Fear

The evil motions of anger, impurity, rash judgement which precede all advertence and deliberation of the mind, cannot of course be sinful, as they are not voluntary. They become sinful when consent is yielded to them after advertence to their malice. The question is discussed among theologians, whether it be sinful, and in what degree, to remain neutral under an evil motion of concupiscence, neither giving consent to it nor positively resisting it. If the question is raised concerning a vehement temptation to impurity, it may reasonably be denied that it is ordinarily possible to remain neutral; the danger of consenting would be too great. In such a case there will usually be a grave obligation to resist positively for fear of being drawn into giving consent. Positive resistance does not mean direct and physical effort, which would be worse than useless; but it means that we must, under temptation, avert our minds from the evil suggestion and occupy them with other thoughts. If, however, the question be put, whether sin is committed by remaining neutral under temptation to evil, not deliberating about committing it, but simply neither consenting to it nor rejecting it, the correct answer would seem to be that a venial but not a mortal sin is thereby mortally sinful only venial. The struggle against vice is more difficult for those who are subject to such propensities, but as long as they are in their right senses with the help of God’s grace they can resist, if only they take the necessary means. The same must be said of those who have strengthened their passions and weakened their will by long indulgence in a habit of sin. V. Frins, De Act. Hum. 1, n. 236. ‘“‘ ' There is not, and there never has been, a person who labours under partial delusion only, and is not in other respects insane.” C. Mercier, Criminal Responsibility, 1905, p. 174.

However, on p. 203 the same author writes: ‘‘ The majority of insane persons are sane in a considerable proportion of their conduct; and when in this part of their conduct they commit offences they are rightly punishable.” Perhaps the explanation of this apparent contradiction lies in a sentence which immediately follows the last. It is this: “‘ Since the limits between the sane and the insane areas of conduct of insane persons are ill defined, no insane person should be punished with the same severity that would be awarded to a sane person for the same offence.” committed. There is some sin, because we are commanded to rule the lower appetites and keep them in subjection to reason, which is not done in the case supposed. But the sin cannot be mortal, for there is no consent of the will, by which alone mortal sin can be committed. This is the teaching of St Thomas and of St Alphonsus.¹

¹ Theol. Mor. 5, n. 6.

Fear is defined to be a perturbation of the mind on account of some present or future danger.

It is grave or slight in proportion as the danger is serious or not serious. Absolutely grave fear is such as will seriously affect an ordinarily constant man, as the fear of death, of perpetual imprisonment, or of loss of goods; relatively grave is such as will seriously affect anyone of timid disposition.

Reverential fear is that which a subject feels lest he should offend his superior. Ordinarily, divines rank it as slight fear, but it may become grave if, for example, a very austere father threaten his daughter with loss of home or with his perpetual displeasure.

Fear from without is the result of some external danger, which may arise either from a necessary cause, as, e.g., from the danger of shipwreck; or it may be threatening from a free agent. Fear from within is from an internal cause, as the fear of death from a disease which has been contracted.

The actions which are done out of fear are simply voluntary, but they are usually also involuntary under a certain respect.

There is no question here of actions which are done in fear or with fear, as when I walk with fear and trembling along a lonely road by night. We are concerned with the effect which fear has on human actions done in consequence of fear; and unless it deprives the agent of the use of reason, which in rare cases may happen, the action remains voluntary, because it is done freely and deliberately to avoid the threatened danger. In such circumstances, as we saw above, the action is said to be simply voluntary; but it is also involuntary under a certain respect, for, unless the danger threatened, the action would not be done. An exception must be made with regard to attrition elicited from fear of hell, which, if it is to be efficacious, must be simply voluntary and in no respect involuntary,¹ for otherwise it would not help to justify the sinner in the sacrament of Penance.² We can easily see how this is possible with regard to sin. For other actions done through fear have some evil or loss annexed to them, on which account they are involuntary under some respect; while aversion from sin is wholly good and reasonable, and so there is no reason why repentance for sin from fear of hell should not be simply voluntary and in no respect involuntary.”

¹ St.Alphonsus, 6, n. 442.

² Trent, sess. 14, c. 4.

Inasmuch as bad actions done through fear are simply voluntary, it would follow that they are imputable to the agent, so that fear does not excuse him from sin. And this is true of such actions as are intrinsically bad and against the natural law. The Church has always considered those to be apostates who through fear of death or persecution deny their faith, though less culpable than those who renounce it without excuse (Can. 2205).

However, with regard to positive precepts, grave fear ordinarily excuses transgressors of them from sin. The reason is, because the legislator is not presumed to desire that his laws should bind when their observance would entail such grave consequences to his subjects. Divines, relying on what we read in Holy Scripture, teach this doctrine concerning the positive law of God, and it will be all the more true of positive human legislation.¹ But if non-observance of a law or a command of a superior would cause great damage to the common good, then the law or command must be obeyed, even with loss of life; for private advantage must yield to the requirements of the common weal. And so a soldier must stick to his post in war, even at the risk of life.

¹ St Thomas, 3, q. 40, a. 4, ad 3; 1-2, q. 100, a. 8, ad 4; Suarez, De Leg. 3, c. 30, n. 6; Can. 2205, sec. 2.

Violence is the onset of force too great to be resisted, and fear is a perturbation of mind arising from present or future danger. Here we treat of fear caused by extrinsic violence, inasmuch as it is a diriment impediment of marriage.

When marriage is contracted through grave fear, caused unjustly by a free agent with a view to extorting marriage, ecclesiastical law makes it null and void. Whether such a marriage is invalid by natural law is a moot point among Doctors. Fear may, indeed, sometimes be so excessive that it takes away the use of reason, so that a man under its influence does not know what he is doing. If a man married under the influence of such terror, the marriage would of course be invalid for want of consent. But commonly even grave fear does not produce such effects; a man in danger of shipwreck or death knows as a rule what he is doing, and if he marries in such circumstances, though induced by fear to do so, the marriage will be valid. But when he is unjustly forced by someone to marry against his will, the injury done to him is a sufficient reason for the Church to make the marriage null and void, even though he knew what he was doing and consented to the marriage. The only difference between this case and the former lies in the injury inflicted by the fear caused by a free agent. This however, does not seem sufficient ground for asserting the nullity of the contract by natural law, though it affords a just reason why positive law should make it invalid. The better opinion, then, seems to be that grave fear is a diriment impediment of marriage by ecclesiastical law when the fear is caused unjustly by someone with a view to compelling the party to marry against his will. Hence, if one who had violated a woman was threatened with a beating and married her in order to escape it, the marriage would be valid. Fear arising from reverence for parents and superiors is in general not sufficiently serious to make marriage contracted under its influence null and void. In certain circumstances, however, such a fear may become grave and sufficient to annul marriage. Much depends on the character of the party who was influenced by fear and on the means employed to compel acquiescence to the wishes of harsh and severe parents or guardians. The question as to whether in any particular case there was grave fear is a question of fact to be determined by the ecclesiastical judge after weighing all the circumstances of the case (Can. 1087).

Although marriage has beer contracted under the influence of grave fear sufficient to render it invalid, the marriage may afterward become valid if fear disappears, and the party who was under its influence freely cohabits with the other and expresses matrimonial consent. In this case it will not be necessary to repeat the external solemnization of the marriage unless the impediment was publicly known. It will be sufficient if the parties manifest their consent to be man and wile privately when freed from the influence of grave fear.

As may be gathered from what has already been said, slight fear, such as any ordinarily constituted person can despise, does not invalidate marriage, even when it is caused unjustly with a view to extort marriage.

III. Enumeration of the passions. Eleven are enumerated, namely:

1. On the part of the concupiscible appetite:

a) Love, which is the complacency of the concupiscible appetite in sensible good, abstracting from its absence and presence (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 26, aa. 1 and 2).

b) Desire, which is the motion of the concupiscible appetite tending toward an absent sensible good (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 30, a. 2).

c) Joy, which is the complacency or rest of the concupiscible appetite in an attained sensible good (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 31, a. 1).

Each is clarified by these words of St. Thomas: "The first change of the appetite by the appetible is called love, which is nothing other than complacency in the appetible; and from this complacency there follows motion toward the appetible, which is desire; and finally rest, which is joy" (I-II, q. 26, a. 2).

d) Hatred, which is the motion of the concupiscible appetite by which it turns away from sensible evil, abstracting from its absence and presence (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 30, a. 1).

e) Flight, which is the motion of the concupiscible appetite by which it turns away from an absent sensible evil (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 30, a. 2, ad 3).

f) Sadness, which is the motion of the concupiscible appetite by which it turns away from sensible evil that is present or joined to it (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 35, aa. 1-3).

2. On the part of the irascible appetite:

a) Hope, which is the motion of the irascible appetite by which it tends toward a future sensible good that is arduous and possible to attain. "Concerning the object of hope," says Aquinas, "four conditions are considered. First, indeed, that it be good; and by this hope differs from fear, which concerns evil. Second, that it be future; for hope does not concern a present thing already had, and by this hope differs from joy, which concerns a present good. Third, it is required that it be something arduous, attainable with difficulty; for someone is not said to hope for something minimal which is immediately in his power to have, and by this hope differs from desire, which concerns future good absolutely. Fourth, that that arduous thing be possible to attain; for no one hopes for that which he cannot attain at all" (I-II, q. 40, a. 1).

b) Despair is the motion of the irascible appetite by which it turns away from an arduous sensible good which seems impossible to attain. "Now the object of hope, which is an arduous good, has the character of something attractive insofar as it is considered with the possibility of attaining it; but insofar as it is considered with the impossibility of obtaining it, it has the character of something repulsive; and thus despair regards this object, whence it implies a motion of a certain withdrawal; and for this reason it is contrary to hope, as withdrawal is contrary to approach" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 40, a. 4).

c) Daring is the motion of the irascible appetite by which it rises up against a terrible sensible evil in order to overcome it. Now daring follows upon hope. For from the fact that someone hopes to overcome the terrible thing threatening him, from this he boldly pursues it (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 45, a. 2).

d) Fear is the motion of the irascible appetite by which it is cast down because of a sensible evil that is arduous, threatening, and scarcely possible to overcome. It is called threatening, for on the one hand it does not concern present evil, but future evil, in which respect it differs from sadness (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 42, a. 3, ad 2); on the other hand, it does not concern a remote and distant future evil: "for because of its distance we imagine this as not going to happen, and therefore we either do not fear it or fear it little. For as the Philosopher says in Rhetoric II, chapter 5, number 1, things very far away are not feared; for all know that they will die, but because it is not near, they care nothing" (St. Thomas, same place, a. 2).

e) Anger is the motion of the irascible appetite by which it seeks vengeance against something harmful, because of harm inflicted. "For whoever is angry seeks to be avenged against someone, and thus the motion of anger tends toward two things: namely, toward the vengeance itself, which it desires and hopes for as a certain good, whence it is also delighted in it; it tends also toward the one against whom it seeks vengeance, as toward something contrary and harmful, which pertains to the character of evil" (St. Thomas, same place).

No passion is opposed to anger. "The Philosopher says in his Rhetoric, book 2, chapter 3, number 1, that becoming mild is opposed to being angry; and this is not a contrary opposite, but a negative or privative one" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 45, a. 2).

Love is the cause of all passions, for "there is no other passion which does not presuppose some love. The reason for this is that every other passion of the soul implies motion toward something or rest in something. But every motion toward something, or rest in something, proceeds from some connaturality or fittingness, which pertains to the character of love" (I-II, q. 27, a. 4).

I. Notion. Fear is here understood as any motion whatever of the irascible appetite following upon the apprehension of a present or future evil.

II. Division. Fear is divided:

1. By reason of intensity, into grave and light, according as the motion is grave or light.

2. By reason of influence on the act, into antecedent and concomitant, according as the act is placed from it or only with it. A traveler from fear hands over money to one lying in ambush; with fear he passes through unsafe places.

III. Influence on the free. Fear generally does not remove the free character of a work placed from fear; nevertheless, if one acts from fear alone, it causes the involuntary in a qualified sense, or lessens the voluntary. The reason for the former is that fear generally does not wholly disturb judgment. The reason for the latter is that what proceeds from fear alone is done with some repugnance and therefore is chosen by the will with lesser affection (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 6, a. 6; St. Alphonsus, V, XXI).

Note. To what extent fear of harm excuses from observing a positive law will be explained elsewhere. For that is not to be sought from the passion of fear, but from the gravity of the evil which threatens, and which, from the reasonable will of the legislator, one generally is not bound to undergo.

IV. Practical question. Having set forth the influence of the passions on liberty, we add a sufficiently practical question: namely, whether there is an obligation of positively resisting the passions, or whether it suffices to behave negatively, that is, not to consent. Concerning this, note:

1. Temptation to sin ordinarily proceeds thus:

a) In the imagination there occurs the image of a delectable thing, which is followed by a motion of the sensitive appetite, or a sense of delight. This motion in itself is indifferent.

b) The intellect adverts to the motion, first as delectable, then as moving toward an evil act.

c) The will either positively consents, whether to the evil act or only to the sense of delight; or positively resists the motion; or behaves negatively toward the motion. Positive resistance can be made directly or indirectly: directly, for instance, by attacking the motion either through a contrary act or through an act of simple displeasure; indirectly, for example, by praying, thinking about other things, performing an external work, etc.

2. The question regards all passions, that is, all motions of the sensitive appetite which tend toward an illicit object. Now one who behaves negatively toward sensual motions:

a) Generally sins by not resisting. The reason is that generally there is danger of consenting. Namely, when the soul according to the sensitive part has been moved toward an illicit object, the will easily freely embraces that same object unless the disordered motion is positively resisted.

b) Sins gravely if the sensitive appetite is borne toward an object gravely evil, and, unless it is resisted, the danger of consenting is grave. Otherwise he sins only lightly. Now the danger of consenting is especially grave when the matter concerns a venereal and vehement motion, as will be said more fully in the treatise on chastity (St. Alphonsus, V, 6-9; Homo Apostolicus, tract III, nn. 41, 42, 44). Besides, note that indirect resistance is often practically to be preferred to direct resistance, especially if the motions of the sensitive appetite toward illicit things are lighter, more frequent, or longer-lasting.

I. Requisites on the part of the one vowing. There are required a will to bind oneself, sufficient knowledge of the thing promised or of the object of the vow, and perfect liberty.

1. A will to bind oneself, at least implicit; for this belongs to the essence of a vow. When the aforesaid will is lacking, there is a mere proposal (St. Thomas, In IV Sent., dist. 38, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 1, ad 2; St. Alphonsus, III, 201).

Corollary I. One who is ignorant of the obligation of a vow vows invalidly, because he lacks the will to bind himself; for the will is not borne toward what is unknown. Except one who wills to vow as others are accustomed to do, even if he merely is ignorant that an obligation arises; for he has an implicit will to bind himself (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

Corollary II. One who wills to vow, but positively excludes the obligation, does not vow; for although the obligation itself is the effect of a vow, nevertheless he who positively excludes the obligation does not have the mind, not even implicitly, of binding himself (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

2. Sufficient knowledge of the thing promised or of the object of the vow; namely, distinct knowledge is not required, but vague knowledge suffices; yet this, if distinct knowledge is lacking, is required per se. I said:

a) Distinct knowledge is not required, but vague knowledge suffices. The reason is that vague knowledge suffices for the one vowing to consent to the object, that is, to those things by which the object is constituted. Hence, for example, a vow of chastity is valid when the one vowing knows that by this vow carnal pleasures are renounced, although he is ignorant of precisely what these pleasures consist in; likewise even if he is ignorant of the "mysteries of life," as they are called.

b) Vague knowledge, if distinct knowledge is lacking, is required per se; for, when this too is lacking, the one vowing does not consent to the object, since it is in no way known. It is said per se, because even vague knowledge does not seem to be required if the one vowing expressly intends to vow what others vow; for then he implicitly consents to the object. Hence one who, for example, in vowing chastity, expressly intends to vow what is vowed by others seems to vow validly, even if he is ignorant, for example, that by a vow of chastity carnal pleasures are renounced. But a defect even of vague knowledge seems almost hypothetical.

Corollary I. Error obstructs validity if it concerns the substantial elements of the thing promised, that is, whether its substance,¹ or the final cause,² or a circumstance which notably changes the substance.³ The reason is that, while error concerning substantial elements remains, consent to the substance is lacking. That a circumstance which notably changes the thing also must be referred to the substantial elements follows from the fact that in this case, according to common estimation, there is a substance or thing morally diverse (St. Alphonsus, III, 198).

Corollary II. Error does not obstruct validity if it concerns either circumstances of lesser moment,⁴ or the impulsive cause.⁵ The reason is that consent to the substance of the thing promised is not lacking. And this holds even if the error gave occasion to the vow;⁶ for the question is not what someone would have done, but what he did. But the fact that, once the error was removed, he would not have consented, does not prevent the fact that he consented (St. Alphonsus, III, 198).

Corollary III. Religious vows, no less than other vows, are void because of error concerning substantial elements, because the reason given above, being drawn from the nature of the thing, must hold here too. Nevertheless, in practice, the said vows will scarcely be void except because of error concerning the very substance of the vows, because, when that error is lacking, error generally will not be such as to constitute a morally diverse object.

3. Perfect liberty, that is, such as is required for sinning gravely; for only an act fully human or fully deliberated suffices for undertaking an obligation (St. Alphonsus, III, 196). Hence vows are invalid when made before the age of discretion, or by one semi-insane, semi-drunk, semi-asleep, or arising from fear which so disturbs the use of reason that full deliberation is impeded. But vows emitted in fervor of devotion are valid, and generally also those which are emitted from sudden passion or levity of mind, because sufficient deliberation generally is present.

Fear which does not impede full deliberation influences a vow in this way:

a) The following do not obstruct validity: 1. grave fear (a fortiori light fear) struck from within, that is, by a cause that is not free; hence a vow emitted in danger of shipwreck is valid; 2. grave fear (a fortiori light fear) justly struck. The reason is that in each case, on the one hand, full deliberation is supposed, and on the other hand no injury has been done to the one vowing, so that no reason exists why the vow would be invalid; 3. grave fear (a fortiori light fear) unjustly struck, but not for extorting a vow, does not obstruct validity; hence a vow emitted so that God may rescue you from the hands of robbers is valid. The reason is that, in relation to the vow, no injury is inflicted on you (St. Alphonsus, III, 197).

b) At least by canon law, grave fear struck from without, unjustly, and for extorting a vow, obstructs validity (can. 1307, § 2). It is disputed whether such fear also by natural law impedes the validity of a vow. Some affirm, and they extend this also to light fear, because God does not accept a vow of this kind, lest He give force to unjust compulsion. Others deny, because, in their opinion, a sufficiently solid reason cannot be alleged why God would not accept a fully deliberated act (cf. St. Alphonsus, cited place).

¹ For example, someone vows a thing of his own which he judges to be glass, when it is a gem.

² Someone vows a Mass for the health of his father, when he is dead.

³ Someone vows a pilgrimage which he judges to be three leagues, when it is six leagues.

⁴ Someone vows a pilgrimage which he judges to be three leagues; but it is three and a half leagues.

⁵ Someone vows alms to be given to poor Peter, whom he judges to be religious, when he is irreligious.

⁶ Suppose that in the cases set forth under 4 and 5, had the error been absent, he would not have vowed the pilgrimage or the alms.

III. Requisites for validity. For validity some things are required on the part of the one swearing, others on the part of the matter.

1. On the part of the one swearing, almost the same things are required as on the part of the one vowing for the validity of a vow (n. 642). It suffices to add these things:

a) For the validity of a confirmatory oath there is required either a pre-existing obligation, or the intention of actually promising something either to God (a vow) or to man. For the validity of an oath standing by itself these things are not required.

It is disputed whether or not for a promissory oath there is necessarily required an intention of obliging oneself by force of the oath. But it seems this must be denied, because for the substance of a promissory oath there is required only the intention of invoking God to give assurance concerning one's own future action (n. 682), not however the intention of obliging oneself by force of that invocation, although that obligation follows as a necessary effect.

b) Fear does not obstruct validity according to these words of can. 1317, § 2: "An oath extorted by force or grave fear is valid, but can be relaxed by an ecclesiastical superior" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 89, a. 7, ad 3; St. Alphonsus, III, 174).

2. On the part of the matter it is required that it be honorable, not illicit or idle. The reason is that divine authority cannot be the bond of an inequitable or vain thing (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 89, a. 3, and a. 9, ad 3; St. Alphonsus, III, 176).

Corollary I. Oaths of parents to punish their children are commonly invalid or at least do not oblige, either because they were about a useless matter, or rather about disordered vengeance, or because the delinquents have already been corrected or have promised amendment (St. Alphonsus, III, 186). Likewise oaths of merchants not to sell for less or not to buy for more, even if they are made seriously, commonly do not have force, because ordinarily they are about a useless matter.

Corollary II. An oath of fidelity to a political Constitution which contains some things contrary to divine or ecclesiastical law is valid insofar as it is restricted to licit things. It is licit if that restriction is expressly added (namely by adding these or similar words: "saving divine and ecclesiastical laws"), or, as happens today, is drawn from usage.¹ Likewise valid and licit is an oath of fidelity to a usurping Prince, when he peacefully possesses the kingdom (St. Alphonsus, I, 94; II, 74).

Corollary III. An oath emitted by a cleric to remain in the diocese and not to enter Religion is valid, because it regards a thing owed by force of the promise made together with the oath, and confirmed by the oath itself.

Corollary IV. An oath concerning matter partly impossible or inept has force and obliges as to the other part, if the matter is divisible by its nature and also intended divisively. Hence, for example, a prodigal sworn promise (or not sworn) can have force in part.

¹ Cf. Brief of Pius VI Charitas, April 13, 1791; Sacred Penitentiary, December 1, 1866 (Acta Sanctae Sedis 1866, p. 675).

I. Notion. Fear is a trepidation of mind on account of a present or future danger.¹

¹ Thus Roman Law, L. 1, ff. Quod metus causa, IV, 2.

I. The notion of betrothals. Betrothals¹ are the mutual promise of matrimony between one man and one woman who are capable. It is said:

1. A promise. Therefore a desire, a mere purpose, or a simple negotiation about entering matrimony does not suffice.

2. Mutual. Therefore it is not sufficient that only one party promise, even if the other accepts the promise; but a counter-promise also is required (canon 1017, § 1). As is clear from what has been said, betrothals constitute a contract, and indeed an onerous one; hence for them, as for every contract of this kind, consent is required:

a) Internal. If it is not internal, consent or volition is lacking in reality. Therefore a fictitious promise does not suffice, that is, one made externally but without the mind of promising. One who wishes to enter betrothals, but has the mind of not binding himself, seems not to enter betrothals, because he excludes that without which the contract cannot exist (cf. vol. I, n. 834). But one who wishes to enter betrothals acts validly, even if he has the mind of not fulfilling the obligation (cf. ibid.). In addition, one who has promised fictitiously is guilty of fraud, and therefore is bound to prevent or compensate the damage; even, if this cannot be done in another way, by now promising truly (St. Alphonsus VI, 832, 833).

b) Fully deliberate; for only an act of this kind can produce an obligation and the acquisition of a right. Hence betrothals entered, for example, in drunkenness, by one half-insane, are invalid; likewise betrothals made from a sudden movement of passion can be invalid (St. Alphonsus VI, 831).

c) Sufficiently free from error; wherefore it is enough to note:

α) Error concerning the person with whom betrothals are entered renders these betrothals invalid. The reason is that in betrothals the person constitutes the object of the contract. But error concerning the object of a contract invalidates the contract (vol. I, n. 836).

β) For the same reason, error concerning a quality or circumstances of the person with whom betrothals are entered renders these betrothals invalid if the error redounds into error concerning the person. Otherwise it does not invalidate them, because consent to the object of the contract is not lacking; nevertheless it renders them rescindable if, had the error not existed, the betrothals would not have been entered; practically, if the error concerns a notable defect. These things indeed do not of themselves hold for all onerous contracts, but with regard to betrothals they are admitted in law, as will be explained later (St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, tr. 18, n. 2).

d) Sufficiently free from fear. Fear which so disturbs the use of reason that the act is not fully deliberate invalidates betrothals (vol. I, n. 840). These things set aside:

α) Fear, whether arising from within, or from a necessary cause, or inflicted justly or unjustly by a free cause, does not invalidate betrothals. The reason is that fear does not prevent the contracting party from furnishing perfect consent. But every contract is intrinsically constituted by perfect consent (St. Alphonsus VI, 844; cf. vol. I, n. 840).

Objection. Grave fear, inflicted unjustly and for extorting consent, invalidates betrothals at least by canon law, just as it invalidates matrimony (canon 1087, § 1), according to that rule: connected things ought to have the same reckoning.

Response. The assertion seems to have to be denied; for since the application of the assigned rule is in itself rather difficult, the Code certainly, if it had wished the rule to be applied, would have stated that betrothals are invalidated by the said fear in the same way as matrimony.

β) Fear renders betrothals rescindable if it has been inflicted both unjustly and by the other contracting party, and has given cause to the contract. If one of the assigned conditions is lacking, fear does not render betrothals rescindable (vol. I, n. 840).

e) External, namely insofar as it must be made known to the other party. Of itself, however, it is indifferent whether it is manifested by words, in writing, or by a sign, for example by a nod. But, with positive law considered, it is required that the legitimate form, to be explained later, be observed (St. Alphonsus VI, 838).

f) Made known to the other party, as was explained in vol. I, n. 834.

g) Made known by the promisor or in his name (vol. I, ibid.).

h) Simultaneous, the one with the other, because otherwise they do not truly agree into one. Of itself, however, it suffices that one consent while the consent previously given by the other persists (vol. I, n. 834).

3. Of matrimony; others say of future matrimony, so that betrothals may be more expressly distinguished from matrimony not yet consummated, which formerly came under the name of betrothals concerning the present, while betrothals properly so called were called betrothals concerning the future.

4. Between one man and one woman. Hence there would not be betrothals if someone promised matrimony to two at the same time.

5. Capable, that is, it is required that the promisors be both actually capable of promising matrimony and at least later capable of contracting it; these things, however, need explanation, which we shall add in the corollaries.

¹ Betrothals are so called from promising, namely from the practice of the Romans, by which one who wished to take a girl as wife addressed her father or guardian with the solemn formula: "Do you promise?" and he responded: "I promise." She who was promised was the bride, that is, the promised one; he to whom she was promised was the bridegroom; he who promised was the sponsor; the whole contract was betrothals; the day on which it was entered was called sponsal.

V. Sufficiently free from force and fear. Concerning this canon 1087 says: "Matrimony entered by reason of force or grave fear inflicted from without and unjustly, from which, in order that one may free himself, he is compelled to choose matrimony, is also invalid. No other fear, even if it gives cause to the contract, carries with it the nullity of matrimony." Therefore:

1. Absolute force renders matrimony invalid; since in the case the external act is posited under physical coercion, with the mind resisting completely, consent of the will is lacking. With regard to force or violence in a qualified sense (vol. I, n. 28), the things said about the full deliberation required, and the things to be said about fear, suffice.

2. With regard to fear,¹ these things hold:

a) Grave fear, inflicted from without and unjustly, from which, in order that one may free himself, he is compelled to choose matrimony, dirimently impedes this matrimony (canon 1087, § 1), at least by canon law. It is said:

α) Grave fear; either absolutely or relatively to the person on whom the fear has been inflicted. It makes no difference whether someone fears a grave evil for himself or for those intimately joined to him.

β) Inflicted from without; that is, by a free cause. Hence, for example, a matrimony entered from fear lest life otherwise be hard would be valid.

γ) Inflicted unjustly. Now fear is certainly inflicted unjustly if someone uses an unjust means, or by an unjust means extorts matrimony whether owed or not owed, or, as others state the same thing, if the one inflicting fear does not have the right of executing what he threatens; as if a father, who catches a young man acting basely with his daughter, threatens him with death unless he marries her.

It is disputed whether fear is inflicted unjustly if someone by a means not unjust in itself extorts matrimony not owed, or if the one inflicting fear indeed has the right of executing what he threatens, but does not have a right to matrimony; as if a girl should threaten a young homicidal man that she will denounce him to the judge unless he marries her, or if a physician, who is bound only from charity to undertake the care of a sick girl, denies his help unless the girl marries him.

Response. Some affirm, because one acts unjustly who through grave fear tries to obtain that to which he has no right, for example matrimony. Others deny, because one does not act unjustly who offers to another a means, for example the choice of matrimony, by which he may avoid a damage which can be inflicted on him without injustice. But it seems one must distinguish thus: If the avoidance of the imminent evil, for example denunciation to the judge or denial of medical care, is esteemed to be of as much value as the choice of matrimony, the answer seems to have to be denied, because an unjust pact is not had. Otherwise, if the avoidance of the imminent evil is not worth so much, then the pact is unjust (cf. St. Alphonsus VI, 1051, 1053).

δ) From which, in order that one may free himself, he is compelled to choose matrimony. These things are certainly verified, and therefore the matrimony is certainly invalidated, if fear is inflicted for extorting matrimony with the one inflicting the fear. Likewise it seems invalid if fear is inflicted for extorting matrimony with someone other than the one inflicting the fear, because there is in reality coercion to matrimony itself.

But it is controverted whether it is necessary that fear be inflicted for extorting matrimony, or whether the intention of matrimony on the part of the one fearing the evil suffices, who in matrimony sees a necessary remedy against a greater evil to be avoided. Some deny that fear inflicted for extorting matrimony is required, and draw the reason from the tenor of the Code, "from which in order that one, etc." But the affirmative answer seems to have to be given, because before the Code it was taught with sufficient commonness that fear inflicted for extorting matrimony was required. Now the Code is not presumed to have departed from the old disposition unless the tenor of the law sufficiently signifies this; and the latter does not have place, since the canon can well be harmonized with the old disposition and be understood thus: "from which, in order that one may free himself, he is compelled to choose matrimony," namely because the fear is inflicted precisely for extorting matrimony. If fear is inflicted for another end, one is not so properly compelled to the choice of matrimony (St. Alphonsus VI, 1049).

ε) At least by canon law. It is disputed whether also by natural law, so that the described fear would also invalidate the marriages of unbelievers. Some deny, because fear does not impede consent simply voluntary into the contract. Others affirm, because a contract caused by gravely injurious fear and irrescindable, and therefore such that the grave injury which was the cause of the contract cannot be repaired, seems to have to be excluded. But if the prior opinion is admitted, such a contract would be had, namely matrimony, since it cannot be rescinded. St. Thomas admits the latter opinion (Supplement, q. 47, a. 3; cf. St. Alphonsus VI, 1054; Homo Apostolicus, tr. 18, n. 64).

Objection. If the latter opinion is admitted, even fear not inflicted for extorting matrimony would invalidate it, because such fear would also involve an injury which could no longer be repaired.

Response. Fear not inflicted for extorting matrimony indeed involves an injury, but one independent of matrimony, of which it was only the occasion, not the cause; but an injury independent of matrimony can be repaired even if the matrimony is valid and can no longer be rescinded.

Question. Whether, with canon law alone considered, matrimony is valid if the party who suffered fear is an unbeliever?

Response. Many deny, because the law does not distinguish. Others affirm, because the impediment in the case seems to affect no party: not the unbelieving party, because he or she is not subject to the Church; nor the faithful party, since the impediment seems to have been constituted in favor only of the party who suffered fear.

With natural law considered, the said matrimony is held by many to be invalid, according to the things set forth.

b) No other fear, for example light fear, or grave fear but justly inflicted, carries with it the nullity of matrimony, even if it gives cause to the contract (canon 1087, § 2). This is clear if the speech is about fear justly inflicted; if it is a question of fear lightly unjust, it is deduced from the fact that, on the one hand, fear does not impede simply voluntary consent, and on the other hand the reparation of a light injury is not to be valued so highly that on account of it, if excluded, the contract must be called invalid (St. Alphonsus VI, 1055). Furthermore note:

α) One who through grave and unjust fear forces another to matrimony sins gravely both against justice and, on account of the nullity of the sacrament, against religion. Therefore he is bound to repair the injury, even, if it cannot be repaired in another way, by convalidating the matrimony, at the will of the one who suffered fear (St. Alphonsus VI, 1057).

β) The Church never dispenses in the impediment of fear, because the dispensation would confirm the injury inflicted on the party who suffered fear, and would bring it about that the one inflicting fear would receive advantage from his crime.

How matrimony contracted from fear can be convalidated will be explained later.

¹ What fear is and in how many ways it is distinguished, see vol. I, nn. 838 and 839.

Obstacles to Consent.—The obstacles to consent are all those factors that take away or lessen the voluntariness of an act. (a) Thus, the actual obstacles that affect the intellect are reduced to ignorance, spoken of above; those that affect the will are passion and fear, and that which affects the external powers is coercion. (b) The habitual obstacles are habits and abnormal mental states.

The acts of one who is under fear are of various kinds.

(a) Acts are done with fear, when the fear is concomitant—i.e., when it is not willed and does not cause the act, but is merely its occasion or would rather prevent it. Examples: Julius is ordered under pain of death to drink a glass of wine, a thing he was intending to do and which he would have done even without any threats. Balbus walks along a lonely road, because he must get home, but he trembles at the thought of robbers. Caius, a highwayman, at the point of the revolver, forces Balbus to hand over his purse, but he fears that the police may arrive before he has secured the money. Titus, a business man, makes a trip by air, because he must reach another city without delay, but he has some apprehensions about his safety. All these men act, not because of, but apart from or in spite of their fears.

(b) Acts are done through fear, when fear causes an act that would not otherwise be performed. The fear may be antecedent (i.e., unwilled) or consequent (i.e., willed). Examples: Balbus, in the case mentioned above, surrendered his purse because of involuntary fear which was caused by the revolver of the robber. Claudius makes an act of sorrow for sin because of voluntary fear which he produces by thinking of the punishment of hell.

The effects of fear, which do not take away the use of reason, on the voluntariness of acts are as follows.

(a) Acts done with fear are not made really involuntary on account of the fear that accompanies them, for they are done for their own sake, not out of fear or as a consequence of fear. They may be called relatively involuntary in the sense that, by reason of fear, they are comparatively unpleasant, unless one enjoys the thrill of danger. Examples: Balbus, Caius and Titus, in the cases mentioned above, acted with perfect willingness. Whether they enjoyed their experiences or not, depends on their attitudes towards adventure and excitement.

(b) Acts done through fear are voluntary simply and absolutely, for the act done under the impulse of fear is what the agent considers here and now as most desirable. Examples: Balbus’ surrender of his purse and Claudius’ act of contrition are just what these two men wish to do as best suited to the circumstances.

(c) Acts done through fear are involuntary in a certain respect, if the agent can retain his inclination towards the opposite of the act and still avoid what he fears; otherwise, they are in no way involuntary. Examples: Balbus retains his liking for the money taken from him by force, and hence the surrender of it to the highwayman, although voluntary, if all things are considered, is not voluntary, if only the money itself is considered. Claudius, on the contrary, retains no liking for his sins, for he knows that, if he does, he will defeat the purpose of his act of sorrow, which is to escape the pains of hell; hence, his contrition, although the result of fear, is in no respect involuntary.

The object of fear is always some evil, for the good does not repel, but attracts. The motive of fear, however, is something good; for one dreads evil on account of some good one wishes to obtain or retain. By reason of the motive, then, fear may be divided into two moral species, namely, fear of the world and fear of God.

(a) Fear of the world is that which dreads creatures more than God, because it sets more store by the things of time than by those of eternity. Thus, St. Peter’s denial of Christ was prompted by fear of the world. When the object of this fear is loss of the esteem of men, it is called human respect.

(b) Fear of God is that which dreads the Creator more than creatures, because it prizes Him above all. Thus, St. Peter’s death for Christ proceeded from his fear of God.

Fear of the world is always sinful, because it makes one offend, or be willing to offend, God for the sake of escaping some temporal evil. It is forbidden by our Lord: “Fear ye not them that kill the body and are not able to kill the soul, but rather fear Him that can destroy both body and soul in hell” (Matt, x. 28). Elias (or Eliseus) is praised because of his freedom from fear of the world: “In his days he feared not the prince” (Ecclus., xlviii. 13). We should note, however, the distinction between habitual fear, on the one hand, and actual or virtual fear, on the other hand.

(a) Habitual worldly fear is a state, not an act—that is, the condition of those who are in mortal sin, and have therefore preferred self to God as the supreme end of life. It is a matter of faith that not all the acts of sinners or unbelievers are bad, for they are able to seek certain particular or natural goods.

(b) Actual fear of the world is a deliberate choice of sin out of fear of some temporal evil; virtual fear is a deliberate act proceeding from such a choice though without advertence to the choice or fear. In both these kinds of fear there is sin, for actual fear commands evil, virtual fear executes it. Examples: Sempronius internally resolves to be guided by his fear of imprisonment rather than by the law of God against perjury (actual fear). He then proceeds to perjure himself, adverting to what he says, but not thinking about his previous fear (virtual fear).

The species of sin to which worldly fear belongs are as follows:

(a) The theological species of this sin depends on the disposition of the person. He sins mortally, if on account of fear he is ready to offend God seriously; he sins venially, if on account of fear he is prepared to commit only a venial sin. Examples: Titus, in order to escape imprisonment or exile, swears falsely. Balbus, having been absent from his office without leave, tells a little lie to escape reproof for this misdemeanor. Titus’ fear is a grave sin, that of Balbus a venial sin.

(b) The moral species of worldly fear is, as a rule, the same as the species of the sin to which it leads, so that but one sin is committed and need be confessed. The reason is that generally the object of fear is something that deserves to be dreaded, and that the aversion from it is not wrong except in so far as it is carried to the extreme of using sin as a means of escape. Example: Caius is wrongly suspected of theft. To free his reputation he swears falsely about a circumstance that appears incriminating. His fear of losing his good name is not a sin in itself, and hence he is guilty of the one sin of perjury.

Fear of God is of two specifically distinct kinds, according as the object one dreads is offense of God or punishments from God. (a) Servile fear, that of a servant with regard to his master, dreads sin because of the punishment it entails; (b) filial fear, that of a son with regard to his father, dreads sin because of the offense to God that is contained in it.

There are two degrees of filial fear to be distinguished:

(a) Initial fear is that of beginners in charity. On account of past sins, they fear punishments from God; on account of their present love of God, they fear they may be again separated from Him. The second fear is stronger with them, and it commands that the first fear be aroused to hold the will more firmly against whatever might separate from love. Of this fear it is said: “The fear of God is the beginning of His love” (Ecclus., xxv. 16).

(b) Perfected fear is that of those who are established in charity. The more the love of God sways the heart, the more is every other love, that of self included, subjugated to the love of God, and the less is one troubled by the thoughts of evils that may befall self. Even in this present life some souls are so strong in the love of God that all servile fear disappears: “I am sure that neither death nor life ... shall be able to separate us from the love of God” (Rom., viii. 38, 39); “Perfect charity casteth out fear, because fear hath pain, and he that feareth is not perfected in charity” (I John, iv. 18).

Divine Commandments Concerning Fear.—(a) Servile fear was not commanded in the Decalogue by any distinct precept, for fear of punishment is supposed in those who received the law; it was, however, commanded there implicitly, inasmuch as penalties were attached to transgressions. Later, in order to keep man more strictly to the law already given, instructions or commandments about the necessity of fear were given. Thus, Job says: “I feared all my works, knowing that Thou didst not spare the offender” (Job, ix. 28), and the Psalmist prays: “Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear, for I am afraid of Thy judgments” (Ps. cxviii. 120); our Lord commands: “Fear Him that can destroy both soul and body in hell” (Matt, x. 28).

(b) Filial fear, on the contrary (i.e., reverential love of God), since it is the principle from which proceed the external acts of respect and homage enjoined in the Decalogue, was inculcated at the time the first law was given. “What doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God, and walk in His ways, and love Him, and serve the Lord thy God?” (Deut., x. 12).

It was said above (see 1313) that hatred differs from other sins against charity, inasmuch as it dislikes another’s good unqualifiedly, whereas these other sins dislike his good with some qualification. Hence, envy differs from hate, because envy is a qualified displeasure. It differs from other kinds of displeasure over the prosperity of others, because the qualification in each case is different.

(a) Thus, emulation is displeased at the thought of a neighbor’s prosperity, not because it does not like his success, but because it dislikes the unsuccess of self. Example: Titus is grieved when he thinks of the virtue of Balbus, because he himself lacks virtue.

(b) Fear dislikes the prosperity or superiority of another, not on account of the prosperity or superiority in itself, but on account of the evil results it apprehends from that prosperity. Example: Caius is displeased at the elevation of Claudius, because he knows the latter is his enemy and will persecute him. He is also displeased that, in spite of his own greater learning and soundness, he has not the influence possessed by Balbus, who misleads many by long-winded sophistry.

(c) Indignation (nemesis) is displeased that a neighbor has a certain good, of which he is unworthy. Example: Sempronius is angry because Titus, who is dishonest, succeeds in business.

(d) Envy grieves over a neighbor’s prosperity, not because it thinks this prosperity will actually bring about a lessening of the honor of self, but because it regards the very fact of that prosperity, in itself and apart from any consequences, as a change in one’s relationship to the neighbor, and to that extent an obscuration of the glory of self. Example: Balbus is grieved at the prosperity of Claudius, because he knows Claudius will use his resources to defame him. Caius is grieved at Claudius’ prosperity, because he regards it as a reflection on his own fame, since he is less prosperous. Balbus fears, Caius envies.

Is grief at the prosperity of another a sin, when it is caused by fear of the harm he will do?

(a) If it is clear that the other will use his prosperity to act against justice or charity or the like, it is not a sin to grieve over the prosperity. For, since it is right to deprive a neighbor of the means of sinning when one has the power to do so, it is not wrong to wish that he lacked those means. Thus, it is not a sin to grieve over the election of an official who will promote lawbreakers and persecute the law-abiding: “When just men increase, the people shall rejoice; when the wicked shall bear rule, the people shall mourn” (Prov., xxix. 2). St. Gregory the Great declares that, as it is not uncharitable to rejoice at the downfall of an enemy, neither is it envious to be saddened at his success; since his downfall is a blessing to the oppressed, while his success means injustice to many.

(b) If it is clear that the other will use his power, wealth, or other goods to inflict evils that are deserved or not unjust, it is wrong to be sorry that he has the power, wealth, etc., just as it would be wrong to deprive him of them. Thus, it is wrong to grieve over the election of an honest official who will correct abuses and punish lawbreakers. It is not unlawful, however, for a lawbreaker to be sorry for himself at the prospect of the penalty he will receive.

(c) If it is uncertain whether the other will use his prosperity to do injury to oneself or to others, it is lawful to fear and to be on one’s guard, but it is not lawful to grieve unconditionally at the prosperity, just as it is not lawful in the circumstances to deprive the other of his prosperity.

Envy is a greater sin than the other kinds of sorrow at a neighbor’s good. (a) Thus, envy grieves over the neighbor’s good (even if he is worthy), and is greater or less in proportion to that good; (b) emulation grieves over one’s own deficiency, fear over the consequences of the other’s good, indignation over the prosperity of one who is unworthy.

What are the acts of the will which consist in the pursuit of good and in flight from evil? - These acts of the will can be distinguished according as the passions of the sensitive appetite, to which they correspond, are distinguished. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 22. Now the passions are: love, to which hatred is opposed; desire or concupiscence, to which flight or abomination is opposed; delight, to which sadness is opposed; hope, to which despair is opposed; daring, to which fear is opposed; finally anger, which has no opposite.

S. Th. 1. 2. q. 23. The first three are passions of the concupiscible; the four latter are passions of the irascible. Love is the simple complacency of good, which proceeds from the connaturality and coaptation of the one appetizing with regard to the thing suitable to him. Dilection adds to love a preceding election; charity adds to love a certain perfection, insofar as that which is loved is esteemed of great price. One love is of friendship, another of concupiscence. For to love is to will good to someone. Toward that good which someone wills to someone there is love of concupiscence. Toward that to which someone wills good there is love of friendship. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 26.

Hatred is the simple displeasure and detestation of evil, which arises from a certain dissonance of the appetite toward that which is apprehended as repugnant and harmful. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 29. One hatred is of abomination, another of enmity. The former is the detestation of some evil of a person; the latter is also the detestation of the person himself, to whom one wills evil. Concupiscence or desire is the movement of the appetite into an absent good. Flight or abomination is the detestation of an absent evil. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 30.

Delight is a certain repose of the appetite from the presence of a delighting good. Sadness is a certain pain from the presence of evil. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 31, 35. Hope is the movement of the appetite into a future good, arduous, possible to obtain, and according to this possibility or impossibility hope differs from despair. Hence it is that hope imports a certain approach to an arduous good; despair, on the contrary, imports withdrawal from it. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 40. a. 1, 4. "Fear flees future harm because of its victory over the one fearing; but daring attacks imminent danger because of its victory over the danger itself." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 45. a. 1. For fear "does not regard evil absolutely, but with a certain difficulty or arduousness, so that it can scarcely be resisted." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 41. a. 2 ad 3. "According to the opposition of good and evil, fear is contrary to hope; according to the opposition of approach and withdrawal, daring is contrary to fear, but despair to hope." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 45. a. 1 ad 3.

Anger is the appetite of vengeance, as possible to itself. It seeks evil itself under the notion of vindictive justice. Hence it regards one object according to the notion of good, namely the vengeance which it seeks, and another according to the notion of evil, namely the harmful man, against whom it wills to be avenged through the infliction of punishment. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 46. a. 2, 6. It has no contrary either according to approach and withdrawal, or according to the opposition of good and evil. For it is a movement toward attacking the injurious evil already lying upon one. Hence neither can there be a movement toward fleeing evil; nor can there be a movement toward good: for when this has been obtained, there is repose and joy of the appetite. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 23. a. 3.

Does fear cause the involuntary? - Fear is the trepidation of the mind because of present or future danger. L. 1. Quod metus, etc., Dig.

It is divided first into light and grave. The first is had either when the present or future evil is light, or when, although it is grave, nevertheless it is only little probable. The second is had when the evil is grave, very probable or certain. But an evil is grave either absolutely or relatively. Absolutely grave is that which strikes fear of itself even into a constant man, and it has place when the evil which is feared is grave in itself and is commonly reputed such, as death, mutilation, etc. Relatively grave is had when the evil which is feared is not grave according to itself, but is such with respect to this or that person.

Fear is furthermore divided into intrinsic and extrinsic by reason of the cause from which it proceeds. Intrinsic fear is that which arises from the intrinsic disposition of the subject himself, namely from each one's own weakness of body or soul. Fear of death excited by a grave illness is intrinsic fear, since it arises, as from a cause, from an infirmity which is in the very subject of the fear. Extrinsic fear is that which is excited by an extrinsic cause, whether this cause is natural or necessary, or whether it is a moral or free cause; as likewise fear of death from shipwreck, or from a robber encountered on the road. Extrinsic fear inflicted by a moral or free cause is subdivided into just and unjust, according as that cause has or does not have the right of inducing fear; as fear induced by a judge or by a highway robber. And whether fear has been inflicted justly or unjustly, such fear can be inflicted simply to obtain something, or to bring in some evil, as in robbers threatening death unless someone gives what he has, or in an enemy likewise threatening death in vengeance; and it can be inflicted in order to extort consent to some certain thing, for example, to betrothals, to marriage, to a contract, etc.

Fear by a special name is called reverential when there is fear lest a superior be offended, or by which someone fears to resist him to whom he is subject, namely father, mother, grandfather, father-in-law, husband, king, master, prelate, tutor, and curator; and likewise an uncle, or cousin, or older brother, if the one suffering the fear dwells with them and receives support from them. "Pontius deservedly says that reverential fear of itself is grave, because it is one thing to operate from reverence owed to a superior, another from reverential fear, which necessarily includes fear of some grave damage imminent from obedience not rendered, for example, long-lasting indignation, etc." L. 1. 3. n. 717. Certainly the indignation of a father, master, etc., is an evil; and if it is long-lasting, it is a grave evil. Therefore, even with other evils excluded, for example beatings, threats, etc., reverential fear of itself is grave. L. 1. 5. n. 20; l. 6. n. 1056; C. H. 1267; C. G. 111, 11112; C. I. 1111 ff.; C. L. 666. "It is one thing to do something with fear, another truly from fear; for the first states concomitance. Hence what is done in that way, although it is absolutely voluntary, nevertheless that voluntary does not arise from fear, but rather is opposed to and conquers the fear itself, which is a sign of a great will: as when Christ the Lord was advancing toward death, fearing it, He embraced it with the highest will, which did not arise from fear of the Father and of men, and therefore conquered natural fear. But to be done from fear signifies that the fear itself induces one to willing or doing something; and then fear is the cause of such voluntary, in the way in which among acts of the will intention is the cause of election, and love of good is the cause of hatred of the opposed evil. For in this way in the present case, when someone fears death, he determines and intends to flee it; and by force of this decree he chooses this means, for example, to throw goods into the sea, and use or execution follows upon this election. Therefore from first to last fear was the cause exciting and applying the will to that efficacious act by which it commanded that exterior action." Suarez, tr. 2, d. 3, s. 1, n. 6.

Now those things which are done from fear are more voluntary than involuntary; for they are voluntary simply, but involuntary according to a certain respect. For each thing is simply such according as it is in act. But here the act, insofar as it is exercised here and now, is simply willed, because, although such an action considered in itself is not lovable simply, nevertheless here and now it is proposed as absolutely to be chosen, as a suitable means for avoiding a greater evil. Therefore under that notion it is here and now simply voluntary. For judgment concerning the voluntary must be made with the thing considered in particular with all circumstances, and not by abstraction or precision of the intellect. "But that what is done through fear is taken as existing outside this case, insofar as it is repugnant to the will, this is only according to reason, and therefore it is involuntary according to a certain respect, i.e., insofar as it is considered as existing outside this case." "Therefore that which is done through fear is voluntary without qualification, i.e., according as it is actually done; but it is involuntary under a condition, i.e., if such fear were not imminent." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 6. "And because acts are in particulars, therefore it is voluntary simply, involuntary according to a certain respect." S. Th. Suppl. q. 47. a. 1; Quodl. 5. a. 10; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 3, s. 1, 2.

Note: Light fear is not regularly judged a cause of acting, because it can easily be repelled and contemned. Nevertheless sometimes it can well be a cause of acting. And thus a subject, not daring out of reverence to contradict a superior, is determined by him, unwillingly, to acting.

Those things which are done from fear are involuntary according to a certain respect when the thing is evil in itself, but good only in the present circumstances, as is clear in the example given of throwing goods overboard for the merchant, which is evil for him in itself, and good for him in the present circumstance of shipwreck. But if the thing is good in itself, so that it is such even abstracting from the present circumstances, then he who operates from fear can be borne into that thing with a perfect inclination of the will, so that the voluntary simply is had, without at the same time having the involuntary according to a certain respect. And thus one who from supernatural fear of Gehenna wills to abstain from sin has the voluntary simply without an involuntary mixed in, because the observance of the divine law is simply good in itself, even abstracting from that circumstance of fear of divine judgments.

Moreover, "he who wills to keep the precept from fear of hell, if he understands the force of that motive, cannot have a simple contrary affection: I would transgress the precept if there were no punishment; for by this very affection he would sin and incur the guilt of punishment, and consequently would act against his own motive. If therefore he is truly and efficaciously moved by that motive, and understands its force and the quality of his acts, it cannot happen that such an affection be present with that motive." Suarez, tr. 2, d. 3, s. 2, n. 6; L. 1. 6. n. 442, objection II.

Does grave fear excuse from fault? - Either the discussion is of those things which are not intrinsically and of themselves evil, or of those things which are from their nature intrinsically evil, as would be, for example, apostasy from faith, blasphemy against God. If the first, ordinarily speaking, grave fear excuses from all fault, because any positive law is not accustomed to oblige with a grave proportionate inconvenience, as is common. Ordinarily speaking, because if someone by grave fear were compelled to the violation of some positive law, which would yield to common harm, or to contempt of legitimate power, or of religion, with grave public scandal, then grave fear would not excuse from fault of transgression. For in the first, the common good must be preferred to private good; but in the second and third, there would already be question of a thing intrinsically evil from its own nature. Nevertheless in this second and third case, if the one suffering, when he violates the law, publicly protests that he does not act thus in contempt of the law or of religion, but only to decline the violence, in the presence of which he declares that law and religion no longer oblige, then, if public scandal ceases, and the aforesaid contempt ceases - which, practically speaking, seems altogether difficult - he would be excused from fault.

If the second, it is certain that fear, however grave, provided it is not such as to take away the use of reason, never excuses from all fault. For those things, since they include intrinsic and essential malice, if they are done voluntarily, can never lack fault. An example is in that Christian who, struck by fear of punishments or even of death, would deny the faith of Christ. Nevertheless it diminishes fault, since it diminishes the voluntary. But, ordinarily speaking, grave fear still leaves such cognition of the things which are done that it suffices for mortal sin. L. 1. 1. n. 175; l. 5. n. 21; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 125. a. 4; Elbel 43-52; Del Vecchio, vol. 1, n. 144.

You will resolve: Grave fear, for example of death, etc., often excuses not only from a positive precept, whether divine or human, even ecclesiastical, but sometimes also from an affirmative natural precept. And thus someone is not bound with danger to life to receive baptism, to confess integrally, to receive communion, to preserve a deposit, to fulfill a vow, or to aid a neighbor in extreme necessity of life. On the contrary, to avoid death a priest cannot violate the sacramental seal. Viva, Opusc. de Act. hum., q. 4, a. 4; Lessius, q. 6, a. 6; L. 1. 1. n. 175.

When does the obligation of law cease? Obligation can cease in three ways: either on the part of the subject, or on the part of the superior, or on the part of the law itself. On the part of the subject it can cease: 1. Simply, through exempting causes, which totally withdraw him from the dominion of the law, for example if someone betakes himself outside the place which the law affects. 2. In a qualified way, through impeding causes, which impede or excuse from its fulfillment a subject remaining under the law. These causes are reduced to invincible ignorance, to fear, and to impotence. Ignorance, if it is invincible, excuses; because no one sins except by a voluntary act, and this presupposes knowledge. But if it is vincible and culpable it does not excuse; such it is when you were able and bound to know or to learn, and it came to mind to doubt, and you did not take pains to understand. L. 168, 170 ff. Cf. here 50, 51. Fear, namely grave fear, often excuses, since from it the observance of the law passes into a grave inconvenience. And so fear of death, e.g., often excuses not only from a positive precept, both human and divine, but sometimes even from an affirmative natural precept. Hence one is not bound, with danger of life, to confess integrally, to preserve a deposit, to fulfill a vow, etc. L. 175. Cf. here 62, 63. Impotence, even moral impotence, excuses. For if the object of the law, considered in itself, is not so difficult and grave, but from particular circumstances becomes such, then there is no longer that obligation which the legislator intends to impose, since that object has been notably changed. And thus David ate the loaves of proposition, prohibited to laymen, when he was in danger of undergoing a grave evil. 1 Reg. 21; Matt. 12, 3, 4. But grave inconvenience and harm must be proportioned to the gravity of the law, so that it may legitimately excuse from it. Since no one is held to the impossible, after someone has become unable to fulfill the law, he is excused, although he sinned in positing the cause; e.g., if someone squandered his goods, and then cannot pay his debts. L. 176. Cf. here 64, 65, 66, 171.

On the part of the superior it can cease: 1. Through dispensation, which is the legitimate relaxation of the law in a particular case. 2. Through privilege, which is a constant and permanent favor granted by a superior against or beyond the common law.

On the part of the law itself the law can also cease. For "it happens many times that something, in the majority of cases, is useful to be observed for the common welfare, yet in some cases is very harmful. Therefore, because the legislator cannot look upon all singular cases, he proposes the law according to those things which happen in the majority of cases, directing his intention to common utility. Hence, if a case arises in which the observance of such a law is harmful to the common welfare, it is not to be observed... But nevertheless this must be observed: that if the observance of the law according to the words does not have a sudden danger which must be met at once, it does not belong to just anyone to interpret what is useful and what is useless to the city; but this belongs only to the Princes, who on account of cases of this sort have authority in the laws to dispense. But if there is a sudden danger, not permitting so much delay that recourse can be had to the superior, necessity itself has a dispensation annexed, because necessity is not subject to law." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 96, a. 6. Cf. here 179.

Do ignorance, fear, and grave inconvenience excuse from invalidation? - R. To the first: Negatively, because subjective ignorance, whether of fact or of law, does not supply the objective defect of the act; and thus there is no marriage, when there stands, e.g., the diriment impediment of consanguinity, whether it is contracted in good faith or in bad faith. - But if the invalidating law is penal, then, if ignorance excuses from guilt, it also excuses from the penalty of invalidation. But if guilt is admitted, yet the penalty of invalidation is unknown, then more probably this is not incurred, because invalidation is an extraordinary and exorbitant penalty, from which ignorance excuses. Schmalz., l. 5, t. 37, n. 105; Sanch., de Matr., l. 9, d. 32, n. 17. More commonly, however, they affirm that it is incurred, because since such ignorance does not excuse from sin against the law, neither consequently does it excuse from the penalty, although this is unknown. Suarez, l. 5, c. 22; Ithur., Cas. 53, n. 24. Nor indeed does ignorance excuse in any way if the invalidation was established principally to preclude evils which otherwise would flow into the commonwealth, but the penalty only accessorily, for coercing the person. And indeed the proper reason of an invalidating law is common utility.

R. To the second and third: There are not lacking those who affirm it, because positive law ought to yield to the natural law of charity, and because in the case there is a certain legitimate epikeia. But it seems one must answer with the common opinion: Negatively; because grave fear, and even gravest inconvenience, neither render the person capable, nor restore to acts the force taken away by law. But since laws of this sort primarily and directly tend to preserving the public good, no place is given to epikeia on account of merely private harm. And thus a marriage between blood relatives and relatives by affinity will be void, even to avoid death, even in the article of death. Private harm, I say; for if a common harm is present, since then the law would become harmful to society, invalidation ceases. L. 191; l. 3, n. 112; l. 6, n. 1029; de Privil., n. 57; Diana, t. 2, tr. 6, r. 62, 73; Sanch., de Matr., l. 3, d. 17, n. 3; Ithur., Cas. 53, n. 18; M. E., vol. 20, p. 177, 474.

Does a promissory oath extorted by grave and unjust fear oblige? - The first probable opinion affirms. For the general rule is that any oath is to be kept when it can be done without sin, lest God be brought in as witness of the false. The second opinion, also sufficiently probable, denies, because an oath follows the nature of the act to which it is added. But that promise by natural law is void, or at least rescindable by the very one who suffered fear, according as the promise is gratuitous or onerous, on account of the grave injury which it contains, which is not to be confirmed and continued by oath. Whence even the patrons of the first opinion warn that he who suffered fear can ask relaxation of the oath, so that he may be excused from the obligation of paying; but if he has already paid, he can seek in judgment what he gave, or secretly compensate himself. L. 174; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 7 ad 3; q. 98, a. 3 ad 1; Ithur., Cas. 15, nn. 11, 18; Struggl 23, 29.

Is a vow made through fear valid? - R. Negatively, if the fear is grave, unjust, inflicted from without in order to extort the vow. The reason is that that cannot be acceptable to God which is violently extorted from someone through injury, since the law of nature demands that right be restored entirely. And this indeed proves that vows of this sort are invalid by natural law. It is clear, moreover, from canon law as to solemn vows of religion, and probably also as to other vows. C. Perlatum 1, de His quae, etc.; L. 197.

Unjust; for if the fear is just, the vow is valid, since there is no true coercion in that which one ought to do, nor is the one vowing reasonably unwilling. Inflicted in order to extort the vow; for otherwise the vow is valid, for example, if someone, fearing death which robbers threaten, made a vow to God that he might be delivered. Grave; whether a vow emitted from light unjust fear is invalid, "Busembaum here affirms with Suarez and Filliucci. Likewise Navarrus and many others cited by Sanchez, Decal., l. 4, c. 3, n. 24. The reason, as they say, is that fear therefore annuls a vow because it takes away full liberty of consent; therefore light fear also will annul it, when it takes away the same liberty and is the cause that the vow is made. And Sanchez calls this opinion probable. But the opposite opinion is more probable, which Sanchez holds, n. 24, with Soto, Valentia, Sa, Azor, etc., and the Salmanticenses, ibid., n. 161, who call it common, and prove it from C. Perlatum, de His quae vi, etc. The reason is that light fear, which can easily be cast off, is not judged to be the cause of so grave a thing as a vow, just as we shall likewise say concerning contracts, n. 718." L. 197.

R. Affirmatively, if the fear arises from within or from a necessary cause, unless it takes away the use of reason from the one vowing; the reason is that vows of this sort are simply voluntary.

Does grave fear invalidate a contract, or at least render it rescindable? - R. Negatively, if there is question of fear from within, or from a necessary or natural cause; or of fear indeed from without, but justly induced. The reason is that fear does not simply take away voluntariness, unless it is so grave that it disturbs reason. Nor indeed does such fear inflict any injury on the contracting party.

If there is question of grave fear from without, and unjustly induced, and not for extorting consent, it is disputed, but a distinction seems to have to be made. "For if it was induced by the other contracting party... the contract is voidable, because he who unjustly induces fear is bound to remove all disadvantages which arise from the injury, among which is the obligation arising from such a contract. Thus more probably Lugo.

But if fear is induced by an irrelevant third party, and the contract is used as a means for declining the imminent evil, then an onerous contract holds irrevocably... for neither of the contracting parties inflicted injury; but the third party inflicting fear cannot take away the obligation by consenting to rescission of the contract, because the contract was not made with him; although he is bound to induce rescission, so that he may avert injury from the innocent person, if this one wishes... And who would say that a contract can be rescinded if, from fear of your enemy plotting against you, you bought a sword to defend yourself?... Lugo excepts 1. the contract of marriage, which he thinks to be invalid if entered upon from such fear. He excepts 2. probably with Palau, gratuitous contracts, because thus better provision is made for the innocent person, and the other cannot complain, because he is deprived only of gain, remaining in the state in which he was before; and just as he would not wish to be obligated in such a state, so neither ought he wish to oblige the other." Reuter 127. S. Th. Quodl. 5. a. 17. Cf. V. 2. n. 1022. If there is question of grave fear from without, unjustly induced for extorting consent by someone other than the fellow contracting party, it is again disputed. The first probable opinion teaches that the contract "cannot be rescinded by natural law, because since neither party has inflicted injury, there is no reason from the nature of the thing why it could be rescinded at the will of one rather than preserved at the will of the other." Reuter 126. C. A. 875 favors this opinion. The second probable opinion holds the opposite, "because by reason of the injury, even if inflicted by a third party, the thing remains obligated to the prior owner, and consequently passes to anyone with that burden; but it is not fitting that someone through another's injury should lose every right in his own thing. Billuart, etc." Gur. 782.

Both Roman Law, Reuter l. c., and Italian Law 1111, French Law 1111, and Spanish Law 1268 are consonant with this latter opinion. Cod. Lusit. 666: the contract is null. If fear from without is unjustly induced for extorting consent by the other of the contracting parties, whether the contract thus entered upon is invalid by the fact itself is disputed. There is a threefold probable opinion. The first affirms. The reason is that if a contract of this kind were naturally valid, justice would arise from injustice, since from a contract extorted by injury there would arise an obligation, which is an act of justice. The second holds that gratuitous contracts are invalid, but not onerous ones. The reason is that for gratuitous contracts, unlike other contracts, an altogether free will is required; for it is a beneficence. But the third, more probable and very common opinion teaches that such a contract is indeed rescindable, but not invalid, neither by natural nor by positive law. Not by natural law, because fear does not simply take away voluntariness. Not by positive law, whether Roman, by which judges are commanded to rescind such contracts, therefore per se the law has them as valid; or French, as is openly had in art. 1117; or Italian 1111, 1113; or Spanish 1267, 1268; or Austrian 870, 874, 875; or German 123; L. 715, 716. - Cod. Lusit. 666: the contract is null.

What if someone were promoted to sacred orders either invincibly ignorant of the obligation of chastity attached to them, or expressly unwilling to vow that obligation itself, or if he were compelled to this by grave fear, or if he were ordained in the very age of infancy? - Reply to the first: Some probably say that he is held to chastity, namely by force of the universal law itself of the Church. Others "probably judge that if the ignorance had been altogether invincible, the ordained man would not be held to chastity, neither from a vow nor from a precept of the Church, because the Church would not intend to oblige such a one; but otherwise if the ignorance had been culpable, or if someone intended to receive the order with the same obligation with which others receive it." Ignorance of this kind is not presumed in the external forum, since it concerns a law so clear and most commonly handed down.

Reply to the second: "In such a case he would be held to chastity not from a vow, but from the precept of the Church, which from a motive of religion would bind him to chastity, the vow being absent."

Reply to the third: One must distinguish: If he did not have the intention of receiving sacred ordination, he is not held, as having been invalidly ordained. If he had the mind of receiving sacred orders, and the fear was just, more probably he is held, because since he is unwilling unreasonably, such fear neither exempts from law nor invalidates the vow. If again he had the mind of receiving sacred orders, but the fear was unjust, more probably he is not held, because of the opposite reason. Wherefore he can validly contract marriage, "but he cannot minister in the order while the marriage stands, nor enjoy clerical privileges." But the nullity of the ordination must be established in the external forum by canonical process. Cf. 106.

Reply to the fourth: "It is certain that he who is ordained before the use of reason, although the ordination is valid, nevertheless is not held to chastity; whence he can validly and licitly enter marriage." Benedict XIV, Bull Eo quamvis tempore, May 4, 1745, commands that in the sixteenth year of age an option be given to them; and, if they wish to preserve chastity, they are admitted to the exercise of the order; otherwise, if they do not wish. And he adds that after ratification they invalidly contract marriage and are held to the divine office. If after the use of reason, but before puberty, some probably say that he is held, others not improbably deny it. The reason is that such a vow, from which this obligation more probably comes, "constitutes a man in an irrevocable state, in which the Pontiff never or rarely dispenses; whence such a vow requires a mature and perfect use of reason." L. l. 6, n. 80, 781, 809-811; S. Th. Suppl. q. 39, a. 2; Sanchez in Dec. l. 5, c. 6, n. 5-8.

Is one who received sacred order through fear unjustly inflicted held to recite the office? - More probably they deny it. The reason is that although fear does not remove the voluntary, nevertheless the Church is not reasonably judged to wish to oblige to the burden of the office except those who receive the order altogether spontaneously. And therefore such persons ordained through grave fear are not even held to chastity. In the external forum, however, they are held to both until the fear has been established before the S. C. of the Sacraments. L. 144; A. S. S. v. 1, p. 330; v. 2, p. 443; v. 6, p. 85. Cf. here 99.

You will resolve: "If someone, unwilling to confess, enters the confessional and, kneeling, speaks with the confessor about some business, he does not simulate the sacrament, nor does he sin with the sin of lying." L. 60. That action is of itself indifferent; and in it the matter and form of the sacrament are wholly lacking. L. ib. - A confessor would sin gravely who pronounced the words of absolution without the mind of absolving, even if he did this in order to extricate himself more easily from an indisposed penitent who was urgently asking absolution, or even demanding it by very grave threats. Many say that in this case the confessor can say: I absolve you, pronouncing the word "not" so quietly that it is not heard by the penitent. St. Alphonsus 59 judges this not improbable; but the confessor could more easily then pronounce other words or prayers rather than the form of absolution; for the rest, that case seems almost chimerical. - But the confessor does not simulate the sacrament of penance if he recites prayers over an indisposed penitent, lest bystanders notice that he is dismissed without absolution; for it is clear among all that penitents are often dismissed with a blessing alone, and sometimes approach the sacred tribunal without the intention of confessing or of completing Confession. L. 59.

A priest would sin most gravely who in Mass pronounced the consecratory words over bread and wine while excluding the intention of consecrating. Nor can they be excused in good faith who, laboring under crass ignorance and celebrating in mortal sin, simulate consecration lest they become guilty of sacrilege, even if they wholly omit the words of consecration. - A priest sins gravely who presents an unconsecrated host as consecrated, even to one knowing and consenting, as sometimes happens to miserable priests with an accomplice who approaches the sacred table for the sake of preserving reputation. The reason is that in this way an unconsecrated host is exposed to the adoration both of the bystanders and even of the knowingly receiving person himself with external reverence, which constitutes external and material idolatry, and therefore something intrinsically evil. L. 61; St. Thomas Quodl. 5, a. 12. "In the case in which someone cannot dispose himself for Communion, he could sometimes agree with the pastor, in order to avoid infamy or scandal, that the latter say over him only the words: May the Body of our Lord Jesus Christ preserve, etc.; and not present the host, as La Croix 160 admits." L. 61.

According to the common opinion, those who, compelled by grave fear, simulate entering marriage do not sin, at least gravely. The reason is that since voluntary consent is lacking, according to the now certain opinion which holds that the spouses are the ministers of this sacrament, matter and form are lacking, and therefore it is not simulation of a sacrament, but only simulation of a contract. "For the same reason he would not sin by the sin of sacrilege who contracted marriage knowing that he had a diriment impediment." L. 62. Furthermore, it must be noted that although someone then wishes to contract marriage, because of the defect of validity of the contract, in reality he does not contract marriage.

Are betrothals entered into through fear invalid by the law itself? If the fear is grave, this is disputed. The first opinion affirms, if the fear is extrinsic and unjust; for they would be valid if the fear were intrinsic, for example if someone promised, fearing lest he be compelled to pay a debt; or just, for then the contracting party would be unwilling irrationally. The reason is that fear dirimently impedes marriage, and betrothals are the way to marriage. The second opinion denies; nevertheless it adds that they can be rescinded by the one who suffered the fear; but if an oath was present, it must be observed until it is relaxed. The reason is that they are not invalid by positive law, which has nothing concerning betrothals; nor invalid by natural law, for fear of itself does not remove consent. "Each opinion is probable, but the first seems to me more probable..., because no one can be obliged to execute an act null in itself, and against which the law resists, such as marriage contracted while such fear endures would be... From these things it is inferred that from betrothals of this sort the impediment of public honesty by no means arises." L. 844.

If the fear is light and gave cause to the contract, the first opinion affirms, which Ballerini calls much more probable; but the second, more common and more probable to St. Alphonsus, denies. The reason is that the other is not judged to have inflicted a true injury, since light fear can easily be repelled. But whether in such a case the one who suffered the fear can rescind the betrothals in conscience, the first opinion, sufficiently probable, denies, on account of the reason just brought forward; but the second opinion, more common and more probable, affirms. "The reason is that since fear gave cause to the contract, so that otherwise it would not have been entered into, the one instilling fear is bound to rescind the contract; hence, just as he is bound to relax the pledge unjustly extorted by such fear, so the one who suffered the fear can revoke the pledge given." L. 844. Sanchez, l. 1, d. 14; l. 4, d. 16.

Has a wife, known by force or fear by a blood relative of the husband, lost the right of asking the debt? R. Negatively, if the force was absolute; for that impediment of asking the debt, as regards incestuous spouses, has only the nature of a penalty, but there can be no penalty where there is no fault. Negatively also when the wife who suffered force or fear did not sin gravely, because a grave penalty is not proportionate to a light fault. Indeed it seems more probable that it must also be denied if that wife sinned gravely, because grave fear excuses from human laws, even if it cannot excuse from the natural law; therefore, since in our case it excuses from the law insofar as it is ecclesiastical, it ought also to excuse from the penalty inflicted by that law. Schmalzgrueber, book 5, tit. 39, n. 79; L. 1071.

What is the impediment of force or fear? Light fear, even unjust fear, does not dirimently impede marriage. The reason is: 1. because light fear is not judged gravely and efficaciously to influence consent; 2. because from positive law only grave fear makes marriage invalid; 3. because otherwise innumerable marriages would become invalid, to the greatest detriment of society.

But grave fear certainly dirimently impedes marriage by ecclesiastical law. The following conditions are nevertheless required, namely that fear be struck: 1. by an external and free cause; 2. unjustly; 3. for the purpose of contracting marriage. C. 10, 14, 15, 18, 28, de Spons.; C. 2, de Eo qui duxit. By ecclesiastical law, or also by natural law? The matter is disputed among the doctors. Trent, sess. 24, chap. 1, 2, de R. M.; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 47, a. 3, 4; Sanchez, book 4, disp. 12, n. 3; Lugo, de Iust. et Iur., disp. 22, n. 175 ff.; Schmalzgrueber, book 4, tit. 1, n. 399; L. 1050; Italian Civil Code, 105; French Civil Code, 180; Austrian Civil Code, 55; German Civil Code, 1335.

Whichever law you say this impediment dirimently impedes by, it does not admit dispensation; rather, it is necessary that the cause of fear be removed. C. Cum locum 1, de Spons. et matr. Therefore, while the cause of fear perseveres, marriage is not convalidated either by copulation or by cohabitation, for these are otherwise presumed to have been extorted by fear. For while fear lasts, just as marriage cannot be validly contracted, so neither can a marriage invalidly contracted be convalidated. It must be said otherwise if copulation is admitted entirely freely and with marital affection, as the doctors commonly hold after St. Thomas, IV Sent., d. 29, q. 1, a. 3, q. 2, ad 2, or also if cohabitation is spontaneous, which, C. Ad id 21, de Spons. et matr., is taken as ratification of consent. In this case, if an occult impediment existed, it will certainly not be necessary to renew consent again before the pastor, according to the general doctrine which Benedict XIV confirms from decrees of the Sacred Penitentiary issued by the authority of St. Pius V, from Declarations of the Sacred Congregation of the Council, and from the practice of the Sacred Rota, Instruction 87, n. 62. Sanchez, book 2, disp. 36, n. 2.

Nor indeed is it necessary that the other spouse, who did not know the impediment, be informed of it when the marriage must be convalidated by new consent. For although this perhaps more probably is required when the consent of each contracting party is invalid because of an impediment by which each is by law itself incapable of contracting, Sanchez, l.c.; L. 895, nevertheless the opposite seems to be said concerning the present case, when the matter concerns only a defect of consent, just as also happens when one or the other contracting party consents fictitiously. Sanchez explains the reason thus, de Matr., book 4, disp. 18, n. 2: "Secondly, it must be supposed that if, after a marriage extorted by fear, copulation spontaneously had with conjugal affection is added, the prior marriage is ratified and begins from then to be valid, if the other, who had consented without fear, perseveres in the original consent. And the reason is that, since the consents need not be simultaneous, and the consent of him who did not suffer fear was legitimate, only the spontaneous consent of him who had consented from fear was lacking for marriage, as I said, book 4, disp. 15, n. 2. But this consent is sufficiently expressed by copulation, etc., from C. Is qui 30, de Spons. Therefore when that has followed, the prior marriage is ratified." And in the same way a little later, ibid., n. 3, he reasons concerning consent expressed by long, mutual, and spontaneous cohabitation, confirming this from the explicit definition of the law in C. Ad id 21, de Spons. et matrim.

In doubt whether fear is to be judged grave, the common doctrine is that one must judge in favor of the validity of the marriage, both because the cause of marriage is favorable and because of reverence for the sacrament. Laymann, book 5, tract 10, part 2, chap. 5, n. 4. To this belongs that statement of Innocent III, C. Licet 47, de Test. et attest.: "It is more tolerable to leave some persons joined contrary to the statutes of men than to separate those legitimately joined contrary to the statutes of the Lord." Schmalzgrueber, book 4, tit. 1, n. 432. Sanchez, book 4, disp. 3.

But the disagreement of the doctors concerning the sufficiency of reverential fear is easily reconciled, if you consider that this fear also, according to the variety of circumstances, is deservedly judged now light, now grave. Thus with others Laymann, l.c., n. 3, who judges that one must reason similarly concerning importunate prayers, which according to the different circumstances of persons may be easy or very difficult to contradict, as Sanchez, book 4, disp. 7, n. 7, Koninck, Lessius, etc., also note.

There is also disagreement among the doctors whether grave fear unjustly inflicted, but not for extorting consent, invalidates marriage, although the common opinion affirms this. Cf. n. 944; Sanchez, book 4, disp. 12, n. 3; Lugo, de Iust. et Iur., disp. 22, n. 175; L. 1049.

When marriage was contracted from grave fear, one is not bound in the forum of conscience, speaking per se, to perfect it, and can withdraw, even against the will of the other. And this is valid also concerning the one who was free from fear, even if it was inflicted by him or by his fault. Thus Sanchez and others, and it is probable according to St. Alphonsus, 1057. Speaking per se, i.e., unless the harm inflicted could not be repaired except through marriage. L. 1045 ff.; E.M.

Does grave fear excuse from censure? R. Affirmatively, unless nevertheless observance of the law is necessary for preserving the public good, or violation of it yields to contempt of faith, or of law, or of ecclesiastical power. The reason for the response is that one who commits a delict from fear sins rather from weakness of nature than from contumacy. The reason for the exception is that in the aforesaid cases the obligation even of human law does not cease.

What special circumstances of absolution from censures are to be noted? Various circumstances of absolution from censures to be noted are declared in the following propositions. An absent and unwilling person can be absolved from censures. For absolution from censures is not sacramental, but a mere relaxation of a bond imposed by the Church, which can also be pronounced upon the absent and unwilling. But this is not licit without grave cause. L. 117, 130; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 24, a. 2. One who is bound by several censures can be absolved from one, the others being left, because there is no necessary connection among them. C. Cum pro causa 27, de Sent. exc.; L. 118, 131; St. Thomas, q. 24, a. 3. Absolution extorted by force or grave fear unjustly inflicted is not valid, from C. single chapter, de His quae vi, etc., in VI; L. 119. The same is to be said if it is given by error concerning the motive cause. C. Offic. 42, de Sent. exc.; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 99, 100, 102; Thesaurus, De Poenis, part 1, chaps. 22-24.

VII. 2. The Holy Synod commands all, of whatever grade, dignity, and condition they may exist, under penalty of anathema which they incur by that very fact, that in no way, directly or indirectly, are they to compel their subjects or any others from freely contracting marriages. Sess. 24, chap. 9, de Ref. Matr.

All, of whatever grade, dignity, and condition they may exist: nevertheless not all simply incur excommunication, but only all temporal lords and magistrates of whatever grade, dignity, and condition. For concerning these there is question in the cited chapter. Under penalty of anathema, not reserved. Directly, when force is exercised on the very person whom someone wishes to compel to marriage, and is immediately brought in order to marriage. Indirectly, when force is exercised on another person who influences the person whom someone wishes to compel to marriage, or when force is exercised on this very person not immediately in order to marriage, but in order to something else which compels the one suffering to marriage. Their subjects or any others, living under their jurisdiction, as is held in the same cited chapter, or at least subject in some way and at some time to their jurisdiction. Compel: by grave and unjust coercion. From freely contracting marriages: therefore coercion must regard marriage actually contracted; nor does it suffice for incurring excommunication to compel only to betrothals, or to compel to marriage if nevertheless marriage does not follow. Suarez, disp. 23, sec. 7, fourth excommunication; Ithur., case 14, n. 14 ff.; case 24, n. 14 ff.; Cardinal De Luca, Opera, tome 14, annotations to the Sacred Council of Trent, discourse 26, n. 35 ff.; Bonacina, disp. 2, q. 2, part 6.

VIII. 3. Against all and each persons, of whatever quality or condition they may be, both clerics and lay persons, seculars or regulars, and also those discharging any dignity, if in any way they have compelled some virgin, or widow, or any other woman unwilling, except in cases expressed in law, to enter a monastery, or to receive the habit of any religion, or to emit profession; and those who have given counsel, help, or favor; and those who, knowing that she does not spontaneously enter the monastery, or receive the habit, or emit profession, in any way have interposed their presence, consent, or authority to the same act. Likewise against those who in any way without just cause impede the holy will of virgins or other women of receiving the veil or emitting a vow. Sess. 25, chap. 18, de Reg.

A virgin or widow, or any other woman: if therefore coercion is done to some man, that he enter religion, this censure is not incurred. Since the Council excepts cases expressed in law, a delinquent woman can licitly be compelled to enter a monastery, as penalty of her crime, or as caution lest she fall into some incontinence; but rarely or never to the habit or profession. L. 212; C. 18, de Convers. coniugator.; C. 19, e.t.

To enter a monastery, or to receive the habit, or to emit profession. "Three members are distinctly enumerated, namely coercion to enter a monastery, to receive the habit, and to emit profession.... The Council twice enumerates these three as altogether distinct. And therefore in that first member it does not say to enter religion, but a monastery, because namely through that it prohibits women from being compelled to live there, even with their own habit retained." Suarez, disp. 23, sec. 7, sixth excommunication. Therefore according to Suarez and others the present censure is incurred even if someone compels a woman to enter a monastery, not so that she may profess, nor so that she may take the habit, but so that she may be honorably educated there. But Bonacina, disp. 2, q. 2, part 2, n. 6, and others do indeed distinguish those three things, whence they assert that excommunication is incurred by one who compels a woman even only to entrance, although she neither receives the habit nor emits profession. But they say that entrance must be understood in order to receiving the habit or emitting profession. Therefore one would not incur this excommunication who would compel a woman to enter a monastery for another end, e.g., that she may be educated there. St. Alphonsus, n. 212, judges the first opinion more probable. To receive the veil, or to emit a vow, seems to be the same as to profess religion; nevertheless because no one can profess unless the habit has first been received, one who impeded this reception would a fortiori impede profession, and consequently would incur this censure. Suarez, l.c.; Bonacina, l.c., part 3, n. 3. But Sanchez and others deny it, "because the decree of the Council must be taken with rigor." St. Alphonsus, n. 212.

In any way without just cause: therefore, if with just cause, this excommunication is not incurred. Impede: to impede is not to compel; to impede is to oppose oneself or to place obstacles, so that someone cannot attain what he justly desires. Ithur., case 24; Sanchez, in Decal., book 4, chap. 4.

1. Sempronius, a priest dressed in lay clothing, passing through places of heretics most hostile to Catholics and especially to priests, omits the recitation of the breviary and eats meat on prohibited days lest he be recognized. But when afterwards he had been recognized, and was driven by fear of death to eat meat on Friday, he obeys, saying repeatedly that the Church, as a pious mother, does not urge the obligation of her law with so great an inconvenience.

2. Liborius, a servant, guarding the house while the master is absent, is attacked at night by a thief, who with drawn dagger demands money from him. But since Liborius has no money of his own, he takes 100 lire belonging to the master and hands them over to the thief, that he may preserve his life unharmed. But the poor man is not yet freed from extreme straits. For the money handed over is not enough for the thief, who threatens death to the servant unless he opens to him the place where the money chest of the master is hidden. Liborius again obeys, that he may escape death.

Q. 1. Does fear cause the involuntary and excuse from sin? 2. Can Sempronius be excused in each case? 3. Can Liborius likewise be excused in each case from sin and from restitution?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 59-62. To the second, affirmatively in the first case, because positive law does not urge with very grave inconvenience. Negatively in the other case, because negative law does not cease, even when very grave inconvenience stands. Moreover, in the case it is a matter of avoiding scandal and of contempt of Religion.

To the third, affirmatively in the first case, because the master is reasonably presumed to consent in so great a danger of life. Affirmatively also in the second case, because the cooperation of the servant in the damage of the master is merely material, which, although it is rather proximate, is nevertheless sufficiently excused when very grave necessity stands. - G. 17, 18; I. M. 59, 62, 1414.

1. Fear is commonly defined: a trepidation of mind on account of an imminent or future danger.

2. On account of an imminent or future danger, namely of an evil danger: for danger of a present evil is no longer present, since it is already there. But present evil does not bring in fear, but sadness. “Evil conjoined is the cause of pain or sadness by way of object.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 36. a. 4. “The object of fear is a future difficult evil, which cannot be resisted.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 41. a. 2. “Sadness is concerning present evil; fear is concerning future evil, which does not move in the same way as present evil.” Ibid. a. 1.

3. Trepidation of mind. “It is manifest that fear, since it is concerning evil, pertains to the appetitive power, which per se regards good and evil.” Ibid. a. 1.

4. Therefore fear carries before itself moral coercion, which namely is exercised upon the will itself; force or violence, on the contrary, brings in physical coercion, which is exercised upon other powers and exterior members, insofar as they are moved and impelled by some exterior force against their natural inclination.

5. Fear is divided into light and grave, by reason of the evil which is feared. The first is had either when the imminent or future evil is light, or when, although it is grave, nevertheless it is little probable and likely. But the other is had when the impending evil is grave, and is very probable or certain.

6. But evil is grave either absolutely or relatively. Hence grave fear is subdivided into absolutely grave and relatively grave. Absolutely grave harm is that which strikes fear of itself into a constant man, and is grave in itself and is commonly reputed such. Each point is explained by the Holy Doctor, 4. Dist. 29. q. 1. a. 2. And first concerning fear falling upon a constant man: “That fear falls upon someone means that someone is coerced by fear. But someone is coerced by fear when he does something which otherwise he would not will, in order to avoid something which he fears. But in this the constant man is distinguished from the inconstant man as to two things. First as to the quality of the danger which is feared, because the constant man follows right reason, through which he knows something for which one must fight or which must be done. But always the lesser evil, or the greater good, must be chosen. And therefore the constant man is coerced to sustaining a lesser evil by fear of a greater evil; but he is not coerced to a greater evil so that he may avoid a lesser evil. But the inconstant man is coerced to a greater evil on account of fear of a lesser evil, as to sin on account of fear of bodily punishment. But the pertinacious man, on the contrary, cannot be coerced even to sustaining or doing a lesser evil so that he may avoid a greater evil; whence the constant man is in the middle between the inconstant and the pertinacious. Secondly they differ as to the estimation of the imminent danger, because the constant man is coerced only from a strong and probable estimation; but the inconstant man from a slight one.... The constant man is intrepid, not because he does not fear at all, but because he does not fear the things which ought not to be feared, or where, or when, they ought not to be feared.” But concerning evil grave in itself and commonly reputed such, he adds these things: “Sins are the greatest of evils, and therefore to this in no way can a constant man be coerced; indeed man ought rather to die than to sustain such things.... But certain bodily harms are lesser than certain others, which are among the principal things which pertain to the person, such as death, blows, dishonoring through rape, and servitude; and therefore from these one is coerced to sustaining other bodily harms.... Nor does it differ whether these pertain to one’s own person, or that of wife, or children, or others of this kind.” And among other things infamy is to be reckoned with these, if it cannot easily be met, ibid. ad 3.; loss of all goods by theft, robbery, fire; dismissal from office; frustration of contracting matrimony; exclusion from an expected inheritance, etc. But relatively grave evil is that which according to itself, and according to the common estimation of men, is not grave, yet is grave with respect to this or that person, for instance, a boy, a girl, a woman, an old man, an infirm person.

7. Fear is further divided into intrinsic and extrinsic, by reason of the cause from which it proceeds. Intrinsic fear is that which arises from the intrinsic disposition of the subject itself, namely from each one’s own infirmity of body or soul. Fear of death stirred up from a grave illness is intrinsic fear, since it arises as from a cause from infirmity which is in the very subject of fear. Extrinsic fear is that which is stirred up by an extrinsic cause, whether this cause is natural or necessary, or whether it is a moral or free cause; as likewise fear of death from shipwreck, or from a robber encountered on the way.

8. Extrinsic fear struck by a moral or free cause is subdivided into just and unjust, according as that cause has or does not have a right of inflicting evil, as fear struck by a judge or by a brigand. And whether the fear has been struck justly or unjustly, such fear can be struck simply for obtaining something, or for inflicting some evil, as happens in robbers threatening death unless someone gives the things which he has, or in an enemy likewise threatening death in revenge; and it can be struck for extorting consent in some certain thing, for example in betrothals, in matrimony, in a contract, etc. In the first and third case, fear struck for obtaining something or for extorting consent, fear per se directly influences consent, either explicitly, as in the third case, or implicitly, as in the first case. In the second case fear per se does not directly influence consent, but per accidens it can influence the will, as, for example, if someone offers himself to an enemy threatening death to him, in order to gain peace for himself, to take that enemy’s daughter in marriage.

9. Fear by a special name is called reverential, when the fear is lest a superior be offended, or by which someone fears to resist him to whom he is subjected, namely father, mother, grandfather, father-in-law, husband, king, master, prelate, tutor, and curator, as the doctors commonly teach with Sanchez; likewise also an uncle, or cousin, or older brother, if the one suffering fear lives with them and receives sustenance from them. St. Alphonsus, l. 6. n. 1056. “Pontius deservedly says that reverential fear per se is grave, because it is one thing to operate from reverence owed to a superior, another from reverential fear, which necessarily puts on fear of some grave harm impending from obedience not furnished, for instance lasting indignation, etc.” St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 717. Certainly the indignation of a father, master, etc., is an evil; and, if it is lasting, it is a grave evil. Wherefore, even with other evils excluded, for example blows, threats, etc., reverential fear per se is grave.

10. “It is one thing to operate with fear, but another from fear; for the first says concomitance. Whence what is done thus, although it is absolutely voluntary, nevertheless that voluntary does not arise from fear, but rather is opposed to and conquers that fear, which is a sign of a great will; as when Christ the Lord was going forth to death, fearing it, he embraced it with the highest will, which did not arise from fear of the Father and of men, and therefore conquered natural fear. But to be done from fear signifies that fear itself induces one to willing or doing something, and then fear is the cause of such voluntary, in the way in which among the acts of the will intention is the cause of election, and election of use; and love of good is the cause of hatred of the opposite evil. For in this way in the present matter, when someone fears death he decrees and intends to flee it; and by force of this decree he chooses this means, for example to cast merchandise into the sea, and use or execution follows upon this election. Therefore from first to last fear was the cause stirring and applying the will to that efficacious act by which it commanded that exterior action.” Suarez D. 3. S. 1.

11. Moreover, those things which are done from fear are more voluntary than involuntary: for they are voluntary simply, but involuntary in a certain respect. For each thing is such simply according as it is in act. But this act, according as it is exercised here and now, is simply willed; because although such an action considered per se is not lovable simply, nevertheless here and now it is proposed as absolutely to be chosen, as a fitting means for avoiding a greater evil. Therefore under that account it is here and now simply voluntary. For judgment concerning the voluntary must be borne with the thing considered in particular with all circumstances, and not through abstraction or precision of the intellect. “But that what is done through fear is taken as existing outside this case, according as it is repugnant to the will, this is only according to reason alone, and therefore it is involuntary in a certain respect, that is, according as it is considered as existing outside this case.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 6. Therefore that which is done through fear without condition is voluntary, that is, according as it is actually done; but it is involuntary under a condition, that is, if such fear were not impending.” St. Thomas, ibid. ad 3. “And because acts are in particulars, therefore it is simply voluntary, but involuntary in a certain respect.” St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 47. a. 1.; Suarez D. 3. S. 1. 2.

12. From what has been said the difference is clear between those things which are done from force and those which are done from fear. “Those things which are done through fear and through force differ not only according to present and future, but also according to this, that in that which is done through force the will does not consent, but is wholly against the motion of the will. But that which is done through fear becomes voluntary for this reason, that the motion of the will is borne into it, although not on account of itself, but on account of another thing, namely for repelling the evil which is feared. For it suffices for the account of the voluntary that it be on account of another voluntary thing. For voluntary is not only what we will on account of itself, but also what we will on account of another thing, as on account of an end. Therefore it is clear that in that which is done through force the interior will does nothing. But in that which is done through fear the will does something.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 6. ad 1.

13. Likewise the difference is clear between fear and concupiscence in relation to the voluntary. “In him who does something through fear there remains a repugnance of the will toward that which is done, according as it is considered in itself. But in him who does something through concupiscence, as is the incontinent man, the prior will does not remain, which was repudiating that which is desired concupiscently; but it is changed to willing that which before it repudiated. And therefore what is done through fear is in some way involuntary, but what is done through concupiscence is in no way involuntary. For the incontinent man of concupiscence acts against that which he previously proposed, but not against that which he now wills. But the fearful man acts against that which even now he wills according to itself.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 7. ad 2.

14. From the preceding doctrine it follows that a contract per se is valid, if someone has been coerced to contracting by grave fear, but nevertheless justly. Whence he who has contracted betrothals from fear of excommunication can be compelled to matrimony, and the contract is valid. C. Ex litteris 10, On Betrothals. He who has violated a virgin is compelled to endow or marry her. He who promised something lest he be accused of a committed crime is bound to give it. The reason is that fear does not render a contract simply involuntary. For he who contracts with grave fear, all things considered absolutely, wills and consents. But since the fear was struck justly, there is no injury. Wherefore the contract cannot be invalid either on account of defect of consent or on account of inflicted injury. — Nor indeed is a contract invalid of itself, if someone has been coerced to contract by grave fear but unjustly, although it can be rescinded at the judgment of him who suffered the fear. For consent is not lacking, since consent is altogether the same, whether the fear is just or unjust. But a contract cannot be rendered invalid from injury. For the immediate cause of the contract is consent, not injury. But because he who unjustly struck fear inflicted injury upon another, he is bound to restore him to the prior state, and the other has a right of exacting this restitution, which can be done only by rescission of the contract.

15. Now those things which are done from fear are involuntary in a certain respect, when the thing is evil in itself, but good only in the present circumstances, as is clear in the example adduced of the casting of merchandise by a merchant, which in itself is evil to him, but is good to him in the present circumstance of shipwreck. But if the thing is good in itself, so that it is such even by abstracting from the present circumstances, then he who operates from fear can be borne by a perfect inclination of the will into that thing, so that the voluntary simply is had, without at the same time having the involuntary in a certain respect. And thus he who from supernatural fear of Gehenna wills to abstain from sin has the voluntary simply without an admixture of the involuntary, because observance of the divine law is simply good in itself, even by abstracting from that circumstance of fear of the divine judgments. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 6. n. 442. Objection II. Moreover, “he who wills to preserve the precept from fear of hell, if he understands the force of that motive, cannot have a simple contrary affection: I would transgress the precept if there were no penalty, for through this very affection he would sin and would incur liability to the penalty, and consequently would act against his own motive. If therefore he is truly and efficaciously moved by that motive, and understands its force and the quality of his acts, it cannot happen that such an affection is with that motive.” Suarez D. 3. S. 2.

16. Whether importunate prayers constitute grave fear? — “Pontius affirms it, etc. But more truly it must be denied, unless the prayers are added to fear of reverence toward a Superior; thus Sanchez, etc. And Sanchez well notes that not all assiduous prayers are called importunate, but only those which are most insistent and more often inculcated.” St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 717.

17. Whether grave fear excuses from fault? — Either the discussion is of those things which are not intrinsically and per se evil, or of those things which from their nature are intrinsically evil, as would be, for example, apostasy from the faith, blasphemy against God. If the first, ordinarily speaking, grave fear excuses from all fault, because any positive law is not accustomed to oblige with grave proportionate inconvenience, as is common. It is said ordinarily speaking, because if someone by grave fear were compelled to the violation of some positive law which would yield to common harm, or to contempt of legitimate power, or of religion, with grave public scandal, then grave fear would not excuse from the fault of transgression; for in the first case the common good must be preferred to private good; but in the second the matter would now be concerning a thing intrinsically evil from its nature. But in this second case if the one suffering, when he violates the law, should protest publicly that he does not thus act in contempt of the law, but only to avoid violence, with which existing, he declares that the law no longer obliges, then, if public scandal ceases and the aforesaid contempt ceases, which, practically speaking, seems altogether difficult, he would be excused from fault. — If the second, it is certain that fear, however grave, provided that it is not such as to take away the use of reason, never excuses from all fault: for since those things include intrinsic and essential malice, if they are done voluntarily, they can never lack fault. An example is in that Christian who, struck by fear of punishments or even of death, would deny the faith of Christ. Nevertheless it diminishes fault, since it diminishes the voluntary. Yet, ordinarily speaking, grave fear still leaves such cognition of the things which are done as suffices for mortal sin. Busembaum apud St. Alphonsus, l. 1. n. 175.; Elbel 43-52.

18. Grave fear, for example of death, etc., often excuses not only from a positive precept, both divine and human, even ecclesiastical, but sometimes also from an affirmative natural precept; and thus someone is not bound with danger of life to receive baptism, to confess integrally, to receive communion, to preserve a deposit, to fulfill a vow, to aid a neighbor in extreme need of life. Lessius q. 6. a. 6.; Bus. apud St. Alphonsus, l. 1. n. 175. On the contrary, in order to avoid death a priest cannot violate the sacramental seal. Cf. Viva, On Human Acts.

19. Here the question is moved: whether a virgin is bound rather to permit herself to be killed than to be violated, if the invader of her chastity and life threatens death to her unless she consents to intercourse. — “There is a twofold opinion,” says St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 368. “The first, which Navarrus, Soto, Toledo, Lopez, and others hold, says that, although she can, nevertheless a woman is not bound to suffer death, but can then have herself permissively while intercourse happens, provided that by will she positively resists and the danger of consent is absent; because, as they say, that permission is not then moral cooperation, but only material, and therefore she is sufficiently excused on account of the danger of death. The second opinion, which the Salmanticenses hold with Lugo, Azor, Bonacina, Filliucci, Palaus, etc., teaches that this is altogether illicit, because, since the woman can impede intercourse, if, induced by fear, she rests, then her cooperation becomes truly moral and voluntary. For in a woman that rest in intercourse is reputed as action. Nevertheless this reason does not convince, because that rest of the woman in reality cannot be called action, since in no way is it positive. Therefore the first opinion, speculatively speaking, does not seem to lack its probability. Nevertheless it must not be denied that the second opinion in practice is altogether to be urged, at least on account of the danger of consent, which can easily be present in that permission.”

20. Likewise the question is moved: whether a woman coerced by grave fear to matrimony, that grave fear remaining, and then coerced by her husband to intercourse by a graver fear of death, can then, by consenting to the matrimony, render it valid and consent to intercourse. — There are some who affirm, because a law constituting a diriment impediment in favor of an innocent person whom it intends to protect would yield to his gravest harm. If it were otherwise, someone would now be cast into the inevitable necessity either of sinning, if she could scarcely trust that she can have herself merely passively, or of undergoing death, and this to preserve her liberty. But one’s own liberty is not necessarily to be preferred to preserving one’s own life. But much more probably it must be denied altogether. For invalidating laws per se directly regard the common good, and do not cease on account of a particular inconvenience, even though very grave. If the impediment in the case ceased, now in reality the impediment of fear would be none. For if the impediment ceases when there is question of consummation of the marriage, then it would have to be said that the impediment had ceased from the beginning, since, speaking per se, that grave fear by which the marriage is contracted is directed and extended all the way to its consummation. Sanchez, On Matrimony, l. 4. D. 18. n. 13 seq.; Tamburini, On Matrimony, Tr. 4. C. 7. § 4.; Mazzotta, On Matrimony, D. 3. Q. 2. C. 3. n. 2.

17. • DEFINITION. Fear is a trepidation of the mind on account of some present or future danger to oneself or to those closely connected.

DIVISION. Fear is commonly divided thus, namely:

1. Grave, or light fear, according as the evil feared is either grave, such as death, mutilation, hard imprisonment, notable detriment to reputation, great loss of goods, etc.; or, on the contrary, light, or a moderate inconvenience, such as the loss of a thing of slight moment, a small detriment to reputation, or even a grave one, but from a slight cause, or one which can easily be averted, etc.

But grave fear is absolutely or relatively so. Fear is called absolutely grave when evils truly grave in themselves are feared; but relatively grave when, although light in itself, it is nevertheless grave with respect to certain persons: thus children, women, the aged, are accustomed to be affected by a greater fear in the same danger than men of mature age.

2. Fear from within, or from without, according as it comes from an intrinsic cause, for example from disease, from infirmity of mind, etc., or from an extrinsic cause, whether free, namely from man, or necessary or natural, as from the elements, contagion, etc.

3. Fear justly or unjustly struck, according as the cause is just, for example that of deserved punishments, which is brought on; or unjust, that is, it is struck by injury.

Reverential fear also must be added, which is had when someone fears lest he have offended his parents or other Superiors. It is referred to just or unjust fear according as its cause is just or unjust. But it can be grave, if there is a prudent fear lest those who strike fear be held offended for a long time or gravely.

18. Principles. - I. An act posited from fear, however grave, is simply and absolutely voluntary and free. The reason is that through fear cognition on the part of the intellect is not taken away, unless the mind is utterly disturbed, nor election on the part of the will, which always enjoys the faculty of determining itself to the opposite. - St. Lig., no. 21. - Hence those have always been held as apostates who, conquered by fear of torments, denied the Faith.

II. Those things which are done from fear, even if they are simply voluntary, nevertheless regularly ¹ are also involuntary in a certain respect: whence also the gravity of fault is lessened. The reason is that when someone is impelled to act by fear alone, he so acts that, fear being absent, he would flee from acting; and therefore a work done from fear alone has joined with it a certain sadness and repugnance of the will, although inefficacious.

¹ It is said regularly; because sorrow for sins which is elicited from fear of divine vengeance excludes every account of true involuntary, or every deliberate affection toward sin.

III. If fear takes away the use of reason, the act, as is clear, can in no way be voluntary. But if it does not indeed take away the use of reason, but notably impedes it, the act will be imperfectly voluntary on account of imperfect cognition of the thing.

IV. Fear light in every respect, at least in the external forum ², is not considered an efficacious cause of acts. For it is presumed that fear of this sort could easily have been contemned, and thus that the man acted entirely of his own accord.

² It is said in the external forum; because it is a mere presumption, since otherwise even light fear can in reality be the cause of acting, so that the act is indeed simply voluntary, yet also involuntary in a certain respect; and although light fear cannot excuse from any grave obligation, nevertheless, if it is unjustly struck, it probably gives the right in the forum of conscience that one not be obliged to a contract entered into from such fear. - St. Alphonsus, book 3, no. 718.

19. You Will Resolve. - 1. Light fear can never excuse from grave sin where the matter of the violated precept is grave.

2. Even grave fear does not excuse of itself from mortal sin, nor make a mortal sin venial, whenever the violation yields to contempt of the Faith or Religion, and generally whenever the law does not cease on account of some grave inconvenience, as will be said below in the Treatise on Laws, no. 108. Moreover, this kind of danger being removed, grave fear excuses from human law; because the legislator is not considered to wish to urge the obligation of the law with so great an inconvenience ³.

³ But when fear exempts a delinquent from censures or other penalties, or when it impedes the value of acts, is disputed in its own places, where Vow, Contracts, Marriage, Censures, etc., are treated.

3. Fear, if it disturbs reason, excuses from mortal sin, as was said above, where concupiscence was treated, no. 15.

4. Fear coming from within or from natural causes does not prevent the act elicited from it from being simply voluntary, and able to be valid: thus a vow made from fear of death in the midst of shipwreck, or in grave sickness, is valid. - Reuter, no. 20. - Billuart, diss. 1, art. 7. - Elbel, no. 48. - See Cases, no. 17 and following.

Fear is: 1. either grave or light; 2. induced by an intrinsic or extrinsic cause, necessary or free, just or unjust; 3. struck in order to contract, or for another end. - Recall the things said in the Treatise on Human Acts, n. 17 and following.

780. Principles. - I. Any fear whatever so disturbing the use of reason that it excuses from grave fault wholly invalidates the contract which follows from it by every law. The reason is that then the consent required for contracting is lacking, whether fear altogether takes away the use of reason or so impedes it that consent cannot be called full and perfect.

II. No contract from fear arising from an intrinsic source, or from a necessary, or natural, cause is invalid, unless perhaps he who contracts from fear was not master of himself. The reason is that no injury is inflicted upon the contracting party, and from another side he preserves sufficient liberty. The same must be said if fear has been struck by a free cause, or by a man, for a just cause; hence a deflowerer compelled by grave but just fear to marry the girl whom he seduced contracts validly.

III. More probably ¹ no contract, at least an onerous one, entered from light fear is invalid, nor rescindable at the will of him who suffered the fear. The reason is that fear light from whatever source is reputed as nothing in law, since it can easily be contemned. - For otherwise very grave inconveniences would follow in human commerce, since light fear is most frequent. Thus St. Lig., Hom. apost., tract. 10, n. 125, etc. Lugo contradicts, however, with others whose sentence is called probable by St. Alphonsus, especially if the fear, although light, is the sole cause of contracting.

¹ Since the Doctors dispute concerning these matters on each side, this matter perhaps claims for itself a more fitting place among Questions than among Principles.

I said, at least an onerous one; for if it is a question of gratuitous contracts, contracts of this kind more probably seem void whenever light fear has been unjustly struck for extorting consent of this kind. For it is essential to these contracts that they proceed from benevolent and spontaneous liberality. Nevertheless, the opposite sentence has seemed probable to others ².

² If probability requires a prudent judgment, and therefore one resting upon some solid reason, it scarcely appears whence probability can be procured for this opinion. For since a gratuitous contract proceeds by its own nature from spontaneous liberality, therefore consent extorted by fear, which on that account someone unwillingly elicits, is repugnant to the nature of the same.

781. Questions. - It is asked, 1. Whether grave fear struck by the counterparty in order to contract invalidates a contract, if it by no means disturbs reason?

I reply, 1. By the sentence of all, contracts of this kind are rescindable, whether they are gratuitous or onerous.

I reply, 2. As regards gratuitous contracts, affirmatively. For this is clear a fortiori from what has been said concerning light fear. And surely if a contract of this kind were valid, he who strikes fear would acquire a right in the thing handed over or promised to him; but this is repugnant, both because the intention of giving gratuitously is lacking, and because right cannot arise from injustice ³. - Thus commonly. - St. Lig., n. 716, admits this as probable.

³ Understand that he who inflicts injury cannot through this acquire a right against the injured person, since rather he contracts the obligation of repairing the injury.

I reply, 3. As regards onerous contracts, it is very much controverted, and a twofold probable sentence is given.

The first, more common sentence affirms that contracts of this kind are valid. For he who suffers fear truly and absolutely wills to contract from the motion of his own will. - Thus St. Lig., ibid. - Lugo, and others.

The second sentence teaches that those contracts are plainly void from natural law. The reason is that otherwise right would arise from injustice; and accordingly he who strikes fear could retain the thing extorted without injustice up to the sentence of the judge, which nevertheless nearly all the adversaries deny. Nor should you say that compensation is given in an onerous contract through money paid or an equivalent handed over; for often it is harder for the proprietor to alienate his own thing from himself than to grant money gratuitously from fear. Moreover, in practice these sentences do not differ very much, since each finally resolves the question in favor of the coerced person, as we have already said concerning a similar case, n. 777.

Notice nevertheless that from canon law contracts elicited from grave fear are certainly invalid where the question is: 1. about marriage, and probably also about betrothals; 2. about the handing over of things of the Church and the renunciation of a benefice; 3. about a vow and religious profession; 4. probably also about ecclesiastical jurisdiction and absolution from censures ⁴.

⁴ The question concerning ecclesiastical jurisdiction extorted through fear must be distinguished from the question concerning absolution from censures. For this latter is manifestly declared void in law, just as Gregory X decreed in the Ecumenical Council of Lyons (cap. unic. de iis quae vi metusve causa fiunt in VI): "The benefit of absolution from a sentence of excommunication, or any revocation whatever of it, or of suspension, or even of interdict, extorted by force or fear, by the authority of the present constitution we wholly empty of force" (see Lugo, disp. 22, n. 129). But it must be said otherwise concerning the former, for whose invalidity only L. 2 De Iudic. is brought forward, which law does nothing to the matter, since it speaks about a judge to whose jurisdiction litigants are not subject, which it declares to be null if, when any one of the litigants had resisted, he was compelled by the powers of the Praetura. Hence De Lugo (disp. 22, n. 131) calls more probable the sentence of those who hold jurisdiction of this kind to be valid. This sentence can sometimes be of use, so that, a reasonable cause requiring it, someone may use this less certain jurisdiction for absolving, even if he suspects that jurisdiction has been conferred by a superior on account of some fear.

782. • It is asked, 2. Whether a contract entered because of reverential fear is rescindable?

I reply negatively, more probably ⁵, because it does not seem of itself a sufficient cause for rescinding a contract, unless at the same time it includes grave fear, suppose of long-lasting indignation, etc. Likewise even most importunate prayers do not constitute grave fear, unless perhaps they are joined with reverential fear toward a Superior. - Sanchez. - Salm. and others commonly. - See St. Lig., n. 717.

⁵ It could be answered more briefly and clearly: affirmatively, when reverential fear can be held grave; otherwise, negatively. But when reverential fear is equivalent to grave or light fear is supposed to have been handed down in the Treatise On Human Acts.

It is asked, 3. Whether a contract is void, or rescindable by private authority, if grave and unjust fear is struck by a third party only, so that the other party is not a participant in the injury?

I reply. It is controverted. The first probable sentence affirms, because by reason of the injury, even inflicted by a third party, the thing remains bound to the prior owner, and consequently passes with that burden to any persons whatever; nor is it fitting that someone should lose every right in his own thing through another's injury. - Billuart, etc.

The second sentence, and itself probable, denies; because, since neither party committed injury, no reason from the nature of the thing is present why the contract should be void, and why it could be rescinded at the pleasure of one party when the other is unwilling. - Lugo, disp. 22, n. 117 ⁶. - Reuter, n. 126.

⁶ Lugo (l.c.) holds, speaking of natural law, that it cannot be rescinded unless he who inflicted the fear somehow makes one thing with the contracting party against whom it was to be rescinded, but that an action is given to the one who suffered fear against him who inflicted the fear, for the damage inflicted. These are Lugo's views, with natural law considered; for (ibid., n. 118) concerning positive law he holds, with the common sentence, that the contracts are valid but to be annulled, excepting some which by the same positive law are void.

783. • It is asked, 4. What if grave fear indeed was unjustly struck, but not for extorting consent?

I reply. It is controverted, but it seems that one must distinguish thus: 1. If fear has been struck by the other of the contracting parties, the contract is not valid, or at least is rescindable, because he who strikes fear is bound to remove all the inconveniences which proceed from the injury. Reuter, n. 127. - Lugo, disp. 22, n. 177, etc.... - 2. It is otherwise if the fear comes from a third party, because none of the contracting parties inflicted injury; but the third party who inflicts fear cannot take away the obligation of the contract by consenting to its rescission, since the contract was not entered with him; nevertheless he is bound to induce toward rescission, so that he may avert the injury from the innocent person, if the latter wishes. Hence a purchase of a sword made from fear of your enemy is valid. Lugo, n. 178, excepts the contract of marriage, which he thinks is invalid if entered from such fear. Others except also gratuitous contracts, because thus better provision is made for the innocent person, and the other cannot complain, since he is deprived only of gain and remains in the state in which he was before; and just as he himself would not wish to be obliged in those circumstances, so also he ought not to oblige the other.

784. You will resolve. - 1. If you threaten someone caught in theft that you will report him to the injured master, or to the guard, or to the judge, unless he promises you a certain gift, the promise holds, nor are you bound to return the gift received, unless perhaps in the judgment of a prudent man it seems excessive ⁷. This is also true even if you had not had the intention of reporting him, but only of frightening him, because you would cede from your right of doing that, which is estimable by price. - Elbel, n. 307. - Reuter, n. 120.

⁷ Concerning this case Roman law has thus: If the thief gave something lest he be betrayed, since the baseness of each one (namely, of the giver and of the receiver) is involved, repetition ceases, that is, an action is denied for recovering what had been given. And again: If you have received something from my fugitive slave, lest you reveal him, I can condict this from you, as from a thief (L. Idem 4, sects. 1 and 4, De condictione ob turpem causam). To these things Johannes Voet (book 12, title 5, n. 3): "To him whose interest it was that something was not given for a base cause, condiction of the things given is read as granted; as, for instance, to the master from whose fugitive or thieving slave you had received money lest you reveal him." From these things it is sufficiently gathered that this question almost falls back into a contract concerning a base thing. Therefore, rather than saying that he who promises silence to the thief cedes from his right, perhaps it must be said that he departs from an office either of justice, or charity, or legal justice or charity toward the republic; and that no other title of receiving or retaining things received from the thief is at hand for him, except that he exposes himself to some danger or damage, whether spiritual or temporal. Compare De Lugo (disp. 19, nn. 103-104) and Molina (De Iust. et Iur., tract. 2, disp. 735, n. 3), who deny that promised silence, if the aforesaid dangers of damage are absent, is estimable by any price and therefore that the accepted price can be retained.

2. If Titius inflicted fear upon you so that you would hand over some thing to Caius, the contract does not hold. For if Caius, at the time at which he accepts the thing from you, knows the injury inflicted on you, he himself is judged to inflict fear through Titius. But if he knows it afterward, he is to be assimilated to a possessor in good faith, who must restore the thing possessed as soon as he discovers it is another's. - Billuart, diss. 1, art. 4.

3. If someone prepares damage for you from mere malevolence, and therefore asks nothing from you, but you of your own accord promise money so that you may escape unharmed, you are not bound to hand it over; because although fear was not in order to contracting, nevertheless it has for its object only the cessation of unjust vexation. But the vexer cannot sell this cessation; therefore whatever he acquires in this way he receives as a possessor in bad faith, and therefore he must restore it. - Billuart, ibid.

4. If a traveler, oppressed by a robber, calls upon a passing man for help by promising him money, the promise is valid, because fear is not its cause, but only the occasion; and from another side the help furnished by the passerby is estimable by price. Nevertheless, if the sum were enormous, it would have to be diminished. - See Cases, n. 785 and following.

Notion. Not with every absolute force, but with conditional force, or force according to something, is fear connected as an ordinary effect. It is defined: a trepidation of mind on account of an imminent or future danger (L. 1. D. IV, 2). Therefore force and fear are customarily treated conjointly. Harm in one's own goods is equated with personal danger, proportion being observed.

Division. Fear is divided: 1. From its degree or quality: into fear disturbing the use of reason, which takes away the voluntary; and into fear not disturbing it, which gives place to deliberation and consent. The motive of this latter is flight from an apprehended danger or harm. This latter again is divided into grave fear, which absolutely, that is, with the nature of the evil considered, or relatively, that is, with attention to the age, sex, and disposition of the person, is accustomed vehemently to affect the mind; and into light fear, which is the dread of a slight danger, or even of a great one, but one not probably impending. Fear absolutely grave is said to fall upon a constant man.

Reverential fear, or the fear of displeasing a father or Superior, or of offending him, is in itself light; but easily, from added circumstances of threats, importunate prayers, long-lasting enmities which are foreseen as future, it is converted into grave fear. Controversies about the nature of reverential fear are to be explained by confused notions rather than by the objective obscurity of the thing.

2. From its cause, fear is divided into fear from within and fear from without, according as it has a cause interior or exterior to the one fearing. But a necessary exterior cause, such as a fire or shipwreck, is practically assimilated to an interior cause.

Fear inflicted by an exterior free cause is again distinguished as just or unjust: it is just if, with attention to the matter and the manner, the one inflicting fear has used his right; unjust, if, at least by reason of the manner, he has violated justice. Thus one who, after receiving an offense, threatens the offender with a lawsuit and legitimate penalties inflicts just fear; one who threatens grave private vengeance acts unjustly by reason of the manner.

Sometimes, moreover, it must be considered whether fear was or was not inflicted in order to extort consent to some certain thing.

I. Influence on the voluntary. Omitting fear by which reason is disturbed, those things which are done from fear are voluntary simply, and for the most part involuntary according to something. They are voluntary simply, because deliberation is not lacking; for the most part they are involuntary according to something, because what is done from fear alone is not of itself lovable, indeed it brings sadness. Yet other reasons besides fear can accede, on account of which the action becomes pleasing; and the very reason of fear can require that every involuntary element be excluded. Thus sorrow for sins which is elicited from fear of divine vengeance virtually excludes every affection for sin. For while affection for sin remains, divine vengeance remains to be feared.

II. How it operates. Fear also can operate beyond its own power as an impulsive cause, provided powers are supplied from elsewhere. Thus, although an act of charity is not contained in the power of fear, a man can be moved by fear to accept the grace of an act of charity.

III. The guilt of one acting from fear. He who has acted badly from grave fear sins less, yet gravely, while there remains a grave obligation which, because of fear, is placed after another consideration; and even in the external forum he is judged more or less worthy of pardon. In canon 2205, §§ 2 and 3, these principles are established: "Fear... grave fear, even only relatively grave... for the most part completely takes away the delict, if the question is of merely ecclesiastical laws. But if the act is intrinsically evil (1), or tends toward contempt of the faith (2) or of ecclesiastical authority (3), or toward harm of souls (4), the causes of which in § 2 diminish indeed the imputability of the delict, but do not take it away." The agent will always be excused, however, if the law by the words "if he shall have presumed" or similar words requires the fully voluntary (c. 2229, 2°).

Wherefore, with attention to fear, the judge will temper the penalty (canon 2218); and grave fear will excuse from penalties latae sententiae, unless, however, "the delict tends toward contempt of the faith or of ecclesiastical authority, or toward public harm of souls" (2229, 3°).

IV. Acts invalid from fear. By law, at least positive law, several acts done from fear become invalid:

a) "Invalid... is a marriage entered upon because of force or grave fear inflicted from without and unjustly, from which, in order that one may free himself, he is compelled to choose marriage" (c. 1087 § 1°);

b) "They are invalidly admitted to the novitiate... who enter religion induced by force, by grave fear..., or whom the Superior receives induced in the same manner" (c. 542, 1);

c) For the validity of any religious profession it is required that... "4° the profession be emitted without force or grave fear..." (c. 572 § 1);

d) "A vow emitted from grave and unjust fear is null by the law itself" (c. 1307 § 3);

e) "A renunciation made because of grave unjust fear inflicted... is void by the law itself" (c. 185). There it is a question of the renunciation of an office; and the same holds concerning the renunciation of a benefice.

V. Although an oath extorted through grave fear and sacred ordination accepted because of fear are said to be valid, nevertheless an oath "can be relaxed by an ecclesiastical Superior" (c. 1317); and he who, after he received a sacred order coerced by grave fear, has not ratified the ordination once the fear has been removed, has contracted no obligation of celibacy and of the canonical hours, and will obtain from the judge that he be reduced to the lay state (c. 214, § 1).

Finally this general rule is established: "Acts placed from grave fear unjustly inflicted... are valid, unless something else is provided by law; but they can, according to the norm of cc. 1684-1689, be rescinded by sentence of the judge, whether at the petition of the injured party, or ex officio" (c. 103, § 2).

N.B. Concerning the individual cases in which acts are weakened, at least by positive law, on account of grave fear, a more distinct treatment will be given in its own place.

By the name "phobias" commonly are meant fears vain in themselves, by which not a few persons today are struck and are impeded from various acts. They are vain, however, insofar as they exist beyond the merit of the cause, or even without a cause. These "phobias" are accustomed to arise in a physically weaker subject through the occasion of some fact, accident, or narration by which he has been greatly moved. In act they are not rarely invincible, and then they will excuse from sins of omission. Prudent psychotherapy, which for the most part will not be too direct or violent, must be applied to remove them, diminish them, or at least restrain them lest they become worse.

But it will be more useful by wise education to render the mind immune from them beforehand. Therefore parents will take care that by no tales are children led or disposed to vain fears; they will forbid them books or spectacles by which the phantasy is excessively excited; indeed they will provoke them to a certain moderate boldness. And in our own case, we ourselves will strongly attack the first beginnings of excessive fear, and will neglect nothing in order that we may rather make little of present evils, lay aside every "egoism," or excessive solicitude for one's own body and one's own advantage, and acquire for ourselves strength of mind. Cf. the things usefully written by several authors concerning the formation of the will.

This must be held as a principle: It is placed in our hand whether we undergo or shake off the yoke of physical evil. If we undergo it, we shall be unhappy and often morally impotent; if we shake it off, we shall be morally free and shall preserve happiness intact.

In a religious matter also, if certain terrors, yet to be inspired by true arguments and not others, can be useful in act, habitual terror is harmful. Indeed we are commanded to fear God, but with filial fear which is combined with the spirit of adoption of sons, in which we cry "Abba," Father (Rom. 8, 15).

67. Notion. Fear is customarily defined as "a trembling of the mind because of an imminent or future danger."⁵⁷ It is said: a trembling of the mind, to signify not a purely sensible fear, insofar as it is the passion of fear, but fear which is perceived by the mind and affects the will. Fear accepted in this sense properly moves the will to doing or omitting something because of an impending evil. But the evil which causes fear is not yet present; for if it is actually present, it causes sadness and not fear. Yet there is present the danger of an imminent or future evil, and indeed of an arduous evil which cannot easily be avoided. For if such an evil can easily be avoided, it does not cause fear. Nor is it necessarily required that the evil threaten the very person of the agent, but it suffices that it also threaten persons joined to the agent. Hence, for example, a father can be struck by grave fear because of an evil which threatens his son.

⁵⁷ Thus Ulpian (Ad edict. Praetoris l. 1, D. IV, 2); this definition indeed is already found according to its sense in Aristotle, Rhetoric l. 2, c. 5: fear is a pain or disturbance arising from an image of a future destructive or painful evil.

68. Divisions. Among the many divisions of fear or dread, the following are the more principal:

1. Fear struck from within or from without. The former is caused by a cause intrinsic to man or by a natural cause, for example, from illness, a storm, contagion, etc. The latter is caused by a free extrinsic cause, for example, by a man, a demon, etc.⁵⁸

2. Grave and light fear. Grave fear arises from the imminent danger of a grave evil, for example, of death, mutilation, grave beating, grave infamy, the loss of a notable quantity of goods, etc., and is said "to fall upon a constant man," that is, it moves not only women and timid men, but also a constant man. - Grave fear is either absolutely grave or only relatively grave. That fear is considered absolutely grave which is accustomed to move every man and whose object is truly grave. That fear is considered relatively grave whose object is indeed in itself light, which nevertheless vehemently moves a determined person because of his special qualities; for example, a timid daughter vehemently fears her father's punishment, which nevertheless, taken objectively, is not so grave an evil. - Light fear is that by which either a light evil is feared, or there is present a light danger of a grave evil; for example, if some robust person because of fear of rain, dust, or mud were to omit Mass on a feast day.

Note. Reverential fear, by which a subject fears the offense or indignation of a superior, for example, a son fears the offense of his father,⁵⁹ is customarily reduced to light fear (at least in the external forum). But in the internal forum reverential fear sometimes becomes grave, namely, if the offense of the superior is held as a grave evil; for example, if the offense of the superior is lasting, if threats and very troublesome quarrels are deservedly feared. But in order that reverential fear be held grave, even in the external forum, strict proof is required, namely, that the reverential fear is qualified, that is, that the offense and indignation of the superior cause grave evils. This case indeed can occur if the validity of marriage is impugned because of a defect of consent caused by reverential fear.⁶⁰

3. Fear justly and unjustly struck. Fear is justly struck when it is caused by a legitimate person and in due manner. Thus, for example, the father of a deflowered daughter strikes just fear into her deflowerer if he threatens to hand him over to the judge. Fear is unjustly struck when someone threatens another with evil without sufficient cause or even altogether injuriously. Thus, for example, there would be unjust fear if the same father threatened the deflowerer of his daughter with death unless he were willing to take the deflowered daughter as wife; still more unjust is the fear which a robber casts upon a traveler, saying: Your life or your purse!

4. Antecedent and concomitant fear. The former precedes the action and causes it; for it moves the will to acting. Whence he who suffers such fear acts from fear; for example, a traveler from antecedent fear is moved to giving money to a robber. - The other fear accompanies the action which it not only does not cause, but rather would impede, if this were possible. Thus in the example brought forward the robber receives the money from the traveler with dread or fear; for he fears lest he be seized and punished by the judge. Concerning concomitant fear we shall no longer speak in what follows.

⁵⁸ Thus Laymann (Theol. mor. l. 1, tract. 2, c. 6, n. 3), D'Annibale (Summula Theol. mor. I, 138), Aertnys-Damen (Theol. mor. I, n. 19), and others explain this division. Other authors understand the same division otherwise, calling fear struck from without that which is struck by any extrinsic cause whatever. Thus, for example, Noldin (De principiis n. 55) calls fear of death from shipwreck fear from without. There is indeed no need to dispute about words, but confusions must be carefully avoided. Besides, all agree that fear caused by an external natural or necessary cause is assimilated to fear struck from within.

⁵⁹ Cf. Act. Ap. Sed. IV (1912), 647, in the Lyons case.

⁶⁰ Cf. below, in the treatise on marriage, the impediment of defect of consent. On the diverse acceptations of reverential fear see D'Annibale, l. c. In practice these controversies are of small utility.

69. What influence does fear exercise upon human acts?

Principle 1. Antecedent fear takes away the voluntary if it is so vehement that it impedes the use of reason; otherwise it is accustomed only to diminish it.

It is explained: a) It is evident from experience that sometimes fear is so grave, especially in timid men, that the use of reason is entirely taken away; indeed women, from sudden fear, not rarely lose consciousness. It is plain of itself that in these cases a voluntary act does not subsist.

b) Apart from those cases, no fear entirely takes away the voluntary. The reason is that under the influence of fear sufficient cognition of the intellect persists and the will remains free. For if not even physical violence itself is able to coerce the will, as was said above, a fortiori fear, however grave, cannot do this. Hence that known adage: "He who prefers, wills." Yet it is conceded that fear diminishes the voluntary; for when fear is absent the action would not occur, and a man under the influence of fear indeed acts, but with internal repugnance. For this reason the scholastics briefly and truly said: An act produced from fear is voluntary simply and involuntary in a certain respect.⁶¹

But the same scholastics immediately added a clause to this proposition, namely: Fear causes the involuntary in a certain respect only when the work produced because of fear is evil accepted according to itself, for example, to throw goods into the sea, but not truly when it is evil only under some particular respect, while in itself it is good, as to lay aside affection toward sin because of fear of hell is a work good in itself, although it appears evil to the sinner not yet penitent. This clause indeed seems altogether necessary. For he who from fear of hell observes the commandments of God and declines from sins does not act with an imperfect and indirect voluntary, as if observance of the commandments were involuntary to him in a certain respect. For then (acting from purely servile fear) he would still have an evil affection toward prohibited things, nor could he be pleasing to God. But the reason is that observance of the commandments, although perhaps first begun by fear of hell, is nevertheless in itself something good; and it can, indeed also must, be intended, even if there were no hell. Whence it follows that good operations which are done from fear of hell (yet not from purely servile fear) are not less voluntary, nor do they lose their moral goodness.⁶²

Corollary. From the principle thus established it is deduced that sin which from its object is mortal, or that which is intrinsically gravely evil, never becomes venial, however much it is done from fear; for it always remains sufficiently voluntary.⁶³ Hence if someone denies the faith from fear of death, or if someone fornicates from grave fear, he sins gravely. It is otherwise with those things which are not intrinsically evil, but evil because prohibited by positive law, as will be said at once.

⁶¹ St. Thomas says that those things which we do from fear "are voluntary simply and involuntary in a certain respect" (S. theol. I-II, q. 6, a. 6). But if the same Angelic Doctor elsewhere (ibid. II-II, q. 142, a. 3) says that those things which are done from fear "are not simply voluntary, but mixed," he does not contradict himself, but takes the word "simply" in another sense, namely, for "purely" or "altogether" or "from every part."

⁶² Billuart, De act. hum. diss. 1, a. 7, and John of St. Thomas, Commentary on S. theol. I-II, q. 6 at the end, discuss very well this sufficiently difficult matter, which is of great moment for the right understanding of attrition.

⁶³ Cf. Code of Canon Law, c. 2205, § 3.

70. Principle 2. Positive laws (whether divine or human) are not accustomed to oblige under grave fear, or, as it is said, they do not oblige with grave inconvenience.⁶⁴

It is explained: Acts prescribed by those laws are not so good that their omission is intrinsically evil, and therefore legislators are not considered to have had the intention of obliging their subjects to the observance of the law even in such great straits. Hence, for example, no one is bound to hear Mass on days of precept if he reasonably fears grave bodily or material harm; no one is bound to satisfy the positive precept of confessing all mortal sins if there is present grave danger of some great inconvenience, which is accidentally and extrinsically joined with confession.⁶⁵ The guardian of a money-chest, because he is driven by robbers under fear of death or wounding to handing over the key of the chest, can hand it over.

But I have said: Positive laws are not accustomed to oblige under grave fear; for sometimes positive laws oblige even with danger of life, namely: a) when otherwise the common good would be endangered - wherefore a soldier is bound to remain at his watch, although he fears the greatest danger of death; b) when transgression of the law would yield to contempt of the faith or of ecclesiastical power or to the harm of souls.^65a Hence the Maccabees, whom the tyrant threatened with death unless they ate swine's flesh in contempt of the law, preferred to undergo death rather than violate the commandment of the Mosaic law. Yet in this latter case the obligation comes rather from natural law, that is, from the obligation of avoiding scandal, than from positive law.

⁶⁴ Code of Canon Law, c. 2205, § 2, establishes: "Grave fear, even only relatively so ... commonly takes away a delict entirely, if there is question of merely ecclesiastical laws."

⁶⁵ Cf. below, On the Integrity of Confession, II, n. 328.

^65a Code of Canon Law, c. 2205, § 3.

71. Principle 3. a) Acts and contracts entered into from grave fear unjustly struck in order to extort consent are indeed valid of themselves; b) yet they can afterward be rescinded; c) indeed some contracts (or acts) entered into from fear are declared by positive law invalid of themselves. This principle has also been established by the Code of Canon Law, c. 103, § 2.

It is explained: a) Fear is not accustomed to take away the voluntary, as was said. But for the validity of an act or contract nothing else is required of itself than the voluntary consent of those contracting and a fit thing.⁶⁶

There are some authors, for example Billuart,⁶⁷ who think that those contracts whose object is only liberation from vexation or from unjust fear are invalid by natural law, because this liberation from vexation or from unjust fear is already owed from justice and therefore cannot be sold. But this reason does not seem to be sufficient, because otherwise all contracts entered from unjust fear would be invalid; yet this is not true. And truly he who enters some contract because of grave fear always wishes to free himself from unjust vexation. Hence he who gave a sum of money to a robber threatening death entered into a valid contract, but afterward can compel the robber to restitution.

b) He who enters a contract from grave fear unjustly struck has suffered a grave injury, from which he can free himself through rescission of the contract, as positive laws also rightly establish.⁶⁸ This matter will be treated more broadly below, II, n. 258.

c) Certain contracts or acts are invalidated by positive ecclesiastical law by the very fact that they are entered into under grave fear, for example, vows,⁶⁹ entrance or admission into the novitiate and religious profession,⁷⁰ marriage contracted from grave fear unjustly struck,⁷¹ a vote in an ecclesiastical election,⁷² absolution from censures and other ecclesiastical penalties,⁷³ renunciation of ecclesiastical offices.⁷⁴

⁶⁶ Billuart, De contractibus diss. 1, a. 4. St. Alphonsus (Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 716) calls this opinion more probable and most common. But many teach the contrary, for example, Laymann (Theol. mor. l. 1, tract. 2, c. 6).

⁶⁷ L. c.

⁶⁸ Cf. Code of Canon Law, c. 1684.

⁶⁹ Ibid. c. 1307, § 3.

⁷⁰ Council of Trent, sess. 25, on regulars, c. 19; Code of Canon Law, c. 542, n. 1; c. 572, § 1, n. 4.

⁷¹ Code of Canon Law, c. 1087.

⁷² C. 3 in VI, I, 6; Code of Canon Law, c. 169.

⁷³ Code of Canon Law, c. 2238.

⁷⁴ Code of Canon Law, c. 185.

St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 6, a. 6; St. Alphonsus, V, n. XX; ed. G., II, p. 693; VI, n. 1047 ff.; ed. G., IV, p. 193; Bain, Les emotions et la volonte, p. 147.

285. DEFINITION. Fear is trepidation of mind, on account of an evil present or future: namely an evil present either to the very person who fears, or to another who is closely joined to him by blood-relationship, affinity, marriage, or singular friendship (V, n. XX).

Fear can be present on account of an evil apprehended in the mind alone as present and imminent.

DIVISION. Fear is divided in many ways:

1. By reason of influence upon the act, it is antecedent or concomitant. Antecedent is that which moves one to acting, so that the action is said to proceed FROM fear. Concomitant is that which only accompanies the action, without influencing it in any way, so that the action is said to be done WITH fear.

Thus a traveler who gives a purse to a robber acts from antecedent fear; but the robber acts with concomitant fear, lest he be discovered.

2. By reason of object, fear is light or grave. Light fear, which is also called vain, is that by which a light evil is feared, or even a grave one, but from a light and improbable cause. Grave fear is said to be present if a grave evil is feared from a very probable cause.

But fear: a) is grave absolutely if an evil grave in itself is feared from a grave and truly probable cause, and cannot be escaped: this fear is said to fall upon a constant man, as being that by which even a firm man is deservedly struck. Commonly grave evils are judged to be death, mutilation, a foul wound, loss of liberty, status, reputation, chastity. b) It is grave respectively if the evil which is feared is indeed in itself and commonly light, yet grave with respect to the one fearing, because he is fearful, such as children, women, old men are (V, n. XX; VI, 1047; H. Ap., III, 16).

Reverential fear must be added, by which a son fears the offense of parents, a ward of a guardian, a wife of a husband, a subject of a Superior. But it can be grave if the fear is lest he who strikes fear be held offended for a long time or gravely (III, 717; VI, 1056; H. Ap., l. c.).

3. By reason of cause, fear is from within or from without. That is said to be from within which comes from an internal cause, such as disease, weakness of mind, etc.; or also, in a broader sense, that which comes from any natural cause whatever, for example, from shipwreck, fire, an attack of wild beasts, etc.; but that is said to be from without which comes from an external and free cause, or from man (VI, 1049).

4. By reason of the mode by which it is struck, fear is just or unjust, according as it is struck from a just cause, for example, of merited penalties, or from an unjust one, that is, through injury.

286. PRINCIPLES. I. Grave fear regularly does not take away, but lessens the voluntary. The reason for the first is, because through fear neither knowledge on the part of the intellect nor choice on the part of the will is taken away, which always enjoys the faculty of determining itself to the opposite. Hence those who denied the faith from fear of torments have always been held as apostates. The reason for the second is, because since fear has joined to it repugnance of the will, the action becomes involuntary in a certain respect: whence the voluntary is lessened, as is clear (V, n. XXI).

We have said regularly; for sometimes fear altogether takes away the voluntary, namely if it is so great that it takes away the use of reason; but this is per accidens, and fear, in such a case, takes on rather the nature of passion, concerning which it will be said n. 290.

II. Light fear neither takes away nor lessens the voluntary. Hence that saying of right: "Vain fear is not a just excuse."

Note. Fear sometimes excuses from law, or at least from penalty, as we saw in the treatise on Laws (n. 223); sometimes it stands against the value of an act, as we shall see below when we dispute concerning vows, oaths, contracts, and matrimony. For from the fact that fear does not take away the voluntary, it does not follow that all things are firm and valid which are done under the influence of fear (V, n. XXII).

S. Th. I-II, q. 6, a. 6.

71. Fear or dread is a passion of the irascible sensitive appetite by which we flee a future sensible evil difficult to avoid. Here it is taken for every movement by which we flee from evil, whether it is a movement of passion or of will; and it is usually defined: a trembling of the mind (that is, unrest and disturbance) on account of an imminent or future evil or danger. It differs from coercion, because the latter physically acts upon the powers of man and is from an extrinsic principle; but the cause which provokes fear is a moral cause which influences by way of a known object, namely, by proposing danger. Hence fear is from an intrinsic principle with knowledge.

72. Fear is divided:

1. By reason of cause, it is either taken up, if it comes from a natural cause, whether intrinsic, such as sickness or weakness of mind, or extrinsic, such as shipwreck, fire, or an encounter with beasts; or inflicted, if it comes from an external free cause, God, the devil, or man. This, by reason of mode, is just when the one causing fear has a right to cause fear and causes it in a legitimate mode, for example a father or judge by due punishments; or unjust when he does not have the right to cause fear or causes it in an illegitimate mode, whether it is done to extort something, for example a contract or vow, or for another end, for example revenge.

2. By reason of intensity, fear is grave when the evil which is feared is great and certainly or probably imminent; and light when a light evil is feared, or a grave one but not probably imminent.

The former is absolutely grave, when the evil considered in itself from its nature is great, e.g., death, grave wounding or mutilation, harsh prison, exile, rape, notable infamy, loss of status or of a great part of goods: this is accustomed to fall upon a constant man and a man of strong spirit; or relatively grave, when the evil is grave only with respect to the person fearing, with attention to his age, sex, condition, character, etc.: this does not fall upon a constant man, but upon a fainthearted one who easily fears; thus a fearful person, a boy, a woman, an old man greatly fears things which a man does not dread.

Reverential fear toward superiors, e.g., of children toward parents, wife toward husband, ward toward guardian, religious toward prelate, cleric toward bishop, per se is judged and generally is light, unless grave threats, blows, or most urgent prayers are added, because then vexation can be reputed hard and grave, or long-lasting indignation can be feared.

3. By reason of the work, fear is antecedent or impelling, while someone acts from fear, when it is the motive of operating, for example if a traveler gives money to a robber from fear of death; and concomitant, or repelling or drawing back, while someone acts not from fear but with fear, when it is not the motive of the work, although it accompanies it, indeed rather would be a motive of not operating, for example if a robber steals with fear of prison, or a merchant with fear boards the high sea.

73. Principles. I. That which is done with fear is perfectly voluntary and free: for then there is present a strong and deliberate will which overcomes and conquers fear.

II. That which is done from fear is regularly mixed from the voluntary and the involuntary, because it is done partly from inclination, partly against the inclination of the will. It is voluntary simply, because the will, all things considered, wills and places it; but involuntary in a certain respect, because it wills and places it with some repugnance, for it would not will it considered according to itself and apart from certain circumstances.

This is clear from the example of a merchant who from fear of shipwreck throws merchandise into the sea. In this case four things concur: 1) love of the lesser good, namely, the merchandise; 2) love of the greater good, namely, life, whose loss is feared; 3) efficacious consent to the loss of the lesser good (the merchandise) for conserving the greater (namely, life); 4) nevertheless an inefficacious love for the lesser good perseveres, from which arises an inefficacious displeasure at its loss. Now the consent is conformable to the second inclination and therefore simply voluntary, but it is against the first, which in some way perseveres, and according to this it is in some way involuntary; whence it is mixed from the voluntary and the involuntary.

We said regularly, because a) sometimes it is not involuntary in a certain respect, if fear also excludes affection toward the lesser opposed good; and then what is done from fear is purely voluntary, not mixed with the involuntary. For other reasons besides fear of the evil to be avoided can be added, on account of which the action becomes lovable in itself, and fear itself can be a motive which demands that an inefficacious affection toward the opposite be excluded. This is clear concerning a sinner who sorrows for sins because of fear of hell, but nevertheless does not retain affection toward sins (Council of Trent, session 14, chapter 4), and similarly a noble man fleeing theft from fear of infamy does not necessarily say: if there were no infamy, I would steal; b) by accident it is not voluntary simply, if the fear is so vehement and so disturbs reason that it totally removes its deliberation and use, and then it removes the voluntary properly so called and the free.

74. Corollaries. - From the aforesaid things it is easily understood:

1. That fear per se and regularly does not excuse from the whole sin, because it leaves the voluntary simply, which suffices for sin; nevertheless it diminishes insofar as the work is involuntary in a certain respect and therefore less voluntary and free (fear excuses from so much but not from the whole; cf. can. 2205, § 3), yet it does not so diminish that it makes a mortal sin venial, because generally it leaves sufficient deliberation for mortal sin.

2. That fear by accident excuses from mortal sin if it removes perfect deliberation, indeed from every sin if it removes all deliberation.

3. That grave fear, because it does not remove the free voluntary, per se from the nature of things does not invalidate human acts (can. 103, § 2), except perhaps sometimes for those acts which from their nature require a more perfect free act (vow, gratuitous donation, marriage).

75. Observations. - 1. Light fear in the external forum is never judged an efficacious cause of action.

2. Grave fear never excuses from an intrinsically evil work which is prohibited by natural law as being evil in itself; it often excuses from the observance of a positive law, or from those things which are evil only because prohibited (can. 2205, § 2 and 3).

15. Definition. - Fear is a trepidation of mind on account of some danger present or future to oneself or to those closely joined to oneself.

Division. - Fear is commonly divided as follows, namely:

1° By reason of itself, into grave and light, according as a grave evil is feared (hard imprisonment, notable detriment to reputation, great loss of goods), certain or probable, inevitable; - or an evil either light, or improbable, or avoidable. Thus, if you take fear objectively. - Subjectively it is most grave, grave, or light according as it disturbs reason entirely, notably, or lightly.

But grave fear is such absolutely or relatively. Fear is called absolutely grave when evils truly grave in themselves are feared; but relatively grave when, although light in itself, nevertheless it is grave with respect to certain persons. Thus boys, women, and old men are wont to be affected by greater fear in the same danger than men of mature age.

2° Fear, by reason of the cause, is from within or from without, according as the thing itself produces fear, as disease, shipwreck, etc., or an extrinsic cause, namely a man bringing fear upon someone.

3° Fear, by reason of the manner in which it is struck in, is struck in justly or unjustly, according as it is inflicted from a cause either just, for example deserved penalties, or unjust; and this fear is unjust as to substance. It is called unjust as to manner when it is inflicted indeed from a just cause, but without the order of law being observed. See n. 1599. II.

4° By reason of the end, fear from without can be struck in either for extorting some act, or for another end.

Reverential fear must also be added, which is had when someone fears lest he have offended his parents, or other Superiors. It is referred to just or unjust fear according as its cause is just or unjust. But it can be grave if there is prudent fear lest those who strike in the fear be held offended for a long time and gravely.

16. Principles. - I. An act placed from fear, however grave, is simply and absolutely voluntary and free. The reason is that through fear neither is cognition taken away on the part of the intellect, unless the mind is entirely disturbed, - nor election on the part of the will, which always enjoys the faculty of determining itself to the opposite. Hence those have always been regarded as apostates who, conquered by fear of torments, denied the Faith.

II. Those things which are done from fear, although simply voluntary, nevertheless regularly are also involuntary in a qualified respect; whence also the gravity of fault is diminished. The reason is that, by hypothesis, when someone is impelled to acting by fear alone, he acts in such a way that, with fear absent, he would recoil from acting; and therefore a work done from fear alone has joined with it a certain sadness and repugnance of the will, although inefficacious. It is said regularly, because sorrow for sins which is elicited from fear of divine vengeance excludes every true notion of the involuntary, or every deliberate affection toward sin. Understand this of fear or attrition that is simply servile, not of servilely servile fear; for the latter does not exclude the will of sinning absolutely, as the former does. Namely, just as in a merchant who casts his wares into the sea from fear of shipwreck there remains an affection simply voluntary toward the wares, so in a sinner detesting his sins from servilely servile fear there remains an affection simply voluntary toward sins; and neither this detestation nor that casting overboard is involuntary except in a qualified respect.

III. If fear takes away the use of reason, the act, as is clear, can in no way be voluntary. But if it does not indeed take away the use of reason, but notably impedes it, the act will be imperfectly voluntary because of imperfect cognition of the thing.

17. Note. - 1° What has been said holds concerning those things which are done from fear, not concerning those things which are done only with fear; for the latter can in no way be called involuntary, and are wont to belong to a man acting manfully or overcoming fear, for instance to a soldier fighting bravely. Bouq. n. 59.

2° It happens that together with fear other causes impel one to acting, and then the action can be pleasing rather than troublesome. For example, someone eats meat on a forbidden day from fear indeed of the mockery of companions, but at the same time from affection for meat. In this case it is not always evident what the act has from fear and what from elsewhere, nor therefore in what degree it is involuntary in a qualified respect. Ib. n. 61.

3° Theologians treat of fear under a threefold respect: 1. as an impediment of the voluntary; 2. as a cause excusing from law; 3. as a cause of invalidity of acts. Here we have spoken of it under the first respect.

Fear is a trembling of the mind on account of some present or future danger to oneself or to those closely joined to oneself; but it is commonly divided thus:

1st. Grave or slight fear, according as the evil feared is either grave, such as death, mutilation, hard imprisonment, notable detriment to reputation, a great loss of goods, etc.; or slight or mediocre inconvenience, such as the loss of a thing of slight moment, a small detriment to reputation; or even something grave, but from a slight cause, or which can easily be averted, etc.

But grave fear is such absolutely or relatively. Fear is called absolutely grave when evils truly grave in themselves are feared; but relatively grave when evils, though slight in themselves, are nevertheless grave respectively to certain persons. Thus children, women, and old men are wont to be affected by greater fear in the same danger than men of mature age.

2nd. Fear from within or from without, according as it proceeds from an intrinsic cause, for example, from sickness, from infirmity of mind, etc.; or from an extrinsic cause, either free, namely from man, or necessary or natural, as from the elements, contagion, etc.

3rd. Fear justly or unjustly impressed, according as it is brought in either from a just cause, for example, from deserved punishments, or from an unjust cause, that is, is impressed through injury. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 20.

Reverential fear must also be added, which is had when someone fears lest he have offended his parents, or other superiors. It is referred to just or unjust fear according as its cause is just or unjust. But it can be grave, if there is a prudent fear lest those who impress the fear be offended for a long time or gravely.

An act posited from fear, however grave, is voluntary simply, although regularly it is also involuntary in a certain respect. The reason for the first is that what, being known as the lesser evil here and now, is efficaciously assumed as a means for avoiding another evil, is called voluntary simply. Hence they have always been held as apostates who, conquered by fear of torments, denied the faith. The reason for the second is that what is done from fear alone is repugnant to the will, and apart from this case would not be done. Cf. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 6, art. 6. - St. Alphonsus, n. 21.

I said, 1st, from fear or from fear alone, because acts posited with fear, or from fear but not as from a total or moving cause, are voluntary without any admixture of the involuntary.

I said, 2nd, however grave, but always excepted is the case in which the fear is so great that the use of reason is wholly removed. But if the fear should be slight under every respect, and at the same time the total cause of the action, in the external forum indeed it is not reckoned, because it is presumed not to have had influence; but in the internal forum that action will be less sinful according to the quantity of influence, or of the involuntary, which it causes.

I said, 3rd, regularly, because then an action is involuntary in a certain respect from fear when in itself it is hateful to the will, although relatively, and appears here and now desirable as a means for avoiding the evil which is feared. But this happens regularly, yet not necessarily and always. For he who, for example, flees sin in order to avoid hell, or from fear of hell, does not for that reason have flight from sin as hateful in itself; otherwise by the force of such a disposition he would always sin and become worse, which it is wicked to assert. Cf. Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 8.

You Will Resolve. 1st. Fear proceeding from within or from natural causes does not prevent an act elicited under its influence from being able to be valid: thus a vow emitted from fear of death in the midst of shipwreck, or in grave sickness, is valid. But if a vow from fear impressed by an extrinsic and free cause is not valid, the reason is not taken from the absence of the voluntary, but from the presence of injury.

2nd. Fear, even grave fear, does not of itself excuse from mortal sin whenever the violation falls into contempt of religion; but it excuses when there is question of a prohibiting human law, or even a positive divine law, not because the voluntary ceases, but because the legislator is judged not to will to press the obligation with so great an inconvenience. But natural laws which prohibit acts intrinsically bad continue to oblige, and so do laws which regard the common good of the whole republic; nor in these does fear excuse.

3rd. § 2. Acts posited from grave and unjustly impressed fear, or from deceit, are valid unless something else is provided by law; but they can be rescinded, according to the norm of can. 1684-1689, by the sentence of a judge, either at the petition of the injured party or ex officio (Can. 103).

Fear is defined in law: « Trembling of mind from the cause of future and imminent danger, » that is, disquietude and disturbance. One fear is grave, another light. Grave fear is one kind absolutely grave, namely whereby a grave and imminent evil is feared, as death, exile, hard imprisonment, etc.; this is called such as befalls a man of constancy, that is, whereby men otherwise of constancy are commonly moved, although at times they ought not to be moved; for no one ought to be moved by any fear whatever, e. g., to perjury. Another fear is respectively grave, whereby although a man of constancy would not be moved, yet a timid person would be moved, as a child, a woman, an old man.

Fear is light when a light evil is feared, or indeed a grave one, but not imminent; as if, under a serene sky, or with frost pinching, you should fear lightning. To absolutely grave fear is reduced reverential fear, whereby one fears superiors gravely incensed and threatening. But if threats and grave indignation are absent, it can be called light, unless perhaps respectively as regards daughters of the family, who have a timid disposition.

I say 1°: Things done out of fear are mixed of the voluntary and the involuntary¹. ¹ Here q. 6, a. 4, c.

It is proved of the conclusion. Things done out of fear, considered in themselves, are not voluntary; nay, thus they are involuntary; but they are made voluntary and willed out of fear, namely in order to avoid the evil that is feared. This whole matter is clear in the common example. The merchant, considering his goods in themselves, setting aside the peril of shipwreck, would not wish to cast them overboard; but a tempest having arisen and the peril of death being imminent, he wills to cast them overboard. Therefore.

I say 2°: Things done out of fear are voluntary simply, and involuntary secundum quid². ² Ibid.

It is proved. That which is voluntary here and now, all circumstances weighed, and involuntary only considered in itself and prescinded from here and now, or from the individuating circumstances, is voluntary simply and involuntary secundum quid. But what is done out of fear is voluntary here and now, all circumstances attended to, and involuntary only considered in itself and prescinded from the circumstances. Therefore. — The min. is clear in the casting of goods into the sea out of fear of shipwreck.

It is confirmed. What is done out of fear is willed absolutely and efficaciously, and not-willed inefficaciously and conditionately only: so the merchant, the tempest pressing in, wills absolutely and efficaciously to cast overboard his goods, which he would not will to cast overboard were the tempest absent. But what is willed absolutely and efficaciously, and not-willed inefficaciously and conditionately only, is voluntary simply and involuntary secundum quid. Therefore.

From what has been said you will gather, 1° that contracts entered into out of grave fear are valid by natural law. Some, however, are invalidated by positive law: concerning which when we treat of contracts.

You will gather 2° that grave fear does not excuse from the whole sin in those things which are intrinsically and immutably evil, or, as is said, forbidden because evil, because they remain voluntary simply. Hence he who out of fear of death denies the faith, commits perjury, fornicates, etc., sins mortally. It does excuse, however, from so much of the sin, and the more so the graver the fear, because it diminishes the voluntary.

But in those things which are not intrinsically evil, but evil because forbidden, grave fear regularly excuses from the whole, not because they are not voluntary simply, but because positive laws, whether divine or human, by the intention of their legislators do not oblige regularly with so great a loss. Whence works of this kind, which are evil only by reason of the law, the obligation of the law ceasing, cease to be evil. Hence he who out of fear of death or of grave infamy, or of another grave evil, did not fast in Lent, or did not hear Mass on a feast day, etc., would not sin.

I said, « regularly, » because sometimes positive laws, whether divine or human, oblige even with loss of life: 1° when that which the law commands is of such moment that in the judgment of prudent men it outweighs the life of a particular individual. It is clear in the soldier commanded not to abandon his post, or to break upon the enemy with evident peril of death. 2° When transgression of the law would redound to contempt of religion or of ecclesiastical authority, as happened to the Machabees, whom tyrants threatened with death unless they ate swine's flesh in contempt of the law; since it is better that the law, the faith, or religion be not despised than that the life of one private person be preserved. But of these specially when we treat of Laws.

I. We shall have much to say concerning oaths that are deceitful, and extorted by fear, which can be consulted, lest we act twice over. We shall therefore only touch briefly on a few points here, all the more since, when treating of contracts and marriage, we shall bring similar controversies under examination.

II. Question I. Does an error concerning the substance of a vow render the vow invalid? Response: Authors commonly affirm this — since error removes the voluntary: for nothing is willed unless first known. Therefore, if you are ignorant of the nature, or substance, of the vow, then the thing promised by the vow is not voluntary, but involuntary. There is, then, no vow — since it is not voluntary. Hence, if you were to profess religious life, ignorant that profession is perpetual, your profession would be null — since perpetuity pertains to the substance of profession. Say the same of ignorance of those things which are reduced to the substance of the thing promised: say, you vowed to journey to Jerusalem, thinking your vow could be fulfilled by an overland journey, being ignorant of the sea voyage; you vowed to enter the Carthusian, or Dominican, order, thinking that eating meat there was permitted — these vows are null, as is taught by Suárez (Bk. II, ch. 11, n. 21), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 12, n. 12), Lessius (Bk. II, ch. 41, dub. 1, n. 21), Prado (ch. 31, q. 4, §1, n. 2), Palao (disp. 1, punct. 6, n. 2), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, punct. 6, §4, n. 116), who add that the one vowing is not bound to other religious orders, since he determinately vowed these two.

Two things present a difficulty to me. The first is that abstinence from meat should enter into the very substance of profession, or pertain to it — for it seems that this abstinence is a certain grave circumstance, but it is not the one thing that distinguishes one Order from another; indeed, all monastic orders that have this law observe the same abstinence from meat. Of the four mendicant orders, two observe this same abstinence. Moreover, this abstinence, compared with the three solemn perpetual vows, does not seem so grave a circumstance as to enter into the very substance of the profession, and to be able to invalidate it. The other difficulty is likewise this: namely, that such a one vowing ought not to be bound to enter any other religious order. Since one who vows entrance into religious life seems to vow, first, the religious state, and then, secondarily, this particular religious order — when there is no express, determinate, contrary intention. All these considerations together render the aforesaid resolution quite doubtful to me. Wherefore it seems to me safer, and more probable, that the one vowing is bound either to enter the promised religious order, or to choose another in which meat is eaten — since, as I said, the circumstance of abstaining from meat does not seem to enter into the substance of a perpetual profession.

III. All theologians, moreover, admit that ignorance of circumstances which do not pertain to the substance of the matter does not invalidate vows, or oaths, but leaves their obligation intact as to substance — even if the person, had he foreseen these circumstances when he made the vow, would not have made it — since such ignorance, as they say, is concomitant with respect to the vow, not principal, or as giving cause to the vow. For you embrace absolutely the principal object of your vow, even though, had you foreseen that object clothed in such a circumstance, you would have abstained from it. For very many vows, promises, and contracts would not be made, if all the circumstances that supervene in the course of time were foreseen; yet, when they actually occur, they invalidate neither vows nor contracts. In this all agree: Cajetan (II-II, q. 88, art. 3, near the end), Sotus (Bk. VII, q. 2, art. 3, ad 3), Molina (Vol. II, disp. 272), Lessius (Bk. II, ch. 20, dub. 2, n. 10), Suárez (Bk. I, ch. 12, n. 6), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 12, n. 6), Castropalao (tract. 15, disp. 1, punct. 6, n. 4), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 6, §1, n. 156). The difficulty is which of the circumstances redound into the substance of the promise, or vow. The cited authors maintain that, in the aforesaid vow of religious life, abstinence from meat is a circumstance invalidating the profession, since it pertains to the substance of the profession. It seems to me, however, that such a circumstance does not pertain to the substance of monastic profession, for the reasons assigned; and this opinion seems to me more probable.

IV. Likewise, if error concerns the end of the vow, if the ignorance is of the essential end of the vow, such ignorance will also impede the value of the vow — since the end of the vow is its object. Wherefore, if ignorance of the essential end of the vow occurs, it will produce the same effect regarding the end as it does regarding the substance of the vow. Several ends are distinguished in a vow. The first is the divine worship, which is common to all vows, and can be called universal, and extrinsic; without which no matter is fit for a vow. The second end is the special, and, in a certain way, intrinsic end, upon whose cessation, too, the vow ceases — as, for example, the proximate end of alms is the relief of another's need. For example: you vowed to give Peter alms, thinking him poor; you afterward discover him to be rich, and in no way needy, and in no way in need of alms; the vow ceases, since it altogether recoils into the nature of the object, which is a peculiar and total relief of poverty — and, that failing, the vow ceases entirely. The third is the extrinsic end which the one vowing freely set before himself: as if you vowed to give health to your sick son... , whom you believe infirm; and, that son being restored to health, or having died, the vow ceases, and so too is that end reduced to the nature of the object; and thus, once that ceases, the vow ceases. If, however, the error is about the occasion, or occasional cause, of the vow, then the vow is not impeded — although, if, before the vow was made, the cause had been known, it would have impeded the making of the vow.

V. You will object, from St. Thomas (Bk. IV, Sent., dist. 38, q. 1, art. 3, qc. 1, ad 3), where he says that "that which, if present, would impede the vow being made, also removes the obligation once the vow has been made." But the circumstances and difficulties that supervene were unknown to the one vowing. Therefore, once the vow is made, they remove the obligation. Response: St. Thomas, in the place cited, speaks in express words of a difficulty, or circumstance, that renders the execution of the vow impossible. Now what renders the execution of the vow impossible, whether it follows, or precedes, the making of the vow, renders the vow null. Here are the words of the Angelic Doctor which immediately follow the passage cited: "Whence, since there cannot be a vow concerning the impossible, as has been said, if something which was formerly possible becomes impossible after the vow is made, the obligation of the vow is removed as to that." And to the proposed difficulty the Angelic Doctor answers, in the first argument, that no one is obligated to a vow whose execution is impossible.

VI. Question II. From what is it to be gathered that circumstances are only an impelling, not a principal, cause of the vow — that is, that they do, or do not, redound to the substance of the object promised by the vow? Response: It is clear from what has been said that all authors agree in this: that error concerning the substance invalidates the vow; not so, error concerning adventitious matters, or concerning impelling causes. The whole difficulty turns on this: from what is it to be gathered whether the circumstances redound into the substance of the object, or not? Authors commonly answer that all those things are the end of the vow which the one vowing intends to obtain through the vow; but that those things are merely the occasion of vowing which only excite the one vowing to make the vow — as if you vow alms to be conferred on a respectable poor person: the relief of poverty is the end of the vow; but the respectability of the poor person is the occasion which excites, and impels, you to make the vow. For relief of poverty is not obtained through the vow in the same way that relief of poverty is really obtained; and therefore this is the end of the vow. Respectability, however, is the occasion of the poor person, which excites you, but is not the end of the vow. All this is clear, and quite easy to grasp. But sometimes circumstances occur so grave that they seem to some to redound into the substance of the vow, on which several others judge otherwise; and concerning these no certain rule can be established, but this business must be left to the judgment of prudent men.

VII. In doubt, however, whether some circumstance has the character of a final, or an occasional, cause, one must consider whether, these being absent, all the other circumstances retain merely the character of occasion. For if, in their absence, the end of the vow still stands, the rest have merely the character of occasion. If, however, in their absence, the end of the vow would collapse, then they would have the character of the end, as Sylvester teaches (s.v. Votum, 2, q. 8), Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 6, near the end, n. 52), Castropalao (tract. 15, disp. 1, punct. 6, n. 7). If, all things considered, probable and grave reasons press on both sides, Sánchez teaches (Bk. IV, ch. 12, n. 5) that it is lawful to adhere to either side, even the less probable, as Bonacina says more explicitly (loc. cit.). If, however, all things considered, the matter remains doubtful and undecided, both these authors determine that it must then be judged in favor of the vow — since when the words of the vow are established, whether spoken aloud or held in the mind, possession stands for the vow, not for the external forum's liberty; and also because the presumption favors the validity of the act. From this you see, then, that these authors do form a peculiar notion of doubt. For if, they say, probable reasons induce the opinion, it is lawful to adhere to either side; but if the reasons are such as to leave the intellect undecided, then judgment must be made in favor of the vow. We too decide that judgment must be made in favor of the vow, in doubt — but on this principle: that in doubtful matters the safer part is to be chosen; and, furthermore, when equal reasons press on both sides, we say the intellect remains in doubt, however probable both sides may be. When, however, the reasons are more probable in favor of the vow, and less probable in favor of liberty, we hold that judgment must be made, by the stronger right, in favor of the vow — as we shall prove at length in its proper place.

VIII. Question III. Is a vow extorted by fear valid? Response. The distinction of fear has already often been explained. For one fear is grave, falling upon a steadfast man; another is light. Grave fear can arise from within: say, from illness, from a storm, from death feared from a wild beast, from an imminent shipwreck. This fear is called intrinsic, because, although the danger that excites the fear is external, it in no way compels the making of the vow; the one vowing is moved by himself to make the vow. Another fear is called extrinsic, which arises from an external cause that compels; and this again is twofold, one justly, the other unjustly instilled in order to extort the vow. Wherefore the one vowing, struck by such fear, chooses the vow as the only means of turning aside the danger that threatens him. These things being laid down, authors by common consent assert that the vow is valid, both by the law of nature and by positive law, when it arises from a grave fear that is intrinsic: because then the one vowing is compelled by no one but himself, and of his own accord and freely chooses the vow as a fit means of escaping the danger. All vows, therefore, made to avoid shipwreck, illness, or death threatening either from a wild beast or from an enemy, are valid. Indeed, even vows elicited on account of a fear instilled from without, but not in order to extort the vow, are valid. For example: you have offended your neighbour; he threatens you with death in revenge; you make a vow to escape death. The vow is valid, because you made the vow with no one compelling you to it. Likewise valid is the vow you elicit in order to avoid the death, or the danger of harm, with which the brother of the girl whom you deflowered threatens you. For although such fear is unjustly instilled from without, it does not tend to extort a vow, but to take revenge; and you, to withdraw yourself from the danger, make the vow of your own accord and freely. The same must be said when the fear comes from without, but is justly brought to bear in order to extort the vow. Because, when the fear is just, the one vowing is unwilling unreasonably; and consequently the consent is justly extorted, and the one vowing is justly compelled to the vow: the whole of the coercion and necessity comes from the one vowing himself, who unjustly refuses to make the vow. Finally, neither does light fear make a vow void, as all commonly admit, because it impairs free consent but little and lightly. And this is certain among all authors.

IX. The whole difficulty, therefore, turns on this: whether a vow is valid that proceeds from grave fear brought to bear from without in order to extort the vow itself. It is agreed almost among all that by the law of nature even such a vow is valid, supposing that the man, though unjustly coerced, truly and sincerely wills the vow and actually makes it: for without the will and deliberation of the one vowing a vow is null, as we said in its place. But if he truly and deliberately wills it, although coerced by unjust fear, the vow is valid by the law of nature: because such external coercion, although it diminishes the voluntary, nevertheless does not take it away, but leaves it absolutely, so far as it suffices for merit and demerit; as is plain in the martyr, who, if under examination he denied the faith out of fear unjustly instilled by a tyrant, would sin mortally. External coercion, therefore, does not take away liberty, though it diminishes it. Much less does an injury inflicted by an unjust aggressor impair that same liberty. For this injury leaves to the one who promised only the right not to be bound to render what he pledged to the invader; but not the right to be freed from the obligation of keeping and fulfilling the faith given to God. The Angelic Doctor explains all this clearly, II-II, q. 89, art. 7, ad 3, speaking thus: In an oath which someone makes under coercion, there is a twofold obligation. One by which he is bound to the man to whom he promises something; and such an obligation is taken away by the coercion. . . . The other is the obligation by which he is bound to God, to fulfil what he has promised in His name; and such an obligation is not taken away in the forum of conscience: because he ought rather to suffer temporal loss than violate his oath. The theologians, both of the household and from without, commonly subscribe to the doctrine of St. Thomas: Sánchez, Lessius, Azor, Palaus, Trullench, and others.

X. The dissent of the theologians comes down to ecclesiastical law. Although, even with this in view, if the discourse is of the solemn vow made in the profession of religion, all affirm that such a vow is null: because the laws speak openly of this vow, and declare that it is made void: chapter Perlatum, Bk. I, tit. 40, on what is done by force or for fear; chapter Sicut qui monasterium, causa 20, q. 1; and chapter Praesens, causa 20, q. 3; and expressly the Synod of Trent, sess. 25, ch. 17, on reform: Let a girl who wishes to take the regular habit . . . not take it beforehand, nor afterwards . . . make profession before the Bishop has diligently examined . . . the will of the virgin, whether she has been coerced, whether seduced, whether she knows what she is doing.

XI. Concerning other vows there are two opinions. The first maintains that other vows are valid: because the laws do not speak of the other vows; and on the other side the making void of a vow is odious, since it derogates from the natural law, in respect of which the vow is valid. When, therefore, no plain text occurs in the law declaring the aforesaid vows null, we ought to defend them as valid. But no such text is in fact found. Therefore these vows are valid, even with ecclesiastical law in view. And this opinion is defended by Sylvester, s.v. Metus, 8, at the end, and s.v. Votum, 2, q. 12; Pontius, On Marriage, Bk. III, ch. 19, n. 9; Suárez, Bk. II, ch. 8, n. 5. The contrary opinion, namely that such vows are null and void, is defended by many authors, who contend that this was declared in the chapter Cum locum, on betrothals, where it is said: Since consent has no place where fear or coercion intervenes; and in the chapter Ad audientiam, and the chapter Perlatum. These texts, they say, though they do not speak expressly of these vows, are nevertheless extended to the vows recounted, by the common interpretation of the jurists and the custom of the Church. Soto, Bk. VII, q. 2, art. 1, in the solution to the 1st and 2nd; Trullench, Bk. II, ch. 2; Bartholomew of St. Faustus, Bk. I of the Thesaurus, q. 111; Prado, ch. 31, q. 5, n. 4; Sánchez, Bk. IV, ch. 3, n. 11; Lessius, Bk. II, ch. 40, dub. 3, n. 18.

XII. It is difficult to pass judgment for either of these opinions. The authors themselves who disagree judge both to be probable. The former, if reason alone is regarded, seems to rest on the firmer foundation. For all the laws alleged speak expressly either of the solemn vows of monastic profession, or of betrothals and matrimony. Why is it that they do not speak universally? Why is it that they restrict their declarations to the two aforesaid kinds of promises? Certainly it seems to be very clearly drawn from the written law that only solemn vows and matrimony are excepted, while the rest are left under the common law. Since, then, the universal law of nature declares these vows valid, on this side this opinion appears the more probable. Moreover, the very reason which the authors of the contrary opinion put forward tells against them. They rely on the examples of matrimony and of monastic profession: because, they say, the reason of all vows is the same. Granted: and in fact by the law of nature all are valid. But if the Church expressly excepts two only from the burden of the obligation, it is legitimately inferred that the rest are not excepted from the law of nature. This reason, which asserts that the condition of all vows is the same, was known to the makers of ecclesiastical law; and nonetheless they excepted only monastic vows and matrimony. Why, then, did they make no mention of the other vows as well? To what they add afterwards, that by the custom of the Church these vows have been declared null, we reply that if such a custom exists, we readily admit that the aforesaid vows are null. But no document of this custom is brought forward. Therefore in such cases, when they occur, it is safer, and to us more probable, that a dispensation should be obtained.

This QUESTION is exceedingly weighty, and presupposes much, and hands down things necessary also for other Tracts, even that on marriage.

I ASSUME first, from the first part 2. Tract. 1. disp. 3. quaest. 5., that the Will, as regards elicited acts, cannot be coerced.

I ASSUME secondly, from the same disput. quaest. 8., that things done through fear are not involuntary. So holds also the Jurisconsult l. si mulier 21. §. si metu coactus, ff. de eo, quod metus causa. and l. cum proponas C. de hered. instit. and C. si privatus, ff. qui et a quibus. The reason is clear, because he can elicit, and not elicit, the act.

Fear IS a trepidation of mind from danger present or to come. So defines Ulpian the Jurisconsult, l. 1. ff. de eo quod metus causa. It is defined likewise by D. Bonav. 3. p. Centil. sect. 55. and in 4. at the place cited.

Fear is DIVIDED into Concussive, such as that which is inflicted by threats, and Impressive, which is called fear of Fact, as when deeds intervene, say blows, etc. So D. Bonav. loc. cit., on which Zasius Instit. de actione, §. quadrupli, num. 10. Bursatt. consil. 72. num. 11. vol. 1., where he reports others; Sanchez l. 3. de matrim. disput. 12 num. 8. Another fear they add, Compulsive from a powerful man, which is also called Violent; because the force that strikes fear is a man of great power: another fear, they say, is tacit, or of reverence, such as a daughter's toward her Father. The last they call fear of treachery, such as that of a sick man fearing to be treated treacherously by his physician.

Fear, then, is said of someone coerced conditionally, because setting fear aside the will would not will it; yet not absolutely, because he can still be unwilling, and therefore it is called conditional force.

BUT violent force, or absolute force, is that which is from without, not conferring force upon the sufferer ex 3. Eth. cap. 2., as if a Christian were dragged to a Mosque, and compelled by blows to offer incense to an Idol; which force D. Bonav. defines thus, loc. cit. Centil. and in 4. at the place cited, following the Jurisconsult, l. 2. ff. de eo quod metus causa: Vis est maioris rei impetus, qui repelli non potest, which assuredly lacks the voluntary altogether:

A CELEBRATED division of fear is that of D. Bonav. in 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1. in corpore, and loc. cit. Centil., and found in c. Considerationi, c. veniens, el. 2. de sponsal. cap. cum dilectus de his quae vi, et from the Jurisconsult, l. metu, l. 2. ff. de eo quod metus causa. Decio cap. final. de appell. c. causam matrimonii, num. 4. de off. deleg. Menochio de arbitrariis l. 2. Centur. 2. casu 135. n. 1. Flaminio de resignatione benef. l. 13. q. 1. n. 54. Abb. c. cum dilectus n. 3. D. Thoma in 4. dist. 29. quaest. un. art. 2. and elsewhere everywhere with the other Theologians and Summists.

Another is called fear falling upon a constant man, which is also called just fear, c. Finali de appell.; it is called probable by D. Bonav. loc. cit. and Goffredo de his, quae vi, num. 2. Angelo, at the word metus. Sylvest. quaest. 1. Sanchez loco cit. num. 19. It is called also grave fear by D. Bonav. and others, with the Jurisconsult, lege metum, l. 2 ff. de eo quod metus causa, where he says, it is not of a man of no account, since even the strong are shaken by it.

Another is called the fear of an inconstant man, and it is called light fear, in contrast to the preceding, because it marks out as inconstant, light, and vain the one who is shaken by it and led to act against his appetite.

Five conditions, however, S. Bonav., in the places adduced, whom the rest follow, assigns to fear, that it be of the first kind. The first is that the evil feared be grave, l. Metum, l. 1. de eo quod metus causa, there, Labeo says fear is to be taken, not any fear whatever, but of a greater evil.

From the last words they take occasion to say that this fear need not be great absolutely, but comparatively, so that it be greater than another, though light in itself. So Sylvest. v. metus, quaest. 1. Veracruz p. 1. speculi, art. 8. concl. 3. Carbon. de restit. quaest. 46. fundamento 3.

But D. Bonav. in 4. loc. cit. in corpore, and loc. cit. Censil. wills it to be grave in itself, say of death, infamy, or mutilation; whom follow Sotus 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1. art. 2. Sanchez num. 12. The reason is, D. Bonav. loc. cit., because contracts are rescinded by such fear, seeing it impedes consent, cap. Cum locum de sponsal.; but when the evil is light, though preferred before a graver evil, the liberty of consent in a strong man is not held to be impeded.

To those words I say that the comparative is there abusive, and signifies only what is positively great, as the Gloss explains there.

The second condition of fear falling upon a constant man is that the estimation of the grave evil be of one probably imminent, and not a light suspicion. So D. Bonav. in 4. loc. cit., and found l. Metum la 2. ff. de eo quod metus causa. For a constant man is not so lightly terrified; so also D. Thom. in 4. dist. 29. quaest. unica, art. 2. in corpore. Scotus there quaest. unica, §. de primo contradictio. Durandus there quaest. 2. Richard. art. 1. quaest. 1. Gabriel in 3. dist. 39. quaest. 1. art. 1. Sotus 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1. art. 2. Palacios there, disp 1. Ledesm. dub. 23. de matrimonio. And from the Jurisperiti, Torcremata 31. quaest. 2. in summa, num. 6. Sylvest. v. metus, quaest. 1. Tabiena v. impedimentum, impedimento 9. quaest. 1. Burlat. consil. 72. num. 30. vol. 1. Alphaeus in his collectaries, collect. 877. Sanchez num. 15. Hence Aristotle, 3. Eth. cap. 9., says, the brave man is fearless, because he does not fear lightly, but where right reason dictates that he must fear.

Hence I infer with D. Bonav. loc. cit. in resol. that there is not required a true and real infliction of the punishments, for then it would be called not fear but harm; but it is enough that there be a probable fear of a future or imminent infliction, Leg. nec timorem 7. ff. de eo quod metus causa and l. 15. tit. 2. p. 4., and the Gloss teaches, c. el. primo vero metuebant de electione. Bartolomaeus l. metum autem, at the beginning, num. 1. ff. de eo quod metus causa. Sylvest. v. metus, quaest. 1. Lopez on that l. 15. Cucus l. 5. instit. Maiorum, tit. 12. num. 157.

Some add that the fear ought to be present, not awaited, though the evil be only future. They gather this from l. metum autem 9. ff. de eo, quod metus causa. So expound many, as Sanchez num. 16. reports.

Others, however, think that a probable suspicion of fear suffices, and that this is enough for rescinding the act, Leg. novissime, ff. de falso tutore, there, that he was thus compelled by fear, or fearing, lest he be compelled. So Bartol. l. 2. lectura 2. C. quod metus causa. Baldus leg. interpositas at the end C. de Transact. Alex. cons. 99. n. 6. vol. 3. Parisius consil. 60. num. 15. vol. 3. Romanus l. 5. ob turpem, num. 10. C. de condonatione ob turpem causam. Hostiens. c. Cum dilectus de his, quae vi, on the words nec metum mortis, and there Anchar. num. 7. Rebuff. Tom. 2. consil. Gallicarum, tit. de rescissione contractuum, art. unico Glossa 2. 2. num. 6. Alex. Tartagnus among the matrimonial consilia of Tileti cons. 21. num. 5. Sylvest. v. metus Villalobos in communi opinione, litt. N. at the word metus, num. 70. Anton. Gabr. tom. 2. commun. l. 11. v. metus, fol. 107. Burgos de Paz cons. 25. num. 73. Padella l. cum proponas, la 1. num. 3. C. de transact. Decisio Pedemontana 170. num. 3. Ioan. Garzia de nobilitate, gloss. 17. num. 14. Mascard. de probat. concl. 1055. num. 26.

Yet that Law sounds differently to me: that the contract be rescinded of one who, compelled by fear, or fearing, would not be compelled, that is, by force against the thing, say if he were compelled to subscribe, l. nam timor violentiae inferendae vitiat electionem. So the Gloss C. bone, CL. 1., at the word metuebant de electione, which all follow there, Alex. cons. 98. vol. 3. Rebuff. Mascad. loc. cit.

Therefore I note that the Law does not say, or thinking probably, lest fear be struck into him, but fearing (it says) lest he be compelled, that is, by force.

The third condition required for grave fear is assigned by D. Bonav. loc. cit. in corpore; and it is that the one striking fear be able to command his threats to execution; for it is not for a brave general to be terrified by the threats of little rustics, as D. Bonav. notes, l. Famosi, ff. ad legem Iul. maiest., there, for the person also is to be considered: whether he could do it, Gloss. l. metum, v. iactationibus, C. de his, quae vi. Anchar. c. ad Audientiam, num. 2. de his, quae vi. Baldus l. metum q. C. de his quae vi, and there Alex. Salicetus num. 2. Sebastianus de medicis, de casibus fortuitis, quaest. 1. num. 67. Flaminius de resign. benef. l. 13. quaest. 1. n. 116. Cucus l. 1. Instit. Mai. tit. 12. num. 165. Rolandus consil. 83. num. 28. vol. 2. Angelus v. metus, Sotus l. 7. de Iustitia, quaest. 2. art. 1. ad 2. Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 3. §. Pro explicatione, fol. 988. Carbo de restit. quaest. 46. fundamento 4., and all whom Sanchez num. 19. follows.

Note, however, that it is not to be taken as though he could in very fact fulfill the threats, but that the one fearing reasonably judge that he can fulfill them, even though in fact he truly cannot, for some reason unknown to the one fearing. Which D. Bonav. signified excellently, loc. cit., whom Richardus follows, there art. 1. quaest. 1., as Sanchez num. 19. reports. Wherefore the quality and power of the one striking fear and of the sufferer must be weighed, as if the former were a powerful man and the latter weaker, as Beroius cap. 1. n. 30. de off. deleg. Sotus, Arag. Carbo, and Sanchez loc. cit., and Henriquez l. 11. de matrim. cap. 9., after D. Bonav. loc. cit. Censil., teach well.

The fourth condition is D. Bonav. loc. cit. Censil., which he indicates in 4., that it be likely that the threatener will execute his threats; because he is wont to do so, and is not of those Worthies who fling out threats but do not execute them. It is established ex l. unica, C. Si quis Imperatori, there, let us weigh the sayings from the characters of men. And leg. Famosi, ff. ad Leg. Iul. maiest. and Leg. metum, C. de his, quae vi, there: Fear ought to be proved not by boasts or contentions alone, but by the atrocity of the deed. And so teaches Bartolus, Paulus, Alex. Baldus, Salicet. and Aretinus: Abbas indeed cap. 1. num. 3. de offic. deleg., and cap. causam matrimon. numer. 5. on the same title, and cap. Cum dilectus, numer. 8. Anchard. in the chapter ad Audientiam, num. 2. de his quae vi. Navo cap. consultatione, num. 12. de sponsal., and cap. finali, num. 17. de appel. Felinus cap. 1. de offic. deleg., there Decius, and cap. causam matrim. on the same title num. 21. Crottus leg. stipulatio hoc modo concepta, num. 67. ff. de verb. oblig. Vitalis de Cambaris tract. de clausulis; clausula non vi, tit. de metu uxoris, found in Tom. 18. tract. noviorum, Iacobinus leg. interpositas, num. 10. Cod. de transact. Couar. 4. decret. 2. part. cap. 3. §. 6. Tiberius Decianus consil. 18. num. 128. vol. 1. Bursatus consil. 72. num. 35. and 42. vol. 3. Flaminius lib. de resignatione, benef. lib. 15. quaest. 1. num. 174. Mascardus de probat. consil. 1055. num. 18. Antonius Gabriel. Tom. 2. com. lib. 11. v. metus, fol. 106.

From the Theologians, Henriquez lib. 11. de matrim. cap. 9., Lopez 2. part. Instruct. de matrim. cap. 40. fo. 1071., and Sanchez num. 20., who num. 21. adds that it is required that such a one be wont to execute the threatened evil in the same kind of evil as that threatened, on the doctrine of Baldus leg. finali at the end, ff. de haered. instit., where he says that conjecture is not drawn from unlike things; so Cynus, whom Alexander cites and follows, leg. metum, num. 2. Cod. de his, quae vi.

The last condition is that the one fearing be unable to meet the threatened evils otherwise than by vowing; for if he could meet them otherwise, it would not be the fear of a brave man, but of a little fellow, whose it is to dread evils he could easily escape. This condition, however, seems to me implicit in the second, whereby the evil is imminent, for then it is well-nigh irreparable.

Straightway Sanchez disputes whether one choosing a greater evil, say to deny Christ, in order to avoid a lesser, say death, can be called a constant man, and whether that fear of a lesser evil, though grave in itself, suffices to render external acts invalid, as involuntary, because it is fear falling upon a constant man, since it is grave according to the first condition of fear.

Very many assert that an evil, even if grave, does not suffice to strike fear into a constant man if it be chosen to avoid another greater evil, to say, he is not held to be a constant man if he chooses the greater evil, say fault, to avoid a lesser penalty, say death; the reason is, because such a one is moved not by rational but by irrational fear; but the constant man acts rationally.

And indeed D. Bonavent. holds this, at the place cited, toward the end, D. Thom. in 3. dist. 29. quaest. unica, art. 2. in corpore, Scotus quaest. unic. §. de prima contradictio, and §. hic dicitur, Durandus quaest. 1. Richardus art. 1. quaest. 1. ad Paludanum quaest. unica, art. 2. concl. 2. num. 13. Gabriel. in 3. dist. 39. quaest. 1. art. 1. and art. 3. concl. 8. Victoria sum. de matrim. num. 168. Sotus in 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1. art. 2. Palacios in 4. dist. 29. dub. 1. fol. 655. Veracruz p. p. speculi, art. 8. and others, whom Sanchez reports, lib. 4. de matrim. disp. 2. num. 2., where he asserts that these Doctors, speaking of fear in reference to marriage and other contracts to be rescinded — namely that it be fear falling upon a constant man, sufficient to annul marriage — require that the lesser evil be chosen by the man, otherwise he was not constant but inconstant.

Others, however, explain that these Doctors will this condition of choosing the lesser evil to be required in order that fear excuse from fault, but not that it suffice for rescinding contracts; and in this sense D. Bonavent. spoke, in 3. dist. 29. art. 3. quaest. 2. ad 3., where he grants fear falling upon a constant man with regard to human contracts; yet with regard to things of universal justice he denies it, according to that of Matth. 10.: Fear not them that kill the body. Therefore such fear, on grounds urged before God, is not reckoned a sufficient cause to excuse man from the guilt of sin, or from the obligation of an oath, though it exempt him from human contracts, according to the Axiom of the Jurisperiti reported above.

In the place indeed adduced by Sanchez, in the fourth sent., at the end of the question cited, he says that fear falling upon a constant man is of those things only that are not contrary to our salvation, and thus no fear of penalty, with respect to committing sin, can fall upon a constant man; therefore he ought rationally to suffer death rather than sin; but marriage is not of things contrary to salvation, whence he infers that, with respect to it, the fear of a constant man can fall, which fear renders the act involuntary; whence it comes about that this condition, of one choosing the lesser evil in order to be a constant man, in our case does not come into play in a vow or oath, but only in things that carry fault in themselves, which, even though they carry only venial fault, are yet a greater evil than any penalty whatsoever, even of death, as D. Bonavent. teaches, in 3. dist. 38, whom others imitate after D. Augustine, reported in cap. ne quis 22. quaest. 2.

Which things being so, Sanchez does not rightly institute the second disputation lib. 4. de matrimonio: Whether the fear of a constant man necessarily requires that the lesser evil be chosen, that is, the penalty rather than the fault. He says that B. Bonaventure, D. Thomas, and others assert that such an evil ought to be preferred in reference to marriage; for since marriage is not compared, as an evil, with the fear, and consequently cannot be called a lesser evil than the evil certainly threatened by the threatener unless one enter marriage, I do not see on what ground Sanchez says that D. Bonaventure, D. Thomas, and others spoke in this sense, that by choosing marriage rather than death, or death rather than marriage, one is said to choose the greater or the lesser evil, and thence one is argued to be a constant or inconstant man. As D. Bonavent. subtly argues, at the place cited, and Sanchez himself, disp. 5. num. 16., where he says that the fear of just excommunication does not strike grave fear with regard to some contract, because one thing is not chosen as an evil before another, since both are goods.

This fear, then, is not only required for the rescission of marriage and other just contracts, as Soto asserts, in 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1. art. 4., Nauar. summa lat. cap. 22. num. 51., and others whom Sanchez follows, num. 3.; neither can it even intervene.

Sanchez defines this well indeed, disp. 3.: this grave fear, which is called falling upon a constant man, is not equally to be assessed, but proportionally, so that what is light to a man may be grave to a woman or a child, cap. indignanti, 13. quaest. 6., as Tiraquel notes, lib. 1. connub. num. 71., the Gloss cap. cum locum de sponsal. v. metu, where Anton. num. 12. Abbas num. 6. Alexand. de Nevo, num. 23. and others.

Moreover, note that it is not required for grave fear, which deters a constant man, that the evil be feared for one's own person, but it is enough that it be feared in the persons of one's children, leg. isti quidem §. fine, ff. de eo, quod metus causa.

The same of other kindred, in cap. sciam cuncti de electione, in 6., which text Jason says is notable, leg. de pupillo, ff. si quis ipsi, num. 12. ff. de operis novi nuntiat. Felinus cap. Ecclesiae sanctae Mariae, n. 99., where fear inflicted upon the kindred of an elector in order to strike fear into the elector is held to have been struck into the elector himself.

The same of a bond of friendship closely joined, Sanchez teaches, num. 9.; because a friend is another self. Attend also to other things concerning grave evil, sufficient to strike fear into a constant man.

AND indeed, as to those evils that are not declared grave by law, that is to be defined by the judgment of a Judge, leg. 3. ff. ex quibus causis. The greater reason is, because all cases cannot be expressed; but this judgment is not required for those evils that are clearly grave by law. So Baldus, cap. 2. de his, quae ad finem; his reason is, because arbitria are given with respect to those things that cannot be comprehended under a rule, on account of human variety, as is noted on leg. non possunt, ff. de legibus. Sylvester notes the same, V. metus, quaest. 4.; it will be so judged, whether the estimation of the impending evil be in accordance with right reason.

AS TO evils certainly grave, D. Bonavent., at the place cited, in corpore, enumerates death, found in cap. cum dilectus, de his quae vi, and leg. nec timorem 7. ff. de eo quod metus causa. The reason is, because of all terrible things the greatest is death, by the testimony of Aristotle, 4. Eth. So also Sanchez, disp. 5. num. 4.

S. Bonavent. asserts the same of mutilation; for it is a kind of partial death, cap. si quis absciderit disp. 55., and it is found expressly in dicta leg 7. The same, of grave bodily torment, is found expressly in the said cap. cum dilectus, and the said leg. 7., to which grave blows are reduced. The same must be said of the fear of arms, leg. 3. at the beginning, in the verse qui armati, ff. de vi, et vi armata.

S. Bonavent. asserts the same of the fear of servitude. It is found in leg. ego puto, and leg. isti quidem, ff. de eo, quod metus causa. Say the same of the fear of captivity and of grave exile. Of the fear of prison, it is found in leg. nec timorem, and leg. qui in carcerem, ff. de eo, quod metus causa.

VI. Likewise in the same place, article 5, reply 1, he subjoins: It must be said that in him who does something through fear there remains a repugnance of the will to that which is done, according as it is considered in itself. And therefore that which is done through fear is in a certain manner involuntary. … The timid man acts against that which even now in itself he wills.