Article Three. On Internal Sins.

Internal sins against chastity are commonly signified by the name of impure thought; but in reality three are distinguished: a. impure thoughts; b. morose delectations; c. impure desires.

61. On impure thoughts. Thoughts are called impure, or rather imaginations, which represent a base matter. Thoughts of this kind are indifferent of themselves, but they contain a twofold dangerous efficacy: of exciting libido even to pollution, and of enticing to consent, namely so that the base thing itself pleases or the desire of perpetrating it arises. Concerning impure thought, insofar as it contains danger of provoking libidinous movements, the discussion is in this number; insofar as it contains danger of consent, the discussion is in the following number.

1. Moral malice. a. To admit impure thoughts from a libidinous affection or from the depraved end of enjoying venereal delectation, which they excite, is a grave sin; likewise to have complacency in the pleasure which thoughts of this kind, arising beyond the will, provoke.

b. To admit impure thoughts which do not stir much, from mere levity or idleness, or to linger over them, is a light sin, because they do not cast one into grave danger of sinning by consent to venereal delectation or of polluting oneself.

c. To admit impure thoughts which stir much, from mere levity or idleness, or to linger over them, ordinarily is a grave sin, because they bring proximate danger of consent to delectation and of pollution. Nevertheless, in order that these thoughts be a grave sin, it is required that advertence to the grave danger of sinning be present.

d. But to admit impure thoughts or to foster them from an honorable end is licit, even if they cause carnal movements, indeed even pollution itself, provided nevertheless that consent to delectation is excluded.

Where someone adverts that from an indecent thought he is carnally stirred, he is bound to repel it if he does not have a just cause of lingering over it; and where nevertheless he adheres to it lingeringly and for a longer time, he sins gravely on account of the proximate danger of consenting to delectation and of arriving at pollution. But if a just cause is present for continuing that thought, he ought to guard against consent to delectation at least through an act of displeasure.

2. Specific malice. Impure thoughts which are sinful insofar as they excite libidinous movements are not specifically diverse according to the diversity of the object represented, but all are of the same moral species: for all agree in this, that they excite libido; but the affection and complacency of the will are borne only toward this effect. Therefore it is not necessary that the object of the impure thought be declared: for it makes no difference whether venereal pleasure arises or is sought from this object or from another.

62. On morose delectations. Morose delectation signifies complacency concerning a base sin represented through thought and imagination, as if it were now being done, as if someone represents to himself base touches, pollution, fornication, sodomy, as if they were now being done either by himself or by another. Concerning it the question is how great and what kind of sin it is.

1. Morose delectation concerning a base thing is a sin of the same gravity and species as the base thing itself represented by thought and imagination: for an act of the will receives its theological and moral species from the object toward which it tends.

Voluntary delectation concerning a base touch on a male differs in species from delectation concerning a base touch on a female; likewise delectation concerning fornication differs in species from delectation concerning sodomy. As regards the gravity of the sin, each of these latter is grave; delectation concerning touch can be grave or light according to the nature of the touch.

2. Morose delectation does not contract the specific malice of circumstances which are contained in the base object, unless the will is delighted in the circumstances themselves: ordinarily the will, by abstracting from the circumstances, is delighted in the object alone.

a. It is a great question whether morose delectations receive specific malice also from the circumstances of the object concerning which the will is delighted: whether, for example, one who is morosely delighted concerning a base touch on a blood relative admits not only delectation concerning venereal touch on a female, but also concerning an incestuous touch; likewise whether an unmarried man who is morosely delighted concerning intercourse with a married woman commits not only delectation concerning fornication, but also concerning adultery.

Since in morose delectation abstraction is made from the execution of the evil thing, one can abstract, and ordinarily in reality one does abstract, from the circumstances of the object, which therefore do not pour back their malice into the delectation. Certainly delectation receives specific malice from the object insofar as the object pleases and delights; but the circumstances of the base object, that it is a blood relative, a married person, are not apt to delight. Therefore it can be said that the will is not delighted in them unless it is explicitly borne also toward the circumstances.

Therefore, although the object of morose delectation must be declared in confession, nevertheless it is not necessary that the circumstances of the object changing the species also be declared: for true probability cannot be denied to the opinion which denies that morose delectation puts on specific malice from the circumstances of the object, unless the will is delighted in those very circumstances.¹

b. Although simple delectation or complacency concerning a base action represented through thought and its inefficacious desire can be distinguished theoretically, nevertheless in the concrete an inefficacious desire is almost always joined with simple delectation. Therefore the faithful ordinarily do not know how to distinguish between morose delectation and base inefficacious desire. Likewise simple delectation concerning a base thing and venereal delectation concerning the same thing are in reality distinguished; but because simple delectation almost always excites venereal delectation, or venereal sense, the faithful do not sufficiently distinguish the latter from the former.

For confessors it follows from these things that the faithful who accuse themselves of impure thoughts must be asked whether they also desired something base. But if they deny it, it is not necessary that confessors be solicitous about the object of the base thought; it suffices that they ask whether they experienced delectations or base senses and consented to them. But if they affirm base desires, the office of the confessor of itself requires that he prudently and directly investigate their object and circumstances; nevertheless, because this investigation is frequently too arduous and renders confession burdensome, and because moreover the faithful do not sufficiently distinguish between thoughts and desires, there will often be cause for omitting that investigation.

¹ Cf. Lacroix, l. 6, pr. 2, n. 1028; Reuter, l. c., n. 209; Lehmkuhl I, n. 255 ff.

63. On impure desires. An impure desire is the will by which someone intends to complete a base thing. It is twofold: efficacious, when someone absolutely intends to complete the base thing; and inefficacious, when someone conditionally, if I could, intends to execute the base thing.

Even in an inefficacious desire there is of itself affection toward the base thing; wherefore the same theological and specific malice belongs to it as to an efficacious desire, and therefore it is not necessary in confession to declare whether the desire was efficacious or inefficacious.

1. Impure desires, whether absolute or conditioned, are sins of the same gravity and species as the external work which is wished for: for the internal act receives specific malice from the object toward which it tends.

That a depraved desire is a sin of the same gravity and species as the desired object is clear also from the words of the Lord: Everyone who sees a woman in order to desire her has already committed adultery with her in his heart.¹ What is said here concerning adultery must be said concerning any other base work: he who desires it has already performed it in his heart.

2. Impure desires take specific malice not only from the object, but also from all circumstances of the object apprehended: for since the depraved will is borne toward a determinate object, it is necessarily borne toward all things which are contained in that object, provided they are known.

Therefore the desire of fornicating with a blood relative is the sin of incest, and the desire of fornicating with a married woman is adultery, namely the same sin which would be committed if the desire were fulfilled. Hence one who confesses a base desire is bound of himself to declare its object and all circumstances of the object changing the species.

Whether it is licit to desire merely natural pollution.

a. Merely natural pollution is called that which occurs spontaneously and involuntarily, whether in dreams or in waking, from the abundance of semen by which nature tries to unload itself.

b. It is not licit to desire it on account of the venereal delectation which accompanies it; but it is licit to desire it from an honorable end, e.g. as a means of quieting temptation, of unloading nature: for the object of this desire is not evil and the end is good.

Pollution which arises naturally, i.e. through causes instituted by nature, is not evil in itself. There are those who say that pollution which occurs from a base dream or from movements and touches following sleep is evil, and therefore that it is illicit to desire it or to rejoice about it. Others, however, think that even pollution occurring in this way is indifferent, because the causes provoking it are natural, n. 34.

Whether it is licit for betrothed persons to rejoice concerning future intercourse. The desire of future intercourse to be had after marriage has been entered, and joy concerning it, is not a sin in betrothed persons, because its object is licit; nevertheless the matter is not without danger. For thought of intercourse to be had easily excites venereal sense; but joy and delectation concerning venereal sense in betrothed persons is as grave a sin as in the unmarried.

Note. Pious penitents who are importunately troubled by depraved images are not to be blamed or rebuked, but suitably instructed in this way: a. imaginations of this kind are not of themselves sins, but temptations excited by nature or by the devil; wherefore b. they are a cross to be borne patiently, by which the merit of good works is increased; and c. they are to be efficaciously fought by ejaculatory prayers interposed from time to time, but otherwise by contempt.

¹ Matt. 5, 28.