Fortitude

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. III, Diss. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Ch. II, Article III. On Fortitude · Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. III, Diss. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Ch. II, Art. III, § I. On Fortitude Itself · Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. III, Diss. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Ch. II, Art. III, § II. On the Parts of Fortitude

To pride is opposed humility, the virtue which occupies the mean between the two extremes of pride and pusillanimity or mean-spiritedness. The mean-spirited man refuses to take the place for which his talents fit him, and which God intends for him. He puts himself beneath his equals and inferiors to the detriment of his dignity and office; he is afraid to exercise the authority entrusted to him, and the public good suffers in consequence. Humility, on the other hand, keeps a man in his place both with respect to God and his fellow-men. It is grounded on the knowledge of God and of self; the humble man knows and acknowledges that he has nothing but what he has received from God, that he is utterly and entirely dependent on God every moment of his life, that if left to himself he will fall into the lowest depths of sin and degradation; and this knowledge causes him to think much of God and little, very little, of self. This is the virtue so much recommended by our divine Lord: “‘ Learn of me, because I am meek and humble of heart.’’¹

Pride leads to many other vices, among which are: presumption, ambition, vainglory, boasting, and hypocrisy.

(a) Presumption is the inclination and wish to undertake what is above one’s capacity. Ordinarily it is a venial sin, but it will be mortal if it is the occasion of serious harm to the cause of God or our neighbour.

(b) Ambition is the inordinate striving after dignities and honours. The inordinateness consists in striving after honours to which one has no just claim or greater than one’s due, or by unlawful modes and means, or with too great eagerness. Apart from such inordinateness it is not sinful to seek after honours and dignities, as these belong to the class of things that are in themselves indifferent; it is a meritorious act to seek with moderation after dignities and honours in order thereby to be able to do more for God and one’s fellow-men. “If a man desire the office of a bishop, he desireth a good work.”² Such an act belongs to the virtue of magnanimity. Ambition is commonly a venial sin, but it becomes mortal when it is the cause of serious harm, or when the means employed to attain its end are grievously sinful.

(c) Vainglory is the inordinate striving after the esteem and praise of men. It is not wrong but praiseworthy to seek after and preserve a good reputation, which, as Holy Scripture teaches, is better than great riches.³ But inordinateness, vanity, and sin come in when the esteem and praise of those men is sought whose esteem is not worth having, or when esteem is sought for what does not deserve esteem, or not so great as is sought after, or when glory is not referred to the proper end. It is usually a venial sin, but may become mortal in the same way as ambition.

(d) Boasting is the inordinate bragging about one’s own good qualities or gifts, or even about what is sinful. If the inordinate display is in action rather than in word it is called ostentation.

(e) Hypocrisy is the feigning of virtues and qualities that one does not possess.

¹ Matt. xi 29.

² 1 Tim. iii 1.

³ Prov. xxii 1.

Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology

Ludovicus Wouters, C.SS.R. — 5 passages

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. III, Diss. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Ch. II, Article III. On Fortitude

Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. II, Art. 2. Good Habits, or Vi…, Division · Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. II, Art. 2. Good Habits, or Vi…, Properties of the Virtues · Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. II, Art. 2. Good Habits, or Vi…, Complements of the Virtues · Vol. I, Pt. II, Q. I, Art. 7. The Sins Against L…, The Sin of Sloth · Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 2. The Virtue of Just…, Comparison of Justice and Other Virtues · Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 7. The Virtue of Fort…, Nature · Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 7. The Virtue of Fort…, Martyrdom · Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 7. The Virtue of Fort…, The Opposite Vices · Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 7. The Virtue of Fort…, The Parts of Fortitude · Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 7. The Virtue of Fort…, Patience · Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 7. The Virtue of Fort…, The Complements of Fortitude · Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 7. The Virtue of Fort…, The Commandments of Fortitude

We shall speak first of fortitude itself, then of its parts.

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. III, Diss. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Ch. II, Art. III, § I. On Fortitude Itself

n. 416.

I. Notion of Fortitude. Fortitude, which is the third cardinal virtue, and which in dignity is surpassed by prudence and justice, but surpasses temperance, can be defined: a moral virtue inclining man to moderate the passions of fear and daring in sustaining and attacking dangers of death. It is said:

To moderate the passions of fear and daring. Thus it is indicated that it belongs to fortitude that man proceed by a middle way between excessive fear and excessive daring.
In sustaining and attacking dangers of death. By these words is indicated the object around which the passions must be moderated.

n. 417.

II. Object of Fortitude. 1. The proper and primary remote material object of fortitude is dangers of death; nevertheless, "because," as St. Thomas says, "he who stands firm against greater things, consequently stands firm against lesser things" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 123, a. 2), fortitude is extended secondarily also to lesser dangers (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 123, a. 4). The proximate material object is the movements of fear and daring. For fortitude inclines one to preserve the mean of reason illumined by faith amid dangers of death; moreover, the passions by which man is drawn away from this mean are fear, "which implies a certain withdrawal from an evil that has difficulty" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 123, a. 3), and daring, by which the appetite rises up against a terrible evil so as to overcome it.

The remote formal object is firmness of soul in moderating the passions of fear and daring amid dangers of death; the proximate formal object is the special moral goodness shining forth in the aforesaid firmness.

n. 418.

III. Acts of Fortitude. The acts of fortitude are two, namely to sustain and to attack. For sometimes right reason dictates that, with danger of death, we attack the adversaries of the good, so that they may be driven back and the assault against the good may cease; but sometimes, and more often, that we patiently sustain such dangers for the sake of the good of virtue, from which one must never withdraw, not even for the sake of removing them. This last act, namely to sustain, is the principal one. For "to attack pertains to fortitude insofar as it moderates daring; but to sustain follows the repression of fear" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 123, a. 6). Now "fortitude is more concerned with repressing fears than with moderating acts of daring; for it is more difficult to repress fear than to moderate daring, because the very danger which is the object of daring and fear contributes of itself somewhat to the repression of daring, but works toward the increase of fear."

Since the cardinal virtue of fortitude is occupied around whatever dangers of death, which, insofar as they are such, are all of the same species, it lacks subjective parts (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 128, single article). But the principal act of fortitude shines forth especially in martyrdom; therefore we wish to note certain things concerning it.

Notion of Martyrdom. By the force of the word, martyrdom - for it is derived from the Greek word marturon (μαρτύρων) - signifies any testimony whatever; but by usage it has long been received that by this word, by antonomasia, there is designated an act of supernatural fortitude by which a singular testimony is given for the truth of the Christian faith, and which can be defined: the voluntary endurance of torment lethal of itself for the faith of Christ. This definition will become clearer from the conditions to be assigned.
Conditions of Martyrdom. Some conditions are on the part of the torment, namely that it be lethal of itself; others on the part of the martyr, namely that he voluntarily undergo the endurance of torment and from a supernatural motive; others on the part of the persecutor, namely that he be distinct from the one being tormented and inflict the torment from hatred against the faith of Christ. Therefore it is required:

a) That the torment be lethal of itself. "A martyr is so called," says St. Thomas, "as a witness of the Christian faith, by which visible things are proposed as things to be despised for the sake of invisible things" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 124, a. 4). Moreover, so long as a man does not undergo torment lethal of itself, he does not show by deed that he despises all bodily things. But according to the more common opinion it is not demanded that death in fact follow; this is only the natural consequence of martyrdom, and does not pertain to its essence. This is clear both from the practice of the Church, which, for example, venerates St. John the Evangelist as a martyr because he voluntarily endured for the faith of Christ a torment lethal of itself, although by a miracle he came out unharmed from the vat of boiling oil; and from reason. For he who suffers torment lethal of itself, even if divine omnipotence prevents death, shows by deed that he despises all temporal things for the faith of Christ; and in this the outstanding act of fortitude formally exists.

b) That the endurance of torment be voluntary. For where the voluntary is lacking, an honorable act in general is also lacking. Therefore, although this condition, insofar as martyrdom is baptism of blood, is not required for little children, nevertheless it is required for adults, in whom martyrdom must always be an honorable act. An actual voluntary acceptance of this torment is best; a virtual voluntary acceptance also suffices; concerning the sufficiency of a habitual voluntary acceptance authors dispute.

c) That the voluntary endurance of torment be accepted from a supernatural motive, namely for bearing witness to the faith of Christ. For martyrdom is testimony shown to Christ; now he who dies, but not for the faith of Christ, does not show testimony to Christ. Therefore it is required that the truth which the martyr testifies to by his torment be a truth taught by Christ. Hence it follows that before the Church he is not a martyr who dies to avoid a sin which he erroneously thinks to be a sin (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 124, a. 5; Supplement, q. 69, a. 6, ad 9).

d) That another inflict the torment out of hatred against the faith of Christ. For the martyr's testimony for the faith of Christ is solemn, as is clear from the words of Christ;¹ wherefore death must be inflicted by another in hatred of Christ; otherwise testimony is not had.

It is disputed whether soldiers who are killed in a sacred war while fighting for the defense of the faith can be called martyrs in the true sense. Some deny it, since the nature of martyrdom, as the most excellent act of fortitude and an imitation of the Passion of Christ, seems to require that the endurance of torment lethal of itself be sustained patiently without attack. There is added the practice of the Church, which never venerates these soldiers as martyrs. Others, however, affirm it, since by attacking and defending, the soldiers seem to defend the Church and Christ more than themselves; and they try to explain the practice of the Church from the difficulty of investigating from what motive, divine or human, the soldiers fought.

Corollary. Neither a soldier in any war, nor a priest, nor a religious woman who succumbs in the duties of his or her office or of charity, is to be called a martyr; indeed, not even a priest who, falsely accused of homicide and able to free himself by violating the sacramental seal, is condemned to death. The cause of the death appointed on the part of the judge is not the cause of Christ, but the supposed homicide. Nevertheless, all these who succumb in fulfilling their office from a supernatural motive, although they are not martyrs, must truly be said to exercise the most perfect act of the virtue of fortitude; indeed, they place the most perfect act of charity according to the words of Christ: "Greater love than this no one has, that someone lay down his life for his friends";² but that act is not martyrdom, which theologians call baptism of blood.

Effects of Martyrdom. a) In the just man it effects second sanctifying grace, and the remission of all venial faults of which he repents, even if attrition without martyrdom would not suffice for their remission, and the removal of all temporal punishments.

b) In the sinner, martyrdom effects first sanctifying grace and the remission of sin, both original sin, if it has not yet been remitted, and personal mortal sin, and the removal of eternal punishments and the other effects assigned for the just man.

Venial sins to which a martyr might die adhering are remitted for him as to guilt by the first act of charity which he elicits immediately after departure from this life (St. Thomas, De malo, q. 7, a. 11; St. Alphonsus, Opera dogmatica, ed. Walter, t. 1, p. 672); and since nothing can delay a martyr from entrance into eternal beatitude, the temporal punishments remaining for these venial sins are removed still by the force of the martyrdom suffered, by the same reason by which the sacrament of Baptism removes these punishments in those adults who, baptized with an affection for venial sins, would immediately depart from life without any sin committed after Baptism.

Note. Concerning the condition required in a martyr that he may obtain the effects of martyrdom, and concerning the manner in which martyrdom produces its effects, cf. the treatise on Baptism.

¹ Matt. 10:32-39.

² John 15:13.

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. III, Diss. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Ch. II, Art. III, § II. On the Parts of Fortitude

n. 419.

Since this virtue is occupied around whatever dangers of death, which insofar as they are such are plainly of the same species, it lacks subjective parts. Therefore it remains to speak of its potential parts.

"For the act of attacking," says the Angelic Doctor, "two things are required; the first of which pertains to the preparation of the soul, namely that it have a ready soul for attacking" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 128, single article). For this magnanimity is given (St. Thomas, cited place). "But the second pertains to the execution of the work, namely that one not fail in the execution of those things which he began confidently" (St. Thomas, cited place). And for this magnificence is posited (St. Thomas, cited place). "But for the other act of fortitude, which is to sustain, two things are likewise required; the first of these is that the soul not be broken by sorrow on account of the difficulty of imminent evils, and fall from its greatness" (St. Thomas, cited place). And as regards this, patience is given (St. Thomas, cited place). "But the other is that from the long-lasting suffering of difficult things man not become wearied to the point that he desist" (St. Thomas, cited place). And therefore perseverance is posited (St. Thomas, cited place). Moreover, these four parts, although insofar as they "are restricted to the proper matter of fortitude, namely to dangers of death" (St. Thomas, cited place), they are integral parts of this virtue, nevertheless "if ... they are referred to certain other matters, in which there is less difficulty, they will be virtues distinct from fortitude according to their own species" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 128, single article). These things noted, we shall speak of each part separately.

McHugh–Callan, Moral Theology

John A. McHugh, O.P., and Charles J. Callan, O.P. — 22 passages

Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. II, Art. 2. Good Habits, or Vi…, Division

n. 150.

There are four principal moral virtues: (a) in the intellect there is prudence, which guides all the actions and passions by directing the other moral virtues to what is good according to reason; (b) in the will there is justice, which inclines a person to make his actions accord with what he owes to others; (c) in the irascible appetite is fortitude, which subjects to reason the passions that might withdraw from good, such as fear of dangers and labors; (d) in the concupiscible appetite is temperance, which represses the motions of passions that would impel one to some sensible good opposed to reason.

These four virtues are also called cardinal virtues, because all the other moral virtues hinge on them.

Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. II, Art. 2. Good Habits, or Vi…, Properties of the Virtues

n. 154.

The golden mean is found differently in different virtues.

(a) In the case of justice, the mean is determined by an external object that is invariable, since justice gives what is due to others, neither more nor less; in the case of fortitude and temperance the mean is determined by prudent judgment and is not invariable, since these two virtues are concerned with the regulation of the internal passions according to conditions of individuals and circumstances. Thus, a debt of ten dollars remains the same whether the debtor is rich or poor, whether the creditor needs it or not. But a glass of liquor, which would be just enough for one who was well, might be far too much for him when he was sick; and a danger which a man might be expected to encounter, might be too much for a woman or a boy.

(b) The mean of the intellectual and speculative virtues is the agreement with objective truth, as lying between the extremes of false affirmation and false negation. The mean of the practical virtue of prudence, as regulating the moral virtues, is right reason, considered as directive of the desires and conduct so as to avoid excess and defect.

(c) The theological virtues have no mean, as far as their object is concerned, since God, being infinite in truth, power and goodness, cannot be believed in, hoped in, or loved too much. By reason of their subject, however, these virtues have a mean, since it is possible for one to exceed, for example, in hope by presumptuously expecting what is not due to one’s condition.

n. 157.

The highest of the virtues within each group are the following:

(a) Charity is greater than faith and hope, since it implies union with its objects, while the other two imply a certain distance from their object;

(b) Justice is superior to fortitude and temperance, since it deals with actions by which man is rightly ordered, both as to himself and as to others, while the others deal with the passions and the right disposition of man as to himself. The order of the moral virtues is: prudence, which is the guide of the others; justice, which deals with man’s actions and orders him rightly, both as to himself and as to others; fortitude, which governs the passions, even when life and death are the issues; temperance, which governs the passions in affairs of less importance;

(c) The chief of the intellectual virtues is wisdom, which considers the supreme cause of things, and therefore judges the other virtues of the intellect.

Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. II, Art. 2. Good Habits, or Vi…, Complements of the Virtues

n. 160.

There are seven Gifts of the Holy Ghost, which are divided as follows:

(a) There are the Intellectual Gifts, which make the soul more responsive to the light which the Holy Spirit sheds upon truths held by faith. These Gifts assist the intellect, first, in its apprehension of the mysteries of faith, that it may be made to grasp more clearly what it believes (Gift of Understanding); secondly, in its judgments, that it may be illuminated so as to adhere to the principles of faith and depart from their opposites, whether there be question of judgments about divine things (Gift of Wisdom), or created things (Gift of Knowledge), or human actions (Gift of Counsel);

(b) There are the Appetitive Gifts, which make the soul more ready to follow divine motions and inspirations. These Gifts aid the irascible affections by giving them a confidence of victory over every peril and by assuring safe arrival at the term of life (Gift of Fortitude); they aid the will in its social relations by leading to a filial love and devotion toward God (Gift of Piety); they assist the concupiscible affections by filling them with a reverence of God’s majesty and a horror of offending Him (Gift of Fear of the Lord).

Vol. I, Pt. II, Q. I, Art. 7. The Sins Against L…, The Sin of Sloth

n. 1324.

Sins that Spring from Sloth

Sins that Spring from Sloth.—(a) To escape his sadness about divine things, the slothful man avoids or flees the things that sadden him—his last end (sin of despair) and the means thereto (sins of cowardice and carelessness). He also attacks the causes of his grief—the persons who would lead him to God (sin of rancor) or the spiritual things themselves (sin of malice). (b) To console himself for the want of joy in spiritual things, he seeks comfort in forbidden things: his mind is unquiet and curious about that which does not concern him, his talk is excessive, his bodily movements are restless, and he must be continually moving from place to place.

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 2. The Virtue of Just…, Comparison of Justice and Other Virtues

n. 1716.

Two virtues of the sensitive appetite that appear more excellent than justice are courage and liberality, but in reality justice is nobler than they.

(a) Thus, courage seems to be better, because it is more essential to the common good in time of great danger; but in reality justice is more useful to the community, for at all times, whether in peace or in war, it is justice that preserves unity and contentment among the people and promotes courage and devotion to the public welfare.

(b) Liberality seems to be better than justice, because it gives more than is due, while justice gives only what is due. But, on the other hand, justice is of more general advantage, since of necessity liberality must be exceptional and shown only to comparatively few, while justice must be exercised continually and must be shown to all; justice is also more necessary, for one must be just in order to be liberal, and not vice versa, since no one is praised as generous unless he first pays the debts of justice; finally, although liberality gives more than is due and may thus be a greater private benefit, justice without liberality is more serviceable to the common interest than liberality without justice.

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 7. The Virtue of Fort…, Nature

n. 2437.

The Virtue of Fortitude

(Summa Theologica, II-II, qq. 123-140.)

The Virtue of Fortitude.—This virtue ranks next after justice and before temperance. Prudence has the greatest amount of goodness since it deals directly with reason, the essential good of man; justice is next because it realizes the dictates of reason in human affairs; the other virtues uphold the reign of reason against the rebellion of passion, fortitude repressing fear, the most powerful foe of reason, and temperance subduing pleasure, which is after fear the strongest of reason’s enemies (cfr. 157, 1627, 1688). Fortitude is nobler than temperance because more closely related to reason; it is the more difficult virtue, because it is harder to bear pain than to abstain from pleasure.

n. 2438.

Fortitude in General

Fortitude in General.—Fortitude (etymologically, strength, vigor, firmness) in general is a moral quality which makes a person unshaken from the right by danger or difficulty. It has various senses.

(a) It is used for a seeming virtue, which has the act but not the requisites (i.e., the knowledge and the free choice) of a moral virtue. Thus, some are brave from ignorance or want of reflection, because they do not realize the danger (e.g., intoxicated persons) or because habit makes them act without thought, or because many successes have rendered them over-sanguine; others are brave from compulsion, because cowardice is severely punished, or from passion, because they are beside themselves with pain, anger, desire, etc.

(b) It is used for an inchoate virtue or a natural fitness to withstand attack or encounter danger. Thus, some persons are so constituted physically that the thought of risk, pain, or death does not affect them strongly (fearlessness, intrepidity), or even attracts them (adventurousness). This kind of bodily bravery is a preparation or predisposition for moral courage.

(c) Fortitude is also the name of a general virtue or rather of a general condition which must be found in every virtue. For there is no virtue without firmness and persistence in good, as the name virtue (i.e., strength) indicates. Thus, a person who is weakly inclined to temperance and opposes no strong resistance to temptation cannot be said to possess the virtue of temperance.

(d) Finally, fortitude is the name of a special virtue which confers vigor and steadfastness in a special kind of trial, such as perils and pains which threaten or inflict severe evils. It is of this fortitude that we now speak.

n. 2439.

Definition of Fortitude

Definition of Fortitude.—Fortitude is defined as “a virtue which in the face of the greatest evils moderates the passions of fear and confidence within the bounds dictated by right reason.”

(a) The primary object of fortitude is the passions, or motions of the sensuous appetite through which the appetite is attracted or repelled by an object brought before it as good or evil, agreeable or disagreeable. Justice is concerned with operations, fortitude and temperance with passions (see 1709).

(b) The passions that chiefly fall within the scope of fortitude are fear and confidence; and thus it is set apart from temperance, which deals with the passions of pleasure. Fortitude has to do with that which is disagreeable to sense, temperance with that which is agreeable. Fear is a disturbance of soul produced by the imminence of an external evil that cannot be easily escaped; confidence is a feeling of self-reliance impelling one to face or attack a threatening evil.

(c) The function of fortitude is to moderate fear and confidence, or to keep them to the happy mean between excess and defect. The passions in themselves are not evil, but they need regulation (see 121, 122); and hence without fortitude one falls either into cowardice or rashness.

(d) Fortitude acts in the face of the greatest evils, that is, even when death itself, the greatest of corporal evils and the king of terrors, is at hand. Virtue is the act of a perfect man, and hence we do not ascribe fortitude to a man who is not brave except in reference to things that are fearful only slightly or not at all (such as having a tooth pulled or a finger lanced). The right regulation of fear springs, therefore, from different good qualities, according to the kinds of objects that inspire alarm: to fortitude in the strictest sense, if there is question of supreme natural evil (that is, death or its equivalent in deadly disease, mortal wound or torture); to fortitude in a wider sense, if there is question of lesser corporal evils (e.g., blows, wounds or mutilation that do not cause death); to some other virtue, if there is question of other kinds of evils (e.g., liberality regulates the fear of losing money).

(e) The motive of fortitude is conformity with right reason. The courageous person despises dangers because he wishes to hold fast to virtue and has for his last aim God and true beatitude. Fortitude is exercised, then, only when one is courageous in a good cause; the end of the work (finis operis), or at least the end of the agent (finis operantis), must be virtuous. The aim of bravery itself is virtuous when it is the common good (e.g., soldiers fighting in defense of country) or the good of a particular virtue (e.g., a judge contending for justice, a virgin for purity, a martyr for religion); the aim of the brave man is good when he performs an indifferent act for virtue’s sake (e.g., waits on another during pestilence because of friendship, goes on a perilous journey because of a pilgrimage). On the contrary, fortitude is not exercised if bravery has nothing to do with virtue (e.g., the imperturbability during sickness or shipwreck of a person who had resolved on suicide), or if it is opposed to virtue (e.g., the daring and coolness of a pirate, bandit, gunman or dueller); to risk ignoble death with bravado is not a virtue.

n. 2440.

The Two Acts of Fortitude

The Two Acts of Fortitude.—(a) The moderation of fear is followed by endurance or firmness in the midst of danger, as in the case of the martyrs. This act in common speech is more especially designated “fortitude.” It is not accurate to speak of it as passive resistance or passive courage. By it, indeed, no external act is performed, but this is due to a most firm internal resolution and self-control, such as a refusal to accept defeat, surrender principles or make peace with wrong. Endurance to undergo is not the same thing, then, as stoical indifference or apathy.

(b) The moderation of confidence is followed, where circumstances call for it, by prudent attack or even, when discretion is the better part of valor, by retreat as in warriors. A truly brave man does not fear to be called a coward, and hence he will not advance when reason forbids nor hesitate to retire when reason commands. Brave endurance is a nobler act of fortitude than brave attack; for endurance struggles against superior strength, it feels the evil already present, and its fight is long and continuous, whereas attack is borne on by a sense of power, the object of dread is still in the distance, and its rush is quick and passing (Prov., xvi. 32). Hence, not all who are courageous in attack are courageous under attack. But both acts are noble, and each is necessary at its proper time.

n. 2441.

The Excellence of Fortitude

The Excellence of Fortitude.—(a) Its Rank.—Fortitude is one of the four principal or cardinal virtues. A principal virtue is one that exercises in the most difficult circumstances one of the four qualities that every moral virtue must have. These qualities are firmness (for every virtue is a habit or strongly rooted quality), rectitude (since a virtue inclines to the good as the right or obligatory), moderation (since a virtue is moral, or measured according to reason), and discretion (since good inclinations must be guided by true direction). Now, just as rectitude is most difficult, on account of self-love, in dealing with others, and moderation in governing the appetites, and discretion in ruling one’s own actions, so firmness is most difficult in the presence of the greatest dangers; and therefore with justice, temperance, and prudence must also be associated fortitude as one of the chief of all virtues. These four principal virtues are also called cardinal virtues (from cardo, a hinge), because the whole moral life of man hinges on them. Thus, though perils of death are comparatively rare, the occasions of such perils are common and one is constantly called on to exercise fortitude (e.g., to be prepared to incur mortal enmities rather than forsake justice, or purity, or religion).

(b) Its Utility.—Fortitude has a certain general utility, for it is found to be of advantage everywhere. Thus, brave men and just men are admired in peace as well as in war, whereas liberal men are serviceable only in certain matters (Aristotle). Fortitude is like a strong tower, or like an army that protects the other virtues, and there are continual demands for its exercise. The life of man is a warfare (Job, vii. 1), and a manly spirit is needed to struggle against the temptations, injuries, infirmities, and trials that threaten virtue. Without fortitude, then, no one can be saved, for the kingdom of heaven is captured only by the aggressive (Matt., xi. 12), and only those who fight shall receive the crown (II Tim., ii. 5).

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 7. The Virtue of Fort…, Martyrdom

n. 2442.

Martyrdom

Martyrdom.—As judgment is the chief act of justice (see 1727), so martyrdom is the chief act of fortitude, and in a sense the most perfect of all acts. For martyrdom is defined as “the voluntary acceptance for the sake of God of a violent death inflicted out of hatred of virtue.” Martyrdom belongs to fortitude which produces it, to love of God which commands it (I Cor., xiii. 13), and to faith which attracts it. Merely as an act of courage, it is inferior to some other acts, since fortitude is not the highest virtue, and the goods for which martyrdom is undergone must be preferable to martyrdom itself. But in two ways martyrdom is the greatest act of virtue.

(a) Thus, internally it has charity for its end, and “greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends” (John, xv. 13); it is the greatest sign of love of God.

(b) Externally it is a profession of faith in the superiority of the invisible and future to the visible and present goods, and no more efficacious proof of this faith can be given than martyrdom (Job, ii. 4; II Cor., iv. 11).

n. 2443.

Kinds of Martyrdom

Kinds of Martyrdom.—The word martyrdom is sometimes used loosely or less accurately, and hence we distinguish the following kinds of martyrdom:

(a) false martyrdom is death suffered in an evil cause, as when one dies for erroneous principles or doctrines (e.g., for anarchy), Martyrdom is testimony of blood given to the truth, not to error, and hence it is not the suffering but the cause that makes the martyr. Improper martyrdom is death suffered for some purely natural good, as when a person dies for the cause of science or of a political party, or in defense of natural truths about God but without a religious motive;

(b) true and proper martyrdom, which is not the virtue but the crown of martyrdom, is death inflicted on an infant out of hatred for Christ, as in the case of the Holy Innocents. This is baptism of blood for infants, as the virtue is for adults, supplying the place of baptism of water (Matt., x. 39);

(c) the virtue of martyrdom in the sight of God (theological martyrdom) is either in desire or in act. Martyrdom of desire, which is the wish to die for God, may have the same essential glory as martyrdom in act, but it lacks the accidental glory, since it does not really suffer the trial (see 89-93). Martyrdom in act, which is external suffering for justice’s sake, has three degrees: the lowest degree is suffering that lacks one or other of the essential conditions (see 2444) for supreme self-sacrifice (imperfect martyrdom), the higher degree has all the essential conditions (perfect martyrdom), while the highest degree has also the accidentals that are most suitable for martyrdom (complete martyrdom);

(d) the virtue of martyrdom in the sight of the Church (canonical martyrdom) is that which, in addition to the conditions for perfect martyrdom, possesses also external indications sufficient to prove their existence and character.

n. 2444.

Conditions for Martyrdom

Conditions for Martyrdom.—Since martyrdom is a virtue and the supreme testimony, it must have the following conditions:

(a) the cause of the martyrdom must be faith (e.g., persecution because the martyr is a Catholic), or some virtue containing a profession of faith, inasmuch as a divine good (e.g., chastity) or a human good (e.g., the truth of a science, the safety of one’s country) is defended for the sake of God;

(b) the persecutor must act from hatred of virtue, but it is not necessary that he be an unbeliever, or that he avow his hatred of virtue as the motive of persecution, or that he pronounce or execute the sentence of death himself;

(c) the martyr must accept martyrdom willingly (actual or virtual intention suffices, and perhaps also habitual); he must be free from guilt that provoked the sentence, and must be in the state of grace or at least repentant; he must die from a virtuous motive, not from vainglory, despair, or other sinful reason. Some make non-resistance a condition for what we called perfect martyrdom, while others make it a condition for what we called complete martyrdom; according to the former opinion the crusaders or other soldiers dying in a just war cannot be called martyrs of religion, but according to the second opinion they may be ranked with the martyrs;

(d) the punishment inflicted on the martyr must be death, either instant (as in decapitation) or delayed (as in gradual starvation, death by slow poisoning, mortal wounds, imprisonment or other hardship), Hence, those who are not put to death, but who are tortured, mutilated or imprisoned (e.g., St. John the Evangelist), are confessors of the faith, but only in an imperfect sense are they martyrs. Some believe that suffering is necessary for perfect martyrdom, and hence that those who are put to death painlessly are not, strictly speaking, martyrs; but others—and with better reason, it seems—deny this. Those who are not killed (e.g., persons who die from disease contracted while attending the sick or from austerities), or who are killed by themselves (e.g., the Circumcellions who thought to win martyrdom by suicide), are not martyrs (on the cases of Sts. Apollonia and Pelagia, see 1856).

n. 2445.

Practical Questions about Martyrdom

Practical Questions about Martyrdom.—(a) The Desire of Martyrdom.—A general desire for or the willingness to suffer martyrdom if the necessity should arise is required for salvation (I John, iii. 16; Rom., x. 10). Apart from necessity, a special desire of martyrdom is not of precept, since martyrdom is an act of perfection; but such a desire is of counsel, since it is encouraged by Christ (I Peter, ii. 21), and many Saints have prayed for martyrdom.

(b) The Choice of Martyrdom.—Regularly it is not lawful to offer oneself freely for martyrdom, for to do so gives the tyrant an occasion of committing injustice, and as a rule there are not sufficient reasons of public or private good for permitting his sin (see 103 sqq.). Exceptionally it is lawful, when there is no danger that one will be overcome and there are urgent reasons for the act, such as the glory of God or the peace of the faithful.

(c) Provocation of Martyrdom.—Regularly it is not lawful to bring on a persecution by aggression (e.g., by destroying idols), since generally this will make one guilty of complicity and presumption. But there are exceptional cases, when the good of souls demands attack on evils (Dan., xiv. 26; Matt., xiv. 3, 4). It is not provocation of persecution, however, to live virtuously (Tob., ii. 8, 9), or to reprove a persecutor after one has been apprehended (II Mach., viii. 15-17; Acts, vii. 51-54).

(d) Flight from Martyrdom.—Flight is sometimes sinful, sometimes obligatory, sometimes optional, according to circumstances, as was explained in 1005, 1006.

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 7. The Virtue of Fort…, The Opposite Vices

n. 2446.

Sins Opposed to Fortitude

Sins Opposed to Fortitude.—(a) Number.—The vices opposed to fortitude are four, two of excess and two of defect, according as fear and confidence are not regulated as to time, place, manner and other circumstances in the way of moderation. He who fears when or as he should not, is timorous (e.g., one who kills himself because he fears the hardships of life, one who neglects religion out of human respect); he who does not fear when or as he should, is insensible (e.g., one who exposes himself to peril of death for the sake of excitement). He who does not dare when or as he should, is cowardly (e.g., a superior who does not correct as he should); he who dares when or as he should not, is foolhardy (e.g., a superior who corrects when there is no chance of a good result).

(b) Malice.—These sins per se are venial, since excess or defect in emotions, which in themselves are indifferent, is not a serious disorder. But they become mortal if they lead to grave evil (e.g., if from fear of persecution one becomes a pagan), or to grave danger (e.g., if from foolhardiness one exposes oneself to death or mutilation). Insensibility and foolhardiness are caused by pride or vainglory, by contempt for life or for the strength of others. Timidity and cowardice diminish culpability, though they do not remove it.

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 7. The Virtue of Fort…, The Parts of Fortitude

n. 2447.

The Parts of Fortitude

The Parts of Fortitude.—As has been said above, the parts of a virtue are subjective, integral and potential (see 1635, 1636).

(a) Fortitude has no subjective parts, for it is concerned with a very specialized matter, namely, the danger of death; and hence there is no room for differences of kind, although there are differences of degree (e.g., greater courage is needed to face an ignominious or cruel death than to face death amid applause or with little suffering).

(b) The integral parts of fortitude are those that are necessary for the perfect functioning of its offices in reference to major dangers (i.e., of death). Now, the first act of fortitude, namely, attack, requires greatness of soul (which makes one love the best things and despise all that is opposed to them) and greatness of deed (which makes one perform generously what was nobly willed). The second act of fortitude, namely, endurance, requires patience (that the soul be not thrown into dejection by difficulties) and steadfastness (that the soul be not turned aside from its purpose or wearied by long-continued opposition).

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 7. The Virtue of Fort…, Patience

n. 2453.

Patience

Patience.—Patience is a virtue which from the love of moderation so controls the sadness caused by present afflictions that this passion neither excessively disturbs the internal powers of the soul nor produces anything inordinate in the external conduct. Hence it differs from the following:

(a) from temperance, for, although temperance also regulates sadness, the sadness with which it deals is caused by lack of pleasures, while that with which patience deals is caused by the presence of evils, especially of those brought on by annoyances from others;

(b) from the endurance of fortitude, for fortitude regulates fear of death, while patience regulates sadness caused by evils of whatever nature, such as sickness, bereavements, loss of money, persecution;

(c) from longsuffering and constancy, for the matter of these virtues is a good which cannot be obtained except by long waiting or a good which must be continually exercised, whereas the matter of patience is an evil that has to be endured in the present. But since the delay of a desired good causes sadness (Prov., xiii. 12), and since continuance in good is irksome to the flesh, both longsuffering and constancy are included under patience.

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 7. The Virtue of Fort…, The Complements of Fortitude

n. 2457.

The Complements of Fortitude

The Complements of Fortitude.—We shall now speak of the Gift, the Beatitude, and the Fruits that correspond to fortitude (see 159 and 2433).

(a) The Gift of Fortitude is an infused habit which makes the appetitive powers readily responsive to the encouragement of the Holy Spirit and filled with a courage that is more than human. Thus, the Gift of Fortitude supplies for what is wanting in the virtue of fortitude. The virtue is regulated by the rules and measure of human prudence, but the Gift is inspired by the presence and command of the Holy Spirit Himself (Ps. xliii. 4, xvii. 2, 3); the virtue strengthens the soul, but the Gift supports even the weakness of the flesh, for the Spirit helpeth our infirmity (Rom., viii. 26; cfr. Luke, xxii. 43); the virtue aids one against the perils of death, but the Gift strengthens in difficulties both of life and death, reinforcing not only courage but also the allied virtues, greatness of soul, munificence, patience and perseverance, for we can do all things in Him that strengthens us (Phil., iv. 13); the virtue gives firm resolution to adhere to the right in spite of death itself, but the Gift adds the unshaken confidence that one shall surmount every difficulty and win the crown of victory (Rom., viii. 31 sqq.).

(b) The Beatitude which is the special exercise of the Gift of Fortitude is the eighth: “Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice’s sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven” (Matt, v 10). The Gift of Fortitude makes the persecuted feel a great confidence and security in the midst of the struggle, and this is a foretaste of the copious, exceeding and eternal reward that follows this Gift (Gen., xv. 1; Rom., viii. 18; II Cor., iv. 17; Ps. xciii. 19; II Cor., i, 1). Others assign to this Gift the Beatitudes of the meek and of those who hunger and thirst for holiness.

(c) The Fruits that are most appropriate here are patience in bearing evil and longsuffering in awaiting or performing good; for these are acts that add a finish of maturity to fortitude (see 2447, 2454, 2456), and in their most excellent state (see 2454) the performance of them is no longer bitter but sweet.

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 7. The Virtue of Fort…, The Commandments of Fortitude

n. 2458.

The Commandments of Fortitude

The Commandments of Fortitude.—(a) Fortitude itself is commanded both in the Old and the New Testament. In the Old Testament are found precepts of bravery in bodily warfare, as in Deut. xx. 3: “Hear, O Israel, you join battle this day against your enemies. Let not your heart be dismayed, be not afraid, do not give back, fear ye them not.” The New Law commands courage before spiritual foes; “Your adversary the devil goeth about like a roaring lion, seeking whom he may devour, whom resist ye strong in faith” (I Peter, v. 8); “Resist the devil and he will fly from you” (James, iv. 7); “Fight the good fight” (I Tim., vi. 12). It also commands fortitude in the presence of corporal dangers: “Fear not them that kill the body, but cannot kill the soul” (Matt., x. 28).

(b) The annexed virtues are counselled when (as is the case with greatness of soul and munificence) they incline to the excellent and superabundant; they are commanded when (as in the case of patience and perseverance) they are necessitated by normal conditions of earthly existence. Greatness of soul is recommended in the invitations to be perfect (Matt., v. 48), to love God more ardently (see 1560) and to follow the counsels (see 364 sqq.), and in the praise bestowed on the excellent virtue of Noe (Gen., vi. 9), of John the Baptist (Matt., xi. 11), and of Mary Magdalene (Luke x. 42). Munificence is recommended in the eulogies of Solomon (Ecclus., xlvii. 20), of Magdalene (Mark, xiv. 9) and of Joseph of Arimathea (Luke, xxiii. 50 ff.). Patience is commanded in Luke, xxi. 19 (In patience possess your souls), and in Rom., xxii. 12 (Be patient in tribulation); perseverance in Ecclus., ii. 4 (In sorrow endure), in Matt., x. 22 (He that perseveres to the end shall be saved), in I Cor., xv. 58 (Be steadfast and unmovable) and in Heb. xxi. 7 (Persevere under discipline).

n. 2459.

Obligation of the Precepts of Fortitude and Annexed Virtues

Obligation of the Precepts of Fortitude and Annexed Virtues.—(a) The precepts of fortitude are negative or prohibitory, and therefore it is obligatory at all times to omit what they forbid (see 371). It is never lawful to be timorous, insensible, cowardly, or foolhardy—to do anything intrinsically wrong, even to escape death (see 317, 318). But it is not necessary to sacrifice life for the fulfillment of an affirmative precept, unless injury to God or the common safety, or an extreme spiritual loss to self will otherwise result (see 317, 818, 361).

(b) The precepts of patience and perseverance are also negative, and hence it is never lawful to be guilty of stolidity, impatience, effeminacy or stubbornness. But since patience and perseverance are not so difficult as fortitude, they have also affirmative precepts. These latter laws oblige always, but not for every occasion (see 371). Thus, one must be always willing to exercise patience, but one who is spared trials has not the occasion to exercise the virtue. Patience itself never ceases to be a virtue, but there is a pseudo-patience which consists in toleration of evils that should not be tolerated, and which is not a virtue but a kind of supineness or spinelessness that pertains to effeminacy rather than to patience.

n. 2460.

Subjects of Fortitude

Subjects of Fortitude.—(a) Laws have universal extension, and hence it would not be true to say that active fortitude is a masculine, passive fortitude or patience a feminine virtue. But greater courage is expected in some than in others on account of greater strength (e.g., the adult, the physically well) or greater necessity (as in soldiers, policemen, firemen, pastors, physicians, rulers).

(b) The counsel of munificence, however, is only for the rich as regards exercise, since others have not the means wherewith to exercise this virtue.

Bucceroni, Institutions of Moral Theology

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 4 passages

Vol. I, On Sins and Virtues, VI. On Virtues · Vol. I, On the First Precept of th…, II. On Adoration, on Sacrifices, on Oblations, on First Fruits, on Tithes · Vol. I, On the First Precept of th…, VI. On Irreligiosity and on Temptation of God · Vol. III, On Baptism, I. On the Nature, Effects, and Necessity of Baptism

Vol. I, On Sins and Virtues, VI. On Virtues

n. 348.

What is fortitude, what are its parts, and what vices are opposed to it? - R. To the first. Fortitude is the virtue which moderates and strengthens the soul against grave dangers, especially of death. - No precept per se of this virtue is given, but only by reason of some special precept to be fulfilled, e.g., even martyrdom to be undergone, lest faith be denied. But whether and when there is an obligation of observing the law even with danger to life was said in the treatise on Laws, and is explained in the individual treatises, when it is asked whether it is licit to do something at least to avoid death. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 140.

There is a twofold act of fortitude, to attack and to sustain: to attack distinguished and arduous things; to sustain adversities. For the act of attacking two things are required. The first is preparation of soul, namely that someone have a prompt soul for undertaking great things, which magnanimity provides. The other regards execution of the work, namely that someone not fall short in the execution of those things which he began magnanimously, which magnificence provides. For the act of sustaining two things also are required. The first is that by the difficulty of imminent evils the soul not be broken through sadness, and fall away from its greatness; and for this patience is posited, by which someone bears evils with an even soul, without disturbance of sadness. The other is that from long-lasting suffering of difficult things man not be wearied up to the point that he desists; and for this perseverance is posited.

R. To the second. These four virtues, magnanimity, magnificence, patience, perseverance, are integral parts of fortitude if they are concerned with dangers of death; but they are potential parts of fortitude if they are concerned with lesser dangers. But fortitude does not have subjective parts, because it is not divided into many virtues differing in species, since it concerns a very special matter, namely dangers of death, which are all of the same genus, although some are greater than others.

R. To the third. Timidity, fearlessness, and audacity are opposed to fortitude. Timidity is a vice exceeding in fearing; for it fears what one ought not, when one ought not, or more than one ought, whence one does not dare to attack when reason dictates, or as it dictates. If it stands in itself, it is a light sin; but if it impels to sin, it will be grave or light according to the condition of that to which it impels. - Fearlessness is a vice deficient in fearing; for one does not fear when he ought to fear, or the things that ought to be feared. It is not a sin distinct from that to whose danger someone exposes himself; for it is a sin only insofar as it is the cause of that, tacitly containing consent to that danger.

Audacity is that which rashly casts itself into dangers. Rashly, namely without just reason. It is a sin according to the account of the evil and danger to which one exposes himself.

Presumption, ambition, vainglory, pusillanimity are opposed to magnanimity. - Presumption is excessive confidence in one's own powers, by which it happens that someone undertakes something, or is prepared to undertake something, above his powers. It is a deadly sin when it occurs with danger or injury of another, as the presumption of a physician, judge, confessor; or when it proceeds from error against the faith, as the presumption of heretics. Outside these cases it is almost always a venial sin. Ambition is an inordinate appetite of honor, by desiring more honor than is fitting. It is a light sin, unless honor is desired either with injury and harm of another, or from a gravely illicit thing, or in a gravely illicit mode or end. Vainglory is desire of vain glory. Vain, if glory is sought from simulated excellence or reputation, if greater than is fitting, or from an illicit thing, or among those who cannot judge rightly about things, or by referring it to an undue end. Per se it is a venial sin, nor does it become a mortal sin except by reason of another sin, which is sometimes involved in its effect. Pusillanimity is a sin by which someone from smallness of soul does not attempt those things which are commensurate with his natural virtue. It is grave or light according to the goods from which he recedes.

Small-magnificence and consumption or excessive profusion are opposed to magnificence. - Small-magnificence is the vice by which man falls short of the proportion which ought to be between expense and work. Consumption or excessive profusion is the vice by which someone exceeds the said proportion, namely so that he spends more than is proportioned to the work. Each is per se a light sin; it can be grave by reason of scandal, or notable harm then following to others, or by another extrinsic reason, e.g., of a vow, testament, etc., by which someone is bound to that magnificent work and ought to be contained within due expenses.

Insensibility and impatience are opposed to patience, but softness and pertinacity to perseverance. - Insensibility is had when someone is touched by no evils, neither his own nor those of neighbors. It is a sign either of brutish stupidity or of inhuman hardness. Insensibility or hardness is rarely a mortal sin; certainly per se it is only venial. - Impatience is had when someone grieves too much, or even from grief departs from the right. Impatience per se is only a venial sin, because it is only an excess in grief, or in a movement of anger, expressed by an external sign; nevertheless it can be deadly by reason of scandal or of the evil which someone does from impatience. - Softness is if someone easily recedes from good because of certain difficulties which he cannot sustain; for that is called soft which easily yields to one touching it. But it is manifest that fear of dangers impels more gravely than desire of pleasures; and the desire itself of pleasures moves more strongly than sadness concerning the lack of pleasure withdraws, because lack of pleasure is a pure defect. And therefore he is properly called soft who recedes from good because of sadness caused by the defect of delights, as if yielding to a weak mover. This is a grave sin in a venereal matter or in another matter of great moment, to which someone is bound by law, precept, vow, or oath; but it is light in a light matter. Pertinacity is perseverance in one's own opinion more than one ought; and it is venial or mortal according to the gravity of the matter, e.g., if someone is unwilling to embrace the Catholic religion lest he seem inconstant; if a Prince is unwilling to revoke pernicious laws. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 123 seqq.; Theol. Wirceb., de Virt. Card. de Fortit.

Vol. I, On the First Precept of th…, II. On Adoration, on Sacrifices, on Oblations, on First Fruits, on Tithes

n. 461.

Can men who have departed from life with a reputation for sanctity be adored? - They can be honored with private worship. But they cannot be honored with solemn and public worship, unless they have been numbered by the Supreme Pontiff in the Catalogue of Saints or Blessed. Public worship, however, is that which is exhibited in the name of the Church, or as instituted by her; private worship is that which proceeds only from private devotion, even if it is done before others. Therefore it is not licit to erect churches or altars in honor of Saints not canonized, or at least not beatified, cf. 463; nor is it licit to invoke them publicly in litanies, nor to expose their relics or images for public veneration, or to carry them around in processions. Yet it is permitted to keep these images or relics privately, to kiss them reverently, etc., because such worship is altogether private, which is not prohibited. Struggl 18; E. M.

Those are called Saints who solemnly, a definitive sentence having been issued, are enrolled by the Roman Pontiff in the catalogue of Saints, and their worship is permitted to all the faithful. Those are called Blessed who, from a special concession of the Roman Pontiff, can be honored with some public worship only in some place or in some Religious Institute. Those are Venerable concerning whom the cause of introduction of their beatification has been signed by the Roman Pontiff. Servants of God are those who have died with a reputation for sanctity or martyrdom. But "Our Most Holy Lord Pius Pope X... forbade Servants of God, whose causes are henceforth introduced, to be called Venerable; likewise he decreed that solemnities are not permitted to be carried out on the occasion of the decree issued concerning the introduction of the cause... nor panegyric orations. But he permitted that Servants of God be adorned with the title Venerable only after the decree issued concerning heroic virtue or concerning martyrdom, yet in such a way that from this permission no argument of granted veneration can be inferred or claimed... Solemnities for giving thanks to God even after the decree issued concerning heroic virtue or martyrdom he likewise prohibited; yet by this prohibition he did not intend to prevent the addition in Masses, as is fitting, of a collect for thanksgiving." S. R. C., 26 Aug. 1913. This Decree also contains several other prescriptions to be observed in the beginning of causes of Servants of God, namely so that the cause may be duly instituted. There are special Instructions concerning the processes of causes of Martyrs in regions of unbelievers. Cf. Consulente Ecclesiastico, 1905, p. 313 seqq. Likewise there is a Decree to be observed concerning judicial order in causes of Servants of God proceeding by way of an excepted case. S. R. C., 11 Nov. 1912. "Our Most Holy Lord Pius Pope X, for treating causes of lesser moment of Servants of God, namely concerning reputation for sanctity in general, concerning non-cult, concerning the validity and relevance of processes, and other similar things, constituted a particular Congregation." Decree S. R. C., 9 Dec. 1908.

Vol. I, On the First Precept of th…, VI. On Irreligiosity and on Temptation of God

n. 492.

Is it permitted to offer oneself to martyrdom? - One must distinguish with St. Thomas. Either a legitimate cause is present or not. If the first, for example, to avoid blasphemies, to procure the glory of God and of faith, to remove in one's neighbor the danger of unbelief, it is certainly permitted, since it is a work of the greatest charity. If the second, it is not permitted, since no one is lord of his own life so that he can squander it at his own pleasure. Whence he sins gravely, when good faith or divine inspiration does not excuse, as we know happened in several Saints. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 174, a. 3; L. 32, l. 6, n. 101. "To sustain martyrdom on account of Christ falls under precept, because namely man ought to have his mind so prepared that he would sooner permit himself to be killed than deny Christ or sin mortally. And thus also to leave one's own goods falls under precept, because the mind of a Christian ought to be prepared rather to sustain the plundering of his goods than to deny Christ or sin mortally." S. Th., Quodl. 4, a. 20.

Vol. III, On Baptism, I. On the Nature, Effects, and Necessity of Baptism

n. 392.

What is baptism of blood; what are its required conditions? - Baptism of blood is the shedding of blood or death endured for faith, or for another Christian virtue. But this baptism is equated with true baptism, because as if ex opere operato, after the manner of baptism, it remits guilt and punishment. As if, because martyrdom does not operate so strictly and properly as the sacraments do, but from a certain privilege by reason of real imitation of the Passion of Christ. Therefore martyrdom profits even infants. The Church honors the Holy Innocents as true martyrs.

For the martyrdom of an adult, that it be such as is necessary for salvation, five things are required: 1. the infliction of death; 2. acceptance of the same from a pious cause; 3. that one not resist the tyrant; 4. that by faith he hold the truth for which he suffers; 5. legitimate disposition for grace. But what such a disposition is, is controverted. The first opinion teaches that true contrition, perfect from love of God above all things, is necessary. The second holds that the will of suffering for Christ suffices, and that there is no need of another penance, even if the man remembers his sins. The third asserts that at least attrition is required, if the man is conscious of sin.

Moreover, contrition can be required for the fruit of martyrdom in two ways: first directly, as a necessary disposition; second indirectly, as a work necessary for avoiding a new sin. - If the one for whom martyrdom is imminent is in mortal sin, contrition is necessary for him for the fruit of martyrdom indirectly, or at least attrition which is thought to be contrition, as a work necessary for avoiding a new sin which would impede its fruit. The reason is that if ever the precept of contrition obliges, it does so especially in danger of death. - Yet contrition is not necessary in itself and directly as a disposition for the fruit of martyrdom, but attrition is required and suffices. The first reason is that the Fathers equate the martyrdom of adults with baptism in its force of destroying sin. Here it must be noted that the very endurance of death according to itself is compared with baptism, and no lesser force in washing away sins is attributed to it than to baptism; nor is this force attributed to internal contrition, but to the external work. Therefore, just as baptism does not require contrition in order to confer grace, so neither does martyrdom. The second reason is that it is certain that for remission of guilt some penance is always required in adults from Trent sess. 14, c. 1.

Theol. Wirceb. 57 ff.; Suarez d. 29, s. 1, 2; L. 95, 97; St. Thomas Quodl. 6, a. 4; 2.2, q. 124; 3 p., q. 66, a. 12 ad 2.

Tanquerey

Adolphe Tanquerey, S.S. — 13 passages

Vol. II, On the Moral Virtues

n. 1061.

Art. II. Concerning Fortitude. — I. The Genuine Concept of Fortitude.

1. Definition. Fortitude (andreia), of which there is question here, is fortitude of mind, and can be defined: the virtue by which the will is so strengthened that it does not desist from pursuing the arduous good, neither because of difficulties, nor even because of the danger of death.¹

¹ This is the definition of fortitude, insofar as it is a cardinal virtue. Sometimes, however, by this name is designated that constancy by which we strive to overcome ordinary difficulties which are accustomed to occur in the exercise of all virtues: this is not a special virtue.

Fortitude, like the other moral virtues, is both natural and supernatural, according as it pursues an arduous natural or supernatural good, and indeed by natural or supernatural means.

(a) The object of this virtue is the arduous moral good, or that which bears before it a special difficulty. Every good indeed is arduous in some way; but when special difficulties and great dangers occur, especially the danger of death,² the special virtue of fortitude is required for overcoming all these. Hence the chief act of this virtue is martyrdom undertaken for God, of which there is treatment in the Treatise on Baptism, n. 42-44.

² The Scholastics, after Aristotle, held that fortitude especially shines forth in that genus of death which threatens in war, because then the common good of the fatherland is preferred to a private good; but St. Thomas (II-II, q. 122, a. 1) notes that under the name of war come all attacks which someone sustains on account of truth and justice. Cicero, moreover (De offic., lib. I, 22), deservedly says: "Although most men think military affairs greater than civil ones, this opinion must be diminished... But truly, if we wish to judge, many civil affairs have arisen greater and more renowned than military ones."

n. 1062.

(b) The subject of this virtue is commonly said to be the irascible appetite: for this is concerned with the arduous good, and uses anger duly moderated for overcoming difficulties; for it pertains to anger to leap upon obstacles and conquer them. Nevertheless it seems to us that fortitude exists primarily in the will, and secondarily in the irascible appetite; for here there is question of pursuing the honest good, which is properly the object of the will, but not of the useful or sensible good, which is the object of the lower appetite. Therefore the virtue of fortitude resides primarily in the will, which deliberately and firmly adheres to the honest good. But because difficulties and dangers often stand in the way, which frighten not only the will but also the lower appetite, it is necessary that fortitude secondarily influence the irascible appetite, for strengthening it against vain fears, and exciting it to approach arduous things strenuously.

n. 1063.

(c) The act of fortitude is chiefly twofold: to endure and to attack: to endure, that is, to stand immovably in dangers and tolerate the gravest torments with an unconquered soul;³ to attack, that is, strenuously to do arduous and dangerous things. - Generally to endure, other things being equal, is more difficult and more meritorious than to attack: for he who endures already feels imminent dangers, while he who attacks has them as future; moreover, to endure imports length of time, while to attack can be from a sudden movement; but it is more difficult to remain immovable for a long time than to be borne by a sudden movement toward something arduous.⁴

³ Horace expressed this elegantly (Odes, III, 3, 8): "The just man and tenacious of purpose is not shaken in his solid mind by the ardor of citizens commanding perverse things, nor by the face of a threatening tyrant... If the shattered world should fall upon him, the ruins will strike him undaunted."

⁴ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 123, a. 6.

n. 1064.

1. The various degrees of fortitude. (a) The first consists in the restraint and mortification of passions. This is true fortitude; for if those are called strong who tame wild beasts and conquer the enemies of the fatherland, they surely must be judged stronger who so restrain and govern anger, lust, and cupidity that they use these not for evil, but for strenuously working good: "The patient man is better than the valiant: and he that ruleth his spirit than he that taketh cities."⁵ - Especially to be praised are those who, despising the vain judgments of men, are never deterred from duty by the mockeries of others.

⁵ Prov. 16:32.

(b) The second degree, which surpasses the first, is this: that, for the spiritual or bodily good of neighbor, they expose liberty, reputation, and their own life to probable danger. The Apostle excelled by this fortitude, who, for the salvation of souls, often exposed himself to diverse dangers, "in perils of waters, in perils of robbers, in perils from his own nation, in perils from the Gentiles, in perils in the city, in perils in the wilderness, in perils in the sea, in perils from false brethren."⁶ Today the same fortitude is exercised not only by missionaries who preach the Gospel among remote peoples, but also by laymen and priests who, among Christian nations, invincibly defend the orthodox faith against rising unbelievers and politicians, with risk of reputation, goods, and even liberty.

⁶ 2 Cor. 11:26.

n. 1065.

(c) They attain the third degree who, in sudden cases, tolerate horrible evils with a strong and unconquered soul. For he who could not prepare himself against rushing evils by previous meditation, and sustains all things undaunted, shows that he has acquired the habit of fortitude by long exercise.

(d) But they ascend to the fourth degree who willingly and lovingly undergo martyrdom for Christ, as St. Ignatius the martyr underwent it, who, writing to the Romans, said: "Would that I may enjoy the beasts which are prepared for me, which I also pray may be swift for my destruction and punishments!" - Few indeed today suffer martyrdom properly so called; but the peace of the Church has its own martyrs: for those who, for Christ and the salvation of souls, spend all things and themselves, sustain all things, attack all things, daily ready to give their life for their sheep, can truly, although not in the strict sense, be called martyrs.

n. 1066.

1. Concerning the vices opposed to fortitude. There are two chief ones: (a) Timidity, or cowardice, which does not endure strongly enough, by fearing where one must not fear, or more than is fitting. To fear those things which are deservedly to be feared, and in the way in which they are to be feared, for example sin or hell, is not timidity; nor is it illicit to flee evils, from the toleration of which no good comes, all things having been diligently weighed. But to consent to vain fears, and from this to neglect duties, is the sin of timidity, whose gravity depends on various circumstances, especially on the gravity of the duty omitted. - In our days that fear which is called human respect must carefully be avoided, by force of which so many Christians omit their religious duties, lest perhaps they displease others.

(b) Excessive daring, or rashness, which is an excess in attacking the arduous good, which is not fitting, or when it is not fitting, or in a manner in which it is not fitting. It arises from contempt of life or of other goods, - from pride, which trusts too much in its own powers, - from boasting, which desires to show its own powers, - or from a certain stupidity of soul. The sin committed from this head must be judged both from the cause from which it arises and from the effects which it induces; for example, he sins gravely who, without cause, exposes himself to grave danger.⁷

⁷ To these vices is generally added fearlessness, which does not fear when one ought to fear (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 126, a. 1-2); but almost the same can be said of it as of rashness.

n. 1067.

II. Concerning the Virtues Annexed to Fortitude.

To attack and to endure are the two offices of fortitude, from what was said above, n. 1063; for fulfilling these more easily, certain virtues are joined to fortitude: namely magnanimity and magnificence, which are ordered to attacking great things; patience and constancy, which regard enduring harsh things. These must be discussed separately.

Magnanimity is promptness of soul for performing great acts of virtues, namely those which are worthy of great honors.

(A) It differs from ambition, which attacks great things on account of human honors; for the magnificent man wills to work those things which are great before God, because it befits a rational creature to intend not only those things which are common, but also those which are excellent. He despises riches, pleasures, honors of this world, and breathes after heavenly things. He indeed intends great honors, but such as are conferred by God: "And therefore he is not lifted up by great honors, because he does not reckon them above himself, but rather despises them... and similarly he is not broken by dishonors, but despises them, as things which he reckons are brought upon him unworthily."⁸

⁸ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 129, a. 2, ad 3.

Wherefore true magnanimity is not opposed to humility, as the Angelic Doctor excellently declares:⁹ "In man there is found something great, which he possesses from the gift of God; and some defect, which belongs to him from the infirmity of nature. Therefore magnanimity makes a man deem himself worthy of great things according to the consideration of the gifts which he possesses from God; thus if he has great virtue of soul, magnanimity makes him tend to perfect works of virtue... But humility makes a man account himself little, according to consideration of his own defect." - And so the magnanimous man relies not so much on his own powers as on divine help, and places his trust especially in God.

⁹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 129, a. 3, ad 4.

n. 1068.

(B) To this virtue there is opposed, by excess, presumption, and by defect, pusillanimity.¹⁰

¹⁰ Two others are commonly enumerated, ambition and empty glory; but of these there was treatment above, where the capital vices were discussed, n. 515-516.

(a) Presumption is the sin by which someone attacks that which is far beyond his powers; for example, he who undertakes the offices of judge, confessor, pastor, etc., for the fulfilling of which he is altogether unequal, from defect of knowledge, prudence, and other virtues; or he who, existing in the state of imperfect virtue, at once tries to do the greatest works. Let Peter be an example, who, trusting too much in himself, was ready to die for Christ, and soon at the voice of a maidservant denied the Master. (b) Pusillanimity is a disposition of soul by which someone flees those things which, all circumstances being considered, he could and ought to do; thus he who, frightened by difficulties and not sufficiently trusting in divine help, flees offices proposed to him by superiors,¹¹ or does not fulfill the duties of his own state from empty fear.

¹¹ Accordingly there is no question here of him who, for the sake of humility, declines offices and honors, but of him who is frightened by difficulties and lacks trust in God.

For judging the malice of sins arising from this double vice, attention must especially be paid to the gravity of the effects which follow from them.

n. 1069.

1. Magnificence seems to be a certain part of magnanimity, and inclines one to do great things through great expenses, for example, in constructing splendid churches, or erecting colleges, universities, monasteries, when the good of the Church or the fatherland demands this.

To this virtue two vices are opposed: (a) excessive sumptuousness, when someone makes great expenses in matters of slight moment; this indeed is irrational, especially when works very necessary for the honor of God and the good of the faithful are neglected; (b) parvificence, which in great matters wills to make only small expenses, so that the works which are undertaken remain very unbecoming.

n. 1070.

1. Patience is the virtue which so moderates sadness arising from present evils that, because of it, the will is not moved away from good, but rather is confirmed in it. Therefore this is not insensibility, or apathy, of which the Stoics boasted, and which in reality is a vice. The patient man feels pain in the body and sadness in the soul, but moderates both, and does not allow them to proceed beyond the limits of reason; for he remembers the words of Paul:¹ "Tribulation worketh patience; and patience trial; and trial hope; and hope confoundeth not."

¹ Rom. 5:3-5. Cf. St. Francis de Sales, Introduction, p. III, ch. 3; Olier, Introduction, ch. 9.

Various degrees are distinguished in patience: (a) to bear with an equal soul the loss of riches, reputation, health, parents, and friends, even when these things happen to us without our fault; (b) to bear those things which are repaid by the ungrateful for benefits received; (c) to sustain all these things not only patiently, but with joy, like the apostles, who "went rejoicing from the presence of the council, because they were accounted worthy to suffer reproach for the name of Jesus."²

² Acts 5:41.

To this virtue is opposed impatience, by which someone grieves too much and from sorrow withdraws from what is right, for example, by complaining bitterly about God and men, and for that reason seeking consolation in pleasures or in idleness. - Impatience is in itself a venial sin, but it can become grave if someone deliberately murmurs gravely against God and divine ordinances, or from this commits lethal sins.

n. 1071.

1. Constancy, or perseverance, is a virtue confirming the mind against fear of impending evils, and for overcoming difficulties which arise from the long exercise of virtue. - Therefore it regards future difficulties, while patience regards present evils; moreover, it is ordered to overcoming that special difficulty which generally proceeds from long practice of virtues: for many experience a certain fatigue and weariness from the fact that the same efforts must often be repeated; for overcoming this, the special virtue of constancy is desired. - Of how great a moment it is to cultivate this virtue is established from this, that only by often-repeated efforts, carried through to the end of life, is solid virtue acquired and the crown of justice obtained: "But he that shall persevere unto the end, he shall be saved."³

³ Matt. 10:22.

To this virtue there is opposed: (a) by defect, inconstancy, or softness of soul, which easily withdraws from a good proposal on account of occurring difficulties, or from weariness of duration; this disposition indeed arises partly from natural temperament, partly from the custom of indulging pleasures and from horror of difficulties; (b) by excess, or abuse, pertinacity, or inclination to persist in a proposal where right reason dictates that one must desist; for, although we ought to persevere in a proposal as long as it appears good to right reason, one must withdraw from it when it is certainly detected as having been undertaken from erroneous judgment, or when circumstances so change that what before was good and opportune now becomes evil or at least less good.

n. 1072.

III. Concerning the Means of Progressing in Fortitude.

Besides prayer, to which it is necessary to have recourse for all virtues, the chief means by which fortitude can be acquired or increased are these:

Frequent meditation on the fragility of temporal goods, when they are compared with eternal goods. For Christian fortitude arises first of all from the intimate persuasion that temporal evils are nothing in comparison with eternal ones; indeed, they become desirable when they are considered as means of obtaining or increasing eternal happiness. For then the Christian does not fear the evils of this world, nor flee arduous things, but rather embraces them, so that from this he may receive an unfading crown. Likewise he is not easily allured by the pleasures and honors of this world, but rather despises them as impediments by which he is kept from attaining eternal beatitude. Wherefore he is deterred from fulfilling duty neither by threats nor by flatteries, but undauntedly endures evils and attacks arduous things, so that he may securely attain his end.
Foresight of evils which can happen, so that we may be able to strengthen the will against them. For from long premeditation we prepare our soul against dangers: just as in war an unforeseen enemy easily oppresses the unprepared, so in spiritual combat we are easily overcome by enemies, if we are unprepared. But, on the contrary, dangers long foreseen become less terrible. The reason for this is that fear, against which fortitude is ordered, weakens our powers unless we resist it strenuously; but if we foresee the evils which can happen, and apprehend them not as harmful, but as useful for virtue and salvation, fear soon withdraws, and the will turns all its powers toward pursuing good, notwithstanding any dangers whatever.

n. 1073.

1. The custom of acting strenuously in the lesser dangers occurring daily: for by this means the soul acquires the firmness necessary for strongly sustaining graver evils and manfully attacking more arduous things. Just as a soldier by daily exercise prepares himself for more arduous and dangerous things, so a Christian, by acting strongly in lesser things, becomes fit for greater things. Therefore those labor under presumption who desire to suffer or do grand things, and at the same time neglect lesser things: if they are weak in the least things, they cannot be strenuous in greater things: "He that is faithful in that which is least, is faithful also in that which is greater: and he that is unjust in that which is little, is unjust also in that which is greater."⁴

⁴ Luke 16:10.

Fervent love for God adds the greatest powers to the will. For "love is strong as death,"⁵ and therefore renders the lover intrepid, fit for tolerating all adverse things strongly, and for performing the greatest arduous things manfully. If love of creatures inspires such fortitude in the hearts of mortals, as daily experience establishes, how much greater fortitude will pure love of God, love of the infinite good, inspire! This indeed can be illustrated by the example of Paul, who, from the fact that he burned with love of Christ, vehemently desired to suffer all things, to do all things on account of Christ: "Who then shall separate us from the charity of Christ? Shall tribulation? or distress? or famine? or nakedness? or danger? or persecution? or the sword?... But in all these things we overcome because of Him that hath loved us."⁶ - Wherefore it will help much frequently to consider the fortitude which the Savior exhibited throughout His whole life, and especially in the Passion, from the time when He began to agonize in the garden of Gethsemani up to the hour in which, dying, He cried out:⁷ "My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?" By this example the Apostles exhorted the faithful to tolerate all things strongly: "Christ suffered for us, leaving you an example, that you should follow His steps... Christ therefore having suffered in the flesh, be you also armed with the same thought."⁸ And in reality many Christians, adhering to the footsteps of the beloved Master, went rejoicing because they were accounted worthy to suffer reproach for His name. But because today many Christians are desired who are endowed with unconquered fortitude, for defending and promoting the faith against innumerable enemies, it is necessary that an ardent love of Christ be inspired in the souls of the young, by which, being inflamed, they may be able strenuously and cheerfully to fight for the Christian faith.

⁵ Cant. 8:6.

⁶ Rom. 8:35-37; let the whole passage be read.

⁷ Matt. 27:46.

⁸ 1 Pet. 2:21; 4:1.

Vermeersch, Theologia Moralis

Arthur Vermeersch, S.J. — 12 passages

Vol. II, Bk. II, Tract VII: On the Virtue of Fortitude

Vol. II, Treatise XII. On the Virtue of Fortitude and the Opposed Vices · Vol. II, Tr. XII, Chapter I. On the Notion of Fortitude · Vol. II, Tr. XII, Chapter II. On the Acts of Fortitude · Vol. II, Tr. XII, Chapter IV. On the Vices Opposed Both to Fortitude and to the Annexed Virtues

Usefulness. - A twofold good especially can be procured for us by examination of this virtue: that we may discern the true virtue of Fortitude from its counterfeit species; and that we may know the way to be entered upon so that we may become sharers of so praised a virtue and learn to exercise it in so many present occasions.

Order of speaking. - First, the virtue itself must be sketched by us, according to the splendid documents which are supplied to us by the Angelic Doctor; then something must be said briefly concerning its acquisition and present exercise.

n. 707.

I. - Description of the Virtue Itself and Its Parts

I. Notion. Fortitude is a virtue of the irascible appetite, "restraining fears and moderating daring." (Cf. St. Thomas 2, 2, q. 123 art. 3, c.).

The irascible appetite regards good or evil (properly sensible) under the aspect of the arduous, or as to be obtained or fled with difficulty (1, q. 81 art. 2, c.; 1, 2, q. 23 art. 1). To this appetite pertain the passions of daring, fear, and hope. Fear is the passion by which one flees from a future, difficult evil, which cannot be resisted (concerning fear cf. 1, 2, q. 41). Daring is the opposite passion; for "fear flees a future harmful thing because of its victory over the one fearing: but daring attacks an imminent danger because of its own victory over the danger itself" (1, 2, q. 45, art. 1, c.).

Although it pertains also to fortitude to restrain rash daring, the principal parts of fortitude consist in removing the impediment of fear. And in fact it is commonly conceived as a good habit by which difficulties are overcome and fear is checked.

Moreover we consider the virtue as it can be acquired, infused, and perfected by the gift of the Holy Spirit. Acquired virtue shows itself in facility of acts: infused virtue furnishes us the power of exercising it connaturally in a supernatural mode; perfected by the gift of the Holy Spirit it acquires the quality of security which we shall soon indicate.

n. 708.

II. The act of the virtue. The chief action of the virtue is this, that, against imminent evils, it confirms the will in good. But confirmation in this again consists in this, that the will not only continues to abstain from every evil, but also that it remits nothing of its positive good action on account of that evil.

Wherefore a twofold function is assigned to fortitude: to sustain and to attack. To attack pertains to fortitude, insofar as it moderates daring; to sustain, however, insofar as it represses fear. "It is more difficult ...," says St. Thomas, "to repress fear than to moderate daring, because the danger itself, which is the object of daring and fear, of itself contributes something to the repression of daring, but operates toward the increase of fear" (2, 2, q. 123 art. 6, c.). The Holy Doctor demonstrates that the function itself of sustaining is more difficult than aggression by this threefold reason: "first indeed, because someone seems to sustain when invaded by someone stronger; but he who attacks invades in the manner of a stronger one. But it is more difficult to fight with one stronger than with one weaker. Secondly, because he who sustains already feels the imminent dangers; but he who attacks has them as future. But it is more difficult not to be moved by present things than by future things. Thirdly, because sustaining imports duration of time; but someone can attack from a sudden movement. But it is more difficult to remain immovable for a long time than suddenly to be moved to something arduous." (Ibid., ad 1.).

n. 709.

III. The object of the virtue. Dangers of temporal evils, to be strongly undergone or attacked, are the common object of this virtue. But because the virtue would not be cardinal unless in that noble contempt of danger it showed itself principal, and the greatest temporal evil is death, thence its proper object is said to be the danger of directly imminent death; directly, insofar as it must be sustained for the sake of the good itself of virtue. Because again these dangers occur in a just war, therefore the virtue of fortitude is said properly to consist about dangers of death which are in war. Yet St. Thomas here, art. 5, c., understands war broadly, of every attack.

n. 710.

IV. Perfection of the virtue. 1. To attain the end of one's work, to escape evils or dangers, is not, as St. Thomas observes, always in the power of man; "but this the Holy Spirit works in man, when He leads him through to eternal life, which is the end of all good works and the escape from all dangers; and of this thing the Holy Spirit infuses a certain confidence into the mind, excluding the contrary fear; and according to this, fortitude is posited as a gift of the Holy Spirit" (2, 2, q. 139 art. 1, c.). Therefore, through the gift of the Holy Spirit, there is added to the virtue a certain confidence of attaining the end, dangers opposing in vain, according to that text, that "to those loving God all things work together unto good" (Rom. 8:28). By this confidence fortitude itself is wonderfully assisted.

Besides that supernatural perfection, fortitude is perfected by promptness in embracing the duty which is joined with danger, by strenuousness in exercising it; and by constancy by which, neither by sadness nor by duration, the soul is called back from a good purpose. Wherefore these are judged to give fortitude its integrity.

n. 711.

V. Christian necessity. Our religion wills us to be prepared for death for the sake of sustaining faith and any virtue whatever. Therefore all of us ought to be strong in the preparation of soul; in occasion we shall truly be so, with the grace of the Holy Spirit assisting.

n. 712.

VI. Potential parts of fortitude. By this name are designated various virtues which, in a less difficult matter, keep the soul upright and persevering in good. Thus magnanimity confirms the soul in the greatest goods or honors to be hoped for or obtained (2, 2, q. 129-133); magnificence directs great expenses to great works to be done suitably (2, 2, q. 134, 135); patience, against sadnesses, especially those which are inflicted by others, protects the good of reason (2, 2, q. 136); perseverance overcomes the difficulty arisen from duration of time (2, 2, q. 137).

To magnanimity St. Thomas also ascribes confidence, which confers promptness. Thus it comes about that the potential parts themselves give fortitude its integrity.

n. 713.

VII. Opposite vices. One can sin against fortitude not only by defect but also by excess. By defect, timidity and sloth are opposed to fortitude; by excess, fearlessness that loves dangers and immoderate daring too confident in itself.

n. 714.

II. - Examples, Occasions, Acquisition of Fortitude

VIII. Examples of the virtue. The most illustrious examples of fortitude, raised by the motive of charity to the highest perfection, are offered to us by the martyrs both of the first age of the Church and of the present century. Concerning martyrdom, its conditions and privileges, see III, 216. 217.

The daring of those who, without a proportionate cause, expose life has a false species of fortitude; duelists also have a false species. For fortitude does not look to this, that it approach dangers as such, but that by no danger it be delayed from doing good.

n. 715.

IX. Present occasions of the virtue. If we consider that constancy in every arduous work to be done is ascribed to the virtue of fortitude (cf. 2, 2, q. 139 art. 1), there are many occasions today of demonstrating fortitude of soul. Whether you consider public calamities, of the Church or even of the fatherland; or the many temptations which are created by worldly neo-paganism; or private difficulties of various kinds which often occur in following virtue: how strong is the man who will never be moved from the way of virtue, while so many seek excuses for gravest sins from the difficulty set before them! Although even today there is not lacking an occasion of bloody martyrdom; and missionaries, already strong in desiring an apostolic expedition, far from parents, from dear ones, from fatherland, can also have before their eyes, in more than one region, a probable death to be accepted for the faith of Christ.

n. 716.

X. Acquisition of the virtue. Sacred and profane letters, whether ancient or modern, celebrate with equal fervor the virtue of a man of constant soul, who has resolved to expect nothing from fraud or suspect arts, nothing from a less approved connivance, whom no fear deters, no difficulty breaks, whom, immovable in his good purposes, "Not the zeal of citizens commanding perverse things, - not the face of a threatening tyrant, - shakes in solid mind.... If the broken world should fall upon him, the ruins will strike him unafraid" (Horace, Odes 3). That man is free, and ready for every illustrious deed.

But a good so greatly loved and praised is at the same time most greatly desired today. They deplore, in external and public action, the timidity of good people^¹; we have to deplore so many personal and domestic falls of those who, on account of human annoyance, transgress the most sacred commands of God. Most opportunely, therefore, one asks concerning the means of strengthening the soul.

And this can already be a consolation to us, that fortitude is open to all in at least some degree. They say this who consider human psychology. What shall we say, we who are fortified by the protection of prayer and have the promised gift of the Holy Spirit?

Therefore these human means can be indicated: meditation on the price at which fortitude is to be held, on the noble glory which it communicates; - on the fragility and vanity of human things, so that more easily we may dominate them; - examples of strong men, which, by reading books, we can place before our eyes; - the companionship of those who demonstrate strength of soul; - small victories carried back from lesser dangers; - the practice of doing all things manfully; - praises themselves of fortitude in others; - finally hope in God exercised by frequent acts.

But if public utility holds us solicitous, we shall strive by every way to procure this, that both parents and those who are accustomed to instruct adolescents should set before themselves as something principal to instill and inculcate strength of soul already in infants themselves, then in adolescents and young people of either sex. From their tenderest years let them learn that there are certain things absolutely forbidden and absolutely necessary: far from boys let there be ridiculous tales which have been accustomed to fill the childish imagination with vain fears; let them be taught to act strongly; and if there has been occasion, let them be praised concerning sincerity of intentions and words; in schools let the manifold method be applied which is at hand for proposing examples of men who have been distinguished by fortitude, especially of recent martyrs; let the adolescents themselves be ordered to weave praises of those men in their written themes; let stage plays be such as effectively commend noble actions: let every softness be denied to the body, but, on the contrary, let exercises of this kind be done which, adding vigor to the body, wonderfully assist the vigor of the soul. What more, since books are not lacking which happily treat the argument of instructing the will.

¹ "The greatest evil of this century," says Montalembert, "is the timidity of good people."

n. 717.

Summary

I. 1. Fortitude, which is numbered the third cardinal virtue, is in the irascible appetite "as restraining fears and moderating daring" (2, 2, q. 123 art. 3), so that against the greatest evils, even of directly imminent death, it firmly preserves the will in the good of reason. "Even of directly imminent death," we say, not because it firms the will against this evil alone, but because, unless even then the good will remained stable, the virtue would not exist complete.

The functions of fortitude are to sustain and to attack; it is divided into no subjective parts, since it orders a very special matter; but its potential parts are various virtues which in a less difficult matter keep the soul upright and persevering in good. They are, from the doctrine which St. Thomas borrows from Tullius Cicero himself, magnanimity, which, operating immediately about the passion of hope, confirms the soul in the greatest goods or honors to be hoped for or obtained (2, 2, q. 129-133); magnificence, which directs great expenses to great works to be done suitably (2, 2, q. 134, 135); patience, which, against sadnesses, especially those which are inflicted by others, protects the good of reason (2, 2, q. 136); and perseverance, which overcomes the difficulty arisen from duration of time (2, 2, q. 137).
Promptness in embracing the duty which is joined with danger, strenuousness in executing it, constancy, by which the soul is not called back from a good purpose either by sadness or by duration: these complete the virtue. But that integrity is attributed to the very virtues which are the potential parts of fortitude.
The elicited act of the virtue of fortitude intends the very honorableness of fortitude; but for the most part it will be commanded by the higher virtue of faith or charity.

Fortitude can be harmed not only by defect, or excessive fear, but also by excess in one contemning or loving dangers, or too confident in acting.

II. Among the most precious qualities of a man is to be placed the virtue of fortitude, by which one becomes truly ready and free for doing every good. But by right instruction and patient exercise it becomes open to all in some degree.

But a distinguished example of fortitude is the martyr, whose fortitude is raised by the motive of charity to the highest perfection.

III. With the virtue of fortitude is connected the gift of the Holy Spirit of the same name, by which gift the virtue is perfected, and the virtuous man is led through even to the end of eternal life. To that gift correspond the two fruits of patience and longanimity (2, 2, q. 139 and 140).

Marc, Institutiones Morales

Clement Marc, C.SS.R. — 2 passages

Vol. I, Part First: On the First P…, Tr. V, Ch. II, Art. I, § 3. On Fortitude and the Virtues Annexed to It

n. ¶405.

NOTION. Fortitude, taken broadly, is firmness of soul in operating good. Taken strictly, it is a cardinal virtue, confirming the soul of man for duly undertaking or sustaining difficult things, chiefly dangers of death (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 123-140). Cf. Lessius, de Jur. et Just., l. 3.

The material object of fortitude is dangers and labors; but the formal object is the honesty which firm constancy of soul in undertaking or sustaining arduous things contains.

There is a twofold act of fortitude: to undertake and to sustain with firmness of soul. But this latter is the more principal, because (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 123, a. 6) it is more difficult to repress fear than to moderate daring. - To this second act pertains martyrdom, concerning which at n. 1452.

n. ¶406.

Parts of fortitude. I. There are no subjective parts or species of fortitude (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 128, a. 1): because this virtue, taken strictly, is occupied about matter contained within narrower limits and entirely specified, namely about dangers of death: and these dangers, although some are greater than others, nevertheless are contained in the same genus.

II. The integrating parts of fortitude (which can also be called potential, when and insofar as they are extended to less arduous matters) are four, namely: magnanimity, magnificence, patience, and perseverance.

MAGNANIMITY is a virtue inclining to great and heroic works in every genus of virtues. To this virtue pertain confidence or trust and security. The difference between security and confidence consists in this, that security imports a certain perfect quiet of soul from fear; but confidence imports a certain strength of hope. - Goudin treats excellently concerning magnanimity, Philosoph., P. III, q. 6, a. 4.
MAGNIFICENCE is a virtue inclining to great works (chiefly to those which pertain to the worship of God) to be completed with great expenses, according to the prescription of right reason. It differs from magnanimity because this latter intends great things in every matter, while magnificence regards only things to be made. St. Thomas (2.2, q. 134, a. 2, ad 3).
PATIENCE is a virtue strengthening the soul in the toleration of afflictions. Through it, the good of reason is preserved against sadness, lest reason succumb to affliction. This virtue is most necessary to man, because in this mortal life evils must be tolerated by him, immense in number and gravity, and because the passion of sadness has much power for impeding the good of reason, according to that saying (2 Cor. 7:10): The sadness of the world works death; and (Eccli. 30:25): Sadness has killed many, and there is no usefulness in it. To patience is joined LONGANIMITY, which is the equanimous toleration of affliction arisen from the delay of a hoped-for good.
PERSEVERANCE is a virtue by which man firmly persists in a good work, notwithstanding annoyances and difficulties which arise from the long duration of the act. Related to it is CONSTANCY, a virtue which bestows so great an immutability in good that man preserves an even mind in all things, and perseveres unchanging against whatever difficulties arise.

Vices opposed to fortitude. To fortitude are opposed rashness (excess), by which someone undertakes arduous things contrary to the prudent dictate of reason, and cowardice (defect), which flees from undertaking what is fitting for repelling evil. Also opposed are fearlessness (excess), which does not fear when it ought, and timidity (defect), which grows afraid inordinately.

Furthermore, considering the potential parts of fortitude, we have the following:

Contrary to magnanimity are: presumption, ambition (excess), and pusillanimity (defect).

To magnificence are opposed: parvificence (defect) and profusion (excess).

To patience are opposed: impatience (excess) and insensibility (defect).

Perseverance is wounded by: pertinacity (excess), inconstancy and softness (defect).

Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis

Dominic M. Prümmer, O.P. — 11 passages

Vol. II, Treatise XII. On the Virtue of Fortitude and the Opposed Vices

n. ¶71.

St. Thomas treats in the Summa theologica, after the tract on justice and the virtues annexed to it, of the third cardinal virtue, namely fortitude.¹⁰⁹⁵ This tract is indeed most useful for the spiritual life. Following the footsteps of the Angelic Doctor and at the same time striving for brevity, we divide this tract into four chapters, namely: 1. on the notion of fortitude; 2. on its acts; 3. on its parts; 4. on the opposed vices.

¹⁰⁹⁵ 2, 2, q. 123-140.

Vol. II, Tr. XII, Chapter I. On the Notion of Fortitude

n. 620.

620. Preliminary note. "The name of fortitude can be taken in two ways: in one way, insofar as it absolutely imports a certain firmness of soul, and in this respect it is a general virtue, or rather a condition of every virtue, because for virtue it is required to act firmly and immovably. In another way fortitude can be taken insofar as it imports firmness only in enduring and repelling those things in which it is especially difficult to have firmness, namely, in certain grave dangers; whence Tully says that fortitude is the deliberate undertaking of dangers and endurance of labors."¹⁰⁹⁶ Omitting the first, general acceptation of fortitude, we speak only of fortitude in the latter sense. Fortitude so accepted can be defined in the following manner:

Definition. Fortitude¹⁰⁹⁷ is a cardinal virtue by which the irascible appetite (and the will) is so strengthened that it does not desist from pursuing an arduous good even on account of the greatest dangers to bodily life.

It is explained. Although other virtues also can impel a man to pursue the good even amid the greatest dangers, nevertheless it is one thing to exercise a work of virtue on account of these motives, and another to do this same thing on account of the nobility of fortitude, namely, because it befits a man to be broken by no bodily evils. Horace the poet already expressed this beautifully:¹⁰⁹⁸ "If the shattered world should fall upon him, the ruins will strike him unafraid."

Fortitude (like prudence and the other moral virtues) is both natural and supernatural, according as it is acquired by one's own powers or infused by God together with sanctifying grace. The natural virtue of fortitude pursues an arduous natural good; but the supernatural virtue of fortitude customarily attains a supernatural object.

The subject of each fortitude is the irascible appetite, insofar, however, as it is subject to the will. For fortitude renders the irascible appetite firm and powerful for promptly and easily moderating the passions of fear and daring when the greatest dangers press. Once this firmness has been established, the will can then expeditiously and easily choose the just mean, namely, lest there be excessive fear or excessive daring. Therefore, although properly speaking fortitude resides in the irascible appetite, nevertheless it directly exercises its overflowing influence upon the will.¹⁰⁹⁹

The material object of fortitude is the extreme dangers, especially of death¹¹⁰⁰ (the remote object), or rather the fears arising on account of those dangers, for example, in a just war or in the defense of some virtue (the proximate object). Robbers, however, duellists, and those waging an unjust war, although they do not fear the dangers of death, do not possess the virtue of fortitude, but rather the vice of fearlessness and daring, because they do not act according to right reason.

The formal object quod of fortitude is the right expulsion of these fears and the restraint of excessive daring. But after a great evil has already arrived, fortitude also moderates the sadness that arises, although it pertains principally to patience to be occupied with moderating sadnesses.¹¹⁰¹ Hence St. Lawrence exercised heroic fortitude: 1. by spiritedly confronting the tyrant and vigorously repelling his iniquitous commands; 2. by joyfully enduring the most atrocious pains in martyrdom.

¹⁰⁹⁶ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 123, a. 2.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Starkmut, Seelentapferkeit, bravoure de l'âme [steadfast courage, fortitude of soul, bravery of soul].

¹⁰⁹⁸ Carm. 3, 3.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Tanquerey (Synopsis theol. mor. n. 1061) incorrectly says that fortitude resides primarily in the will and secondarily in the irascible part. Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 61, a. 2.

¹¹⁰⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 123, a. 4.

¹¹⁰¹ Ib., q. 136, a. 4 ad 2.

n. 621.

621. The gift of fortitude infused by the Holy Spirit¹¹⁰² is always joined with the supernatural virtue of fortitude. This gift of fortitude is an infused quality by which someone, from a special motion of the Holy Spirit and beyond the connatural mode of acting, arrives at the end of every good work begun, with confidence of escaping all dangers. The virtue of fortitude indeed perfects the soul for enduring any dangers whatsoever, but it does not sufficiently give confidence of escaping any dangers whatsoever; this is supplied by the gift of fortitude. To the point the Angelic Doctor writes: "For sometimes it is not within man's power to attain the end of his work or to escape evils or dangers, since sometimes he is overwhelmed by them unto death; but the Holy Spirit effects this in man, while He leads him to eternal life, which is the end of all good works and the escape from all dangers; and the Holy Spirit infuses into the mind a certain confidence concerning this, excluding the contrary fear; and in this respect fortitude is posited as a gift of the Holy Spirit."¹¹⁰³

The fourth beatitude, namely, "Blessed are they who thirst and hunger after justice," corresponds to the gift of fortitude; for fortitude consists in arduous things; but it is very arduous that someone should not only perform virtuous works but perform them with a certain insatiable desire, which can be signified by hunger and thirst after justice.

Two fruits of the Holy Spirit are posited which sufficiently correspond to the gift of fortitude, namely, patience, which regards the endurance of evils, and longanimity, which can regard the prolonged expectation and operation of good things.¹¹⁰⁴

¹¹⁰² Cf. above, I, n. 452.

¹¹⁰³ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 139, a. 1.

¹¹⁰⁴ Ib., a. 2.

Vol. II, Tr. XII, Chapter II. On the Acts of Fortitude

n. 622.

622. From what has been said concerning the material and formal object, it can easily be deduced what the acts of fortitude are. The office of fortitude is rightly to restrain fears and to moderate acts of daring. "Fortitude, however, concerns the repression of fears more than the moderation of acts of daring. For it is more difficult to repress fear than to moderate daring, because the danger itself, which is the object of daring and fear, of itself contributes something to the repression of daring, but, on the contrary, works toward the increase of fear. To attack pertains to fortitude insofar as it moderates daring; but to endure follows upon the repression of fear. And therefore the more principal act of fortitude is to endure, that is, to stand immovably amid dangers, rather than to attack." Thus, after Aristotle, St. Thomas,¹¹⁰⁵ who also adds: "To endure is more difficult than to attack, for a threefold reason. First, because he who endures seems to be attacked by someone stronger, whereas he who attacks advances as the stronger. But it is more difficult to fight with the stronger than with the weaker. Secondly, because he who endures already feels the dangers threatening, whereas he who attacks has them as future. But it is more difficult not to be moved by present things than by future things. Thirdly, because to endure imports length of time, whereas someone can attack from a sudden movement. But it is more difficult to remain immovable for a long time than to be moved by a sudden movement toward something arduous. Whence the Philosopher says that some are forceful before dangers but withdraw in the dangers themselves; but the brave conduct themselves contrariwise."¹¹⁰⁶ Since, therefore, to endure is the principal act of fortitude, it is easily understood that the act of martyrdom is the most excellent act of fortitude, because Christian martyrs most bravely endured a most painful death on account of the love of God.

¹¹⁰⁵ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 123, a. 6.

¹¹⁰⁶ Ib., ad 1.

n. 623.

623. Martyrdom is a Greek word, and in Latin signifies testimony. But in the usage received from the Church, it is taken for testimony to Christian truth through the endurance of bodily death. Therefore, for the perfect notion of martyrdom it is required:

1. That someone truly suffer bodily death. For a martyr is called the most perfect witness of the Christian faith, according to which we ought to suffer all evils rather than incur detriment to the soul. But one who still remains in bodily life has not yet shown absolutely that he despises all earthly things altogether on account of Christ. Therefore, before death has actually been endured on account of Christ, no one can be called a martyr in the perfect sense. Hence those who have suffered torments on account of Christ, but not unto death, are not perfectly and completely martyrs, even if they received a mortal wound from which death naturally ought to have followed, but from which they were miraculously healed.¹¹⁰⁷ Thus, at least according to the more probable opinion. Whence St. John, who was cast into a vat of boiling oil and emerged from it unharmed by divine power, is not to be called a martyr in the strict sense.¹¹⁰⁸ Nevertheless, such saints are sometimes honored by the Church as martyrs, for example, St. John the Evangelist himself and St. Thecla.

2. That someone undergo death inflicted by an enemy in hatred of Christian truth.

Concerning this matter St. Thomas writes:¹¹⁰⁹ "Martyrs are called, as it were, witnesses, because by their bodily sufferings even unto death they bear testimony to truth, not to any truth whatsoever, but to the truth which is according to godliness, which was made known to us through Christ; whence they are also called martyrs of Christ, as though His witnesses. Now truth of this kind is the truth of faith. And therefore the cause of every martyrdom is the truth of faith. But to the truth of faith belongs not only the very belief of the heart but also exterior profession, which indeed is made not only through words, by which someone confesses the faith, but also through deeds, by which someone shows himself to have faith, according to this: 'I will show thee, by works, my faith.'¹¹¹⁰ Whence it is also said concerning certain persons: 'They profess that they know God: but in their works they deny him.'¹¹¹¹ And therefore the works of all the virtues, insofar as they are referred to God, are certain professions of faith, through which it is made known to us that God requires works of this kind from us and rewards us for them; and in this respect they can be the cause of martyrdom. Whence also the martyrdom of blessed John the Baptist is celebrated in the Church, who endured death not for refusing to deny the faith, but for rebuking adultery."

It is required, however, that death be inflicted by an enemy of divine faith or of Christian virtue; whence martyrs in the strict sense are not: a) those who endure death on account of a disease contracted from the care of lepers or of those infected with plague,¹¹¹² which care they undertook on account of the love of God; on the contrary, perhaps those soldiers seem to be martyrs who with a pure intention, that is, on account of God, fought from love of justice and the divine law and were slain in a just war;¹¹¹³ b) those who underwent death on account of natural truths; nor, a fortiori, c) those who suffered death on account of heresy; whence Huss is by no means to be called a martyr.¹¹¹⁴ For the same reason, neither are they martyrs, d) who killed themselves in order to preserve some Christian virtue, because such suicide is unlawful, unless it is excused by the good faith of the agent or by a special impulse of the Holy Spirit. But if the Church venerates as martyrs certain saints who took their own lives in order to preserve virtue, such as St. Apollonia and St. Pelagia, a special impulse of the Holy Spirit is presupposed.¹¹¹⁵

3. That death be accepted voluntarily.

Therefore, if an adult is killed in his sleep on account of the faith, without having thought beforehand about martyrdom, he probably is not a martyr. There are nevertheless authors (among whom is Cajetan¹¹¹⁶) who teach that a man who referred all his things to God is a true martyr if he is killed in his sleep by enemies on account of hatred of the Christian faith. Infants, however, who are killed in hatred of the faith or of Christ, are called true martyrs, because the will is supplied by a special grace.

To the point St. Thomas writes: "Some said that in the Innocents the use of free will was miraculously accelerated, so that they also suffered martyrdom voluntarily. But because this is not confirmed by the authority of Scripture, it is better to say that those little children who were slain attained, through God's grace, the glory of martyrdom which in others their own will merits. For the shedding of blood on account of Christ takes the place of baptism. Whence, just as in baptized children the merit of Christ works through baptismal grace toward obtaining glory, so also in those slain on account of Christ the merit of Christ's martyrdom works toward obtaining the palm of martyrdom."¹¹¹⁷

¹¹⁰⁷ Nevertheless St. Alphonsus (Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 99) says: "It is probable ... that grace is conferred when a martyr receives a lethal wound or torment, although afterward he miraculously does not die. And thus blessed John, cast into a vat of boiling oil, was truly a martyr, and so too the Queen of Martyrs, the Blessed Virgin Mary, standing beside the cross of Jesus."

¹¹⁰⁸ Cf. St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 96, a. 6 ad 7, and S. theol. 2, 2, q. 124, a. 4.

¹¹⁰⁹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 124, a. 5.

¹¹¹⁰ Jas. 2:18.

¹¹¹¹ Tit. 1:16.

¹¹¹² St. Alphonsus teaches the contrary (Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 100), saying: "Twelve academies, thirteen cardinals, and more than three hundred authors hold that such persons are true martyrs."

¹¹¹³ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 124, a. 5 ad 3; Billuart, De fortitud. diss. 1, a. 2.

¹¹¹⁴ Cf. Benedict XIV, De serv. Dei beatif. l. 3, c. 19-20; Waffelaert, De virt. card. n. 15ff.

¹¹¹⁵ Cf. S. theol., l.c., a. 1 ad 2, and Benedict XIV, l.c., c. 11, n. 12.

¹¹¹⁶ Comm. in 2, 2, q. 124, a. 2.

¹¹¹⁷ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 124, a. 1 ad 1.

n. 624.

624. On the efficacy and effects of martyrdom. 1. Martyrdom justifies a sinner, whether baptized or not baptized, whether an adult or a little child. In adults, however, it is required that martyrdom be joined at least with attrition concerning sins committed; for if even the sacrament of baptism does not remit sins unless an adult has at least attrition, a fortiori martyrdom requires attrition. This attrition indeed seems sufficiently present if the martyr voluntarily accepts death on account of the love of God.¹¹¹⁸ This efficacy of martyrdom for little children is as though ex opere operato; for martyrdom is, as it were, baptism, whence it is also called the baptism of blood. Therefore, according to the almost common doctrine of theologians, not only the Innocents slain by Herod, but any little children killed for the Christian faith (even those who are killed in the womb of their mother) are martyrs and will obtain eternal life.

Martyrdom, since it is the most perfect act of charity: a) deletes in the just every venial fault and every temporal punishment still to be discharged for past sins. Whence every martyr flies immediately into heaven, without having to pass through purgatory, and therefore Innocent III says: "He does injury to a martyr who prays for a martyr";¹¹¹⁹ b) merits a great increase of grace and glory.
Martyrdom merits a special crown in heaven, which is called an aureola.

Concerning this aureola Benedict XIV writes,¹¹²⁰ following the doctrine of St. Thomas: "The conjunction of man with God through His perfect vision and fruition is called a golden crown, or simply golden by way of a substantive, just as a triumphal crown woven of laurel is called a laurel by way of a substantive noun. Now, since to essential beatitude, namely joy concerning conjunction with God, another accidental reward is added, that is, a certain joy concerning works performed which have the character of an excellent victory, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas,¹¹²¹ this joy is called an aureola, as though a little crown: The aureola is a certain privileged reward corresponding to a privileged victory."

Theologians commonly admit a threefold aureola, namely, the aureola of virgins, the aureola of doctors, and the aureola of martyrs. "The aureola is said to be something added to the golden crown, that is, a certain joy concerning works performed by oneself which have the character of an excellent victory; this is another joy from that by which someone rejoices concerning conjunction with God, which joy is called the golden crown."¹¹²² The aureola is owed to virgins on account of an excellent victory over carnal pleasure; to martyrs on account of the most difficult victory over the world and the enemies of the faith; but to doctors and strenuous preachers of Christian truth on account of victory over the devil, the prince of darkness and the father of lies. Since in infants who undergo martyrdom there is not properly a struggle, because of the defect of reason, neither is there in them an aureola properly so called, either of virginity or of martyrdom; nevertheless, they participate in some manner in the aureola, insofar as they rejoice in a special manner that they were slain in the service of Christ. Thus St. Thomas,¹¹²³ against several theologians who admit an aureola properly so called even in infant martyrs. The same St. Thomas teaches that the aureola of martyrs is more excellent than the other two aureolae.

¹¹¹⁸ Cf. the diverse opinions concerning this matter in Waffelaert, l.c., n. 24, and in St. Alphonsus, l.c., n. 98.

¹¹¹⁹ c. 6, X, 3, 41.

¹¹²⁰ L.c., c. 15, n. 5.

¹¹²¹ In IV Sent. dist. 49, q. 5, a. 5.

¹¹²² St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 96, a. 1.

¹¹²³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 124, a. 6 ad 1.

Vol. II, Tr. XII, Chapter IV. On the Vices Opposed Both to Fortitude and to the Annexed Virtues

n. 638.

638. 1. Three vices are opposed to fortitude, namely, timidity or cowardice, fearlessness, and daring or temerity.

a) Timidity, of which there is discussion here, is not the passion of fear, for passions in the Aristotelian sense are something indifferent; but it is inordinate fear of temporal evils and especially of the dangers of death. Certainly, in every sin an inordinate fear is included; thus the avaricious man fears the loss of money, the intemperate man the loss of pleasure, and so concerning the others. But the principal fear is that of the dangers of death. And therefore an inordination of such fear is opposed to fortitude, which concerns the dangers of death. Thus St. Thomas.¹¹⁶² Inordinate fear, therefore, is excess in fearing and defect in daring. From the first head it is called timidity; but from the second, cowardice; yet on account of their affinity each is called by the common term timidity. This timidity of itself is only a venial sin; if, however, someone from inordinate fear transgresses a grave precept, this is a mortal sin, or rather the cause of a mortal sin. How fear or dread takes away or diminishes the voluntary and consequently the notion of sin was said above, I, n. 69. The greatest cowardice is when someone, on account of the miseries of this life which he considers intolerable, commits suicide.

b) Fearlessness is the vice which does not fear dangers, and especially the dangers of death, when they ought to be feared. This vice arises either from contempt for life, which a man esteems little, or from pride by which he attributes too much strength to himself, or from stupidity of soul. Fearlessness is a sin insofar as it causes other sins, or insofar as from it a man sins against charity toward himself.

c) Daring or temerity, insofar as it is taken here, is excess in attacking dangers.¹¹⁶³ Daring arises from the same causes as fearlessness, with which it is intimately connected, but chiefly from vain boasting. The same holds concerning the sinfulness of this vice as was said concerning fearlessness. In a duel, in certain contests, in acrobatic exercises, etc., the vices of temerity and fearlessness are accustomed to occur.

¹¹⁶² S. theol. 2, 2, q. 125, a. 2.

¹¹⁶³ Waghalsigkeit, Tollkühnheit [foolhardiness, rash boldness].

n. 639.

639. 2. Four vices are opposed to magnanimity, namely, three by excess: presumption, ambition, and vainglory; one by defect, namely, pusillanimity.

a) Presumption,¹¹⁶⁴ which is opposed to magnanimity, is not to be confused with presumption which is contrary to hope.¹¹⁶⁵ The former is a vice inducing one to undertake works which surpass the powers of the agent; the latter is that which hopes for eternal beatitude through means not ordained by God. If it is said that presumption opposed to magnanimity undertakes those things which altogether exceed the powers of the agent, the powers to be understood are not only his own but also those of others which are nevertheless available to the agent; for that which we can do with the assistance of friends and especially of God is not considered altogether to exceed our powers; whence we are not presumptuous when we undertake works of the virtues, even difficult ones, with confidence in the assisting aid of divine grace. An example of sinful presumption is Peter, who, led by excessive confidence, said: "Lord, I am ready to go with thee, both into prison and to death,"¹¹⁶⁶ and nevertheless afterward denied Christ at the voice of a maidservant. Those also sin by such a sin of presumption who, without sufficient capacity, undertake the offices of judge, pastor, confessor, etc. The origin and culpability of this presumption were already discussed above, I, n. 412. Seneca describes presumption very vigorously: "If magnanimity raises itself beyond its measure, it will make a man threatening, inflated, turbulent, restless, and hasty toward whatever excellences of words and deeds, honorableness being neglected."¹¹⁶⁷

b) Ambition,¹¹⁶⁸ which is opposed to magnanimity by excess, is a vice by which someone inordinately desires an honor which he does not merit or which he refers not to God but only to his own utility; or it can be defined more briefly: an inordinate appetite for honor.¹¹⁶⁹ Since honor is a thing good or indifferent in itself, an inordinate appetite for it is of itself only a venial sin; nevertheless, it can become mortal on account of circumstances, for example, if someone places his last end in such human honor, or if he seeks honor from some mortal sin (boasting concerning sins committed), or if someone seeks his own honor with grave harm to others. The inordinate appetite for honor, or ambition, often has very contrary effects, since instead of true honor, mockery and contempt befall the ambitious man.

c) Vainglory,¹¹⁷⁰ insofar as it is opposed to magnanimity by excess, is taken for an inordinate appetite for empty glory. The appetite for one's own glory is not of itself something vicious, whence we are admonished: "So let your light shine before men";¹¹⁷¹ but the appetite for empty glory is sinful; for to desire something vain is vicious, according to this: "Why do you love vanity, and seek after lying?"¹¹⁷² Glory can be called vain in three ways: in one way on the part of the thing concerning which someone seeks glory, as when someone seeks glory concerning that which is not worthy of glory, such as some fragile and perishable thing (for example, bodily beauty); in another way on the part of the one from whom someone seeks glory, such as a man whose judgment is not certain (for example, if someone wishes to be praised by an ignorant man as learned); in a third way on the part of the very person who desires glory, namely, when he does not refer the appetite for his glory to a due end, such as the honor of God or the salvation of his neighbor. Thus St. Thomas.¹¹⁷³ Vainglory in itself is only a venial sin, because it is not simply repugnant to charity and because it is only an inordination concerning a thing indifferent in itself; nevertheless, it can easily become not only a mortal sin, but also a capital sin from which many other sins spring, as was said above, I, n. 414.¹¹⁷⁴

d) Pusillanimity¹¹⁷⁵ is opposed to magnanimity by defect, and it is a disposition of soul by which someone shrinks from undertaking or doing something as though it were too great and surpassed his powers, when in reality it does not surpass them. Whence, just as the magnanimous man rightly tends toward great things, so the pusillanimous man, from culpable ignorance of his own condition, shrinks from great things which befit him. An example of such pusillanimity in the Gospel is the slothful servant who hid his talent in a napkin and on that account was gravely rebuked. Pusillanimity of itself does not signify a grave sin; nevertheless, it can become a grave sin if someone from pusillanimity omits a grave duty; for example, if parents omit correcting disobedient children because they think themselves unable to make an effective correction; if someone no longer fights against temptations, thinking himself unable to conquer them. Pusillanimity which concerns things altogether necessary for salvation can become the sin of despair. Pusillanimity is conquered by placing hope in divine assistance, which will never fail men of good will. Pusillanimity often arises from a morbid quality of the body or from fixed ideas.

¹¹⁶⁴ Selbstüberschätzung, Vermessenheit [self-overestimation, presumption]; cf. above, I, n. 412.

¹¹⁶⁵ Cf. I, n. 549.

¹¹⁶⁶ Luke 22:33.

¹¹⁶⁷ In St. Thomas, S. theol. 2, 2, q. 130, a. 2 ad 3.

¹¹⁶⁸ Cf. above, I, n. 413.

¹¹⁶⁹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 131, a. 1.

¹¹⁷⁰ Cf. above, I, n. 414.

¹¹⁷¹ Matt. 5:16.

¹¹⁷² Ps. 4:3.

¹¹⁷³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 132, a. 1.

¹¹⁷⁴ Pascal says very wittily and truly concerning vainglory: "Vanity is so rooted in the heart of man that a lackey, a kitchen boy, and a porter boast and wish to have their admirers; and the philosophers themselves want them. Those who write against glory wish to have the glory of having written well; and those who read it wish to have the glory of having read it; and I who write this perhaps have this desire, and perhaps those who will read it will also have it" (Pensées [1907] 400).

¹¹⁷⁵ Kleinmütigkeit [pusillanimity, faintheartedness].

n. 640.

640. 3. Two vices are opposed to magnificence, namely, one by excess: inordinate sumptuousness,¹¹⁷⁶ the other by defect: parvificence.¹¹⁷⁷ Each vice is an inordination concerning great expenditures to be made, and for this reason parvificence is distinguished from avarice and illiberality. Whence St. Thomas teaches: "Just as the magnificent man agrees with the liberal man in this, that he expends money promptly and delightfully, so also the parvificent man agrees with the illiberal or avaricious man in this, that he makes expenditures with sadness and slowness. But they differ in this, that illiberality is considered in regard to common expenditures, whereas parvificence concerns great expenditures, which it is more difficult to make, and therefore parvificence is a lesser vice than illiberality."¹¹⁷⁸ The sinfulness of these vices must be measured from the other sins which are committed on account of them.

¹¹⁷⁶ It was called by the Greeks banausia, by which word both a low, tradesmanlike disposition and the excessive luxury and ostentation proceeding from it are signified; moderns use the word chiefly in the former sense.

¹¹⁷⁷ Knauserei, Engherzigkeit [stinginess, narrow-mindedness].

¹¹⁷⁸ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 135, a. 1 ad 3.

n. 641.

641. 4. Two vices are opposed to patience, one by defect and the other by excess. By defect there is opposed insensibility or hardness, namely, when someone is touched in no way by any evils, whether his own or another's. This indeed is a defect of sadness, although it is an excess of endurance. That this insensibility is sinful is clear of itself, since it is consonant neither with human nature nor with social life, but savors of stupid brutality and unnatural hardness. By excess (of sadness, but by defect of endurance) there is opposed to patience impatience, by which someone is excessively saddened or withdraws from the good because of sadness or pain. The impatient man for the most part outwardly manifests his impatience by murmurings, lamentations, or irascibility. Each sin, namely, insensibility and impatience, is of itself only a venial sin; nevertheless, it becomes mortal if on account of it another virtue, for example, fraternal charity, is gravely injured.¹¹⁷⁹

¹¹⁷⁹ It is remarkable that St. Thomas does not speak of the vices opposed to patience in the Summa theologica.

n. 642.

642. 5. Two vices are likewise opposed to perseverance, namely, one by defect, which is softness or inconstancy, when someone, on account of difficulties which occur in the continuation of a good work, easily withdraws from it contrary to the right dictate of reason. This inconstancy is called softness by St. Thomas,¹¹⁸⁰ which nevertheless is not to be confused with softness which is a sin against chastity. Inconstancy of itself is not a grave sin; nevertheless, it is the cause of many evils and impedes very many goods; for it renders the soul of man weak and almost powerless to accomplish any great work, since difficulties arise in every great work. By way of excess there is opposed to perseverance pertinacity,¹¹⁸¹ which is an inclination to persist in a resolution contrary to the dictate of right reason, as if someone wills to persist in a false religion which he clearly knows to be false. This pertinacity is a mortal or light sin according to the quality of the obligation and virtue which is injured through it.

¹¹⁸⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 138, a. 1.

¹¹⁸¹ Hartnäckigkeit [obstinacy].

Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis

Benedict Henry Merkelbach, O.P. — 52 passages

Vol. II, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On the Cardinal Virtue of Fortitude and on the Annexed Virtues · Vol. II, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On the Cardinal …, First Part: On Fortitude I…, Question One: On Fortitude According to Itself

Vol. II, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On the Cardinal Virtue of Fortitude and on the Annexed Virtues

Introduction

S. Th. II-II, q. 123, a. 1 and 2.

899. Object of the treatise. - Just as there are virtues, namely, one cardinal virtue, justice, and several others annexed to it, which according to right reason order our operations toward others, so virtues are required which according to reason order our passions as to ourselves. But some passions incline toward evil, which temperance restrains; others decline from good, against which fortitude strengthens the soul.

"In two ways," says St. Thomas, q. 123, a. 1, "the human will is hindered from following the rectitude of reason: in one way, by this, that it is drawn by some delectable thing toward something other than the rectitude of reason requires; and this impediment the virtue of temperance removes. In another way, by this, that the will is repelled from that which is according to reason, on account of some difficult thing which threatens it; and for removing this impediment there is required fortitude of mind, by which, namely, it resists difficulties of this sort; just as man through bodily strength overcomes and repels bodily impediments."

Hence just as for moderating and restraining the vehement delectations of the concupiscible appetite there must be the cardinal virtue of temperance, so also a cardinal virtue is necessary concerning difficulties to be tolerated and repelled: fortitude, which strengthens the soul against the repulses of the irascible appetite and overcomes them, so that notwithstanding these a man nevertheless does the good.

From these things it now follows that fortitude:

is necessary, namely, for strengthening the soul against difficulties;

is a virtue, because it makes man pursue the good of reason;

has as its subject the irascible appetite, to be strengthened by reason;

has as its object difficulties and dangers to be conquered, so that it constitutes a mean between fear and presumption.

900. Fortitude (ἀνδρεία = manliness; force; sterkte) imports firmness of soul, and therefore in the general sense indicates every firmness in honorable good, and thus is a condition of every virtue, because for virtue it is required to operate firmly and immovably; but in the strict sense it signifies firmness of soul in sustaining and repelling those things in which it is most difficult to have firmness, namely, in graver dangers, even of death, and thus by excellence it is called fortitude.

This is the virtue restraining the movements of the soul concerning any terrible things whatever, especially concerning dangers of death to be sustained and repelled, or the virtue by which the irascible appetite is so strengthened that it does not desist from pursuing the arduous good and last end even on account of the greatest dangers of bodily life (a. 2). It can be defined: the virtue strengthening the appetite against the greatest dangers of bodily life so that it does not desist from pursuing the arduous good conformably to the due end. In this definition there is indicated:

the genus to which fortitude pertains: virtue, whether natural and acquired, or supernatural and infused;

the subject in which it is: appetite. For it is not in the will, which from its nature is an inclination conformed to reason, but in the sensitive appetite itself concerning passions, which must be moderated when they draw back from the good of reason: thus it is distinguished from prudence and the intellectual virtues;

the proper act by which it is distinguished from others: strengthening, so that it does not desist from pursuing the good of reason; and thus it is distinguished from temperance, which restrains the appetite;

the material object concerning which it is concerned: against the greatest dangers of bodily life; and thus it is distinguished from the virtues annexed to it, which are concerned with lesser dangers, and from justice, which is concerned with external operations toward another;

the formal object or proximate motive: conformably to the due end, which end will be natural in acquired fortitude, supernatural in infused fortitude.

901. Division of the treatise. - The treatise is divided into two parts:

The first is on fortitude itself, namely: 1) on fortitude according to itself; 2) on the act of fortitude; 3) on the vices opposed to fortitude.

The second is on the virtues annexed to fortitude: 1) on magnanimity; 2) on magnificence; 3) on patience; 4) on perseverance and constancy.

To these there is added a conclusion on the gift and precepts of fortitude.¹

¹ On fortitude, these can usefully be compared: St. Thomas, II-II, q. 123-140, with the commentaries of Cajetan, Sylvius, and Billuart; Lessius, De Iustitia et iure et ceteris virtutibus cardinalibus; Waffelaert, De Virtutibus cardinalibus; Winkler, Die Tugendlehre des H. Thomas von Aquin; Janvier, Conf. de N.-D.: La Force chrétienne; Sertillanges, La Morale de S. Thomas d'Aquin; Gilson, S. Thomas d'Aquin in the collection Les Moralistes chrétiens; Leroux, in Rev. Eccl. de Liège, 1928.

Vol. II, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On the Cardinal …, First Part: On Fortitude I…, Question One: On Fortitude According to Itself

S. Th. II-II, q. 123.

n. 902.

902. Fortitude is a virtue, because it strengthens the appetite against difficulties according to right reason, so that it does not recede from the good of reason on account of difficulties and dangers, but tolerates or repels them: thus it makes man to be according to reason.

n. 902.

It is a special virtue, as having a determinate matter and special honesty, and a special impediment to be overcome: for it strengthens the soul in graver dangers, even of death. But where there is special honesty and a special impediment of the good of reason to be overcome, there is a special object, and therefore a special virtue.

n. 902.

It is one virtue, because it has one object: the greatest dangers of death, and other things insofar as they can lead to danger of death; all of which are of the same account, even if some are greater than others.

903. The object of fortitude is the passions of fear and daring as to be restrained, so that the appetite is strengthened for sustaining or repelling the greatest dangers, according to the order of reason toward the due end, under the account of special honesty or rectitude which shines forth in it. In this one object three things are distinguished:

A. The immediate material object in which fortitude places rectitude, or the proximate and proper matter concerning which it is concerned, are the passions of fear and daring, arising from dangers and to be rectified according to reason; consequently, external acts, such as flight, aggression, movement of the body, not as they are toward another (thus they pertain to justice), but insofar as it is required that man be rightly disposed toward himself; but the mediate object or remote matter is dangers and labors, especially dangers of death, but as to be honorably undertaken or sustained, otherwise it would not be a virtue (a. 3).

It is proved: Dangers do not draw back the will from the good of reason except because they are feared; therefore fortitude is immediately concerned with fears and restrains them lest someone fear too much and from fear recede from the good of reason. Yet because sometimes it is necessary not only firmly to tolerate those dangers but also by attacking to repel them, in order to have security afterward, therefore consequently fortitude is also concerned with daring, so that it may hold it within the limits of reason.

But dangers are especially dangers of death. For virtue is the ultimate perfection by which man operates well in all circumstances; but fortitude would not be perfect unless it firmly held back the will of man in the good of reason against the greatest evils; and one who stands firm against greater things consequently also stands firm against lesser things, but not vice versa. Therefore. - But if it did not strengthen against the greatest dangers of death, but only against lesser things, man would not be brave simply, but in a qualified respect (a. 4).

B. The primary material object which fortitude principally and by reason of itself touches is precisely that the passions of fear and daring are to be restrained so that the soul is strengthened according to the order of reason, or are to be ruled conformably to the due end.

C. The formal object, or motive on account of which, of fortitude, is the special honesty and rectitude which consists in strengthening the appetite according to right reason against dangers even the greatest, whether to be sustained with fear or repelled by moderate daring, as is fitting in order to the due end: for fortitude strengthens the appetite because this is right and honorable.

And this is the special and proper motive of the virtue of fortitude, on account of which it is a special virtue distinct from all others: for thus it acts from the very affection or love of the good of fortitude, insofar as it is fitting to reason that fears and daring be restrained in such a way as befits a brave man. It especially agrees with the dignity of man not to be removed from doing by fear of danger, nor to yield to daring rashly hurrying into danger. But if someone from love of faith, chastity, piety, charity, or justice should undergo dangers of death, the act would be regulatively and commandingly from these virtues, but elicitively from fortitude (a. 3).

n. 904.

904. The act proper to fortitude is twofold: the first and principal is to sustain, or to repress fears and stand immovably in dangers; the secondary is to attack, or to moderate daring. For fortitude is more concerned with restraining fears than with moderating daring, and it is more difficult to restrain fear than moderately to attack and moderate daring, because the danger itself of itself contributes something to the repression of daring, but operates toward the increase of fear (a. 6).

n. 904.

And indeed: "1) because someone seems to sustain when invaded by someone stronger; but he who attacks invades after the manner of one stronger; moreover it is more difficult to fight with one stronger than with one weaker; 2) because he who sustains already feels imminent dangers; but he who attacks has them as future. But it is more difficult not to be moved by things present than by things future; 3) because sustaining imports duration of time, but someone can attack from a sudden movement. But it is more difficult to remain immovable for a long time than to be moved by a sudden movement toward something arduous" (ad 1).

n. 905.

905. Fortitude is a cardinal virtue, because there is in it excellently one of the conditions common to every virtue: to operate firmly. For by it the soul is strengthened not only against pleasures, but also against evils and dangers, and not just any, but the greatest, namely, of death. Therefore¹ (a. 11). And thus "even according as it is a special virtue having determinate matter, it helps to resist the assaults of all vices. For one who can stand firmly in those things which are most difficult to sustain is consequently suitable for resisting other things which are less difficult" (a. 3, ad 2).

¹ Cf. I-II, q. 61, a. 3 and 4.

n. 905.

Yet it is not the greatest virtue, for the good of reason pertains essentially to prudence, effectively to justice, because it places that good in human affairs, and only conservatively to fortitude and temperance; yet it is greater to be firm against dangers of death than against pleasures. Therefore fortitude is less perfect than prudence and justice, but more perfect than temperance (a. 12).

906. Corollaries. - From the foregoing it is easily concluded:

dangers are not the matter of fortitude unless they are such that they can be honorably sustained or undertaken; otherwise they are not matter of virtue: for the brave man operates proximately so that the will may be strengthened in the good, remotely on account of the end of legal justice, because every good of virtue is ordered to the common good, or also on account of the last end, God (a. 7);

fortitude is most and directly concerned with dangers which threaten in just war, whether common on account of the necessity of the republic and the common good, or particular where virtue is attacked (justice, faith, chastity, religion), as if death is threatened to a judge unless he give an unjust sentence, to a virgin unless she consent to the ravisher, to the faithful unless he deny the faith; but secondarily and indirectly it is concerned with other dangers from another cause: sickness, storm, attack of robbers, etc. For although these according to themselves and immediately do not seem to threaten someone from this, that he pursues honorable good, nevertheless from the intention of the one acting they can be undertaken or sustained on account of the motive of virtue (at least on account of the good of fortitude, because they befit a brave man), as one who serves a friend infected with plague, who does not refuse to journey for some pious business on account of fear of shipwreck or robbers, etc. (a. 5);

Tr. V, Prologue · Tr. V, Disputation I: On Fortitude · Tr. V, Disputation I: On Fortitude, Question I: Whether fortitude is a virtue, and what virtue · Tr. V, Disputation I: On Fortitude, Question V: On the vices opposed to fortitude

those do not have the virtue of fortitude, but a false likeness of it, who expose themselves to death from vanity, robbers, those waging unjust war, duelists, etc., who are rash and cruel rather than brave, because they do not undergo danger on account of the good of virtue.

n. 907.

907. Remarks. - 1. The brave man delights on one side animally or spiritually (a. 8), that is, from sensitive or intellective apprehension, in the very work of virtue and its end (both remote and proximate); on the other side he has whence he may grieve, also animally, while he apprehends the loss of his own life, and corporally, while he sustains torments (pains, lashes, wounds). Yet the sensible pain of the body is greater than the spiritual delight of virtue, unless sometimes the grace of God infuses a special divine delight (a. 8).

…and 12 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Bontempi, Palladium Theologicum V

Gaudentius Bontempi of Brescia, O.F.M. Cap. — 37 passages

Tr. V, Prologue

IN this virtue, as in the third Cardo, the Gate of a rightly instituted life is turned, and therefore it is also Cardinal; if to this the anointing of the Spirit so accede that it is mobile to each of God's nods, and easily versatile, it will be counted among the seven Gifts: Hence Fortitude is Twofold; one a Virtue, the other a Gift. The first is moral, and is obtained sometimes by use, sometimes by infusion. The second always comes entirely from above, from the Father of lights, from whom is every perfect Gift. Of the first species of Fortitude I shall treat ex professo; of the other, however, I shall touch somewhat on this occasion: Further, this is the only virtue which, remaining unshaken amid the various and shifting vicissitudes of this age, emulates the stable lot of the Blessed; so that however much a strong man may be elevated in prosperity or depressed in adversity, he always clings to his origin with the utmost need, like the light which stands equally distant from the Sun, whether shining in shady valleys or resplendent on the highest mountains. It never allows itself to be puffed up by popular favor, being not unaware of itself, deeming itself to receive testimony from conscience alone: The incentive of this virtue, and at the same time its reward, is Love, at whose sense nothing looks insuperable, but all things it omens as favorable, and to be trodden with an easy foot; hence Fortitude is especially ascribed to love in the canticles: Strong as death is love; for death, insensible to so many and such great things by which we strive in vain to avert it, at last takes sense from all, and although livid with pale countenance, yet dominates the most powerful. Not otherwise does the strong man overcome whatever is aimed at him, and although with much humility of soul he grows cheap to the world, he never ceases to exercise that most absolute dominion; wherefore by St. Doctor tit.6. cap.7. he is compared to iron unconquerable, which so subdues the other metals that they obey its blow. Other splendid comparisons of Fortitude see with the Seraphic Doctor there.

Tr. V, Disputation I: On Fortitude

ABOUT to treat of Fortitude, I shall institute the chief question concerning Martyrdom, which is the most excellent act of this virtue; for he is strongest who does not doubt to spend his life for Christ, and takes upon himself the whole forces of the Tyrant, and triumphs though conquered. I shall then treat of certain companions and auxiliary troops of this virtue, with which it defends itself against the vices adverse to it: for against Presumption, Ambition, and empty Glory fights that great-souled virtue, hence called MAGNANIMITY; but at its back stands Pusillanimity, against which it also aims some blows: there follow Magnificence, Patience, and Perseverance. All these attend Fortitude at its side, and enter hostile engagements with the vices opposed to them, as I shall say here as briefly as possible: this is the whole matter and series of this twofold disputation which I shall bring forth on FORTITUDE; but first I shall examine whether it is a Virtue, and of what kind.

Tr. V, Disputation I: On Fortitude, Question I: Whether fortitude is a virtue, and what virtue

I ASSERT first, that Fortitude is a virtue. It is the teaching of St. Augustine lib. de moribus Ecclesiae, cap. 15. and of Aristotle 3. Eth.

IT IS PROVED by St. Bonavent. first ad 8. Sap. where under the name of Virtue it is counted among the other moral Virtues.

n. 3.

IT IS PROVED secondly by the Holy Doctor in Diaeta, tit. 5. cap. 7. That which makes a man morally good is a virtue: Such is fortitude: Therefore. The major is Aristotle's 2. Eth. cap. 6. the minor is proved, because it removes the impediments that repel one from rectitude, which are the difficulties opposed. So it is had in Proverb. 31. Who shall find a valiant woman? etc. She hath sent her hand to strong things 2 fortitude, and her garment is comeliness. The Holy Doctor proves this by the examples of the Apostles, who, having received through the Holy Spirit the virtue and gift of fortitude, confronted Tyrants Act. 1. and he shows the same of the holy Martyrs, especially the Virgins, Catherine, Cecilia, Agnes, and others, who went rejoicing to prisons and to tortures. Because, namely, they were strengthened by God. For fortitude is from heaven, as is said in 1 Machab. 3. See the Holy Doctor.

n. 4.

HENCE again this assertion is proved in the opusc. de septem itiner. aeternitatis, dist. 5. because it gives strength for overcoming the perils opposed to rectitude, and the very punishments and deaths, and for hastening intrepidly toward the virtues. It proves the assumption in the opusc. de septem Donis, de Dono fortitudinis, cap. 1. from Aristotle 3. Eth. cap. 8. and 9. where he says: He is brave who does not fear terrible things, and endures, as he ought, for the sake of good, and from Paulinus to Jerome, where he says: He who is truly brave neither dares rashly nor fears imprudently, and from St. Augustine lib. 5. de civit. cap. 17. where he relates that many underwent death bravely for the good of the Republic, and from Tully de offic. where he says there were two precepts of Plato, for those wishing to benefit the Republic. The first, that they so uphold the citizens' welfare that whatever they do they refer to it, forgetful of their own advantages. The second precept is that they care for the whole body of the Republic principally, not merely uphold some part while deserting the rest; and therefore this fortitude is ordered to an end that is within the limits of nature.

n. 5.

IT IS PROVED by the Holy Doctor thirdly in Compend. Theol. lib. 5. cap. 36. from Macrobius lib. 1. in somn. Scipionis, cap. 8. for fortitude raises the mind above perils, teaches one to fear nothing but what is base, not to dread the onset of death, and to summon the tamed passions intrepidly to virtue.

n. 6.

NEXT, because it has marvelous effects; for it makes men victorious against the enemies of God, as is said in 1 Machab. 6. Secondly it preserves a man's own goods: When the strong man is armed, etc. Thirdly, because it enriches with goods, Proverb. 10. The hand of the strong hath prepared riches. Fourthly it storms the kingdom of heaven, Matth. 11. The violent take it by force. Fifthly it adorns, Proverb. 31. Fortitude, and her garment is comeliness. Sixthly it secures one in extremities, Proverb. 30. The lion, mightiest of beasts, will fear no one's approach. Seventhly it awaits a recompense, Proverb. 31. Who shall find a valiant woman? Afar, and from the uttermost coasts, is the price of her, etc.

n. 7.

IT IS PROVED fourthly by St. Bonavent. in Pharetra, lib. 2. cap. 31. for it moderates and reduces to the norm of honesty the passions of Fear and Daring, and that in regard to the most difficult objects, namely, the perils of death. It proves the assumption from the Fathers.

n. 8.

St. GREGORY 7. Moral. cap. 8. says: The fortitude of the implanted is to conquer the flesh, to withstand one's own pleasures, to extinguish the delight of the present life, to love the hardships of this world for the sake of earthly things, to despise the allurements of prosperity, to overcome in heart the fear of adversity. The same is had in lib. 4. cap. 30. and lib. 5. cap. 13.

n. 9.

St. JEROME, lib. 16. in Isa. cap. 57. Fortitude, and constancy is the royal road; from which he declines to the right who is rash and pertinacious: to the left, he who is fearful and timorous.

n. 10.

St. AUGUSTINE epist. 19. ad Hieronymum: He who is truly strong in virtue neither dares rashly nor fears imprudently.

n. 11.

St. AMBROSE lib. 1. de offic. cap. 30. he is brave who consoles himself in some sorrow: And truly it is rightly called fortitude, when each one conquers himself, restrains his anger, is softened and swayed by no enticements, is not disturbed by adversity, is not exalted by prosperity, and is not carried about, as it were by a wind, by the change of varied affairs. The same is had in cap. 39. and lib. 5. in Lucam, cap. 6.

n. 12.

SENECA, epist. 59. The wise man and the brave man is fortified and intent against every onrush; if poverty, if grief, if ignominy, if pain makes its assault, he will not give ground, undaunted, but will go against those things, and stand amid them.

n. 13.

IT IS OBSERVED, however, by the Holy Doctor in the places alleged, with St. Thom. ad 1. ex Aristotele 3. Eth. cap. 8. that others exercise acts of the virtue of fortitude that are not true, but like it.

n. 14.

I ASSERT secondly: Fortitude is a special virtue. IT IS PROVED from what has been said, because it has a special honesty in taming the passions, especially daring and fear. Although by the Fathers cited it is extended to the taming of nearly all vehement passions, as St. Thom. also teaches art. 2. ad 2.

n. 15.

I ASSERT thirdly, that Fortitude is a Cardinal virtue. So St. Bonav. in the places cited, St. Thom. quaest. 127. art. 11. IT IS PROVED by the Holy Doctor ex S. Sap. where it is numbered with the Cardinal Virtues in those words: She teacheth Sobriety, and Prudence, and Justice, and Virtue. The Holy Doctor proves the same in the places cited, from the Fathers alleged.

n. 16.

IT IS CONFIRMED because the Cardinal virtues are so called either because through them we enter into the other virtues; or because the order of human life is directed and regulated in the four Cardinals of the lesser world, in likeness of the greater, as the Holy Doctor says serm. 6. Hexaëmer. Such is fortitude: Therefore.

n. 17.

IT IS PROVED also by the reasoning of St. Bonaventure in 3. dist 33. passim, especially quaest. 4. because it belongs to the Cardinal virtues, or, as he says at the end, principal virtues, that which is chiefly attended to in virtue; but among the others one is placed to work firmly, as is clear from Aristotle 2. Eth. cap. 4. and Fortitude claims to itself the praise of working firmly.

n. 18.

From what has been said you have that the object of fortitude is the passions of Daring and Fear, moderating by the mean. So St. Thom. quaest. 123. art. 3. and St. Bonaventure in the places cited, and serm. 5. Hexaemer. from Aristotle lib. 2. Eth. cap. 7. and lib. 3. cap. 6. but it is mediately concerned with perils, especially of death, as the objects of those passions. Aristotle indeed says 3. Eth. cap. 3. and 9. that fortitude is chiefly about the perils of death, which is in war.

n. 19.

St. Thom. art. 6. ADDS, with Aristotle 3. Eth. cap. 9. that fortitude is more concerned with repressing fears than with moderating daring; therefore the principal act of fortitude is to endure, that is, to stand immovable in perils, rather than to attack. The reason is, because it is more difficult to repress fears in perils than to moderate daring. First, because he who endures suffers from another, as from a stronger; but the daring man attacks, as against a weaker; and it is more difficult to fight with a stronger than with a weaker. Second, he who endures already feels the perils imminent; but he who attacks has them as future. Third, to endure is lasting; but to attack can be sudden: and it is more difficult to remain immovable for a long time than to move suddenly.

n. 20.

OBSERVE, that the end, as it were proximate, of fortitude is to express the likeness of its habit in act; but its remote and ultimate end is beatitude, that is, God. So St. Thomas art. 7.

n. 21.

OBSERVE secondly, that the brave man, from the consideration of the honesty of his act, does indeed take delight, yet from the suffering of hardships, in which he is engaged, he grieves. So St. Thom. art. 8. ex Aristotele 3. Eth. cap. 9. The Holy Doctor adds above, that from the abundance of God's grace the pain and sadness are often swallowed up, as happened to the tender holy Virgins.

n. 22.

OBSERVE thirdly, that fortitude is seen chiefly in sudden events. So St. Thom. art. 9. ex Aristotele 3. Eth. cap. 8.

n. 23.

OBSERVE fourthly, that the brave man employs anger, but moderated by reason, for the act of fortitude. So St. Thom. quaest. 127. art. 10. ex Aristotele 3. Eth. cap. 8. and St. Bonavent. in 3. loco citato.

n. 24.

I ASSERT fourthly, that fortitude is inferior to Prudence and Justice, but superior to Temperance.

n. 25.

IT IS PROVED by the Holy Doctor 3. dist. 33. quaest. 4. for the Cardinal Virtues order man in those things that are toward the end, which are all something created; but since man is compared both to himself and to another, the Cardinal Virtues are the moderators of these: if in respect of himself, it can be about the rational, and behold Prudence; or about the Concupiscible, and behold Temperance; or about the Irascible, and behold Fortitude. But if it order toward another, thus it is Justice, because there is one ratio by which he is compared to another, which is the ratio of the due; and because this ratio can be attended to according to the act of each power, hence Cardinal Justice is said to go round about all the powers, and yet is one, on account of the one ratio of ordering toward another. From this you have that Justice is the most noble, then Prudence, which moderates reason, inferior to the will. Thirdly Fortitude, which moderates the concupiscible, even the sensible, inferior to reason and will: lastly Temperance, which is concerned with the concupiscible, which is the lowest.

n. 26.

NOTE, that St. Ambrose, cited by St. Bonaventure in Pharetra, prefers Fortitude to the others, but understand it secundum quid, namely, either in respect of a certain general utility, since it is useful both in warlike and in civil affairs, as St. Thom. answers art. 12. ad 1. Or because fortitude is concerned chiefly with difficulties.

Tr. V, Disputation I: On Fortitude, Question V: On the vices opposed to fortitude

Three vices opposed to fortitude are enumerated: Timidity, Fearlessness (intimiditas), and Audacity.

As to Fear, it is then inordinate when the appetite absolutely flees those things which reason dictates are to be endured. So S. Thomas.

n. 3.

Here is condemned that fear which is inordinate concerning the dangers of death, when on this account one abandons the faith, or those things which fortitude commands to be pursued. Of these it is said Apocal. 21. But the fearful, etc. their part shall be in the pool, etc.

n. 4.

Fearlessness (intimiditas) is the vice by which things to be feared are not feared. Thus of the Celts Aristotle says 3. Eth. cap. 7. They fear nothing on account of foolishness, and there he opposes this to Fortitude.

n. 5.

But it exceeds and inclines to the extreme. Of these Prov. 14. The wise man feareth, and declineth from evil: the fool leapeth over, and confideth.

n. 6.

Audacity is an excess in undergoing and invading dangers, as D. Thomas says quaest. 127. art. 1., according to Aristotle 2. Ethic. capite 7. et lib. 3. cap. 7.

n. 7.

It differs from fearlessness; for this does not estimate the dangers, as if in respect of the one acting there were none, or they were not evils; but Audacity, or rashness, attacks dangers rashly on account of excessive overconfidence.

n. 8.

It is said to have the vice in the opposite extreme, namely, Cowardice (ignavia), as is gathered from Aristotle loc. cit., namely, when one does not dare what he ought, and when he ought.

n. 9.

Commonly, however, these sins are not judged distinct from the sins which follow from them, or to which they are ordered.

Rickaby, Moral Philosophy

Joseph Rickaby, S.J. — 10 passages

Pt. I, Ch. V, Section VIII. Of Fortitude

As Temperance is a curb, restraining animal nature in the pursuit of the good to which it goes out most eagerly, namely, life and the means of its continuance, so Fortitude also is a curb, withholding that nature from irrational flight from the evil which it most dreads. Aristotle tells us what that evil is: "Most dreadful of all things is death, for it is the limit, and for the dead man there appears to be no further good nor evil left." (Eth., III, vi., b.) Death is truly the limit to human existence: for, though the soul be immortal, the being of flesh and blood, that we call man, is dissolved in death, and, apart from supernatural hope of the resurrection, extinct for ever. Death therefore is the direst of all evils in the animal economy; and as such, is supremely abhorred by the sensitive appetite, which is the animal part of man. Fortitude moderates this abhorrence and fear by the dictate of reason. Reason shows that there are better things than life, and things worse than death, for man in his spiritual capacity as an intellectual and immortal being.