§ I. On Fortitude Itself

I. Notion of Fortitude. Fortitude, which is the third cardinal virtue, and which in dignity is surpassed by prudence and justice, but surpasses temperance, can be defined: a moral virtue inclining man to moderate the passions of fear and daring in sustaining and attacking dangers of death. It is said:

1. To moderate the passions of fear and daring. Thus it is indicated that it belongs to fortitude that man proceed by a middle way between excessive fear and excessive daring.

2. In sustaining and attacking dangers of death. By these words is indicated the object around which the passions must be moderated.

II. Object of Fortitude. 1. The proper and primary remote material object of fortitude is dangers of death; nevertheless, "because," as St. Thomas says, "he who stands firm against greater things, consequently stands firm against lesser things" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 123, a. 2), fortitude is extended secondarily also to lesser dangers (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 123, a. 4). The proximate material object is the movements of fear and daring. For fortitude inclines one to preserve the mean of reason illumined by faith amid dangers of death; moreover, the passions by which man is drawn away from this mean are fear, "which implies a certain withdrawal from an evil that has difficulty" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 123, a. 3), and daring, by which the appetite rises up against a terrible evil so as to overcome it.

2. The remote formal object is firmness of soul in moderating the passions of fear and daring amid dangers of death; the proximate formal object is the special moral goodness shining forth in the aforesaid firmness.

III. Acts of Fortitude. The acts of fortitude are two, namely to sustain and to attack. For sometimes right reason dictates that, with danger of death, we attack the adversaries of the good, so that they may be driven back and the assault against the good may cease; but sometimes, and more often, that we patiently sustain such dangers for the sake of the good of virtue, from which one must never withdraw, not even for the sake of removing them. This last act, namely to sustain, is the principal one. For "to attack pertains to fortitude insofar as it moderates daring; but to sustain follows the repression of fear" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 123, a. 6). Now "fortitude is more concerned with repressing fears than with moderating acts of daring; for it is more difficult to repress fear than to moderate daring, because the very danger which is the object of daring and fear contributes of itself somewhat to the repression of daring, but works toward the increase of fear."

Since the cardinal virtue of fortitude is occupied around whatever dangers of death, which, insofar as they are such, are all of the same species, it lacks subjective parts (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 128, single article). But the principal act of fortitude shines forth especially in martyrdom; therefore we wish to note certain things concerning it.

1. Notion of Martyrdom. By the force of the word, martyrdom - for it is derived from the Greek word marturon (μαρτύρων) - signifies any testimony whatever; but by usage it has long been received that by this word, by antonomasia, there is designated an act of supernatural fortitude by which a singular testimony is given for the truth of the Christian faith, and which can be defined: the voluntary endurance of torment lethal of itself for the faith of Christ. This definition will become clearer from the conditions to be assigned.

2. Conditions of Martyrdom. Some conditions are on the part of the torment, namely that it be lethal of itself; others on the part of the martyr, namely that he voluntarily undergo the endurance of torment and from a supernatural motive; others on the part of the persecutor, namely that he be distinct from the one being tormented and inflict the torment from hatred against the faith of Christ. Therefore it is required:

a) That the torment be lethal of itself. "A martyr is so called," says St. Thomas, "as a witness of the Christian faith, by which visible things are proposed as things to be despised for the sake of invisible things" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 124, a. 4). Moreover, so long as a man does not undergo torment lethal of itself, he does not show by deed that he despises all bodily things. But according to the more common opinion it is not demanded that death in fact follow; this is only the natural consequence of martyrdom, and does not pertain to its essence. This is clear both from the practice of the Church, which, for example, venerates St. John the Evangelist as a martyr because he voluntarily endured for the faith of Christ a torment lethal of itself, although by a miracle he came out unharmed from the vat of boiling oil; and from reason. For he who suffers torment lethal of itself, even if divine omnipotence prevents death, shows by deed that he despises all temporal things for the faith of Christ; and in this the outstanding act of fortitude formally exists.

b) That the endurance of torment be voluntary. For where the voluntary is lacking, an honorable act in general is also lacking. Therefore, although this condition, insofar as martyrdom is baptism of blood, is not required for little children, nevertheless it is required for adults, in whom martyrdom must always be an honorable act. An actual voluntary acceptance of this torment is best; a virtual voluntary acceptance also suffices; concerning the sufficiency of a habitual voluntary acceptance authors dispute.

c) That the voluntary endurance of torment be accepted from a supernatural motive, namely for bearing witness to the faith of Christ. For martyrdom is testimony shown to Christ; now he who dies, but not for the faith of Christ, does not show testimony to Christ. Therefore it is required that the truth which the martyr testifies to by his torment be a truth taught by Christ. Hence it follows that before the Church he is not a martyr who dies to avoid a sin which he erroneously thinks to be a sin (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 124, a. 5; Supplement, q. 69, a. 6, ad 9).

d) That another inflict the torment out of hatred against the faith of Christ. For the martyr's testimony for the faith of Christ is solemn, as is clear from the words of Christ;¹ wherefore death must be inflicted by another in hatred of Christ; otherwise testimony is not had.

It is disputed whether soldiers who are killed in a sacred war while fighting for the defense of the faith can be called martyrs in the true sense. Some deny it, since the nature of martyrdom, as the most excellent act of fortitude and an imitation of the Passion of Christ, seems to require that the endurance of torment lethal of itself be sustained patiently without attack. There is added the practice of the Church, which never venerates these soldiers as martyrs. Others, however, affirm it, since by attacking and defending, the soldiers seem to defend the Church and Christ more than themselves; and they try to explain the practice of the Church from the difficulty of investigating from what motive, divine or human, the soldiers fought.

Corollary. Neither a soldier in any war, nor a priest, nor a religious woman who succumbs in the duties of his or her office or of charity, is to be called a martyr; indeed, not even a priest who, falsely accused of homicide and able to free himself by violating the sacramental seal, is condemned to death. The cause of the death appointed on the part of the judge is not the cause of Christ, but the supposed homicide. Nevertheless, all these who succumb in fulfilling their office from a supernatural motive, although they are not martyrs, must truly be said to exercise the most perfect act of the virtue of fortitude; indeed, they place the most perfect act of charity according to the words of Christ: "Greater love than this no one has, that someone lay down his life for his friends";² but that act is not martyrdom, which theologians call baptism of blood.

3. Effects of Martyrdom. a) In the just man it effects second sanctifying grace, and the remission of all venial faults of which he repents, even if attrition without martyrdom would not suffice for their remission, and the removal of all temporal punishments.

b) In the sinner, martyrdom effects first sanctifying grace and the remission of sin, both original sin, if it has not yet been remitted, and personal mortal sin, and the removal of eternal punishments and the other effects assigned for the just man.

Venial sins to which a martyr might die adhering are remitted for him as to guilt by the first act of charity which he elicits immediately after departure from this life (St. Thomas, De malo, q. 7, a. 11; St. Alphonsus, Opera dogmatica, ed. Walter, t. 1, p. 672); and since nothing can delay a martyr from entrance into eternal beatitude, the temporal punishments remaining for these venial sins are removed still by the force of the martyrdom suffered, by the same reason by which the sacrament of Baptism removes these punishments in those adults who, baptized with an affection for venial sins, would immediately depart from life without any sin committed after Baptism.

Note. Concerning the condition required in a martyr that he may obtain the effects of martyrdom, and concerning the manner in which martyrdom produces its effects, cf. the treatise on Baptism.

¹ Matt. 10:32-39.

² John 15:13.