Section — Marc, Institutiones Morales
§ 2. On Fear
St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 6, a. 6; St. Alphonsus, V, n. XX; ed. G., II, p. 693; VI, n. 1047 ff.; ed. G., IV, p. 193; Bain, Les emotions et la volonte, p. 147.
- DEFINITION. Fear is trepidation of mind, on account of an evil present or future: namely an evil present either to the very person who fears, or to another who is closely joined to him by blood-relationship, affinity, marriage, or singular friendship (V, n. XX).
Fear can be present on account of an evil apprehended in the mind alone as present and imminent.
DIVISION. Fear is divided in many ways:
- By reason of influence upon the act, it is antecedent or concomitant. Antecedent is that which moves one to acting, so that the action is said to proceed FROM fear. Concomitant is that which only accompanies the action, without influencing it in any way, so that the action is said to be done WITH fear.
Thus a traveler who gives a purse to a robber acts from antecedent fear; but the robber acts with concomitant fear, lest he be discovered.
- By reason of object, fear is light or grave. Light fear, which is also called vain, is that by which a light evil is feared, or even a grave one, but from a light and improbable cause. Grave fear is said to be present if a grave evil is feared from a very probable cause.
But fear: a) is grave absolutely if an evil grave in itself is feared from a grave and truly probable cause, and cannot be escaped: this fear is said to fall upon a constant man, as being that by which even a firm man is deservedly struck. Commonly grave evils are judged to be death, mutilation, a foul wound, loss of liberty, status, reputation, chastity. b) It is grave respectively if the evil which is feared is indeed in itself and commonly light, yet grave with respect to the one fearing, because he is fearful, such as children, women, old men are (V, n. XX; VI, 1047; H. Ap., III, 16).
Reverential fear must be added, by which a son fears the offense of parents, a ward of a guardian, a wife of a husband, a subject of a Superior. But it can be grave if the fear is lest he who strikes fear be held offended for a long time or gravely (III, 717; VI, 1056; H. Ap., l. c.).
By reason of cause, fear is from within or from without. That is said to be from within which comes from an internal cause, such as disease, weakness of mind, etc.; or also, in a broader sense, that which comes from any natural cause whatever, for example, from shipwreck, fire, an attack of wild beasts, etc.; but that is said to be from without which comes from an external and free cause, or from man (VI, 1049).
By reason of the mode by which it is struck, fear is just or unjust, according as it is struck from a just cause, for example, of merited penalties, or from an unjust one, that is, through injury.
- PRINCIPLES. I. Grave fear regularly does not take away, but lessens the voluntary. The reason for the first is, because through fear neither knowledge on the part of the intellect nor choice on the part of the will is taken away, which always enjoys the faculty of determining itself to the opposite. Hence those who denied the faith from fear of torments have always been held as apostates. The reason for the second is, because since fear has joined to it repugnance of the will, the action becomes involuntary in a certain respect: whence the voluntary is lessened, as is clear (V, n. XXI).
We have said regularly; for sometimes fear altogether takes away the voluntary, namely if it is so great that it takes away the use of reason; but this is per accidens, and fear, in such a case, takes on rather the nature of passion, concerning which it will be said n. 290.
II. Light fear neither takes away nor lessens the voluntary. Hence that saying of right: "Vain fear is not a just excuse."
Note. Fear sometimes excuses from law, or at least from penalty, as we saw in the treatise on Laws (n. 223); sometimes it stands against the value of an act, as we shall see below when we dispute concerning vows, oaths, contracts, and matrimony. For from the fact that fear does not take away the voluntary, it does not follow that all things are firm and valid which are done under the influence of fear (V, n. XXII).