Question One: On Fortitude According to Itself

S. Th. II-II, q. 123.

902. Fortitude is a virtue, because it strengthens the appetite against difficulties according to right reason, so that it does not recede from the good of reason on account of difficulties and dangers, but tolerates or repels them: thus it makes man to be according to reason.

It is a special virtue, as having a determinate matter and special honesty, and a special impediment to be overcome: for it strengthens the soul in graver dangers, even of death. But where there is special honesty and a special impediment of the good of reason to be overcome, there is a special object, and therefore a special virtue.

It is one virtue, because it has one object: the greatest dangers of death, and other things insofar as they can lead to danger of death; all of which are of the same account, even if some are greater than others.

903. The object of fortitude is the passions of fear and daring as to be restrained, so that the appetite is strengthened for sustaining or repelling the greatest dangers, according to the order of reason toward the due end, under the account of special honesty or rectitude which shines forth in it. In this one object three things are distinguished:

A. The immediate material object in which fortitude places rectitude, or the proximate and proper matter concerning which it is concerned, are the passions of fear and daring, arising from dangers and to be rectified according to reason; consequently, external acts, such as flight, aggression, movement of the body, not as they are toward another (thus they pertain to justice), but insofar as it is required that man be rightly disposed toward himself; but the mediate object or remote matter is dangers and labors, especially dangers of death, but as to be honorably undertaken or sustained, otherwise it would not be a virtue (a. 3).

It is proved: Dangers do not draw back the will from the good of reason except because they are feared; therefore fortitude is immediately concerned with fears and restrains them lest someone fear too much and from fear recede from the good of reason. Yet because sometimes it is necessary not only firmly to tolerate those dangers but also by attacking to repel them, in order to have security afterward, therefore consequently fortitude is also concerned with daring, so that it may hold it within the limits of reason.

But dangers are especially dangers of death. For virtue is the ultimate perfection by which man operates well in all circumstances; but fortitude would not be perfect unless it firmly held back the will of man in the good of reason against the greatest evils; and one who stands firm against greater things consequently also stands firm against lesser things, but not vice versa. Therefore. - But if it did not strengthen against the greatest dangers of death, but only against lesser things, man would not be brave simply, but in a qualified respect (a. 4).

B. The primary material object which fortitude principally and by reason of itself touches is precisely that the passions of fear and daring are to be restrained so that the soul is strengthened according to the order of reason, or are to be ruled conformably to the due end.

C. The formal object, or motive on account of which, of fortitude, is the special honesty and rectitude which consists in strengthening the appetite according to right reason against dangers even the greatest, whether to be sustained with fear or repelled by moderate daring, as is fitting in order to the due end: for fortitude strengthens the appetite because this is right and honorable.

And this is the special and proper motive of the virtue of fortitude, on account of which it is a special virtue distinct from all others: for thus it acts from the very affection or love of the good of fortitude, insofar as it is fitting to reason that fears and daring be restrained in such a way as befits a brave man. It especially agrees with the dignity of man not to be removed from doing by fear of danger, nor to yield to daring rashly hurrying into danger. But if someone from love of faith, chastity, piety, charity, or justice should undergo dangers of death, the act would be regulatively and commandingly from these virtues, but elicitively from fortitude (a. 3).

904. The act proper to fortitude is twofold: the first and principal is to sustain, or to repress fears and stand immovably in dangers; the secondary is to attack, or to moderate daring. For fortitude is more concerned with restraining fears than with moderating daring, and it is more difficult to restrain fear than moderately to attack and moderate daring, because the danger itself of itself contributes something to the repression of daring, but operates toward the increase of fear (a. 6).

And indeed: "1) because someone seems to sustain when invaded by someone stronger; but he who attacks invades after the manner of one stronger; moreover it is more difficult to fight with one stronger than with one weaker; 2) because he who sustains already feels imminent dangers; but he who attacks has them as future. But it is more difficult not to be moved by things present than by things future; 3) because sustaining imports duration of time, but someone can attack from a sudden movement. But it is more difficult to remain immovable for a long time than to be moved by a sudden movement toward something arduous" (ad 1).

905. Fortitude is a cardinal virtue, because there is in it excellently one of the conditions common to every virtue: to operate firmly. For by it the soul is strengthened not only against pleasures, but also against evils and dangers, and not just any, but the greatest, namely, of death. Therefore¹ (a. 11). And thus "even according as it is a special virtue having determinate matter, it helps to resist the assaults of all vices. For one who can stand firmly in those things which are most difficult to sustain is consequently suitable for resisting other things which are less difficult" (a. 3, ad 2).

¹ Cf. I-II, q. 61, a. 3 and 4.

Yet it is not the greatest virtue, for the good of reason pertains essentially to prudence, effectively to justice, because it places that good in human affairs, and only conservatively to fortitude and temperance; yet it is greater to be firm against dangers of death than against pleasures. Therefore fortitude is less perfect than prudence and justice, but more perfect than temperance (a. 12).

906. Corollaries. - From the foregoing it is easily concluded:

1. dangers are not the matter of fortitude unless they are such that they can be honorably sustained or undertaken; otherwise they are not matter of virtue: for the brave man operates proximately so that the will may be strengthened in the good, remotely on account of the end of legal justice, because every good of virtue is ordered to the common good, or also on account of the last end, God (a. 7);

2. fortitude is most and directly concerned with dangers which threaten in just war, whether common on account of the necessity of the republic and the common good, or particular where virtue is attacked (justice, faith, chastity, religion), as if death is threatened to a judge unless he give an unjust sentence, to a virgin unless she consent to the ravisher, to the faithful unless he deny the faith; but secondarily and indirectly it is concerned with other dangers from another cause: sickness, storm, attack of robbers, etc. For although these according to themselves and immediately do not seem to threaten someone from this, that he pursues honorable good, nevertheless from the intention of the one acting they can be undertaken or sustained on account of the motive of virtue (at least on account of the good of fortitude, because they befit a brave man), as one who serves a friend infected with plague, who does not refuse to journey for some pious business on account of fear of shipwreck or robbers, etc. (a. 5);

3. those do not have the virtue of fortitude, but a false likeness of it, who expose themselves to death from vanity, robbers, those waging unjust war, duelists, etc., who are rash and cruel rather than brave, because they do not undergo danger on account of the good of virtue.

907. Remarks. - 1. The brave man delights on one side animally or spiritually (a. 8), that is, from sensitive or intellective apprehension, in the very work of virtue and its end (both remote and proximate); on the other side he has whence he may grieve, also animally, while he apprehends the loss of his own life, and corporally, while he sustains torments (pains, lashes, wounds). Yet the sensible pain of the body is greater than the spiritual delight of virtue, unless sometimes the grace of God infuses a special divine delight (a. 8).

2. Fortitude consists especially in sudden things, not indeed as regards the choice of the one acting, because the brave man rather chooses to premeditate dangers so that he can resist or bear them more easily; but as regards manifestation, because in such cases the virtue of fortitude is especially evident if, without present premeditation, as if naturally from long premeditation, he acts bravely (a. 9).

3. The brave man uses anger as an instrument for his act, not for sustaining, but for attacking; not every anger, but anger moderated by reason (a. 10).