Sins of Thought

327. Notions. 1. Those sins are called internal which are completed solely by the internal powers of the soul, namely by the mind and the will. All are reduced to three classes: a. to desire, b. to joy, c. to morose delectation; and desire indeed is referred to a future action, joy, as it is taken here, to a past action, but delectation to a present action; in common speech, however, all these are comprehended under the name of an evil thought.

2. Joy and delectation do not differ specifically: for the difference consists only in this, that the object is represented in delectation as present, in joy as past; but this merely external difference does not suffice for constituting a specific distinction.

3. Delectation (joy) and desire differ specifically: it is indeed one thing to be delighted concerning an injury to one's neighbor, another thing to desire an injury to be inflicted on one's neighbor. For in desire the evil thing is exhibited as to be accomplished by deed; in delectation it is prescinded from the external deed.

Internal sins against chastity are commonly signified by the name of impure thought; but in reality three are distinguished: a. impure thoughts; b. morose delectations; c. impure desires.

61. On impure thoughts. Thoughts are called impure, or rather imaginations, which represent a base matter. Thoughts of this kind are indifferent of themselves, but they contain a twofold dangerous efficacy: of exciting libido even to pollution, and of enticing to consent, namely so that the base thing itself pleases or the desire of perpetrating it arises. Concerning impure thought, insofar as it contains danger of provoking libidinous movements, the discussion is in this number; insofar as it contains danger of consent, the discussion is in the following number.

1. Moral malice. a. To admit impure thoughts from a libidinous affection or from the depraved end of enjoying venereal delectation, which they excite, is a grave sin; likewise to have complacency in the pleasure which thoughts of this kind, arising beyond the will, provoke.

b. To admit impure thoughts which do not stir much, from mere levity or idleness, or to linger over them, is a light sin, because they do not cast one into grave danger of sinning by consent to venereal delectation or of polluting oneself.

c. To admit impure thoughts which stir much, from mere levity or idleness, or to linger over them, ordinarily is a grave sin, because they bring proximate danger of consent to delectation and of pollution. Nevertheless, in order that these thoughts be a grave sin, it is required that advertence to the grave danger of sinning be present.

d. But to admit impure thoughts or to foster them from an honorable end is licit, even if they cause carnal movements, indeed even pollution itself, provided nevertheless that consent to delectation is excluded.

Where someone adverts that from an indecent thought he is carnally stirred, he is bound to repel it if he does not have a just cause of lingering over it; and where nevertheless he adheres to it lingeringly and for a longer time, he sins gravely on account of the proximate danger of consenting to delectation and of arriving at pollution. But if a just cause is present for continuing that thought, he ought to guard against consent to delectation at least through an act of displeasure.

2. Specific malice. Impure thoughts which are sinful insofar as they excite libidinous movements are not specifically diverse according to the diversity of the object represented, but all are of the same moral species: for all agree in this, that they excite libido; but the affection and complacency of the will are borne only toward this effect. Therefore it is not necessary that the object of the impure thought be declared: for it makes no difference whether venereal pleasure arises or is sought from this object or from another.

62. On morose delectations. Morose delectation signifies complacency concerning a base sin represented through thought and imagination, as if it were now being done, as if someone represents to himself base touches, pollution, fornication, sodomy, as if they were now being done either by himself or by another. Concerning it the question is how great and what kind of sin it is.

1. Morose delectation concerning a base thing is a sin of the same gravity and species as the base thing itself represented by thought and imagination: for an act of the will receives its theological and moral species from the object toward which it tends.

Voluntary delectation concerning a base touch on a male differs in species from delectation concerning a base touch on a female; likewise delectation concerning fornication differs in species from delectation concerning sodomy. As regards the gravity of the sin, each of these latter is grave; delectation concerning touch can be grave or light according to the nature of the touch.

2. Morose delectation does not contract the specific malice of circumstances which are contained in the base object, unless the will is delighted in the circumstances themselves: ordinarily the will, by abstracting from the circumstances, is delighted in the object alone.

a. It is a great question whether morose delectations receive specific malice also from the circumstances of the object concerning which the will is delighted: whether, for example, one who is morosely delighted concerning a base touch on a blood relative admits not only delectation concerning venereal touch on a female, but also concerning an incestuous touch; likewise whether an unmarried man who is morosely delighted concerning intercourse with a married woman commits not only delectation concerning fornication, but also concerning adultery.

Since in morose delectation abstraction is made from the execution of the evil thing, one can abstract, and ordinarily in reality one does abstract, from the circumstances of the object, which therefore do not pour back their malice into the delectation. Certainly delectation receives specific malice from the object insofar as the object pleases and delights; but the circumstances of the base object, that it is a blood relative, a married person, are not apt to delight. Therefore it can be said that the will is not delighted in them unless it is explicitly borne also toward the circumstances.

Therefore, although the object of morose delectation must be declared in confession, nevertheless it is not necessary that the circumstances of the object changing the species also be declared: for true probability cannot be denied to the opinion which denies that morose delectation puts on specific malice from the circumstances of the object, unless the will is delighted in those very circumstances.¹

b. Although simple delectation or complacency concerning a base action represented through thought and its inefficacious desire can be distinguished theoretically, nevertheless in the concrete an inefficacious desire is almost always joined with simple delectation. Therefore the faithful ordinarily do not know how to distinguish between morose delectation and base inefficacious desire. Likewise simple delectation concerning a base thing and venereal delectation concerning the same thing are in reality distinguished; but because simple delectation almost always excites venereal delectation, or venereal sense, the faithful do not sufficiently distinguish the latter from the former.

For confessors it follows from these things that the faithful who accuse themselves of impure thoughts must be asked whether they also desired something base. But if they deny it, it is not necessary that confessors be solicitous about the object of the base thought; it suffices that they ask whether they experienced delectations or base senses and consented to them. But if they affirm base desires, the office of the confessor of itself requires that he prudently and directly investigate their object and circumstances; nevertheless, because this investigation is frequently too arduous and renders confession burdensome, and because moreover the faithful do not sufficiently distinguish between thoughts and desires, there will often be cause for omitting that investigation.

¹ Cf. Lacroix, l. 6, pr. 2, n. 1028; Reuter, l. c., n. 209; Lehmkuhl I, n. 255 ff.

63. On impure desires. An impure desire is the will by which someone intends to complete a base thing. It is twofold: efficacious, when someone absolutely intends to complete the base thing; and inefficacious, when someone conditionally, if I could, intends to execute the base thing.

Even in an inefficacious desire there is of itself affection toward the base thing; wherefore the same theological and specific malice belongs to it as to an efficacious desire, and therefore it is not necessary in confession to declare whether the desire was efficacious or inefficacious.

1. Impure desires, whether absolute or conditioned, are sins of the same gravity and species as the external work which is wished for: for the internal act receives specific malice from the object toward which it tends.

That a depraved desire is a sin of the same gravity and species as the desired object is clear also from the words of the Lord: Everyone who sees a woman in order to desire her has already committed adultery with her in his heart.¹ What is said here concerning adultery must be said concerning any other base work: he who desires it has already performed it in his heart.

2. Impure desires take specific malice not only from the object, but also from all circumstances of the object apprehended: for since the depraved will is borne toward a determinate object, it is necessarily borne toward all things which are contained in that object, provided they are known.

Therefore the desire of fornicating with a blood relative is the sin of incest, and the desire of fornicating with a married woman is adultery, namely the same sin which would be committed if the desire were fulfilled. Hence one who confesses a base desire is bound of himself to declare its object and all circumstances of the object changing the species.

Whether it is licit to desire merely natural pollution.

a. Merely natural pollution is called that which occurs spontaneously and involuntarily, whether in dreams or in waking, from the abundance of semen by which nature tries to unload itself.

b. It is not licit to desire it on account of the venereal delectation which accompanies it; but it is licit to desire it from an honorable end, e.g. as a means of quieting temptation, of unloading nature: for the object of this desire is not evil and the end is good.

Pollution which arises naturally, i.e. through causes instituted by nature, is not evil in itself. There are those who say that pollution which occurs from a base dream or from movements and touches following sleep is evil, and therefore that it is illicit to desire it or to rejoice about it. Others, however, think that even pollution occurring in this way is indifferent, because the causes provoking it are natural, n. 34.

Whether it is licit for betrothed persons to rejoice concerning future intercourse. The desire of future intercourse to be had after marriage has been entered, and joy concerning it, is not a sin in betrothed persons, because its object is licit; nevertheless the matter is not without danger. For thought of intercourse to be had easily excites venereal sense; but joy and delectation concerning venereal sense in betrothed persons is as grave a sin as in the unmarried.

Note. Pious penitents who are importunately troubled by depraved images are not to be blamed or rebuked, but suitably instructed in this way: a. imaginations of this kind are not of themselves sins, but temptations excited by nature or by the devil; wherefore b. they are a cross to be borne patiently, by which the merit of good works is increased; and c. they are to be efficaciously fought by ejaculatory prayers interposed from time to time, but otherwise by contempt.

¹ Matt. 5, 28.

THERE are as many kinds of bad thoughts as there are different kinds of sin, but for the purpose of this chapter they are commonly reduced by theologians to two kinds: bad desires and morose pleasure in evil imaginations. Desire, therefore, is here understood in a wide sense and comprises a longing, a wish, purpose, or intention of doing something wrong. Morose pleasure is voluntary joy, delight, and satisfaction in an evil imagination, and what is said about it is also applicable to voluntary sadness and sorrow on account of something good, which should cause the opposite sentiments.

Desires are efficacious when there is the intention of taking the necessary means to obtain what is desired; they are inefficacious or conditional when this is not the case.

An efficacious desire of doing what is wrong is a sin of the same kind as the external action would be; it contracts the malice of the object and of all the circumstances of the object. The reason is plain. The external action in the concrete with all its circumstances is the object to which the will tends in forming an efficacious desire; and as an act is specified by its object, the evil desire belongs to the same species of sin to which the external act would belong when . performed in the circumstances contemplated.

The same must be said of inefficacious or conditional desires, unless the condition takes away all the malice of the act, as it frequently may do, ‘There is no harm, for example, in saying, “‘ I should like to eat meat on a Friday, unless the Church forbade it’’; and the same is true generally whenever the condition, “if it were lawful,” is annexed to a merely positive prohibition. If this condition is annexed to a desire against the natural law, as ‘1 should like to steal if it were lawful,” or ‘‘ I should like to commit fornication if it were not forbidden,” the condition does not remove all the malice of the vicious will, for the very tendency of the will toward such objects is against right reason. Such conditional desires, then, are sinful, unless they indicate a mere propensity towards such sins without any voluntary affection of the will. In any case, however, they are dangerous, and should not be indulged or expressed,

Morose pleasure in the imagination of what is evil is what ordinary Catholics mean by a bad thought in the restricted sense, It is sinful when voluntary, for it is an approbation, a satisfaction in what is wrong; it is an act of the will which is specified by a bad object, and so it derives its special character and malice from the object. To take pleasure, then, in the thought of revenge, is a different sin from taking pleasure in the thought of adultery.

There is a difference, however, between the source of the malice of evil desires and of morose pleasures. We have seen that evil desires contract all the malice of the object and of its circumstances. Morose pleasure, too, contracts the malice of its object and of any circumstance which is a motive of the pleasure, but not of other circumstances which may belong to the object in the concrete. For the will in morose pleasure tends to the object not as it exists in the concrete with all its circumstances, but as it is represented in the imagination, and precisely in so far as the object thus represented allures the appetite. Morose pleasure, then, takes its malice from the object, but not from all the circumstances of the object.

Taking pleasure in an evil imagination must be distinguished from taking pleasure in the thought of sin. It is not sinful to take pleasure in thinking about pride, for example, and trying to penetrate its malice. Knowledge naturally gives pleasure and in itself is not sinful. But it is dangerous to think about some sins, about sins of lust or revenge, for example, and on account of the danger it is wrong to think about sins of the flesh without good reason. Thinking about such sins with good and sufficient reason is not sinful, for the danger of sin is not sin, and it may be neglected for sufficient cause; if there is not sufficient reason and the danger of consent is small, it will be a venial sin; if the danger of consent be proximate and the matter grave, the sin will be mortal.

Morose pleasure in certain definite sins of one’s past life has for its object the sins as they were actually committed with all their circumstances, and so it will be infected with all the malice of the circumstances. Morose pleasure in past sins is thus similar in its malice to evil desires, and on this account obtains the special name of “joy” in theology. A penitent who has been guilty of this sin should say what sins they were whose remembrance gave him pleasure.

Those who are not yet married and those who have been married may not take pleasure in the thought of what is allowed to married people, for in practice such pleasure cannot be confined to the intellect; it also excites the sensua appetite and this causes temptation and sin.

It is not sinful to take pleasure in a good result which followed from some evil, as, for example, in the good results of a war or of a revolution. We may lawfully rejoice in the death of someone who was causing great harm to public morality, or to the public good in general, not precisely because he is dead, but for the reason that the cause of public harm is removed. We prefer the public good to the good of the individual, especially if he is doing harm. In this connection mention may be made of certain propositions condemned by Innocent XI, of which the following is a specimen: “It is lawful for a son to rejoice that he killed his father in a drunken fit on account of the great wealth to which he has thereby succeeded.”’ It is obvious that such joy is morally wrong, for the act of parricide was at any rate materially wrong even when committed while drunk, and joy on account of what was, and is, wrong is unlawful; nor does succession to the father’s wealth, a good of a lower order than human life, especially a father’s life, furnish a just cause for such unfilial rejoicing.

As it is unlawful to take pleasure in evil, so it is sinful to entertain voluntary sadness on account of good. To be sorry, therefore, for what is good and matter of precept is a mortal or a venial sin according as the precept binds under mortal or venial sin; and so a reprobate sins grievously who laments the years that he spent in leading a virtuous life. Even though the good be not matter of precept, as, for example, the vows of religion, it is irrational and at least venially sinful to be sorry for having taken them; it will be grievously sinful if it leads to the danger of transgressing them.

On the questioning of penitents concerning bad thoughts, see Genicot, I, n. 175.

(St. Thomas, I-II, q. 74, a. 8; St. Alphonsus, Theologia Moralis, bk. V, 12-28; Homo Apostolicus, tract. 3, nn. 47-54.)

Three internal sins are distinguished: morose delectation, desire, and joy, insofar as the will is borne toward an act as such - abstraction having been made from its present, past, or future execution - toward an act to be perpetrated, or toward an act perpetrated. Therefore joy regards the past, desire regards the future, while morose delectation abstracts from both, indeed even from the present, because delectation concerning a present act coincides with the act itself. We shall speak first of morose delectation, then of desire and joy; and indeed of the latter in one treatment, because they are governed by almost the same rules. We pass over delectation concerning a present work, because, as we have said, it coincides with the work itself.

(St. Thomas, I-II, q. 74, a. 8; St. Alphonsus, Theologia Moralis V, 12-28.)

Internal sins are distinguished as three: morose pleasure, desire, and joy, according as the will is borne toward an act as such, with abstraction made from its present, past, or future execution; toward an act to be committed, or toward an act committed. And so joy regards the past, desire regards the future, while morose pleasure abstracts from both, indeed also from the present, because pleasure concerning a present act coincides with the act itself. We shall speak singly about morose pleasure, then about desire and joy, and indeed about the latter in one treatment, because they are governed by almost the same rules. Pleasure concerning a present work we pass over, because, as we have said, it coincides with the work itself.

I.

I. Notion and division. Desire is distinguished into simple desire and proposal. Simple desire is the act by which the will is indeed borne toward a work to be executed, but which nevertheless does not reach a proposal of executing that work. Proposal is the act by which the will proposes to execute the work. It is distinguished into absolute and conditioned, according as someone resolves absolutely or conditionally to commit the act.

Joy here is understood as deliberate complacency concerning an act committed. Joy expressed in words is called boasting.

II. Morality.

1. Simple desire, proposal, and joy concerning an evil act are evil, and indeed gravely or lightly evil according as the act is gravely or lightly evil. For they involve an affection of the will toward an evil act which they embrace: desire toward the future, joy toward the past. But an affection of this sort is manifestly evil, and indeed gravely or lightly evil according as the act is gravely or lightly evil. Add these words of Sacred Scripture: "You shall not covet your neighbor's wife."¹

¹ Exod. 20:17.

2. Simple desire, proposal, and joy take species both from the object considered according to its lowest species, and from the circumstances both of the subject and of the object. The reason is that they tend toward the act as it is or was on the part of the thing, with all its circumstances. It is said:

a. From the object considered according to its lowest species. Hence one who proposes to himself to commit, for example, pollution or fornication, contracts the guilt of pollution or of fornication.

b. From the circumstances of the subject, as was said about morose pleasure (n. 120).

c. From the circumstances of the object. Hence one who takes up the proposal of sinning with a married person, a blood-relative, etc., becomes guilty of adultery or incest.

The aforesaid things hold even if the desire or joy regards an act materially only evil. Hence proposition 14 was deservedly proscribed by Innocent XI: "It is lawful for a son to rejoice over the parricide of his parent, perpetrated by himself in drunkenness, on account of the enormous riches thereafter obtained by inheritance" (St. Alphonsus V, 20). It is lawful, however, to rejoice that an act materially evil happened rather than formally evil.

Note. Boasting about a sin truly committed commonly carries with it joy properly so called concerning the sin. But boasting about a fictitious sin seems to involve rather morose pleasure than joy properly so called; indeed sometimes it involves pleasure only concerning the manner of the depraved work. Hence to this boasting let those things be applied which we said about morose pleasure either concerning the work or concerning the manner alone (St. Alphonsus V, 26).

3. A conditioned proposal concerning an act which, with the condition set aside, would be depraved:

a. Is evil, if the condition does not remove the malice of the object; this occurs if the condition does not regard the malice of the act, as if someone were to say: I would steal, if there were no hell; I would kill my enemy, if I had a sword; I would fornicate, if I were not a religious, etc. (St. Alphonsus V, 13).

b. Is not evil, at least gravely, if the condition removes the malice of the object. "And this can happen not only in things forbidden by positive law, as if you were to say: I would eat meat in Lent unless the Church forbade it, but also in things forbidden by natural law, in a case in which the object could be lawful, namely by saying: If God permitted it, I would want to carry off that thing of Titius; if I were not a priest, I would marry; and similar things. We said: at least gravely; for ordinarily desires of this sort are not excused from venial sin, since commonly they are dangerous or at least idle" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

c. What if someone were to say that he would do something which is intrinsically evil, by adding the condition: if it were lawful; for example, if you were to say: "If it were not a sin, I would want to blaspheme, perjure myself, commit adultery, fornicate, avenge myself, and similar things" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.). Now most authors accuse him who speaks thus of sin, because the condition is impossible and therefore cannot remove the malice of the object. Granted; but deservedly it is doubted whether in the case there is true desire, or, to use the words of St. Alphonsus, "it is said with sufficient probability that when the will desires some impossible evil object under the condition if it were lawful, it never effectively consents to it; for when you choose that object by saying if it were lawful, and you know that it is not and cannot be lawful, you do not truly choose it, but only show your inclination. But it would be otherwise if you were to choose that evil object not to be prohibited, because to will the order and law of nature to be inverted is evil of itself" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.). So also Cajetan,¹ the Salmanticenses,² and Suarez.³

¹ In I-II, q. 13, a. 5.

² Tractatus 20, De principiis moralibus, c. 13, n. 62.

³ De legibus, l. 3, c. 13, n. 10.

Corollary I. It is lawful to rejoice and to be delighted concerning a good effect, for example concerning a temptation quieted through pollution, or concerning offspring conceived from fornicatory intercourse, etc. The reason is that the object of the pleasure is good. Nevertheless, "pleasures of this sort sometimes are not without danger" (St. Alphonsus V, 20), because the transition is easy to pleasure concerning the depraved act itself, which was the cause of the effect. Likewise, once an evil act is supposed, it is lawful to desire its good effect, for example that someone, if he sins again, be punished and amended. But it is not lawful to desire that someone sin again, even for the end that he be punished and come to his senses.

It is disputed whether it is lawful to rejoice and to be delighted concerning an evil act, for example concerning fornication, insofar as, not because, it was the cause of a good effect. With St. Alphonsus (V, 20), against many, it seems that this must be denied, because that thing, insofar as it was the cause of a good effect, or as the cause of a good effect, is not really distinguished from the evil act, so that joy concerning such an act as the cause of the effect in reality embraces the evil act itself, and therefore from an evil object becomes evil.

Corollary II. It is lawful, for an honorable end, to rejoice concerning merely natural pollution, because it is not a sin, not even a material one (St. Thomas, In IV Sent., dist. 9, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 1, ad 5; St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.; n. 65). Otherwise one must speak of another pollution, even if it was only a material sin (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

The concupiscible passions are defined as follows: (a) love, the first of the passions and the cause of all the others, tends to sensible good considered as desirable, abstracting from its presence or absence; while hatred is the aversion from sensible evil considered precisely as unsuitable and abstracting from its presence or absence; (b) desire tends to sensible good that is absent, and flight turns away from sensible evil apprehended as future; (c) delight is the affection produced in the sensitive appetite by the presence and possession of the object desired; (d) sadness is the passion which dejects the soul on account of the presence of an evil.

As was said above (89-93), the external acts of the members of the body have no morality of their own, since they are completely subject to the will. Consequently, there are only three classes of sins, if classification is made according to the faculties from which the sins proceed: (a) sins of sensuality, which were spoken of above when we treated of the passions (177 sqq.); (b) sins of thought; (c) sins of desire and reminiscent approval.

Sinful joy is an act of the will by which one takes delight in sins already committed by oneself or by others. We must distinguish between sinful joy and joy about things that are sinful.

(a) Sinful joy rejoices over the iniquity contained in past acts, either because it loves that iniquity in itself, or because it loves it as the cause of some gain. Examples: An unjust and revengeful man rejoices when he thinks of the oppression he exercised against some helpless person who had incurred his wrath. A criminal recalls with joy the perjuries by which his helpers secured his escape from justice.

(b) Joy about things that are sinful or consequent on sin rejoices, not that what was done was wicked, but over other circumstances that were good or indifferent. Examples: An employer admires in the conduct of a dishonest employee, not the injustice committed, but the shrewd manner in which the fraud was perpetrated. A bystander is very much amused to witness a fight, not because he likes discord, but because the acts and remarks of the fighters are comical. A man rejoices when he hears that a friend has committed suicide and made him his heir, if the joy is confined to the second part of the news.

To be sorry because one performed good that was not obligatory is not sinful of itself, but it may become so by reason of the evil motive of the sorrow, or of the danger of sin. Examples: If a person is sorry that he performed many unnecessary devotional exercises, because he injured his health thereby, his sorrow is not sinful. If he grieves over this because he now dislikes religion, his sorrow is made bad by his evil motive. If he regrets that he married, this is sinful if it leads him to neglect the duties of his state and commit injustice.

Joy.—The precept of charity includes a precept of joy, and hence the Apostle says: “Rejoice in the Lord always; again, I say, rejoice” (Philip., iv. 4, 5). This joy of charity has the following properties: (a) it is about good, not about iniquity, and it is not unrestrained; it rejoices “in the Lord”; (b) it should not be discontinued or interrupted by sin, but should rejoice “always.” It may, however, be mixed with sorrow over sin or the delay of entrance into the presence of God ( Rom., xii. 15; Ps. cxix. 5), for only in heaven will joy be filled (John, xv. 11). St. Paul spoke of himself as “sorrowful, yet always rejoicing” (II Cor., vi. 10).

Impure Thoughts.—Impure thoughts (delectatio morosa) are representations in the mind or imagination of impure venereal objects in which deliberate pleasure is taken.

(a) They are representations, that is, mental pictures or images of things absent from the senses, but thought of or imagined as present. Thus, impure thoughts differ from desires, which consist in attraction with will to accomplish, and also from sense contact of various kinds with objects present to the eyes, ears, or touch.

(b) They are joined with deliberate pleasure of the will, that is, one intends them or consents even momentarily to them after perceiving their presence and malice, even though carnal pleasure is not felt or does not threaten. Thus, impure thoughts differ from tempting thoughts, which are transient and unwished forms that appear in the mind, and are thought on before their true character is adverted to, or which gain a lodging in spite of efforts to eject them. A tempting thought is not sinful, but an occasion of merit when resisted, no matter how long it endures (see 2497 b).

(c) The pleasure is taken in a venereal object, that is, in the thought of fornication, adultery or other carnal sin, committed by oneself or by another. Hence, impure thoughts are not to be confused with the pleasure taken in knowledge about impurity (e.g., a professor of medicine or morality is not impure when he rejoices at the sexual knowledge he possesses and which is necessary for his duties, or willingly thinks about sex matters when it is necessary or useful for him to do so), or with pleasure taken in the morally indifferent manner of the venereal sin. For example, amusement over a ridiculous feature of a sin which one detests is not an impure thought (see 233-236).

The Malice of Impure Thoughts.—(a) The Theological Malice.—Impure thoughts are mortal sins: for he who deliberately rejoices at the thought of sin, loves sin and is therefore guilty of it. They are venial sins when there is imperfect advertence, and also when there is lightness of matter on account of the remoteness of the danger of a thought only indirectly voluntary. They are mortal when there is full deliberation and the impure thought is directly voluntary or gravely dangerous (see 2496).

(b) The Moral Malice.—Impure thoughts have the same specific malice as the representation of the object which is entertained as a welcome guest in the mind; for not only is impurity given the hospitality of the mind, but a particular kind of impurity (see 90, 235). Hence it follows, first, that a specifically different object (as is the case with different consummated sins) makes a specifically different sin (e.g., to think pleasurably of unlawful intercourse is mental fornication if the persons in mind are unmarried, and is mental adultery if the person in mind is married); secondly, that objects not specifically different—as is the case with different non-consummated sins of lewdness—do not make specifically different sins (e.g., to think pleasurably of a sinful kiss and to think sinfully of a sinful touch are both mental lewdness or impure thoughts); thirdly, that special malices of the object from which the mind can prescind—viz., those which in the external act do not change the species or do not explain the venereal pleasure—and from which it does prescind, are not incurred (e.g., to think pleasurably of sin with a woman who is married and a relative, if the thought that she is married or one’s relative is not pleasing or is displeasing, is mental fornication, not mental adultery or mental incest). In praxi vero consulitur confessariis ut regulariter abstineant a quaestionibus de specie morali delectationis morosae; nam fideles plerumque nesciunt faciliter distinguere inter species morales cogitationum, et sic interrogatio evaderet vel inutilis, vel etiam ratione materiae perieulosa. Ad haec quum casus crebriores sint, maximo esset incommodo, tum confessariis, tum poenitentibus, si sacerdos exquireret quae vix cognosci possunt. Sufficit igitur ordinarie sciscitari de specie theologica (utrum voluntas complacuerit), vel de specie morali generali (utrum actus internus delectatio morosa vel potius desiderium fuerit). See Canon 888, Sec.2; Norms for Confessors in Dealing with the Sixth Commandment, Holy Office, May 16, 1943.

Impure Desires.—Impure desire is a deliberate intention to commit impurity in the future.

(a) It is a deliberate intention, that is, a purpose or will to which consent is given internally. Hence, an impure desire is not the same thing as a statement of fact, as when a passionate person declares that he would sin, were it not for fear of the consequences, meaning only that he is frail, not that he wishes to sin. Neither is it the same as a mere velleity, which desires venereal pleasure under circumstances that would make it lawful, as when a married man wishes that he were lawfully married to a woman other than his present wife, or that both he and the other woman were free to marry each other. But these velleities are foolish and venially sinful, and often on account of danger they are mortally sinful. An impure desire exists when the will consents unconditionally (as when a person decides or wishes to fornicate tomorrow) or conditionally under a proviso that does not take away the malice (as when a person decides that he would fornicate were it not for fear of punishment, or Wishes that it were lawful for him to practise fornication).

(b) It is an intention to commit impurity, and hence there is no impure desire in wishing what is not venereal pleasure (e.g., the spiritual, mental or bodily relief that follows on an involuntary pollution), or what is lawful venereal pleasure (e.g., when engaged persons think, but without carnal commotion or danger, of the benefits of their future married relationship).

Malice of Impure Desires.—Impure desires are mortal sins and have the malice of the object and of the circumstances that one has in mind; that is, one commits the same kind of sin in desiring as in performing impurity. Hence, Our Lord declares that he who looks upon a woman to desire her unlawfully has already committed adultery in his heart (Matt., v. 28), and hence also the ninth commandment forbids sins of impure desire. The principles given in 2506, 2507, apply also to impure desires with this difference that the mind when it wills external performance considers the object as it is in itself, not as it is mentally represented, and hence is less likely to prescind from actual circumstances known to it, But even here confessional investigation is sometimes not necessary on account of its moral impossibility.

167. • A threefold class of them is distinguished, namely:

1. Morose delectation, or free complacency in an evil thing exhibited by the imagination as present, without desire.

2. Joy, or deliberate complacency concerning a past evil thing, or an evil work performed either by oneself or by another ¹.

¹ Complacency here does not mean pleasure or delight drawn from consideration of the evil object, but rather a certain approval by which the will has the evil perpetrated as pleasing and accepted: which approval indeed can be called joy in this sense, that someone concerning the evil deed not only is not sorry, as he ought to be, but rather rejoices.

Moreover joy is properly said also of a present good; indeed it is customarily defined as enjoyment of a good possessed and loved (Suarez, On 1.2, treat. 2, disp. 7, sect. 1, nos. 3-5). Concerning which matter St. Thomas says thus (1.2, q. 31, art. 3): Joy is a certain species of delectation... For we are delighted also in those things which we desire, when we obtain them.... But the name of joy does not have place except in delectation which follows reason; whence we do not attribute joy to brute animals, but only the name of delectation.

3. Desire, or an act of the will wishing for an evil thing. It is called efficacious if an intention or absolute proposal of executing it is present; otherwise it is called inefficacious ². - St. Lig., no. 15.

² It is necessary that some efficacy be present even in inefficacious desires; otherwise they would not even deserve the name of desire. Namely there is present a conditionally efficacious will, which would pass into work unless something else obstructed. Hence St. Alphonsus well says (book 5, no. 15): A desire is called inefficacious if it does not propose absolutely to execute, but consents that it would execute, if it could, when, for example, it says: If I could steal the treasure of the Church, I would steal it.

But what the malice of these is, and what the species, hold in these few words:

I. Desire, even inefficacious, is truly a sin, and takes on the species both of the object and of the circumstances.

And 1. it is truly a sin. For this is established from the precept, Thou shalt not covet, which must generally and indefinitely be understood of the prohibition of any depraved affection. Moreover every desire of a prohibited thing is opposed to right reason: for it is base and dishonest to desire, namely to propose to oneself either absolutely or conditionally to execute, that which it is not licit to execute.

2. It takes on the species of its object. For any desire, even inefficacious, tends to its object, and consequently is a volition of the special malice of that object, and therefore contracts its specific malice ³. This is also established from the words of Christ, Matth. 5.28: He who shall have looked at a woman to lust after her has already committed adultery with her in his heart. But to commit adultery in Scripture is everywhere understood as adultery. Therefore...

³ The internal act about which this treats here regards the external act as to be entrusted to execution, either absolutely or at least hypothetically; therefore it is necessarily carried to it according to all the conditions and circumstances which affect it, whether they are necessarily prerequired for it, or inseparably accompany it, or of their own accord follow from it.

3. It also takes on the species of the circumstances of the object. For desire, since it tends to an object, touches that object as it is in itself with its circumstances. Therefore it contracts the whole malice also of the circumstances. Hence in confession, for example of the desire of fornicating, the circumstances of consanguinity, affinity, matrimonial bond, or vow of chastity which affect the person desired must be declared. - St. Lig., no. 12.

168. • II. Joy likewise is a sin and indeed of the same species as the evil action about which it is concerned, and it likewise takes on the species of the circumstances joined to it, no otherwise than desire itself. The reason is that joy, as we said above, is approval of a past evil; therefore this embraces the sinful act as it existed in itself, namely clothed with its circumstances. Therefore it also takes on the whole malice of these.

Hence he who in the recollection of past sins is complacent in them and approves them, ought in confession to explain the object of this complacency, and the circumstances changing the species, just as if he had sinned anew by deed.

Boasting about a committed sin, displeasure concerning an evil not perpetrated, and also sadness concerning a good performed ⁴, must be recalled to joy.

⁴ Understand this especially of a work which had to be performed by strict obligation; and thus sadness of this sort will be such a sin as a refusal to fulfill the obligation would have been. But if the discourse is about a good act to which one was not held, to repent without just cause of a good of this kind will certainly not lack some venial fault; since this is against reason, because the proper object of repentance is an evil thing; but there will be no fault if a cause is present which makes the repentance honorable. Confer what Sanchez has concerning one who repents of a vow emitted (On the Decalogue, book 4, ch. 12, no. 2).

169. • III. Morose delectation 1. is certainly a sin; 2. it also certainly varies in gravity and species according to the variety of objects exhibited to the mind.

The reason for the first is that it is opposed to rational nature and divine law for the will to have as pleasing that which is discordant with right reason and displeases God. Moreover deliberate delectation concerning an evil object argues affection toward it: but affection toward an evil object is an evil affection, as is clear ⁵. Therefore... Hence Osee 9.10: They became abominable like those things which they loved. And Prov. 15.26: Evil thoughts are an abomination to the Lord. Therefore...

⁵ The guilt of morose delectation appears easily, since in reality it is nothing other than consent to delectation concerning an evil work. Thus St. Thomas, where he excellently distinguishes delectation about the thought of an evil work, which does not pertain here, and delectation about the evil work thought of (1.2, q. 74, art. 8): Someone thinking about fornication can be delighted about two things. In one way, about the thought itself; in another way, about the fornication itself thought of... But the thought itself, according to itself, is not mortal sin; indeed sometimes it is only venial, for example when someone thinks about it uselessly; but sometimes it is without any sin at all, for example when someone thinks usefully about it, as when he wishes to preach or dispute about it. And therefore consequently the affection and delectation which is thus about the thought of fornication is not of the genus of mortal sin, but sometimes is venial sin, sometimes none. Whence neither is consent to such delectation mortal sin... But that someone thinking about fornication is delighted ABOUT THE ACT ITSELF thought of, this happens from this, that his affection is inclined toward this act. Whence that someone consents to such delectation is nothing other than that he consents in this, that his affection be inclined toward fornication: for no one is delighted except concerning that which is conformable to his appetite. But that someone chooses that his affection be conformed to those things which according to themselves are mortal sins is mortal sin. Whence such consent to the delectation of mortal sin is mortal sin.

More briefly Laymann (book 1, treat. 3, ch. 6, no. 2): It is one thing to be delighted about the thing thought of, for example fornication, in such a way that the formal reason of delighting is from the thing itself, but thought is only the condition proposing and applying the thing thought of; but another thing is to be delighted about the thought, for example of fornication, in such a way that the formal reason of delighting is from the thought itself... We are speaking here about delectation WHICH IS TAKEN FROM THE THING ITSELF. For since the thought of an evil thing is not evil of itself, but sometimes good, as if you think about base things for the sake of teaching or admonishing, but sometimes venially evil, as if you think about the same things from curiosity; it follows that delectation also concerning such thought as object is not evil of itself, but sometimes good, sometimes venially evil.

The reason for the second is that whoever is delighted concerning an object evil in itself approves it and adheres to it by his affection. Therefore in what degree and species the object is evil, in the same plainly will its delectation be evil. Therefore... - St. Thomas, 1.2, qu. 74, art. 8. - St. Lig., no. 15.

170. Questions. - QUESTION 1. Whether morose delectation also takes on the specific malice of circumstances, as desire and joy do?

I answer: It is controverted. Probably no. The reason is that simple delectation does not tend to the object as to be placed, but rests in it as represented by the intellect. Now the intellect abstracts from the other properties of the object besides that which moves the delectation ⁶. Lugo, Laymann, Reuter, Bonacina, etc., against others who contend that simple delectation takes on all the species of the object, just as desire itself does. St. Lig. says that each opinion is probable, book 5, no. 15 ⁷.

⁶ This opinion does not deny that specific malice is taken also from circumstances, if these also are the object of delectation; but if the delectation, as Sanchez says (On the Decalogue, book 1, ch. 2, no. 11), whom therefore the Salmanticenses wrongly allege for the opposite opinion, no differently than several others there reported by Sanchez (treat. 20, ch. 13, no. 31), is not carried to the object according to its whole malice apprehended, but according to a part, as to a woman apprehended indeed as not his own, yet not as married to another or a nun; it will not have the whole malice of the external work, but only the malice apprehended, and that alone will have to be confessed, and it will be reduced to the species of simple fornication.

This hypothesis indeed is founded in the nature of the thing. For it happens that the will is carried to that which is indeed delectable, the circumstances of which, far from alluring, rather blunt the appetite, for example that the woman is already married to another, that she is a nun, or a blood relative, etc., which the Salmanticenses also suggest (treat. 20, ch. 13, no. 30), where they well advert that the things said above hold indeed concerning the circumstances of the object, but not concerning the circumstances of the person sinning, for example if he is married or bound by a vow of chastity, although these circumstances contribute nothing to the delectation.

⁷ ** Although St. Alphonsus says that the opinion of the Author is very probable, nevertheless he adds (ibid.) that he greatly likes what Holzmann says (On the Precepts of the Decalogue, treat. 2, no. 698), that, for example, the circumstance of adultery must be explained by reason of the proximate danger of desiring at least inefficaciously, etc. And the VV. (page 913, no. 20) recall here those things which the Holy Doctor has elsewhere (Apostolic Man, treat. 3, no. 48), where after alleging some from the indicated false allegations of the Salmanticenses, he adds that in practice... without doubt all the circumstances of the object must be explained in delectation.

I answer: The opinion of Holzmann will be able to have place when he who is morosely delighted concerning an evil object at the same time has known that he is then violating the obligation of guarding against the grave and proximate danger of falling into depraved desire for that same object. But otherwise in the other hypothesis. The reason is clear from the first principles of ethics; for no sin is ever committed if some notion of obligation does not shine beforehand.

171. • QUESTION 2. Whether it is licit to desire evil under the condition, if it were licit?

I answer with a distinction: Yes, of itself, if the condition applied takes away the whole malice of the thing; the reason is that such an affection involves no disorder either in itself or in the object, from which by the condition malice is wholly excluded. But no in the other hypothesis; the reason is that such an affection tends to an evil object, and indeed absolutely, since the condition does not take away malice from the object even as represented, and consequently the whole malice of the object is poured back into the act of the will. And indeed there are certain objects concerning which a condition however applied cannot take away malice. For those things which are intrinsically evil cannot be changed, and consequently a condition would be applied uselessly, since to wish for such things of itself would be to desire that the law and order of nature be changed. - St. Lig., no. 27; Apostolic Man, no. 50.

Yet he is probably to be excused from grave sin who by such a desire certainly would not wish that that which was intrinsically evil should become licit, but only would show his propensity toward that object. - St. Lig., Apostolic Man, ibid., with others. Moreover everyone sees how dangerous desires of this kind are, even if the condition applied were to take away the whole malice, especially in things prohibited by natural law, but licit in some case or state, for example: I would kill an enemy, if God commanded; I would take a wife, if I were not a priest or bound by a vow; I would gladly marry Caia, if I did not have a wife. Such desires Cajetan (Sins of Thought) deservedly calls foolish and diabolical temptations; because although a desire of this kind is licit, nevertheless the present delectation concerning that object is illicit, which in a venereal matter will easily be found joined with desire. Indeed other conditioned desires concerning things prohibited only by positive law are also to be dissuaded, because for the most part they are idle, and sometimes can labor under some disordered affection ⁸.

⁸ Sometimes desires of this kind can be neither idle nor disordered, namely if they are concerning a good object, for example if, with a suitable condition applied, a married man were to foster desires about undertaking sacred ministries and enjoying Communion of the chalice, or a Religious bound by vow of poverty about distributing alms, building hospitals, adorning churches, etc., or a cleric about destroying the enemies of the Church in a just battle, etc.

172. • QUESTION 3. Whether it is licit to be delighted concerning the inculpable omission of some precept left undone from forgetfulness?

I answer: No, if the joy is referred to the omission insofar as it is objectively evil. But yes, if it is referred only to the pleasure or advantage honest in itself. - Suarez, On Sins, disp. 5, sect. 7, no. 15. - Lugo, On Penance, disp. 16, no. 389, etc., against others who deny it without distinction ⁹.

⁹ Suarez and Lugo, alleged here by the Author, and also others commonly, hand this down not only concerning the omission of a commanded work, but generally concerning any act whatsoever evil according to itself, which nevertheless someone performed without fault, namely from inadvertence or ignorance, or in madness, sleep, drunkenness: namely, that it is not licit to rejoice concerning the past act according to itself and on account of its pleasure; nevertheless it is licit to rejoice concerning the good effect thence following, and therefore concerning that act only insofar as it was the cause of such an effect, as Suarez says.

Here carefully observe those words: According to itself and on account of its pleasure; for by these is excluded the reason because of which St. Alphonsus (book 5, no. 20) seems with Sanchez and certain others to depart from this doctrine. For Sanchez shrewdly observes (On the Decalogue, book 1, ch. 2, no. 16) that the aforesaid causes, which are reduced to defect of free consent, indeed excuse the exterior work from fault, but do not likewise make licit the delectation inherent in an evil work which is later freely taken. And hence comes the solution of the question whether it is licit to rejoice concerning pollution in sleep, or even to desire it. For as St. Thomas teaches (on 4, dist. 9, q. 1, art. 4, q. 1, ad 5), it will be a sin if pollution pleases on account of the delectation; but not if it pleases as an unloading or alleviation of nature. Concerning this matter see the same St. Thomas (2.2, q. 154, art. 5), where, contrary to what St. Alph. has, l. c., he recalls to the natural cause of pollution a base dream, to which also the touches or movements following that same dream can be reduced. For when, he says, seminal humor abounds in the body, or when a resolution of humor has occurred... the sleeper dreams those things which pertain to the emission of such abundant or resolved humors; as also happens when nature is burdened by some other superfluity; so that sometimes phantasms pertaining to the emission of such superfluities are formed in the imagination.

** The VV. (page 140) move a twofold complaint: 1. that you will seek in vain in the text of Sanchez the words brought above; 2. that the Author twists Sanchez into his own sense.

I answer to 1. There the opinion of Sanchez is reported, not the words. If the VV. desire that opinion expressed in the words of Sanchez, behold it (l. c.): As often as the cause excusing the exterior deed from mortal fault, namely defect of consent, does not concur in the delectation itself, although the deed is free from fault, nevertheless the delectation will not be free from sin.... The reason is that that deed was OF ITSELF mortal, and free from fault solely by ignorance or defect of reason. Since therefore that delectation lacks a similar excusing cause, and is wholly voluntary, and is concerned with an object OF ITSELF mortal, it will be mortal. Was not this opinion expressed in the preceding, even though in other words?

I answer to 2. There is no twisting there, nor could there have been any necessity of twisting. The Author was suggesting there that the hypothesis or question about which Suarez, Lugo, etc., who affirm that joy is licit, is one thing, but the hypothesis about which Sanchez, who denies it, is another. It was a deed worthy of its authors that the Salmanticenses (treat. 20, ch. 13, no. 48) in some way set up the question according to the hypothesis of Suarez, Lessius, etc., and then in a manner often customary to them opposed (ibid., no. 49) to these Sanchez, Azor, etc., who discuss the question according to another hypothesis. The great confidence of St. Alphonsus toward the Salmanticenses caused that here, as also often elsewhere, he transcribed these things from them, and moreover added Collet, Roncaglia, and also Croix; although the last, since he sets up each hypothesis, therefore, as the matter demanded, in the one (book 5, no. 89) agrees with Sanchez, etc., but in the other (ibid., no. 91) with Suarez. But you would say that the Salmanticenses are less worthy of excuse in this, because since apud Suarez, Vasquez, Lessius, etc., they could see each hypothesis most clearly proposed, and aptly solved according to the diverse merits of the cause, they opposed to them authors who did not even mention a word concerning the other hypothesis. But as to the fact that the VV., with no one preceding, undertook (l. c.) to refute the resolution of Suarez, etc., for the diverse hypothesis, it will have been enough to observe that the question is brought to this: whether the same fact, under a diverse aspect or consideration, can or cannot stir up a diverse and indeed right affection; and whoever understands this question will be able by himself to decide concerning the merit of the refutation.

The VV. add (page 142) that the authority of St. Thomas is invoked by the Author. But from what has been related in the Note, that appears false. For by the Author only two things are suggested. 1. Under a diverse consideration it is licit or not licit to have delectation concerning nocturnal illusion. 2. That St. Thomas stands against the doctrine of St. Alphonsus (book 5, no. 20), that pollution in sleep is objectively evil if it comes from touch and a base dream; St. Thomas recalls even that which proceeds from a base dream to a natural cause. And these things suffice for the seventeen columns with which the VV. detain the reader. For concerning condemned propositions it will be said in its own place.

Concerning the general question proposed in the text, it will be useful to have indicated that several Doctors distinguish between things prohibited by the law of nature and things prohibited only by human law; and they affirm delectation illicit concerning the first genus, but not likewise as to the other, provided it is not done under the aspect of prohibition. Thus Sanchez (book 1, ch. 2, no. 10), Azor (part 1, book 4, ch. 6, q. 1), and others, whom St. Alphonsus follows (book 5, no. 27), saying, thus it must be held... whatever Croix says (book 1, no. 81). Yet immediately the Holy Doctor (l. c.) adds: Nevertheless it is not licit to be delighted concerning Mass left aside because of forgetfulness, and similar things; because the omission is objectively evil, as Roncaglia (treat. 2, ch. 3, q. 5) with Azor and Sanchez.

And in reality Roncaglia wrote thus, distinguishing with the Salmanticenses (whom he transcribes with their name passed over in silence) whether an impediment of fulfilling a precept withdraws from the obligation of the precept, or only excuses. Hence he deduces that it is licit for a youth to be delighted concerning the omission of a fast to which he is not yet held, and for the sick to be delighted concerning the omission of Mass; but otherwise if this happens from forgetfulness, because the omission then remains objectively evil; then he alleges Azor and Sanchez. But Sanchez in the very place cited by Roncaglia (book 1, ch. 2, no. 16) teaches the opposite and adds this exception to the general rule: Understand, unless concerning things prohibited only by human law... there is delectation about the material act, and as to its substance, with the prohibition set aside; in which case we said, no. 10, that it is not mortal to be delighted, even when breaking the precept is mortal, much less when it is freed from sin by ignorance. - But Azor (q. 1, book 4, ch. 6, q. 1): If he who is delighted thinking about eating flesh meats absolutely and in itself, but not as it is forbidden at certain times, does not sin, therefore it is because he does not take delectation from an evil thing insofar as evil; for the eating of flesh meats is not evil of itself. Tamburini (Decalogue, 1.3, ch. 5, sect. 1, no. 2) applies this doctrine to the omission of the Breviary, since the object of delectation can be the lack of labor and watching; and say the same of the omission of Mass, when someone can be delighted merely concerning the avoided inconvenience of a journey, rain, etc. The defect of coherence in this question is owed to the Salmanticenses, whom Roncaglia also copied; since they (treat. 20, ch. 13, no. 37) say that in things prohibited by positive law the substance of the work can be set aside from its prohibition; and then they forget this very thing.

173. Resolves. - 1. If a penitent accuses himself of some depraved thought, he must be asked whether he knew it was a sin; and if he answers that he detested it as soon as he knew it was base, he must be judged wholly immune from sin. - If he answers that for some time he had some confused cognition of the malice, and adhered to it, but without fully adverting to its gravity, then indeed he is easily to be excused from grave sin, but not from venial. But if he does not know how to extricate himself from these questions, ordinarily it must be presumed that he did not consent, or at least that full consent or perfect advertence was lacking in him, especially if he is of a God-fearing conscience. - Saettler.

2. Although it is one thing to be delighted concerning an evil thing, but another to be delighted concerning the, for example, clever mode by which the evil thing was performed (which indeed of itself can lack fault); nevertheless the Confessor ought easily to suspect morose delectation in those who willingly hear base things, although these do not seem to be narrated except to make manifest the ingenious mode by which they were performed; and certainly if the discourse were about honest actions, however ingeniously performed, they would generally perceive much less delectation. Say the same about those who eagerly read books less honest ¹⁰.

¹⁰ In these things it must chiefly be attended whether at other times the penitent is accustomed to consent to depraved delectation. For otherwise, that someone is more inclined and eager to be engaged in reading or hearing a base subject is not an indication of deliberate delectation from base things, but of human infirmity; and although the delectation by which the lower appetite is solicited is rejected, this does not impede weak nature from inclining toward matters of this kind more than toward other matters to be handled; especially because sometimes there also accedes a certain curiosity, which is accustomed to be sharpened toward new and unusual things the more a man would not dare without just cause to undertake that work. Hence the anxiety by which some are sometimes troubled must be calmed, because in handling these matters rather than others, or in hearing confessions of women rather than of men, they seem to themselves to be willingly engaged.

3. It is not mortal to be saddened concerning an obligation not essentially commanded, insofar as it is burdensome only, or in the divided sense of the law, for example concerning the burden of fasting. - St. Lig.

4. It is not licit to be delighted concerning the evil thing itself considered in itself, because the object of delectation is always evil. Nevertheless it is licit to be delighted concerning the good effect which proceeds from it, provided the order of charity is not violated ¹¹. Hence the following proposition under no. 15 was condemned by Innoc. IX: It is licit for a son to rejoice concerning the parricide of his father perpetrated by himself in drunkenness, on account of the great riches thence obtained from the inheritance.

¹¹ The Salmanticenses (treat. 20, ch. 13, no. 47), whom St. Alphonsus followed (book 5, no. 20), fabricate a disagreement here among doctors, and accuse Vasquez, Lessius, Palau, etc., as if they taught that, on account of a good effect, it is licit to be delighted concerning a formally such sin, and consequently that affection can licitly be terminated, on account of a good end, in a thing intrinsically evil. But these things are wrongly fabricated, since no disagreement is had in these authors except perhaps in words. Let Lessius, with whom the others also agree, be heard (On Justice and Right, book 4, ch. 3, no. 105): When someone is said to rejoice concerning an evil work, insofar as it is the cause of good, it can be understood in two ways. First, that on account of the good effect he rejoices that that work is or was, or was done by himself; and this is wholly illicit, if that work was intrinsically sin: because this is to approve sin, and to have complacency in it on account of a good end.... For just as that effect, or relation to that effect, cannot effect that that work, which is intrinsically sin, be licit or good, so neither that it be worthy of joy and complacency.... Secondly it can be understood that he rejoices that that depraved work had or has such a good effect; and thus it is licit to rejoice concerning an evil work. For we do not rejoice that that work is evil; but supposing that it has been done, we rejoice that it gave cause for a good effect. For it is truly worthy of joy that by divine goodness the greatest goods proceed even from the worst works. But this is rather to rejoice concerning the effect than concerning the work, although we also rejoice concerning the causation of the good which belongs to the work.

** The VV. (page 145), having set forth the opinions, as they understood them, of Vasquez, Bonacina, Lessius, and Palau, conclude (page 144): Rightly therefore St. Alphonsus attributed to Palau and Lessius the opinion that it is licit to be delighted concerning an evil work not as sin, but as cause of the effect following. They add that Vasquez and Bonacina, whom they falsely say was added by St. Alphonsus, had progressed further; and therefore that a disagreement of doctors concerning this question exists.

I answer: 1. The mark of false accusation was attributed to the Salmanticenses, not because the accused Authors do not have that thesis, but because this is explained by the Salmanticenses as if the affection, as is said in the Note, were terminated to a thing intrinsically evil. But this is false; because the aspect of causality in the case is not evil.

2. It was said that there is no disagreement among the Doctors except in words. This is clear from the words of Lessius brought forward, and also from the fact that none of the Doctors whom the Salmanticenses and St. Alphonsus oppose as contrary has anything against the thesis thus proposed.

3. Finally, what the VV. add, that Vasquez and Bonacina progressed further, is an indication that they did not grasp even the least bit the opinion of Vasquez, and therefore of Bonacina; whence we think it happened that they wrote: Vasquez, S.J., teaches that it is not mortal sin to desire a formally evil work with efficacious will; which words indeed, having regard not to the mind of the VV. but to the words, carry open calumny. Vasquez and Sayrus, says Sanchez (book 1, ch. 2, no. 9), say that although in general an efficacious will (which they call desire) of any mortal thing is mortal, yet not every delectation concerning any work whatsoever, even by natural right prohibited under mortal sin, is mortal, provided it is not concerning the work under the aspect under which it is sin, or contrary to a precept. He then indicates their singular doctrine, which he says is proved most widely and learnedly by Vasquez, and concludes: And thus, although Vasquez admits that morose delectation of a mortal thing is mortal, nevertheless he recedes from the foundations by which the most common opinion proves this. These things prove that Vasquez, as to substance, did not recede from the common doctrine. Lugo himself also testifies to the same thing (On Penance, disp. 16, no. 363), saying: This opinion of Vasquez is embraced by not a few others, Reginald, Sayrus, and others, whom Diana reports and follows..., and Azor, Salas, Filliuccius, Bonacina, and Lessius apud the same Diana call it probable, and Castrus Palao follows the same. And he indeed adds (no. 364): This opinion is difficult perhaps more in the mode of explaining than in the thing itself; which he pursues up to no. 370. Yet that Vasquez declined to these absurdities which the VV. saw, neither Lugo, nor anyone else, saw through or suspected.

5. The Confessor ought to act cautiously with those who rejoice about an advantage coming to them from their own or another's sin, or from the harm or death of another; for sometimes delectations of this kind arise not from the advantage alone, but from joy concerning the sin itself or the evil of the neighbor ¹². The same is to be feared about him who says that he rejoices concerning the spiritual good of the neighbor, but which proceeds from his misfortune, for example from grave infirmity, loss of temporal things, etc. For joy concerning the neighbor's evil can sometimes creep in rather than concerning the good effect thence proceeding, especially if he previously had enmity with him. Therefore the Confessor, if the matter seems to require it, should not neglect prudently to look into the mind of the penitent. - St. Lig., no. 20. - See Cases, no. 150 and following.

¹² The vigilance of the Confessor is opportune because of two things, namely 1. lest the desire or joy of a good effect (for those things which are said here about joy, from the common opinion of the Doctors, are almost valid concerning desire, or even concerning delectation) pass over into joy, or desire, or approval of sin considered in itself, from which that effect is caused; especially if someone has obtained profit of great moment from his sin; in which case joy and delectation concerning the great happiness acquired will indeed scarcely be abstracted from delectation in the evil cause. 2. Lest ever, namely even if any fault whatsoever of anyone is absent, or at least delectation concerning fault is absent, the order of charity be violated, which certainly demands that the good which we intend be reasonably preferable to the good of which we either wish another to be deprived or rejoice that he is deprived. Hence the condemnation of the proposition mentioned in the preceding number; for the order of charity does not permit that a son prefer the hope of inheritance to the death of his father. But concerning these things better where charity is treated.

What are the acts of the will which consist in the pursuit of good and in flight from evil? - These acts of the will can be distinguished according as the passions of the sensitive appetite, to which they correspond, are distinguished. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 22. Now the passions are: love, to which hatred is opposed; desire or concupiscence, to which flight or abomination is opposed; delight, to which sadness is opposed; hope, to which despair is opposed; daring, to which fear is opposed; finally anger, which has no opposite.

S. Th. 1. 2. q. 23. The first three are passions of the concupiscible; the four latter are passions of the irascible. Love is the simple complacency of good, which proceeds from the connaturality and coaptation of the one appetizing with regard to the thing suitable to him. Dilection adds to love a preceding election; charity adds to love a certain perfection, insofar as that which is loved is esteemed of great price. One love is of friendship, another of concupiscence. For to love is to will good to someone. Toward that good which someone wills to someone there is love of concupiscence. Toward that to which someone wills good there is love of friendship. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 26.

Hatred is the simple displeasure and detestation of evil, which arises from a certain dissonance of the appetite toward that which is apprehended as repugnant and harmful. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 29. One hatred is of abomination, another of enmity. The former is the detestation of some evil of a person; the latter is also the detestation of the person himself, to whom one wills evil. Concupiscence or desire is the movement of the appetite into an absent good. Flight or abomination is the detestation of an absent evil. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 30.

Delight is a certain repose of the appetite from the presence of a delighting good. Sadness is a certain pain from the presence of evil. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 31, 35. Hope is the movement of the appetite into a future good, arduous, possible to obtain, and according to this possibility or impossibility hope differs from despair. Hence it is that hope imports a certain approach to an arduous good; despair, on the contrary, imports withdrawal from it. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 40. a. 1, 4. "Fear flees future harm because of its victory over the one fearing; but daring attacks imminent danger because of its victory over the danger itself." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 45. a. 1. For fear "does not regard evil absolutely, but with a certain difficulty or arduousness, so that it can scarcely be resisted." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 41. a. 2 ad 3. "According to the opposition of good and evil, fear is contrary to hope; according to the opposition of approach and withdrawal, daring is contrary to fear, but despair to hope." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 45. a. 1 ad 3.

Anger is the appetite of vengeance, as possible to itself. It seeks evil itself under the notion of vindictive justice. Hence it regards one object according to the notion of good, namely the vengeance which it seeks, and another according to the notion of evil, namely the harmful man, against whom it wills to be avenged through the infliction of punishment. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 46. a. 2, 6. It has no contrary either according to approach and withdrawal, or according to the opposition of good and evil. For it is a movement toward attacking the injurious evil already lying upon one. Hence neither can there be a movement toward fleeing evil; nor can there be a movement toward good: for when this has been obtained, there is repose and joy of the appetite. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 23. a. 3.

What is election? - Election is an act of the will by which the will is borne into a particular means as a means, or as a useful good; namely, it is the efficacious volition of some particular thing which is loved on account of another.

Therefore election proceeds from the efficacious intention of the end, and its object is the useful good as such and possible for us; and it contains at least virtually the volition of the end itself.

Likewise election retains its intrinsic nature, although it does not happen to take place among several things, when that means is only one. For an act is specified by its proper object, and the same object of election remains, namely the means to the end, whether it is the only means or whether it is compared with others. Election is after the manner of desire, because it is concerning the means as to be executed, and precedes execution; and therefore it is concerning an absent thing.

Moreover election is the purpose of the will; since purpose is an act of the will by which someone determines that he will do something. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 13; Suarez, d. 8, s. 1, 2.

Can someone labor under an invincibly erroneous conscience as regards depraved desires and other merely internal acts, namely if no exterior action follows? - Speaking explicitly and generally about desire, Elbel has this, n. 127: "That many, at least among the more uneducated and less instructed, can inculpably persuade themselves that desires of this kind are not evil unless they are completed by deed, seems sufficiently certain; and Sanchez, Stoz, and La-Croix expressly teach this." This opinion, says S. Alph. 1. 1. n. 9, "I have never been able to judge probable.... With other learned recent authors I judge it little probable." The reason for this opinion is that if someone certainly knows the malice of the external action, and nevertheless wills to execute it, he already knows that he wills evil. How then will he be excused from sin? But as regards simple delectation, that invincible ignorance can more easily be present; for the tendency of the will toward evil is not so evident as in desire efficacious of itself. And the same also seems to have to be said of inefficacious desire.

Note: One sins against the law not only by action, namely by commission or omission, by doing or not doing those things which are prohibited or commanded by law, but also by simple desire, without execution of the thing, by simple morose delectation, or voluntary complacency, without desire, or, conversely, by voluntary sadness. Hence he also sins against the law who despises, censures, reproaches those things which are to be done or were to be done; which is the same as despising, censuring, reproaching the law which commands them; or, on the contrary, approves, praises, boasts of those things which are not to be done or were not to be done; whether he himself or another has transgressed the law. Moreover scandal can easily be present by reproach or boasting; since these easily furnish others with an incitement, or delight. Except if someone praises not the evil thing itself, but the new, clever, vigorous manner in which the thing was accomplished: for this is a certain natural good, provided nevertheless that the danger of delight in the evil thing and of scandal is absent. Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 266, 273; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 186, a. 9, ad 3.

Formal contempt of law, by which someone expressly despises the law, or its author, as he is superior, refusing to be subject to his ordinance, is always, speaking in itself, mortal. For it is contempt of authority. Hence it is not grave: 1. If the thing itself commanded is despised, insofar as it is made little account of. 2. If the superior is despised, not as superior, but insofar as he is a contemptible individual person, because, for example, he is imprudent, base, idiotic, rude, unlearned. Nevertheless this would still be mortal, if such a judgment, which is thus formed about that person, were gravely rash, as is clear. 3. If the act by which the precept, or the superior, is despised is not perfect by reason of advertence and deliberation, as often happens. Hence Lessius, Sanchez, etc. say that mortal sin by reason of contempt rarely occurs. But material contempt, by which someone violates the law in order to indulge his passions, is mortal or venial according to the measure of the matter. L. 142; S. Th. l. c.

What are the merely internal sins of the will, and what is their nature? All sins which are committed by the interior will alone can easily be reduced to desire and delectation. - Desire is the purpose of some thing, or an act of the will by which we will to attain some good. One is efficacious, and is a purpose absolutely efficacious of itself, whence it is that someone in reality undertakes means to lead it to effect. Another is inefficacious, and is a purpose only conditionally efficacious, which someone would execute if he could; e.g., if he could steal the treasure of the Church, he would steal it. Now the desire of an evil thing is evil, since the object of action and of desire is one and the same. Hence a depraved desire has the species and malice, mortal or venial, of the sin which the exterior thing has toward which it is borne. Namely desire tends to this, absolutely or at least conditionally, that it execute the thing and constitute it as really existing. But if someone truly executed the thing, he would contract every malice both of the object and of the circumstances. Therefore the same must be said if someone pursues the thing by affection and desire; for since this affection of desire is joined with the very existence of the object, it is necessarily joined with all things necessarily connected with the object itself. Wherefore Titius having relations with Caia, another's wife, commits adultery if he knows her to belong to another, even if he would not wish her to belong to another; in the same way one desiring Caia, another's wife, is also guilty of adultery if he knows her to belong to another, and even if he would not wish her to belong to another, because desire tends, as the execution itself does, into the same existing work, and thus concrete with all its circumstances. Consequently in confession of the desire, e.g., of fornicating, the circumstances of consanguinity, marriage, the vow of chastity of the person, etc., are to be declared. L. 12. By no means, however, is there need to add whether the act concerning the object was absolute or conditioned. La-Croix, l. 6, p. 2, n. 1032.

Delectation is a certain simple rest and complacency of the will from the presence of a fitting good, either possessed according to the thing, or according to cognition and apprehension. Delectation does not properly differ from joy, except insofar as joy is rather called the delectation of the rational appetite, and delectation rather is called that which belongs to the sensitive appetite with a certain transmutation of the body; and this delectation is also called sensible or sensual, and if it is with transmutation of the organs and spirits serving generation, it is called carnal or venereal delectation. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 31; q. 72, a. 2; Sanch. in Dec., l. 1, c. 2, n. 33. - But according to St. Alphonsus, 15, as desire regards future time and the work to be committed, so joy regards past time, namely when someone is pleased with himself concerning an evil work committed; and delectation regards present time, that is, when someone through imagination and thought renders present to himself the work of sin, e.g., fornication, and with deliberate consent delights in it, as if he were actually fornicating, yet without the desire of executing it. Morose delectation in a depraved thing is sin, because love is present in delectation. For that depraved thing would never delight unless it were loved according to itself. Suarez, de Pecc., d. 5, s. 7, n. 5. Moreover delectation is the rest of the appetite in good. "And therefore according to the delectation of the human will a man is chiefly judged good or evil. For he is good and virtuous who rejoices in the works of virtues, but evil who rejoices in evil works." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 34, a. 4. Morose delectation is voluntary delectation; for it is called morose not on account of a necessary delay of some time, but on account of the necessary consent of the will. For not delectation, but consent to delectation, is sin. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 74, a. 6, 8; q. 88, a. 5, ad 2. In a depraved thing; for delectation is twofold. One is concerning a depraved work, so that the evil work is the object of delectation, and this is always evil; another is delectation concerning the thought of an evil object, so that not the evil work, but the very thought concerning the evil work is of itself the object of delectation. And this can either be good, if there is a just cause of thinking, e.g., for the sake of study, consultation, etc., with abhorrence of the object; or it can be venially evil, if it is done from curiosity, etc.; or it can sometimes be even gravely evil, if there is proximate danger of consent. S. Th. de Verit., q. 15, a. 4; L. 16, 17.

Morose delectation in a depraved thing, insofar as delectation is distinguished from joy according to time, has malice and species according only to the variety of objects exhibited by the mind. For simple delectation does not tend into the object as something to be placed in reality, but rests in it as represented by the intellect. But the intellect abstracts from the other properties of the object except that one which moves delectation. L. 15, 28. But joy, as desire, takes on the malice and species both of the object and of the circumstances really annexed to it. For joy, since it is a volition pleased with itself, and therefore approving the past thing, is borne into it such as it existed in itself, namely clothed with its circumstances. Hence, in recollection and complacency over past sins, it is necessary in confession to declare the nature and specific circumstances of the object. L. 15. In recollection and complacency. For sin is not had by simple recollection of a sin formerly committed, from the fact that it neither pleases nor displeases the one remembering, because by no law are we commanded to repent several times of sins, if we have already done penance for them, or here and now to repent, if we have not yet repented of them. Laymann, de Poenit., d. 2, s. 8; Sporer, de Poenit., n. 192; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 376 ff.; S. Th. Quodl. 12, a. 33.

Lest in this matter the confessor scandalize the penitent by indiscreet questions, it must be noted that the confessor, from the general rule, ought to make judgment concerning sins as they are set forth, according to the obvious and natural sense of the accusation. Thoughts about a venereal matter, delectations, desires, are regularly borne, the former into carnal commotion, the latter into pollution and copulation. Wherefore the confessor satisfies his duty if he asks the penitent concerning consent furnished; for the aforesaid acts are not always voluntary and deliberate, nor is consent always explicitly explained. Consent often in these acts is not concerning some determined object, but is indeterminate consent into venereal delectation, pollution, and copulation, which is regularly followed by delectation arising from the commotion of the genital organs. And into this ordinarily are simple delectations borne. Desires, on the contrary, are borne into the completed act. Therefore the confessor will then be able to ask the penitent only whether the aforesaid acts regarded himself or another person, of a different or the same sex. But even from this question one must abstain if the penitent is still ignorant of these matters, especially since it is a lesser evil that confession not be exact than that the penitent be scandalized. Besides, if at times extraordinary species are present, and penitents know them, they are ordinarily accustomed to declare them themselves. Reuter, p. 2, n. 209.

Resolves: To rejoice concerning the manner, e.g., new, clever, vigorous, by which a thing was accomplished is not illicit, since the object of delectation is not evil. L. 18. If the thing, as it happened, is not evil, not even materially, nor harmful to another, to desire it is not of itself illicit, although otherwise it would be intrinsically evil, e.g., pollution which naturally happens in sleep. To desire, namely by simple affection and without any cooperation. But if it is licit to desire, it is also licit to rejoice concerning it already done. The reason is, "because what it is licit to desire that it be done, it is also licit to rejoice that it has been done; and conversely, if it is right to rejoice concerning the fact, it is also licit to desire that it be done; for these are of the same morality: for joy necessarily results from the desired good obtained, and supposes or implicitly includes desire." Lessius, de Iust. et Iur., l. 4, c. 3, n. 104; Laymann, l. 3, s. 4, n. 17; Lugo, l. c., n. 389. "I, however," says the same Lessius, l. c., "am not an author that desires of this sort be admitted to anyone; both because, although they are not evil in themselves, nevertheless they indicate an imperfect affection of chastity; and because holier remedies, and those used by holy men, are not lacking. I would say the same about joy. Also in all matters of this sort, as we have already often warned, every cooperation and danger of consent must be avoided." - Billuart, tr. de Temp., diss. 6, a. 4, Obj. III; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 154, a. 5; L. 19, 20; l. 3, n. 478.

It is not a sin, speaking in itself, at least not mortal, if spouses delight, only by the rational appetite, concerning an act of marriage past, future, or possible, with respect to the co-partner present or absent. The same must be said if a spouse-to-be desires future copulation, or likewise delights in it only by the rational appetite, or a widow concerning a past one, with the danger of consent into venereal delectation arising from it set aside. The reason is that these acts have a licit object. Nevertheless they are full of danger on account of the aforesaid venereal delectation often arising from them. Lugo, de Poenit., d. 19, n. 376, 385; Sanch., de Matr., l. 9, d. 47, n. 1, 4, 7; L. 23, 24, 25.

Sadness concerning a good accomplished which was commanded under grave obligation is gravely culpable; concerning a good which was commanded under light obligation, it is light. Likewise concerning a good under neither grave nor light precept, it is light, unless there is a just cause now of regretting it; for it is a certain disorder to be saddened over a good accomplished, although not commanded by precept. But if sadness is borne not into the good itself, but into the annoyance, the labor, etc., it is of itself not a sin. Sanch. in Dec., l. 4, c. 12, n. 2; Suarez, l. 5 de Voto, c. 7, n. 4; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 39.

Is it licit to desire evil under the condition, if it were licit?

R. Affirmatively in itself, if the condition added removes the whole malice of the work, e.g., I would eat meats in Lent, unless the Church prohibited it. For such an affection involves no disorder, neither in itself nor in the object, from which all malice is excluded by the condition. - But otherwise negatively, e.g., I would sin if there were no hell, because the affection tends into an evil object, and indeed absolutely, since the condition does not remove malice from the object, even as represented, and therefore the whole malice of the object is poured back into the act of the will. And indeed there are certain objects concerning which a condition, however added, cannot remove malice, e.g., if it were licit, I would destroy God. For those things which are intrinsically evil cannot be changed; and therefore the condition would be applied uselessly, since to wish such things is to desire that the law and order of nature be changed, which would be still worse. Yet probably he would be excused from grave sin who, by such a desire, would not certainly will that what is intrinsically evil become licit, but would only show his natural inclination toward that object, e.g., I would avenge myself if it were licit, but I do not wish it because of the law of God; or would state the matter only enunciatively, e.g., younger, I would have avenged myself, signifying not what he would now wish if he were younger, but what perhaps as a younger man he would have done; yet with the danger of efficacious desire always removed, and also of true inefficacious desire, namely every will of doing, and every simple affection of the will. What has been said of desire must consequently also be said of delectation and joy of the rational appetite. For it is not licit to rejoice and delight in that good which it is not licit to love and desire; and, conversely, it is licit to rejoice and delight by the rational appetite in that good which it is licit to love and desire. For love and desire are the way to joy and delectation, as motion tending to rest. Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 284 ff.; Sanch. in Dec., l. 1, c. 2, n. 22 ff.; Billuart, tr. de Temp., diss. 6, a. 15, § IV, You ask third; S. Th. de Verit., q. 15, a. 4; L. 12, 13, 14.

What order generally is to be observed in charity toward neighbor?

In the order of charity each one is bound after God to love: 1. himself according to spiritual goods, insofar as he wills God, his end, i.e., the supreme and uniquely necessary good, more to himself than to another; then neighbor as to the same spiritual goods; 2. himself as to intrinsic bodily goods, such as life, health, etc.; then neighbor as to the same bodily goods; 3. himself, and then neighbor, as to external goods, such as reputation, honor, riches. The reason is that love of self is the rule of love of neighbor. But the rule is prior and preferable to what is ruled. Therefore love of self always precedes and is preferred to love of neighbor, where the matter concerns goods of the same order and equal necessity.

Of the same order: Supernatural goods are to be preferred to natural goods. Likewise the common good is to be preferred to private good, because the common good of many is more divine than the private good of one. Intrinsic natural goods, life, health, integrity of members, are to be preferred to extrinsic goods, reputation, honor, riches. But reputation and honor with respect to riches are of a higher order, because they are something spiritual and moral.

Necessity, whether temporal or spiritual, is distinguished as threefold: 1. Extreme, when danger of life, that is, of eternal damnation or death, or of another evil almost equal to death, so presses upon the neighbor that he, morally speaking, cannot escape it without another's help. And it is quasi-extreme if he can free himself, but only with the greatest difficulty; or if there is only probable danger of the aforesaid evil: of life, of integrity of principal members, of liberty, of a most grave disease, of infamy. 2. Grave, when someone suffers great danger to the salvation of the soul, or to the life of the body, or of another grave evil, which he cannot escape without great difficulty. Such is the necessity in which those things necessary for conserving one's state are lacking. 3. Common or middling, in which someone can provide for himself without great difficulty. In this, in the spiritual order, are vulgar sinners who, if they wished to apply some effort, would rise again from a depraved state; but in the temporal order poor beggars are generally in it, for whom life, according to their condition, is not too burdensome and miserable. Tambur., Expl. Dec., l. 5, c. 1, § 1, n. 4 seqq.; § 2, n. 5 seqq.; Suarez, de Carit., d. 9, s. 2, n. 4; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, aa. 4-6; q. 31, a. 3; q. 32, a. 3; q. 44, aa. 7, 8; L. 25, 27, 31; H. A. 18.

We have hitherto explained the external sins of lust; it remains that we speak of internal sins.

224. In this matter, besides thought on the part of the intellect and imagination on the part of the phantasy, three internal acts are chiefly and generally distinguished: morose delight, desire, and joy.

Impure thoughts and imaginations excite venereal delight, and of themselves they have a great influence upon it.

Thoughts of dishonorable things of themselves contain no sin. Consequently, to have them from an honorable end, even not without the wrong effect of venereal delight, is of itself no sin.

But if an honorable and just end is lacking, if they are had from a wrong affection, or if they are of things very dishonorable, even from mere curiosity or levity, or if one dwells on them too long, they contain a grave influence upon venereal delight, and then they cannot be excused from grave sin. But impure thoughts of things not very dishonorable and only slightly moving are not of themselves, by reason of their light influence upon venereal delight, except a light sin. And, since impure thoughts of this kind tend only to exciting venereal delight, they are all of the same species; and consequently then there is no need to explain their various objects in Confession.

225. Delight, in its most general acceptance, is the resting of a cognitive or appetitive faculty in its own proper object, from the conformity of such an object with that faculty. It is threefold according to the threefold faculty: spiritual or intellectual, which has place in the intellect and the will; such, for example, is the delight of the intellect in the contemplation of truth; sensible, which arises in an organ of sense, the organs of generation being excluded, for example, the delight of sight from a beautiful thing, of hearing from music, of touch from smoothness, of taste from flavor, of smell from sweetness of odor; carnal or venereal, which is felt in the organs of generation, and so is the resting of the sensitive faculty in matters of generation.

Sensible delight and carnal or venereal delight look to exterior acts. Concerning both, with respect to the present matter, it has already been said above, n. 2, and in the preceding chapters.

But spiritual delight is contained under interior acts; and when it regards a prohibited thing, it is usually called in moral theology morose delight; and it is a simple and voluntary complacency concerning an illicit thing. Simple, that is, without desire and intention of accomplishing it by deed, so that one is content with delight alone, with an interior thought, for example, concerning the killing of an enemy, or carnal copulation. Voluntary: hence delight is not called morose on account of any delay of time whatever, but on account of its continuation after full advertence of the intellect to the malice of the thing; and so delight is morose, even if the will, after such advertence, persists and freely dwells in it for one instant, or moment of time.

Therefore morose delight concerning a venereal thing merely spiritual, namely one which remains in the will alone, even joined with no base commotion of the flesh, will always be grave sin outside legitimate marriage, because it concerns an object gravely prohibited. Cf. here n. 2. And consequently the same must be said of desire and of joy concerning a venereal thing, which likewise are always grave. - Morose delight regards an object present according to apprehension, as "when through the imagination of the phantasy someone renders the work of sin present to himself, namely the act of fornication, and delights in it by deliberate consent, as though he were actually fornicating, yet without a desire of executing it." L. l. 5. numero 15.

Desire is an act of the will by which someone deliberately intends the object itself as future, and therefore as to be placed in himself. It is twofold: one is simple desire, or desire of itself inefficacious, and it is the mere concupiscence of the external work and of the means without intention of executing such a work, the means not being applied; the other is desire of itself efficacious, or purpose, and it is the interior concupiscence of the external work and of the means with an absolute intention, or at least a hypothetical one, if it could be done, of executing the work, the due means being applied.

Joy, finally, is an act of the will by which someone deliberately approves, and is complacent within himself concerning, the past object itself, that is, the object carried out in execution, and therefore as that object was placed in himself. Ithur. Cas. 18. n. 2-6.; Billuart, Diss. 6. art. 15. Sect. 1. III.; Lugo, de Poenit. D. 16. n. 363 and following.

Note. "Not a few, especially from the ruder sort, are involved in this deception, that they think they consent only when they have the will of executing, and of perpetrating by the work itself, fornication, deflowering, or some other external lustful act. This error is enormous and must be extirpated by priests, according to their strength." Ithur. Cas. 18. n. 5.

226. Desire, whether it be efficacious or inefficacious, takes on the species both of the real object and of the circumstances of that object. Joy likewise takes on the species both of the real object and of the circumstances annexed to it. Morose delight varies in species according to the variety of the apprehended objects and of the circumstances exhibited to the mind. - This is established from the very intrinsic tendency of such acts, already explained. Billuart, l. c.; Lugo, l. c.

Corollary 1. The sentence is very probable "that if someone delights concerning copulation with a married woman, not because she is married, but because she is a beautiful woman, etc., he does not contract the malice of adultery; for the circumstance of adultery then does not enter into the delight. For this reason chastity only is harmed, not justice. And Tamburini probably says the same, if someone, with venereal affection, without desire, looks upon a married woman. Yet, this notwithstanding, what Holzmann has greatly pleases me, namely that although by reason of the delight there is no obligation of explaining the circumstance of adultery, nevertheless in practice it must be explained by reason of the proximate danger of coveting, at least inefficaciously, that married woman, into which danger one casts himself who delights concerning her. But there is no doubt that adultery is committed as often as joy, or complacency, is had concerning copulation had, or desire concerning copulation to be had, with a married woman, because then the will embraces the whole wrong object with all its circumstances, and cannot prescind from them, and therefore harms chastity and justice. Likewise, if someone delights concerning sodomitic copulation. Likewise, if the person who delights is bound by a vow of chastity, he also sins against the vow." L. l. c. Cf. Billuart, l. c. Sect. III.; Lugo, l. c.

2. Delight concerning the evil work itself, for example, of fornication, etc., is always evil, gravely or lightly, according as the work itself is gravely or lightly evil. But delight concerning the thought of an evil work, so that not the evil work itself, but only cognition of it, is the object of the delight, is of itself indifferent; and so it can be good, if there is a just cause of thinking, for example, for the sake of study, consultation, etc., always with abhorrence of the object itself; or it can be venially evil if it is done from curiosity, levity, etc.; or it can also be gravely evil, if it is done from an end mortally evil, or if proximate danger is present of deliberate delight in the object itself. What has been said concerning delight of thought must also be said concerning delight in the artful, skillful, etc., manner of an evil work carried out; for example, if you delight in the ingenious abduction of a bride carried out by another, from an honorable end the delight will be honorable, but if from an evil end, the delight is evil. St. Thomas, Quodl. 12. a. 33.

3. The doctrine of St. Thomas saying, 2. 2. q. 154. a. 4, that it is not a sin if nocturnal pollution pleases as an unloading or relief of nature, can in no way be understood of the delight inherent in pollution, which, as being base, is in itself and objectively evil; and in this way the holy Doctor explains himself in IV. Dist. 9. q. 1. a. 4. q. 1. ad 5. Indeed St. Alphonsus, lib. V. n. 20, wishes St. Thomas to be understood of a purely natural pollution, which naturally proceeds from nature unloading itself, and by no means of nocturnal pollution which has happened from touch or from a base dream, because under this respect it is again objectively evil. Moreover, in practice complacency of this kind, although in itself and speculatively honorable, is to be avoided because of the danger which it brings. G. Dumas, v. 1. n. 173. "Concerning pollution had in sleep," says Ithur. Cas. 18. n. 6, "someone can rejoice, not insofar as it is venereally delightful, but insofar as it is useful, either for quieting temptations, or for consulting health." Cf. Scavini, Tr. 4. d. 1. c. 2. a. 4. q. 13.; Ithur. Cas. 23. n. 31 and following.; Sanchez, in Dec. l. 1. c. 2. n. 19.; Billuart, Diss. 6. art. 14, I say 1, I say 2.; D'Annib., p. 1. n. 275. (18), ed. 4.

4. "It is not a sin, at least not mortal, if spouses delight by the rational appetite only concerning a past, future, or possible act of marriage, with respect to the partner present or absent. Likewise if a betrothed man desires future copulation, or delights concerning it; or a widow concerning past copulation. The reason is because these acts have a lawful object. I said: by the rational appetite; because if a betrothed man or a widow voluntarily consents to sensitive and carnal delight, which arises naturally from the remembrance of future or past copulation, he or she sins mortally, as Lessius, Bonacina, Tanner, Palaus, and Diana teach against Medina. But since sensitive and carnal delight, and indeed also the danger of consent to fornication, for the most part follows the aforesaid delight of the will, that delight of the will scarcely has a place in practice, at least in a widow and the betrothed; among spouses, however, provided danger of pollution is absent, Filliucci, Bonacina, Sanchez, Lessius, and Diana teach that even sensitive and venereal delight is not mortal; both because the state of marriage excuses these things, as also immodest touches undertaken for the sake of pleasure alone, and because these tend of themselves to the conjugal work, although by accident the work is not exercised." Busembaum apud S. Alph., l. V. n. 23. - Struggl, Tr. VII. q. 7. art. 2. nn. 18. 19.; Sporer, de matr. n. 505.; Ithur. Cas. 18.; L. l. c. n. 24, 25, lib. VI. n. 937.; Billuart, Diss. 6. art. 15. Sect. IV.

Cf. nn. 288, 389.

499. State of the question. Since difficulties often arise concerning merely internal sins, it is expedient to speak specially about these. But there are three internal sins: morose delectation, desire, and joy. (a) Morose delectation is referred to an evil work exhibited by the imagination as present. Namely, when the imagination depicts something evil, for example, theft, homicide, a base act, and the will deliberately is delighted in it, without nevertheless the desire being conceived of executing it, evil delectation is had; and this is called morose, because the will stands still in it, or lingers, although perhaps for only one instant. For it is not required for sin that complacency persevere for a long time, but it suffices that consent be voluntarily offered; whence morose delectation signifies the same as voluntary.

(b) Desire looks to a future thing: when someone depicts to himself an evil delectation as future, and deliberately wills to enjoy it, a depraved desire is had.

(c) But joy is free complacency concerning an evil work as past, and is had when someone represents to himself a past evil act, and at the same time deliberately takes complacency in it. Here also belongs sadness concerning a good performed, or concerning an evil not performed, as if someone says: I grieve that at that time, when the occasion presented itself, I did not strike the enemy.

Concerning delectation and joy the same principles hold, with this difference, however, that joy, as concerning a more concrete past thing, more easily puts on the malice of the circumstances of the object depicted in the imagination.

500. 1. Concerning morose delectation and joy. (A) Delectation or joy can be concerning the thing itself thought of, or concerning the knowledge of this thing; thus a physician, hearing that someone has been wounded, can rejoice concerning the wound itself inflicted, because, for example, the wounded person is an enemy, or can rejoice from the fact that he knows such a one to have been wounded, so that he may be able to assist him. To rejoice concerning an evil thing insofar as it is evil is deservedly judged a sin; to rejoice concerning the knowledge of this evil is not of itself sin, indeed it can be good, if this is done from an honorable end. Thus he who studies the medical art ought to learn those things which pertain to generation; if he is delighted intellectually concerning the knowledge acquired, so that he may be able to exercise his art, he in no way sins; but if he deliberately thinks about these matters in order to perceive venereal pleasure from them, he is guilty of sin.

501. (B) Morose, or voluntary, delectation, or joy concerning an evil thing, is a sin of the same species and gravity as the evil work represented by the imagination.

For morose delectation or joy receives its morality from the object formally taken, just as any other human act (above, n. 144). Therefore if the thing about which one deliberately thinks is evil, the delectation arising from it is sin; if the delectation concerning theft is concerned with light theft, the sin is venial; but mortal if the question concerns theft of grave moment.

It must likewise be noted that evil delectation assumes the malice of the object as it is depicted in the imagination; thus delectation concerning theft of a sacred thing puts on a twofold malice, provided the circumstance of the sacred thing is apprehended by the agent. But if the imagination, and therefore the will, does not apprehend these circumstances, probably the special malice arising from these circumstances is not contracted; thus he who is delighted concerning the theft of a sacred thing, not because it is sacred, but because it is precious, probably incurs only the malice of theft, but not of sacrilege.

502. (C) It is illicit to be delighted or to rejoice concerning an evil thing on account of the good effect which followed from it; nevertheless it is licit, speaking of itself, to be delighted concerning the good effect which followed from an evil thing, provided the evil thing itself is sincerely disapproved.

The reason for the former is because it is not licit to approve evil, even on account of a good end, as we explained, n. 151. Whence these propositions 13 and 15, which directly regard joy concerning a past evil and indirectly delectation concerning a present evil, were deservedly condemned by Innocent XI: "If you do it with due moderation, you can without mortal sin be saddened concerning the life of someone, and rejoice concerning his natural death... not indeed from displeasure with the person, but because of some temporal profit. - It is licit for a son to rejoice concerning the parricide of a parent perpetrated by himself in drunkenness, on account of the immense riches obtained from the inheritance thence."¹

¹ Denzing., n. 1030, 1032; Viva, on this proposition.

The reason for the latter is because delectation is not borne toward the evil object, which is disapproved, but toward the good effect. - Yet it is said speaking of itself, because in practice he who is voluntarily delighted concerning the good effect is not rarely exposed to the danger of consenting to the evil object itself; hence let him not neglect sincerely to disapprove that object.

503. (D) To be delighted or rejoice not concerning the evil work, but concerning the ingenious mode by which it is completed, or concerning the charming mode by which it is narrated, is of itself free from fault, although not rarely dangerous. For the will in this case is borne toward something good or indifferent, but not toward the evil object; but since the passage from the mode to the thing is easy, especially in the matter of chastity, such delectation is not without danger.

Thus to be delighted concerning the artful mode by which someone completes a theft, concerning the ridiculous mode by which women quarrel among themselves, concerning paintings made with the greatest art, although immodest, concerning a charming narration of things less modest, of itself is not sin, but easily leads to sin.

504. 2. Concerning depraved desires. Desire is called efficacious, or a purpose, when someone absolutely intends to execute an evil thing; but inefficacious, if only conditionally, for example, if I could, if it were licit.

(A) The absolute desire of an evil thing or action is a sin of the same species and malice as the external act toward which it is borne. For the malice of an act, and its gravity and species, is drawn from the object toward which it tends. Whence Christ said:² "He who looks at a woman to lust after her has already committed adultery with her in his heart." - Therefore desire includes all the malices which are found in the object itself, provided they are at least implicitly apprehended; but they are more easily apprehended in the case of desire than in the case of simple delectation; for he who wishes for some thing generally is borne toward it such as it is, - while he who is delighted concerning a thing thought of not rarely abstracts from certain of its qualities.

² Matt. 5:28.

505. (B) Conditional desire of itself is not sin, if the condition truly removes the malice; otherwise, it is sin.

To understand this, one must distinguish between those things which are extrinsically evil and those which are intrinsically evil.

(a) In those things which are extrinsically evil, the condition added "if it were licit" removes sin, because it removes the malice of the object; for example, I would eat meat today, if it were not prohibited by the Church; I would marry, if I were not bound by a vow of chastity. - Yet often desires of this kind are not only idle, but dangerous, because the passage from conditional desire to absolute desire is easy.

(b) In all things intrinsically and absolutely evil, the condition added does not remove sin, because malice cannot be separated from these acts; therefore they sin who say: I would wish to blaspheme, steal, act basely, perjure myself, if it were licit.

(c) A fortiori a condition which does not regard liceity does not excuse from sin, for example, I would commit theft if it could be done secretly; I would blaspheme if hell did not exist.

506. Yet it must be noted that sometimes an inefficacious desire of an evil thing is not sin, or at least is not grave, because it is not deliberate, but only the manifestation of a certain natural propensity by which the sensitive appetite is borne into evil, without the will offering consent to it, at least full consent. Thus some who are prone to vengeance, anger, or pleasure, say that they would gladly wish to indulge these vices, unless there were hell; but, because they believe there is hell, they restrain these desires. - Whatever the case may be, thoughts and desires, even conditional ones, concerning evil things must be expelled as soon and as strenuously as possible, lest perhaps the will, allured by these vain and dangerous phantasms, soon offer consent.

— Notion of the argument. From the definition handed down above, n. 402, from St. Augustine, "a word, or deed, or thing desired," there are distinguished sins of heart, of mouth, and of work. This distinction is formal when the mind and tongue begin a sin which according to itself requires exterior consummation. Then sins of heart and mouth, if they must be estimated separately, are referred to the same objective species as the sin of work, and at the same time differ from it in species, as incomplete from complete (Cf. 1, 2, q. 72 art. 7).

On the contrary, the same distinction is merely material if it concerns a sin which is completed by internal consent, as interior heresy, or by words, as detraction.

For then they are sins simply consummated.

In this place we consider internal sins as incomplete according to themselves, and to be estimated separately.

Those internal sins can be delight, or simple love and complacency, affecting an evil thing or action; desire of the same thing or action; joy concerning a past act.

As we noted above, n. 117, there are some who reserve the name delight to delight of sense, so that by the name joy they call the delight of the will. We do not speak of fruition of a present thing or action, since this is necessarily one with the consummated sin itself. The things which we said above concerning the honesty of delight are to be compared.

215. - Besides the general indications of Christian piety, these things are usefully to be advised:

1. A diligent and complete flight from the proximate occasion. Let the confessor endeavor to dispose the soul to the greatest liberality in this matter, so that he may obtain more than he could strictly command, and may lead the penitent to follow the safer parts.

The other spouse will sometimes have to be admonished of imprudence. Imprudent is the wife who, from religion, refuses to accompany her husband to the theater, for it is by no means expedient that the husband go alone to these places; imprudent is she who introduces or fosters her husband's familiar association with her marriageable but unmarried sister, for, by the very reason that two sisters are accustomed to be similar, the husband is easily tempted by those allurements of that sister which he previously loved in his wife; he in turn is an occasion of temptation for that unmarried woman. Imprudent also is the wife who introduces or admits into the home governesses or maidservants who have not been cautiously selected; imprudent is she who desires to use a separate bed.

2. The suppression of the cause which rendered the marriage less happy. Let the confessor, insofar as discretion permits it, inquire attentively into those things which one of the spouses casts against the other or desires in the other, in case perhaps he can remove by opportune counsel certain things done unskillfully. It happens, for example, that the wife is reluctant in rendering the debt; that she does not provide sufficiently for domestic order; that she neglects cleanliness in clothing and body; whereas it contributes greatly to a happy family that all things be well polished and carefully arranged, that appetizing foods stimulate the appetite, and that no wrongly understood piety prohibit the wife from pleasing her husband.

3. Discreet severity in judging the sin of adultery. It cannot be tolerated that a Catholic man seem to make little of what he has committed against conjugal fidelity. Therefore, the adulterer will have to be reproved by the confessor with grave words, although without anger, especially if he seems to accuse himself of such things coldly and with an even mind.

365. - The interior acts which pertain here can conveniently be gathered into a twofold genus.

Some, more intellectual, are physically immune from carnal pleasure; others, on the contrary, stir the flesh in the present.

366. - 1. Acts which induce commotions of the flesh and are voluntary as such are called interior acts more in name than they truly are interior. For they are accustomed to be sought and exercised on account of the pleasure which they induce here and now. They please as a cause of pleasure. Wherefore they are rather the work of imperfect or perfect lust excited and obtained by an interior act.

2. This is the more frequent species of sin which penitents accuse when they confess depraved thoughts; and it is that which, in this matter, is chiefly marked by the name of morose pleasure.

Wherefore also, since the object then presented to the imagination does not please except as the cause of present pleasure, it is specified by this pleasure alone.

Therefore this rule is customarily handed down: Those who, desire being excluded, have base thoughts to accuse ought to accuse neither the object nor the base movement, unless there was pollution. Not the object, since thoughts understood in this way do not vary in species according to the various object; for individual things are not loved except as the cause of venereal pleasure, toward which alone the sinners are affected. Not the base movement, for, the thought having been indicated, that movement itself is sufficiently indicated, unless there was pollution.

Wherefore we added that pollution must be declared.

367. - You will ask on this occasion what moral judgment is to be made concerning the ideal representation of a base thing.

1. A merely notional representation, or one without an imaginary imitation of the thing, is in itself neither evil nor proximately provocative. Thus we designate adulteries and homicides by an innocent word. If it was idle or useless, it will laudably be repelled; nevertheless no scruple is to be had concerning it.

2. But the thing can be painted in the phantasy as upon a panel. Concerning this fictitious picture one must reason as concerning a true one.

a) To consider briefly a representation involuntarily present, a lustful intention being excluded, will not be grave. If there was a just cause of study, etc., there will be no sin.

Nevertheless, a cause for contemplating or looking upon an imaginary exhibition will be present more rarely than if a work made by art were to be considered.

But if the attention was undertaken with a lustful intention, a grave sin is committed.

This intention being excluded, a morose consideration of a gravely obscene or gravely exciting phantasm is infected with grave guilt because of the proximate danger of assent, unless a just cause, if one should ever be present, and a positive repudiation of the pleasure remove at once both the danger and the delusion.

A morose consideration of a thing which excites lightly will be venial in itself if a cause was lacking.

b) To excite images of this kind, or voluntarily to render them present, must be estimated by a similar rationale: it will be grave if it is done from lust, or if, because of the nature of the image, you expose yourself to a proximate occasion of assent; otherwise it will be a light sin or no sin, according as a sufficient cause was lacking or excuses the matter.

Active procurement, however, introduces an aggravating circumstance. Cf. Noldin, De sexto, no. 61.

3. Moreover, the positive obligation of repelling impure and useless phantasms - although that repudiation is always praiseworthy and commendable of itself - is not grave, except insofar as a proximate danger of assent to present pleasure must be removed ¹. That danger is judged to be sufficiently removed of itself by an interior act of displeasure made once or twice in the same temptation.

¹ Concerning a will which bears itself "indifferently," cf. Sanchez, In Decalogum, book 1, chapter 2, no. 13.

This danger being removed, a light obligation does not exist except insofar as it can be fulfilled sufficiently conveniently.

But the best manner is that, all anxiety having been put aside and the aid of the Blessed Virgin Mary having been implored, the mind turn positively to other, healthier, and higher things.

But one who knows himself to be subject to these temptations should, preferably outside the temptation, in the morning or evening, according to the usual time of temptation, elicit a firm resolution; let him pray to God; and then, intent upon his own affairs, let him pass by those thoughts as though by neglecting them.

But if they press the mind more, it will often be very useful to promise or perform some act of penance, or even to exercise an act of humility, as if you were to disclose the matter to a spiritual man.

But let one tempted by impure things beware, let him carefully beware lest he quickly judge himself guilty and thus be cast down or disturbed in spirit, whence worse things are accustomed to occur.

368. - That we may now speak of the former, or of the truer genus of interior acts, simple complacency of affection first occurs, without desire or a will of execution. Nothing is intended; something is loved in itself. A complacency of this kind is to be judged from the object, and it becomes moral from only those notes in which pleasure was truly taken. For it concerns an abstract object. Wherefore:

1. Deliberate intellectual complacency concerning a base action induces of itself the various guilt of that action. But if certain evil notes composing the object remain foreign to the affection, or do not positively please, they do not communicate their malice to the one taking pleasure. Thus complacency concerning inter- course with a definite person who is married or sacred will generally be only complacency in fornication, since the other notes rather displease of themselves.

2. Complacency concerning a thought entertained about a base thing is of itself about an honorable thing, since the thought of a base thing is not base in itself. But because of the danger of an obscene phantasm, it easily becomes suspect. Cf. St. Thomas, De veritate, question 15, article 4.

3. Complacency concerning the wondrous, rare manner in which an evil thing was performed, concerning the elegance of base speech, or concerning the art by which a statue was made, is also of itself about an indifferent thing; but again, because of the danger of evil complacency, it must be dissuaded.

369. - Desire superadds some tendency toward the object, or some will of execution, in an efficacious or inefficacious wish.

An efficacious will elicits an absolute resolution; an inefficacious will is subordinated to an unfulfilled condition. It is a mere wish.

Every desire is a movement of the will distinct from simple complacency. Yet as such, or in the subjective consideration of the act, if it was lustful, it induces the guilt of imperfect lust common with complacency, so that it does not of itself constitute an aggravating circumstance because of intensity. Cf. what was said, no. 356.

But objectively, an efficacious desire embraces the whole object as it exists; it loves or admits all its notes, at least absolutely, although not all for their own sakes, so that it contracts all the specific malices of the object.

But an inefficacious or conditioned desire must be judged from the nature of that condition.

If the condition excludes every malice, the desire will not of itself be objectively blameworthy, as if someone were to say: I would use her if she were mine. Yet it is evident that some danger is present in these desires.

And if the thing is evil only because it is prohibited, it is honorable to conceive the desire in this way: I would do it if it were lawful.

But if the thing is intrinsically dishonorable, we must bear an affection entirely detached from that thing, so that it may be conformable to right order. Wherefore it is not lawful, as though grieving over the prohibi- tion, deliberately to adhere to this will: I would fornicate if it were not prohibited.

394. Notions. Internal sins are called those which are perfected within the heart of man and do not appear outwardly, except perhaps because of an effect accidentally following from them. There are three species of them: morose delectation, joy, desire. - That internal sins, and not only external acts, as the Pharisees thought, are really sins is clear from many texts of Sacred Scripture. Already in the decalogue there is the precept: "Thou shalt not covet."⁷⁴ But in Proverbs it is said: "Evil thoughts are an abomination to the Lord,"⁷⁵ and in the book of Wisdom: "Perverse thoughts separate from God."⁷⁶

The three internal sins enumerated are not only true sins, but are also more dangerous sins, because a) they are more easily perpetrated; b) they are more difficultly avoided; c) they are less cared for. Hence it is better to treat of them specially and individually.

Note. Although internal sins are wont chiefly and more frequently to occur in the matter of lust, nevertheless they can also be in any other evil matter, for example in hatred of neighbor, in injury to justice, etc.

⁷⁴ Deut. 5, 21; cf. Rom. 7, 7 and 13, 9.

⁷⁵ Prov. 15, 26.

⁷⁶ Sap. 1, 3. Cf. Matth. 23, 27.

St. Alphonsus, V, 12; ed. G., II, p. 720; H. Ap., III, 47; Vind. Alph., P. 2, q. 2; Aertnys, I, n. 236; Lehmkuhl, I, n. 353; Ami du Cl., 1912, p. 1025.

345. Internal sins, as such, are all evil acts elicited by the will and deliberately willed, which are perfected in the mind. Concerning these the Tridentine Synod warns (Sess. XIV, c. 5) "that sometimes they wound the soul more gravely, and are more dangerous than those which are admitted openly." The reason is because they are more easily perpetrated, are less cared for, and especially in the article of death expose the soul to the danger of damnation (Inst. cat., P. I, c. 6, n. 4).

Internal sins are reduced to a threefold class: 1. to desire and purpose, which regard future time; 2. to joy or complacency, which look to past time; 3. to delectation, which refers itself to present time.

346. DEFINITION. Desire, not insofar as it is a passion, but insofar as it is an affection of the soul, is defined: An act of the rational appetite tending toward an absent good. As it is taken here, that is, as sin, it is an act of the will by which someone deliberately desires to complete an evil work by deed.

DIVISION. Desire, with respect to execution, is said to be: 1. inefficacious (or conditioned), which someone consents to execute if he could; which therefore stands without purpose and is called velleity, for example, if he says: if I could steal the treasure of the church, I would steal it; 2. efficacious (or absolute), if he consents to execute it with foresight, or at least hope, of completing the work, and thus a purpose is elicited, for example, if someone devises means for killing an enemy (V, 15; H. Ap., III, 47). Purpose is the act by which the will determinately wills and resolves to complete the work.

347. PRINCIPLES. I. Any desire, even inefficacious, or purpose, concerning an evil thing or action, is sin. This is clear both from the precept, "Thou shalt not covet," and from reason, because to seek evil is certainly repugnant to rational nature and to the divine ordination (recall the things said n. 316).

348. II. A depraved desire or purpose includes the same malice and species which are in the desired work. This is clear from Matt. (5:28): He who shall have looked upon a woman to covet her has already committed adultery with her in his heart. The reason is because the internal act of desire has its goodness and malice from the external act as from its object, indeed simply, that is, as it exists concretely (V, 12; H. Ap., III, 48). Cf. n. 312.

Hence: 1. It must be well examined whether he who admitted a depraved desire apprehended all the malices which are in the object, or only adverted to this or that one.

2. A penitent who elicited a desire, even inefficacious, of stealing ought to explain whether it concerned a grave thing. Likewise, he who basely desired a woman ought to say whether she is a blood-relative, or an affine, etc.; because such circumstances (unless they are invincibly unknown by the sinner) add new malice to the sin. Indeed, it is EXPEDIENT in hearing confession to understand whether the desire was efficacious or not, and a true purpose of perpetrating external sin, so that occasions to be fled and remedies to be applied may be better known.

349. Questions. QUAER. 1. Whether he sins gravely who wishes for some gravely evil object under the condition: IF IT WERE LAWFUL?

Resp. Regularly negatively, since the condition appended takes away in fact the malice of the work, because then the desire is borne toward an object stripped of malice.

I say regularly, because this is certain:

1. In those things which are forbidden by positive right alone; for example, if someone says: I would eat meat on Friday if the Church had not forbidden it; or: I would wish that today the eating of meat were not prohibited, so that I could feed on it. 2. In those things forbidden by natural right, which in some case and state are lawful: for example, I would kill an enemy if God commanded; I would take a wife, if I were not a priest.

This is also sufficiently probable if the matter concerns those things in which malice cannot be separated from the object, because then also malice is taken away, while the will, by wishing under a condition which it knows cannot be verified, does not truly wish, but rather shows a natural propensity. For the rest, desires of this sort commonly are dangerous, or at least idle.

But to desire that things intrinsically evil be lawful is a grave sin, for it is to wish for the inversion of the order of nature. Likewise, it is a grave sin if the condition appended does not regard the malice of the object, but the punishment or something else; for example, I would fornicate if there were no hell; I would kill an enemy if I were not a priest (V, 13; H. Ap., III, 50).

QUAER. 2. Whether it is lawful to wish temporal evil to a neighbor FOR A GOOD END?

Resp. 1. It is lawful, if the order of charity is preserved, namely so that temporal evil is wished for a greater good. Thus St. Alphonsus (V, 21) with St. Thomas and others commonly.

Hence it is lawful to desire temporal evil for a neighbor: a) on account of the spiritual good of the neighbor himself; b) on account of the common good, whether spiritual or temporal; c) on account of the good even of a third innocent person, provided that it is of greater moment. Thus, for example, it is lawful to wish for the death of a heresiarch, or of a disturber of public peace, on account of the common good and the good of many, according to that saying (Gal. 5:12): Would that they be cut off who trouble you. Likewise, it is lawful to be saddened by the fact that dignities are conferred upon the unworthy; or by the health of him who takes from it an occasion of sinning. Likewise, it is lawful to wish poverty, disease, or some other adversity to a wicked man, so that he may come to his senses. Nevertheless desires of this kind sometimes are not free from danger. Cf. II, 30; H. Ap., III, 63.

Resp. 2. It is not lawful in other cases, where, namely, the good intended does not surpass or at least equal the evil which is wished to the neighbor.

Wherefore it is illicit for a wife to desire the death of her husband because she is treated badly by him; and for a mother to desire the death of a daughter who, on account of deformity or poverty, lacks hope of marrying honorably. That these and similar things are not lawful is clear also from the condemnation of the 13th and 14th propositions made by Innocent XI, of which the former sounds thus: "If you do it with due moderation, you can without mortal sin be saddened about the life of someone, and rejoice about his natural death, ask and desire it with inefficacious affection, not indeed from displeasure with the person, but on account of some temporal advantage"; but the latter: "It is lawful with an absolute desire to desire the death of one's father, not indeed as the evil of the father, but as the good of the one desiring, because, namely, a rich inheritance is going to come to him" (V, 22).¹

350. DEFINITION. Complacency is an act or affection of the will delighting itself in some thing. Joy, in general, is the complacency of the appetite in a good already obtained, or apprehended as such. As it is taken here, it is the deliberate complacency of the will concerning an evil work carried out either by oneself or by others (V, 15).

To this also can be recalled: 1. boasting about a sin committed; 2. sorrow or displeasure concerning an evil not perpetrated, or impossible; 3. sadness concerning a good carried out.

351. PRINCIPLES. I. Joy concerning an evil perpetrated is sin. For such joy includes approval of evil. The same must be said concerning displeasure on account of an evil not perpetrated, for example, on account of a theft omitted.

But sadness concerning a good carried out is not always sin, if, namely, a cause is present which renders the regret honorable, for example, after some vow not sufficiently considered when emitted. But if no cause rendering the regret honorable is present, he would sin venially who was saddened concerning a good act to which he was not bound; for this sadness would be against reason, since the proper object of sadness is an evil thing. But he would sin mortally if he were saddened concerning a good work to which he was bound from a grave obligation (Sanchez, Decal., l. 4, c. 12, n. 2).

352. II. Joy concerning an evil carried out comprehends the whole malice of the work, and all its species. The reason is because joy or complacency in a work already perpetrated necessarily, just as desire also, embraces the sinful act as it exists in itself, namely clothed with its circumstances. Therefore it also assumes the morality of these, not otherwise than a depraved desire.

Hence: 1. He who takes complacency for himself in the remembrance of past sins, and approves them, ought to explain in confession both the object of this complacency and its species-changing circumstances, if any are present. 2. Likewise, "he who boasts about a grave sin truly perpetrated by himself ought to explain in confession also the species of the sin; because then complacency concerning the sin done is commonly added to the boasting, and this takes the same species of sin. But otherwise if the boasting is about a fictitious sin" (V, 26; H. Ap., III, 48).

353. Questions. QUAER. 1. Whether it is lawful to rejoice concerning an EVIL WORK ON ACCOUNT OF A GOOD EFFECT which followed from it?

Resp. 1. If the work is formally evil, namely perpetrated with sin, it is certain among all that it is not lawful to be delighted concerning it.

2. But if it is only materially evil, because it happened without sin, for example, homicide committed in drunkenness, there are not lacking authors who admit that the will can be delighted concerning it, as concerning the cause of a good effect.

But St. Alphonsus (V, 20; H. Ap., III, 52), with many others, says that the following must be held as truer: that such delectation is always illicit; because although the action was not formally sinful, nevertheless it was objectively evil. If someone therefore is delighted not concerning the effect alone, but concerning the evil thing itself, as concerning the cause of a good effect, the direct object of his delectation is an objectively evil thing; and therefore he sins.

Therefore you have among the propositions condemned by Innocent XI the 15th, which sounds thus: "It is lawful for a son to rejoice concerning the parricide of a parent perpetrated by himself in drunkenness, on account of the enormous riches thereafter obtained from inheritance."² Hence they sin at least lightly (Lehmkuhl, I, n. 358), who are delighted concerning the omission of the Hours, or the eating of meat, or the breaking of a fast, even if these occurred from inadvertence or from ignorance (H. Ap., III, 54; cf. Vind. Alph., P. II, q. 2).

QUAER. 2. Whether it is lawful to rejoice concerning THE GOOD EFFECT of an evil work?

Resp. It is lawful, speaking per se; because then the will is not borne into an evil object. We say speaking per se, that is, setting aside the danger of rejoicing concerning the evil work itself; for we are bound to avoid such danger (cf. n. 374).

Hence: 1. It is lawful to be delighted concerning relief following from pollution, whether accidental or voluntary, provided there is absent the danger of delighting oneself concerning the pollution itself, which, always and objectively evil, ought to be displeasing, even if inculpably in sleep, through touches or a base dream, it was had. 2. A son does not sin who rejoices concerning the obtaining of an inheritance on account of homicide; nor a woman who is delighted concerning gain acquired for herself from dishonest trade; provided that in these or similar cases the cause itself is always held in hatred (V, 20).

QUAER. 3. Whether it is lawful to rejoice or be delighted CONCERNING THE NOT EVIL MODE by which an evil action was carried out?

Resp. It is lawful, per se, because, since the mode of action was not evil in itself, the delectation is not concerning an evil object. Thus, without sin, stories, comedies, wars, homicides, frauds, thefts, quarrels, etc., often delight us (V, 18).

It was said per se, because by reason of danger it can be illicit. Thus those easily come into danger of delighting themselves concerning the evil thing who, for example, frequently and willingly hear certain base deeds, in the narration of which only the ingenious manner by which they were carried out seems to please. For if the discourse were concerning honest actions, even carried out in an ingenious manner, persons of this kind, for the most part, would perceive much less delight (Praxis, n. 40).

Note. The things which above (n. 349) were said concerning a licit object of desire can also be said concerning joy and complacency. For concerning the things which it is lawful to desire, concerning these it is likewise lawful to rejoice.

354. DEFINITION. Delectation, taken generally, is the rest of the appetite in a good possessed, that is, apprehended or had; and it can be in both the sensitive appetite and the intellective.

Morose delectation (or depraved thought properly so called) contains a double element: the thought by which an act of sin is rendered present, and the complacency of the will, by which it is delighted concerning that act as if it then executed it, yet without the intention of executing it (V, 15).

It is called morose not indeed from a delay of time, since even in one point of time every internal sin can be completed, but on account of the deliberate delay which the will makes in it.

The object of this delectation and of these thoughts is more often something illicit in itself, for example, homicide, fornication, and similar things; it can also be an object prohibited by positive law, for example, the eating of meat on a fast day, provided the will is borne toward it under the aspect of prohibition. For the law, with respect to these things, prohibits only the external action.

It is called depraved thought properly so called, that is, sinful, because the will, when it ought to have resisted it, rests in it. Therefore depraved thought is not to be confused with thought concerning a depraved thing, which thought can be lawful. Cf. Ami du Cl., 1912, p. 1025. See n. 357.

355. PRINCIPLES. I. Morose delectation is sin. For it is repugnant to right reason and to the divine law that someone have as pleasing what displeases God. Hence that saying (Hos. 9:10): They became abominable, like those things which they loved; and (Prov. 15:26): Evil thoughts are an abomination of the Lord.

356. II. Morose delectation takes its theological and moral species from the object which someone renders present to himself through the imagination of fantasy. The reason is because whoever is delighted concerning an act of sin takes that act as object, approves it, and adheres to it by his affection insofar as it is rendered present. Therefore, since morality is specified from the object, according to the grade and species of malice of the object, its delectation also will be evil with the same [malice]. Thus St. Thomas (1.2, q. 74, n. 8) and St. Alphonsus (V, n. 12). See the things said n. 347, 348.

357. Corollaries. 1. Speculatively speaking, it is very probable that morose delectation does not necessarily assume the specific malice of all the circumstances of the object. The reason is because simple delectation does not tend into the object as posited, or to be posited, but rests in it as represented by the intellect. Now, the intellect abstracts from other properties of the object, besides that which moves delectation. Thus, for example, if someone is delighted concerning copula with a married woman, not as married but only as beautiful, he does not commit adultery, since the circumstance of adultery does not move the delectation.

Note. But considering the matter practically, the opposite opinion greatly pleases St. Alphonsus, namely in the case where the delectation concerns some libidinous act with a determinate person. For then, on account of the corruption of human nature, there is a proximate danger of coveting or desiring, at least inefficaciously, the determinate object itself, especially if it is inordinately loved; and therefore these circumstances are to be explained in confession. But it would be otherwise if, from the nature of the thing, or from past experience, or from the disposition of the person, such a danger is judged not to be proximate (V, 15; H. Ap., III, 48). Cf. n. 1820.

2. It is lawful per se to be delighted concerning the thought or knowledge of an evil thing. We say: per se, that is, excluding depraved affection and danger of delectation concerning the evil thing itself. For knowledge of evil is not per se evil, and therefore can be the object of the will, unless it is prohibited from elsewhere, or illicit.

Therefore the delectation which is had, not concerning the evil work, but concerning speculative or scientific thought of an evil object, can be: either 1. good, if a just cause of thinking is present, for example, on account of study, consultation, etc., with abomination of the object; or 2. venially evil, if it is done from curiosity, etc., with only remote danger; or 3. gravely evil, if, when the matter concerns a gravely evil work, there is present a proximate danger of consenting in the delectation (V, 17; H. Ap., III, 49).

Now, the danger of delighting oneself concerning the evil thing itself must practically be measured: a) from the mode of thinking; b) from the quality of the person thinking; c) from the matter thought about; d) from the cause on account of which it is thought about. Thus, for example, if someone reads a book less honorable, there must be considered: the mode by which he reads, for example, greedily; the quality of the reader, perhaps prone to venery; the book which is read, perhaps obscene by profession; the cause of reading, namely whether it is sufficient that the probable danger of delectation concerning the evil thing itself be entered upon (Kon., n. 233).

3. It is not lawful for the betrothed and widowed, according to the truer opinion, to have delectation concerning the future or past work of marriage, even with the danger of sensitive delectation excluded. "The reason is because delectation renders the object present to itself; and therefore whenever the present object here and now is evil, since here and now there is absent the condition rendering marriage honorable, every actual delectation concerning it is also evil" (V, 24; H. Ap., III, 51).

"Another thing must be said concerning desire, by which the betrothed man wills future copula; for this is lawful, because, when the will is borne toward a future object, it can desire it under the condition by which the object will be lawful. But because in such desire there is also danger of delectation, therefore the betrothed are very much to be exhorted that they carefully turn away from themselves base thoughts of this kind." Concerning the Married, cf. n. 2111, 2.

358. Practical rules. The confessor, so that he may judge rightly concerning sinful thoughts, should duly attend to the following:

1. Lest he uselessly waste time through questions troublesome to himself and to the penitent, or even dangerous, let him not inquire concerning the species or number of thoughts unless it has first been clear to him concerning consent. Wherefore let him first ask the penitent whether he adverted that thoughts of this kind were sins. But if the penitent responds that he detested them as soon as he knew that they were base, he must be judged altogether immune from sin. If he responds that for some time he indeed had a confused knowledge concerning their malice, but did not attend to it perfectly, he is easily to be excused from grave sin, though not from venial.

2. But if the penitent is not able to free himself from these questions, ordinarily it must be presumed that he did not consent, or at least that full consent, or perfect advertence, was lacking to him, especially if he is of timorous conscience. On the contrary, he who is accustomed to sins, and fears them little, in doubt must be presumed to have consented (Kon., n. 235). Recall the things said n. 337, q. 3.

228. • A threefold class of them is distinguished, namely:

1° Morose delectation, or free complacency in an evil thing exhibited through the imagination as present, without desire.

2° Joy, or deliberate complacency in a past evil thing, or in an evil work performed either by oneself or by another.

3° Desire, or an act of the will wishing for an evil thing. It is called efficacious if there is an intention or absolute purpose of executing it; otherwise it is called inefficacious.

But what the malice of these is, and what species, hold in these few things:

I. Desire, even inefficacious, is truly a sin, and assumes the species both of the object and of the circumstances.

And 1° it is truly a sin. This is established from the precept: Thou shalt not covet, which must be understood generally and indefinitely of the prohibition of any depraved affection. Moreover every desire of a prohibited thing is repugnant to right reason: for it is shameful and dishonest to desire, namely to propose to oneself either absolutely or conditionally to execute, what it is not licit to execute.

2° It assumes the species of its object. For any desire whatever regards the external act as to be mandated to execution, either absolutely, if the desire is efficacious, or at least hypothetically, if it is inefficacious; necessarily therefore it is borne into that act according to all the conditions and circumstances which affect it, whether they are necessarily prerequired for it, or inseparably accompany it, or follow from it of their own accord. This is established also from the words of Christ:² He who shall have looked at a woman to lust after her, has already committed adultery with her in his heart. But to commit adultery in Scripture is everywhere understood of adultery. Therefore ...

3° It also assumes the species of the circumstances of the object. This is clear from the reason just brought under 2°. Hence in confession, for example, of the desire of fornicating, the circumstances of consanguinity, affinity, the bond of matrimony, or a vow of chastity, which affect the desired person, must be declared.

229. • II. Joy likewise is a sin, and indeed of the same species as the evil action about which it is conversant, and similarly assumes the species of the circumstances annexed to it, no otherwise than desire itself.

The reason is because joy, as we said above, is the approval of past evil; therefore this embraces the sinful act as it existed in itself, namely clothed with its circumstances. Therefore it also assumes the whole malice of these. - Hence he who takes complacency in the recollection of past sins and approves them must in confession explain the object of this complacency and the circumstances changing the species, just as if he had sinned anew by deed.

Boasting concerning a sin committed, sorrow over evil not performed, and also sadness over good accomplished are to be referred back to joy.

230. • III. Morose delectation 1° is certainly a sin; 2° it also certainly varies in gravity and species according to the variety of objects exhibited to the mind.

The reason for the first is because it is repugnant to rational nature and to divine law for the will to have as pleasing that which is discordant from right reason and displeases God. Moreover deliberate delectation concerning an evil object indicates affection toward it; but affection toward an evil object is evil affection, as is clear. Therefore ... Hence Osee:² They became abominable like those things which they loved. And Proverbs:³ Evil thoughts are an abomination to the Lord.

The reason for the second is because whoever is delighted concerning an object evil in itself approves it and adheres to it by his affection. Therefore in the very degree and species in which the object is evil, in the same entirely will the delectation concerning it be evil. Therefore ... St. Thomas¹ and St. Alphonsus.²

Does it also assume the malice of the circumstances of the object? Negatively, very probably, theoretically speaking. The reason is because simple delectation does not tend into the object as to be posited, but rests in it as represented by the intellect. But the intellect abstracts from other properties of the object besides that which moves delectation. In practice, however, the opposite opinion is very pleasing to St. Alphonsus,³ namely because of the proximate danger of depraved desire. Yet if you foresee that the penitent will be induced with difficulty to open the circumstances of the object thought upon, because of the speculative probability of the former opinion you will prudently abstain from troublesome questions. Thus with Billuart, Scavini, T. I, n. 923.

231. Questions. - Quaer. 1° ON DESIRE. Is it licit to desire evil under a condition, if it would be licit?

Resp. Distinguish. Affirmatively of itself if the appended condition removes the whole malice of the thing; the reason is because such an affection involves no disorder either in itself or in the object, from which through the condition the malice is wholly excluded. But negatively in the other hypothesis; the reason is because such an affection tends into an evil object, and indeed absolutely, since the condition does not remove the malice from the object, even as represented, and therefore the whole malice of the object is poured back into the act of the will. And indeed there are certain objects concerning which a condition, however appended, cannot remove the malice. For things which are intrinsically evil cannot be changed, and therefore a condition would be appended uselessly, since to choose such things of itself would be to desire that the law and order of nature be changed.⁴

Nevertheless he would probably have to be excused from grave sin who by such a desire certainly would not will that what is intrinsically evil should become licit, but would only disclose what he would will in another condition of things. - St. Alphonsus⁵ with others. Besides, no one fails to see how dangerous desires of this sort are, even if the appended condition removed the whole malice, especially in things prohibited by natural law, yet licit in some case or state; for example, I would kill my enemy, if God commanded; I would take a wife, if I were not a priest or bound by vow; I would gladly marry Caia, if I did not have a wife; which desires Cajetan rightly calls foolish and diabolical temptations; because, although such a desire is licit, nevertheless the present delectation concerning that object is illicit, which in venereal matters will easily be found joined with desire. Indeed other conditional desires concerning things prohibited by positive law alone must also be dissuaded, because for the most part they are idle, and sometimes they can labor under some inordinate affection.

Hence the confessor must prohibit betrothed persons from lingering in the desire of intercourse to be had in future matrimony; for "great" is "the danger of present delectation, which is evil when the condition which gives honorable character to that object is absent." Yet often betrothed persons and widowers are in good faith, not thinking it to be mortal to be delighted concerning a licit object, as intercourse in matrimony is; and therefore the confessor will prudently be silent about mortal sin, unless he should see pollution to follow from that complacency.

232. • Quaer. 2° ON JOY. Is it licit to rejoice 1) concerning the evil act itself because of the good effect following from it; 2) concerning the good effect of an evil act?

Resp. to the 1st: Negatively, and this (provided the reason for the prohibition of the act is not to be sought precisely from advertence alone, as for example in a lie) even though it was materially evil only. The reason is because then the act was evil from the object. This is also clear from proposition 15 among those condemned by Innocent XI (p. XV), in which the discussion is evidently of an act materially evil only, of parricide committed in drunkenness.

Hence they sin who are delighted concerning the eating of meat, or the breaking of fast, from ignorance or oblivion, even involuntary, or concerning nocturnal pollution not purely natural, that is, proceeding also from some cause other than from nature discharging itself; for example, from base phantasms presented to the imagination of the sleeper, or from touches wholly involuntary.²

Resp. to the 2nd: Affirmatively, provided there is absent a probable danger of formal sin; for in this case you do not rejoice concerning evil. Yet I said: provided it is absent, etc. The reason is because, as was said at n. 87, I, without a sufficient cause it is licit for no one to expose himself to such danger. Therefore it will be licit, speaking of itself, or setting aside that danger, to rejoice concerning the discharge caused by pollution, even voluntary, or concerning the obtaining of an inheritance from homicide.¹ - Each response is valid also concerning desire and delectation.

233. • Quaer. 3° ON DELECTATION. Is it licit to be delighted concerning 1) the thought of an evil thing; 2) the mode?

Resp. to the 1st: Affirmatively, provided there is absent a proximate danger of delectation concerning the evil thing itself, as St. Thomas² explains in the following words: "Someone thinking about fornication can be delighted in two ways: in one way concerning the thought itself, in another way concerning the fornication itself thought of; ... but the thought itself according to itself is not a mortal sin; indeed sometimes it is only venial, for instance when someone thinks uselessly about it; but sometimes it is wholly without sin, for instance when someone usefully thinks about it, as when he wills to preach or dispute about it," etc. - But the danger of delectation concerning the evil thing itself in practice must be measured from the mode of thinking, - from the quality of the person thinking, - from the matter thought upon, - from the cause on account of which it is thought upon. Thus, if someone reads a less honorable book, these things must be considered: the mode in which he reads, for example eagerly; - the quality of the reader, perhaps prone to venery; - the book which is read, for example obscene by design; - the cause of reading, namely whether it is sufficient that he expose himself to the probable danger of delectation concerning the evil thing itself.

Resp. to the 2nd: Affirmatively, provided 1) the mode is not evil of itself, and 2) the danger of which we have just spoken is absent. The matter is clear of itself. Thus he does not sin who laughs at the mode in which a drunk man proceeds with his foot wavering because of wine; because the mode of itself is not evil. On the contrary, he sins who is delighted concerning the frauds and lies which he used to seduce a girl, because those frauds and lies are evil. - But because of the danger of delectation concerning the evil thing, those can easily sin who, for example, frequently and willingly hear certain base things which do not seem to be narrated except to show the ingenious mode in which they were done; for if the conversation concerned honest actions, even if done more ingeniously, they would for the most part perceive much less delectation.

234. • Quaer. 4° Whether and when does he sin who does not resist the motions of concupiscence?

Resp. By concupiscence in this place we do not understand a passion of the sensitive appetite, indifferent to good or evil, insofar as it is considered as diminishing or even altogether removing the voluntary (n. 12-14), but the tinder of depraved desires, or propensity to evil, residing not only in the inferior appetite but also in the superior. Concerning the motions of this concupiscence hold these things:

Principles. - I. However much the soul may be struck by the stimuli of the depraved tinder, there will never be any stain of sin, unless the will in some way either consents to them, or does not impede them when it can and ought to impede them. Common and certain. - See St. Thomas.¹

II. Motions of the will which are first-first, namely those which precede any deliberation of reason whatever and are elicited before attention is given to the object's agreement with the rule of morals, are wholly without fault. The reason is because insofar as they precede deliberation of reason and advertence to moral malice, they are neither voluntary nor free, and consequently are free from formal sin. Thus all Theologians.

III. Motions of the will which are second-first, namely those which follow upon some use of reason, yet are elicited with only slight, obscure, and imperfect advertence to the rule of morals, in any matter, even grave, are only venial sin. The reason is because acts of this sort are imperfectly free and only semi-deliberate; and so on account of the imperfection of the act they are excused from grave fault. Thus likewise the common opinion of Theologians.

Resolves. - 1° Motions, however depraved, so long as they displease the will, even after advertence to the rule of morals, are free from all fault.²

2° One who bears himself negatively, that is, neither consenting nor resisting, when the danger of consent is absent, sins lightly; otherwise, in grave matter and when a just cause of bearing himself negatively is lacking, gravely. Hence:

a. In vehement motions, which greatly allure the consent of the will to grave sin, because, for example, venereal delectation is added, it is illicit to bear oneself negatively or indifferently, but there is required a positive act of resistance or at least of displeasure, and this under grave obligation; since with the same obligation by which one is held to avoid sin itself, one is also held to avoid the danger of it. Direct resistance is nevertheless not necessary; but indirect resistance suffices, and indeed is more advisable, namely by turning the mind to other things; nor is material resistance necessary, for example by pressing excited parts over the clothing, although that can be useful. But prayer will be best. - Resistance that is positive indeed, but tepid, excuses from mortal sin, but not from venial.

b. In carnal motions with which there is not joined a proximate danger of consent, to bear oneself negatively is not free from venial sin, since we are held to take care lest the appetite disturb reason even lightly, or entice to sin, even only remotely. - But light motions are better resisted by contempt.

c. There is no sin in bearing oneself negatively, if a just cause is present, as if you have experienced that the motions are increased by positive resistance or anxious solicitude or reflex thought; or the motions arise from an action necessary or useful, for example from hearing confessions, from reading base matters useful to be known, from a touch necessary for healing, and similar things.¹

235. • Quaer. 5° What is to be done with a penitent accusing himself of some depraved thought?

Resp. Lest you waste time uselessly and through questions annoying to you and the penitent, or even dangerous, do not inquire about the species or number unless first it is sufficiently certain to you concerning consent. But that you may recognize this, he must be asked whether he noticed that it was a sin; and if he answers that he detested it as soon as he knew it was base, he must be judged entirely immune from sin. - If he answers that for some time he had some confused knowledge of the malice and adhered to it, but without fully attending to its gravity, then indeed he is easily to be excused from grave sin, but not from venial. But if he does not know how to extricate himself from these questions, ordinarily it must be presumed that he did not consent, or at least that full consent or perfect advertence was lacking, especially if he is of timorous conscience. On the contrary, he who is accustomed to sins or abhors them little is, in doubt, presumed to have consented; for in doubt a prudent presumption is sought from things commonly occurring. - But commonly it happens that a pious man does not consent without knowing that he is really consenting to sin; while a depraved man does not resist sin without a struggle, which indeed removes doubt concerning consent or dissent.

He who doubts whether he did something while awake or sleeping, in possession of himself or not, is judged not to have sufficiently adverted nor consented; for he who is awake sufficiently perceives himself to be awake.

If there is a defect of age, that is, before the completed seventh year, at least perfect advertence and full consent are not presumed, unless malice certainly supplies for age (yet see n. 548, q. 1° and n. 1344, 7°). Finally, the mere continuation of a depraved thought is not an indication of consent; since both temptation and resistance can be long-lasting.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 74, a. 3 and 4; De Malo q. 7, a. 6 and 8; De Veritate q. 25, a. 5.

448. Movements of sensuality or concupiscence are called inordinate movements of the sensitive appetite rising up against the order of reason, such as movements of sensible love or aversion, anger, gluttony, delight, sadness, hope, fear, despair, audacity, etc., and especially venereal movements.

They are distinguished by theologians as: 1) first-first movements, which precede every advertence of reason, and these are not formal sins, which is of faith for the baptized, from the Council of Trent, sess. 5, can. 5; and it is certain concerning infidels from the condemnation of propositions 50 and 51 of Baius;

2. second-first movements (so called because they are second after the first-first, and first among moral and free movements), which occur with semiplene or some advertence, and these are venial sins;

3. deliberate movements, which occur with full advertence of the intellect and are deliberately admitted or excited by the will: these are voluntary

either a) directly and in themselves, when the will positively consents to them, and then they are mortal sins if they are gravely inordinate or prohibited under grave matter;

1. We use the received terminology, which it is neither possible nor opportune to change. The terminology of St. Thomas is different, although not of all of his age. According to him, first-first movements are merely natural movements, which depend solely on the disposition of the body, or which are so suddenly aroused at the apprehension of sense that reason could in no way foresee and impede them; second-first movements are those which depend on the sensitive apprehension of imagination or sense. But since the sensitive faculties are born to be moved by reason and to obey it, reason can impede those movements. Concerning these St. Thomas teaches that they are venial sins, and indeed generally and indefinitely, because if reason is watchful, it can foresee and impede individual movements. Nevertheless do not conclude from this that they are always sins. St. Thomas enunciates a general principle: movements of themselves are apt to be foreseen by reason and therefore can and ought to be impeded, and thus they are indirectly voluntary; in fact, sometimes there are excusing causes on account of which they ought not or even cannot be impeded. In this matter more recent authors perhaps admit excuses too easily and more than is fitting, being less solicitous concerning the office of watchful reason; the ancients applied the principle very rigorously and attended less to causes of excuse.

or b) indirectly voluntary, when the will only omits to repress them while it can and ought;

or c) voluntary in a positive cause, when the will only places a cause from which they are foreseen as going to follow.

449. Indirectly voluntary movements are those to which the will neither positively consents nor resists, but to which it has itself negatively and which it only permits. Concerning them it must be said:

1. Man certainly sins in them, because reason and will fail in their office of directing and repressing the movements of the inferior powers, nor can man hold himself indifferently toward whether his movements and acts are inordinate or not. But the appetite of evil is deformity and consequently to be expelled. If reason adverts to this, it ought to deliberate concerning it and show displeasure and remove the deformity as far as it can, according to Gen. IV, 7: Its appetite shall be under you, and you shall rule over it. But he who has himself negatively is judged equivalently to consent. But:

a) per se he does not sin gravely, because positive and full consent of the will is lacking;

1. Let it be noted that a man cannot permit another to excite movements in himself, and indeed under grave matter, because this is cooperation in mortal sin and more easily includes danger of consent.

b) per accidens he would sin gravely, if from this there were a proximate danger of consenting to gravely prohibited movements, as often happens in more vehement venereal commotions, and in vehement hatred or appetite of revenge.

2. Many say: "if the movements are vehement, one must resist under mortal sin, because proximate danger of consent is present," but this is not always true; "if the movements are slight, one need not resist under mortal sin, because the danger of consent is small," but neither is it always small for all.

2. Man is bound to resist them positively, insofar as it is necessary and morally possible for not consenting and for repressing the movements:

a) Ordinarily, however, not directly, that is, by contrary or violent acts, because this is not necessary or is too difficult, or even excites the movements more.

3. Per accidens there can be an obligation of resisting directly, if another resistance does not sufficiently exclude the danger of consent, for example, in anger or hatred.

Direct resistance is made by suppressing imagination, by an act of love in place of hatred, of hope in place of despair, by compression of the members, by violent movement of the head, by chastisement of the body through afflictions, vigils, discipline, for example, by throwing oneself naked into thorns or into cold water, etc.

b) But generally he is bound to resist indirectly, by applying the mind to other incompossible things, especially those which more strongly affect the mind.

Thus, for example, by interrupting the work, pursuing business, by an external occupation requiring special attention, by praying, meditating, etc.

c) Sometimes, if there is a just cause for not resisting otherwise nor repressing the movement, positive resistance by a simple act of displeasure, at least implicit, suffices; this act is not to be repeated frequently, since, until it is retracted, it is judged morally to persevere.

1. Displeasure is present implicitly if someone voluntarily does something else, voluntarily does not attend to these things, or contemns them.

Thus if someone has experienced that another resistance is useless for coercing the movements, or excites and increases them more; or if the movements have their origin from a necessary cause or from a useful action, as will be indicated in the following number under c), and it is too troublesome to repel them, for example, because of duration; or if the movements are slight and transitory, both because causes exciting such movements are very frequent and therefore the obligation of repressing them would be too difficult, and because they are better and more efficaciously repressed by contempt: for solicitude to impede them is accustomed to excite the imagination and increase the movements. All these things are easily verified in a scrupulous person, who therefore shows sufficient displeasure by simply contemning the movements.

Nevertheless, in the aforesaid circumstances, man must bring safeguards and care lest he consent to the movements.

450. Movements voluntary in the cause, which are not intended and to which the will does not consent, but which are only willed in a positive cause from which they are foreseen as going to follow, are sin only as much as the cause insofar as it influences them. Hence:

a) It is grave sin without sufficient reason to place a cause per se gravely influencing movements prohibited under grave matter, such as venereal movements, movements of great unjust anger, of great hatred, even if they do not follow per accidens.

Thus, for example, reading long continued that is very impious and persuasive against religion, the priesthood, public order, etc., exciting hatred, anger, revenge; very base reading, conversation or reading inducing despair or suicide; frequenting companions who excite to this; duration of touch or sight of a dishonorable part; likewise protracted morose delight of revenge or lust. Hence St. Alphonsus says that even a movement of pollution is not mortal unless it comes from a cause per se mortal in the genus of lust: 1) it must be mortal, because since pollution is not willed in itself but only in the cause, it will be evil in that degree in which the cause itself is evil (understand: in which the cause is evil insofar as it is a cause; but every and only a cause which per se gravely influences movements prohibited under grave matter, unless there is an excusing reason of a good effect which compensates the evil, is mortal insofar as it is a cause); 2) it must be mortal in the genus of lust, because otherwise it would influence pollution not gravely but only lightly, for example, drunkenness.

b) It is a light sin without a just cause to place an action lightly influencing even vehement movements and movements prohibited under grave matter (indeed, even pollution itself), provided that they do not please and there is no proximate danger of consent. A slight influence into a grave thing, namely, is a light matter.

Such is a not-long conversation with an impious man or with a girl; sight or touch not very base; reading slightly impious or slightly base. A sufficient reason for permitting these things will be any reasonable cause of necessity, utility, or fittingness.

c) It is no sin from a just cause to place an action from which inordinate movements are foreseen as going to follow (even pollution), provided that proximate danger of consent is always absent.

In the matter of lust, a just cause for a priest is to hear confessions and study base matters; for a surgeon, to see and touch dishonorable parts, likewise for one serving the sick or in baths; for all, to kiss women according to the custom of the country, to touch oneself from necessity, to ride on horseback for the sake of recreation or utility, to lie down in a more comfortable position, to take hot foods and drinks moderately.

451. Observation. - In the preceding things we have spoken according to natural law alone; for sometimes causes which for someone influence lightly or in no way are prohibited even under grave matter by positive law, for example, by the law of the index of books.

I. There are three internal sins of lust: morose delectation, desire, and joy. The first regards the present time, because it is concerned with the object insofar as it is present to us here and now by cognition; desire regards the future, because it is an act of the will wishing for an evil thing; joy regards the past, and is complacency or approval of an evil work formerly perpetrated by oneself or by others. In other words, morose delectation is consent to the thought present pleasure alone, not to the act itself; if the act were present, lust would already be external. Desire is also consent to an act future and to be posited; joy is consent to an act past and posited.

II. Lustful morose delectation (complaisance impure, onkuisch behagen) is nothing other than consent to pleasure concerning a lustful or immodest work; whence it is defined: simple love or voluntary complacency concerning a venereal work exhibited by cognition as present, without the will of carrying it out. For he who takes pleasure feigns to himself the action of sin as present, for example fornication, and concerning it, by deliberate consent, takes pleasure as if he were actually carrying it out and fornicating, yet without desire of carrying it out.

It is called delectation, because the mere thought of an evil thing is not sin, unless per accidens insofar as it includes danger of sinning, but the pleasure concerning a lustful thing thought of is sin. It is called morose, not because it requires a delay of time, for it can be perfected in a single moment, but because deliberating reason, rather than repelling the pleasure, dwells about it insofar as the venereal thing is grateful and pleasant to it.

Lustful morose delectation is sin, and indeed mortal sin. For no one takes pleasure except in that which seems good to him and conformable to his nature; therefore he who takes pleasure in a lustful thing has it as good for himself, and accordingly his affection tends into an evil thing. But since all external lust that is in itself and directly voluntary is mortally evil, voluntary pleasure concerning it is also mortal. For that someone deliberately choose that his affection be conformed to a work which of itself is mortal is already mortal sin. Thus Saint Thomas, I-II, q. 74, a. 8.

This certainly is to be understood of fully voluntary complacency in venereal pleasure, and in acts of true lust, and indeed those gravely evil from their nature; not, however, of complacency in merely sensible pleasure, or in acts of lust from their nature lightly evil, as being voluntary only indirectly or in a cause influencing little, or in mere immodesty, as in the touch and look of the genitals had only from curiosity or levity. This is clear from the general principles explained above, and from the whole course of the argumentation.

III. Morose delectation, although it is less evil than the evil work itself or the proposal of it, nevertheless because it tends to the same thought object, has the specific malice of the work, provided and insofar as that work is thought of as pleasurable or moves to pleasure. Thus delectation concerning sodomy, concerning adultery as adultery, concerning fornication, differ in species. Nevertheless morose delectation does not contract the malice of circumstances which reason represents, but from which in the delectation it abstracts, and about which the delectation is not concerned, or by whose delectability the appetite is not moved. For delectation tends into the object, not as it exists really, but as it exists in the intellect, and accordingly does not tend into circumstances which reason does not represent as pleasurable and which are not the motive of the pleasure. Hence:

1. if the imagined object pleases only as a cause of carnal pleasure in general, only the malice of impudicity or imperfect lust is contracted and is to be accused, unless, however, pollution follows;

2. but if delectation is had concerning a special circumstance, for example concerning an act to be exercised precisely as solitary, or with a woman, with a married woman, with a sacred person, or with a male, and so forth, affection toward this special malice is contracted and one will have to be accused of solitary sin, or fornication, adultery, sacrilege, sodomy, and so forth;

3. if someone takes pleasure concerning a married or sacred person, not insofar as married or sacred, but insofar as beautiful, only the specific malice of fornication, not of adultery or sacrilege, is contracted.

IV. Absolute lustful desire (onkuische begeerte) and joy (onkuisch verheugen) have the same species and gravity of malice which the work has about which they are concerned, to be posited or already posited, with all known circumstances (Matt. V, 28). For desire tends into a work really to be posited, and accordingly not as it is represented abstractly in the intellect as pleasurable, but as it is on the part of the thing; and joy is concerning a past work as it was. Each tends into all the circumstances which are in the work and are not separable from it in the concrete.

On the contrary, in conditioned desire, if the condition excludes all or partial malice of the object, that malice is totally or partially not contracted, for example: I would have copulation with her if she were mine; I would sin with her unless she were married.¹ But if the condition does not exclude the malice, the whole malice is contracted, for example: I would fornicate if it were licit or if I could.

¹ Yet in practice this can be dangerous, as will be said on the following page.

V. Corollaries. Let morose delectation concerning a thought lustful work not be confused:

1. with delectation concerning the very thought itself, which can be good, for example to take pleasure in theological science concerning base things;

2. with delectation concerning the mode by which the lustful thing is done. For this is good, venially evil, or mortally evil, according as the mode itself is good or lightly or gravely evil. Examples are: to take pleasure in an ingenious or new mode of perpetrating lust, in matrimonial copulation had beside the natural mode, in a mode of exercising lust against nature;

3. with delectation concerning only the good effect following from lust, for example concerning offspring conceived from fornication or concerning concupiscence calmed from pollution. This is licit, provided it is not also had concerning the lustful work itself on account of the good effect;

4. with delectation concerning a work as licit at another time or in another state. For this is licit, not indeed if it is done concerning the work absolutely and as concerning the present, for example for the betrothed concerning copulation now to be had, but if it is done under the condition of the time or state in which it will be licit, because this condition removes the malice from the work, for example concerning copulation to be had in future marriage. This is to be understood of the delectation of the rational appetite, which can tend to the object as proposed by reason, and accordingly under a condition concerning the future or concerning the past and thus abstracted from malice; it is not valid of the delectation of the sensitive appetite, which tends into the object proposed by sense, and accordingly always absolutely and as concerning the present. Hence for practice:

a. by rational appetite, but not carnal appetite, the betrothed can take pleasure concerning future copulation and desire it; likewise widowers and widows can take pleasure concerning past copulation and rejoice in it;

b. but for other unmarried persons, although the same of itself is not illicit, ordinarily it is illicit per accidens, because it will not happen without motions of concupiscence, which they cannot excite, and for permitting which they can have no reason;

c. on the contrary, spouses, even when the partner is absent, can take pleasure carnally concerning copulation had or to be had, provided it is not done principally on account of pleasure but on account of an honorable end, and there is no danger of pollution, because here and now copulation is licit for them, although per accidens it is impossible.

It should be noted, however, that all the aforesaid delectations in practice are to be avoided, both because they are often idle and therefore venial sins, and because they are very dangerous, since a transition easily occurs to delectation concerning the lustful work itself. Nevertheless, in this matter, there will be greater liberty for married persons.

VI. Observation. The cause or occasion of internal lust is base conversations and writings, and the hearings and readings of them. Concerning these, let it be noted:

1. When someone speaks base things from libidinous affection, to excite venereal pleasure either in himself or in others, it is always mortal sin. The same must be said when someone, by speaking base things, exposes himself or another by such speech to the proximate occasion of mortal sin.

Hence they easily sin gravely:

a. who mingle conversations concerning the conjugal act, concerning things licit and illicit between spouses, concerning modes of impeding generation, of procuring pollution, or concerning young men and girls, especially if this is done among younger persons of different sex;

b. who out of boasting recount their own base sins, both because they often give great scandal and because they easily take complacency in the sins perpetrated;

c. who say base things because of pleasure taken from those things thought of, or with danger of such pleasure, or with danger of grave scandal.

2. To speak base things from levity or curiosity or for mere recreation, in such a way that the pleasure does not pass to the things which are expressed by the words, but stops in the artifice of the words, provided scandal is absent and the danger of the speaker falling into mortal sin is absent, is not mortal sin; for the affection of the will is not borne into lust. Thus often among the uneducated and workers, or among women gathered together. Yet because this recreation is inordinate, there is venial sin.

3. The same is to be said, as in the two prior principles, concerning the hearing, reading, and singing of base things.

4. To write base things on account of doctrine, on account of history, on account of informing superiors or due reprehension, is no sin. The same is to be said in the same cases concerning speech, hearing, and reading.

5. To write base things for the pleasure to be taken by oneself or to be provoked in others is mortal sin. Likewise to write such things without this intention, but with at least confused foresight of this effect, unless, however, some necessity or utility excuses.

6. To write base things out of levity or pleasantness, without danger of scandal even of the little ones, is only venial sin.

7. In words or writings, by invitation or counsel or approval, to induce another to a sin of lust is mortal sin, which participates in all the specific malices of the work advised.

VII. Warning. In order that in practice it may more easily be discerned whether someone has voluntarily admitted internal sins of lust, it is better in temptation to distinguish three stages:

The first is suggestion, or the mere representation of evil in the imagination;

the second is sensible and organic delectation, or pleasure in the sensitive appetite, arising from the suggestion if it was vivid: it is the feeling of temptation;

the third is voluntary complacency, or consent of the will to the delectation, after advertence of reason.

In the last alone is sin present. Hence they are accustomed to say: to feel temptation is not sin, but to consent is; not the feeling or pleasure, but the consent and complacency.

A threefold class of them is distinguished, namely:

1st. Morose delectation, or free complacency in an evil thing exhibited through imagination as present, without desire.

2nd. Joy, or deliberate approval of an evil work performed either by oneself or by another, by which the will holds the perpetrated evil as pleasing and acceptable.

3rd. Desire, or an act of the will seeking an evil thing as to be obtained, and therefore to be carried out by work. It is called efficacious if there is present an absolute purpose of carrying it out; inefficacious if there is present only conditioned consent, for example, if someone says: I would steal if I could; or I would fornicate with this woman unless I feared infamy, etc. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 15.

Therefore morose delectation is concerned with the object, not as it is in itself, but as here and now it is presented to the imagination; joy, on the contrary, and desire are concerned with the object as it once was or will be in itself.

I Say 1st. Desire of an evil thing, even inefficacious, is truly sin, and takes on the species both of the object and of the circumstances. The reason for the first is that it is base and dishonorable to desire absolutely or conditionally what it is not lawful to carry out. The reason for the second is that every desire, even inefficacious, tends toward its object, and therefore is a willing of the special malice of that object, and so contracts it. The reason for the third is the same; for desire, since it tends toward the object as to be carried out by work, reaches that object as it is in itself with its circumstances. Therefore it contracts the whole malice also of the circumstances. - Hence in confession, for example, of a desire of fornicating, there must be declared the circumstances of consanguinity, affinity, matrimonial bond, or vow of chastity which affect the desired person. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 12.

I say 2nd. Joy likewise is sin, and indeed of the same species as the evil action with which it is concerned, and it likewise takes on the species of the circumstances annexed to it, no otherwise than desire itself. The reason is that joy, as we said above, is approval of past evil, which necessarily embraces the sinful act as it existed in itself, clothed namely with its circumstances. Hence one who, in the recollection of past sins, takes complacency in them and approves them, ought in confession to explain the object of this complacency and the circumstances changing the species, just as if he had sinned again in act.

To joy are to be reduced boasting concerning a committed sin, displeasure concerning an evil not perpetrated, and also sadness concerning a good performed.

I say 3rd. Morose delectation is certainly sin, and certainly also takes on the gravity and species of the objects exhibited to the mind. The reason for the first is that it is repugnant to rational nature and divine law for the will to hold as pleasing that which is discordant with right reason and displeases God. Besides, deliberate delectation concerning an evil object argues affection toward it; but affection toward an evil object is an evil affection, as is clear of itself. Therefore ... Hence in Osee ix, 10, it is said: "They became abominable like those things which they loved." But the reason for the second is that whoever takes delight in an object evil in itself approves it and adheres to it by his affection; and therefore the malice of that delectation will plainly be evil with the same gravity and species by which the object is evil. - Cf. St. Thom. 1-2, q. 74, art. 8. - St. Alphonsus, n. 15.

Question 1. Does morose delectation take on also the specific malice of the circumstances of the object, as desire and joy do?

Response. Negatively, probably, according to many theologians; and the reason is that simple delectation does not tend toward the object as it really exists, but rests in it as it is represented by phantasy. Moreover this, neither from the nature of the thing nor in fact, is accustomed to represent all circumstances, but only that one which moves the delectation more. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 15. - Baller., note (a), p. 148.

Question 2. Is it lawful to desire an evil under the condition, if it were licit?

Response. Affirmatively, if the condition added removes the whole malice of the thing, because such an affection involves no disorder, neither in itself nor in the object from which by the condition malice is altogether excluded. But the response would be negative in another hypothesis, because such an affection tends toward an evil object, and indeed absolutely, since the condition does not remove malice from the object even as represented, as would be blasphemy, perjury, etc. Nevertheless he would probably be excused from grave sin who by such a desire certainly did not will that what is intrinsically evil should become licit, but only showed his propensity toward that object. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 27; and Hom. Ap., n. 50.

For the rest, no one fails to see how dangerous desires of this kind are, even if the condition added would remove the whole malice, especially in things prohibited by natural right, yet licit in some case or state; for example, I would kill my enemy if God commanded; I would take a wife if I were not a priest or bound by vow; I would gladly marry Bertha if I did not have a wife. Cajetan deservedly calls these desires foolish and diabolical temptations. Indeed also other conditioned desires concerning things prohibited only by positive right are to be dissuaded, because for the most part they are idle, and sometimes can labor under some disordered affection. - Cf. Cajet., under the title Sins of Thought.

Question 3. Is it lawful to be delighted concerning the inculpable omission of some precept left aside from forgetfulness?

Response. Although it is never lawful to rejoice or take delight either concerning an evil omission or concerning an evil work, even when inculpably admitted, according as they were evil in themselves; yet it is lawful, of itself, that is, with the danger of consent to delectation concerning the evil cause excluded, to rejoice or take delight concerning the good and honorable effect which arose from them.

But whether it is also lawful to rejoice or take delight concerning the evil cause itself, not according as it is evil, but according as it was the cause of a good effect, many affirm with Lessius, Suarez, Cardinal de Lugo, and others; but St. Alphonsus, with several others, denies it, alleging proposition 15, condemned by Innocent XI, which holds thus: "It is lawful for a son to rejoice over the parricide of his parent perpetrated by himself in drunkenness, on account of the great riches thereafter obtained from the inheritance." - But it must be said that it is not clear whether by this proposition absolutely every joy concerning an inculpable evil work was condemned; or rather only the joy was reprobated by which the son, against the right order of charity, places the good of a much inferior order, namely the riches obtained from it, before the death of his parent. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 20. - Lessius, de just. et jure, lib. 4, cap. 3, n. 105. - Suarez, disp. 5, sect. 7, n. 15. - Lugo, de poenit., disp. 16, n. 389. - Viva, in the cited proposition, n. 12. - Baller., note (a), p. 152; and note (c), p. 186.

You Will Resolve. 1st. It is not lawful to be delighted concerning nocturnal pollution according to itself and on account of its pleasure, but it is certainly lawful to be delighted concerning it according as it is an exoneration or alleviation of nature. For the defect of free consent through sleep, although it cannot make licit a delectation inherent in an evil work which thereafter is freely taken, nevertheless can very well excuse the exterior work from fault. And this is the true doctrine of St. Thomas, who also refers a base dream to the natural cause of pollution, to which can be reduced also the touches or motions following that same dream. "For when," he says, "seminal humor abounds in the body, or when a resolution of the humor has been made, ... the one sleeping dreams those things which pertain to the expulsion of such abundant or resolved humor; just as also happens when nature is burdened from some other superfluity; so that sometimes phantasms pertaining to the emission of such superfluities are formed in the imagination." - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 154, art. 5; and in 4, dist. 9, q. 1, art. 4, q. 1, ad 5. - St. Alphonsus, n. 20. - Baller., note (b), p. 149.

2nd. The confessor ought to act cautiously with those who rejoice concerning an advantage coming to them from their own sin or another's, or from the harm or death of another; for sometimes delectations of this kind arise not from the advantage alone, but from joy concerning the sin itself or the evil of the neighbor. The same is to be feared concerning one who says that he rejoices concerning the spiritual good of the neighbor, but one which arises from his misfortune, for example, from grave infirmity, loss of temporal things, etc. For sometimes joy concerning the evil of the neighbor can creep in rather than concerning the good effect arising from it, especially if he previously bore enmity against him; therefore the confessor, if the matter seems to demand it, should not neglect prudently to look into the mind of the penitent.

• Cf. St. Alphonsus, ibid.

3rd. Although it is one thing to be delighted concerning an evil thing, and another to be delighted concerning the manner, for example, an ingenious one, by which the evil thing was performed (which indeed can of itself be free from fault), nevertheless the confessor ought easily to suspect morose delectation in those who gladly hear base things, although these do not seem to be narrated except for manifesting the ingenious manner by which they were done, especially when a habit of consenting to evil delectation confirms this suspicion.

4th. It is not mortal to be sad concerning an obligation not essentially commanded, insofar as it is only troublesome, or in the divided sense of the law, for example, concerning the trouble of fasting.

5th. If the penitent accuses himself of some evil thought, he is to be asked whether he knew it to be sin; and if he responds that he detested it as soon as he knew it to be base, he is to be judged altogether immune from sin. - If he responds that for some time he had some confused cognition of malice and adhered to it, but without fully adverting to its gravity, then indeed he is easily to be excused from grave sin, but not from venial sin. But if he does not know how to extricate himself from these questions, ordinarily it is to be presumed that he did not consent, or at least that full consent or perfect advertence was lacking in him, especially if he is of a timorous conscience.

Caius, a most innocent young man of sixteen years who is being educated in a certain Catholic college, one day comes upon an expurgated passage in a pagan author whom he studies. Thereupon, led by curiosity, he seeks another copy of the same book, in which he finds the complete passage. He reads it and finds described a fornication committed by a certain pagan god with a woman. Troubled and attracted by this reading, he thinks about the matter within himself and begins to suspect how human beings derive their origin, something of which he had previously been altogether ignorant. The young man, moreover, being exceedingly ingenuous, asks his teacher so that he may have certainty about the matter. The teacher consents, astonished at such innocence and suspecting that others in the class of about the same age are perhaps in the same state, and publicly explains to all of them the physiology of human generation. It is asked:

1. What is a bad thought, and what is required in order that someone may sin mortally by it?

2. Is thought about a bad thing sinful, and is anything to be noted particularly about thought concerning the matter of lust?

3. What is to be said about the manner of acting of Caius and of his teacher?

1. What is a bad thought and what is requisite for a mortal sin of thought? A bad thought is either a desire to do something bad, or morose delectation in something evil as represented in the mind. All bad thoughts can be reduced to those two classes. Under bad desires are placed all internal sins which tend toward the doing of some evil. Under morose delectation come all internal sins which are consummated in the mind, and which do not tend to the accomplishment of some evil outside the mind. For a mortal sin of thought the object must be gravely sinful, and there must be clear advertence to the grave malice and full consent to it.

2. Is the thought of an evil object sinful, and is there anything to be specially noted concerning thinking about sins of impurity ?

The thought of an evil object is not necessarily sinful. If, for example, I think about a brutal murder which has been committed, I do not thereby commit sin. I should commit sin if I thought of it with pleasure and approbation, gloating over the hideous details, or rejoicing in the murder because the murdered man was an enemy of my own. Although it is not sinful to think of an evil object in itself, yet sometimes there is danger in such a thought, because it tends to excite a sinful appetite. Thoughts of revenge are of this class, and still more so thoughts of impurity. A thought about impurity may be either no sin at all, or it may be a venial sin, or it may be mortal. A thought about impurity is no sin at all if there is good reason for entertaining the thought, as when a priest studies moral theology, and there is not proximate danger of consenting to it or to any evil motions which arise from the thought. Venial sin will be committed when there is no good reason for thinking of the bad object, and the danger of consenting to evil is not proximate. If this danger is proximate, mortal sin will be committed when the object is grievously sinful.

3. The case. Caius committed venial sin in indulging his curiosity, but as far as the case allows us to judge he does not seem to have committed mortal sin. After his curiosity was aroused the master acted rightly in briefly and clearly explaining to him the physiology of generation, but he should have told him not to think or talk about the matter with others, and he should have told him where the danger of sin lay. The master acted very imprudently in giving a public lecture on the subject in class; the few cases in which it would have done good had better have been treated privately. In other cases in all probability it would have done harm by needlessly directing attention to what should not be thought about except at the proper time, and by occasioning comment and talk about the matter among the boys, to their serious danger.