Article II. On the Integrity of Confession.

272. Definition and necessity. Confession is entire if it comprehends all sins which by the will of Christ must be declared in sacramental confession.¹

A twofold integrity of confession is distinguished, material and formal. Material integrity is had when all mortal sins which have been committed and not yet directly remitted are manifested; formal integrity is had when all mortal sins are explained which here and now, considering the circumstances, can and must be accused. Now if those things which can be enumerated are enumerated, in reality all are present, and formal and material integrity are had together; but if one or another sin is omitted from a just cause, the confession will be formally but not also materially entire.

1. Material integrity is not always required for a valid confession: for Christ in his goodness and wisdom was unwilling, for valid reception of this sacrament, to demand something which very often is morally or even physically impossible; material integrity is of this kind.

2. But formal integrity is altogether required for a valid confession: for the divine precept of declaring all mortal sins committed certainly refers at least to those sins which the penitent here and now can and must declare. Hence he sins gravely who omits some sin which he here and now can and must declare.

Whether it is licit to divide confession. He is said to divide confession who manifests some sins to this confessor and others to another confessor. Now the integrity of confession requires that all mortal sins be manifested to the same confessor, since all are remitted together. Hence divided confession is not licit if through it the formal integrity of confession is not preserved; but if by dividing confession formal integrity is preserved, to divide confession is of itself licit.

a. From a just cause it can happen that someone confesses mortal sins to one confessor and venials to another; thus a penitent can manifest some grave sin unknown to the confessor, and then ordinary venials, in order that, on account of shame, he may more easily and without danger of sacrilege confess to a confessor who is known to him. Likewise if someone here and now is not bound to confess some mortal sin, e.g., one reserved to him who does not have the power of absolving, he can be silent about that to one confessor and manifest it afterward to another.

b. Therefore it is not licit for a superior, because he is occupied by many labors, after hearing only reserved sins, to absolve a penitent and to send him to another confessor so that he may be absolved from non-reserved sins, because he cannot be absolved from reserved sins unless he is absolved from the others; but sacramental absolution cannot be validly and licitly conceded to him who has confessed in divided manner, unless there is present a cause excusing from the integrity of confession. Nor is the lack of laborers a cause excusing from integrity. But a penitent can be absolved by the superior, after hearing only the sins reserved with censure, from the censure and be sent to another confessor so that he may be absolved from the sins, because absolution from censure is not sacramental and therefore does not suppose an entire confession of sins. Once the censure and reservation have been removed, the penitent can be absolved sacramentally from sins by another confessor.

¹ Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 5 and can. 7. Cf. Pesch VII, n. 176.

273. What is required for the integrity of confession. In order that confession may be entire, there must be declared all mortal sins committed after baptism and not yet directly remitted or not declared in due manner, according to species and number, and also external acts, but not the effects of sin.

274. 2. According to species: namely the lowest moral species of mortal sins must be declared: for according to the Council of Trent, in confession there must be declared all and each mortal sin, i.e., according to the proper sense of these words in species and number.¹

a. Therefore the divine precept is not satisfied by the confession of sins only in general (I have sinned mortally), nor by confession of them in generic species (I have sinned against justice), but any sin must be declared in its lowest species (I have stolen grave matter from my neighbor).

b. But he who, whether from ignorance or from forgetfulness, cannot declare a sin in its lowest species, is not therefore excused from manifesting the sin insofar as he can manifest it. Therefore he who would know that he had committed mortal sin but would be wholly ignorant of what sort it was is bound at least to say this, that he has sinned mortally; and he who would know that he has offended against justice but cannot further recall by what reason, ought at least to indicate this, that he has sinned gravely against justice. For even a sin which can be declared only generically constitutes necessary matter of confession and sufficient matter of valid absolution. Nevertheless, once this absolution has been obtained, the specific confession of the same sin remains to be supplied if it can later be done.

¹ Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 5 and can. 7. Cn. 901.

275. 3. According to number: for from the Council of Trent all and each sins, and from the Code (cn. 901) all mortal sins of which after diligent examination of oneself one has consciousness, must be accused.

a. The integrity of confession demands that, as far as can be done, the certain number of mortal sins be explained; wherefore he sins in like manner, both he who knowingly or from culpable negligence expresses a greater number, and he who expresses a lesser number, and finally also he who, knowing a determined number, indicates only a probable one with the particle about added: for all lie in a grave matter and disturb the sacramental judgment, unless scrupulosity, good faith, or zeal for greater security excuses them.

Therefore they do not satisfy the obligation of confessing integrally who confess only the species of sins but not the determined number in this way: I have blasphemed often or several times; I have often omitted Mass on Sunday; several times I ate meat on days of abstinence, etc. These indeed are to be instructed by the confessor that they must confess integrally also as to number.

b. When after diligent examination of conscience the certain and exact number of sins cannot be found, the probable number must be expressed, namely that which approaches more closely to the truth, with the particle about added. By this particle about there is not comprehended a notable excess or defect, but only a modest one, yet one proportioned to the number expressed according to this rule: a modest defect or excess will be, relatively to about five sins, to add or subtract one unit here or there; relatively to about ten, two units; relatively to twenty, three or four; relatively to forty, four or five; relatively to one hundred, five or six. Therefore in the first case the penitent will be judged to have sinned four, five, or six times; in the second, eight, nine, ten, eleven, or twelve times; and similarly in the others.¹

c. If the penitent afterward finds the exact number of sins, and the sins which he does not remember are certainly more than the number comprehended together with the particle about declared in confession, he must afterward manifest the excess in confession, because these sins had in no way been set forth; but he is bound to nothing when he finds that he had expressed a number notably greater: for in the greater number indicated there is already contained and absolved that lesser number, supposing that the penitent did not lie but in good faith exaggerated the number.

But if no number, not even a probable one, can be had, as almost happens in habitual sinners, these things must be noted:

a. St. Alphonsus (n. 466) warns that the confessor ought not to be too anxious in investigating the number of sins where it cannot be indicated: for it suffices that the penitent open the habit of sinning and the delay of time during which he persevered in the state of sinning, and how often in a day, in a week, in a month he was accustomed to sin. From these things the prudent confessor will know the state and conscience of the sinner better than from the probable number which the latter utters more by guessing than by seriously weighing.

b. If the penitent could not even know and indicate this, the confessor should induce him to open his state, manner of living, habit and occasions of sinning, and by this reason the state of conscience is sufficiently manifested so that he can be absolved. Wherefore if a penitent of this kind afterward remembers his sins more distinctly, he is not bound to confess them more accurately: for in that confused accusation all things were sufficiently known by the confessor, so that the penitent could have been directly absolved from all of them. Therefore it suffices if, for example, a prostitute says: For two years I remained in a brothel and as often as there was occasion, even to married men, etc., I gave power of my body; or if a concubinary says: For three years I lived in concubinage; or another: I desired any women whomsoever I encountered, even relatives, married women, sacred persons; or: About most shameful things, whenever any occasion was given, I spoke with any companions, etc., etc.²

Note. If one sinful act contains two malices specifically diverse, as if one having a vow of chastity pollutes himself, the divided sin can be accused in confession thus: I sinned by pollution; I violated my vow, and that gravely. Likewise if one sinful act contains two malices distinct in number, as if someone by one theft gravely injured two owners, the divided sin can be accused in confession thus: I committed grave theft; likewise I committed grave theft against another man. Those who concede that malices can be divided in confession bring forward as the reason that the penitent explains the sin as to each malice, which suffices in confession. Those who deny this say that the confessor hearing these things conceives that the penitent has committed two sins distinct in number, which is not true. Nevertheless this error of the confessor does not alter the sacramental judgment.

¹ Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, n. 97; St. Alphonsus, n. 466.

² Sporer-Bierbaum III, pr. 3, n. 451 ff.

276. 4. External acts, by which internal acts are completed in the ratio of sin: for we must confess sins; but by the name of sin there is properly understood not only the internal act, but also the external one, which is its natural complement.

a. For although the external act does not of itself have its own malice, nevertheless it participates in the malice of the internal act and, with the internal act which by its nature it perfects and completes, constitutes one moral act, namely the sin completed and consummated in its species.

b. If the external act were not declared, the gravity of the injury inflicted upon the neighbor would not be understood, nor the obligation of restitution, censure, irregularity, etc.

c. Finally, the Church has always understood and interpreted the Lord's precept concerning confession of mortal sins in this way; wherefore it does not suffice for him who committed theft to say in confession: I had the purpose of stealing or I wished to steal, but one must say: I stole.

277. 5. Not the effects of sin. Namely, there are sinful external actions from which sometimes effects follow which, once the external action has been placed, no longer depend on the will of the agent: if someone, for example, with gravely evil intention gives poison to his neighbor, or gives a girl a means for procuring abortion, sometimes there follows, whether he wishes it or not, death and abortion. Moreover, to declare these effects, even if they followed, is not necessary for the confession to be formally entire: for by divine precept sins alone must be declared; but those effects are not sins, since they are in no way free. Wherefore it suffices to set forth the depraved will and the efficacious action for producing that effect.

Nevertheless it is expedient, and sometimes for another reason plainly necessary, that the effect which followed from the external sin be set forth, namely when the confessor needs to know whether there is an obligation of restitution, irregularity, censure, or reservation: for external sins are usually not punished with these penalties unless the effect also followed, lest a penalty so grave be inflicted more often than by itself it ought to be.

278. Concerning doubtful sins the question is asked whether they are necessary matter of confession. Moreover, a threefold different doubt can be distinguished: a. concerning the sin itself; b. concerning the gravity of the sin; c. concerning the confession of the sin. It is supposed that the doubt is not merely negative, but positive, or resting on a probable foundation. Now, although it is to be advised that penitents confess doubtful sins, nevertheless, from strict obligation, they are not bound to confess them, whatever the doubt may be: for a doubtful obligation is no obligation. Therefore:

1. He who doubts whether he really committed a sin, if the doubt remains after diligent examination, is not bound to confess it: for an obligation is not to be imposed unless it is certainly established. Moreover, from the Council of Trent,¹ mortal sins of which consciousness is had must be accused, i.e., those of which certain knowledge is had; but there is not certain knowledge of doubtful sins.

2. He who doubts whether a sin which he certainly committed is grave, whether on the part of the matter or on the part of consent, is not bound to confess it for the same reasons.

In practice, however, according to St. Alphonsus (n. 476), the two following rules are to be observed:

a. In doubt whether the matter of sin is grave, rather rude penitents ought ordinarily to accuse doubtful sins, both because they cannot of themselves form conscience for themselves and because very often they do not know how to distinguish venials from mortals. Nevertheless scrupulous persons, who are not accustomed to commit mortal sins, must be excepted. But those who are not rude but sufficiently instructed are ordinarily to be gently exhorted, not obliged, to accuse doubtful sins.

b. In doubt concerning full consent: a. if penitents are of timorous conscience and are not accustomed to sin gravely, they are in no way bound to confess doubtful sins, because presumption favors them, which is had from things ordinarily occurring; indeed they must be impeded from this accusation if they seem prone to scruples. b. If penitents keep a middle way between a timorous and a lax conscience, they are not indeed to be obliged, but they are to be induced to declare doubtful consent, because this is profitable for tranquility of conscience. c. If penitents are of lax conscience, generally they ought to declare doubtful sins, because the presumption deduced from things ordinarily occurring, which is against them, reaches moral certitude concerning the sin committed.

3. He who doubts whether a sin certainly committed and certainly also grave has already been confessed is, for the same reasons, not bound to confess it again: for a law which has probably already been satisfied is no longer certain, and therefore cannot beget a certain obligation. In practice indeed confession is to be advised in order to procure tranquility of conscience; nevertheless no strict obligation exists.

He who has confessed a mortal sin as doubtful, which afterward he discovers certainly to have been committed, is not bound to confess the same sin again as certain, because he has already satisfied the precept of confession: for he who confesses a sin according to species and number as it is in conscience, and is directly absolved from it, has already satisfied the precept of confession.²

This solution, which more recent authors judge probable³ against the more common opinion of the older authors,⁴ is confirmed from another question which is almost commonly solved by authors from the same principle. He who set forth a doubtful number of sins with the particle about is no longer bound in confession to declare the certain number if he later finds it, unless the excess is notable; therefore neither is he bound in this case, since even in a probable number certain sins are declared as doubtful.

¹ Sess. 13, c. 7.

² Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, n. 77.

³ Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri V, n. 226; Lehmkuhl II, n. 318 (n. 422); Gury II, n. 480; Genicot, Theol. mor. inst. II, n. 291.

⁴ Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 478.

279. On the circumstances of sins. Some circumstances of sins are species-changing, which add to the act a new malice distinct in species from that which the act has by reason of its object; thus the circumstance of a sacred place from which a thing is taken adds to theft the malice of sacrilege against the virtue of religion. Others are aggravating or diminishing, which only increase or diminish the malice of the sinful act within the same species of sin, whether by reason of duration or intensity, mode, time, person, place, etc. These circumstances are either lightly or notably aggravating or diminishing, according as they lightly or notably increase or diminish the malice of the act.

1. Species-changing circumstances must necessarily be explained in confession:¹ for unless they are declared, all mortal sins are not accused in their proper species, which is required by divine precept. It scarcely needs to be mentioned that a new malice added to a sinful act must be mortal in order to constitute necessary matter of confession.

Which circumstances change species is declared, with regard to individual sins, in the tractate on the precepts. In this place only a few things must be added. In sins of scandal (induction, cooperation), the circumstance of superiority or office sometimes adds a new malice against piety or justice, as if a parish priest is a scandal to his parishioners, parents to their children, a teacher to a pupil committed to his special care. This obtains when the superior by force of his office is bound, from piety or justice, to care for the spiritual welfare of the subject. Therefore a base sin of a confessor with his penitent, which has relation to confession, takes on the new malice of real sacrilege; but a sin which is not referred to confession does not take on a new malice, because outside confession the confessor is not bound to procure the spiritual welfare of the penitent. Finally, other superiorities or dignities, such as that of a magistrate, priest, master, etc., can increase the malice of a sin committed with a subject, layman, servant, but they do not change the species.²

¹ Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 5. Cn. 901.

² Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, n. 309.

280. 2. Circumstances only aggravating do not have to be explained necessarily in confession: for no precept exists which obliges one to declare circumstances only aggravating. Indeed sins alone must necessarily be declared in confession; but circumstances which do not change species do not add a new sin to the sinful act. Hence the Council of Trent, which enumerates all conditions required for the integrity of confession, speaks only of circumstances which change species, with no mention made of circumstances which only aggravate,¹ and the new Code likewise.

a. With all agreeing, no obligation exists of confessing circumstances that are only lightly aggravating or diminishing; today, however, the opinion that there is no obligation of confessing circumstances even if they are notably aggravating has become almost common, especially because the Council of Trent not only is silent about this obligation, but seems positively to exclude it. For where, in the cited place, it accurately declares what must be manifested in confession from the precept of Christ, after it had taught that all and each mortal sins and the circumstances which change the species of sin must be manifested, it adds: "nothing else is to be required of penitents in the Church." As regards the difficulty which the Roman Catechism makes in this question,² it is not improbable that its words are to be understood concerning circumstances which change the theological species, namely which cause a light sin to become grave, or a grave sin to become light.³ Nor does the reason taken from this have force, that otherwise a fitting penance could not be imposed; since it suffices that the penance be proportioned to the specific substance of the sins and their number, but exact equality between penance and the gravity of sin as to circumstances is not required. For if exact equality were required, circumstances notably diminishing would also have to be declared in confession, which nevertheless no one demands.⁴ Finally, if these circumstances had to be declared necessarily, an intolerable burden would be imposed on both confessors and penitents, and thence innumerable anxieties and difficulties would arise, since it is very difficult, not to say impossible, to distinguish which circumstances are notably and which are lightly aggravating.

b. Moreover, the faithful ordinarily tend to declare circumstances at least the more notable, which indeed can be recommended to them, because it greatly contributes both to tranquility of conscience, to more abundant fruit of the sacrament, and to more suitable direction. Yet if it concerns circumstances of sins against the sixth precept, penitents are not only not to be questioned about them, but they are not even to be permitted to set them forth, on account of the danger which would thence be created both for the confessor and for the penitent.

c. Nevertheless, when the confessor asks about circumstances only aggravating, the truth must be candidly opened. For the confessor has the right of asking not only those things which are necessary for procuring the integrity of confession, but also several other things, of which kind are: a. aggravating circumstances; b. conditions necessary for incurring censure, irregularity, or a reserved case; c. the habit of sinning;⁵ d. relapse; e. a proximate occasion of sin; f. grave obligations; g. the disposition necessary for valid absolution. Hence he who has sinned with several diverse persons satisfies the precept by declaring the species and number of the sin, even if he does not declare that he committed it with several persons; for example, he who has fornicated with three persons satisfies by saying: I committed the sin of fornication three times, even if he does not add whether with the same person or with different persons. Nevertheless he must respond to the confessor asking about this matter, because he is more easily kept in proximate occasion who has sinned several times with the same person.⁶

¹ Sess. 14, c. 5. Cn. 901.

² De poenitentia, n. 47.

³ Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri V, n. 209.

⁴ Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, n. 120.

⁵ Therefore this proposition (58) was condemned by Innocent XI: We are not bound to confess to a confessor asking about it the habit of some sin.

⁶ Cf. Lacroix, l. 6, pr. 2, n. 18.

281. Whether he satisfies his obligation who accuses a recent sin as if committed formerly. Since a sin as to substance is not changed, whether it is said to have been committed at this or that time, or is said to have been remitted or not remitted, he who accuses a recent sin as if already remitted of itself satisfies the obligation of confessing integrally. Therefore he satisfies the obligation of confessing integrally who mixes new sins with old, or who in a general confession does not distinguish from other sins the mortal sins committed since the last confession, even if he does this deliberately in order to disguise the time at which he committed the sin. But if the penitent, being asked about the time, lies and declares a sin committed today to have been done at a remote time, he seems to commit a light sacrilegious falsehood; nor does the opinion of those seem to be approved who think that a penitent of this kind does not satisfy the obligation of confessing.

Among more recent authors, several favor the opinion just set forth,¹ since the circumstance of time does not pertain to the necessary matter of confession: for any mortal sin must be declared according to its whole essential and specific malice; but the circumstance of time is external and accidental to a sin considered according to its specific essence. What is usually objected, namely that a sin committed at this time is different from a sin committed at another time, is solved by this distinction: it is another individual sin, but not another specific sin; but it suffices that the species of the sin be declared in confession. Therefore he who by lying denies that he committed the sin since the last confession does not deny the specific sin itself, which must necessarily be declared in confession, but the accidental circumstance of time of the sin, which does not have to be declared necessarily. On the contrary, he wishes to confess and in reality confesses that same sin which he committed, to which through falsehood he adds a false external circumstance (already accused, already remitted, committed at another time), which nevertheless does not change the species of the sin. The confessor thinks the same sin was done at another time or already remitted; and he thinks this either from his own error or from the falsehood of the penitent. But the error of the confessor, whether his own or induced by deceit of the penitent, does not obstruct the validity of the sacrament, provided the confessor rightly judges, or at least can rightly judge, concerning the species or specific essence of the sin, which alone is the necessary matter of confession and the object of absolution. Nor should it be said that the confessor is in this way impeded from imposing a fitting penance: for it is not required for valid absolution that the confessor, through the accusation of the penitent, be in the state of imposing a fitting penance, provided the penitent is disposed to accept and perform a fitting penance.

¹ Gury II, n. 488 note; D'Annibale III, n. 309 note 60; Bucceroni, Inst. theol. mor. II, n. 715. Cf. Genicot, Theol. mor. inst. II, n. 288; Lugo, disp. 16, n. 46 ff.