Section — Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis
2. On Fear
67. Notion. Fear is customarily defined as "a trembling of the mind because of an imminent or future danger."57 It is said: a trembling of the mind, to signify not a purely sensible fear, insofar as it is the passion of fear, but fear which is perceived by the mind and affects the will. Fear accepted in this sense properly moves the will to doing or omitting something because of an impending evil. But the evil which causes fear is not yet present; for if it is actually present, it causes sadness and not fear. Yet there is present the danger of an imminent or future evil, and indeed of an arduous evil which cannot easily be avoided. For if such an evil can easily be avoided, it does not cause fear. Nor is it necessarily required that the evil threaten the very person of the agent, but it suffices that it also threaten persons joined to the agent. Hence, for example, a father can be struck by grave fear because of an evil which threatens his son.
57 Thus Ulpian (Ad edict. Praetoris l. 1, D. IV, 2); this definition indeed is already found according to its sense in Aristotle, Rhetoric l. 2, c. 5: fear is a pain or disturbance arising from an image of a future destructive or painful evil.
68. Divisions. Among the many divisions of fear or dread, the following are the more principal:
1. Fear struck from within or from without. The former is caused by a cause intrinsic to man or by a natural cause, for example, from illness, a storm, contagion, etc. The latter is caused by a free extrinsic cause, for example, by a man, a demon, etc.58
2. Grave and light fear. Grave fear arises from the imminent danger of a grave evil, for example, of death, mutilation, grave beating, grave infamy, the loss of a notable quantity of goods, etc., and is said "to fall upon a constant man," that is, it moves not only women and timid men, but also a constant man. - Grave fear is either absolutely grave or only relatively grave. That fear is considered absolutely grave which is accustomed to move every man and whose object is truly grave. That fear is considered relatively grave whose object is indeed in itself light, which nevertheless vehemently moves a determined person because of his special qualities; for example, a timid daughter vehemently fears her father's punishment, which nevertheless, taken objectively, is not so grave an evil. - Light fear is that by which either a light evil is feared, or there is present a light danger of a grave evil; for example, if some robust person because of fear of rain, dust, or mud were to omit Mass on a feast day.
Note. Reverential fear, by which a subject fears the offense or indignation of a superior, for example, a son fears the offense of his father,59 is customarily reduced to light fear (at least in the external forum). But in the internal forum reverential fear sometimes becomes grave, namely, if the offense of the superior is held as a grave evil; for example, if the offense of the superior is lasting, if threats and very troublesome quarrels are deservedly feared. But in order that reverential fear be held grave, even in the external forum, strict proof is required, namely, that the reverential fear is qualified, that is, that the offense and indignation of the superior cause grave evils. This case indeed can occur if the validity of marriage is impugned because of a defect of consent caused by reverential fear.60
3. Fear justly and unjustly struck. Fear is justly struck when it is caused by a legitimate person and in due manner. Thus, for example, the father of a deflowered daughter strikes just fear into her deflowerer if he threatens to hand him over to the judge. Fear is unjustly struck when someone threatens another with evil without sufficient cause or even altogether injuriously. Thus, for example, there would be unjust fear if the same father threatened the deflowerer of his daughter with death unless he were willing to take the deflowered daughter as wife; still more unjust is the fear which a robber casts upon a traveler, saying: Your life or your purse!
4. Antecedent and concomitant fear. The former precedes the action and causes it; for it moves the will to acting. Whence he who suffers such fear acts from fear; for example, a traveler from antecedent fear is moved to giving money to a robber. - The other fear accompanies the action which it not only does not cause, but rather would impede, if this were possible. Thus in the example brought forward the robber receives the money from the traveler with dread or fear; for he fears lest he be seized and punished by the judge. Concerning concomitant fear we shall no longer speak in what follows.
58 Thus Laymann (Theol. mor. l. 1, tract. 2, c. 6, n. 3), D'Annibale (Summula Theol. mor. I, 138), Aertnys-Damen (Theol. mor. I, n. 19), and others explain this division. Other authors understand the same division otherwise, calling fear struck from without that which is struck by any extrinsic cause whatever. Thus, for example, Noldin (De principiis n. 55) calls fear of death from shipwreck fear from without. There is indeed no need to dispute about words, but confusions must be carefully avoided. Besides, all agree that fear caused by an external natural or necessary cause is assimilated to fear struck from within.
59 Cf. Act. Ap. Sed. IV (1912), 647, in the Lyons case.
60 Cf. below, in the treatise on marriage, the impediment of defect of consent. On the diverse acceptations of reverential fear see D'Annibale, l. c. In practice these controversies are of small utility.
69. What influence does fear exercise upon human acts?
Principle 1. Antecedent fear takes away the voluntary if it is so vehement that it impedes the use of reason; otherwise it is accustomed only to diminish it.
It is explained: a) It is evident from experience that sometimes fear is so grave, especially in timid men, that the use of reason is entirely taken away; indeed women, from sudden fear, not rarely lose consciousness. It is plain of itself that in these cases a voluntary act does not subsist.
b) Apart from those cases, no fear entirely takes away the voluntary. The reason is that under the influence of fear sufficient cognition of the intellect persists and the will remains free. For if not even physical violence itself is able to coerce the will, as was said above, a fortiori fear, however grave, cannot do this. Hence that known adage: "He who prefers, wills." Yet it is conceded that fear diminishes the voluntary; for when fear is absent the action would not occur, and a man under the influence of fear indeed acts, but with internal repugnance. For this reason the scholastics briefly and truly said: An act produced from fear is voluntary simply and involuntary in a certain respect.61
But the same scholastics immediately added a clause to this proposition, namely: Fear causes the involuntary in a certain respect only when the work produced because of fear is evil accepted according to itself, for example, to throw goods into the sea, but not truly when it is evil only under some particular respect, while in itself it is good, as to lay aside affection toward sin because of fear of hell is a work good in itself, although it appears evil to the sinner not yet penitent. This clause indeed seems altogether necessary. For he who from fear of hell observes the commandments of God and declines from sins does not act with an imperfect and indirect voluntary, as if observance of the commandments were involuntary to him in a certain respect. For then (acting from purely servile fear) he would still have an evil affection toward prohibited things, nor could he be pleasing to God. But the reason is that observance of the commandments, although perhaps first begun by fear of hell, is nevertheless in itself something good; and it can, indeed also must, be intended, even if there were no hell. Whence it follows that good operations which are done from fear of hell (yet not from purely servile fear) are not less voluntary, nor do they lose their moral goodness.62
Corollary. From the principle thus established it is deduced that sin which from its object is mortal, or that which is intrinsically gravely evil, never becomes venial, however much it is done from fear; for it always remains sufficiently voluntary.63 Hence if someone denies the faith from fear of death, or if someone fornicates from grave fear, he sins gravely. It is otherwise with those things which are not intrinsically evil, but evil because prohibited by positive law, as will be said at once.
61 St. Thomas says that those things which we do from fear "are voluntary simply and involuntary in a certain respect" (S. theol. I-II, q. 6, a. 6). But if the same Angelic Doctor elsewhere (ibid. II-II, q. 142, a. 3) says that those things which are done from fear "are not simply voluntary, but mixed," he does not contradict himself, but takes the word "simply" in another sense, namely, for "purely" or "altogether" or "from every part."
62 Billuart, De act. hum. diss. 1, a. 7, and John of St. Thomas, Commentary on S. theol. I-II, q. 6 at the end, discuss very well this sufficiently difficult matter, which is of great moment for the right understanding of attrition.
63 Cf. Code of Canon Law, c. 2205, § 3.
70. Principle 2. Positive laws (whether divine or human) are not accustomed to oblige under grave fear, or, as it is said, they do not oblige with grave inconvenience.64
It is explained: Acts prescribed by those laws are not so good that their omission is intrinsically evil, and therefore legislators are not considered to have had the intention of obliging their subjects to the observance of the law even in such great straits. Hence, for example, no one is bound to hear Mass on days of precept if he reasonably fears grave bodily or material harm; no one is bound to satisfy the positive precept of confessing all mortal sins if there is present grave danger of some great inconvenience, which is accidentally and extrinsically joined with confession.65 The guardian of a money-chest, because he is driven by robbers under fear of death or wounding to handing over the key of the chest, can hand it over.
But I have said: Positive laws are not accustomed to oblige under grave fear; for sometimes positive laws oblige even with danger of life, namely: a) when otherwise the common good would be endangered - wherefore a soldier is bound to remain at his watch, although he fears the greatest danger of death; b) when transgression of the law would yield to contempt of the faith or of ecclesiastical power or to the harm of souls.65a Hence the Maccabees, whom the tyrant threatened with death unless they ate swine's flesh in contempt of the law, preferred to undergo death rather than violate the commandment of the Mosaic law. Yet in this latter case the obligation comes rather from natural law, that is, from the obligation of avoiding scandal, than from positive law.
64 Code of Canon Law, c. 2205, § 2, establishes: "Grave fear, even only relatively so ... commonly takes away a delict entirely, if there is question of merely ecclesiastical laws."
65 Cf. below, On the Integrity of Confession, II, n. 328.
65a Code of Canon Law, c. 2205, § 3.
71. Principle 3. a) Acts and contracts entered into from grave fear unjustly struck in order to extort consent are indeed valid of themselves; b) yet they can afterward be rescinded; c) indeed some contracts (or acts) entered into from fear are declared by positive law invalid of themselves. This principle has also been established by the Code of Canon Law, c. 103, § 2.
It is explained: a) Fear is not accustomed to take away the voluntary, as was said. But for the validity of an act or contract nothing else is required of itself than the voluntary consent of those contracting and a fit thing.66
There are some authors, for example Billuart,67 who think that those contracts whose object is only liberation from vexation or from unjust fear are invalid by natural law, because this liberation from vexation or from unjust fear is already owed from justice and therefore cannot be sold. But this reason does not seem to be sufficient, because otherwise all contracts entered from unjust fear would be invalid; yet this is not true. And truly he who enters some contract because of grave fear always wishes to free himself from unjust vexation. Hence he who gave a sum of money to a robber threatening death entered into a valid contract, but afterward can compel the robber to restitution.
b) He who enters a contract from grave fear unjustly struck has suffered a grave injury, from which he can free himself through rescission of the contract, as positive laws also rightly establish.68 This matter will be treated more broadly below, II, n. 258.
c) Certain contracts or acts are invalidated by positive ecclesiastical law by the very fact that they are entered into under grave fear, for example, vows,69 entrance or admission into the novitiate and religious profession,70 marriage contracted from grave fear unjustly struck,71 a vote in an ecclesiastical election,72 absolution from censures and other ecclesiastical penalties,73 renunciation of ecclesiastical offices.74
66 Billuart, De contractibus diss. 1, a. 4. St. Alphonsus (Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 716) calls this opinion more probable and most common. But many teach the contrary, for example, Laymann (Theol. mor. l. 1, tract. 2, c. 6).
67 L. c.
68 Cf. Code of Canon Law, c. 1684.
69 Ibid. c. 1307, § 3.
70 Council of Trent, sess. 25, on regulars, c. 19; Code of Canon Law, c. 542, n. 1; c. 572, § 1, n. 4.
71 Code of Canon Law, c. 1087.
72 C. 3 in VI, I, 6; Code of Canon Law, c. 169.
73 Code of Canon Law, c. 2238.
74 Code of Canon Law, c. 185.