III. On the Morality of Human Acts

What is the division of the treatment of human acts in relation to the end? - We have spoken of human acts in relation to man, who through them orders himself to the ultimate end of human life, or beatitude. We must now speak of the same acts in order to the aforesaid end; or of the morality of those same acts. For the order of human acts to the common end of human life constitutes the moral order, or the morality of human acts. First, however, we must speak generally of morality itself; then of the various sources of this morality in human acts. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 21. a. 2 ad 2.

What is the generic and specific notion of the morality of human acts? - Moral is said from mos, which is a repeated mode of acting in free acts. Hence a moral act and a free, human, voluntary act are the same in reality, but not in notion. For morality adds to a free, human, voluntary act a relation or bearing toward the rule and norm directing it; and this norm, namely the supreme norm, is the end, the ultimate end of the whole of human life. Therefore human acts can be considered either generically, all of them, or specifically, these or those. If they are considered generically, insofar as they are human acts, they are capable of leading man to the end, namely to the ultimate end, in whose possession happiness and beatitude and his full perfection consist. For through them man orders and leads himself to the end. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 1. a. 1. 2; q. 2. a. 2.

If they are considered specifically as these or those acts, insofar as they are such acts, they actually order and lead, or do not, to the end, according as they are or are not conformed to the end. And thus, for example, knowledge of God, love of God, by their nature order and lead man to the end; ignorance of God, hatred of God, by their nature turn man away from and remove him from the end. If human acts are regarded in the first way, generally, they are called moral. If, in the second way, they are considered as constituted in a particular species, they are called morally good or evil, honorable or shameful. "Good and evil," says S. Th. 1. 2. q. 18. a. 5, "diversify the species in moral acts." Therefore morality constitutes the genus; goodness or malice the species.

What is the adequate nature of morality? - By morality is commonly understood the bearing of human acts toward their proper norm and rule, according to which they are ordered and directed. And thus also commonly, the genus being taken for the species, acts are distinguished as moral and immoral, to designate upright human acts and voluntary acts deficient from their proper rectitude. Now morality, according to its primary and fundamental concept, considered generically, can be defined as: the capacity which human actions have in themselves to be good or evil in order to the end of creation, that is, to be conformable or suitable, or not, for attaining this end; but considered specifically, it is the notion of conformity or deformity which human actions have in themselves in order to the end of creation, as means to the end, namely insofar as they are suitable or unsuitable to lead man, or not, to his end.

For by the morality of human acts is commonly understood the notion of rectitude or non-rectitude of those same human acts; and since human acts are means to the common end of human life, the end is the rule and measure of that rectitude or non-rectitude. "Rectitude of the will... is nothing other than the due order of the will to the ultimate end." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 5. a. 7; Ethic. l. 6, lect. 2.

Again, by morality is understood that acts are according to reason or apart from reason: now reason manifests this and dictates that this is to be followed in human acts, namely that the end of creation is to be attained by acts congruent and conformable to it. Likewise by moral goodness or malice is commonly understood that human acts are ordered to that end, are according to right reason ordering one's proper acts to the aforesaid end, or apart from this right reason. Hence the goodness of acts exists insofar as they are useful for man's end. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 7. a. 2, a. 4 ad 2. And consequently from that end, and from the object ordered or not ordered to that end, the human act is constituted in the species of a morally good act or a morally evil act. S. Thomas 2. 2. q. 153. a. 2.

According to its primary and fundamental concept; for proximately and formally that conformity or suitability, deformity or unsuitability, is only from law, which is manifested through right reason. For by the very fact that law commands something to be done or omitted, it formally and proximately constitutes that thing in the notion of a means in order to attaining the end, the use of such a means producing an obligation in conscience. Hence rightly S. Alph. 1. 5. n. 3. 4 says: "The moral goodness of a human act consists in a certain conformity and suitability of the free act with right reason and law." S. Th. q. 18. 19. 20; Suarez tr. 3. d. 1, d. 2. s. 1. 2, d. 3. s. 2. 3, d. 7. s. 1-6, d. 10, d. 11.

"In those things," says S. Th., "which are done through the will, the proximate rule is human reason, but the supreme rule is eternal law.... Every voluntary act is evil by the fact that it departs from the order of reason and of eternal law. Hence it follows that a human act, by the fact that it is good or evil, has the notion of rectitude or of sin." 1. 2. q. 21. a. 1. "The rule of the human will is twofold: one proximate and homogeneous, namely human reason; the other is the first rule, namely eternal law, which is, as it were, the reason of God." 1. 2. q. 71. a. 6. "It must be said," says S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 4, "that in all ordered causes, the effect depends more on the first cause than on the second cause, because the second cause acts only in virtue of the first cause.

But the fact that human reason is the rule of the human will, by which its goodness is measured, it has from eternal law, which is divine reason. Hence in Ps. 4 it is said: Many say, Who shows us good things? The light of thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us: as if he were saying: the light of reason which is in us can show us good things and regulate our will insofar as it is the light of thy countenance, that is, derived from thy countenance. Hence it is manifest that the goodness of the human will depends much more on eternal law than on human reason." On human reason.

For since eternal law is unknown to us according as it is in the divine mind, yet becomes known to us through natural reason, hence reason itself too is a rule and norm of human acts, and indeed the proximate one, as presenting immediately to the will good or evil according to eternal law. But this proximate rule is subjective, merely proposing the object; law is the proximate objective rule, constituting rectitude. But what is said of eternal law must be understood of any law whatever: since any law is an ordinance of reason, constituting the order and rectitude of human acts to the end; nor indeed are all human acts commanded or prohibited by eternal law itself.

Hence many human acts are commanded or prohibited only by positive law; and thus they are proximately and formally constituted in the notion of a necessary means to the end. Laws, "if indeed they are just, have the power of obliging in the forum of conscience from eternal law, from which they are derived, according to that saying of Prov. 8:15, By me kings reign and lawgivers decree just things." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 96. a. 4. - Lugo De Incarn. d. 5. n. 75; Less. De Perfect. divin. l. 13. c. 26; E. M. Wherefore "he who sins acts both against reason, and against human law, and against divine law." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 87. a. 1; and "that is licit which is prohibited by no law." S. Th. 4. D. 15. q. 2. a. 4. Wirceburg. c. 3. art. 3. 4. 5; E. M. 6. 69. 79.

Is the twofold assigned rule of morality universal? - The remote and fundamental norm of morality, namely man's ultimate end, embraces all human acts; otherwise it would no longer be the remote and fundamental rule of morality. The reason is evident, because all human acts are means to the end of the whole of human life. Yet not all have the same bearing toward this end; for some are ordered per se, namely by their intrinsic nature ordered to this end, as, for example, knowledge and love of God, love of neighbor, justice to be observed toward others, etc.; and these acts are called intrinsically good, and because they are good, namely intimately and necessarily consonant with the order of reason, therefore they are then commanded by the natural law. Others, on the contrary, are per se opposed, or by their intrinsic nature discordant from the common end of human life, as, for example, blasphemy, perjury, sacrilege, theft, etc.; and these acts are called intrinsically evil, and because they are evil, namely intimately and necessarily discordant from the order of reason, therefore they are then prohibited by the natural law. Finally there are acts which per se, or by their intrinsic nature, are not necessarily connected with the aforesaid end, and consequently with the order of reason, as, for example, to converse with a friend, to go into the country, etc.; and these acts are called intrinsically indifferent. Therefore by the necessity of attaining the end these acts neither must necessarily be placed, nor must necessarily be omitted; but if someone freely wishes to place them, he certainly must exercise them in such a way, by the very necessity of attaining the end, that he does not withdraw from the end, but always tends toward the end, since for this reason nature itself gave man the faculty of acting freely, that through free action he might lead himself to the end. Hence by the very fact that the act, namely the act in the concrete, is not opposed to the end, it is already at least in some way consonant with the end, and morally good. S. Th. 2. D. 40. q. 1. a. 5.

Likewise the proximate and formal rule, namely law, embraces all human acts: for it commands some, prohibits others; but those which it neither commands nor prohibits, but permits either positively or negatively, must, by the same commanding law, be performed in such a way that they are not opposed to the order and rectitude of reason; and thus acts of this kind are by that very fact morally good, since, if in effecting them the order of reason is observed, they are already suitable to reason, and morally good and honorable. E. M. 6. 69. 79.

You will resolve: 1. And from this it is clear what the order and rectitude of reason signifies, namely it imports the proportion of the means to the end, which reason does not make, but knows and proposes to the will. And thus A. D. says that moral good is that which is suitable to the order of reason; likewise honorable good, that which is suitable to the rectitude of reason. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 18. a. 8; q. 39. a. 2. The rectitude of human acts exists according as the human will is regulated by the divine will, S. Th. 1. p. q. 63. a. 1, or according as it has order to the end, 1. 2. q. 7. a. 2.

2. Therefore it must be concluded that those things are morally good or evil which are suitable to rational nature and to law, or unsuitable to it, in order to the ultimate end, to which the same nature is destined. Nor indeed is it necessary that they be informed by the motive of charity, or even that they be referred to God from a supernatural motive. E. M. 7. 54. 58. 69. 75. 79. - Likewise it must be concluded that it is wholly erroneous to assign as the supreme rule of human actions either human nature itself or even human reason itself, whose part is only to manifest the rule. For otherwise, if human reason itself were the rule of rectitude, it certainly could never decline from it. S. Th. 1. p. q. 63. a. 1.

Whether morality, or moral goodness or malice, is found only in the interior act of the will, or also in the exterior act? - Morality formally is only in the interior, free act of the will; materially, however, it is only also in the exterior act. For a twofold moral goodness or malice can be distinguished in the exterior act. First, the objective moral goodness or malice of the exterior act can be considered, which that act has of itself, namely from its proper object and circumstances, by which it is objectively affected, according to the right order of reason. Goodness or malice of this kind, which the exterior act has in itself because of due or undue matter and due or undue circumstances, is derived from reason, according as that object and those circumstances exhibit the rectitude of reason or a deviation from the right order of reason. This objective goodness or malice of the exterior act is prior to the goodness or malice of the act of the will. And thus the exterior act is the object of the will, insofar as it is proposed to the will by reason as a certain good apprehended and ordered by reason, or as departing from this order; and it causes moral goodness or malice in the will.

Second, moral goodness or malice can be considered in the exterior act in order to the end, according as this exterior act stands under the interior act of the will. For the end is the proper object of the will. And thus the notion of good or evil which the exterior act has from order to the end is found first in the act of the will, and is derived from it to the exterior act. Moreover, insofar as the exterior act consists in the execution of the work, it is an effect of the will and follows the will. The will is then compared to the exterior act as an efficient cause; hence the moral goodness or malice of the act of the will is the form of the exterior act, as existing in the acting cause, S. Th. 1. 2. q. 20. a. 1. Therefore "the goodness of the end redounds from the will into the exterior act, and the goodness of the matter and circumstances redounds into the act of the will," S. Th. 1. 2. q. 20. a. 3.

Now the exterior act and the interior act of the will, as they are considered in the genus of morals, are one human act, ib. If the human act is considered adequately in this way, the formal moral goodness or malice of the human act is intrinsically only in the interior act of the will, but in the exterior act only by extrinsic denomination. For the morality of a human act, formally considered, is found only in a free act, and freedom formally is only in the will. Likewise formal moral goodness is from order to the end, which is the proper object of the will, q. 20. a. 1. Hence it is clear that in the exterior act moral goodness of this kind, which is according to order to the end, depends wholly on the will, ib. a. 2.

But that "goodness of the exterior act which it has from matter and circumstances is other than the goodness which is from the end; it is not, however, other than the goodness of the will which it has from the very act willed, but is compared to it as its reason and cause," q. 20. a. 4 ad 2. This is confirmed, "for however much the exterior act may seem good in itself and conformable to reason, nevertheless if it is commanded by an evil internal act or depraved intention and election, it is not good insofar as it is a human act. Therefore this is a sign that in the notion of a human act it is good only by denomination from the interior act. A similar argument is this: because the exterior act precisely and taken in itself does not add formal moral goodness to a man, nor render him more virtuous. For if we understand someone who, thinking that he can execute the exterior act of virtue, has an efficacious will to exercise such an act, he is upright and virtuous, whether he can really execute it or not, because virtue does not depend on a faculty which can be lacking to us unwillingly, but on the will, supposing that the will is equal.... This doctrine concerning external acts proceeds in the same way in acts of the intellect and of the sensitive appetite." Suarez tr. 3. d. 10, s. 1. n. 6. 11. "What is clearer than that the will is reputed as the deed, where necessity excludes the deed?" S. Bernard Ep. 77; Gen. 22:16; Matt. 5:28. The will, namely a will efficacious of itself. E. M. 6. 71. 72.

Does the external act add morality in some way to the internal act? "It must be said first, that the exterior act of itself does not bear an increase of goodness or malice, if the other things are equal, in the interior act. Thus D. Th. 1. 2. q. 20. a. 4.... because the exterior act does not have a goodness distinct from the interior, and necessarily follows from it if it is in our power; but if it is not in our power, it does not diminish the goodness of the will.... Second, it must be said that external action is sometimes necessary for the goodness of the will, or for such goodness.... For when it is in man's power to execute an external action, he cannot have a perfect interior will unless he executes the exterior action, because the exterior act is the term and end of the interior, and because an absolutely perfect will is one that acts when it can.... Third, it must be said that accidentally the exterior act can increase goodness or malice simply.... For 1. because of the exterior act a man often endures and perseveres more in the interior act; indeed he often multiplies interior acts, and in this way it is morally worse to kill. 2. Because the exterior action itself both kindles the affection, and thus contributes to the interior act, in the way in which vocal prayer is accustomed to contribute to interior devotion. 3. External actions are useful for moderating the passions and habituating the body, so that it may more easily serve justice.... It must also be added that good external acts are useful for the effect of satisfaction for temporal punishment due for sin, because satisfaction is taken not only from goodness, but especially from the penal character of the act; but the exterior act of itself brings its own pain and sorrow. Finally it must be added that exterior acts are necessary for certain effects of grace, which are conferred either ex opere operato, or from a special privilege; such as are the effects of the sacraments and the effects of martyrdom, and any others that are similar, because, since these effects do not depend on the mind alone of the one acting, they have been promised to one exercising such a work not only in affection, but also in effect; and in the same way on the contrary, evil external acts, or even their effects, are necessary for incurring certain punishments or censures, which are not incurred by the internal act alone." Suarez tr. 3. d. 10. s. 2. n. 2. 3. 4. 6; Wirceburg. c. 3. a. 1; L. 1. 2. n. 42; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 13. a. 5 ad 1, q. 20. a. 5, 2. D. 40. a. 3; E. M. 71. 72.

Can the same exterior act be good and evil? - "It must be said that nothing prevents something from being one according as it is in one genus, and multiple according as it is referred to another genus.... And according to this nothing prevents some act from being one according as it is referred to the genus of nature, which nevertheless is not one according as it is referred to the genus of morals.... For continuous walking is one act according to the genus of nature; yet it can happen that there are many according to the genus of morals, if the will of the walker is changed, which is the principle of moral acts. Therefore if one act is taken as it is in the genus of morals, it is impossible that it be good and evil by moral goodness and malice; and yet if it is one by the unity of nature and not by the unity of morals, it can be good and evil." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 20. a. 6.

Are there indifferent human acts, that is, acts which are neither morally good nor morally evil, neither honorable nor shameful? - If human acts are considered in the abstract, or according to their species, which they have intrinsically from their proper object, abstraction being made from the end and from determining circumstances, then there certainly are indifferent acts, namely those which from their species are neither evil nor good, just as man considered in himself, or according to his species, is neither virtuous nor vicious. And the reason is that every object has some goodness or malice, at least natural; yet it does not always import moral goodness or malice, which is considered by comparison to the order, namely of reason. For not every object of a human act includes something pertaining to this order of reason: indeed not all actions are per se necessarily connected with the ultimate end, nor are all commanded or prohibited by law, but many are merely permitted, such as to walk, to go into the field, to lift a straw from the ground, and the like. Therefore such acts according to their species are indifferent. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 18. a. 8.

But if human acts are considered in the individual, or concretely, namely according as they are determined both by particular circumstances and by the end, the Scotists affirm that indifferent acts are given in the individual. The reason is that no certain law commands that they be directed to the ultimate end of human life, namely God, nor that one always act from a higher motive of honorableness and virtue; but, given human frailty and weakness, God himself permits man to act from this very weakness and frailty for the necessity and convenience of nature itself, as, for example, sometimes to eat more sumptuously, to arrange banquets, to be refreshed by the sight of the sky, the field, etc. Therefore these and other similar actions can be exercised from a merely indifferent end. And the same should be said of a greater good which is often omitted; this omission is neither good nor evil, but indifferent. From this, however, it follows that there are human acts which are not moral.

The Thomists, on the contrary, deny that there are indifferent acts in the individual, and more truly. The reason is that either someone does a thing necessary, useful, suitable to rational nature, namely to the soul, the body, or external things ordered to both; or he does a thing wholly useless and idle. If the first, this action tends to an end naturally good, and is good. If the second, he does a thing unsuitable to rational nature, as being at least superfluous; for reason dictates that entities are not to be multiplied without necessity, or utility, or some suitability. Besides, since it is proper to reason to direct and order to a due end human acts which are done from deliberation, either a human act is actually ordered to the due end, and has the notion of good, or it is not ordered to the due end, and then by this very fact it is opposed to right reason, and has the notion of evil. Certainly the indifferent will cannot pursue something indifferent, but good, either according to reason or according to sense. From this it follows that there are no human acts which are not at the same time moral. "For moral acts and human acts are the same." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 1. a. 3, 2. D. 40. q. 1. a. 5; Suarez tr. 3. d. 9. s. 3.

And from the reason adduced it is brilliantly clear that those indifferent acts of the Scotists are not really such, but are morally honorable; for if they are done because of necessity, utility, suitability, they are according to the order of reason, and consequently morally honorable. Indeed both to eat more sumptuously at times, and to arrange banquets, and to be refreshed in mind and body, are acts according to reason, if these things are kept within due limits. Therefore those acts are truly done from the motive of honorableness and virtue, although they are done from natural frailty, necessity, utility, suitability: since honorableness and virtue consist in this, that the rectitude of reason be preserved. They are moreover also ordered to God, at least implicitly, although not explicitly, as we shall explain more shortly, since by the very fact that they are according to reason and good, they are referred to God by their own nature. Therefore the omission also of a greater good, which takes place because of the good work which someone does, with no evil circumstance mixed with it, is not evil, nor is it indifferent; but good. "And he who joins his virgin in marriage does well; and he who does not join her does better." 1 Cor. 7:38. Good, namely if someone, acting well, adverts to the aforesaid omission; otherwise it is neither a human act nor moral, consequently. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 18. a. 9, q. 24. a. 2, q. 39. a. 2, 2. 2. q. 23. a. 3, q. 141. a. 6 ad 2, q. 145. a. 1. 3, q. 168. a. 3 ad 3, q. 169. a. 1 ad 1, S. q. 49. a. 2 ad 6; L. tr. De Act. hum. XLI seq.; Wirceburg. c. 3. a. 2; E. M.

Is it necessary for the moral goodness of human acts to direct all actions to the glory of God; and do human acts, insofar as they are good or evil, have the notion of merit or demerit before God? - R. To the 1st: The more common and truer opinion affirms it. The reason is most clearly evident from what has been said; since every moral action, in order that it be good, must tend to the ultimate end and be ordered to it by reason. But if a human action tends and is ordered to the ultimate end, it is already directed to the glory of God. Therefore it is as necessary to direct all actions to the glory of God as it is necessary for them to be morally good. "The goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end: but the ultimate end of the human will is the highest good, which is God. Therefore it is required for the goodness of the human will that it be ordered to the highest good." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 9. "The whole that man is, and what he can and has, must be ordered to God." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 22. a. 4 ad 3. - 1 Cor. 10:31.

Hence it is enough to direct them to God virtually on the part of the work, or by the very act exercised, namely by acting for the end of some virtue, or for what is honorable and consonant with rational nature; for such an act tends to the glory of God from its intrinsic nature. To the point S. Th. 1. 2. q. 8. a. 3 ad 2: "Whenever someone wills those things which are for the end, he wills the end by the same act; but not conversely." And q. 21. a. 4: "He who does an evil act not referable to God does not preserve the honor of God which is due to the ultimate end." Cajetan on the same q. 8. a. 3: "one who always seeks what is for the end seeks the end, not habitually, but actually, as actually extends itself to virtually. For virtually to use something is within the breadth of actual use; otherwise that precept would never be fulfilled: Do all things for the glory of God; for to do imports to operate actually."

Much more, moreover, is it enough to direct all actions to God virtually on the part of the one operating himself, who by an act of charity has ordered his whole life to God and remains in habitual charity. Cajetan says this on 1. 2. q. 8. a. 3: "Between the movement of the will toward something habitually and actually, there is the middle movement of the will toward it virtually.... For when one having charity sins venially, he indeed habitually loves God, but not actually, as is clear, nor virtually, because sin is not directable to God. But when one having charity walks or preaches, and whatever else he does not do evilly, although he does not actually think of God, nevertheless that act is not only an act of such virtue, but of charity, and the will then is borne virtually toward God, and not only habitually, which belongs to one sleeping and to one sinning venially." S. Th. 2. D. 10. q. 1, a. 5; E. M.

R. To the 2nd: A human act has the notion of laudable or blameworthy, or of fault, from the fact that it is from the power of free will: "For to be praised or blamed is nothing other than to impute to someone the malice or goodness of his act." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 21. a. 2. It has the notion of good or evil from the fact that it is suitable or unsuitable to right reason. It has the notion of rectitude from the fact that it has order to the end. It has the notion of honorable or of sin from the fact that it is conformable or deformable to law. Finally it has the notion of merit or demerit according to the retribution of justice toward another, from the fact that it is performed in service of another. Retribution is made to someone from the fact that he acts for the advancement or harm of another. By giving something from those things which are in our dominion, we acquire for ourselves a certain right to receive something from another's. S. Th. De Verit. q. 29. a. 6. Therefore from the fact that a human act is referred to God as to the ultimate end, and consequently promotes his honor and glory, and God is the governor and ruler of the whole universe, to whom it belongs to make retribution for those things which are done well or badly in it, human acts have before God the notion of natural merit or demerit. For a human act considered precisely according to its moral goodness, in the present order of divine providence, is not formally meritorious of grace and eternal life; for grace is necessary for supernatural merit, by which it is elevated to a supernatural condition. Materially, however, such an act is capable of becoming meritorious of supernatural reward, presupposing divine ordination and grace being added. For if these are removed, there is had only natural merit toward a merely natural reward, from the fact that good works yield to God's service. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 5. a. 7, q. 21. a. 2. 3. 4, q. 114. a. 1. 2; Wirceburg. c. 3. a. 3; E. M. 75. 89.