse for making an incomplete Confession. For were such reasons sufficient to justify an incomplete Confession, then the faithful would easily persuade themselves that they were justified in making an incomplete Confession, and this divine ordinance would fail, to a large degree, of its purpose, or, as Gury expresses it: “The reason is that Confession is by its nature essentially laborious; and therefore, if a grave difficulty—for example, great repugnance or shame—excused from integrity, the faithful would generally be excused from accusing themselves of mortal sins, and consequently the institution of the Sacrament of Penance would for the most part collapse. Moreover, the Church could not reserve atrocious crimes, because that creates no slight inconvenience for penitents” (II. n. 497). Neither would the great number of penitents excuse one from the material integrity required in the Confession, "concursus magnus poenitentium non excusat," v. g., on a great feast day, or the occasion of a plenary indulgence during a jubilee. Pope Innocent XI, on March 2, 1679, condemned the following proposition: “It is lawful sacramentally to absolve persons who have confessed only partially because of a great concourse of penitents, such as may occur, for example, on the day of some great feast or indulgence.” That confessor would be guilty of sacrilegious conduct, indeed, who, on the occasion of a great crowd of penitents, would dispense them from the obligation of making a materialiter Integra Confession, and would grant absolution after the Confession of one or another mortal sin. Any handbook of moral theology may be consulted on this matter.

II. Application of Principles.—In the case, as stated above, Titia is conscious, in a general way, that she is guilty of sin, and in this conviction she accuses herself, giving evidence of a contrite heart, and praying to be absolved. That she confesses no sin in particular arises from the fact that her memory is weak, and perhaps also from want of sufficient religious instruction, but it has not its reason in any false shame or sinful negligence. For it not seldom happens that many are so uninstructed, and of such poor intellectual parts, that, although they know in a general way that they have sinned, and express true sorrow for their sins, they nevertheless are unable to recall any sin in particular. This class of penitents is not to be confounded with another class, namely, those penitents that imagine they have no sins, because they are blinded by self-conceit. We argue, therefore, that in the present case, Titia has made a formaliter integra Confession, in as far as she gives evidence of true contrition for her sins, and by praying to be absolved makes a Confession of her sins in as far as it is possible for her under the present i circumstances. "Ad impossibile nemo tenetur" must be applied in this case. She does the best she can, considering her condition, and that is all that is required of her.

Tappehorn, in his able work on the Sacrament of Penance, says: "If the particular sin can not be remembered or confessed, it will suffice to indicate its species; if this is impossible, it is sufficient to confess that one has sinned mortally, although one can not remember or confess in what particular way." The confessor, therefore, ought to absolve Titia unconditionally. “Any dying person who in some manner, by voice or sign, confesses or asks for absolution can and ought to be absolved, and indeed absolutely. The reason is that all the requisites for the Sacrament and for a formally complete Confession are present.” (Gury, II, n. 505; St. Lig. n. 408.)

The expressed wish to be absolved contains in itself a Confession that one has sinned. If now the confessor, in imparting absolution, adds the condition, "si peccata commisisti," then he sets at naught the penitent's Confession, and in this he is not justified.

(1) Father Anastasius, pastor of a large parish, has during Easter time on many days a large number of people at his confessional. It happens then that persons come to Confession, who, as Father Anastasius realizes, are in need of a General Confession. Father Anastasius considers that he has not time for this now, and he knows a way out. He makes with such persons an appointment when they are to come and make a General Confession, and for the present bids them awaken contrition, bestows absolution and dismisses them.

(2) Sophia, a woman of wealth and position, comes to Confession. To the question whether she had ever concealed a mortal sin in Confession, without having since made reparation, Sophia answers in the affirmative. Father Anastasius directs her to make good this wrong now by the required repetition of Confessions. Sophia objects that she cannot possibly stay longer in the Confessional, nor omit holy Communion, both because of a grave danger to her reputation, because friends have come with her and are waiting. She promises, however, to come soon for a General Confession. Father Anastasius thereupon listens to the necessary materia absolutionis and absolves Sophia, as he would one seriously sick who for the time being cannot make a complete confession.

Father Anastasius submits his procedure in these cases to his confessor for approval. What is to be said to cases 1 and 2.

The confessor must say, as regards case 1, that Father Anastasius, who, on account of a great number of penitents, releases them and himself from the obligation of material completeness of Confession, commits a grave sin. This is clear from the condemnation by Innocent XI. of the opinion: It is lawful to absolve sacramentally those who have confessed only by halves because of a great concourse of penitents, such as, for example, can occur on the day of some great feast or indulgence. It is true that in Father Anastasius’ case Confessions at Easter time are concerned, not those on the occasion of a great festival, or Indulgence, to which the condemned proposition refers. But the prohibition has reference to the practise generally, and the great festival, or Indulgence, are merely quoted as examples of occasions upon which a great many Confessions may occur. The fact that a great number of penitents surround the confessional is not of itself sufficient reason to disturb the proper order of the tribunal of penance. According to the unanimous teaching of theologians there can excuse from the material integrity of Confession only a very (omnino) great and casual harm, that might arise out of the material completeness to either penitent, confessor, or a third person. A great number of penitents does not necessarily involve such harm for anybody. Some of these penitents may not be in need of Confession, others may be well able to go to Confession elsewhere, and the insistence upon material completeness would not cause them great harm. On the other hand, the habit of curtailing Confessions on such occasions, will put the confessor in danger of absolving insufficiently disposed penitents, Whenever theologians enumerate reasons that excuse from material completeness of Confession, they take it for granted that this danger is not encountered, and this is something which Father Anastasius seems to have ignored. There is no possible injury important enough to justify the absolution of a penitent not sufficiently disposed, and, as Segneri (Confessore Istruito II.) very correctly remarks, it is far better that few are healed than that many are dealt with and not one healed. For this reason Father Anastasius, in our case, cannot excuse himself from the obligation to insist on the material completeness of Confession, ob defectum temporis, time was wanted by him only on account of the large number of waiting penitents; he can release himself from this duty still less because of the danger of absolving penitents not well disposed.

We will not maintain, however, that, with a throng of penitents waiting, the confessor is never allowed to prefer the interest of waiting penitents to the completeness of Confession. He will be permitted to follow this course in a case when the waiting penitents would be exposed to great harm. This is evident from the opinion of theologians dispensing with the material integrity of Confession. This opinion is not included in the condemned proposition. It is not declared that it is never allowed to curtail Confession when there is a large number of penitents, but that it is not allowed to do so merely on account of the great crowd, or, as Berardi (Prax. Conf. n. 1048, VII.) states it: The condemnation concerns the case in which the confessor, because of the said concourse, routinely halves confessions, hearing only one or another sin and immediately giving absolution. Nor is opposed to this opinion the admonition of St. Alphonsus to confessors in the event of a great crowd of penitents: He ought not to be concerned that other penitents are waiting, for then the confessor is not bound to attend to the good of others, but only to that of his own penitent; for him alone at that time, and not for the others, he will have to render an account to God.

This admonition has reference to the case when the required disposition is wanting in the penitent, and when it is the confessor’s duty so to dispose him that he may be validly absolved. We are speaking here of the material integrity in the Confession of a penitent who is well disposed. As a rule, it is also the duty of confessors to supply a deficiency in integrity, but this duty is neither so absolute nor so great as the former, because material integrity in the Confession of a well-disposed penitent is required not for valid, but for lawful absolution. There is, therefore, in our case not, as St. Alphonsus presumes in the passage cited, the good of one penitent opposed to the good of others, but, rather, the material integrity of the Confession opposed to the good of the waiting penitents, and hence our case is quite different from the one St. Alphonsus presupposes. Indeed, the holy Doctor teaches (H. A. tr., XVI, n. 30), that a penitent is excused from material integrity of Confession (and that the confessor is to take care of it) whenever there is to be feared from it great harm for the penitent or others. Hence, it is allowed beyond doubt to curtail the Confession, whenever, and to the extent in which, the completeness of Confession causes great harm to waiting penitents. An example of this is found in Lehmkuhl, Vol. II., n. 329. There can be dispute only of the required extent of the harm that would excuse.

To resume the case of Father Anastasius, our opinion follows: If the time for Easter Communion draws to an end and Father Anastasius knows that it will be impossible for the waiting penitents to comply elsewhere, or later, with the precept, then we consider that for this reason it is permissible to absolve a well-disposed penitent with neglect of the material completeness of the Confession, provided, of course, that absolution is necessary to this penitent. The obligation to fulfil the commandment makes absolution so necessary to this penitent that it would be lawful to absolve him even upon incomplete confession. That the same necessity is present in the case of the waiting penitents supplies the defectus temporis which excuses from the material completeness of the Confession in the individual case. It cannot be objected that the confessor might extend the Easter time for the waiting penitents, for this might be objected also regarding the individual penitent, which the theologians, however, omit to do.

Nevertheless, we believe that a case where it would for this reason be allowed to neglect the material completeness of the Confession will seldom occur, because the confessor cannot easily have knowledge of the condition of the waiting penitents, and, moreover, particularly at Easter time there must many penitents be supposed wanting in the proper disposition. For this reason it is at such time better to tarry than to hurry.

In regard to case 2, the confessor will approve of Father Anastasius’ opinion that Sophia may, in this case, be absolved after a materially imperfect confession. The opinion of Father Anastasius is obviously based on the teaching of theologians, and Segneri solves the same case (l. c.) in the same manner. Father Anastasius erred, however, in concluding that, because Sophia was excused from making a complete confession, she was likewise excused from accusation of recent sins further than what was sufficient for the materia absolutionis, though she could confess these without grave danger to her reputation. This certainly is not correct. The obligation of material integrity of the Confession refers not modo indiviso upon the totality of the grievous sins committed by the penitent, but modo diviso upon the individual ones. It follows that even if the penitent for some reason is excused from the accusation of some particular sins, nevertheless, the obligation of the material integrity of the Confession in regard to other grievous sins committed continues. For this reason Berardi says in the passage quoted: Care must be taken that material integrity suffer detriment as little as possible. And Segneri, in a case identical with that of Father Anastasius, does not state it as the rule to require only the necessary materia absolutionis and then absolve, but to require of the penitent the accusation of as many grievous sins as is possible in the available time and only then to absolve. So should Father Anastasius have acted in the case of Sophia. Therefore, he was not justified in dealing with Sophia as with “one grievously sick, who, for the time being, cannot make a complete confession.” In the case of a person grievously sick there is physical or moral impossibility of speaking, which is not to that extent the case with Sophia. While she stated that “she could not possibly remain at this time longer in the confessional,” she evidently meant the length of time needed for repetition of former Confessions.

We are finally of the opinion that Father Anastasius should have considered it his duty to make use of the time which evidently. was available to assist this willing penitent in a Confession, which, though perhaps not in the opinion of Sophia, but according to the requirements of the Sacrament of Penance, would have been a complete one.

The laborer Stephen, hardly thirty years of age and not married, is a consumptive and has spent the last eighteen months in a hospital. In his religion he is indifferent, faultfinding, supercilious, and sceptical. His morality, especially, is in bad shape, as may be gathered from his talk. In the hospital, however, he has been receiving the Sacraments every month, not of his own accord, yet without remonstrance whenever the sister in charge asked him to prepare himself for Confession. The confessor at the hospital, however, enjoys not his full confidence, but another, befriended, priest has it. To ask for the latter, he fears, would cause comment, and hence he omits this until he feels his last hour approaching. Then he has this other priest summoned during the night, as he positively demands to confess to him and to none other. At this last Confession he accuses himself of having concealed in previous Confessions a grave theft; he is just able to tell how large a sum of money he took, and that in more than fifteen Confessions he has not accused himself of it, but does not make an attempt to repeat the invalid Confessions because he is ignorant of this requirement, and under existing conditions this reparation would be too much for his strength. He has previously received Extreme Unction, though, of course, just as sacrilegiously and invalidly as previous absolutions and Communions. The question is how this sick man should have been treated in his last moments.

Answer.—He should have been treated in no other manner than he was treated by the confessor, to whom he gave his confidence.

In view of the suffering and anxiety of his last hour, he was left in good faith that he need only accuse himself of the theft concealed until then; he was not reminded of the obligation to repeat all his invalid Confessions; the confessor, however, recalled to the patient briefly some of his sins which had become known to this priest outside of Confession, and directed that he should include in this Confession all these sins, and also all faults in former Confessions and Communions, every thought, word and act against the sixth commandment, neglect of holy Mass, transgressions of the commandment of fasts and abstinence, etc., and to repent of them sincerely and heartily. The priest then recited for him the act of Contrition in the form of vigorous ejaculatory prayers, and asked him in conclusion if he really meant that which he had just repeated; if he really was sorry for having so often and so grievously offended God. Then he inspired the patient with confidence in the merits of Jesus Christ, and the mercy of God, gave him absolution, and administered holy Communion, but not Extreme Unction. The priest acted upon the principle that a more complete Confession was under such circumstances too difficult, even impossible, and that on account of these circumstances it was advisable not to disturb the penitent in his good faith that he need not confess anything more; that, indeed, it would be injudicious and dangerous to call the patient’s attention to the requirements of repeating the invalid Confessions or even hic et nunc to demand such difficult, indeed impossible, task. Extreme Unction, although unworthily received, the priest holds, cannot be repeated in the same danger of death brought on by disease, that the Extreme Unction received some days ago will now, since the recipient through improved sentiments removed the obex gratiae, and received absolution, yet produce its effects.

The principle applied in the matter of the confession is expressed in the following quotation from De Lugo (De Sacr. Poen. Disp. 16, Sec. 14, n. 594): “As in the examination of conscience, only the deliberation suited to human capability is required, and as this deliberation should not be such as to arouse reluctance or disgust in regard to this holy Sacrament, it is evident that a less intelligible and positive statement may be accepted from a person who, in consequence either of illness, or of the multitude of his sins, or for some other cause (either because of incapacity, or because of illness, or because of the multitude of sins, or for some other cause) would find it too difficult to prepare an exact statement. A person, for instance, who is to confess the sins of a whole life, a life passed in sin, would find it extremely difficult to make an examination as exact as another may easily make at his monthly Confession; indeed, it would be such a hardship to the former as would ‘be likely to render Confession distasteful and obnoxious. This is the reason why we require a less precise and exact statement from public sinners and persons of that kind, than if a person, for instance, had only lived in sin for a month, or even less.

The principle ruling in the matter of Extreme Unction is stated in the following: It is asked whether this Sacrament (Extreme Unction) can be valid yet without effect, so that when the obstacle recedes it confers its effect. I answer affirmatively with the common opinion of the Doctors. The reason is that it is a Sacrament that cannot be repeated, at least for a certain time, namely during the same illness or state of illness, as we noted above in article 3, number 8; and therefore, if it was received without any substantial defect and with only an obstacle, or a lack of the disposition required on the part of the subject, but afterward the obstacle is removed and a sufficient disposition is supplied, it produces its effect, lest the sick person be wholly deprived of its fruit. See Castropalaus, number 14; the Salamancans, question 3; Mezger, treatise 19, disputation 50, article 2, number 4, etc. (Babenstuber, De Extr. Unct. art. 5, n. 5.) But when is there a sufficiens dispositio? “If the sick person receives the Sacrament in mortal sin in good faith or while deprived of his senses, attrition suffices; but if he received it in bad faith (as in our case), contrition or confession is required in order to dispose himself rightly.” (Aertnys, Theol. Moral. II. n. 354.)

BERNARD DEPPE.

The Confession of Cajus is being so protracted that bystanders must come to the conclusion that he has committed many sins of a complicated nature. To save him from this danger to his good name the confessor, Father Levis, tells Cajus: “You have now confessed enough sins; make the intention that all your other sins be included in this Confession, awaken contrition and good resolution, and I will now give you absolution, as people may otherwise find your long stay here suspicious.” What is to be said about this view and practise of Father Levis? How should the penitent have been dealt with?

1. Without any doubt whatever Father Levis’s views and practise are lax, erroneous and detrimental. He imagines, of course, that he is taking this course upon a right principle, but he applies the same wrongly. It is true that defamation before others, to which the material integrity of the Confession would expose a penitent, is sufficient reason in order to content one’s self, hic et nunc, with the required formal integrity, reserving obligation and intention to confess later, in the following Confession, any grievous sins not now confessed. There is presumed also the necessity not to postpone the Confession altogether. (St. Alphonsus Theolog. Mor. 1. VI. 484, 485.) As an example, let us suppose the case that a sick man who has confessed for the reception of holy Viaticum, has made a sacrilegious Confession, and then asks the priest who brings the holy Viaticum, to hear his Confession once more, intending to make this a General Confession, that would take very long. To prevent unavoidable injury to the good name of the penitent, the confessor should in this case listen to a few sins, and give absolution after admonishing the sick man to attend to the completion of his Confession later on pro posse.

This correct doctrine and prudent practise Father Levis applies in a lax, erroneous, and pernicious way. St. Alphonsus says (/. c. n. 595): Nor can an exception (from material integrity) be admitted if, because of the length of the confession, others might easily suspect that the penitent was burdened with many sins.

The opposite view carried out consistently would frustrate to a great extent the Divine command of completeness of Confession, for the reason especially, that Father Levis neither acknowledged nor urged the obligation to make up the deficiency in the following Confession, and thus just the greatest and most careless of sinners would comply least to the Divine command. There would, furthermore, be no fixed rule at what moment the confessor might stop a confession of sins, for the duration of Confessions differs greatly, and one cannot say just at what moment a just suspicion of bystanders might begin to be excited. Again, such practise would violate seriously the most important office of the confessor, the one of physician of souls, also of teacher and judge, and often and easily it might occur that just such sins would not be confessed on account of which the confessor would refuse absolution, or would give it only upon certain conditions, or which at least would require earnest exhortation and advice. Penitents might even with intention reserve such sins for the end of their Confession, hoping of being dispensed from their mention. Finally, this practise would promote in many penitents carelessness in sinning.

It will, therefore, not be permissible to eliminate for Cajus a danger to his good name at the cost of the necessary completeness of Confession. But may and should there be no consideration of a danger to good reputation under such circumstances? Yes, there should be, in as far as the necessary completeness of Confession may be preserved; and this may be done in two ways: either by curtailing the Confession, on part of penitent and confessor, in all not essential things. Or, the Confession might be divided by directing the penitent, and stating the reason for it, to retire for a little while and then return at a suitable moment, to complete the Confession or to receive instructions and advice. Indeed, one might in such case, the necessary completeness of Confession presumed, for greater security grant absolution immediately, with the intention afterwards, as explained, to supplement what the office of physician of souls directs in this case, for this is the duty of the confessor no less than solicitude for material completeness of a Confession, and certainly belongs to the salutary completeness of the Sacrament of Penance. In conclusion it should be kept in view for the guidance of confessors that it is, first of all, necessary to do all that which the Sacrament requires and which is necessary and salutary for the welfare of the penitent’s soul, and only then discretion and charity, in everything that will facilitate the reception of the Sacrament of Penance, may claim consideration, to avoid and eliminate anything that would make it distasteful and difficult. J. P. Arnold, C.SS.R.

That a general accusation in case of necessity suffices for confession when it is impossible to make a specified accusation, as it not infrequently happens in the case of dying, is a universally known and certain doctrine of holy Church, and contained in the Rituale Romanum. It is another question, one upon which theologians differ, whether such accusation is satisfactory in respect to sins which one is not obliged to confess, venial sins for instance, or mortal sins already confessed and forgiven through absolution by a priest. A penitent, for instance, accuses himself of venial sins committed since the last Confession, and includes the sins of his past life with the words: “I also include all sins of my past life in this Confession,” or the penitent is not conscious of any sins committed since the last Confession, so that this general statement is his whole accusation.

In discussing this question two points must of necessity be distinguished—the validity, and the lawfulness, of such a Confession. The first question is therefore whether such a general accusation, where a materia necessaria is lacking, is valid, even if the case is not one of necessity; the second, is it permitted?

I. Is it valid? This question in my opinion should be answered affirmatively, because confirmed by the Ratio theologica, as also by the opinions of theologians.

As regards the intrinsic reason, it is essential but also sufficient in the holy Sacrament of Penance that the confessor pronounces sentence and applies his jurisdiction. The confessor is made aware from the penitent’s accusation that since his last Confession he has not been guilty of grievous sin, and that for this reason he accuses himself of sins already confessed and forgiven. With regard to these sins the confessor reasons that the penitent confesses them with sincere contrition, detailed knowledge of these sins in particular is not necessary to him, as they have been already judged by a priest and remitted; the penitent, however, deserves (de congruo) on account of his renewed accusation a renewing of the grace dispensed in the Sacrament of Penance. If a general accusation such as this did not suffice for the essence of the Sacrament of Penance, it could not suffice either in the case of a dying person, nor in any other case where, on account of circumstances, it is impossible to confess special sins. Since, however, the nature of the Sacrament is unchangeable, and in case of necessity a general accusation is valid and sufficient where it refers to the materia necessaria, then it must be valid also when it concerns a materia libera. The reason why, except in the case of necessity, a general mention of non-confessed mortal sins is insufficient for Confession is found in the Divine Commandment, which directs the sinner to confess his sins with kind and number, so that the priest may be enabled to judge of the spiritual state of the penitent, and to decide whether he is worthy or unworthy of absolution. It is clear that he who acts contrary to this commandment cannot receive valid absolution. There is no such a commandment concerning venial sins, or mortal sins already confessed and forgiven; hence it suffices to confess these in general to the confessor with true contrition and firm resolve to avoid them; the confessor judges this and gives absolution in accordance.

The intrinsic reasons for this opinion are supported by the opinion of theologians. That many great teachers do not doubt the validity of such Confession cannot be disputed. St. Alphonsus, for instance, in discussing the question whether an invalid Confession must be repeated, when the penitent renews his accusation to the confessor who has heard the invalid Confession decides (Lib. 6. n. 502) that this repetition is not required. He says: It suffices if the confessor remembers the state of the penitent, or recovers a confused knowledge of it, and the penitent accuses himself in general of everything previously confessed. The reason is that, although the first confession was not sacramental, nevertheless its ratification, when the penitent thereafter accuses himself generally of the faults confessed, joined with the knowledge previously possessed by the confessor, is rightly regarded as sufficient. Likewise, because, as Croix probably judges in the place cited, such a confession, since it was made with a view to receiving absolution, is also sufficiently called sacramental, insofar as it too pertains to the sacramental seal. If we apply this principle to our question the result is that a general accusation of the sins of the past life suffices when the sins are known to the confessor from a previous confession to such extent that he has at least a cognitio confusa of his penitent’s state of conscience. The holy teacher goes further, after supposing the case that the confessor has forgotten all and yet contents himself with the general accusation of his penitent, he expresses the opinion: He could not, indeed, lawfully impart absolution, as Lugo, number 642, Croix, number 1218, and Laymann, with the others cited above, rightly say, because then he could not impose a suitable penance. Yet if he then absolved after a confession made in general, he would absolve validly, as Laymann, chapter 9, number 6 at the end, and Croix in the place cited, with Aversa, Illsung, and Diana, teach.

St. Alphonsus summits no reasons for his decision, but refers to Laymann, Croix, etc, so that he makes the teaching of these theologians his own. This teaching contains the answer to our question, and in proof thereof it will suffice to state the reason of their teaching, which Laymann expresses in the following words:

The reason, which I have given rather often, is that a specific and particular manifestation or knowledge of sins is not of itself and simply of the essence and necessity of the Sacrament, but only of the necessity of the divine precept, which the penitent has already satisfied. In another place (cap. 8. n. 2.) he discusses this point more extensively: But it must be carefully observed here that the specific and numerical declaration of all sins does not of itself and directly pertain to the necessity or essence of the Sacrament, as though the Sacrament of Penance could never subsist unless a complete confession of all mortal sins were made, as, among others, Paludanus noted in book 4, distinction 21, question 2, article 2, conclusion 2; Suarez, disputation 23, section 1, numbers 8 and 10; and Coninck, disputation 7, doubt 1 and doubt 10, conclusion 2. Rather, it pertains to the necessity of the divine precept; yet the voluntary transgression of that precept indirectly results in a defect of the Sacrament, namely so that it is not validly received. For at least attrition is of itself required for the substance of the Sacrament of Penance; but attrition cannot coexist with an actual sin, namely mortal sacrilege, which the person confessing commits by concealing one or more sins without a just cause, whether through malice or through gross negligence.

It follows from this that a general accusation, if not contrary to the Divine Commandment, suffices for the nature of the Sacrament of Penance. Croix likewise writes: loc. cit.: For the validity of absolution it suffices to accuse oneself of sins in general, although, speaking in itself, this is unlawful according to what was said from number 620; and in the place cited, number 623: If someone outside necessity thus accuses himself only in general of venial sins, without determining any one in its species, he is indeed validly absolved, as authors more commonly teach with Herinx, disputation 3, number 67, and Bosco, number 114. Suarez (Disp. 23. Sect. 1. n. 9.) in respect to general accusation of a dying man, who cannot specify his sins better, teaches: Finally, one who had no consciousness of mortal sin, if at that moment he said that he had sinned venially, should without doubt be absolved, since in venial matters it is not necessary for confession to explain number or species; but one who says that he has sinned says at least that he has sinned venially. Therefore this will be sufficient matter. To this the great teacher presumes an objection (n. 10) which he answers in the sense of the above-mentioned theologians. You will say: by this argument it would be proved that a confession of venial sin in general is of itself sufficient in one who has no consciousness of mortal sin, even outside a case of necessity. The answer is that, speaking only speculatively, perhaps this can be defended, both for the reason stated and also because^* one who confesses idle words is judged to present sufficient matter, and yet he declares his conscience no more than one who says that he has sinned venially, nor does he alter the confessor’s judgment more. Nevertheless, in practice this must be denied because of the uncertainty of the matter. Not without importance for our question it is to learn how Suarez refutes the reasoning of theologians, who maintain that signs of contrition without the manifestation of a particular sin are not sufficient to grant absolution to a dying man who can no longer speak. The argument of these theologians was the following: Where knowledge of some particular thing is not given, a judgment of prudence has no place; therefore neither does absolution. He answers (n. 7): It is one thing to know that another has sinned, but another to know that the other acknowledges and sorrowfully subjects his sins to the keys so that they may be forgiven; and this special knowledge is provided there. Hence, although that confession is called general with respect to its remote matter, it is particular with respect to its proximate matter. ... For no sufficient reason proves that it must be distinct on the part of the thing concerning which the accusation is made, or that this belongs entirely to the essence. And number 11 discusses this more closely. Nor does it matter that the remote matter, which is as it were the object of that confession, is universal; because absolution immediately concerns the proximate matter, which is a particular confession, and its effect also concerns this particular person, and thus this whole action concerns particulars.

^* To what extent this reasoning stands the test we will not examine here.

It is plain from the quoted passages that Suarez considers a general accusation sufficient for the validity of Confession, not only in the case of necessity, but also outside of it, when it relates to sins for which there is not the obligation by virtue of a Divine commandment to confess with kind and number. This opinion is supported by Herinx, who teaches it even more distinctly in the following words: Whether one who has no necessary matter confesses sufficiently, even outside necessity, by accusing himself of all sins in general or of venial sins in common? I answer that it appears entirely so: because venial sins in their species are not necessary matter for confession; moreover, such a confession is a sorrowful accusation of sins, as is clear from what was said in the conclusion. For the reason that this is not valid outside necessity for those who have mortal sins is that they must express them according to species and number, insofar as possible. To the list of theologians there extensively quoted in support of this opinion might be added many more who teach the same, as, for instance, Alexander de Alés, Sylvester, Burghaber, Dicastillo, Diana, Coninck, Voit, Reuter.

There seems to be sufficient evidence, therefore, that the validity of a general accusation in the Sacrament of Penance is based upon good reasons and excellent authority. And now we ask:

II. Is such a general accusation permissible? If our opinion were correct beyond all possible doubt, this question might at once be answered in the affirmative, assuming that there would be no objection from any quarter. The reasons given by us do not, however, remove every doubt concerning the validity of a general accusation; even if they did, such a general accusation, except in case of necessity, would offend against a universal binding usage of the Church, and it would not correspond to the special character which our Lord wished to give to the holy Sacrament of Penance. For the theologians teach that the confession of all mortal sins committed after Baptism is a Divine commandment, because the Saviour intended to appoint the priest a judge to whose decision the sinner’s fate should be absolutely subjected, not according to human discretion but according to the laws of Divine justice and mercy. Each mortal sin incurs in Divine justice the loss of heaven, and mercy decrees to restore to the sinner that which he lost. The priest, who in the Sacrament of Penance has the task of restoring, if possible, to the sinner this lost title to heaven, must be made aware of every single mortal sin, and therefore the sinner must make known to the confessor all his mortal sins. To describe a matter exactly, it is not enough to state the genus to which it belongs: there must be added the differentia specifica. The word sin gives only the general idea of an act contrary to the Divine commandment. So does the expression Divine commandment give only the general idea of a commandment, and is specified only by the object of the commandment. The idea of sin, be it mortal or venial, finds its differentia specifica in the relation of the sinful act to a certain object aimed at by the Divine commandment. Therefore the expression, “I have sinned,” is not one which indicates the essentials of a sin. Whatever the Saviour has ordained in regard to the Sacrament of Penance must be present at every administration of the same, provided it is possible and the object of the commandment is not lacking. The object, however, namely the priest’s judicial power over the sinner, as instituted by Christ, is present in the case of all sins, confessed or not confessed. Therefore a general accusation, except in a case of necessity, is never sufficient for Confession, and there is always the obligation to make known to the confessor a specified sin.