Mortal and Venial Sin

With reference to the gravity of its malice, sin is divided into mortal and venial. Holy Scripture teaches us that there are certain sins which exclude from the kingdom of God,¹ and, on the other hand, that the just, even while they remain just, frequently fall into slight faults.² The same truth is taught by the Church. There are, then, mortal and venial sins.

The essence of mortal sin consists in turning aside from God, our last end, and virtually placing our supreme happiness in some created good. But our last end is the vital and guiding principle of moral conduct, and to throw that aside is to make complete shipwreck of the moral life. It is not merely to wander out of the direct path, as is done by committing venial sin; however much this is done, if the ship be kept moving toward the port, it will come to harbour at last; but if the ship be steered altogether away from the port, it will never get there. By committing mortal sin, then, we turn away from God, our last end; we rob our souls of the sanctifying grace of God which is their life, and we incur liability to eternal separation from God and punishment in hell. Venial sin is indeed an offence against God, but it does not turn the soul away from him, nor rob it of his sanctifying grace; and it is more easily pardoned than mortal sin.

¹ Prov. xxiv 16; Jas. iii 2.

² Trent, sess. 14, C. 5.

Mortal sin is sin in the fullest and most complete sense; it is an act of consummate wickedness. A bad act must have three conditions in order to be mortally sinful:

(a) There must be full advertence to the grave malice of the act. A child that has not yet attained the full use of reason, a person half asleep, or half drunk, or half-witted, cannot know and appreciate sufficiently the malice of mortal sin, and so cannot commit it. , It is not, however, necessary to reflect explicitly on God; or on the grave wickedness contained in the act in order to sin mortally. It will be sufficient if one who has the full use of reason consciously does what 1 x Cor. vi 9. he knows to be seriously wrong, although there is no actual weighing of motives for doing or avoiding the act, no actual thought of God, no explicit calling to mind of the terrible consequences of mortal sin. Men who never think of God from morning till night, men who do not believe in hell, certainly commit mortal sins when they do what their consciences tell them is seriously wrong. Their conscience, as we saw above, is the voice of God.

(b) Besides advertence of the mind to the malice of the act, there must be full and free consent of the will to do it. If a man does not give full consent, but only dallies with the temptation, there is venial but not mortal sin; if, through being only half conscious or partially deranged, he has not full control over his will, he cannot be guilty of mortal sin.

After a temptation to sin is over, the conscience is sometimes uncertain and troubled as to whether full consent was given to sin. Often one may form one’s conscience on the point by reflecting whether he was fully awake or conscious of what he was doing, whether the sinful act to which temptation impelled him was executed if there was the opportunity of doing so. If doubt remains, it should be settled by presumptions drawn from what usually happens. If he usually yields to such temptations, the presumption is that he did so on this doubtful occasion; the presumption is in his favour if he does not usually yield consent.

(c) The object or the matter to which consent is given must be seriously against the moral law in order that a sin may be mortal.

The matter is serious as a rule when the sin committed is directly against our duty to God, as blasphemy, heresy, hatred of God, idolatry, despair of God’s mercy.

The matter is also serious when the sin causes great harm to our neighbour, as do sins against justice, charity, and obedience.

When sins cause great harm to the sinner himself the matter will also be serious and the sins mortal. This is the case with sins of intemperance and lust.

Some grievous sins are always mortal if there be full advertence and consent in the act. They do not admit parvity of matter, as theologians say. On the other hand, some sins, which if the matter be serious are mortal, become venial when the matter is light; sins against justice and charity are of this kind. It is a mortal sin to steal ten pounds, it is a venial sin to steal a penny. Some sins are of their nature venial, and only become mortal when they contract some special malice from the circumstances. Fidelity to a simple promise binds under pain of venial sin, but when the promise is bilateral and the matter serious, as in espousals, it binds under grave sin and in justice.

From what has been said about mortal sin, it will be clear that a sin will be venial if anyone of the three conditions required for mortal sin be wanting.

Mortal sin may in certain circumstances become venial, and, on the contrary, venial sin may become following paragraphs will make this clear: mortal. The (a) Mortal sin may become venial on account of an erroneous conscience which wrongly judges a grave sin to be only venial.

(b) The same may happen on account of imperfect advertence or imperfect consent to an act which in itself is gravely sinful.

On the other hand, a venial sin may become mortal:

(a) On account of an erroneous conscience which falsely judges a venial sin to be mortal.

(b) On account of a gravely sinful intention with which a venial sin is committed, as when a lie is told in order to commit adultery.

(c) On account of the proximate danger to which one is exposed of committing grave sin, as when one reads a slightly indecent book, but foreseeing that it will be the proximate occasion of grave sin.

(d) On account of grave scandal caused by venial sin.

(e) When light matter coalesces and becomes grave by additions, as when one who is bound to fast frequently in the day takes small quantities of food, which are notable in the aggregate; or when a considerable amount of money is stolen in small thefts.

Although no mere multiplication of venial sins can ever amount to a mortal sin, yet venial sin frequently committed disposes the soul to commit mortal sin both directly and indirectly. Directly, by forming a habit which becomes stronger and stronger, continually requiring greater indulgence for its satisfaction, and finally leads to mortal sin. This is often seen in such sins as theft and lust. Indirectly, because venial sin familiarizes the soul with wrongdoing, lessens the fear of God in the soul, diminishes the fervour of charity, and causes God to withhold those more abundant graces which he would otherwise give, and which would preserve the soul from sin, but without which the soul falls grievously.

To deliberate whether we shall commit mortal sin or not, weighing the reasons on either side, is itself a grievous sin. It is against the precept of charity, by which we are obliged ever to cling unswervingly to God; it is a grievous injury to God, as if a subject were seriously to deliberate whether he should or should not be faithful to his king and country.

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. II, Diss. II, Pt. II, Sect. III, Ch. I, Art. II, § III. On the Unequal Gravity of Sins · Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. II, Diss. II, Pt. II, Sect. III, Ch. II, Art. II, § I. On Mortal Sin · Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. II, Diss. II, Pt. II, Sect. III, Ch. II, Art. II, § I, Scholion. On Mortal Sin by Accident · Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. II, Diss. II, Pt. II, Sect. III, Ch. II, Art. II, § II. On Venial Sin · Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. II, Diss. II, Pt. II, Sect. III, Ch. II, Art. II, § II, Scholion I. On Venial Sin by Accident

In this chapter we have for the most part kept in view the objective malice of sin. As a rule, the confessor should judge of sins confessed according to the objective malice, but he will, of course, bear in mind that the subjective malice of sin may be very different from the objective. The subjective malice of sin will depend upon the degree of instruction and knowledge, the graces which the sinner had received, the violence of the temptation to which he was subjected, whether he was influenced by habit, perhaps unconsciously formed, or whether he was the subject of hereditary tendency, and many other considerations. It is obvious that the question of subjective malice must be generally left to the infinite knowledge of God, who alone sees and penetrates the inmost recesses of the heart.

Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology

Ludovicus Wouters, C.SS.R. — 16 passages

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. II, Diss. II, Pt. II, Sect. III, Ch. I, Art. II, § III. On the Unequal Gravity of Sins

Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. II, Art. 3. Bad Habits, or Vices, Mortal Sin · Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. II, Art. 3. Bad Habits, or Vices, Venial Sin · Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 1. The Virtue of Prud…, Subjective Parts · Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 4. The Vices Opposed …, Theft and Robbery

The discussion is not of that unequal gravity of sins by which one sin is mortal and another venial; concerning that question we shall speak later. Rather, the question is generally whether sins are of unequal gravity, and whence this comes.

n. 256.

I. Existence of unequal gravity. Not all sins are equally grave. This is of faith against the Stoics, Jovinian, and others. It is proved: 1. from Sacred Scripture: "He who handed me over to you has the greater sin."¹ It is proved: 2. by reason. Sin involves a departure from the rectitude of reason; "and therefore it is of great importance for the gravity of sin whether there is a greater or lesser departure from the rectitude of reason; and according to this it must be said that not all sins are equal" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 73, a. 2).

¹ John 19:11; cf. John 7:26; Matt. 5:22; 12:31; 1 John 5:16-17.

n. 257.

II. Root of inequality. Unequal gravity is taken from the object, circumstances, and end of the sinful act. For "everything is naturally increased from the same thing from which it is caused" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 73, a. 7). But sin is caused from the disorder of the object, circumstance, and end.

From the object, or, practically, from the dignity of the virtue to which it is opposed; "for contraries are about the same thing, and in this way it is necessary that a graver sin be opposed to a greater virtue" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 73, a. 3). Now virtues, considered according to their dignity, come in this order: 1. charity; 2. faith; 3. hope. The cardinal virtues follow, and their parts, concerning each of which it is difficult to determine in what order, considered according to their dignity, they should be counted. There is added that account must also be taken of the particular good of some virtue which is injured by sin; and when all these things are considered, the inequality of gravity can scarcely be determined accurately.

I add these things from St. Thomas:

a) Hatred of God is the gravest of sins (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 73, a. 3, ad 3).

b) "Sins which are committed against one's neighbor are to be weighed in themselves according to the harms which are inflicted upon one's neighbor, because from this they have the character of fault. But the harm is greater insofar as a greater good is taken away. Now there is a threefold good of man, namely the good of the soul, the good of the body, and the good of external things. The good of the soul, which is greatest, cannot be taken away by another except occasionally, for example, through evil persuasion, which does not impose necessity. But the other two goods, namely of the body and of external things, can be taken away violently by another. But because the good of the body surpasses the good of external things, sins by which harm is inflicted upon the body are graver than those by which harm is inflicted upon external things. Hence among the other sins which are committed against one's neighbor, homicide is graver, by which the life of the neighbor already actually existing is taken away. Consequent to this is adultery, which is against the due order of human generation, through which there is entrance into life. Consequent to this are external goods, among which reputation surpasses riches, because it is nearer to spiritual goods; hence it is said in Proverbs 22: 'A good name is better than many riches.' And therefore detraction according to its genus is a greater sin than theft; yet less than homicide or adultery" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 73, a. 3).

From circumstances and end, for example, from circumstances:

a) Of the person sinning. Hence in themselves the sins of the faithful are graver than those of unbelievers (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 73, a. 10).

b) Of the person against whom the sin is committed. Hence sins against God are graver than sins against oneself and one's neighbor (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 73, a. 9).

c) Of the perfection of the depraved act, for example, on account of greater deliberation, intensity, duration, etc. Hence spiritual sins are graver than carnal sins (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 73, a. 5), and sins of malice are graver than sins of weakness (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 78, a. 4).

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. II, Diss. II, Pt. II, Sect. III, Ch. II, Art. II, § I. On Mortal Sin

n. 277.

I. Existence of mortal sins. There are mortal¹ or grave sins. This is of faith from these words of the Council of Trent: "If anyone shall say that there is no mortal sin except unbelief, or that grace once received is lost by no other sin, however grave and enormous, except the sin of unbelief, let him be anathema."² The same Council teaches that "all mortal sins must be recounted by penitents."³ It is proved: 1. from Sacred Scripture, which very often declares that there are sins because of which men are deprived of divine friendship and are damned eternally. Thus, for example, "The impious man and his impiety are hateful to God";⁴ likewise, "Depart from me, you cursed, into eternal fire."⁵ It is proved: 2. from the holy Fathers. Thus St. Jerome: "There are light sins, there are grave ones";⁶ St. Augustine: "For who would say that one must sin, even if one sin is damnable, another venial?";⁷ likewise St. Basil,⁸ St. John Chrysostom,⁹ St. Ambrose.¹⁰ It is proved: 3. from reason, because there are sins which plainly turn one away from the ultimate end, as we shall soon explain more fully.

¹ It is called mortal because it takes away the principle of spiritual life, namely habitual grace, and brings death to the soul (St. Alphonsus, V, 51; St. Thomas, I-II, q. 72, a. 5).

² Session 6, canon 27.

³ Session 14, chapter 5.

⁴ Wis. 14:9.

⁵ Matt. 25:41.

⁶ Bk. 2, Against Jovinian, n. 30.

⁷ Contra mendacium, c. 8, n. 19.

⁸ Homily on Psalm 7, v. 3, n. 2.

⁹ Homily 12 on the Epistle to the Romans, n. 18.

¹⁰ Bk. 2, De poenitentia, c. 18, n. 95.

n. 278.

II. Nature of mortal sin. Every sin is a certain disorder from the ultimate end, i.e., from God, or a certain deformity from the rule, i.e., from the law directing man to the ultimate end. Now mortal sin is disorder in every way, or aversion from the ultimate end. Therefore such a sin utterly overturns the due order to the ultimate end; hence it is said to be against the substance of the due order. "When the soul," says St. Thomas, "is disordered by sin even to aversion from the ultimate end, namely God, to whom it is united by charity, then it is mortal sin" (I-II, q. 72, a. 5; St. Alphonsus, V, 11). Now aversion from the ultimate end, which is contained in mortal sin, takes place through conversion toward a creature as toward the ultimate end.

Corollary. Mortal sin is of infinite malice, because by placing a creature before the infinite God it inflicts an infinite injury upon God. "Whoever," says St. Thomas, "places something less worthy before something more worthy, does injury to it, and so much the more as the thing is more worthy. But whoever establishes for himself an end in a temporal thing, which everyone sinning mortally does, by this very fact, as to his affection, places the creature before the Creator, loving the creature more than the Creator" (De veritate, q. 28, a. 2).

n. 279.

III. Division of mortal sin. Mortal sins are divided into mortal sins from their genus, mortal sins from their whole genus, and mortal sins by accident. Now:

Those are usually called mortal from their genus¹ which according to their proper matter can be grave, and in fact are grave or light according as the matter is grave or light.
Mortal sins from their whole genus are those whose matter is always grave, so that they cannot be light except from ignorance of the grave malice, or from imperfection of the act. Such are, for example, unbelief, despair, blasphemy, perjury, etc.
There will be discussion of mortal sins by accident in the scholion.

¹ According to St. Thomas, mortal from its genus seems to be that which, if it is present according to its perfect notion, is always grave. This seems to be deduced from these words of the holy Doctor: "It must be said that one who does injustice in small things falls short of the perfect notion of doing what is unjust, insofar as it can be held not to be altogether against the will of the one who suffers this; for example, if someone takes one apple from another, or something of that sort, concerning which it is probable that the other is not injured by it and that it does not displease him" (II-II, q. 59, a. 4, ad 2; II-II, q. 66, a. 6, ad 3).

n. 280.

IV. Conditions of mortal sin. For mortal sin there are required: 1. grave matter; 2. the legislator's intention of obliging under grave obligation; 3. full advertence; 4. full or perfect consent. The reason for the first and second has been explained in n. 149. The reason for the third and fourth is that, in order that man simply turn himself away from the ultimate end and merit eternal punishment, a perfect human act is required (St. Alphonsus, V).

What grave matter is, see n. 149 and the things to be said under VI.
Whence the legislator's intention of obliging under grave obligation is discerned, see n. 149. This intention, with regard to divine law, whether natural or positive, is always present if the matter is grave. With regard to human laws in grave matter, it is presumed to be present unless the contrary is established (n. 149).
Full advertence, and actual advertence, either in the act itself or when its cause was placed. Now full advertence is had when someone, fully self-possessed or with mind free, adverts to the grave malice. It suffices, however, that he advert to it confusedly (St. Alphonsus, V, 3).
Full consent is that which follows full advertence.

n. 281.

V. Effects of mortal sin. Mortal sin: 1. deprives one of sanctifying grace and charity, and of the other supernatural virtues except faith and hope, and finally of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. 2. It renders dead the good works done while sin has not yet been remitted, i.e., worthy of no heavenly reward; likewise it renders works done previously mortified, so that they are to be deprived of heavenly reward unless they revive through repentance. 3. It deprives the sinner of the special providence by which God rules his friends; deprived of this, the sinner, unless he soon comes to his senses, will soon slip into other sins. 4. It often induces temporal evils, both public and private. 5. It induces liability to punishment, concerning which there was discussion in n. 267.

n. 282.

VI. Criteria for discerning mortal sins. Mortal sins are discerned, as was said concerning discerning the grave obligation of law (n. 149): 1. from Sacred Scripture; 2. from definitions of the Church; 3. from the consensus of the holy Fathers; 4. from the consensus of theologians; 5. from the gravity of the terms by which some sin is prohibited; 6. from the gravity of the punishment; 7. finally, from the intrinsic reason, insofar as it demonstrates that some sin is opposed to charity. Concerning this, observe: since mortal sin consists in aversion from the ultimate end (n. 278), but conversion toward the ultimate end takes place through charity, therefore those sins are mortal which are simply opposed to charity. Now these are simply opposed to charity: 1. those which are opposed to charity contrarily, such as sins of hatred against God, society, or neighbor; 2. those which inflict grave injury, whether upon God himself, as unbelief and despair; or upon the good of God, i.e., his honor, as the explicit choice of a creature for the ultimate end, idolatry, simony, etc.; or upon the good of the species, as lust; or upon one's own good, as suicide; or upon the good of neighbor and society, as grave theft (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 88, a. 2; II-II, q. 59, a. 4; II-II, q. 66, a. 6). But for judging whether something is gravely opposed to the good of God, of society, of oneself, or of one's neighbor, not only competent authority must be attended to, but also, if authority does not settle the matter, common estimation.

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. II, Diss. II, Pt. II, Sect. III, Ch. II, Art. II, § I, Scholion. On Mortal Sin by Accident

n. 283.

Mortal sin by accident is had when a sin venial in itself becomes mortal from an added circumstance. Now a sin venial in itself, and likewise an act indifferent in itself, can become mortal:

I. From invincible erroneous conscience, as if someone thinks the theft of a small thing to be grave sin.

II. From an added end, or if the venial act is referred to a gravely evil end, as if someone lies in order to extort intercourse (St. Alphonsus, V, 59).

III. From proximate danger or grave danger of mortal sin, as if someone from a somewhat immodest touch will probably consent to the venereal delectation to follow, or goes to a person with whom he is probably going to sin (St. Alphonsus, V, 63). Concerning proximate danger, more fully in the treatise on Penance.

IV. From scandal, as if a priest should go about half-drunk before others.

V. From the ultimate end constituted; this happens explicitly if someone holds a lightly evil thing as the supreme good; implicitly, if someone is actually prepared to transgress a grave precept rather than abstain from an act in itself venially evil or not evil at all, as if someone actually proposes rather to neglect Mass than to stop playing (St. Alphonsus, V, 60).

VI. From contempt of authority, namely if someone transgresses a law or precept because he despises the law or precept itself, or the superior as such. It must be said otherwise when someone neglects a law or precept in a light matter, either because the thing commanded is esteemed little, or because the superior is held in little account not as such but as unlearned, imprudent, etc. (St. Alphonsus, I, 142; IV, 161, q. 3).

Likewise one sins gravely, even if the matter in itself is light, if one does not observe a precept because one does not wish to be subject to authority (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 186, a. 9, ad 3).

With these things noted concerning contempt of authority, it is pleasing to add certain things concerning contempt in general. Therefore let there be:

Notion. Contempt is despising a person or thing which is worthy of esteem. It can be either merely internal or externally manifested.
Quality of the sin. Contempt is opposed to that virtue from whose motive it is prohibited. Thus, for example, despising God is opposed to religion; despising one's father as such is opposed to piety; despising a superior as such, i.e., authority, is opposed to observance.
Gravity of the sin. Contempt is a grave or light sin according as it involves grave or light irreverence, etc. Thus, for example, contempt of God, of a man as such, of one's father as such, are grave. It must be said otherwise of contempt of a man or father insofar as, for example, he is given to drunkenness, or of a superior insofar as he is imprudent, proud, etc.

Corollary. He who transgresses even the very slightest law or precept from contempt of the legislator or commander as such sins gravely against dulia. He who transgresses these because he does not wish to be subject to authority sins gravely against obedience. He who transgresses these neither because he contemns authority nor because he does not wish to be subject to authority, but from another motive, sins against that virtue from whose motive the law or precept was given; therefore against obedience if, which will rarely happen, they were given from the motive of obedience. And indeed he sins gravely or lightly according to the matter.

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. II, Diss. II, Pt. II, Sect. III, Ch. II, Art. II, § II. On Venial Sin

n. 284.

I. Existence of venial sins. There are venial¹ sins, distinct from mortal sins. Luther and Calvin taught that all sins by their nature are mortal and worthy of eternal punishment; nevertheless they are called venial: according to Luther, because they are not imputed to one having faith; according to Calvin, because they are not imputed to the predestined. Likewise Baius taught that no sin is venial by its nature, but that some are such from the mercy of God.

Concerning the stated proposition the Council of Trent has these words: "For although in this mortal life, however holy and just they may be, they sometimes fall into at least light and daily sins, which are also called venial, they do not on that account cease to be just. For that voice of the just is both humble and true: Forgive us our debts."² There is added the condemned second proposition of Baius: "No sin is by its nature venial, but every sin merits eternal punishment."

The proposition is proved from Sacred Scripture, which compares some sins to very light things, others to very grave things. Thus some are compared to a gnat, others to a camel;³ some to a mote, others to a beam;⁴ some to hay and stubble placed upon the foundation of Christ.⁵ Then Sacred Scripture declares that all men sin, although some persevere in the justice and friendship of God: "In many things we all offend";⁶ "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us."⁷

¹ It is called venial because, with the principle of spiritual life, namely grace, preserved, it inflicts upon the soul a languor easily curable, and easily obtains pardon (St. Alphonsus, V, 51).

² Session 6, chapter 11.

³ Matt. 23:23-24.

⁴ Luke 6:41.

⁵ 1 Cor. 3:12 ff.

⁶ James 3:2.

⁷ 1 John 1:8.

n. 285.

II. Nature of venial sin. Venial sin is not aversion, as mortal sin is, but a certain disorder from man's ultimate end. It is called a certain disorder from the ultimate end insofar as it involves an act which is not referable to God as ultimate end; nevertheless, neither is it referred to a creature as to the ultimate end, in which case it would be mortal, but it is referred to beatitude in common as to the ultimate end. Therefore such a sin does not overturn the order toward God; hence it is said to be against the integrity of the due order. "But when," says St. Thomas, "disorder takes place short of aversion from God, then there is venial sin" (I-II, q. 72, a. 5). And elsewhere: "Venial sin falls short of mortal sin in this, that it does not entirely disorder from the end. But in some way it delays from the end, while the order to the end is preserved" (In II Sent., dist. 35, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2; St. Alphonsus, V, 11).

Corollary I. From what has been said about mortal and venial sin, it is clear in what sense mortal sin is said to be against the law, while venial sin is only beside the law (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 88, a. 1, ad 1). Namely, the former is against the law, the latter beside the law, insofar as by law is understood the divine disposition which establishes the substance of order, or the order essential with respect to the ultimate end. Nevertheless, venial sin can to this extent be called against the law insofar as it is opposed to something contained in the law, or, as St. Thomas says, insofar as "it does not observe the mode of reason which the law intends" (cited place), i.e., as St. Alphonsus explains, it does not observe the mode of the law. Now the mode of the law against which venial sin strikes is the integrity of order (V, 11).

Corollary II. Sin is predicated of mortal and venial sin not univocally, but only analogically,¹ because the notion of sin, namely disorder, is altogether diverse in each. For mortal sin altogether disorders from the ultimate end, but venial sin only in some way delays from the end, while the order to the end is preserved. Hence "the division of sin into venial and mortal is not the division of a genus into species which equally participate in the notion of the genus, but of an analogue into those things of which it is predicated according to prior and posterior; and therefore the perfect notion of sin, which Augustine sets down, belongs to mortal sin. But venial sin is called sin according to an imperfect notion, and in order to mortal sin; just as accident is called being in order to substance, according to the imperfect notion of being" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 88, a. 1, ad 1). Therefore mortal and venial sin differ in the whole genus, or in theological species, as they say.

¹ Something is predicated of several things univocally if it is in them in the same mode; analogically, if in a diverse mode.

n. 286.

III. Division of venial sin. Venial sins are divided into venial sins from their genus and venial sins by accident.

Those are called venial from their genus whose proper matter is essentially light, so that mortal sin cannot be had unless malice of another species is added. Such, for example, is a lie (St. Alphonsus, V, 52).
There will be discussion of venial sins by accident in the scholion.

n. 287.

IV. Conditions of venial sin. For venial sin, imperfect or half-full advertence and consent suffice. Now:

The signs of imperfect advertence are: 1. if you were half-asleep or half-drunk; 2. if you adverted to the malice lightly, like one half-asleep; 3. if you were so carried away by passion, apprehension, or distraction that you hardly knew what you were doing; 4. if, after weighing the matter better, you judge that you certainly would not have acted if you had been watchful, sober, and with mind calm (St. Alphonsus, V, 54). Moreover, with regard to sins committed before the seventh year, in doubt full advertence is always presumed to have been absent.
He who doubts whether he fully consented can presume that he did not consent, at least not fully: 1. if one of the signs of imperfect advertence assigned above is present; 2. if he was so disposed that although he could easily have carried out the sin, nevertheless he did not carry it out; 3. if he remembers that he proceeded timidly; 4. if, immediately reflecting upon the act placed, he is terrified, saddened, and at once repels it.

And indeed these things are valid generally. But abstraction having been made from the signs set forth, in doubt about full consent, the timorous person can always presume that he did not fully consent. It is otherwise if someone has been accustomed to consent to sins. One who now consents, now does not consent, cannot resolve the doubt by the help of presumption (St. Alphonsus, V, 55; VI, 476). Besides, commonly one should abstain from direct investigation, both because for the most part it will be fruitless, and because it will rather often be a new excitation to temptation.

He who deliberates whether he wishes to consent to a mortal sin, supposing full advertence to the grave malice of the proposed thing, sins gravely, because he lays aside the absolute will of not sinning. Nevertheless, in practice there is often not perfect deliberation, but only a certain negligence in fighting the temptation.

n. 288.

V. Effects of venial sin. Venial sin: 1. diminishes fear of God and tenderness of conscience, and increases tepidity of soul. 2. It impedes special graces and renders us unworthy of that special affection with which God follows the just who are fervent in his love. 3. It disposes toward mortal sin, both directly and indirectly. Directly, by generating and increasing a depraved habit; thus small thefts dispose toward grave ones. Indirectly, insofar as they diminish the fervor of charity and actual graces. 4. It induces liability to punishment, concerning which we have spoken.

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. II, Diss. II, Pt. II, Sect. III, Ch. II, Art. II, § II, Scholion I. On Venial Sin by Accident

n. 289.

I. A sin mortal in itself becomes venial by accident:

From invincible erroneous conscience, as if someone holds the theft of a grave thing to be venial.
From defect of perfect consent (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 88, a. 6; St. Alphonsus, V, 54, 55).
Some add: from an excusing cause, which because of only a slight defect does not excuse from the whole. But the legislator, if he urges the substance of a grave precept, seems always to urge it under grave obligation, so that one who injures a grave precept according to its substance without a truly sufficient cause seems to sin gravely.

McHugh–Callan, Moral Theology

John A. McHugh, O.P., and Charles J. Callan, O.P. — 25 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. II, Art. 3. Bad Habits, or Vices, Mortal Sin

n. 169.

Mortal Sin

Mortal Sin.—A sin is mortal or deadly, when by it a person turns away from God, his Last End, and prefers to Him some created good, thereby incurring the debt of eternal punishment.

n. 170.

The first condition necessary in order that a sin may be judged mortal is that the matter of the sin be grave, either in itself or in the opinion of him who commits it; it must include turning away from God and the substitution of some created good as the Last End.

n. 171.

The matter of a sin is known to be grave: (a) when the law of God or of the Church declares that it is seriously displeasing to God, or that it will separate one from His favor or rewards; (b) when right reason shows that it does great injury to the rights of God, of society, of one’s neighbor, or of oneself.

n. 172.

The matter of a sin is grave in two ways. (a) It is grave from the character of the act and without exception, when the good which is injured is infinite, or is a finite good of greatest importance and indivisible, Thus, heresy, despair, and simony against divine law are always serious, because they offend against an infinite good; while murder, though it injures only a finite good, is nevertheless always grave matter because earthly life is of highest importance among finite goods, and if taken away is taken entirely. (b) The matter of a sin is grave from the character of the act but with exceptions, when the good that is injured is of grave importance, but finite and divisible. Thus, the worship we give to God is finite and admits of more and less; and hence a sin against worship, though serious from the nature of the offence, may be slight on account of the smallness of the irreverence. Similarly, though theft injures a grave right, it is not grave matter when the amount stolen is small.

n. 173.

The second condition required that a sin be mortal is that there be full advertence to the grave malice of the act, for one cannot be said to separate oneself from God unless one has made the same amount of deliberation that is required for any temporal affair of great moment.

n. 174.

Advertence is the act by which the mind gives attention to something. It is of two kinds: (a) full advertence, when there is nothing to impede perfect attention, as when a person is wide awake, in full possession of his faculties, and not distracted; (b) partial advertence, when there is something that, prevents entire attention, as when a person is only partly awake; or not entirely conscious, or distracted with many things.

n. 175.

Hence in the following cases, even though there be serious matter, a sin is not mortal, on account of lack of full advertence. (a) When without one’s will there is no full advertence to the act itself, as happens with those who are half-asleep, or who are under the influence of drugs, or who are mentally confined by anxiety or physical pain, etc. (see on Human Acts, 24 sqq.). (b) A sin is not mortal when there is no full advertence to the sinfulness or to the gravity of the act. Those who through no fault of their own are unaware that an act is sinful, or that it is a mortal sin (e.g., children, the half-witted, or the uninstructed), have no full advertence to the malice of the act; likewise, those who, without being responsible for their inadvertence, do not think at the moment of the sinfulness or seriousness of what they do (e.g., those who think out plans for revenge before they have taken second thought on its immorality).

n. 176.

Signs that indicate that there was no full advertence are: (a) if afterwards one can scarcely recall what happened; (b) if shortly afterwards one cannot be sure what was one’s state of mind at the time.

n. 177.

Though full advertence is required for a mortal sin, it is not required that this advertence be the most perfect. (a) It is not necessary that the advertence be preceded by long deliberation, for advertence can be full even when the consideration is only momentary, (b) It is not necessary that advertence be continued during the commission of a sin, for what follows is foreseen if adverted to at the beginning. (c) It is not necessary that advertence to the malice of the sin be clear or exact. One who perceives that there is some special malice in robbing a church, even though he does not understand just what the malice is, has sufficient advertence to become guilty of sacrilege. Likewise, one who has doubts as to whether a certain sin is mortal, or who suspects that it is mortal, has sufficient advertence for grave guilt if he commits that sin. (d) It is not necessary that advertence to the malice of the sin be reflex (i.e., that one advert to the fact that one is conscious of the gravity of the sin); for to will the malice, it suffices that one be conscious of the malice. (e) It is not necessary that advertence to the malice of the sin be explicit (i.e., that one have in mind the precise nature of sin as an offense against God, which produces a stain on the soul and incurs the debt of punishment); for to will evil and its gravity, it suffices that one perceive the evil and its gravity, even though one does not analyze the meaning or seek out the ultimate reasons.

n. 178.

The third condition required that a sin be mortal is that full consent of the will be given it, for no one separates him self from God except through his own free choice. (a) Consent is not full, when there has not been full advertence, or when an act has been done under violent compulsion; (b) consent is full when there has been full advertence and no forceful compulsion (see above on Violence, 52).

n. 179.

Indications that consent was not full are: (a) if before the sin the person was of tender conscience and had habitually a horror of grave sin; (b) if at the time of the sin the person recoiled from the sinful suggestion—e.g., if he had a hatred for it as soon as it was fully perceived, or if he was saddened at the temptation, or if he kept from an external act that could have been easily performed; (c) if after the sin the person was conscientious, and yet had doubts as to whether consent was given.

Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. II, Art. 3. Bad Habits, or Vices, Venial Sin

n. 180.

Venial Sin

Venial Sin.—A sin is venial, or more easily pardonable, when by it one turns inordinately towards some created good, not so, however, as to forsake God as one’s Last End or to prefer self-will to the divine friendship.

n. 181.

The first condition required that a sin be called venial is that its matter be light, either in reality, or in the invincible belief of him who commits it. The criteria by which we may know what matter is light are authority and right reason (see above, 171).

n. 182.

The matter of a sin is light in two ways. (a) From the character of the act, the matter is light when the good which is injured is finite and of minor importance. Thus, truth about trivial things is of less importance among finite goods, and consequently a small lie about some unimportant matter, which helps and does not harm the neighbor, is light matter. (b) From the quantity of the matter, the matter is light when the good injured is of major importance but divisible. An example here is a theft that works only small harm (see above, 172).

n. 183.

The second condition for a venial sin is that there be some advertence to the malice of the act. (a) The advertence is not full when the matter is grave, and the act done without compulsion, for else the sin would not be venial but mortal. (b) The advertence may be full or partial when the matter is light.

n. 184.

The third condition for a venial sin is that there be some consent of the will to the malice of the act. (a) The consent is not full when the matter is grave, for else the sin would be mortal. (b) The consent may be either full or partial when the matter is light.

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 1. The Virtue of Prud…, Subjective Parts

n. 1639.

The Subjective Parts or Species of Prudence

The Subjective Parts or Species of Prudence.—Prudence in general is the right direction of human actions to their ends; and hence there will be as many different kinds of prudence as there are different kinds of ends of human actions. But the division of ends will be into the particular good of the individual and the common good of the multitude, and thus there are the two species of individual or personal prudence and social prudence.

(a) Individual prudence is the right management of his own acts by the individual, with a view to his personal uprightness.

(b) Social prudence is the right management of the acts of others or of self, with a view to the general welfare of a society.

n. 1640.

Social prudence in turn is subdivided in accordance with the two classes of society, the perfect and the imperfect, into political and domestic prudence. (a) Political prudence is the right administration of the affairs of a larger multitude, such as the State. (b) Domestic prudence is the right administration of the affairs of the family.

n. 1641.

Political prudence, according to usage, often has or may bear an unfavorable and evil signification. Hence, as we are considering now the virtue of prudence, we should remark that political prudence here is something very different from political methods or practices that are wise in evil, but not in good, though often called prudent (see 1651, 1674 sqq.). Examples: (a) Evil forms of government, such as tyranny, oligarchy, or mob rule, cannot be said to have the virtue of political prudence, no matter how successful they may seem, for they do not rule in the interests of the people at large, and this interest is the very beginning and end of true social prudence. (b) Evil practices in the regulation of government or of political parties—such as employment of foul means to maintain the interests of the State, corruption, bribery, intimidation, used for the purpose of winning the election of a ticket or candidate—cannot be honored with the name of prudence, but should rather be called Machiavellism and dishonest politics.

n. 1642.

Prudence exercised for the benefit of the nation as a whole should be found, not only in rulers, but also in private citizens. We may distinguish, then, the following kinds of prudence:

(a) in those who conduct the affairs of the nation there should be governmental prudence or statesmanship. Of rulers prudence in the highest degree is expected; for the chief function of prudence is to direct actions, and the heads of States must direct not only their own actions but those of great bodies of men. Scripture speaks of prudence and justice as the two virtues that are especially needed in a prince (Jer., xxiii. 5);

(b) in those who direct the defense of the nation against its enemies there should be military prudence, for bravery has to be guided by wisdom: “A wise man is strong, and a knowing man, stout and valiant, because war is managed by due ordering, and there shall be safety where there are many counsels” (Prov., xxiv. 5, 6);

(c) in subjects there should also be political prudence, for, as they are rational beings and members of society, they should willingly rule their acts according to the law and should fulfill their own particular offices with a view, not only to their own individual good, but to the good of the whole community.

n. 1643.

Utility of Prudence for Society

Utility of Prudence for Society.—Hence, we see that none of the virtues is selfish or concerned exclusively with the good of individuals. (a) Thus, prudence, as just said, is political and domestic as well as individual; (b) justice is legal (i.e., towards society) as well as commutative (i.e., towards individuals); (c) even temperance (e.g., avoidance of drunkenness) and courage (e.g., defense of public safety) pertain to the common good and are commanded in laws of the State.

n. 1644.

Prudence attends chiefly to good morals, but it attends also to other goods that benefit human life.

(a) Thus, personal prudence directs one, not only to seek after virtue, but also to seek after lawful conveniences and to shun such things as are embarrassing or undesirable. Hence, the prudent man acts so as to avoid offense and to gain the good will of others; he studies the dispositions of those with whom he lives, so as to live peaceably, etc.; he protects himself against the attacks and snares of the unfriendly (cfr. Acts, xxiii. 6; Matt., xxii. 17).

(b) Domestic prudence provides not only for the virtuous lives of the members of the household, but also for their health and happiness, food and clothing, and other necessities and lawful pleasures (Luke, xii. 42).

(c) Political prudence is exercised, not only in the regulation of the conduct of the people through good laws, but also in the promotion of their welfare, peace, prosperity, and contentment.

(d) Military prudence provides for religion and good morals, by appointing chaplains, giving opportunity for religious exercises, insisting on discipline and military virtues, etc.; but it also looks after the interests of the individual men, the efficiency of all branches of the service, preparedness of the fighting forces, etc.

n. 1645.

Neither should practical prudence or practicality (i.e., the knowing what to do and how to do it) be identified with merely material pursuits, since it is a quality that pervades all human activity, from the lowest to the highest, from the manual to the intellectual, from the temporal to the spiritual. Just as there are unpractical mechanics and business men who are not skilled at their work, so also there are practical students and church people who do their own work well and get good results.

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 4. The Vices Opposed …, Theft and Robbery

n. 1899.

There are two opinions about the estimation of the property loss.

(a) Thus, an older opinion held that the standard should be an absolute one, that is, that the loss should be determined independently of the wealth or poverty of the person injured, since the financial situation of this person is a purely extrinsic circumstance of the theft. The rich man has just as much right to his $10 as the poor man has to his $10, and it is therefore just as injurious to deprive the former of the sum as it is to deprive the latter. What is a mortal theft in one case is a mortal theft in every case.

(b) A later opinion, which seems to be the common one today, distinguishes two standards: an absolute one, which fixes one highest amount that is always grave matter on account of its magnitude, however wealthy the loser may be, and a relative one, which proposes a scale of lower amounts that are grave matter on account of the economic condition of the persons stolen from. It is argued that a relative standard should be set up, since the injury of theft is certainly felt more by those who have less means to fall back on; and that an absolute standard is also necessary, since without it the property of the rich would not be sufficiently safeguarded and the peace and order of society would be endangered.

n. 1900.

Opinions on the Amounts that Are Grave Matter

Opinions on the Amounts that Are Grave Matter.—(a) The older opinion, according to which there is only one invariable standard for all classes and conditions, regards as grave matter the amount necessary to support for a day, according to his state and obligations, a man whose financial condition is midway between wealth and poverty; for the loss of a day’s support is usually looked on as a serious loss, and a standard for all should be taken from the average. This daily support amount may be reckoned from the amount of daily wages or income. In the United States in 1955 the average daily wage was between $14 and $15, but, if only skilled laborers or those who are in moderately prosperous circumstances are considered, the average would be considerable higher. Perhaps it would range between $25 and $30. Or if we strike a medium between the highest and the lowest figures given by the advocates of two standards, we should arrive at approximately $30 or $35.

(b) The common opinion today fixes the absolute amount, which is grave matter even when theft is from the wealthiest person or society as the equivalent of a week’s wages for the head of a family living in fairly good circumstances but dependent upon his work for its support. As to the actual amount, authors differ. Thus, Father Francis Connell, C.SS.R., wrote in 1945 in American Ecclesiastical Review (p. 69): “To lay down a general norm in view of actual conditions and value of money, it would seem that the actual sum for grave theft would be about $40.” In 1946, writing in the Homiletic and Pastoral Review (p. 694), Father Joseph Donovan, C.M., stated: “It is hard to see how less than $100 could be absolutely grave with the chances of a higher amount being probably so.”[*] This sum was criticized as being excessive and did not meet with ready acceptance by all moral theologians. On page 127 of the third printing of his Outlines of Moral Theology (1955), Father Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R., suggested $75 as a reasonable absolute sum considering the value of money at the time, and, as a practical norm, the sum has been acceptable to most confessors and authors. Relatively grave matter corresponds with the amount needed to support a worker and his family for a day or, according to some, the amount required for the support of the worker alone. Relatively grave matter would range from about $5 from a poor person on relief, through $20-$35 from skilled laborers and persons in comfortable circumstances, to $75 from the wealthy. The latter sum constitutes the absolute standard. For a general norm to establish relatively grave matter, then, an acceptable procedure is to take the daily earning power or expenses of those who do not belong to the wealthiest classes, but who just barely make a living by reason of their work or charity.

[*] This is not to suggest that the authors cited hold to the “week’s pay norm” as the standard. Father Connell, for example, defines the absolute as “a sum which is so large that society would suffer much if it could be stolen without grave sin even from the richest or from a wealthy corporation” (op. cit., pp. 127-128). The interest in citing the authors is to show the precise sums suggested by them at various times regardless of the norm used in arriving at the particular amount suggested.

Bucceroni, Institutions of Moral Theology

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 9 passages

Vol. I, On Sins and Virtues, IV. On the Gravity of Sin

n. 311.

What is the gravity of sin, and whence is it to be derived? The gravity of sin is the quantity or measure of malice by which a sin is more or less offensive to God, and consequently worthy of a greater or lesser punishment. The greater or lesser gravity of sins is to be derived generally: 1. from the object, end, and circumstances, as they are more or less repugnant to rational nature or to law; 2. from the excellence of the virtues or precepts to which sins are opposed; 3. from the various modes by which virtues or laws are violated; 4. from the greater or lesser advertence to the malice of the act, or from the different degree of consent given to the depraved act; 5. from the duration of the evil act, or from its intensity; 6. from its effects. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 72, 73, 77, 78, 79, a. 4; 2. 2. q. 39, a. 2; q. 65, a. 4; Quodl., 5, a. 20; Wirceb. D. 2, c. 1, 2.

Hence sins are distinguished as sins of ignorance, infirmity, and malice. For those are committed from culpable ignorance, these from weakness of powers, the latter from the full affection of the will. Sins are moreover distinguished as deliberate and surreptitious or semi-deliberate; sins of heart, mouth, and deed, according as they are completed by mind alone, or also by words or deed; sins of commission and omission, perpetrated by action against the law or by neglect of the law; spiritual and carnal, according as they are opposed to goods merely spiritual or sensible, or bodily; against oneself, against one's neighbor, against God, according to their various object. Likewise certain graver sins are said in the Scriptures to cry to heaven, namely because they most vehemently provoke the wrath of God, and merit most grave punishments. They are voluntary homicide, Gen. 4:10; the unspeakable crime of impurity, Gen. 18:20; 19:13; injury inflicted upon the poor, especially the widow and orphan, Ex. 3:7; 22:22, 23; defrauding the wages of workers, Deut. 24:14, 15; Jas. 5:4. Furthermore certain sins are specially said to be against the Holy Spirit, which most greatly oppose divine grace, and as it were close the approach to pardon, Matt. 12:31, 32; Mark 3:29; Luke 12:10; 1 John 5:15, 16, namely presumption concerning the mercy of God, Ecclus. 6:6; despair, Eph. 4:19; impugnation of acknowledged truth, Matt. 12:31; obstinacy in sins, Acts 7:51; envy of another's spiritual good; final impenitence, 1 John 5:16.

n. 312.

How many kinds of sin are there? - Sin is either mortal, or venial, according as it is the transgression of a law obliging gravely or lightly, a grave or light offense against God. Mortal sin of itself, as it is such, has some disorder distinct in species from every disorder which is in venial sin. For that depravity which is directly contrary to the last end, and by reason of which man is turned away from it and turned toward a creature as toward his last end, is a proper species of disorder and moral depravity; and this is proper to mortal sin, and cannot be found in venial sin. Suarez, de Peccat., d. 2, s. 5, nn. 2, 3; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 71, a. 4; q. 72, a. 5; q. 74, a. 9; q. 88, 89; de Malo, q. 2, a. 8; Quodl. 6, a. 16.

Mortal sins are such: 1. By their whole genus, when their object or matter, whatever it may finally be, contains a grave disorder, as in lust, blasphemy, perjury, heresy, etc. 2. By their genus, but not the whole genus, when their matter, remaining in the same species, can be grave, although it also can be light, as are sins against justice. But venial by their genus are called sins which, considered according to the matter or nature of the object, do not admit grave guilt, and therefore, so long as they remain within their species, that is, another species does not accede, mortal by its genus, they cannot be mortal. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 77, a. 8 ad 1; q. 88, a. 5; L. 11, 51; Trid. s. 6, C. 15, cc. 27, 28; E. M.

n. 313.

What things are required for mortal sin? For mortal sin there are required and suffice: 1. grave matter; 2. full advertence to the grave malice; 3. full consent in the prevarication. Proof of the first part. For light matter induces only a light obligation, and therefore its transgression cannot be a grave sin. Proof of the second and third parts: because, since by mortal sin man totally recedes from God, his last end, so that he may totally adhere to creatures, and rest in them as in his end, this cannot happen unless man fully, deliberately, and consequently with full knowledge of the thing, prefers the creature to the Creator. Therefore sin mortal by its whole genus can become venial by reason of imperfect advertence and imperfect consent. He does not sin gravely who indeed knows that he acts badly, but nevertheless does not attend to the gravity or lightness of the matter, namely if he does not even confusedly have knowledge of the gravity; this can more easily be presumed to have been lacking in rude persons and children, but not likewise in others, where the matter treated is notably grave. And indeed the sin would always be grave if someone were so disposed in mind that he wished to act even if there were grave fault. - S. Th. 1. 2. q. 74, a. 10; q. 88, a. 6; 2. 2. q. 35, a. 3; q. 36, a. 3; L. 52 seqq.; E. M.

n. 314.

In a case of doubt, what are the signs of imperfect advertence and deliberation? - The signs of imperfect advertence are: 1. If you apprehended that it was evil faintly, and as if half-asleep. 2. If afterward, when you consider better, you judge that you would not have done it if you had apprehended it in that way. 3. If you labored under a most vehement passion, apprehension, or distraction, or were disturbed, so that you almost did not know what you were doing. The signs of imperfect consent are: 1. If someone was so disposed that although he easily could have carried out the sin, nevertheless he did not carry it out. 2. If someone doubts whether he consented, especially if he is a God-fearing man. 3. If someone is accustomed to be so affected that he would rather die than expressly sin mortally, because such a person does not easily consent. 4. If someone remembers that he proceeded very timidly and hesitantly. 5. If he was half-asleep, not fully master of himself, etc., and judges that he would not have done it if he had been fully awake. The continuation alone of a depraved thought is not a judgment of consent having been given, because a temptation can be long-lasting, to which one resists according to his strength. Struggl, q. 2, n. 6; L. 54, 55; l. 6, n. 476.

n. 315.

Does he sin gravely who deliberates about giving consent to an object gravely evil, if at last he does not consent? - The solution of the question depends on the quality of the deliberation. For if this is imperfect, i.e., if it is only a certain hesitation, or omission of resistance from dullness, sluggishness, or negligence, it does not exceed venial sin. But if the deliberation is full, insofar namely as the will is prepared and affected toward either side, it will be a mortal sin, because the will then shows itself ready to place God after sin; and it has a deliberate affection toward evil.

n. 316.

What things are required for venial sin? For venial sin there are required and suffice some advertence, however slight, to the malice of the act, and some consent of the will, however imperfect. These indeed are required, because, these being removed, there can be no knowledge and willing of evil, and therefore no sin. But they suffice, because, these being posited, the knowledge and willing of evil, which are necessary for constituting sin, are had in some manner. E. M.

n. 317.

Can several venial sins constitute one mortal sin? R. Negatively, by reason of multiplication, and speaking per se. For the essences of things are immutable. - R. Affirmatively, by reason of lightness of matter, if this, although light in itself, nevertheless acceding to others coalesces into one and constitutes grave matter by reason of continuation, as from several small fragments taken several times on a fast day. Struggl, q. 2, n. 26; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 88, a. 4.

n. 318.

In what ways does venial sin become mortal per accidens? 1. By reason of erroneous conscience, as is clear. 2. By reason of an attached end gravely evil, as if someone lies lightly in order to commit fornication. But it suffices in confession to confess the fornication; it is not necessary also to explain the lie. - 3. By reason of the last end, which someone constitutes even in a light thing, e.g., in a game, in a person inordinately loved, etc. "If someone, from love of gaming, were prepared to commit any mortal sin whatever, it would be a sin of rashness, and indeed most grave, but without species." L. 60. 4. By reason of absolute and formal contempt, "namely when therefore formally and absolutely the precept is violated because you refuse to be subject to it or to the superior, which is a sin of consummate pride; or when therefore you do not wish to obey the precept because it is a precept, and this is a sin of formal disobedience; both of these gravely fight against the charity owed to the superior. Therefore it is one thing to contemn the law or the legislator, even human, not as such a person, but as legislator, which is mortal; another thing to contemn the thing commanded, which is venial if the matter is light." L. 61; l. 4, n. 161; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 105, a. 2; q. 186, a. 9 ad 3; a. 10 ad 3. 5. By reason of the grave scandal of others, which gravely repugns to charity. 6. By reason of grave harm to others, which gravely repugns to justice. 7. By reason of the proximate occasion and proximate danger of sinning.

"In this matter it is most certain that a work venial in itself or indifferent passes into mortal sin, if the one acting exposes himself to an occasion so proximate that it places him in a moral and proximate danger of sinning mortally. But this moral proximate occasion, or this moral proximate danger, occurs when from its genus the occasion is such that it frequently induces men of similar condition to mortal sin, or it is established by experience that it has such an effect in this man.... just as he is exposed to the danger of incurring temporal harm who undertakes a work at such a time and place and with such circumstances that he can scarcely avoid that harm.... And in this probable danger of sinning mortally, the circumstances of that sin to whose danger he exposed himself must be confessed.... Since it is of the same malice to place oneself in moral danger of committing some crime as to commit it.

For by the same precept by which one is bound to avoid a crime, he is also obliged to avoid its proximate danger." Sanch., in Dec., l. 1, c. 8, nn. 1, 4. - Except: 1. unless such caution is used that the danger ceases; 2. unless a grave cause is present; for then the danger is not morally voluntary, but one is compelled unwillingly by that necessity to undergo it. Sanch., l. c., nn. 2, 3; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 10, a. 9; L. 63; E. M.

n. 319.

Does he sin gravely who would wish to avoid only mortal sins, and would have the purpose of committing all venial sins? R. Negatively, speaking per se, apart from the case of peculiar frailty, so that a proximate danger of sinning gravely would be induced. For neither will the multiplication of venial sins ever constitute a mortal sin, because the individual venial sins will always remain in an inferior species; nor does a mind so disposed per se induce a proximate danger of sinning. But, speaking practically, he who spurns small things is gradually disposed also to spurn greater things. Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, nn. 49, 50; Suarez, de Rel., tr. 8, l. 1, c. 4, n. 18; Ithur., Cas. 35, n. 28; L. l. 4, n. 12; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 87, aa. 3, 4.

Gury-Ballerini, Compendium of Moral Theology (8th ed., 1884)

Jean-Pierre Gury, S.J.; notes by Antonio Ballerini, S.J. — 50 passages

Vol. I, Treatise On Sins, Part One. On Sins in Gener…, Gravity, and Distinction o…, Ch. II, Especially on Mortal and Venial Sin

- DEFINITIONS. The gravity of sin is the quantity or measure of malice by which sin is more or less offensive to God, and consequently worthy of greater or lesser penalty.

Mortal sin is the transgression of a law gravely obliging, or a grave offense of God, depriving one of divine friendship and sanctifying grace, and rendering the sinner worthy of eternal punishment.

Venial sin is the transgression of a law lightly obliging ¹, or a light offense of God, which neither deprives one of divine friendship, nor of sanctifying grace, nor consequently excludes one from eternal beatitude.

¹ Here the definition of venial sin is handed down from its object; for otherwise from the imperfection of the act a fault can be light, although in itself the law obliges gravely.

Certain sins are mortal from their whole genus, when their object or matter, whatever it finally may be, always contains a grave disorder, as happens in luxury, blasphemy, perjury, heresy, etc. They are called mortal from their genus (not whole), when their matter, remaining in the same species, can be grave, although it can also be light, of which sort are sins against justice. - But venial from their genus are called sins which, with the matter or nature of the object considered, do not admit grave guilt, and therefore, so long as they remain within their own species, that is, another species mortal from its own genus does not accede, cannot be mortal. - St. Lig., no. 41 ².

² ** See below, note to no. 153.

With these things posited, let the following propositions stand:

Proposition I — Not all sins are equal, but some are graver than others

- It is proved 1. from Sacred Scripture. Jeremiah, ch. 7, says of the Israelites: They have acted worse than their fathers. - Thus Christ to Pilate, John 19: He who handed Me over to you has the greater sin.

It is proved 2. from reason. With proportion given, that must be said about the injuries of men against God which is said about the injuries of children against parents, or of subjects against Princes; but these indeed differ among themselves by reason of gravity: therefore those also. - Moreover sins are opposition to virtues and precepts; but some virtues are more excellent than others, and some precepts are graver than others: therefore opposition to these will be graver, or less grave. From another source also, the depraved intention of the delinquent can admit various degrees of malice, as is clear. Therefore....

QUESTION. Whence is the greater or lesser gravity of sins to be sought?

I answer: It is generally to be sought 1. from the object, end, and circumstances, according as they are more or less opposed to rational nature or to law; 2. from the duration of the evil act, or from its intensity; 3. from greater or lesser advertence to the malice of the act, or from the different degree of consent furnished to the depraved act; 4. from the excellence of the virtues or precepts to which the sins are opposed; 5. from the various modes by which virtues or laws are violated.

n. 148.

Proposition II — Mortal sins are given

- It is proved 1. from Sacred Scripture. 1 Cor. 6 and following says: Do not err: neither fornicators, nor those serving idols, nor adulterers, nor the effeminate, nor those who lie with males, nor thieves, nor the avaricious, nor drunkards, nor evil-speakers, nor the rapacious shall possess the kingdom of God. - And Rom. 1.32: Those who do such things are worthy of death. - And 1 John 3.14: He who does not love remains in death. - Add innumerable other testimonies of Sacred Scripture, from which it is most clearly established that many men on account of their sins will be rejected by God and tormented with eternal penalties.

n. 148.

It is proved 2. from the authority of the Church. For the Church teaches that mortal sins are given. Thus Trent, sess. 6, can. 27: If anyone shall have said that there is no mortal sin except that of infidelity, or that by no other sin, however grave and enormous, except the sin of infidelity, is grace once received lost, let him be anathema. - Likewise, sess. 14, ch. 5, it says: It is necessary that all mortal sins be recounted by penitents in confession. Therefore mortal sins are given.

n. 149.

Proposition III — Merely venial sins are given

- It is proved 1. from Sacred Scripture. Prov. 24.16 says: The just man shall fall seven times, and shall rise again. Therefore he who falls or sins while he is just does not sin mortally, since he is not deprived of justice; therefore only venially. Therefore, etc. - Likewise, James 3.2: In many things we all offend; but we do not all sin mortally, since many are just before God, as is established from many places of the Old and New Testament, for example, as is said of Zachariah and Elizabeth, Luke 1.6, of St. Joseph, Matth. 1.19, etc. Therefore there are just persons not immune from sin; therefore venial sins are given.

n. 149.

It is proved 2. from the definition of the Church. In Trent, in the place cited above, it is said: Venial sins, by which we are not excluded from the grace of God, and into which we fall more frequently, can be expiated by many other remedies (besides the sacrament of Penance). It is also established from proposition 20 of Baius, condemned by Pius V and other Supreme Pontiffs, which sounds thus: There is no sin venial by its nature, but every sin merits eternal punishment.

n. 149.

It is proved 3. from reason. For among friends light offenses are given, which do not dissolve friendship; therefore similarly they ought to be given toward God. Therefore....

Questions. - QUESTION 1. In what does the formal difference between mortal sin and venial sin consist?

I answer: The difference between mortal and venial sin is situated in this, that he who sins mortally withdraws from God his ultimate end, so that he turns himself to a creature and rests in it as in his end; but, on the contrary, he who sins venially does not withdraw from God, but places acts so disordered that they can in no way tend to God. - Thus commonly with St. Thomas, 1.2, qu. 72, art. 5.

QUESTION 2. What things are required for mortal sin?

I answer: Three things are necessarily required, namely 1. grave matter either in the object or in the circumstances; - 2. full advertence to the grave malice of the act; - 3. full consent of the will in the prevarication.

Therefore 1. grave matter is required; otherwise mortal sin would not be distinguished from venial by reason of the matter, since light matter of itself cannot dissolve man from divine friendship ³.

³ For light matter of itself does not induce grave obligation; but where there is not grave obligation, neither can the transgression be grave.

Full advertence and full consent are also required, because since through mortal sin man totally withdraws from God so that he adheres to creatures, this cannot happen unless the sinner deliberately prefers the object of sin to God, and thus constitutes his ultimate end in the creature. Moreover it is wholly foreign to divine goodness to consign a man to eternal damnation either because of a light transgression or because of an act not perfectly free and voluntary. - Thus all. - St. Lig., nos. 5, 6, 53.

Now advertence is judged full and sufficient if an express thought, or at least grave doubt about mortal malice, precedes the consent or sinful act. And this indeed can happen even in a single instant through a simple judgment about the malice, without the mind by discourse reflecting several times upon itself by a special act; nevertheless true and full deliberation of mind and full adhesion to the depraved object are always required.

QUESTION 3. What things are required for venial sin?

I answer: For venial sin there are required and suffice some advertence, however slight, to the malice of the act, and some consent of the will, however imperfect: these indeed are required, because when these are removed there can be no cognition and volition of evil, and consequently no sin; but they suffice, because when they are posited, the cognition and volition of evil which are necessary for constituting sin are had in some way.

- QUESTION 4. How can sins be known as mortal by reason of matter?

I answer: A threefold rule is assigned.

Rule I. Recourse must be had to Sacred Scripture. For what things are grave, or what are light, must be weighed not by human but by divine judgment, says St. Aug., Enchiridion, ch. 77. Now those things are to be judged mortal which in Sacred Scripture are declared worthy of death, or to exclude from the kingdom of heaven; or which are pronounced with the particle woe, which indeed denotes truly grave deformity. Thus the Apostle concerning the works of the flesh, Galat. 5.19, says: Which are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, luxury... I foretell to you, as I have foretold, that those who do such things shall not possess the kingdom of God. - Recall also the long series of mortal sins which the Apostle enumerates, 1 Cor. 6 and following, as above in Proposition II.

Rule II. Recourse must be had to the Church, or to the definitions of the Supreme Pontiffs, to the Decrees of general Councils, etc., in which many things are declared mortal, or only venial. For the Church is the pillar of truth, and therefore the rule and measure of morals must be sought from its doctrine.

Rule III. Recourse must be had to the Holy Fathers, to the Doctors of the Church, and also to the common doctrine of Theologians. For the Holy Fathers and Doctors were placed by God in the midst of the Church as burning lamps for driving away the darkness of error and for enlightening the faithful in the way of truth. But Theologians know better than the rest how to interpret the testimonies of Scripture and of the Fathers and the Decrees of the Church, and to compare cases not defined with defined ones, those not declared with declared ones, and from parity or likeness to deduce suitable conclusions. Therefore those things which are unanimously held by them as mortal are to be judged as such; for the consensus of the Doctors is an indication of truth.

- When the preceding rules are lacking, it is very difficult to determine when a sin is grave or light. But generally the following are judged grave:

All sins which are directly against God, or some perfection of His. Likewise all sins which turn to grave prejudice of the human race, as are the various species of luxury.

All sins which are gravely opposed to the end of great moment intended by the law, such as the omission of fasting, of Mass, of annual confession, of Paschal Communion, etc.

All sins by which the neighbor is gravely harmed in the goods of life, fortune, reputation, etc., such as homicide, detraction very harmful to the neighbor, notable theft, etc.

Moreover the limits between mortal and venial sin very often can in no way be determined, as is established from innumerable controversies of the Doctors concerning this matter. But mortal sin is not to be asserted unless it is certainly established concerning it, as St. Lig. rightly notes, Moral System, at the end, and book 6, nos. 604, 605 ⁴.

⁴ It is useful here to append those things which St. Alphonsus has in the former place. It is a thing worthy of admiration, he says, to see some persons think there is no safer mode of saving souls than to lead them through harsher paths; but they err no less than others who lead consciences along the more lax way. For we are held to render an account to God not only for excessive indulgence, but also for excessive rigidity, by which consciences are ensnared, which properly, according to St. Antoninus, is to build for Gehenna. Cabassutius explains this very aptly from the doctrine of St. Bonaventure; for after he detests immoderate benignity, he reproves immoderate rigor, which, as he says, while it compels men to things too arduous, closes off the way of eternal salvation; it condemns those to be saved, as Blessed Bonaventure says, and drives those conscious of their own infirmity to desperation. For it happens that wretched men, having heard this more rigid doctrine, believe or doubt that mortal fault is present where there is none; but nevertheless, overcome by the difficulty of the thing, from an erroneous conscience they sin mortally and are damned. - Thus St. Alphonsus, who then appends several opinions of the Doctors. We select these for our matter.

Theological Doctors ought not be easy in asserting that some things are mortal sins where they are not most certain of the matter; for through assertions of this kind, rigid and too strict, men are by no means raised from the mire of sins, but are plunged into it more deeply, because more desperately. Gerson.

Do not be prone to judge sins mortal, where it is not established to you by certain Scripture. St. Raymond.

Nothing ought to be condemned as mortal sin concerning which evident reason or manifest authority of Scripture is not had. Gabriel Biel.

A question in which it is treated whether something is mortal sin is determined most dangerously, unless for this express authority of Scripture or of a canon of the Church, or evident reason, is had. St. Antoninus.

But if the Confessor cannot clearly perceive whether it is mortal, then the sentence does not seem to be hastened, as William says, so that on account of this he denies absolution, or makes for him a conscience concerning mortal sin. And since laws are readier for loosing than for binding..., he seems rather to be absolved. St. Antoninus.

n. 153.

- QUESTION 5. How does sin mortal from its genus become venial, and vice versa?

n. 153.

I answer: 1. Sin mortal from its genus can become venial in four ways, namely by reason 1. of smallness of matter; - 2. of imperfect advertence; - 3. of imperfect consent; - 4. of erroneous conscience. - Thus St. Thomas, 1.2, qu. 88, art. 1 and 2. - St. Lig., no. 54.

n. 153.

I answer: 2. But sin venial from its genus can become mortal 1. by reason of erroneous conscience; - 2. by reason of scandal; - 3. by reason of a depraved end gravely evil; - 4. by reason of formal contempt of the law, or of the authority commanding; - 5. by reason of a depraved affection for a thing otherwise lightly evil, so that one is prepared even to transgress a precept gravely obliging; - 6. by reason of danger or proximate occasion of falling into mortal sin. - Thus all ⁵.

⁵ Here the doctrine of St. Thomas must not be passed over, that sin venial from its genus cannot become mortal unless a circumstance accedes changing the species, and therefore this never happens because of a merely aggravating circumstance. Thus the Holy Doctor (1.2, q. 88, art. 5): It is manifest that a circumstance cannot make mortal sin from venial sin, while the circumstance remains; but only then, when it transfers into another species, and becomes in some way a specific difference of the moral act. Confer also De malo, q. 2, art. 8.

- QUESTION 6. Whether he would sin gravely who wished to avoid only mortal sins, and cared not at all about omitting venial ones?

I answer: No, more probably, speaking of itself and speculatively. The reason is that an intention so constituted does not induce a proximate danger of sinning gravely ⁶. - But in practice the matter is difficult and very arduous, since facility in sinning venially is the cause why the soul is gradually weakened, and finally is more easily conquered by grave temptations, according to that saying of Eccli. 19.1: He who despises small things shall fall little by little.

⁶ This response is taken from St. Alphonsus (book 4, no. 12); but St. Alphonsus makes the question not about mere negligence in avoiding venial sins, but about the proposal of committing all venial sins, nor does he merely say that opinion is speculatively more probable, as though in practice a grave obligation were present of avoiding a remote danger of this kind.

Card. De Lugo well says (On Penance, disp. 15, no. 49): No one will say that from this head there is an obligation under mortal sin to avoid venial sins.

And Suarez (On Religion, treat. 8, book 1, ch. 4, no. 18): It is necessary to advert that rarely or never is there mortal sin because of danger of this kind...; because otherwise it is not a proximate occasion, but a remote one.

QUESTION 7. Whether it is a grave sin, without cause to expose oneself probably to the danger of falling into mortal sin?

Vol. II, Pt. I, Ch. I, Section 2: Mortal and Venial Sins · Vol. II, Pt. I, Ch. I, Section 3: Distinctive Characteristics of Mortal and Venial Sin

I answer: Yes, if it is a matter of a proximate occasion of sin, as the matter is clear of itself; but not in other cases. - Sanchez, On the Decalogue, book 4, ch. 8, no. 1.

…and 10 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Tanquerey

Adolphe Tanquerey, S.S. — 34 passages

Vol. II, Fundamental Moral Theology…, On Sins and Vices

n. 449.

1. The Doctrine of Scripture Concerning Grave Sin Is Set Forth.

(A) That there are grave sins which bring death upon the soul and are the cause of damnation is evidently gathered from Scripture. (a) Thus Christ, in the sermon on the mount, reproving sins against neighbor, says: "But I say to you, that everyone who is angry with his brother shall be liable to the judgment; and he who shall say to his brother: Raca, shall be liable to the council; and he who shall say: Thou fool, shall be liable to the gehenna of fire."² Now words of this kind: shall be liable to the judgment, to the council, signify, from a certain analogy with the penalties inflicted by the tribunals of the Jews, that those who gravely offend their brothers, not only in deed, but in heart or word, are to be punished with a grave penalty; but gehenna designates eternal damnation. This indeed He declares more clearly, by prophetically describing the last judgment:³ "Depart from me, you cursed, into eternal fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels. For I was hungry, and you did not give me to eat"...

² Matt. 5:22; cf. Maldonat on this place. - The mind of Christ is that not only homicide is grave sin, but also anger internally conceived, when it leads to homicide, or to very contumelious words. From this, however, it is not licit to infer that every motion of anger is grave.

³ Matt. 25:41-42.

(b) The Apostle lucidly sets forth the same doctrine, both with regard to the sin of our first parents and with regard to actual sins: "By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death... That as sin reigned unto death, so also grace might reign through justice unto eternal life."¹ Hence those who sin gravely are excluded from the kingdom of heaven:² "Do not err: neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor the effeminate, nor liers with males, nor thieves, nor the covetous, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor extortioners shall possess the kingdom of God." (c) According to John, mortal sin is privation of light for the mind, and privation of life for the soul: "For everyone who does evil hates the light, and does not come to the light, that his works may not be reproved... He who says that he is in the light, and hates his brother, is in darkness even until now... He who does not love remains in death."³ The reason is because sin separates us from Christ who is truth and life.

¹ Rom. 5:12, 21. The question concerns each death, corporal and spiritual.

² 1 Cor. 6:9-10; cf. Gal. 5:19-21.

³ John 3:20; 1 John 2:9; 3:14.

n. 450.

(B) Among sins, some are graver than others. Thus God, apud Jeremiah,⁴ complains of the Jews thus: "They have hardened their neck, and have done worse than their fathers." Christ Himself, addressing Pilate, says: "Therefore he who delivered me to thee has the greater sin."⁵ This indeed is especially clear from the fact that certain sins are called irremissible, while others can be remitted: "Therefore I say to you: every sin and blasphemy shall be remitted to men; but the blasphemy of the Spirit shall not be remitted."⁶ The context having been inspected, the question here concerns the sin of the Pharisees who attributed the miracles of Christ to the devil, and thus deliberately and pertinaciously denied His divine mission; but this sin is said not to be remitted, because it is altogether difficult for those who pertinaciously abuse grace to repent sincerely. In the same way the words of John can be understood, who distinguishes between sin unto death and sin not unto death.⁷

⁴ Jer. 7:26.

⁵ John 19:11.

⁶ Matt. 12:31; cf. Mark 3:29-30.

⁷ 1 John 5:16.

n. 451.

(C) From all these things it can be gathered that the malice of mortal sin consists especially in this, that it turns us away from God. Jeremiah had already explained this by comparison, saying:¹ "For my people have done two evils: they have forsaken me, the fountain of living water, and have dug for themselves cisterns, broken cisterns, which cannot hold waters." The same is established from many texts alleged above, where sin is called the transgression of the divine law, an offense against God, hatred of God, the loss of divine friendship and divine filiation, privation of light and grace, the cause of damnation and of eternal separation from God; for by these and other words of this kind it is signified that man - who through grace is the adoptive son of God, a participant in the divine nature, a son of light, and therefore is united to God by a manifold bond - by mortal sin becomes a son of the devil, a participant in his works, and walks in darkness, and therefore is truly turned away from God. Wherefore the last sentence of the judge against impenitent sinners is situated in declaring that this departure will be eternal: "Depart from me, you cursed, into eternal fire."²

¹ Jer. 2:13.

² This is the very sentence which Bossuet, in the sermon De la gloire de Dieu dans la conversion des pecheurs, magnificently explains, as is his custom: "Hell, if we understand it, is sin itself; hell is to be far from God." (Ed. Lebarq, t. II, p. 75.)

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(D) But that certain sins are not mortal, or are not the cause of eternal damnation, is gathered very probably from a few texts of Scripture. (a) For Christ declares that there is lesser and greater iniquity:³ "He who is unjust in little, is unjust also in greater." Besides, the Apostles confess that all Christians offend in many things: "In many things we all offend⁴... If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us";⁵ nevertheless from the context it is supposed that those sins are not mortal, nor do they take away charity; thus, for example, a little afterward it is added: "But he who keeps His word, truly in him the charity of God is perfected; and in this we know that we are in Him."⁶ Therefore certain sins are given so small that they by no means destroy charity and spiritual life.

³ Luke 16:10.

⁴ Jas. 3:2.

⁵ 1 John 1:8.

⁶ 1 John 2:5.

(b) The same is indirectly deduced from the celebrated and difficult text of St. Paul,⁷ as it is understood by many Fathers: "According to the grace of God, which was given to me, as a wise architect I laid the foundation... But if anyone builds upon this foundation gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay, stubble, the work of each one shall be manifest; for the day of the Lord shall declare it, because it shall be revealed in fire, and the fire shall prove what sort each one's work is. If anyone's work remains which he built upon it, he shall receive a reward. If anyone's work shall burn, he shall suffer loss; but he himself shall be saved, yet so as through fire." For there the discourse concerns certain doctors who, after Paul, had preached the Gospel to the Corinthians; if they had handed down doctrine not solid, but little useful, relying more on the persuasive words of human wisdom than on the power of Christ, the vanity of their labor will appear on the day of judgment: they indeed will not suffer eternal penalty, because they announced the faith, but, on account of their empty work, they will pay some penalty. From this it is deduced that they sinned, but not mortally.

⁷ 1 Cor. 3:10-15.

Yet we confess that these arguments are not apodictic, unless the authority of Tradition is added.

n. 453.

2. The Doctrine of the Fathers Concerning the Gravity of Sin Is Set Forth.

(A) In the first three centuries, the distinction between mortal and venial sins is not explicitly instituted, but between the greatest and the small, between those which had to be expiated by public penance and those which were remitted by contrition, almsgiving, prayer, and other means of this kind. Nor from the beginning was it clearly and distinctly defined which sins in species were to be held as grave, but only gradually, according to the progress of Christian conscience: since not a few acts which did not seem gravely sinful to those recently converted from paganism were afterward held graver by those who, through Christian education, had formed for themselves a more delicate conscience, as will be clear from what must be said.

¹ Vacandard, Le traitement des peccata leviora, apud Rev. du Clerge francais, 15 August 1901; id., La Penitence publique, 1903 (collection Bloud), p. 25-44; Batiffol, Etudes d'hist. et de theol. positive, Paris, 1902, pp. 81, 144, 128 and passim.

n. 454.

(a) Already in the second century three sins were considered as most grave, indeed by some as irremissible by the power of the keys, namely apostasy, moechia or adultery, and homicide.² From this certain persons inferred that these three alone are mortal sins. But undeservedly; for Tertullian, who declares these irremissible, enumerates other sins which are grave and must be chastised by public penance: "But there are also those contrary to these (minute offenses), as graver and destructive, which do not obtain pardon: homicide, idolatry, fraud, denial, blasphemy, certainly also moechia and fornication, and whatever other violation of the temple of God."¹

² Cf. Tertullian, De Pudicitia, c. 5 and 12, P.L., t. II, 987-989, 1001-1005; cf. A. d'Ales, La theologie de Tertullien, Paris, 1905, p. 272-276; J. Turmel, Tertullien, Paris, 1905, p. 210-213.

¹ Tertullian, ibid., c. 19, P.L., II, 1020.

n. 455.

(b) From another side there are lesser, or small, sins, which are daily committed and can be remitted through penance. For the same Tertullian says:² "For to whom does it not happen either to be angry unjustly, and beyond the setting of the sun, or even to put forth the hand, or easily to curse, or to swear rashly, or to destroy the fidelity of a pact, or to lie from shame or necessity? In businesses, in offices, in gain, in food, in sight, in hearing, how many things tempt us, so that if there were no pardon of these, salvation would belong to no one! Therefore there will be pardon for these through Christ, the entreator of the Father." - St. Cyprian testifies that penance was necessary for these lesser offenses:³ "When in lesser sins sinners do penance for a just time, and, according to the order of discipline, come to exomologesis, and through the imposition of the hands of the bishop and clergy receive the right of communion..." Therefore these lesser offenses are not merely venial according to the present manner of speaking.

² De pudicit., c. 19, P.L., II, 1020.

³ St. Cyprian, epist. 9, P.L., IV, 251.

n. 456.

(B) From the fourth century, the distinction is already explicitly made between grave sins, which are to be expiated by public penance, and light sins, concerning which it suffices to do penance privately.

(a) Thus St. Ambrose:⁴ "Because as there is one baptism, so also one penance, which nevertheless is done publicly; for we ought to repent of daily sin: but this latter is for light offenses, the former for graver ones."

⁴ St. Ambrose, De Paenitent., cap. 10, P.L., XVI, 520.

n. 457.

(b) Augustine declares this more fully. Besides original sin, which is destroyed through baptism, he distinguishes two kinds of sins: grave sins or crimes, which are remitted only by long and public penance, namely those which the Apostle describes in the epistle to the Corinthians and to the Galatians; and light sins, which all commit and which are destroyed by prayer: "For those whom you see doing penance have committed crimes, either adulteries or certain monstrous deeds: thence they do penance. For if their sins were light, daily prayer would suffice for destroying these."⁵ - The reason for the difference between light and grave sins is taken from this, that the former do not destroy the foundation of faith and charity, while the latter overturn the foundation of charity: "These things therefore (light sins), because when carnally loved by affection they are not lost without sorrow, for this reason those who have them in such a way that they have in the foundation faith which works through charity, and do not by any reason or cupidity prefer them to this, when they suffer loss in the loss of them, arrive at salvation through a certain fire of sorrow... But he who, for the sake of either keeping or acquiring them, commits homicide, adultery, fornication, idolatry, and any similar things, will not be saved through fire because of the foundation, but, the foundation having been lost, will be tormented by eternal fire."¹

⁵ De Symbolo, to Catechumens, c. 7, P.L., XL, 636; cf. Enchiridion, c. 68-71, P.L., XL, 264-266; sermon 351, P.L., XXXIX, 1535-1549.

¹ De fide et operibus, cap. 16, P.L., XL, 216.

n. 458.

(c) With regard to the Eastern Church, the same is established from the canonical epistles of St. Gregory Thaumaturgus and St. Basil. The former, being asked concerning the kind of penance which had to be imposed on those who had sinned on the occasion of the incursion of the Goths, sets forth how one should act with those who had eaten idolothytes, or had committed fornication, robbery, theft, invasion of others' homes, or had unjustly detained captives, or had been cooperators with barbarians.² The latter weaves a longer catalogue of offenses which are subject to canonical penance: there are numbered the killing of an animated or unanimated fetus, digamy and trigamy, fornications of deacons and of canonesses who had vowed virginity, and other grave sins against chastity, homicides, beatings, idolatry, violent motions of anger, usury, perjuries; indeed, it is equitable that involuntary killing, or killing done in war, be punished by some penance.³ Elsewhere he complains that many make little of sins which nevertheless are declared as mortal by Paul:⁴ "Assuredly a most evil custom has deceived us; assuredly a perverse tradition of men exists for us as the cause of great evils, which namely, while certain sins have been avoided, has indifferently admitted others, and while it pretends to be vehemently indignant at some, as at homicide and adultery, and at others of the same kind, it judges some to be worthy not even of simple rebuke, such as anger, or reviling, or drunkenness, or avarice, and whatever things are similar to these, against all of which also elsewhere Paul, speaking in Christ, brought forth the same sentence, when he said: Those who do such things are worthy of death." Therefore mortal sins were recognized, besides idolatry, moechia, and homicide. But elsewhere they teach that certain sins are very light, into which all fall.

² Canonical epistle, P.G., X, 1019-1047.

³ Canonical epistle, P.G., XXXII, 663-684; cf. Chardon, Hist. des Sacrements, Migne, Theol. Curs., XX, 692-721, where these and other canonical epistles of St. Basil are rendered into French.

⁴ De Judicio Dei, P.G., XXXI, 670.

n. 459.

Thus Caesarius of Arles, in a sermon to the people, says:⁵ "And although the Apostle has mentioned many capital sins, nevertheless, lest we seem to cause despair, we briefly say which they are: sacrilege, homicide, adultery, false testimony, theft, robbery, pride, envy, avarice; and anger, if it is held for a long time; and drunkenness, if it is assiduous, is computed in their number." These sins indeed must be expiated by long penance; otherwise they will be punished by eternal flame. Among minute sins he chiefly numbers these: "As often as someone either in food or in drink takes more than is necessary... as often as he speaks more than is fitting, or is silent more than is expedient; as often as he exasperates a poor man asking importunately. As often as, although healthy in body, while others fast, he wishes to dine; or, given over to sleep, rises later to church... As often as he visits the sick later. If he has neglected to call back the discordant to concord. If he has exasperated a neighbor, or wife, or son, or servant more than is fitting; if he has flattered more than is expedient... If he has not given food to the hungry poor; or has prepared for himself banquets too delicate or too costly... For these and things similar to these undoubtedly pertain to minute sins, which, as I have already said, can scarcely be enumerated, and from which not only the Christian people, but no one of the saints could ever have been, or will be, immune. Although we do not believe the soul to be killed by these sins, nevertheless by filling it as it were with certain pustules, and as with a dreadful scab, they make it deformed." Afterward he adds that these minute sins are redeemed by good works, especially fraternal charity and alms. - Elsewhere among minute sins he numbers not a few which today would be held as mortal: "Let us think, from the time when we began to be wise, what for oaths, what for perjuries, what for curses, what for detractions, what for idle words, what for hatred, what for anger, what for envy, what for evil concupiscence, what for gluttony, what for sleepiness, what for filthy thoughts, what for concupiscence of the eyes, what for voluptuous delectation of the ears..."¹ - Therefore it is clear that the difference between mortal and venial sins, from the first centuries, was first indirectly and confusedly, then explicitly and clearly recognized; but that the rules by which they are distinguished from each other were not clearly defined; and therefore some offenses, which today by a rightly cultivated conscience are held as grave, at that time were regarded as light. - This evolution will be better understood by him who attentively runs through the penitential books; for there he will find an examination of conscience which, as the centuries pass, becomes more and more prolix.²

⁵ Appendix to Serm. St. Augustine, P.L., XXXIX, 1946-1947.

¹ Sermon 257, apud Migne, P.L., XXXIX, 2220.

² You will find some of these penitential books apud Morinus, Comment. histor. de disciplina in administrat. Paenitent., Appendices; Chardon, op. cit., p. 712-725.

n. 460.

3. The Theological Doctrine Concerning Mortal Sin.

(A) Notion. In mortal sin two things can be considered: the voluntary act by which someone transgresses the law, and the defect of rectitude which is found in such an act. Under this last respect, according to St. Thomas¹ and other theologians commonly, mortal sin is defined as a turning away from God the ultimate end, through a voluntary and inordinate turning toward creatures.² Consequently mortal sin is opposed to divine goodness and wisdom, to the eternal law, and also to the rational nature of man, from what was said above, n. 25. For the most part man does not primarily and explicitly will to turn himself away from God, but, when a useful or delectable created good has been proposed to him, he sometimes chooses the disorder inhering in sin, and therefore the turning away from God, rather than to be deprived of the delectation: "They loved the glory of men more than the glory of God."³ Hence, for grave sin, it is not necessary directly to intend a turning away from the ultimate end, but it suffices to will it indirectly and logically, by desiring a created good which is known to be contrary to the ultimate end. - In truth man does not desire evil insofar as it is evil, but insofar as it lies hidden under the appearance of good. This indeed is valid even concerning hatred of God: thus the worst sinners do not hate God except insofar as they apprehend Him as opposed to their own good.

¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 72, a. 5.

² Among Protestants, others more orthodox, as Bovon, define sin as the free transgression of the law, by which egoism is preferred to love of God; others, tending toward rationalism and determinism, as Schleiermacher and Rothe, hold sin to be as it were a necessary stage of human evolution, in which flesh lusts against spirit and turns the same away from God. Cf. Lichtenberger, Encyclop. des sciences religieuses, t. X, at the word Peche; Bovon, Dogmatique chretienne, Lausanne and Paris, 1895, t. I, p. 311-397, and Morale chret., 1897, t. I, p. 257-316.

³ John 12:43.

Wisdom graphically describes these psychological dispositions of sinners:⁴ "For they have said, thinking not rightly within themselves: short and tedious is the time of our life, and there is no refreshment in the end of man, and no one has been known to return from hell... Come therefore and let us enjoy the good things that are, and let us use the creature quickly as in youth... Let us crown ourselves with roses before they wither; let there be no meadow through which our luxury does not pass... Let us oppress the poor just man, and not spare the widow... These things they thought and erred: for their malice blinded them."

⁴ Wis. 2:1-21; the whole chapter should be read.

n. 461.

Corollaries. (a) From this the difference between mortal sin and venial sin appears: for the latter does not turn man away from God the ultimate end, but only retards him from Him, as will be explained below.

St. Thomas declares this thus:¹ "For there is a twofold disorder: one through the removal of the principle of order, another in which, even with the principle of order preserved, disorder occurs concerning those things which are after the principle; just as in the body of an animal sometimes indeed the disorder of complexion proceeds even to the destruction of the vital principle, and this is death; but sometimes, with the principle of life preserved, there is a certain disorder in the humors, and then it is illness. But the principle of the whole order in morals is the ultimate end... whence when the soul is disordered by sin even to turning away from the ultimate end, namely God, to whom it is united through charity, then it is mortal sin; but when disorder occurs short of turning away from God, then it is venial sin."

¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 72, a. 5.

n. 462.

(b) From this also the controversy, long agitated among theologians, whether the formal constitutive element of a sin of commission consists in something positive or in something negative, can be reconciled.² A twofold element can be distinguished in sin: the voluntary act and its disorder. Now sin of commission, considered on the part of the act, consists in something positive by which someone tends toward a good at least apparent; but the disorder of the same act essentially consists in the privation of due rectitude, since the will, by inordinately desiring a created good, turns itself away from God.

² All indeed confess that sin of omission is something negative. But according to Suarez (De peccatis, disp. I, sect. I, n. 4), sin essentially consists in the privation of due rectitude; according to the Wurzburg theologians (De pecc., n. 13), it consists in the positive tendency of the act toward the prohibited object. Billuart, diss. I, art. 2, sets forth the reasons alleged on each side.

Wherefore God indeed concurs toward the positive act, by moving the will to acting; but neither directly nor indirectly is He the cause of the disorder, which proceeds wholly from the depravity of the human will. "Whence this defect is not reduced to God as to a cause, but to free choice; just as the defect of limping is reduced to the curved shin as to a cause, but not to the motive power, by which nevertheless whatever there is of motion in limping is caused."³ - Nor let it be said that God indirectly cooperates with sin from the fact that He does not prevent it; for most wisely He willed man to be free, and He offers him the helps necessary for avoiding sin; but it is altogether fitting that, after He has sufficiently instructed men toward the good, He allow them to act by their own motion, and by their own efforts to acquire merits and to attain eternal life, with the help of grace which He denies to no one well disposed. For from what was said, n. 185, it is licit to cooperate materially with sin, provided there is a proportionately grave reason.

³ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 79, art. 2.

n. 463.

(B) Concerning the malice of mortal sin.¹ The malice, or disorder, of this sin is manifold, if it is considered on the part of God, on the part of Christ, and on the part of the sinner himself.

¹ Besides the theologians, cf. Manning, op. cit., ch. I; Bourdaloue, Sermons sur les Mysteres, 1st sermon on the Passion of Jesus Christ; id., Exhortations, Sur le jugement du peuple contre J.-C.; id., Careme, Wednesday of the 5th Week, concerning the state of sin and the state of grace; Gratry, Medit. inedites, Paris, Tequi, 1878, 7th Meditation, Sin.

On the part of God, mortal sin is (a) disobedience and rebellion against God, the supreme legislator: for the sinner deliberately, although created by God and wholly depending on Him, prefers his own will to the will of God, although he knows very well that He is supreme Lord, King of kings, and Lord of lords, and that He prescribes nothing except what is consonant with reason and wisdom. Thus he becomes guilty of rebellion: for since by a manifold title he is justly subject to the dominion of God, nevertheless equivalently² he says, "I will not serve," and rejects the authority of God. (b) It is deservedly called injustice or iniquity; for God, as being the infinite good and the font of all beatitude, and also the supreme Lord, has a strict right that He be our ultimate end; and therefore the sinner, turning himself away from God the ultimate end, violates that right, and, insofar as he can, deprives Him of that external glory which he ought to render to the most perfect Being; thus he commits true injustice. (c) It imports a certain irreligiosity: for to God, because of His supreme excellence and majesty, supreme worship and honor is due; but the sinner denies this honor, indeed in some sense dishonors and contemns the Lord, preferring the vilest creature to the Creator, according to that saying:¹ "They have forsaken me, the fountain of living water, and have dug for themselves broken cisterns which cannot hold waters." But this contempt has the character of contumely, because sin is committed in the sight of the omnipresent God: "Against Thee alone have I sinned, and I have done evil before Thee."² (d) It is foul ingratitude: for God is a distinguished benefactor: whatever of being, whatever of good we have, proceeds from Him; natural and supernatural gifts He has generously bestowed upon us; He has sanctified and redeemed our souls; but we use His benefits to offend Him, and indeed at the very time when He bestows His gifts upon us!

² It is said equivalently, or logically, by way of conclusion, not explicitly; for most often the sinner does not expressly intend this rebellion; hence sacred orators should abstain in this matter from excessive amplifications.

¹ Jer. 2:13. Hence Paul says (Rom. 2:23-24): "By transgression of the law thou dishonorest God: for the name of God through you is blasphemed among the Gentiles."

² Ps. 50:6.

n. 464.

On the part of Christ, (a) sin was the cause why Christ had to undergo such bitter pains and tortures, and a most shameful and most cruel death; therefore he who, knowing these things, nevertheless sins, by that very fact logically and indirectly becomes an accomplice of those who crucified the Lord, and, as far as lies in him, renews His agony, tortures, humiliations, crucifixion, and death, and therefore in some sense becomes guilty of deicide: "Crucifying again to themselves the Son of God."³ (b) But because through baptism he entered into a covenant with Christ, and breaks it through sin, by that very fact he is deservedly held as a covenant-breaker, just as the Jewish people when it broke the faith given many times. (c) Since he has likewise been made a living temple of God and marked by a sacramental character, the sinner commits a certain sacrilege, dedicating the temple of God to profane uses and rashly violating his own soul consecrated to Christ. Wherefore the sins of a Christian are graver than the sins of unbelievers, and the sins of a priest graver than the sins of Christians.⁴ - Yet for the most part sinners are not conscious of the whole malice which of itself is in mortal sin; and therefore sacred orators, when they speak concerning this matter, ought to have this before their eyes.

³ Heb. 6:6; here the question indeed concerns apostasy from the faith, but by analogy it can be extended to all mortal sins. Wherefore Christ could address sinners, as He addressed the Jews themselves, thus: "What more ought I to have done for thee and have not done? I indeed planted thee, my most beautiful vineyard: and thou hast become very bitter to me: for with vinegar thou hast given me to drink in my thirst and with a lance thou hast pierced the side of thy Savior." Let the whole reproaches be read, in the Mass of Friday of great week.

⁴ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 73, a. 10.

n. 465.

On the part of man, sin is the highest evil, namely: (a) spiritual suicide, since it brings death upon the soul; (b) deformity and defilement, since it deprives the soul of the supernatural beauty with which it shone, and of the many supernatural gifts and habits which adorned it; (c) ignominious servitude, since the sinner is constituted a slave of the devil, and renders himself subject to his attacks. Therefore the Prophet deservedly says:¹ "Know and see, that it is evil and bitter for thee to have left the Lord thy God."

¹ Jer. 2:19.

n. 466.

(C) Controversy concerning the infinity of sin. According to all, mortal sin, insofar as it is the evil of man, is not infinite, because the goods of which it deprives him are finite. Likewise the malice of sin, or the disorder of the sinful act considered in the will of the sinner itself, is something finite, since the human will is incapable of infinite malice.² But the question concerns the offense, or the injury inflicted by sin; and from this head, all concede that sin is at least extrinsically and objectively infinite, because namely it dishonors God, who is truly infinite. But it is controverted whether the offense inflicted upon God is simply and intrinsically infinite in the genus of morals, or only extrinsically and in a qualified way.

² Some theologians indeed say that the malice of sin is in some way infinite, but they confuse this malice with the offense inflicted upon God.

(a) Many Thomists affirm that mortal sin, under the notion of offense, is of simply infinite gravity in the genus of morals.³ For the gravity of offense grows according to the dignity of the person upon whom it is inflicted, according to that saying: injury is in the injured person; and in truth the same injury inflicted upon a soldier is less grave than if it is inflicted upon a general. But the person offended through mortal sin, namely God, is of simply infinite dignity. - It is confirmed from this, that mortal sin deserves an infinite penalty in duration.

³ Thus especially Gonet, Clypeus theol. thomisticae, concerning Sins, diss. IX, art. 6; the Salmanticenses, De Incarnat., disp. I.

(b) Yet not a few theologians hold, with Scotus and Suarez,⁴ that the gravity of sin, even under the notion of offense, is infinite only in a qualified way. For there are mortal sins graver than others; but if they were simply infinite, all would be equal, since there is not given an infinite greater than an infinite. - Besides, the divine majesty and excellence, although infinite, is known only in a finite way; but the malice of the act, even under the notion of offense, is measured according to the dignity of the person not considered in itself, but insofar as it is known by the agent.

⁴ Suarez, De peccatis, disp. II, sect. 3; Pesch, n. 477-482.

Conclusion. We gladly admit what St. Thomas says:¹ "Sin committed against God has a certain infinity from the infinity of the divine majesty: for the greater is he against whom one offends, the graver the offense is." But we do not think that a certain infinity signifies infinity simply; rather, we assent to those who say that the gravity of offense morally taken is to be measured not only from the dignity of the person offended, but also according to the agent's cognition, which is finite.

¹ St. Thomas, III, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2.

n. 467.

(D) Concerning the inequality of mortal sins.² That not all mortal sins are equal we have already learned from Scripture, n. 450. Reason shows the same: for although sin consists essentially in turning away from God, the ultimate end, nevertheless there are degrees in it. For this is not a mere negation of conversion to God, but also a positive opposition against the end, in which there can be many degrees, whether on the part of the will, or on the part of the object and circumstances.

² Horace elegantly refutes the theory of the Stoics, who taught that all sins are equal, Satir., I, 3, 96:

"Those to whom it has pleased that sins are nearly equal, labor
when it has come to truth: sense and morals resist,
and utility itself, almost the mother of the just and fair."

(a) On the part of the will; for since sin is an act of the will, it will be greater or lesser according as the volition is more or less perfect: but this, even when it suffices for grave sin, can be more or less intense by reason of deliberation, effort, and duration. Thus, other things being equal, the sin is graver which was preceded by more attentive deliberation, and which was committed with vehement affection, without external solicitation, for a long time.

(b) On the part of the object and circumstances; for since sins are diverse according to the diversity of objects, those which are immediately committed against God are graver, such as voluntary apostasy from the faith, blasphemy; among those which are perpetrated against man, those which are against his life are graver than those which are against his goods, for example, homicide is worse than theft.¹ Circumstances likewise can increase malice; thus parricide is graver than homicide, and theft of sacred things than simple theft. This will be declared more fully in the course of Moral Theology.

¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 73; cf. Lehmkuhl, t. I, n. 1223-1232.

n. 472.

1. Grave matter: but this can be such by reason of the object or circumstances, from what was said above, n. 144-146 and 158-161. - But what matter is grave can be defined both by authority and by reason.

(A) By authority. (a) We have already said that from Scripture it can be discerned that certain sins are mortal, namely those which are said to exclude from the kingdom of heaven, to be worthy of death or eternal damnation, execrable, abominable, etc. (b) The same can be gathered from the decrees of Councils, Pontiffs, or Congregations, or from the common doctrine of the Fathers and theologians, or from the common sense of the faithful. In this matter it must be noted that there has been some progress, so that the catalogue of sins today is longer than in the first times of the Church; this indeed happened not so much from an authentic declaration of the Pontiffs, who have very rarely pronounced concerning the gravity of sin, as from the common sense of doctors or of the faithful, and from the progressive education of Christian conscience.

n. 473.

(B) By reason: for this, since it is a certain participation in divine reason, judges concerning the morality of human acts, and therefore concerning the gravity of sins. The general principle is that that sin is to be held as mortal which imports a grave disorder with regard to God, society, oneself, or neighbor. Thus mortal of themselves are:

(a) Sins which inflict grave injury upon God or His divine attributes, such as infidelity, apostasy, despair, hatred of God, blasphemy, irreligion. (b) Sins which induce grave harm to the human race or to society, for example, fornication, rebellion against legitimate authority, all those things which foster discords among the various orders of citizens. (c) Sins which are so opposed to charity or justice toward oneself or neighbor that they bring notable detriment; thus, for example, suicide, homicide, theft of some moment, hatred of neighbor, detractions and calumnies which greatly injure reputation, etc.

Certain sins are called grave from their whole genus, when namely they admit no smallness of matter, for example, apostasy, hatred of God, blasphemy; these are always mortal of themselves, nor can they become light except by defect of full deliberation or full consent. But others are grave from their genus, insofar as of themselves they have it that they can be grave, yet in such a way that they are venial not only from defect of full deliberation or consent, but also from smallness of matter; for example, theft, detraction, etc.

n. 474.

1. Full advertence, namely that which a man fully master of himself is accustomed to apply to a business of great moment; for when the matter concerns the loss of eternal salvation, or turning away from the ultimate end, semiplene advertence does not suffice, such as exists in one half-asleep or in him who is distracted by another matter. Therefore it is required that the action be clearly apprehended or clearly suspected as illicit, and indeed gravely so: for if this appears only confusedly and obscurely, it cannot be said that the sinner wills, explicitly or implicitly, to turn himself away from God.¹ Yet it is not necessary that someone again and again, for a long time, maturely and reflexively consider the matter as prohibited by God under grave penalty; but it suffices to perceive the act clearly and directly, even for a brief time, as gravely illicit.

¹ Vieux Moraliste, Peche precis et peche vague, apud Ami du Clerge, t. XX, 1898, p. 1025-1030.

Hence they lack full advertence, and therefore do not sin gravely: (a) the half-asleep, the half-drunk, or all those who are not truly masters of themselves; (b) those who, occupied and distracted by another matter, give only slight attention to the action which they perform; (c) those who, by vehement passion, or agitation of the nerves, or another physical disease or pathological state (above, n. 128-135), are so disturbed that they attend to the matter only imperfectly; (d) those who immediately or a little after the fact, weighing its malice more attentively, judge that they would not have acted so if they had seriously thought beforehand; and a fortiori if they scarcely remember what they did.

n. 475.

1. Full consent, that is, that which follows full advertence, and at the same time is offered with that liberty which a matter of great moment requires. For this liberty it is not necessary that the agent be immune from passion or fear, but it suffices that, notwithstanding vehement passion or fear, he is able to deliberate and choose maturely: thus he is not excused from grave sin who, from fear of death, externally denies the faith, or, in order to preserve a public office, deliberately, although reluctantly, commits injustice.

But in doubt whether someone has fully consented, these can be held as signs of imperfect consent: (a) he who habitually abhors mortal sin, and therefore is of a fearful conscience, so that he is prepared rather to die than to sin gravely, is to be presumed not to have fully consented. (b) He who experienced some desire of doing evil, and abstained from external sin, while an easy occasion of sinning externally presented itself, is generally to be judged not to have offered full consent. (c) The same can be said of him who, as soon as he fully adverted to the temptation, repelled it; or is anguished or saddened concerning depraved thoughts or desires which invade his mind, even if they have remained for a long time.

n. 476.

Corollaries. (A) Therefore it can happen that an action objectively gravely sinful is not mortal sin:

(a) From defect of full advertence or full consent from the things said above; (b) from invincibly erroneous conscience, when namely someone in good faith thinks that the action is only lightly evil; (c) from an excusing cause, when the matter concerns some law, from whose fulfillment sufficient reason can excuse; for example, grave inconvenience excuses altogether from hearing Mass on a feast day, and an inconvenience not so grave can excuse from mortal sin, if not from venial.

n. 477.

(B) On the contrary, a sin light from its genus can become grave:

(a) From erroneous conscience, when the agent holds a venial sin as grave, for example, a minute theft; (b) from a gravely evil end, if someone, for example, steals a thing of slight price for committing homicide: for the means which is ordered to a gravely evil end participates in the grave malice of the end itself; for the same reason, he sins mortally who adheres to a thing prohibited only under light sin, yet in such a way that he is prepared rather to offend God gravely than to bid farewell to the thing; (c) by reason of scandal, when it is morally certain that grave scandal will arise from a sin otherwise venial, for example, if a priest acts so lightly that he offers grave scandal to laymen; (d) by reason of danger, if someone, by sinning venially (for example, by idle conversation), foresees that he is going to fall into grave temptation; (e) by reason of contempt, when someone violates the law in light matter, but with the intention of manifesting contempt toward the law or the legislator: which nevertheless occurs very rarely; (f) by reason of matter coalescing, when matters, small of themselves, are so ordered to making some one moral whole that they effect a notable transgression of the same precept; thus sometimes minute thefts coalesce into one and constitute mortal sin, as is declared in the Treatise on Justice, n. 440-444.

n. 478.

(C) Since it is very difficult in practice to define whether some sin is mortal, all circumstances having been attended to, and especially the psychological dispositions of the agent, let the confessor not be prone to judging easily that such or such an action is gravely evil, unless this is sufficiently evident.¹ Often he will prudently recognize that the matter is doubtful, and leave it to divine judgment; but he will be solicitous about exciting contrition in the heart of the penitent, and will urgently exhort him to strive to abstain from every deliberate sin.

¹ Cf. Vieux Moraliste, apud Ami du Clerge, t. XX, 1898, p. 1029.

n. 479.

I. Concerning the Nature of Venial Sin.

Already from Scripture and the Fathers (n. 452 sq.) we know that there are lesser, or venial, sins, which do not bring death upon the soul. The same can be gathered from Trent declaring that mortal sins are to be set forth in confession, but that venial sins can be omitted without fault, because they can be expiated by many other remedies.³ Wherefore this proposition 20 of Baius was condemned by Pius V: "There is no sin venial from its nature, but every sin deserves eternal punishment."⁴

³ Trent, sess. XIV, cap. 5.

⁴ Denzing., n. 900.

n. 480.

1. Notion. Venial, according to the force of the word, signifies that which can obtain pardon, and from this head all sins can be called venial, because remissible. But venial sin, insofar as it is distinguished from mortal, is so called because it does not take away sanctifying grace, and therefore from its own nature is worthy of pardon. It in fact obtains pardon when due retraction has been made and temporal penalty paid.

But with regard to the thing, venial sin is a morally evil act by which, nevertheless, habitual conversion to God is not taken away.

n. 481.

1. Difference between venial and mortal. St. Thomas declares this thus:¹ (a) Since sin is a certain sickness of the soul, it is called mortal when it induces an irreparable defect, or takes away the principle of life. But the principle of spiritual life is order to the ultimate end, and therefore mortal sin, which is a turning away from the ultimate end, is of itself irreparable, and cannot be repaired except by divine power. But sins which have disorder concerning those things which are toward the end, the order to the ultimate end being preserved, are reparable, and are called venial.

¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 88, a. 1.

(b) In another way he explains the matter:² one sinning mortally is truly turned away from God, and therefore recedes from the way which leads to the ultimate end; but one sinning venially is not turned away from God, but is similar to him who delays too much on the road, and therefore is retarded in the attainment of the ultimate end.

² St. Thomas, in II Sentent., dist. 42, q. I, a. 3, ad 5.

(c) Hence one sinning venially, although he displeases God, does not cease to love Him. For when something is prohibited only under light sin, it can happen without the agent being turned away from the ultimate end, and without losing divine friendship. Therefore his disposition is this: I know indeed that this thing displeases God, but not so that He denies His friendship to those who elicit it; therefore I enjoy this thing, but I would prefer to lack its advantage than to lose charity. - Something similar also happens in human matters: sometimes a friend does those things which displease a friend, but would by no means wish to furnish anything which would dissolve the covenant of friendship.

In truth just as a man turned away from God by mortal sin can nevertheless do some good works, so likewise man, while he habitually remains turned toward God through grace, can elicit acts venially evil which, although they are not referred to God, are not for that reason referred to a creature as to an ultimate end.

(d) Venial sin must be diligently distinguished from imperfections which, although they are not against the law, do not reach that degree which the pursuit of perfection imports.

In what sense venial is said to be beyond the law. Venial sin is said by St. Thomas³ and by certain other theologians to be beyond the eternal law, insofar as it is beyond the ultimate end which the eternal law primarily regards, and because it does not destroy charity, which is the fullness of the law. But from this it is not licit to infer that venial sin is only beyond, but not against, the law. Every sin, even light sin, is a transgression of the law; but venial sin is not against the ultimate end, nor therefore, strictly speaking, against the eternal law, by which all beings are ordered to the ultimate end.

³ St. Thomas, Q. disp., de Malo, q. 7, a. 1, ad 1.

n. 482.

1. Conditions required for venial sin. Venial sin can be committed in two ways: (a) when the matter itself is light: then sin remains venial, even if there is perfect knowledge and full consent; (b) when the matter is grave, but full knowledge or full consent is lacking (above, n. 474-475). - But when light matter is had can be gathered from the things said above, n. 472-473, and will be explained more fully in the whole course of this work.

n. 483.

II. Concerning the Effects of Venial Sin.

In order that an equitable judgment may be made concerning the malice and effects of venial sin, one must diligently distinguish between those things which are committed from mere frailty, without mature deliberation or full consent; - and those which are done deliberately, from some affection, especially if they are committed frequently and from habit: for these bring much greater detriment to the soul. But because not a few orators and ascetics have not kept these distinctions before the mind, they have amplified the malice and effects of venial sin more than was fair.

First indeed it is helpful to set forth what venial fault does not produce in the soul. (a) It neither extinguishes nor diminishes sanctifying grace. For since it is not a turning away from God, it does not destroy divine friendship: indeed, habitual grace in itself it does not diminish: for this, since it is nothing other than the supernatural state of conversion to God, could not be diminished except by acts contrary to the ultimate end or to charity; but from what has been said, venial sin is by no means opposed to the ultimate end or to charity. - Nor from this are the infused virtues, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which are connected with habitual grace, diminished, nor merits already acquired.

(b) Hence it does not properly induce a stain into the soul; for the stain of sin consists in the privation of sanctifying grace; moreover venial sin by no means takes this away or diminishes it. Yet in a less proper sense it is sometimes said to cause a stain, and is compared to dust and filth which defile the face of man. St. Thomas declares this thus:¹ in the soul there is a twofold brightness, one indeed habitual, from sanctifying grace, the other actual from acts of virtues; now venial sin indeed impedes the splendor which arises from acts of virtues, but not habitual brightness, because it does not exclude nor diminish the habit of charity.

¹ St. Thomas, q. 89, a. 1.

n. 484.

1. Nevertheless venial sin, frequently and deliberately committed from affection, produces pernicious effects.

(A) It diminishes the fervor of charity; for fervor consists in promptness for doing all things devoutly and generously on account of God; now he who frequently, deliberately, and from affection sins venially is by no means prepared for doing all things on account of God, but in many things deliberately chooses to please himself more than God. Gradually therefore he leaves behind arduous things, and pursues only the easier things: in prayer, he does not greatly care to expel wanderings of soul; in fulfilling the duties of his state, he conducts himself negligently; in virtues he does not strive to progress; works of charity languish, and voluntary mortifications grow torpid; in one word, gradually and without sensing it, tepidity is induced, or the state in which the powers of the soul grow languid.

n. 485.

(B) It gradually disposes toward mortal sin, not indeed of itself, since it differs altogether from mortal sin, but through a certain consequence, as St. Thomas says:¹ (a) For, as the disposition of clinging to created things grows from habit and affection, the desire of sinning can so increase that the will, even in matters of greater moment, clings to the creature against the will of God; thus, for example, he who first consents lightly to anger, by repeated acts deliberately committed, easily admits grave motions of anger; likewise he who often indulges curiosity and sensuality, by reading books rather dangerous and by fostering imaginations approaching pleasure, soon, overcome by desire, sins gravely. - The reason for this is that one sinning venially, as the Angelic Doctor says, "from the fact that he becomes accustomed not to subject his will in lesser things to due order, is disposed to this, that he also not subject his will to the order of the ultimate end, by choosing that which is mortal sin from its genus." In truth, with Christ as witness,² "he who is unjust in little, is unjust also in greater." (b) Besides, he who frequently and from affection sins venially, by that very fact abuses actual grace, deliberately resisting the inspirations of the Holy Spirit; for this reason he is deprived of more abundant helps, and, when grave temptation arises, he is found weaker for overcoming it.

¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 88, a. 3.

² Luke 16:10.

n. 486.

(C) Venial sin also induces guilt of fault and guilt of penalty: (a) guilt of fault, because, although it does not dissolve divine friendship, nevertheless it displeases God and saddens Him: for one sinning venially prefers his own will to the divine good pleasure, and therefore is truly guilty of fault; if this happens frequently, the guilt is increased daily, and the charity of God toward us grows cold, as does ours toward God: "But I have against thee that thou hast left thy first charity. Remember therefore from where thou hast fallen, and do penance, and do the first works. But if not, I come to thee, and I will move thy candlestick out of its place, unless thou do penance."¹ (b) Guilt of penalty, insofar as one sinning venially, although he does not deserve the eternal penalty of loss, nevertheless ought to undergo some temporal penalty proportioned to the offense, whether in the present time or in purgatory. But what penalty is due to venial sin cannot be defined, but must be left to divine judgment.²

¹ Apoc. 2:4-5. Here the question concerns Timothy, bishop of Ephesus; cf. Fouard, Saint Jean, 3rd ed., Paris, 1905, p. 125.

² Therefore one must beware of those orators and ascetics who heap up examples taken from the Old Testament to prove that the penalty of death was not rarely inflicted upon those sinning venially. The examples alleged refer to public facts, which are severely chastised on account of the public good: therefore they are undeservedly extended to other cases.

Therefore with St. Francis de Sales it is licit to conclude that affection for venial sins must be extirpated:³ "Never can we be wholly pure and clean from venial sins, at least so that we live and remain long in this purity; but we can have no voluntary propensity toward venial sins... These affections are directly contrary to devotion, as affection toward mortal sin is contrary to charity; for they weaken the powers of the spirit, and render them languid, impede divine consolations, open the door to temptations, and, although they do not kill the soul, nevertheless they greatly weaken it and render it sick."⁴

³ St. Francis de Sales, Introd. a la vie devote, p. I, ch. 22.

⁴ Here it is licit to observe that not all venial sins can indeed be avoided according to Trent (sess. VI, cap. 11), but, according to common doctrine, all fully deliberate venial sins can be avoided. Hence a vow concerning avoiding all venial sins is invalid, but not one concerning avoiding all deliberate venial sins.

Koch–Preuss

Antony Koch; adapted and edited by Arthur Preuss — 35 passages

Vol. II, Pt. I, Ch. I, Section 2: Mortal and Venial Sins

IMPORTANCE OF THE DISTINCTION. —The distinction between mortal and venial sins is of great practical importance, especially for the tribunal of Penance, where the sinner is obliged to state the kind and number of his mortal transgressions, which constitute materia necessaria for the validity of the Sacrament. Venial sins, on the other hand, are materia libera, i. e., they need not be confessed, though to confess them is useful and advisable.¹

¹ Conc. Trident., Sess. XIV, De Poenit., cap. 5 and can. 7; Sess. VI, cap. 11.

The teaching of the Church with regard to the distinction between mortal and venial sins is clear and definite. Nevertheless, the scientific demonstration of this doctrine is one of the most difficult problems of Moral Theology and has given rise to many heated controversies (e. g., Kleutgen vs. Hirscher; Frick vs. Linsenmann; Pesch vs. Schell, etc.)

n. ¶3.

PROOF FROM SACRED SCRIPTURE, TRADITION, AND REASON. —The distinction between mortal and venial sins has a solid basis in Sacred Scripture and ecclesiastical Tradition.

n. ¶4.

Sacred Scripture distinguishes between sins of greater or less gravity in such passages as: "Whosoever is angry with his brother, shall be in danger of judgment; and whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be in danger of the council; and whosoever shall say, Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell fire;”² in the parables of the moat and the beam,³ of the king who took account of his servants,⁴ in the similitude of the blind guides who strain out a gnat and swallow a camel,⁵ and so forth. The Bible moreover expressly mentions sins that are "worthy of death," ⁶ the doers of which "shall not possess the kingdom of God;”7 sins “that beget death,”⁸ and others that are regularly committed by all men, even the just.⁹ Comparing the texts one cannot but see that there is a difference, not only of quantity or degree, but likewise of quality or essence, between different sins (differentia in ipsa ratione peccati). Mortal sin robs man of sanctifying grace, destroys the supernatural life of the soul, and entails eternal damnation; whereas venial sin merely weakens grace and diminishes that love which is poured out in the heart by the Holy Ghost.

² Matth. V, 22. Cfr. Matth. X, 15; XI, 22; XVI, 10; John XIX, 11.

³ Matth. VII, 3 sqq.

⁴ Matth. XVIII, 23 sqq.

⁵ Matth. XXIII, 24.

⁶ Rom. I, 32; cfr. Ex. XXXII, 30 sq.; 1 John V, 16. T 1 Cor. VI, 9 sq.; Gal. V, 19 sqq.

⁸ Jas. I, 13 sqq.

⁹ Jas. III, 2; 1 John I, 8.

n. ¶5.

We have purposely refrained from citing in support of our thesis the oft-quoted text, "A just man shall fall seven times and shall rise again;" for, as St. Augustine pointed out many centuries ago, there is question here not of sins but of misfortunes.¹⁰

¹⁰ Prov. XXIV, 16.—Cfr. St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, XI, c. 31: "The just man falls seven times and rises again, that is, however often he falls, he will not perish. He intended this to be understood not of iniquities, but of tribulations leading to humility." (Migne, P. L., XLI, 345). Cfr. Enarr. in Ps., 118, s. 31, n. 4 (P. L., XXXVII, 1529). —J. V. Bainvel, Les Contresens Bibliques des Prédicateurs, 2nd ed., Paris 1906, pp. 102 sq.

n. ¶6.

In I John V, 16 "sin unto death" is probably not ordinary mortal sin but that which is technically known as the sin against the Holy Ghost.¹¹

¹¹ Cfr. A, Zahn, De Notione Peccall, Halle 1872, pp. 13, 28, 51.

n. ¶7.

The scriptural locus classicus for our thesis is 1 Cor. III, 8 sqq., in which the difference between mortal and venial sin is developed very graphically and with a deep insight into human nature. This text was made much of by the Scholastics.¹²

¹² Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 89, art. 2; Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. II, p. 530.

n. ¶8.

Ecclesiastical Tradition furnishes a long and uninterrupted series of testimonies in support of the distinction with which we are dealing.

n. ¶9.

The ancient penitential discipline distinguished between unpardonable and pardonable sins,¹³ and among the latter classed some as more grievous than others.

¹³ Matth. XII, 31 sq.; John XX, 22 sq.

n. ¶10.

St. Augustine draws a sharp line between "magna crimina" and unavoidable " quotidiana peccata" which, he says, are wiped out by the Lord's Prayer.¹⁴

The Catholic Church has constantly insisted on this important distinction and defended it against heretics.¹⁵

¹⁴ St. Augustine, Contra Iul., IT. c. 10, n. 33: "While laboring in this warfare with concupiscence, so long as human life upon earth is a temptation, we are not therefore without sin because that which is called sin in this sense works in our members against the law of the mind, even when we do not consent to unlawful things; but in those matters in which we are overcome by that rebel, though not mortally but nevertheless venially, we contract that for which we say daily: Forgive us our debts." (Migne, P. L., XLIV, 696).—Enchir., c. 71: "For the daily brief and light sins without which this life is not lived, the daily prayer of the faithful makes satisfaction. This prayer entirely blots out these least and daily sins." (P. L., XL, 265).—Tr. in loann., 26, n. ii: "Though sins are daily, let them not be deadly." (P. L., XXXV, 1611).—De Symb., c. 7, n. 15: "I do not tell you that you will live here without sin, but there are venial sins without which this life is not lived. Baptism was instituted for all sins; prayer was instituted for light sins, without which we cannot exist. What does prayer contain? We are washed once in baptism; we are washed daily in prayer. But do not commit those sins for which you must be separated from the body of Christ—may this be far from you. Those whom you see doing penance committed crimes, either adulteries or other monstrous deeds; for these they do penance. For if their sins were light, the daily prayer would suffice to blot them out." (P. L., XL, 636).— Serm., 58, c. 7, n. 8: "You cannot live on this earth without debts. But one class consists of those great crimes which it is good for you to have forgiven in baptism and from which you ought always to remain aloof; another consists of daily sins, without which man cannot live here and for which daily prayer is necessary." (Migne, P. L., XXXVIII, 397).—With regard to venial or daily sins, St. Augustine calls the Lord's Prayer "quotidiana nostra mundatio" (De Nupt, et Coniug., I, c. 33, n. 38), "quotidiana mundatio sanctae orationis" (Serm., 56, c. 8, n. 12), and "quasi quotidianus baptismus nosier" (Serm., 213, c. 8). —On the Patristic literature regarding this question see Gerigk, Wesen und Voraussetzungen der Todsunde, Breslau 1903, pp. I? sqq.

¹⁵ Cfr. Conc. Milev. II, can. 6-8: "The saints say in the Lord’s Prayer, not only humbly but also truthfully: Forgive us our debts." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 106 sqq.). —Among the condemned propositions of Baius is the following (n. 20): "No sin is venial by its nature, but every sin deserves eternal punishment." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1020). — Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, c. n; c. 15; can. 23 and 27; Sess. VII, De Bapt., can. 10. —On Luther's teaching that all sins are by nature mortal, see H. Denifle, Luther und Luthertum, Vol. I, 2nd ed., pp. 501 sqq.

n. ¶11.

Everyday experience as well as the common sense of mankind and enlightened reason confirm the distinction between mortal and venial sins. As there is a state of spiritual death and moral infirmity, so there are external and internal acts that produce death and infirmity; and as there is a moral order which can be either grievously or slightly violated, so there are grievous and slight offenses against that order.¹⁶ "Could anything be more absurd or foolish," asks St. Augustine, "than to consider one who has indulged in immoderate hilarity guilty of as great a sin as the wretch who has brought ruin upon his native land?" ¹⁷ "If two acts are equal because they are both offenses," he continues, "then mice and elephants are equal because they are both animals, and flies and eagles are equal because they can fly through the air." ¹⁸ "Not only Scripture, but mankind in general," says a recent moralist, "recognize the fact that there are sins which by their nature do not involve a real lapse from morality, and which do not render the agent bad and worthless, but are committed even by just and pious men.

¹⁶ Cfr. Prov. VI, 30 sqq. —St. Jerome, Adv. lovin., II, c. 30: "There are light sins and grave sins. It is one thing to owe ten thousand talents, another to owe a farthing. We shall indeed be held guilty for an idle word and for adultery, but it is not the same thing to blush and to be tortured, to be ashamed and to be tormented for a long time." (Migne, P. L., XXIII, 327)-

¹⁷ St. Augustine, Epist., 104 (a/. 254), c. 4, n. 13: "What more absurd or more insane thing can be said than that one who has sometimes laughed too immoderately and one who has savagely set his country on fire should be judged to have sinned equally?"

¹⁸ Ibid., n. 14: "Or if they are equal because both are offenses, mice and elephants will be equal because both are animals, and flies and eagles because both are winged creatures." (Migne, P. L., XXXIII, 394). —Cfr. Horace's Satires, I, 3, 96 sqq.: "Those who have decided that sins are nearly equal are at a loss when the truth is reached: feeling, custom, and usefulness itself, almost the mother of justice and equity, oppose them."

n. ¶13.

... That there is an essential difference between an offense against courtesy and battery and assault for the purpose of robbery, between a falsehood told in jest and a slander affecting a man's honor, every reasonable person perceives." ¹⁹ The truth expressed by St. James.that "in many things we all offend," ²⁰ was perceived long before the Apostle's day by Thucydides ²¹ and others.

¹⁹ J. Mausbach, Die kath. Moral, 2nd ed., p. 110; English translation by Buchanan, pp. 259 sq. We have modified the English version somewhat in order to render the sense of the original more accurately.

²⁰ Jas. III, 2: "For in many things we all stumble."

²¹ Hist., III, 45: "All are naturally inclined to sin both privately and publicly." —Cfr. Seneca, De Clement., I, 6: "We all sin, some more gravely, others more lightly."

n. ¶14.

SPECULATIVE ARGUMENT. —To demonstrate the distinction between mortal and venial sin speculatively was first attempted by the Schoolmen, especially by SS. Thomas ²² and Bonaventure,²³ who emphasize the fact that sin is essentially a turning away from God, due to a wrong tendency of the will. a) "When," says St. Thomas (l. c.), "the soul is so disordered by sin as to turn away from its last end, God, to whom it is united by charity, there is mortal sin; but when the disorder stops short of turning away from God, the sin is venial. For as in animal bodies the disorder of death, which results from the destruction of the principle of life, is irreparable in nature, whereas the disorder of sickness can be repaired, because the vital principle is preserved, so it is in matters concerning the soul. For in speculative matters he who errs in first principles is beyond the reach of persuasion, whereas one who errs but retains the first principles, may be brought back to the truth by the aid of those same principles. And so in matters of conduct, he who by sinning turns away from his last end, suffers a fall that is, so far as the nature of the sin goes, beyond repair, and exposes himself to eternal punishment. But he whose sin stops short of turning away from God, is under a disorder that by the very nature of the sin admits of repair; and therefore he is said to sin venially, because he does not sin so as to deserve never-ending punishment."

²² St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 72, art. 5: "The difference between venial and mortal sin follows the diversity of disorder which completes the nature of sin. Disorder is twofold: one by removal of the principle of order; the other in which, even while the principle of order is preserved, disorder occurs concerning things that follow the principle. Thus in an animal body a disorder of its constitution sometimes proceeds to the destruction of the vital principle, and this is death; but sometimes, while the principle of life is preserved, a certain disorder occurs in the humors, and then there is sickness. Now the principle of the whole order in morals is the last end, which holds the same place in practical matters as an indemonstrable principle in speculative matters. Hence, when the soul is disordered by sin to the point of turning away from the last end, namely God, to whom it is united through charity, then there is mortal sin; but when disorder occurs short of turning away from God, then there is venial sin. For just as in bodies the disorder of death, which occurs through removal of the principle of life, is naturally irreparable, whereas the disorder of sickness can be repaired because the principle of life is preserved, so it is in matters pertaining to the soul."

²³ St. Bonaventure, Brevil., P. V, c. 8: "Since sin signifies a withdrawal of the will from the first principle, insofar as the will is naturally meant to be acted upon by Him, according to Him, and for His sake, every sin is a disorder of the mind or will, concerning which virtue and vice naturally exist. Actual sin, therefore, is an actual disorder of the will. Now this disorder is either so great that it destroys the order of justice, and in this way it is called mortal sin, because it is apt to take away life by separating the soul from God, through whom the just soul is given life. Or it is so slight that it does not destroy that order, but only disturbs it in some respect, and then it is called venial sin, because we can quickly obtain pardon for it, inasmuch as grace is not taken away through it nor does man incur divine enmity."

n. ¶15.

Hence the customary definition: "A mortal sin is a turning away (aversio) from God and a turning to (conversio) creatures with a change of object/' When the (final) object remains unchanged, there is only venial sin.²⁴ Mortal sin, therefore, is a complete turning from God to the creature, whereby the creature becomes man's last end and the object of his affection. Such an act necessarily destroys the proper relation between God and man, and consequently robs the soul of supernatural life. Man is ordained towards his last end by charity, and whatever runs counter to charity (conceived either as the love of God or the love of one's fellow-men for God's sake) is mortally sinful. All such offenses are mortal sins according to their species (peccata mortalia ex suo genere). When the will is directed towards an object that is not contrary to charity, though it contain within itself some disorder (inordinatio quaedam), the sin committed is venial according to its species (peccatum veniale ex suo genere). Since, however, human acts receive their specification not only from their objects, but likewise from the end or purpose of the agent, a sin which is by nature venial, so far as its object is concerned, may become mortal in respect of the person who commits it, either because he inordinately seeks his last end in that object, or because he directs the object towards an end which is by nature mortally sinful;—as when one employs a useless word for the commission of a grievous crime. Similarly, a sin which is by nature mortal may become subjectively venial if the act remains incomplete, because there is no full advertence and consent; —as when one is tempted against the faith.

²⁴ "Mortal sin is a turning away from God and a turning toward creatures with a change of center; but where the center is not changed, venial sin is present." (St. Thomas, l. c.)

n. ¶16.

To be mortal, therefore, a sin need not be committed "with uplifted hand against God," as Schell was accused of having taught, i. e., it need not be inspired by hatred and malice or involve formal rebellion against the Almighty. Nor need it be an act of obstinate and impenitent opposition to divine truth and grace. The Church would not have drawn up a long list of mortal sins ²⁵ if she believed that there is but one mortal sin, namely, rebellion or obstinate resistance to the will of God.²⁶

²⁵ Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, c. 15; Prop, damnat. ab Alexandra VII., n. 23; sub Innocent. XI., 43, 44, 47, 49, 51 sq. (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1123, 1193 sq., 1197, 1201 sq.)

²⁶ Cfr. F. A. Gopfert, Moraltheologie, 6th ed., Vol. I, p. 219. —It is but just to add that Dr. Schell protested against the construction put upon his teaching by his opponents. "I have never denied," he says, "that every wilful transgression of the divine law in an important matter is a mortal sin. On the contrary, I accept this definition: only it falls short of determining what is important or unimportant in each case.... Were I asked to define the nature of mortal sin, I should say it was a voluntary or wilful transgression of a divine law in an important matter." (H. Schell, Kleinere Schriften, edited by K. Hennemann, Paderborn 1908, pp. 580, 587.)

n. ¶17.

b) The fact that every sin implies a disturbance of the moral order does not suffice to establish an essential distinction between mortal and venial sins. For this distinction is not (or, at least, not entirely) based on the objective consequences of sin (materia gravis et levis), i. e., the greater or less degree in which the moral order is disturbed, but primarily on the subjective tendency of the will. "The external object /' says a modern theologian, "is merely the proximate aim and motive. The ultimate cause of sin is the ego, the gratification of self-love, that inordinate seeking of one's own interest which is directly opposed to the love of God. This is true of all sins, even of those whose object lies outside the sinner's own person (infidelity, despair, presumption)."²⁷

²⁷ H. Gerigk, Wesen und Voraussetzungen der Todsünde, p. 116. —Cfr. Cicero, Parad., Ill, i: "You say that the matter is small; but the fault is great. For sins are not to be measured by the outcome of things, but by the vices of men."

n. ¶18.

Hence, broadly speaking, it may be said that whatever is done out of malice is mortally sinful, whereas that which has infirmity for its motive is merely a venial sin, though, strictly speaking, there are sins of malice that are venial and sins of infirmity that are mortal. No man is able to fathom the secret motives of his fellow-men, and consequently God alone can tell with absolute certainty how much malice has gone into any sin.²⁸

²⁸ Cfr. Jer. XVII, 10; 1 Cor. IV, 4; 2 Thess. II, 7; Deut. XVII, 8.

n. ¶19.

St. Augustine says: "Which sins are venial and which are mortal can be ascertained only from Sacred Scripture, not from human wisdom." ²⁹ And St. Thomas: "It is perilous to decide as to the grievous character of a sin unless we have a positive teaching to go by." ³⁰ St. Raymond of Pennafort, whom the Church honors as "the eminent minister of the Sacrament of Penance," advises confessors to go slow in deciding any sin to be grievous, lest they discourage their penitents.³¹

²⁹ Enchiridion, c. 78: "Which sins are light and which are grave must be weighed, not by human, but by divine judgment." (Migne, P. L., XL, 269).— Cfr. ibid., c. 79: "There are some things that would be thought very light unless they were shown in the Scriptures to be grave beyond belief." (P. L., XL, 270). —IDEM, De Civ. Dei, XXI, c. 27, n. 5: "It is most difficult to discover, and most dangerous to define, which sins so impede arrival at the kingdom of God that they nevertheless obtain pardon through the merits of the saints. For my part, up to this time, although I have applied myself to the matter, I have not been able to trace them out." (P. L., XLI, 750). —The reason why God left this question unsolved, St. Augustine finds in the salutary admonition to avoid all sins: "And perhaps they remain hidden for this reason: lest zeal for advancement grow sluggish in avoiding all sins. But now, while the measure of venial iniquity, even if it persists, is unknown, zeal for progressing toward better things is certainly exercised more watchfully by perseverance in prayer." (Ibid.)

³⁰ Quodlibet., IX, art. 15: "Every question in which mortal sin is at issue is decided perilously unless an express truth is possessed." —Cfr. J. Gerson, De Vita Spirit., lect. 4: "Theological doctors ought not readily to assert that certain sins are mortal where they are not most certain of the matter; for by rigid assertions of this kind in universal matters men are by no means raised from the mire of sins, but are plunged into it more deeply because more despairingly."

³¹ "I counsel one thing: that you not be too prone to judge sins mortal where this is not established for you by a certain text; otherwise men might be led into despair." (CL. 3, tit. de Poenit. et Rem., § 21.) —Cfr. St. Alphonsus, Homo Apost., tr. 1 6, n. 118; J. E. Pruner, Moraltheologie, Vol. I, 3rd ed., p. 189.

n. ¶20.

A conscientious Catholic will strive to avoid all sins, venial as well as mortal.³²

³² Cfr. St. Augustine, De Bapt., II, c. 6, n. 9: "Let us not bring deceitful balances, in which we weigh what we wish and how we wish, saying according to our own judgment, ‘This is grave, this is light’; but let us bring the divine balance from the Holy Scriptures, as from the Lord’s treasuries, and in it weigh what is graver—or rather, let us not weigh, but recognize what has been weighed by the Lord." (Migne, P. L., XLIII, 132).

n. ¶21.

Mortal sin, therefore, is a wilful transgression of the law of God in a matter which one knows or believes to be important. It robs man of sanctifying grace, deprives him of the friendship of God, and renders him deserving of eternal damnation.

n. ¶22.

Venial sin, on the other hand, is either a violation of an important law without full advertence or consent, or a transgression of a law of slight importance.³³ Venial sin does not destroy sanctifying grace and is more easily pardoned than mortal sin because it does not involve formal contempt (contemptus) but merely neglect of God (neglectio Dei).

³³ Cfr. St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., 1. V, n. 51: "Mortal sin is that which because of its gravity destroys grace and friendship with God and deserves eternal punishment. It is called mortal because it takes away the principle of spiritual life, namely habitual grace, and brings death to the soul. Venial sin is that which because of its lightness does not take away grace and divine friendship, although it diminishes the fervor of charity and deserves temporal punishment. It is called venial because, while the principle of spiritual life, namely grace, is preserved, it inflicts upon the soul an easily curable sickness and easily obtains pardon." (Ed. Gaudé, II, 747).

n. ¶23.

If there were no distinction between mortal and venial sin, then either all sins would be mortal or all would be venial. The former proposition would entail Rigorism, the latter Laxism. It has been objected that the Catholic teaching on this subject is derogatory to virtue and breeds lax opinions and carelessness. This accusation is unfounded. The Church expressly teaches that venial sin is incomparably worse than any temporal injury or evil, and can be expiated only by sincere contrition and penitence, through the merits of Jesus Christ. She exhorts her children to avoid all venial sins by means of prayer, self-discipline, and the grace of God, because no man is allowed to commit even the slightest offense against the majesty and justice of God.³⁴ "No confessor," says Gury, "does his full duty unless he tries to wean his penitents from frequent venial sins, especially such as involve full advertence, since a man who does not strive to avoid venial sins easily falls into mortal sins."

³⁴ Rom. III, 8.

n. ¶24.

READINGS. —St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 1a 2ae, qu. 72, art. 5; qu. 88-89. —IDEM, De Malo, qu. 7, art. 1-2. —IDEM, Summa contra Gentiles, III, c. 143-144. —Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. II, pp. 528 sqq. —F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, pp. 156 sqq. —Chr. Pesch, S.J., Theologische Zeitfragen, II, Freiburg 1901, pp. 47 sqq., 83 sqq.—J. Stufler, S.J., Die Heiligkeit Gottes und der ewige Tod, Innsbruck 1903. —IDEM, Die Theorien der freiwilligen Verstocktheit, Innsbruck 1905. —H. Gerigk, Wesen und Voraussetzungen der Todsünde, Breslau 1903.—Ph. Kneib, Die "Jenseitsmoral" pp. 99 sqq.—Th. Slater, SJ., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 136 sqq. —Wilhelm-Scannell, A Manual of Catholic Theology, Vol. I, pp. 6 sqq. —J. Mausbach, Catholic Moral Teaching and Its Antagonists, New York 1914, pp. 258 sqq. —G. H. Joyce, SJ., The Catholic Doctrine of Grace, N. Y. 1920, pp. 202 sqq. —J. S. Vaughan, Venial Sin, London 1924. —A. Landgraf, Das Wesen der lässlichen Sünde in der Scholastik bis Thomas von Aquin, Bamberg, 1923. —V. Cathrein, SJ., Die lässliche Sünde und die Mittel zu ihrer Verhütung, Freiburg i. B. 1926.

Vol. II, Pt. I, Ch. I, Section 3: Distinctive Characteristics of Mortal and Venial Sin

THE LEADING CRITERIA. —As mortal sins are necessary matter for confession (materia necessaria), the penitent who enters the sacred tribunal must be able to distinguish them with comparative certainty from venial sins. For this purpose Catholic moralists have established the following criteria: a) KNOWLEDGE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PRECEPT TRANSGRESSED. —If the precept is of great importance for the moral and social order (materia gravis), and its transgression is likely to entail serious consequences, the sin is grievous (peccatum grave). If, on the other hand, the precept is unimportant (materia parva), and the matter divisible, the sin is light. Note, however, (1) that this objective distinction between serious and light sin is not identical with the distinction between mortal and venial sin, 29 for subjectively or individually a grievous sin may be venial and a venial sin mortal, whereas a grievous sin per se can never be light nor a mortal sin venial. (2) Some precepts and some sins, e. g., simony, blasphemy, murder, fornication, violation of the seal of confession, are essentially indivisible and therefore do not admit of parvitas materiae. (3) The decision regarding the cessation of parvitas materiae or the beginning of a grievous sin is always more or less arbitrary. (4) When a sin is materially grievous, the presumption is that it is a mortal sin, and vice versa.

b) THE DEGREE OF ADVERTENCE REQUIRED FOR A MORTAL SIN. —No one who is unconscious can sin, and one who is half asleep, or partly intoxicated, or feeble-minded, cannot sufficiently appreciate the malice of mortal sin to be guilty of it.¹

¹ Cfr. Matth. XXV, 26; Jas. IV, 17; cfr. Gen. XIX, 33-35; XX, 4-6.

n. ¶3.

However, to be guilty of mortal sin, a man need not reflect explicitly on the malice of the contemplated act or be fully aware of the importance of the law transgressed. It is sufficient for him to know that the act is sinful. Culpable ignorance, therefore, when it results in the commission of a grievous sin, does not excuse from guilt. Still less is it necessary to commit the sinful act with the full consciousness of offending God. Some writers have construed a distinction between philosophical and theological sin. They define the former as an act contrary to rea- son and the natural law, but involving no conscious violation of a divine precept, and hold that it may be grievous, but never mortal. This theory has been formally condemned by the Church.²

² Prop. Damnat. ab Alexandra VIII. (Aug. 24, 1690), n. 2 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1290).

n. ¶4.

c) THE FREE CONSENT OF THE WILL. —To make an act mortally sinful, the will must give its full and free consent. This consent need not, however, involve the actual and direct intention of transgressing the moral law. All that is required is that it be full and free.³

³ Cfr. Gury, Compendium Theol. Moralis, Vol. I, n. 150: "For mortal sin three things are necessarily required: (1) matter grave in itself or because of circumstances; (2) full advertence to the malice of the act; (3) full consent of the will to the transgression." —Ibid., n. 153: "For venial sin some advertence, however slight, to the malice and some consent, however imperfect, of the will are required and suffice: they are required because, if they are removed, there can be no knowledge and willing of evil and therefore no sin; but they suffice because, when they are present, the knowledge and willing of evil necessary to constitute sin are present in some manner."

n. ¶5.

Mortal sin, as we have seen, is a complete turning away from God to the creature. No act is mortally sinful unless the agent clearly perceives its true character and gives full consent. By committing a mortal sin man renders himself guilty of eternal damnation. Now it would be contrary to the goodness and mercy of God to condemn a man to eternal punishment on account of a slight transgression or for an act which was not entirely free or wilful.⁴

⁴ Op. cit.r n. 150: "Full advertence and full consent are required because, since through mortal sin man totally withdraws from God so as to adhere wholly to creatures, this cannot occur unless the sinner deliberately prefers the object of sin to God and absolutely wills to establish his ultimate end in it. Moreover, it is wholly foreign to divine goodness to condemn a man to eternal damnation either for a slight transgression or for an act that is not perfectly free and voluntary."

n. ¶6.

Some sins are mortal by their very nature or species (peccata mortalia ex genere suo). They are those whose object is important in itself, regardless of conditions or circumstances, e. g., the theft of a large sum of money. Others (peccata mortalia per accidens) are rendered mortal by the attending circumstances, e. g., grave scandal.

n. ¶7.

Those sins which are mortal by their nature or species are subdivided into peccata mortalia ex toto genere suo and peccata mortalia ex genere suo non toto. Sins of the former class embody some grievous disorder, such as unbelief, despair, etc. Those of the latter class have an object that, though binding under pain of grievous sin, admits of degrees because of the smallness of the matter involved (parvitas materiae), e. g., theft, slander.

n. ¶8.

There is an analogous distinction between venial sins ex genere suo and per accidens. The former involve an unimportant object, whereas the latter have an important object, but are rendered venial by circumstances.⁵

⁵ Ibid.: "Mortal sins are of these kinds: (1) mortal in their whole genus, when their object or matter, whatever it may be, contains a grave disorder, as in lust, blasphemy, perjury, heresy, etc.; (2) mortal in their genus, but not in the whole genus, or simply mortal in their genus, when their matter, while remaining in the same species, is generally grave, although it can also be light, as are sins against justice; (3) mortal accidentally, that is, when they are mortal not from their object but from some circumstance, for example, from an erroneous conscience, etc." —Cfr. Gopfert, Moraltheologie. Vol. I, 4th ed., pp. 224-230.

n. ¶9.

PRACTICAL HINTS. —a) A venial sin can become mortal, ( I ) by the action of an erroneous conscience that wrongly judges a venial sin to be mortal; (2) through a gravely sinful intention (finis pravus), as when a lie is told in order to enable one to commit adultery; (3) on account of the proximate danger of mortal sin; (4) because of formal contempt of the law or the lawgiver, and (5) by reason of grave scandal entailed.

n. ¶10.

In a similar way, an objectively mortal sin may become subjectively venial, (i) on account of the smallness of the matter involved (parvitas materia); (2) through imperfect advertence or consent to an act in itself gravely sinful (excusable ignorance, extreme haste, weakness); (3) because of failure to consummate an intended sinful action, though it would have been easy to do so. b) When positive doubt exists as to whether an act was mortally sinful or not, this doubt may be resolved in favor of the person concerned if he was so disposed that he would not have committed a mortal sin even though it was easy for him to do so, but would have preferred to die rather than grievously offend God; or if, without his own fault, he was not entirely master of his actions; or if he is uncertain whether he consented to the sinful act or remembers that he proceeded timidly or in doubt.

n. ¶11.

Though, strictly speaking, no mortal sin can become venial, and no venial sin mortal, because of the essential difference existing between the two, a person who constantly commits venial sins with full deliberation thereby forms evil habits, which will sooner or later precipitate him into mortal sin and rob his soul of sanctifying grace. It is in this sense that the Scholastics say that venial sin disposes the soul to mortal sin.⁶

⁶ Cfr. Ecclus. XIX, 1; Luke XVI, 10. —St. Augustine, Tract, in loa., 12, n. 14: "Many small sins, if neglected, kill. Drops are small, yet they fill rivers; grains of sand are small, yet if much sand is piled on, it presses and crushes. A neglected bilge does what an onrushing wave does: it enters gradually through the bilge, but by entering for a long time and not being pumped out, it sinks the ship. What is pumping out except acting by good works so that sins do not overwhelm us—by groaning, fasting, giving, and forgiving?" (Migne, P. L., XXXV, 1492).—IDEM, Serm., 56, c. 9, n. 12: "If all these things are gathered against us, do they therefore not weigh us down because they are small? What difference does it make whether lead or sand presses you? Lead is one mass; sand is small grains, but by their multitude they press you. Sins are small. Do you not see rivers filled from tiny drops and foundations swept away? They are small, but they are many." (P. L., XXXVIII, 383)-—IDEM, Serm., 58, c. 9, n. 10: "Let sins be forgiven; let past sins be forgiven; let future sins cease. But you cannot live here without them, whether they are lesser, small, or light. Yet let those light and small sins not be despised. Rivers are filled from tiny drops. Let not even lesser things be despised. Through narrow cracks water seeps into the ship, the bilge is filled, and if the bilge is neglected the ship sinks." (P. L., XXXVIII, 398).—Pseudo-Augustine, Append. Serm., 292 (a/. 244 de tempore), n. 6: "Do not despise your sins because they are small, but fear because they are many. For drops of rain too are small, but they fill rivers, carry off great masses, and uproot trees with their roots." (P. L., XXXIX, 2999).—St. Gregory the Great, Moral., |. 10, c. 11, n. 21: "From vanity we are led to iniquity." (P. L., LXXV, 933).— St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, q. 88, art. 3: "Venial sin can by a certain consequence dispose toward a sin that is mortal on the part of the agent. For when the disposition or habit is increased by acts of venial sins, the desire of sinning can grow to such a degree that the sinner will place his end in a venial sin. For to everyone who has a habit, insofar as he has it, the end is operation according to the habit; and thus by sinning venially many times he will be disposed toward mortal sin." —IDEM, ibid., art. 4: "Not all the venial sins in the world can have as much guilt as one mortal sin. But if it is understood that many venial sins make one mortal sin dispositively, this is true according to the two modes of disposition by which venial sin disposes toward mortal sin." —IDEM, ibid., 2a 2ae, q. 186, art. 9: “Venial sin is a disposition toward mortal sin insofar as it hinders those things by which one is disposed to observe the principal precepts of the law of Christ, which are the precepts of charity.” —Cfr. J. P. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. i, n. *53: "Venial sins, however much multiplied, can never of themselves and by reason of multiplication coalesce into a mortal sin, because each remains in the inferior species. Sometimes, however, by reason of matter accumulating they attain to mortal sin, as happens especially in matters of justice."

n. ¶12.

READINGS.—St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 1a 2ae, qu. 88.—F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, pp. 161 sqq.—Th. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 136 sqq—H. Gerigk, Wesen und Voraussetzungen der Todsünde, Untersuchung der Frage nach dem Wesensunterschiede zwischen dem Peccatum Mortale und Veniale, Breslau 1903, especially pp. 96 sqq.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 11th ed., pp. 328 sqq.—A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 11th ed., pp. 193 sqq.—Sabetti-Barrett, S.J., Comp. Theol. Mor., 22nd ed., pp. 113 sqq. —A. Tanquerey, Synopsis Theol. Mor. et Pastor., Vol. II, pp. 253 sqq.—L. Billot, S.J., Disquisitio de Natura et Ratione Peccati, Rome 1900, th. I sqq. —H. E. Manning, Sin and its Consequences, Ch. I, sqq. (French tr. by Maillet, Le Peché et ses Consequences, Avignon 1894, Ch. I sqq.)- —B. V. Miller, "Mortal and Venial Sin in the Early Church," Irish Eccl. Record, March 1921, No. 639, pp. 236-256. —A. Vermeersch, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, pp. 355 sqq., 368 sqq. —A. Landgraf, Das Wesen der lässlichen Sünde in der Scholastik bis Thomas von Aquin, Bamberg 1923.

Vermeersch, Theologia Moralis

Arthur Vermeersch, S.J. — 14 passages

Vol. I, Tr. V, Chapter III: On Venial Sin

It will chiefly be necessary to treat of actual sin; for only a few things must be added concerning habitual sin.

Vol. I, Pt. I, Tract V. On Sins In General, Ch. II, Article II. On Mortal Sin · Vol. I, Pt. I, Tract V. On Sins In General, Ch. II, Article III. On Venial Sin

I. - On Actual Venial Sin

Order of speaking. First we shall confirm that there are venial sins. There will follow a psychological analysis and definition of venial sin, with certain explanations added concerning the analogy and the evil of this sin. Then we shall give criteria of venial sin; then concerning the modes by which acts venial of themselves can become mortal. And, by way of complement, two cases will be solved.

n. 412.

— There are venial sins. We call venial sin a sin which, as it is committed, does not constitute man turned away from God, or an enemy of God, nor is worthy of eternal punishment, but is of itself remissible.

But that there are such sins must be held by faith, from the Council of Milevis, c. 7; Trent, s. VI, c. 11 and 12, and can. 23, 25; and s. XIV, c. 5 and can. 7.

And it is certain that there are also sins which are such by their nature, and not merely from the mercy of God, who would punish beneath the merit of the cause.

But this third question is disputed among theologians: whether or not God, by supplying sufficient helps, could have prohibited all deliberate disorders under mortal guilt.

n. 413.

— Psychological explanation and definition.

I. In our present condition, just as indeliberate movements anticipate the use of reason, so also it happens that we have semi-deliberate acts, or acts not fully human, concerning which we spoke in the treatise on human acts. But it repugns human nature itself that man should be judged to have determined concerning his end by a semi-deliberate act. Therefore, already on account of this cause, we make acts short of aversion from God or from the ultimate end, which nevertheless are disordered.

Furthermore, even deliberately a weak man can, while he practically acknowledges and reveres God the ultimate end, act as if inconsequently in those things which, because they are not according to the order of reason, cannot be referred to God; and nevertheless, because they allow charity toward God and the threefold order (toward God, toward neighbor, in oneself) to be substantially untouched, they do not bring about aversion of the agent himself from God. Therefore the agent remains turned toward God, but his action is referred neither to God nor to another end simply and positively ultimate. Hence again there are had disordered acts without aversion from God.

II. And this is venial sin, which therefore can be defined: a voluntary disorder concerning a creature, without aversion from God. And at once it is also seen to be of twofold notion, since sin can be venial because of the imperfection of the act and because of the lightness of the object.

Sin which because of the very notion of the matter is venial, is such from its genus. Wherefore, when we are moving in a mortal genus of sin, yet in such a way that smallness of matter excuses from grave guilt, the cause of excuse is rather the imperfection of the act than the lightness of the object. That is, injury to another man is grave from its genus. But the small quantity which is taken away secretly, the small insult or detraction which is committed, cause the injury reasonably not to be judged perfect. Therefore the very quality of the action has been changed because of the modest measure of the thing. Therefore observe that the excuse is not formally quantitative but qualitative.

n. 414.

— Analogy of venial sin. Venial sin signifies another disorder, offense, and punishment than mortal sin; and therefore it is sin only analogically. It signifies another disorder, since it removes no essential order, so that it repugns God the ultimate end neither immediately nor mediately. It signifies another offense: for it does not constitute God an enemy; nor does one sinning venially prefer a creature to God, but only fixes for his will an immediate term diverse from the term which, God willing, it ought to have. Yet the command of God is not urged in the case under threat of enmity. It signifies another punishment, that is, a temporal one.

Wishing to express this, St. Thomas says that venial sin is not against the law but beside the law; but Scotus says that venial sin is opposed to counsel, not to precept. Scotus seems by the name of counsel to understand a norm whose observance is not necessary for salvation. St. Thomas, however, by his manner of speaking avoided every opposition with the definition by which St. Augustine defined mortal sin as something done against the law. In itself, the words can be explained in this way. If you consider the law of God all at once and as a whole, as the ordination by which man is directed to his end, venial sin, since it is not done according to an opposite direction, cannot be called contrary to it (cf. Cajetan in this place), but at the same time it is not according to the law; wherefore it is said to be beside the law: the sin is in the very mode of observing the law. St. Thomas himself explains his mind thus: "Venial sin is so called according to an imperfect notion and in order to mortal sin, just as accident is called being in order to substance, according to an imperfect notion of being; for it is not against the law, because one sinning venially does not do what the law prohibits, nor omit that to which the law obligates by precept; but he acts beside the law, because he does not observe the mode of reason which the law intends" (1, 2, q. 87, art. 1 ad 1). Hence the things we said above, n. 404 and 413, are confirmed.

n. 415.

— The evil of venial sin. Nevertheless venial sin is held in hatred by God, as something which repugns his infinite goodness; and, as long as it is not removed, it impedes the sight of God. It is an evil which, in its own order, transcends every physical evil, so that it cannot be committed for avoiding any punishment. It is opposed to the fervor of charity, because a man in whom charity perfectly dominates will do nothing which is not referred to the beloved God.

n. 416.

— The subject of venial sin. Venial sin, since it says an election not in agreement with the intention of the higher appetite, demonstrates an imperfect subordination of the lower appetite to higher reason. In innocent man, movements little deliberated would not have existed; and all things consequently would have been composed according to the deliberation of higher reason. Wherefore man, in the state of preternatural integrity, could not have sinned venially. Similarly the Blessed Virgin, because of the moral gift of integrity, must be said to be immune from venial stain. Where there is no discursive process, but all things are apprehended and sought in the principles themselves, venial sin cannot exist. For only a discursive process permits something to be proposed as good without order to the intended end simply ultimate. Therefore, not because light matter was lacking, but because of the angelic perfection of nature, an angel could not sin venially (St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 89, art. 3 and 4).

n. 417.

— Criteria of venial sin. Let us distinguish venial sins which can be such although they are deliberate, from actions which are not venial except because of imperfect deliberation.

According to the things which we explained above, n. 413, deliberate venial actions will be violations of order which we can call accidental, because they allow the order of essences to be substantially untouched, or because they are opposed to positive law only in a light matter.

Those accidental violations of the essential order will be, in our relation of subjection to God, various negligences in fulfilling duties of religion which neither arise from formal contempt nor are so notable that they contain virtual contempt; in our relation to neighbor, they will be faults which harm him little, and do not reasonably remove the notion of friendship. Observe that these acts turn upon a thing which from its genus is grave, so that they are not light except because they are objectively imperfect.

In ourselves, on the contrary, there also occur acts venial from their genus: dissipations of things of which we have perfect dominion, which will not become grave unless for that reason a grave duty now cannot be fulfilled; so also useless and vain concupiscence (not however in a venereal matter), vain enjoyment, curiosity, superfluity of adornment and dress, trifles, idleness, excess in food, drink, sleep, use of marriage, fear, sadness, appetite of money, praise, etc. So also lies. For whether you consider the harm of error and of deception of the neighbor concerning my mind, since it concerns contingent truth, it is light by its nature; or whether you consider the denied communication of my mind, this of itself was not due; or whether you consider the abuse of the faculty of speech, since speech is immediately ordered to the good of the speaker, a lie does not break through the immediate order of the whole faculty, but badly refers to the good of the speaker the act or use of a faculty which is immediately ordered to that good; whereas in the abuse of the venereal faculty outside marriage, the sinner uses, against the immediate end of the faculty, for his own satisfaction, a faculty which is immediately for the good of the species; or finally whether you consider the social effect of lying, circumscribed by the false communication of my mind, which is not necessary, even by frequent falsity of this sort mutual communication and mutual trust are not notably harmed.

Yet the things said return concerning the necessity of recurring to external criteria.

Criteria of imperfect deliberation or imperfect consent.

Those criteria are taken: a) from presumption: if one is accustomed to be so disposed that he would rather die than expressly sin mortally; b) from the conscience of the agent: if, from habitual disposition, you judge that you would not have done it if you had fully apprehended the matter; if a God-fearing man doubts concerning his assent; if the spontaneous sentence immediately was "I did not consent"; c) from the state in which the agent was: he was half-asleep, very distracted, agitated by vehement passion, disturbed; d) from the mode of action: it was done with a very timid and as it were perplexed mind; while you wished to deliberate, the words had already slipped out of your mouth, the thing had already been done; e) from the incomplete action: he who could conveniently have executed the sin (for example, solitary sin), notwithstanding temptation, did not execute it. A certain distraction easily happens in fantasies less chaste, in detractions, and especially in sins in the cause, where effects, harms, dangers of others, fled the mind. "Recall here forgetfulnesses, ignorances lightly culpable, erroneous consciences from light negligence" (Ball.-Palm. I, tr. 4, n. 685).

Therefore let the confessor prudently ask the penitent, according to his capacity, whether he acted fully awake, whether after observing the malice of the thing he elicited no act against the temptation; but once the response "I remain doubtful," "I do not know," has been received, he will not insist too much, lest he become troublesome, but let him recur to presumptions; nor rarely will he have to commit the matter to the divine judgment (Genicot, I, 161).

n. 418.

— Passage to mortal sin. On the contrary, they say that venial sin or even an indifferent act passes into mortal, because of the depraved affection of the will or the effect of the action, by reason of the ultimate end, of an adjoined end, of contempt, scandal, danger, accumulated matter. With what truth these things are said will appear after an examination has been made.

By reason of the ultimate end: if one fosters affection for a venial or even indifferent thing (say a game, a person), not only intense but such that actually or virtually he would rather violate a grave precept than be deprived of those things.

Observe that habitual disposition according to itself does not suffice, because that to the committing of which he is prepared by habit alone is not imputed as anyone's fault. Otherwise, how many would actually sin who are so disposed that for a small cause they would neglect duties, commit shameful things!

If that affection betrays itself in grave guilt of commission or omission of which it was the occasion, it will be enough to accuse that grave guilt. If in no guilt, the sin is by affection alone.

By reason of an adjoined end: as if one lies lightly in order to extort copulation. Again, however, not the lie itself, which remains light in itself, but only the desire or contrivance of fornication must be accused.
By reason of absolute and formal contempt, whether of the Superior or of the precept as such: as if you refuse to be subject to the precept or to the Superior, which is the sin of consummated pride; if you are unwilling to do it because it is prescribed, which is the sin of formal disobedience: both gravely repugn the charity due to the Superior.

But contempt according to some respect is not grave of itself, when, the authority being admitted, one contemns only execution; when one habitually indeed wishes to be subject, but here and now in a small matter shakes off the yoke; when one contemns the Superior merely as unlearned, imprudent, imperfect; nor interpretative contempt, when the precept is violated because of another cause: anger, a depraved custom. And if the matter which gave occasion to contempt is light, contempt alone must be confessed.

By reason of scandal: if you cause a mortal ruin of the neighbor. Only the superadded malice, which is gravely opposed to charity, must be manifested in confession.
By reason of danger of falling into mortal sin, if proximate danger of grave sin is induced. The notion of proximate danger will be explained below, where the flight of sin is treated. In venereal matter, interior or exterior sensualities, venial according to themselves, can produce such danger.
By reason of accumulated matter. For if several small matters are morally joined, all are morally reputed as one, and grave matter arises. But they can be joined according to themselves, or according to the effects produced. According to themselves, as if you often steal a little and do not restore; if by intervals you omit several psalms of the same office; if on the same day of fast you eat a little rather often. But he does not sin gravely who on diverse feast days has worked a little, who daily in Lent has eaten a little or has determined to eat: these are not morally united among themselves. Nor does he sin gravely who on diverse days has violated a vow of praying a little something every day, or of giving a small alms. It would have to be answered otherwise if by small daily distributions he had wished to fulfill the execution of a vow of a great sum to be given. Nor are several vows which are to be fulfilled on the same day united among themselves. Hence he who, on one day, has violated one hundred vows of light matter, has not for that reason sinned gravely. - According to effect, as if, by repeated detractions, you render a person utterly hated.

n. 419.

— You ask whether or not matter, grave in itself, can become light, considered as a small part of a sum or of a total quantity.

This can indeed happen, but the cases must be prudently weighed. In the first place it is necessary that it concern a thing which is estimated quantitatively, as money, as prayers to be said. Furthermore, it is necessary that this matter belong as a part to the whole or to a certain universality. Hence, he who has vowed 100,000 is not judged, with one hundred notes omitted, to have sinned gravely against the vow or promise. In dividing a large patrimony, the largeness will cause things notable in themselves to be judged light by a certain tacit consent. Lehmkuhl, II, 269, thinks the same can be said of the omission of one Mass from one hundred owed for the same intention; but others do not admit this. Nor in strictly commutative contracts, as buying, selling, borrowing, do they concede that he who does not pay a sum grave in itself is excused from grave sin.

Observe that, in contracts concerning Masses, when one Mass is being treated, the obligation of paying one stipend is not grave, while grave is the obligation of celebration to which such a stipend is joined.

n. 419 bis.

— What is called the will of committing all venial sins practically signifies nothing except a general remissness in avoiding venial sins. Remissness of this sort, negligence, although dangerous and very harmful in itself, for the most part is only venial, because toward mortal sin "it is only a remote disposition, unless some peculiar circumstances come upon it, which in some matter consummate a proximate occasion." Suarez, De Relig., tr. 8, l. 1, c. 4. So also Lugo, Paen. d. 16, n. 50; St. Alphonsus 4, 12 (as more probable), against Sanchez, In Decal. I, 5, 4.

n. 419 ter.

— Deliberation concerning committing a mortal sin will be mortal, if it has been perfect, that is, if, fully adverting to the grave malice of the proposed act, you deliberately choose to remain wavering: for then you virtually judge that it can happen that a created good is reasonably preferred to divine friendship. But often it is only a certain negligence in expelling contrary thoughts and affections, which is venial. Lehmkuhl I, n. 347, 5.

n. 420.

II. - On Habitual Venial Sin

— Venial sin itself perseveres morally until it is retracted. Wherefore there is also habitual venial sin. But in a just man there remains the principle of charity by which venial fault can be repaired; and habitual venial fault is contained by no real privation. Certainly, repeated venial acts easily generate a certain difficulty of acting perfectly; but that difficulty, which remains after the fault has been destroyed, is a certain punishment concomitant to sin, but constitutes no habitual sin. Moreover no stain properly so called follows venial sin. For venial sin indeed impedes the splendor which the soul obtains from acts of virtues; but, since it removes or diminishes no infused habit, and since stain signifies a habitual rather than an actual detriment, the soul is stained by venial sin only according to some respect, not properly.

n. 421.

Summary

— I. From the definition of the Councils, it must be held by faith that there are venial sins, which, as they are committed, do not constitute man an enemy of God, but are remissible. And it is certain that such sins are such by their nature, and not from the mere mercy of God. But it is disputed whether or not God could by positive will have made all disorders mortal. Venial sins are explained psychologically, both because we have semi-deliberate acts, and because we can deliberately act not consequentially to our preserved voluntary ordination toward God, the ultimate end, in things which allow the substance of the order to be untouched.

Therefore venial sin is a voluntary disorder concerning a creature, without aversion from God. That which because of the notion of the matter is venial is such from its genus. Because of imperfection, acts are venial, even in grave matter, when they are semi-deliberate acts, and those which, because of the slight quantity of this matter, are excused from grave sin.

II. Venial sin is analogically sin, since it signifies another disorder and offense than mortal sin, and brings in another punishment. It is said to be beside the law, not against it, insofar as it is not done according to the direction opposite to the law, that is, to ordination to the end.

III. Yet it is an evil above every physical evil, and is held in hatred by God, and impedes his sight.

IV. The subject is only man, who has a discursive process and imperfectly subject lower powers.

V. The criteria of venial sin will be: 1. Objectively accidental violations of order, concerning the mode of worshiping God and of preserving justice and charity toward neighbor. In acts which are not referred to others, sins venial from their genus are chiefly found, such as lying itself. 2. Signs of imperfect deliberation, to be taken from presumption, from the spontaneous dictate of conscience, from the state of the agent, from the mode of action, and from its incomplete notion.

VI. Venial sin properly does not pass into mortal. But things gravely culpable can come upon it: affection, an extrinsic end, contempt, scandal, danger of mortal sin, and sometimes accumulated matter.

On the contrary, a quantity which, separated, would be grave, can, as a small part of the whole, be held as light. Nor does the will of committing all venial sins seem grave. Deliberation concerning committing mortal sin is not always perfect, and therefore not subjectively mortal.

VII. There is morally habitual venial sin; nevertheless it consists in no real privation; nor is a stain properly so called produced by venial sin.

Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis

Dominic M. Prümmer, O.P. — 12 passages

Vol. I, Pt. I, Tract V. On Sins In General, Ch. II, Article II. On Mortal Sin

n. 361.

361. Essence. Already above in n. 358 the essence of mortal sin was described in some way in the definition of sin in general. For this definition, given by St. Augustine, principally belongs to mortal sin. Yet for a fuller explanation it is necessary to observe the following: the disorder which is found in mortal sin consists:

1. In aversion from God. From what was said above in n. 20, it is clear that man ought in all his acts, explicitly or at least implicitly, to tend toward his last end, which is God or intimate union with God. But if man does not do this, he sins, and indeed gravely, if he perfectly turns himself away from God, the last end. Therefore mortal or grave sin is essentially aversion from God; and the Angelic Doctor⁴³ says excellently: "When the soul is disordered by sin all the way to aversion from the last end, namely God, to whom it is united through charity, then there is mortal sin"; and elsewhere:⁴⁴ "In any mortal sin the principal reason of evil and gravity is from this, that it turns away from God; for if there could be conversion toward a changeable good without aversion from God, although it would be disordered, it would not be mortal sin."

2. In a gravely disordered conversion toward creatures. For the sinner so vehemently desires a temporal good that he prefers to be turned away from God rather than not to enjoy this good. Therefore aversion from God is necessarily joined with disordered conversion toward creatures,⁴⁵ and each element constitutes a grave injury and therefore an offense against God. By the voluntary aversion of the sinner from God the bond of charity between God and man is broken, and consequently habitual grace is destroyed. But since sanctifying or habitual grace is, as it were, the life of the soul, hence grave sin is deservedly called mortal, namely because it causes the death of the soul. But a dead soul cannot enter into eternal life. Therefore mortal sin, which frivolously breaks on this earth the bond of charity with God, in the other world will justly be punished by violent separation from God in gehenna. This punishment indeed is called the "punishment of loss."

3. In a grave wounding of rational nature. For every sin is true foolishness committed against right reason,⁴⁶ since it is most foolish to lose an infinite good for enjoying a finite good.

4. In a grave wounding of the social order. In some sins this wounding is very open, for example, in homicide, adultery, etc., but in reality it is found in any sin, since, by gravely wounding the sinner, a member of society, it also wounds human society itself.

⁴³ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 72, a. 5.

⁴⁴ 2, 2, q. 20, a. 3 (Leonine ed.).

⁴⁵ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 20, a. 1 ad 1.

⁴⁶ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 71, a. 2.

n. 362.

362. Existence of mortal sin is manifestly drawn from Sacred Scripture. For Christ says concerning certain sins against neighbor: "But I say to you that everyone who is angry with his brother shall be guilty of judgment; ... but he who says, Thou fool, [to his brother] shall be guilty of the gehenna of fire."⁴⁷ - St. Paul affirms: "The wages of sin is death."⁴⁸ Moreover: "If you live according to the flesh, you shall die."⁴⁹ - Therefore mortal sins exist. Nor are only sins perpetrated from fixed malice or against the Holy Spirit⁵⁰ mortal sins - as some theologians wished - but also sins done from grave disordered passion, as for example adultery, fornication, etc.

⁴⁷ Matth. 5, 22.

⁴⁸ Rom. 6, 23.

⁴⁹ Rom. 8, 13; cf. also 1 Cor. 6, 9 and Iac. 1, 15.

⁵⁰ These sins are called sins with the raised hand.

n. 363.

363. Inequality of mortal sins. The ancient Stoics, Jovinian, Novatian, and several Protestants taught that all sins are equal. But this is manifestly false, as appears both from Sacred Scripture and from theological reason. - Christ, speaking to Pilate, said: "He who handed me over to thee has the greater sin."⁵¹ Concerning the Jews Jeremiah says: "They have acted worse than their fathers."⁵² - But the intrinsic reason why one sin is graver than another is chiefly taken from the object disorderedly desired. For sin, as a human act, is specified from its object. But the object of sin admits degrees of disorder. Thus, for example, in adultery there is greater disorder than in fornication. - Against this doctrine it is customary to object: mortal sin is the death of the soul. But death does not admit more and less. Therefore neither does mortal sin. But it is easily responded: sin is not the death of the soul formally, but effectively, that is, sin indeed produces death, but it is not death itself, just as a sword which produces death is not death. But just as diverse causes producing the death of the body can be greater and lesser, for example, the ball of a gun and the ball of a ballista, so also diverse sins causing the death of the soul.⁵³

Rules for discerning the gravity of sins. For judging concerning the gravity of individual sins it is necessary to recall those things which were said above in n. 110 sqq. concerning object, circumstances, and end as sources of morality. Therefore one must consider first of all the nobility of the virtue to which the sin is opposed. The highest and noblest virtue is charity. Hence sins directly opposed to the virtue of charity are the gravest, for example, hatred of God, which is called by St. Thomas simply "the worst sin of man."⁵⁴ Charity toward neighbor is prescribed in an equal manner as charity toward God. Hence sins which wound charity toward neighbor are graver than the rest, and the nobler the good of the neighbor that is wounded, the graver is the sin. Thus homicide, which wounds the highest natural good of the neighbor, namely bodily life, and which sometimes also produces the eternal ruin of the neighbor, is a much graver sin than adultery, by which a lesser good is wounded. Next the circumstances must be considered, because, although the gravity of sins must primarily be taken from the gravity of the object and from the nobility of the virtue to which they are opposed,⁵⁵ nevertheless it also depends on the circumstances of person, place, time, etc. Thus, for example, by blaspheming a priest sins much more gravely than a driver. St. Thomas observes⁵⁶ that carnal sins, for example, sins of lust, are of themselves and all else being equal lesser than spiritual sins, for example, blasphemy, hatred of neighbor, because the aversion is greater and the temptation is customarily lesser in spiritual sins than in carnal sins. But carnal sins are more infamous because they render man like brute beings; and besides, they are customarily more dangerous because temptations to them are more vehement and the habits arising from them are eradicated with greater difficulty. "Let those attend to these things," says Billuart,⁵⁷ "not a few who wish to be held spiritual and look down with pharisaical disdain upon others on account of certain human falls, while they themselves are stained with graver sins of pride, envy, detraction, etc."

⁵¹ Io. 19, 11.

⁵² Ier. 7, 26; cf. also Thren. 4, 6.

⁵³ Cf. Billuart, De pecc. diss. 3, a. 2.

⁵⁴ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 34, a. 2. Blessed Albert the Great says: "Infidelity is the greatest sin simply" (in 4, dist. 39, a. 2 ad 4). But nevertheless there does not seem to be anything except an apparent contradiction between Blessed Albert and St. Thomas; for Blessed Albert considers the gravity of infidelity by reason of the harm which it brings in, which indeed can be graver than simple hatred of God; indeed it can include hatred of God.

⁵⁵ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 73, a. 4.

⁵⁶ Ib. a. 5.

⁵⁷ De pecc. diss. 3, a. 3.

n. 364.

364. Conditions required for mortal sin. For mortal sin three things are necessary: 1. grave matter, 2. full advertence, 3. perfect consent of the will. The reason is that mortal sin produces such deadly effects - it destroys the friendship of God and sanctifying grace, thrusts down into gehenna, etc.; cf. below n. 392 - that no human act is to be judged so evil unless a) it is perfectly voluntary, that is, has been performed with perfect advertence and full consent, and b) it is concerned with grave matter.

1. Grave matter necessary for mortal sin can be defined and discerned both from authority and from reason. Authority is threefold, namely that of Sacred Scripture, of the Church, and of the Doctors.

If in Scripture certain sins are said to exclude from the kingdom of heaven, to be worthy of death or eternal fire, execrable, abominable, etc., they are judged grave and their matter grave, for example fornication, adultery, etc.

If decrees of Supreme Pontiffs or of Councils have declared some sin to be grave, its matter is grave. Thus we know that there is grave matter if someone omits an act of charity for five years,⁵⁸ if someone transgresses the precept of observing feasts.⁵⁹

By the authority of Doctors and theologians we know what matter is grave in theft, in violation of fasting, etc.

By reason the gravity of sin must be weighed from the object and circumstances of the act. But that sin is judged grave from the object and circumstances which brings in a grave disorder against the eternal law of God, that is, against God, or human society, or neighbor, or ourselves. But the gravity of the disorder must be weighed according to prudent judgment, with account taken of the precept and of its end, which is impeded. Thus to omit the infusion of drops of water into the wine to be consecrated is judged a grave sin and grave matter, because the signification of that infusion is most grave, namely the blood and water flowing from the side of Christ are signified. But to destroy such a signification seems to be grave matter in the sacrifice of the Mass, by which the sacrifice of the cross is recalled.

Therefore grave matter is required for mortal sin. But light matter cannot constitute anything except a light sin. Nevertheless there are certain sins which are not excused from grave fault on account of lightness of matter, or rather, in which any matter whatever freely willed is always grave. They are called mortal sins ex toto genere suo, from their whole genus. Whenever in these there are full advertence and full consent, mortal sin also exists. Such sins are, for example, blasphemy, hatred of God, lust, violation of the natural or eucharistic fast, etc. But the intrinsic reason is that even the least fully voluntary act of sins of this kind includes grave disorder. Hence the common manner of speaking, "Sins mortal ex toto genere suo do not admit smallness of matter," must be understood thus: any fully voluntary matter whatever of these sins is a grave disorder and therefore a grave sin. Yet these sins become venial from imperfection of the act, namely when full advertence or full consent is lacking. Thus, for example, semi-deliberate lascivious thoughts are venial sins, as also second-first acts of blasphemy are. - Other sins, mortal from the object, which nevertheless admit smallness of matter even when full advertence and full consent exist, are called mortal ex genere suo, from their genus, for example theft, causing damage, etc. Therefore the following expressions must be noted:

venial sin ex genere suo (lying);

mortal sin ex genere suo (theft);

mortal sin ex toto genere suo (lust).

⁵⁸ Prop. 6, condemned by Innocent XI; apud Denz. n. 1156.

⁵⁹ Prop. 52 condemned, Denz. n. 1202.

n. 365.

365. 2. Full advertence. Advertence can be concerned with a twofold object, namely with the physical act and with the malice of that physical act. The first advertence can be present without the other, for example someone knowingly eats meats, but does not know or has forgotten that today this eating is illicit because of Friday. If the first advertence is lacking, the act is no longer human, but an act of man, and therefore cannot be a mortal sin. As to the other advertence, authors do not agree on what kind is necessary for mortal sin. All indeed teach that advertence must be full, and that half-full advertence does not suffice, but they dispute among themselves whether actual advertence is required or virtual advertence suffices. That actual advertence is required is taught by several authors cited by St. Alphonsus;⁶⁰ that virtual advertence suffices is judged by Cajetan, Billuart,⁶¹ and others. It seems to be a dispute over a word. Certainly false and savoring of Jansenism is the opinion of a few who say that all transgressions of law are to be imputed, even if no actual advertence ever intervened, neither direct nor indirect, neither clear nor confused advertence of the malice of the act, and that interpretative advertence suffices, which consists solely in this, that a man has had the physical and remote power of adverting to the malice. St. Alphonsus deservedly says⁶² of this opinion: "It would follow that very many men would find themselves burdened with many mortal faults, though they had never had any cognition whatever concerning them." On the contrary, for mortal sin it is by no means required that one here and now actually advert to the malice of the act; crass and supine inadvertence suffices. For if actual ignorance or inadvertence is voluntary and culpable in the cause, for example because of negligence,⁶³ because of passion which one deliberately wishes to follow,⁶⁴ because of a bad habit which one knowingly retains,⁶⁵ without any doubt it does not excuse from mortal sin. Thus, for example, prostitutes are sometimes so carried away by their own most evil life and vices that they no longer actually attend to the malice of individual shameful acts. Nevertheless those shameful acts, notwithstanding actual inadvertence to the malice, are mortal sins.

Clear advertence is not required, but confused advertence to the malice of the act suffices. Therefore it is by no means necessary that one clearly and explicitly advert to the whole malice of the act. Thus, for example, he who kills his enemy commits homicide with all the circumstances which he could and ought to have foreseen, even if he does not actually think that this enemy is, for example, the father of a family, is perhaps in mortal sin, that God has forbidden homicide, etc.; or a priest who sins against chastity also commits sacrilege, although here and now he thinks nothing of the vow of chastity being violated.

Note. In practice it is not rarely rather difficult for the confessor to discern whether full advertence was present or not. If the penitent is of a timorous conscience, for the most part it is licit to judge that full advertence was not present, if some doubt arises about it; but if the penitent is of a lax conscience and a freer life, the presumption stands for sufficient advertence having been had.

Signs of half-full advertence are:

a) If someone committed the act half-asleep or half-drunk or almost not master of himself. Note this concerning pollution which occurs in sleep or in drowsiness!

b) If someone, carried away by a most vehement passion, did not retain the full use of reason, for example in anger.

c) If someone labors under pathological states or affections, for example hysteria, mania, phobia, etc.

d) If after the deed someone scarcely remembers what gravely evil thing he did, or if he says firmly to himself that he would never have done it if beforehand he had seriously thought.

⁶⁰ Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 4.

⁶¹ De pecc. diss. 5, a. 6.

⁶² L. c.

⁶³ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 76, a. 3. De malo q. 3, a. 7 ad 7 et 8.

⁶⁴ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 6, a. 8. De malo q. 3, a. 10.

⁶⁵ S. theol. l. c.

n. 366.

366. 3. Perfect consent. Whenever full advertence has been present together with freedom from coercion or violence, perfect consent exists. Therefore fear and passion indeed lessen consent, but they do not take it away, unless, however, they disturb reason. Thus, for example, a woman who is violated, violence having been inflicted, does not sin; on the contrary, she sins if, from grave fear of infamy or of another evil, she permits violation or other lustful acts. Likewise a young man sins who, as grave temptation grows hot, procures pollution, provided however that the use of reason is not utterly disturbed by passion or fear.

Signs of half-perfect consent in doubt about consent given:

a) If someone is of a timorous conscience and habitually abhors committing grave sin.

b) If someone has experienced the desire of doing something evil and nevertheless has abstained from the external act, even if he could easily have sinned externally.

c) If someone, perceiving temptations, is immediately troubled and saddened.

Moreover, in practice the same thing holds concerning consent as was said above concerning advertence: in doubt one must stand for that for which the presumption stands. A man of a timorous conscience, in doubt about sufficient consent, is not judged to have consented fully; it is otherwise if the man has a lax conscience. If the matter remains doubtful, let the confessor leave it to divine judgment.

Vol. I, Pt. I, Tract V. On Sins In General, Ch. II, Article III. On Venial Sin

n. 367.

367. Notion. According to the force of the word, venial sin is that which can obtain pardon. In this sense all sins committed on this earth are venial, because they are remissible. St. Thomas notes⁶⁶ (with several authors of the thirteenth century) that sin is called venial in three ways: 1. from the outcome, because it has obtained pardon; and thus St. Ambrose says that "every sin through penance becomes venial"; 2. on the part of the cause, insofar as it has in itself something lessening the fault, as when it is done from infirmity or ignorance, although in itself it is a grave sin; 3. on the part of its own nature, insofar as it takes away neither the order to the ultimate end nor sanctifying grace. Here we speak only of venial sin in the third sense. But in what the essence of such venial sin accurately consists, authors do not agree.

a) It is certain that the essence of venial sin does not consist in this, that venial sin is against counsel, but mortal sin is against precept. This opinion is attributed by some, though others contradict, to Scotus.⁶⁷ The falsity of this opinion is manifest. For, for example, an officious lie, which is a venial sin, is strictly prohibited and not only dissuaded.

b) Likewise it is certain that the essence of venial sin does not consist in this, that it brings in temporal punishments, while on the contrary mortal sin brings in eternal punishment; nor in this, that mortal sin makes an irreparable disorder, but venial sin a reparable one. For these are rather effects of venial and mortal sin, but not their constitutive differences.⁶⁸

c) Leaving aside these opinions, some say that venial sin neither turns away from God nor constitutes the creature as the ultimate end of the sinner, as mortal sin does; others teach that mortal sin errs concerning the ultimate end, but venial sin concerning the means to the ultimate end; others say that mortal sin is contrary to charity, but venial sin is not; others think that mortal sin is the death of the soul, while venial sin is only a sickness of the soul. - Perhaps all these modes of speaking differ rather in words than in the thing signified. The better mode of speaking seems to be: the essence of venial sin consists in a certain disorder, but not in total aversion from the ultimate end, as mortal sin is. Thus also speaks the Angelic Doctor:⁶⁹ "Sins which have disorder concerning those things which are for the end, the order to the ultimate end being preserved, are reparable and are called venial." But if the same Angelic Doctor sometimes teaches that venial sin is not against but beside the law of God,⁷⁰ it must be understood in this way: venial sin is not against the law simply but in a certain respect, that is, it is not against the end and fullness of the law, or it does not destroy union with God as ultimate end, but certainly it is against the law, because it is a transgression of the law. Hence St. Thomas himself in several places⁷¹ expressly teaches that venial sin is against the law, that is, that it is a transgression of the law.

d) From what has been said it is apparent that there is the greatest difference between mortal and venial sin; indeed venial sin is not called sin except analogically. Hence theologians commonly teach that the notion of sin and of offense against God belongs not univocally but analogically to mortal and venial sin, just as the notion of being belongs analogically to substance and accident.⁷² But just as a thousand accidents do not constitute one substance, so any number however great of venial sins does not constitute one mortal sin nor is it equivalent to it in malice.⁷³ Indeed certain texts of the Holy Fathers, considered at first glance, apparently teach the contrary. Thus, for example, St. Augustine⁷⁴ says: "Those [light sins], although they are perceived not to strike, one by one, with a lethal wound, ... nevertheless all gathered together, like scabies, the more numerous they are, kill." But these and similar things must be explained with the Angelic Doctor⁷⁵ in this sense, "that many venial sins dispositively cause mortal sin." Moreover, concerning the effects of venial sin the discussion will return below in n. 390. - But small thefts and other venial sins on account of smallness of matter, if they are multiplied, can at last sometimes coalesce, so that they constitute a mortal sin. Then, however, the venial sins themselves do not coalesce, but the matter coalesces, which becomes grave. But to transgress the law in grave matter is a mortal sin.

⁶⁶ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 88, a. 2. Cf. Bl. Albert the Great 2, dist. 22, a. 4 ad 2.

⁶⁷ 2, dist. 21, q. 1. Cf. Billuart, De pecc. diss. 8, a. 2.

⁶⁸ De malo q. 7, a. 1.

⁶⁹ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 88, a. 1.

⁷⁰ "It is fittingly said that venial sin is not against the law, but beside the law: because, if in some respect it withdraws from the order of law, nevertheless it does not corrupt the law itself, because it does not corrupt charity, which is the fullness of the law" (De malo q. 7, a. 1 ad 1). Cf. Cajetan, Com. in 1, 2, q. 88, a. 1.

⁷¹ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 74, a. 10 ad 1; 2, 2, q. 100, a. 3.

⁷² S. theol. 1, 2, q. 88, a. 1 ad 1. De malo q. 7, a. 1 ad 1. Durandus, as is his custom, contradicts St. Thomas.

⁷³ S. theol. l. c. a. 4.

⁷⁴ Sermo 351, n. 5 (Migne, Patr. lat. 39, 1541).

⁷⁵ S. theol. l. c. ad 1.

n. 368.

368. Two corollaries follow from the nature of venial sin explained thus far:

1. The act of venial sin in a just man is in some way referred to God.⁷⁶ This indeed is not to be understood as if a just man actually referred his venial sins to God or to his honor. For this would be blasphemy, since even venial sin is an injury and offense against God; but the act of venial sin is referred to God because it coexists with the habit of charity in a man who does not wish gravely to offend God and destroy his friendship, and who himself tends toward God as ultimate end.⁷⁷

2. Adam and Eve before the fall could not sin venially in Paradise, but their first sin necessarily was mortal. So St. Thomas⁷⁸ and the Thomists. The reason is that in the state of innocence the first parents had the gift of original justice, which impedes venial sin. For venial sin can occur only in a twofold way: a) on account of imperfection of the act, when namely full advertence or full consent is not present, as, for example, semi-deliberate morose delectations; b) on account of disorder concerning means which are for the end, the order of the end itself being preserved, as are venial sins from their genus or from smallness of matter. But each of these was impossible in the state of innocence, because each happens on account of a defect of order, from the fact that the lower powers of man refuse to obey the higher. For the fact that sudden motions of sensuality arise in us, which induce to action before reason has perfectly deliberated, and so produce venial sin from imperfection of the act, arises from an order disturbed between reason and the lower powers of the soul. But the fact that the human soul is disordered concerning means which are for the end, while due order to the end itself is preserved, comes from this, that the means which are for the end are not infallibly ordered under the end. But in the state of innocence, as long as Adam and Eve were subject to God, there was the most perfect and most firm submission and due ordering among the diverse powers of the soul. Therefore Adam and Eve could not sin venially either from imperfection of the act or from lightness of matter, as long as their most happy union with God had not been destroyed through mortal sin. - Likewise an angel, whether good or evil, cannot sin venially for the same reason.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 88, a. 1 ad 2 et 3; 2, 2, q. 24, a. 10 ad 2.

⁷⁷ Cf. Billuart, De pecc. diss. 8, a. 4, § 2.

⁷⁸ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 89, a. 3. De malo q. 7, a. 7.

⁷⁹ S. theol. ib. a. 4.

n. 369.

369. The existence of venial sin was denied by Pelagius, Wiclef, Luther,⁸⁰ Melanchthon, Calvin, Baius, and perhaps also by Gerson,⁸¹ all of whom do not seem to admit an intrinsic difference between mortal and venial sin. Nevertheless it is of faith that man, both the just man and the sinner, can sin venially. This indeed appears from Sacred Scripture, from the Holy Fathers, and from definitions of the Church.

1. Sacred Scripture, without any respect to persons, compares certain sins to very light things, certain sins to very grave things. Thus some are compared to a gnat, some to a camel;⁸² some to a mote, some to a beam.⁸³ Likewise according to Sacred Scripture all men commit certain sins. But it cannot be said that even all just men commit mortal sins. Thus, for example, it is said: "In many things we all offend."⁸⁴ "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us."⁸⁵ "The just man shall fall seven times and shall rise again."⁸⁶

Often also the text of St. Paul, 1 Cor. 3, 10 sqq., is brought forward to prove the existence both of venial sin and of purgatory: "According to the grace of God which was given to me, as a wise architect I have laid the foundation; but another builds upon it. But let each one see how he builds upon it. For no one can lay another foundation besides that which has been laid, which is Christ Jesus. But if anyone builds upon this foundation gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay, stubble, the work of each one will be manifest; for the day of the Lord will declare it, because it will be revealed in fire, and the fire will prove of what sort each one's work is. If anyone's work remains, which he built upon it, he will receive a reward. If anyone's work burns, he will suffer loss; but he himself will be saved, yet so as through fire." - Although in this text the discussion is not directly about venial sins, but only about certain not so correct doctrines of the Corinthian doctors, which are compared to wood, hay, and stubble, nevertheless at least indirectly and by way of conclusion this text seems clearly enough to prove the existence both of venial sin and of purgatory;⁸⁷ for those doctors will endure temporal punishment through fire for the less correct doctrines proposed, and therefore they had previously sinned venially.

2. The Holy Fathers speak of venial or light sins. Thus St. Ambrose says:⁸⁸ "Because, just as there is one baptism, so there is one penance, which however is done publicly; for daily sin ought to cause us to repent; but this penance is for light delicts, that one for grave delicts." Indeed already Tertullian speaks of light sins, explaining the text of St. John, "He who knows his brother to sin a sin not unto death, let him ask, and life shall be given to him who sins not unto death,"⁸⁹ in this way: "Nor have we ourselves fallen away from that distinction of delicts from which we departed. For here also John commended that [distinction], that there are certain delicts of daily incursion, to which we all are subject. For to whom does it not happen either to be angry unjustly and beyond the setting of the sun, or even to lay on a hand, or easily to speak evil, or to judge rashly, or to destroy faith pledged, or to lie from shame or necessity? ... In eating, in seeing, in hearing, how greatly we are tempted, so that, if there were no pardon for these things, salvation would belong to no one.... But there are also things contrary to these, as graver and deadly, which do not receive pardon: homicide, idolatry, blasphemy, certainly, and adultery and fornication. Beyond these Christ will not be an intercessor [the sense seems to be: these cannot be blotted out by prayer alone]. These things he who has been born of God will by no means admit.... Thus John's account of diversity will stand, disposing the distinction of delicts."⁹⁰ Although Tertullian, as is his custom, does not speak so clearly, nevertheless this text seems to be of great moment for a twofold reason, namely a) because it is a very ancient testimony for the distinction between grave and light sins; and b) because Tertullian interpreted the text of St. John the Apostle in this way. - More clearly concerning the distinction between grave and light sins speaks St. Augustine:⁹¹ "For those whom you see doing penance have committed crimes, either adulteries or certain immense deeds: hence they do penance. For if their sins were light, daily prayer would suffice for blotting these out." From the times of St. Augustine onward testimonies for the existence of venial sin abound.⁹²

3. Definitions of the Church concerning venial sin are not lacking. The Council of Trent says: "For although in this mortal life even the saints and just, however holy, sometimes fall at least into light and daily sins, which are also called venial, they do not for that reason cease to be just."⁹³ Pius V condemned the proposition (20) of Baius: "There is no sin venial by its own nature, but every sin merits eternal punishment."⁹⁴

Therefore it is certain by faith that venial sins exist, that is, sins which of themselves do not cause the death of the soul. The same is very consonant with right reason, which utterly recoils from an opinion asserting that because of any light sin whatever, for example because of a jocose lie or a voluntary distraction in prayer, a just man loses sanctifying grace and becomes worthy of the eternal punishment of gehenna.

⁸⁰ Luther thought that a just man cannot sin mortally: "You see how rich a Christian man is. Even willing, he cannot lose his salvation by however many sins, unless he should be unwilling to believe. For no sins can damn him except unbelief alone. All the rest, if faith returns or stands in the divine promise made to the baptized, are in a moment absorbed through the same faith" (De captiv. Babyl.).

⁸¹ Heretics do not admit venial sin except from the outcome, that is, because of pardon afterwards following; and this indeed happens from predestination (Wiclef), from faith (Luther), or from both at once (Calvin). Gerson, however, thought that every sin, even a light one, merits eternal punishment, but that from divine mercy certain light sins are not imputed unto death. (Lib. de vit. spir. animae, lect. 1.) Baius taught the same (Prop. condemned 20). Cf. Billuart l. c. a. 1.

⁸² Matth. 23, 24.

⁸³ Luc. 6, 41.

⁸⁴ Iac. 3, 2.

⁸⁵ 1 Io. 1, 8.

⁸⁶ Prov. 24, 16. Many exegetes understand this text of light sins, for example Jerome, St. Gregory, St. Bede, etc.; but others more rightly understand it of tribulation or persecution.

⁸⁷ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 89, a. 2. In 1 Cor. c. 3, lect. 2 ad vers. 12.

⁸⁸ De poenit. c. 10 (Migne, Patr. lat. 16, 541).

⁸⁹ 1 Io. 5, 16.

⁹⁰ De pudicitia c. 19 (Migne, Patr. lat. 2, 1074).

⁹¹ De symb. ad Catech. c. 7 (Migne, Patr. lat. 40, 636).

⁹² Cf. Billuart, De pecc. diss. 8, a. 1.

⁹³ Sess. 6, c. 11 de iustif. (Denz. n. 804).

⁹⁴ Denz. n. 1020; cf. also n. 748 1539.

n. 370.

370. Divisions. Venial sins are distinguished as of a threefold genus:

ex genere suo, from their genus, namely those sins whose moral object constitutes only a light disorder, for example a jocose lie, an idle word, etc.;
ex parvitate materiae, from smallness of matter, namely those sins which indeed of themselves are grave, but nevertheless because of light matter are also light disorders, for example the theft of an obol;
ex imperfectione actus, from imperfection of the act, when full advertence or full consent is lacking, as happens in all objectively evil second-first acts, for example semi-deliberate impure thoughts.

n. 371.

371. Change of malice. Although venial sin can never become mortal by multiplication, as was said above in n. 367, nevertheless an action objectively evil venially can become subjectively mortally sinful, and conversely an action objectively gravely evil can become subjectively lightly evil. In this sense authors are accustomed to say briefly: venial sin becomes mortal, and conversely mortal sin becomes venial.

a) Venial sin considered objectively becomes subjectively mortal in the following ways:

1. From erroneous conscience. Thus, for example, if someone, firmly believing that every lie committed in the tribunal of penance, even about those things which do not pertain to the integrity of confession, is a mortal sin, nevertheless lies in the confessional, he truly sins mortally. This is clear from what was said above in n. 307 concerning erroneous conscience.

2. From a gravely evil end of the one acting. Thus, for example, if someone lies with the intention of fornicating, he sins gravely. The reason is that the end of the one acting specifies the act. This is clear from what was said above in n. 121.

3. From multiplied matter coalescing. But the matters of sins coalesce if a) they fall under the same precept and b) they are morally united. Thus, for example, several light parts omitted from the same Divine Office coalesce, as do several light eatings done on the same day of fasting; on the contrary, parts pertaining to diverse Offices do not coalesce, nor do light eatings done on diverse days. The matter of small thefts can so coalesce that at last, at some time, it becomes grave; and then the thief sins mortally by each following small theft, because in any following theft he is judged to hold ratified all the preceding takings, which, taken together, assuredly constitute grave matter.⁹⁵

4. From formal contempt. Theologians are accustomed to distinguish a twofold formal contempt: one perfect, the other imperfect. - The first is total rebellion against the superior commanding, so that the subject now refuses to obey in any matter whatever. It is clear that contempt of this kind is always a mortal sin, whenever it is repeated even in a light matter. For it is a grave wound to the virtue of obedience. - The other formal contempt, namely imperfect contempt, is refusal of obedience in some determined matter, yet together with readiness to obey in other matters. Authors do not agree whether even this imperfect contempt, even if it is objectively light, renders any disobedience gravely evil. There seems to be only an apparent disagreement among authors. For if such contempt is material rather than formal, it certainly admits smallness of matter; but if it is strictly formal, so that the superior himself as superior is spurned, it seems always to be gravely sinful according to that saying of St. Luke: "He who spurns you, spurns me,"⁹⁶ because it is a grave injury inflicted upon a lawful superior.

5. From grave detriment (whether of material damage, or scandal, or danger of sinning), which is foreseen as going to follow from venial sin. Thus, for example, he sins mortally who foresees that grave quarrels will arise from jocose words; he sins gravely who is so addicted to play that he omits hearing Mass on a day of precept, that he neglects the duties of his state; he sins gravely who from curiosity reads rather free things with proximate danger of falling into grave sin.⁹⁷

b) Mortal sin considered objectively becomes subjectively venial in the following ways:

1. From erroneous conscience. This is clear from what was said above in n. 307.

2. From imperfection of the act,⁹⁸ when namely sufficient advertence or full consent is lacking. From imperfection of the act any mortal sin whatever, even that which is mortal ex toto genere suo, from its whole genus, such as lust, blasphemy, etc., can become venial. But the reason is that for mortal sin, to which such enormous punishments are inflicted, such as the privation of sanctifying grace, the eternal punishment of gehenna, etc., a human act perfectly deliberated and voluntary is deservedly necessary. For it would be too harsh if such punishments were inflicted on account of an act not perfectly imputable to the agent.

3. From smallness of matter. As is manifest from what was said above, grave matter is required for mortal sin; if this is lacking, mortal sin also must be lacking. Sins mortal from their whole genus do not admit smallness of matter, but only sins mortal from their genus, such as theft, detraction, disobedience, etc.

⁹⁵ Cf. below II in the treatise on justice.

⁹⁶ Luc. 10, 16.

⁹⁷ Cf. Billuart, De pecc. diss. 8, a. 3, § 2.

⁹⁸ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 88, a. 6.

n. 372.

372. Scholion. On the difficulty of discerning the gravity of sin. All theologians agree that mortal sin is present as often as the three conditions listed above in n. 364 are present; but in practice it is very difficult, indeed not seldom altogether impossible, to judge whether an act committed, with all the circumstances and the dispositions of the penitent attended to, is a mortal sin or not. Who, for example, can always determine with certitude when matter grave and sufficient for mortal sin is accurately present in theft; when sufficient consent was present in depraved thoughts; when sufficient advertence intervened in blasphemies uttered by uneducated men! St. Augustine, as an eagle among the Doctors, confesses that notwithstanding his own study he could not arrive at this, and warns that this must be weighed by divine rather than human judgment.⁹⁹ Since these things are so, let the confessor not be prone to judging that such or such an act was a mortal sin. Often he must leave the judgment to divine wisdom; let him be solicitous about arousing contrition in the heart of the penitent, and earnestly exhort him to abstain from every deliberate sin.

As objective criteria for discerning between grave and light sins are held the same things which were indicated above in n. 364 for recognizing grave matter in sin, namely:

Authority a) of Sacred Scripture; b) of the Church; c) of the Doctors.
Right reason, judging whether some sin wounds gravely or lightly the moral order instituted by God.

⁹⁹ De civ. Dei l. 22, c. ult., and Enchir. c. 78.

Marc, Institutiones Morales

Clement Marc, C.SS.R. — 18 passages

Vol. I, Part First: On the First P…, Tr. IV, Chapter III: On the Gravity of Sins · Vol. I, Part First: On the First P…, Tr. IV, Ch. III, Article I: On Mortal Sin · Vol. I, Part First: On the First P…, Tr. IV, Ch. III, Article II: On Venial Sin

Vol. I, Part First: On the First P…, Tr. IV, Chapter III: On the Gravity of Sins

St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 72, a. 5; q. 88-89; de Malo, VII, a. 1, 2; Contra Gentes, l. 3, c. 143; Lib. Sent., II, D. 42, q. 1, a. 3; St. Alphonsus, V, n. 1; ed. G., II, n. 705; III, 132: "On the abuse of speaking evil of the dead"; ed. G., II, p. 456; Aertnys, l. 1, n. 228; Lehmkuhl, I, 334; Scheeben, Dogmatik, II, 528 seqq.; Koch, Lehrb. der Moralth., 243; Gopfert, I, 224; controversy with Schell apud Commer; Mausbach, Kath. Mor., p. 214; Manning, Sin and its consequences.

The gravity of sin is the measure of malice, or deformity, which the act has with right reason, or (what is the same) the greater or lesser offense of God contained in sin.

n. ¶333.

PRINCIPLES. I. Not all sins are of the same gravity, but some are graver than others. This is of faith against Jovinian; and is proved: 1. From Scripture, for example, from the words of the Lord to Pilate: He who handed me over to thee has the greater sin (John 19:11). 2. From reason. For sin is a disorder of a human act. But such a disorder can be greater or lesser, as is luminously clear from the things said concerning the morality of human acts. Therefore.

II. Some sins are mortal, others venial. This is of faith against Calvin and Baius. It is proved: 1. From Scripture, which declares some sins worthy of death: Those who do such things are worthy of death (Rom. 1:32). Likewise the classic text 1 Cor. III, 8. Then (Matt. 7:3) some sins are likened to a beam, others to a mote: but a mote is a light thing, a beam something grave. 2. From the decrees of the Church, for example, from the condemnation of the 20th proposition of Baius, asserting: "There is no sin venial from its nature, but every sin merits eternal punishment." Likewise from Trent (Sess. XIV, c. 5), which teaches that all mortal sins which occur to memory are to be confessed; not likewise venial sins.

n. ¶334.

Questions. QUAER. 1. Whence must the diverse gravity of sins be taken?

Resp. 1. It must be taken primarily on the part of the object, or from the dignity of the virtues to which sins are opposed. Thus, for example, blasphemy, from its genus, is a greater sin than theft; because it is opposed to a more excellent virtue, namely religion (1.2, q. 73, a. 4).

It must be taken secondarily from the circumstances, for example, from the dignity of the person, from the duration or intensity of the act, from the effects, but especially from the greater or lesser grade of knowledge, advertence, and consent.

Hence, other things being equal: graver are a man's sins committed against God than against himself and neighbor; sins of commission than of omission; sins of mouth and work than of heart; sins of malice than sins of infirmity, and these graver than sins of ignorance; sins of those who excel in knowledge, virtue, dignity, etc. (St. Alph., Selva, P. I, c. 4).

QUAER. 2. Whether a sin lighter from the object can, by reason of a circumstance, exceed the gravity of a sin of a superior species?

Resp. Affirmatively, more probably with St. Thomas and others: "because although, regularly, the graver sin is that which is opposed to the more perfect virtue, nevertheless, since the gravity of a sin of a superior species is finite, therefore, even if physically it cannot be exceeded by the malice of a sin of an inferior species, it can indeed be exceeded morally." Thus, for example, gold is more precious than silver and lead. Yet this does not prevent a great heap, or mountain, of silver from being more precious than a small mass of gold. "And therefore the aforesaid rule of measuring the gravity of sin from opposition to the superior virtue runs only when sins are the greatest against each virtue, but not when the comparison is made of the greatest sin to the least" (V, 34; H. Ap., III, 56).

Hence morally sodomy and bestiality are graver sins than perjury, as St. Thomas teaches with the Salmanticenses. Within the ambit of the same virtue, sins against a prohibiting law are also physically graver. In general, a sin is graver the nobler the person against whom it is directed; whence sacrilegious Communion, according to St. Thomas, is not the gravest sin of all. Moreover, a sin is graver the more important the good which is wounded, for example, in sins against charity owed to the neighbor (Lehmk., I at the end).

In sin also the aspect of malice and the aspect of harm which it brings must be distinguished. From this St. Thomas observes (1.2, q. 73, a. 5): spiritual sins are, according to themselves, greater than carnal sins; but carnal sins are of the greatest adherence. Wherefore, the greatest cautions must always be employed, so that even the very beginnings from which that most dangerous pest can arise may be strongly resisted.

With these things premised, the matter must be discussed: 1. concerning mortal sin; 2. concerning venial.

Vol. I, Part First: On the First P…, Tr. IV, Ch. III, Article I: On Mortal Sin

n. ¶335.

DEFINITION. Mortal sin is a deliberate transgression of a law gravely obliging, or: an OFFENSE, that is, an injury OF GOD, which, on account of its gravity, dissolves grace and friendship with God, and merits eternal punishment (see n. 339). "It is called mortal, because it removes the principle of spiritual life, namely habitual grace, and brings death to the soul" (V, 51; cf. Inst. Cat., Introd.).

DIVISION. Mortal sin is such either from its whole genus, or from its genus simply, or per accidens.

It is mortal from its whole genus, when by reason of the object it is always grave, because the whole notion of offense is detected both in the least and in the greatest quantity of matter.

Of this kind are hatred of God, formal heresy, perjury, blasphemy, simony by divine right, direct violation of the sacramental seal, or breaking the fast before Communion, venereal acts outside marriage, etc. These never admit smallness of matter: because they always contain grave disorder by reason of the object (V, 56).

It is mortal from its genus (simply or not from the whole), when by reason of the object it can be mortal or venial according to the quantity of matter; but the sin is not mortal unless it reaches a certain quantity of matter.

Of this kind are thefts and other sins against justice; for they admit smallness of matter (V, 54-56; H. Ap., III, 67).

It is mortal per accidens (venial per se), if by reason of the object, or considering the nature of the thing, it is indeed light, but has been made grave

by reason of some special circumstance which intervenes in the act, for example, by reason of error, scandal, etc., as will be explained below (n. 342, q. 3).

n. ¶336.

PRINCIPLE. For mortal sin three things are necessarily required, namely grave matter, full advertence of the intellect, and perfect consent of the will. The reason is because, human frailty being considered, it does not seem to befit divine goodness to punish man with eternal torments on account of a transgression in matter altogether light, or on account of the violation of an obligation not fully and perfectly voluntary (V, 53).

There is required 1. Grave matter, namely matter which is such either according to itself, or by reason of some circumstance, for example, if the end of the legislator is of great moment, to which the law contributes very much, or if grave scandal must be avoided, etc.

Full advertence to the grave obligation, and therefore in the definition of mortal sin there is added deliberate, that is, perfect in the line of act.

For the intellect can advert in a twofold way: either fully, when someone, fully master of himself, perfectly discerns the matter, having the mind free; or half-fully, when he discerns the matter in an imperfect way, as happens in half-wakefulness, in half-drunkenness, in distraction, in most vehement passion. Now, in order that a sin be mortal, full advertence is always required either to the malice of the act, or to the danger of sinning, or to the obligation of averting such a danger; and this either actually, while the action is posited, or in the beginning when the cause was freely posited, from which afterwards the evil act followed (Conf. dir., III). Cf. n. 318.

Perfect consent of the will. Consent is called perfect when the act of the will embracing evil is wholly free and deliberate, or when it follows wholly full advertence of the intellect; but imperfect, if it was sudden, without sufficient deliberation, or if it follows half-full advertence; or finally, if only the inferior part of the soul consents, with tepid resistance of the will (cf. n. 322, q. 1).

Now, for mortal sin, which is full and consummated fault, imperfect consent does not suffice, but full and perfect consent is required, in which there is the whole notion of the voluntary. This is common and certain, says St. Alphonsus (V, 5), among the Doctors even of the more rigid opinion. Nevertheless it can happen that the will, with only indirect consent, commits mortal sin, if, namely, with the effect foreseen, it wills the cause, as was said above (H. Ap., III, 40). Cf. n. 319, 321.

Note. Virtual and confused advertence suffices, provided it is full; nor is it required that it be distinct. It is distinct when someone discerns the quality or quantity of the sin; concerning virtual we spoke n. 317; it will be confused when, by an act of the intellect fully conscious of itself, he doubts or suspects the malice of the action (V, 3). This suffices for perfect consent and for mortal sin, as is clear from the things said n. 36. Therefore neither is it required, as certain neoterics have thought (but afterwards they taught this less openly), that mortal sin must be committed from rebellion against God, from formal insurrection against God, from hatred of God and with a certain pertinacity. See Commer, Herrmann Schell, p. 118.

n. ¶337.

Questions. QUAER. 1. How can the objective gravity of sins, or gravity BY REASON OF MATTER, be known?

Resp. The objective gravity of sins is known:

I. From authority: 1. From Sacred Letters. "Which sins are light, which grave, must be weighed not by human, but by divine judgment," says St. Augustine (Ench., c. 78). Therefore those sins must be considered mortal which in Sacred Letters are said to be worthy of death, or to exclude from the kingdom of heaven, or hateful to God, etc. For words of this kind signify that the deformity of the action is certainly grave. 2. From the definitions of Supreme Pontiffs and decrees of General Councils; if, namely, in them some sin is declared mortal, or is found affected by grave penalties (Diss. proleg. Zacch., P. II, c. 3 and 4). 3. From the doctrine of the holy Fathers, Doctors of the Church, and distinguished theologians. Those things which by them unanimously, or almost unanimously, are held as mortal, must also by us be considered as such. For not to assent to them savors of temerity, since their consensus in a moral matter is an indication of truth (Kon., n. 202).

II. From the very matter of sin or from natural reason. Thus generally GRAVE are judged: all sins which are directly against God or some perfection of his; sins which tend to grave prejudice of the human race, as are the various species of lust; sins by which the neighbor is gravely harmed in goods of life, fortune, reputation, etc.; sins which are gravely repugnant to an end of great moment intended by law, as the omission of fasting, Mass, annual confession, Paschal Communion, etc.

For the rest, the limits between mortal and venial sin often, indeed very often, can in no way be determined, as is clear from innumerable controversies of the Doctors. But where strict doubt perseveres, one must stand for the milder part and the faithful person must prudently be instructed. "For a mortal sin is not to be built up, unless it is certainly clear concerning it" (I, 89; V, 52, Bene hic).¹

QUAER. 2. Whether he sins gravely who knows his action is EVIL, but is ignorant of its GRAVITY, or does not attend to it?

It is noted beforehand. The question has force concerning those things which are not evidently grave, nor evidently light: for concerning evident things it cannot be supposed that the one operating, who adverts that the matter is evil, does not attend, not even confusedly, to gravity or lightness; because, at least implicitly and exercisedly, he sufficiently apprehends one or the other. Likewise the question is not concerning a man who positively doubts concerning the gravity of his action. Let the conclusion given above, n. 36, be read again.

Resp. It is disputed; but to St. Alphonsus sufficiently probable is the opinion of those who say that a man of this kind sins, per se, only venially; because in order to sin mortally, it is required that someone consent directly or indirectly to a mortal sin; but he who in no way thinks of, or suspects, mortal sin cannot by any reason be said to consent to mortal sin (I, 23; cf. Istruz., I, 13).

We said PER SE, that is, supposing: 1. that he does not apprehend, at least confusedly, the danger of sinning gravely or the obligation of investigating the matter; 2. that the agent is not of lax conscience; otherwise, at least indirectly, he must be judged to consent to mortal sin (cf. n. 318, 2).

QUAER. 3. How must one judge IN DOUBT concerning perfect consent?

Resp. One must judge from things commonly happening, as we have already said (n. 50).

If the one doubting is of timorous conscience and is not accustomed deliberately to consent to grave sin, it can reasonably, indeed morally certainly, be believed that he has not consented. For he who habitually adheres to God, and greatly fears lest he be deprived of divine grace, if it sometimes happens that he is turned away from him, must inflict great force upon himself in order that he despise the remorse of conscience and deliberately throw himself into sin: but he cannot do this unless he certainly adverts to the evil which he embraces.

But for presuming that full consent was not present in a pious man, these following CONJECTURES are especially useful: "a) If such a one has had a serious and often repeated purpose of never sinning mortally, and does not know that he has certainly revoked it. b) If, when he adverts the evil, he is terrified and immediately repels the temptation, and at once doubts whether he consented. c) If he remembers that he proceeded timidly (that is, if there was present only torpor, yawning, hesitation of the will). d) If he does not know whether he did or thought something in wakefulness or sleep; for if he had been awake, he would have adverted it and would know it" (VI, 476). e) Finally, if he could easily have proceeded to the external act, and nevertheless did not proceed (Reuter, Neo-conf., 244, 265).

If the one doubting is accustomed easily to fall into mortal sins (or is of lax conscience), the opposite must be judged concerning him; "because in doubt he is presumed to have consented. For if he had resisted, he would indeed remember that effort which he inflicted upon himself to repel the temptation."
Whether mortal sins which remain plainly doubtful from this must be declared in confession will be weighed below in the treatise on Penance (n. 1695 seq.).

QUAER. 4. Whether he sins gravely who DELIBERATES concerning furnishing consent to a gravely illicit thing, if finally he does not consent?

Resp. The solution of the question depends on the quality of the deliberation. If the deliberation is only a certain hesitation, or omission of resistance, proceeding from torpor, sloth, or negligence, it does not exceed venial sin. But if the deliberation is full and formal, by which, namely, someone weighs whether he wishes to perpetrate a gravely evil thing or not, it is a mortal sin. For thus hesitating, after the manner of Pilate, he values God with the creature; wherefore he commits a sin of the same species and gravity as that concerning which he deliberates (Croix, V, 226-229).

For promoting tranquility of conscience in doubts concerning consent, a simple and serious effort to elicit an act of charity has much force; it helps very much and can by no means harm.

n. ¶338.

Note. By reason of peculiar malice, there are also distinguished:

Sins AGAINST THE HOLY SPIRIT. Six are numbered: a) presumption, b) despair, c) attack against acknowledged truth, d) envy of fraternal grace, e) obstinacy, f) final impenitence. They are called sins against the Holy Spirit because, through them, that is cast away by which the Holy Spirit is accustomed to remove man from sin: whence they are most grave, and are remitted only with the greatest difficulty (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 14, a. 2).
Sins CRYING TO HEAVEN. There are four, namely: a) homicide, b) sodomy, c) oppression of the poor, d) defrauding the wages of laborers. They are called crying, because they most vehemently provoke divine vengeance and merit most grave punishments (Voit, de Pecc., n. 316-317).
Irremissible sins, concerning which see Matt. XII, 31; Mark III, 28; Luke XII, 10; 2 Pet. II, 20; Heb. VI, 4; X, 26. They are so called not with respect to God, but with respect to man, who rejects the mercy of God.

Scholium

On the Effects of Mortal Sin

n. ¶339.

The chief effects are the following:

GRAVE INJURY OF GOD. Any mortal sin is an offense of God, not effectively, because God is incapable of harm, but affectively; and it is a true injury and contempt of the divine Majesty, which is placed after the creature (H. Ap., III, n. 20). For mortal sin is aversion from God and conversion to the creature.

But this offense of God involves so great an evil in itself that it cannot be conceived by any created intellect: for objectively and extrinsically, or on the part of the one offended, it is truly infinite, because "injury is in the one injured as honor is in the one honoring" (St. Thom., III, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2).

PRIVATION OF SANCTIFYING GRACE, and with this privation, the loss of all merits, and inability for acquiring new merits.
A MOST FOUL STAIN OF THE SOUL. To the point St. Thomas says (1.2, q. 86, a. 1 and 2): "The soul of man," he says, "has a double brightness: one from the shining of the natural light of reason, by which it is directed in its acts, and another from the divine light of wisdom and grace, by which man is perfected for acting well. But when man sins, he adheres to certain things against the light of reason and of the divine law, and thus he is stained ...; the stain of the soul is so called metaphorically. This stain remains in the soul even when the act of sin passes away, insofar as it imports a defect of brightness from recession from the light of reason and of the divine law ... but after he returns to the light, which is done through grace, then the stain ceases."
GUILT-BOUNDNESS OF FAULT. This prior guilt-boundness, which differs from stain only according to the mode of signifying, properly says a state of culpability, which includes two things; namely: a) privation of the praiseworthy or of praise, which is owed both to the person who operates according to the order of reason and of the eternal law, and to the act which agrees with these rules ...; b) the obligation of repairing the injury inflicted upon God, through deviation from the aforesaid order of reason and of the eternal law, and therefore through contempt of God himself (1.2, q. 21, a. 2).
GUILT-BOUNDNESS OF PUNISHMENT, that is, the obligation or necessity of paying the punishment due to sin. As St. Thomas rightly observes, those things which are contained under some order are in a certain way one, in order to the principle of the order. Wherefore whatever rises against the order ought to be depressed by that order and the prince of the order. Therefore, since sin perverts the THREEFOLD order of reason, of the universe, and of God, hence it incurs guilt-boundness of a threefold punishment, namely remorse of conscience, vengeance of creatures (for example, through fire), and privation of God (1.2, q. 87, a. 1).
PUNISHMENT ITSELF. Punishment is usually defined: the privation of a due good, against the will of him who is deprived, on account of fault. Wherefore two things are to be noted: one concerning its gravity; the other concerning its bitterness.

As to gravity, it depends on the magnitude of the good of which someone is deprived. Whence the gravest of all punishments is the privation of God, who is the highest good. The second place is held by the privation of supernatural goods. From this punishment it easily results that one sin becomes per accidens the punishment of another, insofar as the sinner, despoiled of his supernatural habits and more deprived of actual graces, is drawn on to other sins, as if by the proper weight of his perverse nature. In the third place comes the privation of natural goods. By this punishment also, at least partly, the sinner is chastised; for his nature, wounded by original sin with the fourfold wound of ignorance, malice, infirmity, and concupiscence, is affected by a new wounding. St. Thomas well declares this (1.2, q. 83, a. 3).

But as to the bitterness of punishment, it must be said that it arises from contrariety of the will. And hence it often happens that in this life the greatest punishment is felt least, and the least is felt most; for "the fascination of trifling obscures goods" (Wis. IV, 12). But after death, punishment torments according to its intrinsic gravity. For man, once having entered into the house of his eternity, at last judges rightly concerning those divine goods, to the possession and enjoyment of which he was born. Whence the more excellent the goods are, the more bitterly he grieves concerning their privation. And since God is infinite good, St. Alphonsus does not doubt (Praep. ad mortem, cons. 26, punct. 3) to assert that the punishment of the damned is plainly incomprehensible and in a certain way infinite. Cf. Lessius, de Perfectionibus moribusque divinis, l. XIII, c. 12, 13, 28 seqq.

Vol. I, Part First: On the First P…, Tr. IV, Ch. III, Article II: On Venial Sin

n. ¶340.

DEFINITION. Venial sin is a light transgression of the divine law, lessening the fervor of charity, and rendering man worthy of temporal punishment (V, 51; H. Ap., III, 23).

It is called venial because it does not take away the principle of pardon, which is grace, and therefore easily obtains pardon; but not as if it were a thing light in itself or to be little esteemed. It is enough to understand, says St. Alphonsus, that it is an offense of God, so that it be avoided more than any other evil whatsoever (Instr. cat., Introd., n. 9).

DIVISION. Venial sins are such either per se, or per accidens.

Venial sins per se, or from their genus, are those which, by reason of the object, are always venial, so that they never become mortal unless they are drawn outside their proper species on account of some supervening circumstance. Thus a lie always remains venial, unless by reason of harm or another circumstance it passes to another species.

Of this kind are, generally, sins committed against one's own good, as useless and vain concupiscence, vain delight of the senses, prodigality, curiosity, superfluity of clothing, excess in food, in drink, in sleep, in laughter, in fear, in sadness, in appetite for money, praise, and several other things which will be enumerated below when we treat of capital sins.

Venial sins per accidens are those which indeed from their genus are mortal, but which, on account of smallness of matter or another circumstance, become light, as will be explained below (n. 342, quaer. 2).

n. ¶341.

PRINCIPLE. For venial sin three things are required: an obligation imposed by some precept, advertence at least half-full to the light malice of the transgression, and some consent, at least imperfect. That these three are required is clear; for, these being removed, either there would be a transgression of no law, or there would be no knowledge and willing of evil, that is, no deformed human act would be present, and consequently no sin properly so called.

From these things, venial sin is clearly discerned from imperfection, in which not all things intervene which are required for constituting formal sin. Namely, IMPERFECTION is usually taken in a twofold sense. 1. In one sense, imperfection, with respect to law, is called an action or omission repugnant not indeed to some positive precept, but to mere counsel; to executing which someone is incited either through the impulse of grace, or through the dictate of reason, or only through the directive will of Superiors. Imperfection, taken in this sense, is not per se sin; for where there is no precept, there is no transgression of a precept. We said per se, because often imperfections of this sort, on account of various circumstances, are not free from fault, for example, on account of vicious love, curiosity, sensuality, sloth, etc. 2. In the other sense, imperfection, by reason of act, is called a transgression of precept wholly indeliberate and involuntary, both in itself and in the cause, such as wholly involuntary distractions during prayer, involuntary excess in laughter, in sadness, in indignation, in joking, in telling stories. In this sense, imperfection is free from all fault.¹

n. ¶342.

Questions. QUAER. 1. Whence must the DIFFERENCE between mortal sin and venial sin be taken?

Resp. The Doctors more commonly teach that it must be taken from the essentially diverse mode by which the will converts itself to the creature in each sin. Namely, by sinning mortally, the will converts itself to the creature totally, as if the creature were its ultimate end, and therefore it averts itself totally from God, and at least implicitly contemns his friendship. But by sinning venially, the will, while preserving its habitual tendency toward its ultimate end, that is, toward God, pursues the creature only by an undue and inordinate love: wherefore it incurs only temporal punishment, which corresponds to the inordinate conversion to the creature.²

And in this sense St. Thomas seems to speak when he says that venial sin is not against, but beside the law; understand that it is not against the end of the law, which is charity, but is against the order of the law to be observed, and consequently is a true transgression of law, as is clear from the definition of sin (cf. V, 11).

QUAER. 2. In how many ways does a sin, mortal from its genus, become VENIAL?

Resp. In three ways: a) from smallness of matter; b) from imperfection of knowledge, that is, either from an invincibly erroneous conscience, by which someone judges that something is venial which of itself is mortal, or from half-full advertence; c) from imperfection of consent (cf. n. 336).

QUAER. 3. From how many causes can a sin, venial from its genus, become MORTAL?

Resp. From six causes, namely:

By reason of error, when someone in reality wills or operates something which of itself is a light sin, but seriously thinks or doubts, from erroneous conscience, that it is a grave sin (cf. n. 22; 337, q. 2).
By reason of an adjoined end, when, namely, to an act per se venially evil there is joined a gravely sinful end: as if someone lies lightly in order to seduce a girl (n. 306, 307).
By reason of excessive affection, when, namely, in a lightly evil thing the ultimate end is constituted, so that the man badly disposed at least by an internal act sets it before God, and knowingly and actually is prepared gravely to offend God rather than renounce his vain delight.
By reason of formal contempt of the law, or of the legislator: thus "it is mortal to do or omit something from contempt of a just human law; likewise, from contempt of God prescribing or even counseling, which for that reason contains a tacit blasphemy, as if God prescribed or counseled useless things, etc." (V, 61, 3). Cf. things said n. 179, 3.
By reason of scandal, when grave scandal of the little ones proceeds from venial fault: as if from venially evil words which parents bring forth, children are gravely scandalized; or if children, through light disobedience, knowingly provoke parents to blasphemies.
By reason of danger, when, from a light fault, there arises a proximate or probable danger of sinning gravely: as if someone talks idly with a woman, having sufficiently learned by experience that from conversations of this kind he has often sinned mortally (I, 22; V, 59-63; H. Ap., III, 68).

n. ¶343.

From the things said you will resolve: 1. Several venial sins cannot constitute one mortal sin by reason of multiplication; because since mortal and venial differ essentially between themselves, the nature of one cannot become the nature of the other. Whence St. Thomas (1.2, q. 88, a. 4): "All the venial sins of the world cannot have so great a guilt-boundness as one mortal sin." And St. Alphonsus: "It is better to permit innumerable venial sins than one mortal sin" (III, 130).

Nevertheless they can reach mortal sin by reason of matter coalescing. "It must be adverted," says St. Alphonsus, "that small matters repeated then constitute grave matter when they coalesce of themselves, or at least morally in themselves; as are small thefts, small omissions in the office, in Mass, or small eatings repeated on the same fast day" (V, 56, 2; H. Ap., III, 67).

Any Christian who wishes to avoid mortal sins alone, without caring anything about omitting venial sins, does not sin mortally, speaking per se; the reason is because a purpose of this kind conduces to mortal sin only remotely. But it is otherwise if contempt is present, or the proximate danger of falling into mortal sin, respect being had to past experience (IV, 12). As to religious, cf. n. 2154.
Someone does not sin gravely by reason of excessive affection from the fact that he is borne very intensively and vehemently into a created thing; but it is required that appreciatively he esteem that object, at least virtually, in such a way that he is actually prepared, on account of it, to transgress a precept obliging under mortal sin. We say actually prepared; because that which he is disposed only habitually to commit is not imputed to him as fault (V, 60).
A confessor does not satisfy his office if he has no care to remove the penitent from frequency of venial sins, especially those which are committed with full advertence. The reason is because he who casts aside all care of avoiding venial sins will little by little fall into mortal sins (cf. n. 344, 5).

Scholium

Vol. I, General Moral Theology, Treatise: On Sins in General, Third Part: On the Effects…, Fourth Question: On Mortal…, Article I: On the Difference Between Mortal and Venial Sin · Vol. I, General Moral Theology, Treatise: On Sins in General, Third Part: On the Effects…, Fourth Question: On Mortal…, Article II: On the Gravity of Mortal Sin

On the Effects of Venial Sin

n. ¶344.

Venial sin produces many effects, and these calamitous ones (Lancicius, de Fuga pecc. ven., l. I). The chief are the following:

It offends God. "It does not indeed affect him with grave injury," says St. Alphonsus, "but nevertheless with some injury. It is not a grave evil, as mortal sin is, but it is a greater evil than all other evils which can happen to creatures" (Inst. cat., Introd., n. 9).
It induces guilt-boundness of punishment (per se temporal), to be undergone in this life or in the other. We said per se temporal; for the Angelic Doctor thinks (1.2, q. 87, a. 5, ad 3) that although venial sin, since it does not separate from God, does not merit eternal punishment, nevertheless it can per accidens, whether by reason of irremissibility, be punished eternally, if it is found in the damned not remitted with respect to fault.
It impedes special graces, and renders man unworthy of that peculiar affection of God by which he himself is accustomed to pursue the just, according to that saying (Matt. 7:2): In what measure you have measured, it shall be measured back to you.
It lessens the fear of God, and increases tepidity of soul. Nevertheless it does not directly lessen charity or the other infused virtues, but it lessens the fervor of charity.
It disposes to mortal sin. This is clear: a) From Ecclus. 19:1: He who despises small things will fall little by little. b) From daily practice. Moreover, it disposes both negatively, by diminishing the fervor of divine charity, the horror of sin, the alacrity of faith, and divine grace; and positively, by increasing the inclination of the will to evil, whence it comes about that at last man rushes headlong into mortal sin (Selva, P. I, c. 5).

IT IS ASKED. Whether venial sin causes a STAIN in the soul?

St. Thomas responds (1.2, q. 89, a. 1): "Just as in the body there is a twofold brightness, one indeed from the intrinsic disposition of members and color, but the other from exterior clarity supervening: so also in the soul there is a twofold brightness. One indeed habitual, as if intrinsic, but the other actual, as if exterior brilliance. But venial sin indeed impedes actual brightness, yet not habitual brightness ... Whence, properly speaking, venial sin does not cause a stain in the soul. And if somewhere it is said to induce a stain, this is in a certain respect, insofar as it impedes the brightness which is from acts of the virtues."

Konings, Theologia Moralis

Anthony Konings, C.SS.R. — 8 passages

Vol. I, TREATISE ON SINS, PART FIRST: ON SINS IN GEN…, OR ON THE NATURE, GRAVITY, AND DISTINCTION OF SINS, Ch. II, ESPECIALLY ON MORTAL AND VENIAL SIN

n. ¶200.

Definitions. - The gravity of sin is the quantity or measure of malice, by which sin is more or less offensive to God, and therefore worthy of greater or lesser punishment.

Mortal sin is a transgression of a law gravely obliging, or a grave offense against God, depriving of divine friendship and sanctifying grace, and rendering the sinner worthy of eternal punishment.

Venial sin is a slight offense against God, which neither deprives of divine friendship, nor of sanctifying grace, nor therefore excludes from eternal beatitude.

Certain sins are mortal from their whole genus, when their object or matter, whatever it may finally be, always contains grave disorder, as happens in lust, blasphemy, perjury, heresy, etc. - They are called mortal from their genus (not whole) when their matter, remaining in the same species, can be grave although it can also be light, of which kind are sins against justice. - But sins are called venial from their genus when, considering the matter or nature of the object, they do not admit grave guilt, and therefore so long as they remain within their own species, that is, another species mortal from its genus does not accede, they cannot be mortal.

n. ¶201.

Questions. - Quaer. 1° Whence is the greater or lesser gravity of sins to be taken?

Resp. It is to be taken generally 1° from the object, end, and circumstances, according as they are more or less repugnant to rational nature or to law; 2° from the duration of the evil act, or from its intensity; 3° from greater or lesser advertence to the malice of the act, or from the diverse degree of consent furnished to the depraved act; 4° from the excellence of the virtues or precepts to which the sins are opposed; 5° from the various modes in which virtues or laws are violated.

Quaer. 2° What is required for sin to be formally mortal?

Resp. There are required 1) grave matter either in itself, or at least in the apprehension of the intellect; - 2) full advertence to the grave malice of the act; - 3) full consent of the will in the prevarication.

And so 1° grave matter is required; for otherwise mortal sin would not be distinguished from venial by reason of the matter, since light matter of itself cannot dissolve a man from divine friendship.

2° Full advertence and full consent are also required, because, since through mortal sin a man recedes totally from God in order to adhere to creatures, this cannot happen unless the sinner deliberately prefers the object of sin to God, and so constitutes his ultimate end in a creature. Moreover, it is altogether foreign to divine goodness to hand a man over to eternal damnation either because of a light transgression, or because of an act not perfectly free and voluntary. - Thus all.¹

Moreover advertence is judged full and sufficient if an explicit, or at least implicit, thought of mortal malice precedes the consent or sinful act. And this indeed can happen even in a single instant through a simple judgment concerning the malice, without the mind reflecting several times upon itself by a special act; yet true and full deliberation of the mind, and full adhesion to the depraved object, are always required.

Quaer. 3° What is required for venial sin?

Resp. For venial sin there are required and suffice some advertence, however slight, to the malice of the act, and some consent of the will, however imperfect: these indeed are required, because if these are removed there can be no knowledge and volition of evil, and therefore no sin; but they suffice because, these being posited, knowledge and volition of evil, which are necessary for constituting sin, are had in some way.

n. ¶202.

- Quaer. 4° How can sins be known as mortal by reason of matter?

Resp. A threefold rule is assigned.

First Rule. - Recourse must be had to Sacred Scripture. For what things are grave or what are light are to be weighed not by human but by divine judgment, says St. Augustine.² Moreover those things must be judged mortal which in Sacred Scripture are declared worthy of death, or to exclude from the kingdom of heaven; or which are announced with the particle: woe, which surely denotes truly grave deformity. Thus the Apostle³ says concerning the works of the flesh: Which are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, luxury . . . I foretell to you, as I have foretold, that those who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God. - Recall also the long series of mortal sins which the Apostle enumerates.¹

Second Rule. - Recourse must be had to the Church, or to the definitions of the Supreme Pontiffs, to the Decrees of General Councils, etc., in which many things are declared mortal, or only venial. For the Church is the pillar of truth, and therefore from her doctrine the rule and measure of morals must be taken.

Third Rule. - Recourse must be had to the Holy Fathers, to the Doctors of the Church, and also to the common doctrine of Theologians. For the Holy Fathers and Doctors were placed by God in the midst of the Church as burning lamps for driving away the darkness of error, and for illuminating the faithful in the way of truth. But Theologians know better than others how to interpret the testimonies of Scripture and the Fathers and the Decrees of the Church, and to compare cases not defined with defined cases, things not declared with things declared, and to deduce fitting conclusions from parity or similarity. Therefore those things which are held by them unanimously as mortal must be judged as such; for the consensus of the Doctors is an indication of truth.

n. ¶203.

- When the preceding rules are lacking, it is very difficult to determine when sin is grave or light. But generally the following are judged grave:

1° All sins which are directly against God, or some perfection of his. Likewise all sins which turn to the grave prejudice of the human race, as are the various species of lust.

2° All sins which are gravely repugnant to an end of great moment intended by law, as the omission of fasting, Mass, annual Confession, Paschal Communion, etc.

3° All sins by which one's neighbor is gravely injured in the goods of life, reputation, fortune, etc., as homicide, detraction very harmful to one's neighbor, notable theft, etc.

Moreover the limits between mortal and venial sin can very often in no way be determined, as is established from innumerable controversies of the Doctors on this matter. But mortal sin must not be asserted unless it is certainly established, as St. Alphonsus rightly notes.²

n. ¶204.

- Quaer. 5° How does sin mortal from its genus become venial, and vice versa?

Resp. 1° Sin mortal from its genus can become venial in four ways, namely by reason 1° of smallness of matter; - 2° of imperfect advertence; - 3° of imperfect consent; - 4° of erroneous conscience. - Thus St. Thomas¹ and St. Alphonsus.²

Resp. 2° But sin venial from its genus can become mortal 1° by reason of erroneous conscience; - 2° by reason of scandal; - 3° by reason of a depraved end gravely evil; - 4° by reason of formal contempt of law, or of the authority commanding; 5° by reason of a depraved affection for a thing otherwise lightly evil, so that someone is prepared even to transgress a gravely obliging precept; - 6° by reason of danger or proximate occasion of falling into mortal sin. - Thus all.

n. ¶205.

- Quaer. 6° Does he sin gravely who PROPOSES to commit all venial sins, and to avoid only mortal sins?

Resp. Negatively, more probably, speaking of itself, because such a proposal of itself conduces only remotely to mortal sin. I said: speaking of itself, or excluding contempt and proximate danger of falling into mortal sin, with account had of past experience.³

Quaer. 7° Is it a grave sin to expose oneself without cause to danger of falling probably into mortal sin?

Resp. Affirmatively, as is plain of itself. See what was said at n. 87. I.

n. ¶206.

- Quaer. 8° Does he sin gravely who without sufficient cause posits an action from which he will suffer base motions?

Resp. He does not sin gravely if 1) the action is not of itself and gravely influencing toward depraved effects; 2) he does not intend them; 3) proximate danger of consenting in depraved delight is absent (n. 8).

Quaer. 9° Does he sin gravely who deliberates about furnishing consent to a gravely illicit thing, if finally he does not consent?

Resp. The solution of the question depends on the quality of the deliberation. For if this is imperfect, namely if it is only a certain hesitation, or an omission of resistance from torpor, sloth, or negligence, the sin will not exceed venial. - Lacroix. But if the deliberation is full, it will be mortal sin, because the will shows itself prepared to place God after sin. - Lacroix.⁵

Quaer. 10° Can venial sins multiplied effect a mortal sin?

Resp. Distinguish. Negatively of themselves, or by force of multiplication, because the individual sins remain in an inferior theological species; Affirmatively by reason of the coalescing matter, as, for example, in theft.

n. ¶207.

Resolves. - In formal sins you will discern venial from mortal:

1° From the gravity of matter [n. 201, q. 2°. 1)]; from the degree of advertence; from the nature of the act, insofar as, if full advertence is present, perfect consent is never lacking in sins of commission of work or speech; but it can be lacking in sins of heart or of omission.

2° Where it is not clear that some sin is mortal, the confessor ought not to be hasty in judging that it is in fact grave both objectively and subjectively, because in doubt one must stand for the smallest part, or at least the matter is to be left to divine judgment.¹ Cf. n. 695, R. 2°.

3° In doubt concerning perfect consent you will judge in favor of the penitent, 1) if he is of a timorous conscience and habitually prepared to die rather than offend God; 2) if, adverting more fully to the temptation, he was terrified and immediately repelled it; 3) if he does not know whether, waking or sleeping, whether fully master of himself, he did or willed something evil.² Cf. n. 1363, q. 2°.

The confessor does not satisfy his office if he applies no care to remove the penitent from the frequency of venial sins, especially of those which are committed with full advertence. For he who strives not at all to avoid venial sins usually gradually falls at last into some mortal sin. (A) p. 485.

Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis

Benedict Henry Merkelbach, O.P. — 83 passages

Vol. I, General Moral Theology, Treatise: On Sins in General, Third Part: On the Effects…, Fourth Question: On Mortal…, Article I: On the Difference Between Mortal and Venial Sin

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 88, a. 1; q. 72, a. 5; De Malo q. 7, a. 1 and 2.

530. Thesis. There are in fact mortal sins distinct from venial sins. - This is of faith from universal preaching, confirmed in the Second Council of Lyons, profession of faith of Michael Palaeologus, by Benedict XII, const. Benedictus Deus, by the Council of Florence, in the decree of union, and by Trent, sess. 6, c. 5 and 15, can. 23, 25 and 27, and sess. 14, c. 1 and 5, can. 7.

Mortal and venial sin differ in several ways:

as to the debt of punishment: for mortal sin merits eternal punishment, but venial sin temporal punishment. Yet, says St. Thomas (De Malo q. 7, a. 1), "that difference follows upon the account of mortal and venial sin, but does not constitute it. For sin is not such because such a punishment is owed to it, but rather conversely, because the sin is such, therefore such a punishment is owed to it";

as to effect, for mortal sin deprives of grace, which is the supernatural life of the soul, and therefore of itself is irreparable and is called mortal (together with grace the connected gifts are taken away: charity, infused moral virtues, gifts of the Holy Spirit, sacramental graces; likewise the right to heaven and the merits of good works); but venial sin does not take away (nor diminish) grace, which is the principle of pardon and condonation, and therefore of itself is reparable and is called venial.¹ But neither is this the constitutive difference: for from the fact that some sin is grave, it has privation of grace as its effect and is irreparable, and not conversely. Hence:

¹ "Sin is as it were a sickness of the soul. Therefore just as there are certain curable diseases, and certain incurable ones which are called mortal, so there are certain curable sins which are called venial, and certain sins (as far as they are of themselves) incurable, although they can be cured by God, which are called mortal." De Malo, q. 7, a. 1.

in the very account of disorder the fundamental and intrinsically constitutive difference is to be sought. For disorder is twofold: "One by subtraction of the principle of order; another by which, the principle of order being preserved, inordination occurs concerning those things which are after the principle ... But the principle of the whole order in morals is the ultimate end ... Hence when the soul is disordered by sin concerning the ultimate end itself, even to aversion from God, to whom it is united by charity, it is mortal sin"; but when without aversion from the end disorder occurs only concerning those things which are toward the end, then it is venial sin (q. 72, a. 5). In other words: in mortal sin man constitutes for himself an ultimate end contrary to God, and therefore recedes from God and turns himself away (against the order of the end); in venial sin he inordinately adheres to those things which are toward the end, and by this act only does not tend to God (outside the order of the end). From this difference, as from a root, the first two follow.

n. 531.

531. Mortal and venial sin differ on the part of the formal element or privation. - For in each there is undue conversion to created good which cannot be referred to the ultimate end, and according to this they can pertain to the same species (for example, theft). But in mortal sin man is so converted to created good as if it were totally his ultimate end, whence to the conversion is joined the privation of every order to God as to the end, and this privation is aversion or recession from God; on the contrary, in venial sin man is converted to a creature, not as to the ultimate end, but places some act by which he cannot tend to God, and therefore to the conversion is joined only the privation of actual tendency to God, although habitual order to him remains; and this privation is only retardation or distancing from the end. Hence on the part of privation mortal and venial sin differ from the whole genus and infinitely, for, as St. Thomas says (q. 87, a. 5, ad 1), "the ultimate end differs infinitely from those things which are toward the end."

n. 531.

In other words, in each there is an act tending to something prohibited by law, but the difformity with law is very diverse. For the law primarily commands the very essence of moral order, or the order itself of subjection to God the ultimate end; secondarily (as the complement of order) it commands the mode by which this is done, namely, that nothing be done except toward this end. Hence something can be against law in two ways: 1. simply and perfectly, because it turns one away from God, the highest good, and destroys the essence of moral order, the very subjection to the Ultimate End, and in this way mortal sin is against law; 2. imperfectly and in a certain respect, because although it does not contain aversion from the ultimate end, nevertheless it is not referable to the ultimate end, God, to whom we are bound to refer ourselves and all our things: in this second way venial sin is against law; but because it is not against the law of subjection to God but only against the mode which the law intends, it is better called beside the law. Therefore in mortal sin there is difformity with the essential and primary ordination of the law commanding what is altogether necessary to the end, and therefore it is called against the law, that is, against the end of the law, which is charity by which we are subjected and united to God; in venial sin there is only difformity with the accidental and secondary ordination of the law, which commands something useful to the end, and therefore it is called beside the law, that is, beside the end of the law, but against only the means to the end, without overturning subjection to the end. And therefore the notion of sin is analogical (ad 1).

532. From this is understood the revealed and theological doctrine concerning the nature of mortal sin:

A. In the Scriptures: 1. Christ himself teaches that there are absolutely grave sins, which are the cause of grave punishment, indeed of eternal damnation: "Whoever shall say to his brother: fool, shall be liable to the hell of fire" (Matt. V, 22); "Depart from me, accursed, into everlasting fire" (Matt. XXV, 41-42). Hence the Apostles also affirm that certain sins exclude from the kingdom of heaven (I Cor. VI, 9-10; Gal. V, 19-21; Rom. VI, 23; VIII, 13; James I, 15) and deprive the soul of supernatural light and the life of divine love (John III, 20; I John II, 9; III, 14).

Yet there are sins relatively graver than others: "He who handed me over to you has the greater sin" (John XIX, 11; cf. Jer. VII, 26); indeed certain ones are so grave that from their nature and as it were without a miracle of God they are called "irremissible" (Matt. XII, 31; Mark III, 29). Conversely, others of themselves are very light (Matt. XXIII, 24; Luke VI, 42), so that they are often committed even by the just (James III, 2; I John I, 8).

From these things are understood both the malice of mortal sin, which is in aversion from God (Jer. II, 13; Ezek. XVIII, 24), and its effect, because it deprives of the grace of God and charity and divine life, and brings death upon the soul and eternal damnation.

Namely, man, who through grace is a) an adoptive son of God (John I, 12; Eph. I, 5; I John III, 1-2; Rom. VIII, 14-16); b) a participant of the divine nature, that is, like to God, holy and a son of light (II Pet. I, 4; I John III, 2; Eph. IV, 25; V, 8); c) a friend and temple of God (John XV, 14-15; I Cor. III, 16-17; VI, 19; John XIV, 23); d) worthy of eternal life and an heir (Col. I, 12-13; Rom. VIII, 17; Tit. III, 7); e) capable of meriting it (John XV, 1-5; Matt. X, 42; Rom. VIII, 17; II Cor. IV, 17; II Tim. IV, 8; Heb. X, 35; VI, 10); - through mortal sin becomes a) a son and servant of the devil (I John III, 8; John VIII, 44; II Pet. II, 19); b) a participant of his works, by which he walks in darkness and is unclean (I John I, 7-9; III, 8; Eph. V, 8; Col. I, 13; Heb. IX, 14); c) an enemy of God (Rom. V, 10); d) worthy of hell (Matt. XXV, 41, 46; Mark IX, 42; Apoc. XIV, 11, XX-XXII); e) incapable of meriting eternal life (John XV, 5-6).

B. Among the Fathers:² 1. In the first three centuries the distinction between mortal and venial sin was not explicitly but only confusedly established. They distinguished a) between the greatest sins and lesser sins; b) between the greatest and middle sins, which had to be expiated by public penance, and minute sins, which were remitted by contrition, almsgiving, prayer, and other means of this kind. But in the second and third century three sins were held as most grave: apostasy, adultery, and homicide, so that in at least certain Churches pardon was not conceded to them, at least before the article of death.

² Cf. Tanquerey, Th. Mor. fund., n. 453-459.

These things are clear from the testimony of Tertullian and St. Cyprian.

From the fourth century the distinction is already had explicitly between grave sins, which are to be expiated by public penance, and light sins, for which it suffices to do penance privately. Witnesses of this are St. Ambrose and St. Augustine for the Latin Church; St. Gregory Thaumaturgus and St. Basil for the Greek Church.

Afterwards, around the sixth century especially, rules are handed down by which grave or capital sins and light or minute sins may be discerned, because the gravity of many up to this point had not been perceived. An enumeration can be found in Caesarius of Arles and in the Penitential books.

C. Among the Scholastics a scientific analysis and deeper investigation is established. They not only declare that those sins are distinguished by reason of effect and punishment, but by intrinsic nature, namely, in the very account of disorder by comparison, namely, to the ultimate end and to the eternal law, as was explained above.

533. Remarks. - 1. Aversion from God, which constitutes actual mortal sin, is not to be confused with privation of grace. This is habitual aversion and the effect of mortal sin; that is the inordination in the evil act itself by which we act against charity and exclude it, namely, actual difformity with charity and actual recession from the end, which is the cause of the privation of grace: the actual privation of habitual ordering. The former is the pure and total privation of charity; the latter is not pure privation but a tendency to good with privation. Hence St. Thomas, De Malo q. 2, a. 9, ad 2: "The death of the soul is the privation of grace through which the soul is united to God; but the privation of grace is not essentially guilt itself but the effect of guilt. Hence sin is called the death of the soul not essentially but effectively; but essentially it is a deformed or inordinate act."

He who sins mortally has as the end to which he orders himself, himself; as the end which he seeks, the created good itself, concerning which he unduly rejoices and toward which he tends as toward the ultimate end; namely, his own good loved even to contempt of God, or the suitability, convenience, excellence, abundance, wisdom of the sinner as disposed by himself, not as ordered by God, but connoting the privation of God.

He who sins venially cannot refer that act to God: for this would be most injurious to God, - nor does he refer it to some created good as to the ultimate end, because then he would sin mortally; - but simply refers it to happiness in common and abstractly willed. It is good in common under the aspect of complete good, or one's own good according to its whole breadth, abstracting from honorable or delectable good, a good universally comprehending every good of man.

Since on the part of privation mortal and venial sin are of diverse order and differ in whole genus and infinitely, it follows that all venial sins, even taken together, do not constitute one mortal sin, because they do not put on aversion from God properly so called. Hence he who proposed to commit all venial sins would not sin mortally per se; nor per accidens on account of the danger of thus falling into mortal sin, because that proposal only remotely leads into mortal sin.

That mortal sin is concerned with the ultimate end, but venial sin with those things which are toward the end, is not to be understood as though the proximate object of a gravely sinful act were always the ultimate end, the highest good (or that mortal sin is always directly against God); but the proximate object of a lightly sinful act were always some means to the ultimate end, namely, a created good, since there manifestly are mortal sins which are proximately concerned with means to the end, such as homicide, theft, etc., which has place when the means are necessary to the end. But understand that mortal sin is an inordination concerning the end because it destroys due order or conjunction with the ultimate end; venial sin is an inordination concerning only means which, namely, are not necessary to the end, because the will adheres too much to created goods, without nevertheless receding from the ultimate end. In other words: inordination concerning means necessary to the end is also concerning the end itself; but inordination concerning means not necessary is not inordination concerning the end.

Vol. I, General Moral Theology, Treatise: On Sins in General, Third Part: On the Effects…, Fourth Question: On Mortal…, Article II: On the Gravity of Mortal Sin

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 84, a. 2; q. 87, a. 4; II-II, q. 162, a. 6; q. 34, a. 2; q. 105, a. 1, ad 1; III, q. 1, a. 2 and ad 2; Suppl. q. 99, a. 1; III Sent. d. 20, q. 1, a. 2; II Sent. d. 42, q. 1, a. 5 and ad 2; De Verit. q. 28, a. 2 and ad 5; De Malo q. 2, a. 9, ad 5.

534. Mortal sin is the gravest evil, whether it is considered on the part of God, or on the part of man.

A. As to God:

It is the highest injury done to the Highest Good, by which man places the ultimate end and seeks beatitude in a creature and prefers it to God, contemns, dishonors, turns away from, and hates him, contemns his love and friendship, and thus violates the right of God, which requires that we refer to him all actions and all creatures which we use; whence sin implicitly contains the malice of hatred of God,¹ of irreligion, of contumely toward God everywhere present (Ps. L, 6), and of idolatry (John XII, 43; Rom. II, 23; Is. LII, 5; XLIII, 24; Ezek. XXXVI, 20; Ps. CXXXVIII, 8; Ps. I, 6; I Kings II, 30; Lev. VI, 2; XXVI, 15; Phil. III, 19; Gal. V; Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 5).

¹ Cf. II-II, q. 34, a. 2. There it can be noted, according to the mind of Cajetan, that sin includes the malice of hatred both of abomination and of enmity. In every mortal sin there is included the will that God not prohibit nor punish; whence God is implicitly hated as a thing contrary to the will of the sinner (hatred of abomination); indeed, there is the will that there not be a prohibiting God, and thus implicitly God is hated also as a person (hatred of enmity). In other words, in sin there is included the will that we ought not to prefer God to others and love him more than others, which pertains to abomination; indeed, the will that he not be the one whom we ought to prefer to others and who is to be loved above all things, which bespeaks enmity.

It is rashness, disobedience, and bold rebellion against infinite majesty, and an offense and contempt of the supreme legislator, almighty lord, judge and king, of his will and law itself, to which it contradicts and refuses obedience and subjection; whence it implicitly contains the malice of pride (Gen. II, 16; III, 1; Heb. II, 2; Jer. II, 20; Is. XXXIII, 14; Wis. V, 2-15; I John III, 4; Job XV, 25; Gal. VI, 7).

It is the greatest ingratitude against an outstanding benefactor, whose benefits we use for offending him: against the Father creating, conserving, providing, adopting us as sons, and calling us to eternal life; against the Son, brother and redeemer (Heb. VI, 5), whose cause of death it renews; against the Holy Spirit sanctifying, the friend and inhabitant of our soul. Hence it implicitly contains contempt of the friendship and presence of him whom we cast away from ourselves, and the malice of sacrilege, because it violates the soul consecrated to God, and of infidelity against the covenant entered into with God (Ezek. II, 3; Jer. XXXI, 32; Is. I, 2; Heb. X, 26-31; Eph. IV, 3) and the duties following from it (Is. V; Jer. II, 32; III, 1; II Kings XII, 7; Heb. VI, 6; I Cor. III, 17; VI, 19; II Cor. VI, 16).

B. As to man it is:

baseness, dishonesty, and foolishness (Ps. XLVIII, 13; LXVIII, 6; Wis. V, 2-13), as being an evil against our nature and reason (q. 71, a. 2);

spiritual suicide, as depriving one of supernatural light and life (I John III, 15, 20; II, 9; III, 14; Tob. XII, 10);

deformity depriving the soul of natural and supernatural beauty, whence it dishonors the one operating and renders him worthy of contempt (Ps. XLVIII, 13);

servitude of the devil (I John III, 8; Jer. II, 19; Rom. VI, 6; II Pet. II, 19), because man does the work of the devil and subjects himself to him by consenting to him, and thus renders himself more liable to temptations.

n. 535.

535. Remarks. - 1. The aforesaid malices are not found per se in mortal sin except implicitly, and consequently at most they are voluntary in the cause and virtually; hence they are not to be explained in confession, as being a condition of every sin; unless someone explicitly and formally intended some one of them in itself, because then a sin of the intended species would be present.

n. 535.

Many malices of mortal sin are also found in venial sin, but only analogically, imperfectly, and in a certain respect (a. 1, ad 1). Hence, if it is a light evil in comparison with mortal sin, nevertheless in itself it is very grave.

536. In what sense mortal sin is infinite. - Mortal sin:

On the part of conversion is not infinite, because both the act of man and the created good toward which it tends are finite.

On the part of aversion from the Infinite Good:

Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus II. On the Prima Sec…, On Sins, On Mortal and Venial Sin, Whether there is venial sin distinct from mortal by its own nature? · Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus II. On the Prima Sec…, On Sins, On Mortal and Venial Sin, In what, and how, mortal and venial sin differ from one another? · Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus II. On the Prima Sec…, On Sins, On Mortal and Venial Sin, What is the last end of the one sinning mortally, and of the one sinning venially? · Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus II. On the Prima Sec…, On Sins, On Mortal and Venial Sin, Whether mortal sin, as an offense, is of simply infinite gravity? · Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus II. On the Prima Sec…, On Sins, On Mortal and Venial Sin, Whether man, in the first moral instant of the use of reason, is bound to turn himself to God; and whether venial sin can exist with original sin alone?

a) it is not of infinite malice: for infinite evil is pure evil, without any mixture of good; hence in order that sin have infinite malice, man would have to tend toward evil insofar as it is evil; which is impossible;

…and 43 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Sabetti-Barrett, Compendium of Moral Theology

Aloysius Sabetti, S.J., and Timothy Barrett, S.J. — 8 passages

Vol. I, Tr. IV, Pt. I, Chapter II. On the Gravity of Sin

n. 127.

The gravity of sin is the quantity or measure of malice by which sin is more or less offensive to God: it is called mortal if, because of the violation of a law gravely obliging, it dissolves divine friendship and renders man guilty of eternal damnation; otherwise it will be venial. - Cf. St. Thom. 1-2, q. 88, art. 1.

It must be noted here that some sins are said to be mortal from their whole genus, and others simply mortal from their genus (not whole). The former are those whose matter, of itself, setting aside erroneous conscience, semi-full advertence, or imperfect consent, always contains grave disorder within its whole genus, as happens in lust, blasphemy, heresy, etc. But the others are those whose matter, within its genus, is now grave, now slight, of which sort are sins against justice. - But sins are said to be venial from their genus which, considered according to the matter or nature of the object, do not admit grave guilt within their genus, and therefore, until they are transferred into another genus by a new mortal deformity accruing from elsewhere, they cannot be mortal. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 51. - Lacroix, n. 199.

I say 1st. Not all sins are equal, but some are graver than others. Proof 1st. from Sacred Scripture: Jerem. vii, 26: "And they have done worse than their fathers." St. John xix, 11: "He who handed me over to you has the greater sin." Proof 2nd. from reason. What is said, with due proportion, of the injuries of men against God must be said of the injuries of sons against parents, or of subjects against Princes; but these certainly differ among themselves by reason of gravity: therefore those also. Besides, sins are opposition to virtues and precepts; but some virtues are more excellent than others, and some precepts are graver than others; therefore opposition to these will be graver or less grave. From another side also the evil intention of the delinquent can admit various degrees of malice, as is clear. Therefore.

I say 2nd. There are mortal sins. Proof 1st. from Sacred Scripture. I Cor. vi, 9, 10: "Do not err: neither fornicators, nor those serving idols, nor adulterers, nor the effeminate, nor those who lie with males, nor thieves, nor the avaricious, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor the rapacious will possess the kingdom of God." Rom. i, 32: "Those who do such things are worthy of death." I St. John iii, 14: "He who does not love remains in death." Add innumerable other testimonies of Sacred Scripture, from which it is very clearly established that many men, because of their sins, are to be rejected by God and tormented with eternal penalties. Proof 2nd. from the authority of the Church: for the Church teaches that there are mortal sins. Thus Trent, sess. 6, can. 27: If anyone shall have said that there is no mortal sin except that of infidelity, or that grace once received is lost by no other sin, however grave and enormous, except the sin of infidelity, let him be anathema. Likewise sess. 14, c. 5 says: It is necessary that all mortal sins be recounted by penitents in confession.

I say 3rd. There are merely venial sins. Proof 1st. from Sacred Scripture: Prov. xxiv, 16: "The just man will fall seven times." Therefore he who falls or sins while he is just does not sin mortally, since he is not deprived of justice: therefore only venially. Therefore. Likewise St. James iii, 2: In many things we all offend; but we do not all sin mortally, since many are just before God, as is clear from many places of the Old and New Testament, for example, as is said of Zachariah and Elizabeth, Luke i, 6; of St. Joseph, Matt. i, 19, etc. Therefore there are just persons not immune from sin; therefore there are venial sins. Proof 2nd. from the definition of the Church; in Trent, in the place cited above, it is said: "Venial sins, by which we are not excluded from the grace of God, and into which we fall more frequently, can be expiated by many other remedies (besides the Sacrament of Penance)." It is clear also from proposition 20 of Baius, condemned by Pius V and other Supreme Pontiffs, which sounds thus: "There is no sin venial by its own nature, but every sin merits eternal penalty." Proof 3rd. from reason: for among friends there are slight offenses which do not dissolve friendship; therefore similarly such offenses ought to be given toward God. Therefore.

n. 128.

Questions

Question 1. What things are required for mortal sin?

Response. Three things are necessarily required, namely grave matter either in itself or because of circumstances; full advertence to the grave malice of the act; full consent of the will into the transgression. Therefore:

There is required 1st. grave matter, otherwise a law obliging under grave sin could not be had.

There is required 2nd. full advertence of mind, otherwise there will not be full deliberation.

There is required 3rd. full consent of the will, because unless the sinner, with full consent and full deliberation, prefers the object of sin to God, and thus establishes his ultimate end in the creature, he cannot be said to withdraw totally from God. Besides, it is altogether alien to the divine goodness to consign man to eternal damnation either because of a slight transgression or because of an act not perfectly free and voluntary. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 5, 6, and 53.

n. 128, Q. 2.

Question 2. What things are required for venial sin?

Response. For venial sin there are required and suffice some advertence, however slight, to the malice of the act, and some consent of the will, however imperfect: they are required indeed because, when these have been removed, there can be no cognition and volition of evil, and therefore no sin; but they suffice because, when these have been posited, cognition and volition of evil, which are necessary for constituting sin, are had in some way.

n. 128, Q. 3.

Question 3. In what way can sins be recognized as mortal by reason of matter?

Response. A threefold rule is assigned.

Rule I. Recourse must be had to Sacred Scripture, and those sins must be judged mortal which in Sacred Scripture are declared worthy of death, or exclude from the kingdom of heaven, or which are expressed with the particle woe, which indeed denotes truly grave deformity. Thus the Apostle says concerning the works of the flesh, Galat. v, 19: "Which are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, luxury ... I foretell to you, as I have foretold, that those who do such things will not possess the kingdom of God." - Recall also the long series of mortal sins which the Apostle enumerates, I Cor. vi, 9 and 10.

Rule II. Recourse must be had to the Church, or to the definitions of the Supreme Pontiffs, to the Decrees of general Councils, etc., in which many things are declared mortal, or only venial. For the Church is the pillar of truth, and therefore from her doctrine the rule and measure of morals is to be taken.

Rule III. Recourse must be had to the Holy Fathers, to the Doctors of the Church, and also to the common doctrine of theologians. For the Holy Fathers and Doctors were placed by God in the midst of the Church as burning lamps for driving away the darkness of error, and for illuminating the faithful in the way of truth. But theologians know better than others how to interpret the testimonies of Scripture and of the Fathers, and the Decrees of the Church, and how to compare cases not defined with defined ones, cases not declared with declared ones, and from parity or similitude to draw opportune conclusions. Therefore those things which by them unanimously or almost unanimously are held as mortal are to be judged as such; for the consent of Doctors is an indication of truth.

But when the preceding rules are lacking, it is very difficult to determine when a sin is grave or slight. Generally there are judged grave 1st. all sins which are directly against God or some perfection of his: likewise all sins which tend to the grave prejudice of the human race, as are the species of lust; 2nd. all sins which gravely repugn the end of great moment intended by the law, such as the omission of fast, Mass, annual confession, paschal communion, etc.; 3rd. all sins by which the neighbor is gravely injured in the goods of life, fortune, reputation, etc., such as homicide, detraction very harmful to the neighbor, notable theft, etc.

For the rest, the limits between mortal and venial sin very often can in no way be determined, as is clear from the innumerable controversies of the Doctors concerning this matter. But a mortal sin is not to be asserted unless it is certainly established concerning it, as St. Alphonsus rightly notes. Cf. Systema Mor.; and de Sacram. Poenit., nn. 604 and 605.

n. 128, Q. 4.

128. Question 4. In what way does a sin mortal from its genus become venial, and vice versa?

Response. A sin mortal from its genus can become venial in a fourfold way, namely by reason of: 1st. smallness of matter; 2nd. imperfect advertence; 3rd. imperfect consent; 4th. erroneous conscience. But a sin venial from its genus can become mortal: 1st. by reason of erroneous conscience; 2nd. by reason of scandal; 3rd. by reason of an end gravely evil; 4th. by reason of formal contempt of the law, or of the authority commanding; 5th. by reason of an evil affection toward a thing otherwise slightly evil, so that one is prepared to transgress even a precept obliging gravely; 6th. by reason of danger or of a proximate occasion of falling into mortal sin; 7th. finally by reason of any circumstance which contains mortal malice in itself and accedes to the act, as St. Thomas well observes, in such a way that it changes its species. - Cf. St. Thom. 1-2, q. 88, art. 1, 2, and 5. - St. Alphonsus, n. 54.

n. 128, Q. 5.

Question 5. Would he sin gravely who wished to avoid only mortal sins, and cared not at all about committing venial sins?

Response. Negatively, more probably, according to a sufficiently common opinion of theologians, even if this were done from purpose, and not from mere carelessness, provided contempt or peculiar frailty is excluded. The reason is that a soul so disposed does not of itself and necessarily introduce a proximate danger of sinning gravely. But in practice the matter is slippery, since facility in sinning venially is the cause why the soul is gradually weakened, and more easily at length is overcome by grave temptations, according to that saying of Ecclus. xix, 1: "He who despises little things will fall little by little." - Cf. St. Alphonsus, de Praeceptis partic., n. 12.

n. 128, Q. 6.

Question 6. Does he sin gravely who deliberates about furnishing consent to a gravely illicit thing, if at last he does not consent?

Response. The solution of the question depends on the quality of the deliberation; for if this is imperfect, namely if it is nothing but a certain hesitation, or an omission of resistance arising from torpor, sluggishness, or negligence, the sin will not exceed venial. - But if the deliberation is full, the sin will certainly be mortal, because the will then implicitly places some created good before God; for by the very fact that it seriously deliberates, weighing on either side the advantages and temporal evils arising from sin, it shows itself prepared to violate the law if it shall have perceived some utility in this violation. - Cf. Lacroix, nn. 226 and seq. - Sanchez, in Decalog., lib. 1, cap. 1, n. 16.

n. 128, Q. 7.

Question 7. Does he sin gravely who, without sufficient cause, places an action from which he is going to suffer base motions?

Response. 1st. Affirmatively, when a man stirs up these evil motions deliberately. For such a one consents to evil delectation to such a degree that he expressly seeks it.

2nd. Negatively, when, no cause being given on the part of the one suffering, these motions arise naturally and spontaneously, and the danger of consent is absent, as the matter is evident.

3rd. Affirmatively, when he places an action which of itself gravely influences these evil motions, and which itself is a grave sin in the genus of lust. Thus St. Alphonsus, lib. 3, n. 482: "If the cause of pollution gravely influences it and the man does not abstain from placing that cause or action, it is clear that the pollution is imputed as sin, even if it was not intended, provided that it was foreseen at least in a confused way. Causes of this kind are without doubt all those which of themselves are grave faults in the genus of lust. Therefore all pollutions arising from these causes certainly are mortal. And then (note this) that base act which is the cause of pollution has a special malice against nature." And again in the same place, n. 484: "The common and more probable opinion teaches that it is not mortal unless it arises from a cause mortal of itself in the genus of lust. The reason why the cause ought to be mortal is that, since pollution is not willed in itself but only in the cause, it will be evil in that degree in which the cause itself is evil. The reason why the cause ought, besides, to be evil in the same genus of lust is that, since the cause concurs only slightly toward pollution, there is not a grave obligation of avoiding it on account of pollution, which happens beyond intention."

Therefore if there is present a just reason for placing a licit action, for example, to study, to heal, to hear confessions, no guilt is contracted from these effects: likewise no guilt, if a cause outside the genus of lust in no way influences of itself the evil effects, but these follow only by accident: there will be only slight guilt if a cause outside the genus of lust only slightly influences the effects. If the action is within the genus of lust, an indirectly voluntary gravely evil effect will be imputed only when the action itself gravely and proximately influences this effect and is a mortal sin against the sixth.

You Will Resolve. 1st. Where it is not clear that some sin is grave, the confessor ought not to be hasty in judging that it is actually grave, both objectively and subjectively, because in doubt one must stand for the minimum, or at least the matter is to be left to divine judgment. - St. Alphonsus, n. 52.

2nd. In doubt concerning perfect consent you will judge in favor of the penitent: 1st. if he is of a timorous conscience and habitually prepared rather to die than to offend God; 2nd. if, becoming more fully advertent to the temptation, he was terrified and at once repelled it; 3rd. if he does not know whether, awake or sleeping, whether fully master of himself, he did or willed anything evil. Elbel, n. 578. - St. Alphonsus, lib. 6, n. 476.

3rd. A confessor does not satisfy his office if he applies no care by which he removes the penitent from frequency of venial sins, especially of those which are admitted with full advertence. For one who strives in no way at all to avoid venial sins is accustomed little by little at length to slip into mortal sin. - See Cases, n. 144 and seq. - Roncaglia, c. 1.

Billuart, Summa Summae

Charles-René Billuart, O.P. — 47 passages

Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus II. On the Prima Sec…, On Sins, On Mortal and Venial Sin, Whether there is venial sin distinct from mortal by its own nature?

St. Thomas, qq. 88 and 89.

Mortal sin is called that which brings death to the soul, depriving it of grace, and it is worthy of eternal punishment. Venial sin, strictly taken, is called that which does not exclude from the subject the principle of pardon, which is grace.

The heretics of later times, Wiclef, Luther, Melancthon, Calvin, etc., taught that all sins are mortal by their nature and are of themselves onto death of the soul and eternal punishment; but in fact do not inflict these upon the predestined and the faithful, from the mercy of God; and thus venial sin is not distinguished from mortal sin by its nature, but either from a law or mercy enacted by God, or from the condition of the sinning person.

I say: There are given venial sins distinct from mortals by their own nature, not only from the condition of the sinner or from the mercy of God¹. ¹ Here q. 88, a. 1 and 2, c.

It is proved 1° from Scripture. In various places of Scripture, some sins, without any respect to persons, are compared to most light things, others to most grave things: thus Matth., XXIII, 24, some are compared to a gnat, others to a camel; Luc., VI, 41, some to a mote, others to a beam; I Cor., III, 12, some to hay and stubble built upon the foundation which is Christ. But, if all sins were of themselves mortal, some would be ill compared to those minute things, while others are compared to most grave things; for that ought not to be called minute and light which inflicts of itself death of the soul and eternal hell. Therefore, as neither can a mote of itself blind, nor a gnat suffocate, nor hay or straw overthrow the foundation; so neither do sins compared to those minute things kill by their nature, and constitute the guilty one in eternal death.

It is proved 2°. The council of Trent defined the same truth session VI, chapter 11, canons 7, 23 and 25, and session XIV, chapter 5: read¹. And finally the Sovereign Pontiffs St. Pius V and Greg. XIII condemned this proposition: « There is no sin venial by its nature, but every sin merits eternal punishment. » It is the 20th among the Baianists. ¹ Sess. VI, cap. 11: « Although in this mortal life however holy and just men may be, they sometimes fall into at least light and daily sins, which are also called venial, they do not therefore cease to be just. » — Can. 7: « If anyone shall say that all works done before justification, in whatever manner they are done, are truly sins, or merit the hatred of God...; let him be anathema. » — Can. 23: « If anyone shall say that a man once justified can sin no more, nor lose grace, and therefore that he who falls and sins was never truly justified, or, on the contrary, that he can avoid during his whole life all sins, even venial ones, except by a special privilege of God, as the Church holds concerning blessed Virgin ; let him be anathema. » — Can. 25: « If anyone shall say that in every good work the just man sins at least venially, or, what is more intolerable, mortally, and therefore merits eternal punishments, and that only on this account he is not damned, because God does not impute those works to damnation ; let him be anathema. » — Sess. XIV, cap. 5: « From these things it is gathered that penitents must recount in confession all mortal sins of which, after diligent examination of themselves, they have knowledge, even if those sins be most hidden and committed only against the two last precepts of the Decalogue, which sometimes wound the soul more gravely and are more dangerous than those which are committed openly ; for venial sins, whereby we are not excluded from the grace of God and into which we fall more frequently, although rightly and usefully and without all presumption they may be said in confession, as the practice of pious men demonstrates, can nevertheless be passed over without fault, and be expiated by many other remedies. »

It is proved by a manifold reason. The first is founded in Scripture. According to Scripture, God does not impute nor punish sins otherwise than they deserve of themselves, as is clear from that Psal., LXI, 13: For thou wilt render to every man according to his works. And II Cor., V, 10: That every one may receive the proper things of the body, according as he hath done. Therefore, if there are sins which God does not punish with eternal punishment, they do not merit it of themselves.

The second. Sin is a certain infirmity of the soul, according to that Psal., VI, 3: Have mercy on me, O Lord, for I am weak. Therefore, as there are certain infirmities of the body mortal of themselves, others not, so also infirmities of the soul.

n. 9.

The third. Among friends there are light offenses which by their nature, and not only from the favor of the friend, do not dissolve friendship. Therefore similarly toward God. Will anyone believe that a just man and friend of God, by the nature of an idle word or superfluous laughter, incurs the hatred of God and liability to eternal gehenna?

n. 10.

The fourth, special against the heretics. Adam, David and St. Peter were faithful and predestined. Yet nevertheless certain of their sins were truly mortal, and reckoned and imputed as such, namely the eating of the forbidden fruit in Adam, adultery in David, denial of Christ in St. Peter. Nor indeed do I think anyone denies that Adam, David and St. Peter lost by these sins the friendship of God and incurred liability to eternal punishment, until they were expiated by penance. Of the sin of Adam so understand Ambros., book de Paradiso, c. 9, and Aug., book XIII de Civit., c. 12. Of the adultery of David so judges the same Aug., in Psal. L. Of the sin of St. Peter similarly understands the same Aug., tract. 66 in Ioann., n. 2, where of St. Peter he says: « He died denying, and rose again weeping. » Therefore venial sins are not distinguished from mortals by the sole condition of the sinner.

n. 11.

It is confirmed. Dignity of person does not diminish, but augments sin, as St. Thomas proves above q. 73, a. 10, c, and we from him in the same place. Therefore sin is not venial because it is committed by a faithful man or one predestined.

Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus II. On the Prima Sec…, On Sins, On Mortal and Venial Sin, In what, and how, mortal and venial sin differ from one another?

You will ask 1° by what formally and primarily mortal sin and venial sin are constituted and differ.

I answer. Mortal sin and venial sin are formally and primarily constituted and differentiated by this, that mortal sin is simply against the law, inasmuch as it is against the end of the law, which it overturns; not so venial sin. But the end of the law is the charity of God and neighbor, I Tim., I, 5; for all laws aim at this, that we love God with our whole heart, and our neighbor as ourselves. Or, which is the same thing, they formally and primarily differ in that mortal sin turns one away from God as last end, and constitutes the ultimate end in a creature; but venial sin, the order to the last end remaining, makes an inordinateness regarding means. The reason is because, a perfect transgression of the law being posited, or aversion from God as last end, all apprehend mortal sin, and thence follow the exclusion of sanctifying grace and charity, the dissolution of the friendship of God, the death of the soul irreparable of itself, guilt of eternal punishment, and all other things which are attributed to mortal sin and do not befit venial sin.

You will ask 2° whether mortal sin and venial sin differ essentially from each other.

I answer. Affirmatively. Because the malice of mortal sin, as appears from what has been said, consists in a relation of disproportion to the last end; but the malice of venial sin rests in a relation of disproportion to means not absolutely necessary for the end. But these two relations differ specifically. Therefore.

You will ask 3° whether and how mortal sins can be discerned from venial.

I answer. To wish to define certainly each and every one — this is mortal, this venial — is rash, since it surpasses human industry; and Augustine, the Eagle of Doctors, confesses, book XXI de Civit., last chapter, n. 5, notwithstanding his study¹, that he could not attain to this; and in the Enchirid., c. 78, n. 21, he says it must be weighed rather by divine than by human judgment. Nevertheless concerning some things it can be defined certainly, concerning many probabilistically; wherefore three rules are commonly assigned by theologians, the first from Scripture, the second from tradition, the third from natural reason. ¹ There the holy Doctor says: « Which are those very sins that so impede the attainment of the kingdom of God, and yet obtain indulgence through the merits of saintly friends, is most difficult to find out, most perilous to define. I certainly, up to this time, while laboring on this matter, could not arrive at their discovery. And perhaps they lie hidden on this account, lest zeal for progress grow sluggish in avoiding all sins. »

The first rule from Scripture. Sins which in the Scriptures are said to exclude from the kingdom of God, to be abominable, detestable, execrable, worthy of death, or have some other grave malediction attached to them, or to which is said Woe! are mortal; those, however, which are expressed in milder terms are venial. Of the former you have examples in Levit., XXIV, 15-21; Prov., VI, 16-19; Isa., I throughout; Rom., I, 18 seqq.; I Cor., VI, 9 et 10; Galat., V, 19-21; Ephes., V, 3 seqq., and elsewhere; of the latter, Prov., X, 19; Matth., XII, 36 et 37, and elsewhere.

The second rule from tradition. Those things which from the common sense of the Fathers, bishops and doctors are held in the Church as mortal must be reckoned mortal; those held as venial must be reckoned venial: because it is justly presumed that God does not desert his Church in a matter of such moment, nor permit her to be deceived by common error, to the ruin of souls.

n. 9.

The third rule from natural reason. Sins which, according to right reason, gravely injure the charity of God and neighbor are mortal; those which injure it lightly, venial. But to discern whether they injure the charity of God and neighbor gravely or lightly, many things must be considered: 1° the nature of the act, whether it admit or not lightness of matter, of which in the following article;

n. 10.

2° the gravity or lightness of the matter, both on the part of the object and on the part of the end and circumstances, in those things which admit it; 3° whether the sin be of its genus mortal or not; 4° the tenor of the words of the law, whether it commands severely and under grave penalty; 5° what was the intention of the legislator in this case; 6° whether the sin was committed with perfect or imperfect deliberation, whether from malice, or from weakness or ignorance. But when consent perfectly or imperfectly deliberated must be reckoned so, I will say in the following article.

Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus II. On the Prima Sec…, On Sins, On Mortal and Venial Sin, What is the last end of the one sinning mortally, and of the one sinning venially?

I say 1°: The creature is the ultimate end of one sinning mortally¹, according to that word of the Apostle, Philip., I, 19, of the gluttonous: Whose God is their belly. ¹ Here q. 88, a. 1, ad 4, and q. 89, a. 1, ad 3.

It is proved 1° from Aug., who in many places places the whole perversity of human life in this, that he enjoys things to be used and uses things to be enjoyed²; but to enjoy, according to the same Aug., lib. XI de Civit., c. 25, and elsewhere, is to adhere to something as to an ultimate end. But he who sins mortally enjoys things to be used; for he does not use them on account of God, since on their account he forsakes God. Therefore. ² « We use that thing which we refer to that from which pleasure is to be taken. All human perversion, therefore, which is also called vice, is to will to use things to be enjoyed and to enjoy things to be used. And again all ordering, by which even virtue is named, is to enjoy things to be enjoyed and to use things to be used. But things honorable are to be enjoyed, and things useful to be used. » De div. quaest. LXXXIII, q. 30.

It is proved 2º by reason. What man perversely loves by sinning mortally, he does not love as a means, or as an intermediate end subordinated to God, otherwise he would not sin; and moreover it is clear because, according to Scripture, Isa., I, 2, by sinning mortally he spurns³ God, and I Reg., XII, 10, forsakes⁴ God. Therefore he loves it as an ultimate end, or as a mean or intermediate end subordinated to another creature, and that other creature will be for him the ultimate end. ³ Hear, O heavens, and give ear, O earth, for the Lord has spoken. I have nourished and brought up children, but they have despised me. ⁴ They cried to the Lord and said: We have sinned, because we have forsaken the Lord and served Baalim and Astaroth.

But there remains the question: what creature is the ultimate end of one sinning mortally. Concerning which

I say 2º: The ultimate end of one sinning mortally is his own and private good, not in itself, but inordinately loved even to contempt of God and exclusion of grace and charity.

The first part is proved. That is the ultimate end of one sinning mortally which he loves for its own sake, and under whose reason he loves other things. But one sinning mortally loves his own and private good for its own sake, and the other particular goods which he pursues he loves by reason of his own and private good. Therefore. — The major is the definition of the ultimate end. — Proof of the minor. In every mortal sin the sinner loves a changeable good, because in it he finds, or apprehends, or imagines some convenience and advantage for himself. For either he apprehends this good as serving him, and thus apprehends it as good for himself; or he apprehends that he ought to serve that good, as idolaters worshipped idols for gods, and thus he apprehends its serving him as convenient and advantageous, just as a friend apprehends serving his friend as convenient and good for himself. Therefore whatever particular goods one sinning mortally pursues, those he loves under the reason of his own and private good.

The second part is proved. The ultimate end of one sinning mortally is opposed to God and irreferable to him. But one's own and private good in itself is not opposed to God and irreferable to him, but only cuts itself off from him; but as inordinately loved even to contempt of God and exclusion of grace, it is opposed to God and irreferable to him. Therefore.

From this you will infer that not everything the sinner does is mortal sin; nay rather, sometimes it is morally good, as honoring parents, paying debts¹, etc. For although these are not actually and explicitly referred to God in the sinner, they are nevertheless not irreferable of themselves; nay they are referred virtually and implicitly, as I shall say elsewhere. Hence also you have the solution of objections that can be made. ¹ This concludes against the 25th proposition of Baius condemned: « All works of infidels are sins, and the virtues of philosophers are vices. »

n. 9.

I say 3º: The ultimate end of one sinning venially, whether sinner or just man, is beatitude as such, or to be well and happy. For thus the ultimate end is had positively, and it is easily conceived how it does not exclude charity; because this most common end, since it is necessarily loved and indifferent of itself so as to be applied to a good or evil object, gives no honesty or malice to the act of itself, but abstracts from both. Consult dissert. I de Ultimo fine, a. 4 and 5.

n. 10.

Hence you will understand in what sense St. Thomas says in many places that venial sin is habitually referred to God. For the holy Doctor means nothing else than that venial sin in the just man is compatible with charity, and does not exclude it; because habitual relation, as I said in dissert. I de Ultimo fine, a. 5, signifies pure concomitance of some habit with an act, without any influx, whether actual or virtual. Whence, just as if a just man while sleeping were reciting prayers, he would be said to refer them habitually to God, on account of the concomitance of the habit of charity; so, while he sins venially, his sin is said to be referred habitually to God, on account of the charity concomitant, which he does not expel.

Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus II. On the Prima Sec…, On Sins, On Mortal and Venial Sin, Whether mortal sin, as an offense, is of simply infinite gravity?

Note 1°. Sin is an evil of God, not indeed physically damaging, for it takes nothing real away from God, but dishonoring and offensive by way of contempt — not only by reason of disobedience but chiefly by reason of violation of the strict right which he has to be the last end of all human actions, as he is their first principle, from which last end the sinner mortally turns away, constituting it in a creature, as was said in the preceding article. Now this injury consists in some morality and denomination whereby the person is said to be injured and offended, not effectively and entitatively, but morally and according to right estimation.

Note 2º. This dishonoring or offense can be considered in two ways: on the part of the act or of its object and circumstances, and on the part of the subject, namely God whom it affects and in whom it is morally subjected; for as, it is commonly said, honor is in the one honoring, so offense is in the one offended.

I say: It is more probable that mortal sin, in the character of offense considered on the part of God whom it affects, is of gravity simply infinite.

It is proved 1° from St. Thomas, 3ª parte, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2: « Sin, he says, committed against God has a certain infinity from the infinity of divine majesty; for the offense is so much graver, as greater is he against whom offense is given. Whence there was need, for condign satisfaction, that the act of the satisfier have infinite efficacy, as being that of God and man. »

Nor let it move you that he said, « a certain infinity. » For he said thus because it is not infinite in every way, neither on the part of the act nor in the physical genus, but morally only; not however because it is not infinite absolutely and without diminution. It appears because otherwise he would badly infer from it the necessity of infinite satisfaction.

It is proved 2º by reason taken from the principle laid down by the holy Doctor. Gravity of offense grows according to the dignity of the person upon whom it is inflicted: thus injury inflicted on a general is greater than on a soldier; greater inflicted on a king than on a general. And the reason is, because offense morally is in the one offended, as honor is in the one honoring, according to the common adage; and truly the offended one is the sufferer of injury, but the sufferer is the subject receiving; whence, as honor grows according to the dignity of the person honoring, so grows offense according to the dignity of the person offended. Yet the dignity of the person offended, namely God, is simply infinite. Ergo.

Neither say that offense grows according to the dignity of the person offended, not arithmetically and according to equality, but geometrically and only according to proportion: from which only follows that the offense of God be of higher order than offense of creatures. — Against is the fact that God himself confers upon the offense committed against himself that it be of higher order. Yet he is not only of higher order, but infinite. Ergo he also confers upon the offense committed against himself that it be infinite; for he is not less powerful to confer infinity than superiority of order.

If you reply, that communicating infinity is impeded by the limitation of the sinner's effort — I answer. this limitation is in the physical genus, and the infinity of offense in the moral genus. But this physical limitation does not impede moral infinity; just as, although the actions of Christ theandric were physically finite, nevertheless by reason of the divine supposit they were infinite morally and in being of value. — It is confirmed. The effort of the sinner is not only finite, but also of lower order than God offended. Yet, notwithstanding this inferiority, God communicates to him gravity of higher order, as the adversaries say. Ergo, though it be finite, he can communicate to it infinity.

Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus II. On the Prima Sec…, On Sins, On Mortal and Venial Sin, Whether man, in the first moral instant of the use of reason, is bound to turn himself to God; and whether venial sin can exist with original sin alone?

The question is of the perfect use of reason, which suffices for deliberating about things most weighty, to which a child arrives gradually and successively, some more quickly, some more slowly.

…and 7 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Slater, Cases I

Thomas Slater, S.J. — 13 passages

Slater, Cases I, Sin, Case 7. The Philosophic Sin

To Caius, a priest, it seems that theologians, even recent ones, do not sufficiently weigh the circumstances in which the less instructed among the faithful especially live today when they discuss the malice of sins. For very many have from infancy been so accustomed to sins of drunkenness and lust and to the omission of Mass on days of obligation that they regard these and other things as almost nothing. Added to this are bad habits contracted from infancy which blind the conscience and weaken the will. Moreover, such persons scarcely ever think about God except perhaps when they come to church, and therefore, even if they act badly, they do not intend to offend God with the danger of eternal punishment. Led by these reasons, Caius imposes an altogether light penance upon the less instructed who confess such things and readily dismisses them absolved. Hence it is asked: