Article I: On Mortal Sin

335. DEFINITION. Mortal sin is a deliberate transgression of a law gravely obliging, or: an OFFENSE, that is, an injury OF GOD, which, on account of its gravity, dissolves grace and friendship with God, and merits eternal punishment (see n. 339). "It is called mortal, because it removes the principle of spiritual life, namely habitual grace, and brings death to the soul" (V, 51; cf. Inst. Cat., Introd.).

DIVISION. Mortal sin is such either from its whole genus, or from its genus simply, or per accidens.

1. It is mortal from its whole genus, when by reason of the object it is always grave, because the whole notion of offense is detected both in the least and in the greatest quantity of matter.

Of this kind are hatred of God, formal heresy, perjury, blasphemy, simony by divine right, direct violation of the sacramental seal, or breaking the fast before Communion, venereal acts outside marriage, etc. These never admit smallness of matter: because they always contain grave disorder by reason of the object (V, 56).

2. It is mortal from its genus (simply or not from the whole), when by reason of the object it can be mortal or venial according to the quantity of matter; but the sin is not mortal unless it reaches a certain quantity of matter.

Of this kind are thefts and other sins against justice; for they admit smallness of matter (V, 54-56; H. Ap., III, 67).

3. It is mortal per accidens (venial per se), if by reason of the object, or considering the nature of the thing, it is indeed light, but has been made grave

by reason of some special circumstance which intervenes in the act, for example, by reason of error, scandal, etc., as will be explained below (n. 342, q. 3).

336. PRINCIPLE. For mortal sin three things are necessarily required, namely grave matter, full advertence of the intellect, and perfect consent of the will. The reason is because, human frailty being considered, it does not seem to befit divine goodness to punish man with eternal torments on account of a transgression in matter altogether light, or on account of the violation of an obligation not fully and perfectly voluntary (V, 53).

There is required 1. Grave matter, namely matter which is such either according to itself, or by reason of some circumstance, for example, if the end of the legislator is of great moment, to which the law contributes very much, or if grave scandal must be avoided, etc.

2. Full advertence to the grave obligation, and therefore in the definition of mortal sin there is added deliberate, that is, perfect in the line of act.

For the intellect can advert in a twofold way: either fully, when someone, fully master of himself, perfectly discerns the matter, having the mind free; or half-fully, when he discerns the matter in an imperfect way, as happens in half-wakefulness, in half-drunkenness, in distraction, in most vehement passion. Now, in order that a sin be mortal, full advertence is always required either to the malice of the act, or to the danger of sinning, or to the obligation of averting such a danger; and this either actually, while the action is posited, or in the beginning when the cause was freely posited, from which afterwards the evil act followed (Conf. dir., III). Cf. n. 318.

3. Perfect consent of the will. Consent is called perfect when the act of the will embracing evil is wholly free and deliberate, or when it follows wholly full advertence of the intellect; but imperfect, if it was sudden, without sufficient deliberation, or if it follows half-full advertence; or finally, if only the inferior part of the soul consents, with tepid resistance of the will (cf. n. 322, q. 1).

Now, for mortal sin, which is full and consummated fault, imperfect consent does not suffice, but full and perfect consent is required, in which there is the whole notion of the voluntary. This is common and certain, says St. Alphonsus (V, 5), among the Doctors even of the more rigid opinion. Nevertheless it can happen that the will, with only indirect consent, commits mortal sin, if, namely, with the effect foreseen, it wills the cause, as was said above (H. Ap., III, 40). Cf. n. 319, 321.

Note. Virtual and confused advertence suffices, provided it is full; nor is it required that it be distinct. It is distinct when someone discerns the quality or quantity of the sin; concerning virtual we spoke n. 317; it will be confused when, by an act of the intellect fully conscious of itself, he doubts or suspects the malice of the action (V, 3). This suffices for perfect consent and for mortal sin, as is clear from the things said n. 36. Therefore neither is it required, as certain neoterics have thought (but afterwards they taught this less openly), that mortal sin must be committed from rebellion against God, from formal insurrection against God, from hatred of God and with a certain pertinacity. See Commer, Herrmann Schell, p. 118.

337. Questions. QUAER. 1. How can the objective gravity of sins, or gravity BY REASON OF MATTER, be known?

Resp. The objective gravity of sins is known:

I. From authority: 1. From Sacred Letters. "Which sins are light, which grave, must be weighed not by human, but by divine judgment," says St. Augustine (Ench., c. 78). Therefore those sins must be considered mortal which in Sacred Letters are said to be worthy of death, or to exclude from the kingdom of heaven, or hateful to God, etc. For words of this kind signify that the deformity of the action is certainly grave. 2. From the definitions of Supreme Pontiffs and decrees of General Councils; if, namely, in them some sin is declared mortal, or is found affected by grave penalties (Diss. proleg. Zacch., P. II, c. 3 and 4). 3. From the doctrine of the holy Fathers, Doctors of the Church, and distinguished theologians. Those things which by them unanimously, or almost unanimously, are held as mortal, must also by us be considered as such. For not to assent to them savors of temerity, since their consensus in a moral matter is an indication of truth (Kon., n. 202).

II. From the very matter of sin or from natural reason. Thus generally GRAVE are judged: all sins which are directly against God or some perfection of his; sins which tend to grave prejudice of the human race, as are the various species of lust; sins by which the neighbor is gravely harmed in goods of life, fortune, reputation, etc.; sins which are gravely repugnant to an end of great moment intended by law, as the omission of fasting, Mass, annual confession, Paschal Communion, etc.

For the rest, the limits between mortal and venial sin often, indeed very often, can in no way be determined, as is clear from innumerable controversies of the Doctors. But where strict doubt perseveres, one must stand for the milder part and the faithful person must prudently be instructed. "For a mortal sin is not to be built up, unless it is certainly clear concerning it" (I, 89; V, 52, Bene hic).¹

QUAER. 2. Whether he sins gravely who knows his action is EVIL, but is ignorant of its GRAVITY, or does not attend to it?

It is noted beforehand. The question has force concerning those things which are not evidently grave, nor evidently light: for concerning evident things it cannot be supposed that the one operating, who adverts that the matter is evil, does not attend, not even confusedly, to gravity or lightness; because, at least implicitly and exercisedly, he sufficiently apprehends one or the other. Likewise the question is not concerning a man who positively doubts concerning the gravity of his action. Let the conclusion given above, n. 36, be read again.

Resp. It is disputed; but to St. Alphonsus sufficiently probable is the opinion of those who say that a man of this kind sins, per se, only venially; because in order to sin mortally, it is required that someone consent directly or indirectly to a mortal sin; but he who in no way thinks of, or suspects, mortal sin cannot by any reason be said to consent to mortal sin (I, 23; cf. Istruz., I, 13).

We said PER SE, that is, supposing: 1. that he does not apprehend, at least confusedly, the danger of sinning gravely or the obligation of investigating the matter; 2. that the agent is not of lax conscience; otherwise, at least indirectly, he must be judged to consent to mortal sin (cf. n. 318, 2).

QUAER. 3. How must one judge IN DOUBT concerning perfect consent?

Resp. One must judge from things commonly happening, as we have already said (n. 50).

1. If the one doubting is of timorous conscience and is not accustomed deliberately to consent to grave sin, it can reasonably, indeed morally certainly, be believed that he has not consented. For he who habitually adheres to God, and greatly fears lest he be deprived of divine grace, if it sometimes happens that he is turned away from him, must inflict great force upon himself in order that he despise the remorse of conscience and deliberately throw himself into sin: but he cannot do this unless he certainly adverts to the evil which he embraces.

But for presuming that full consent was not present in a pious man, these following CONJECTURES are especially useful: "a) If such a one has had a serious and often repeated purpose of never sinning mortally, and does not know that he has certainly revoked it. b) If, when he adverts the evil, he is terrified and immediately repels the temptation, and at once doubts whether he consented. c) If he remembers that he proceeded timidly (that is, if there was present only torpor, yawning, hesitation of the will). d) If he does not know whether he did or thought something in wakefulness or sleep; for if he had been awake, he would have adverted it and would know it" (VI, 476). e) Finally, if he could easily have proceeded to the external act, and nevertheless did not proceed (Reuter, Neo-conf., 244, 265).

2. If the one doubting is accustomed easily to fall into mortal sins (or is of lax conscience), the opposite must be judged concerning him; "because in doubt he is presumed to have consented. For if he had resisted, he would indeed remember that effort which he inflicted upon himself to repel the temptation."

3. Whether mortal sins which remain plainly doubtful from this must be declared in confession will be weighed below in the treatise on Penance (n. 1695 seq.).

QUAER. 4. Whether he sins gravely who DELIBERATES concerning furnishing consent to a gravely illicit thing, if finally he does not consent?

Resp. The solution of the question depends on the quality of the deliberation. If the deliberation is only a certain hesitation, or omission of resistance, proceeding from torpor, sloth, or negligence, it does not exceed venial sin. But if the deliberation is full and formal, by which, namely, someone weighs whether he wishes to perpetrate a gravely evil thing or not, it is a mortal sin. For thus hesitating, after the manner of Pilate, he values God with the creature; wherefore he commits a sin of the same species and gravity as that concerning which he deliberates (Croix, V, 226-229).

For promoting tranquility of conscience in doubts concerning consent, a simple and serious effort to elicit an act of charity has much force; it helps very much and can by no means harm.

338. Note. By reason of peculiar malice, there are also distinguished:

1. Sins AGAINST THE HOLY SPIRIT. Six are numbered: a) presumption, b) despair, c) attack against acknowledged truth, d) envy of fraternal grace, e) obstinacy, f) final impenitence. They are called sins against the Holy Spirit because, through them, that is cast away by which the Holy Spirit is accustomed to remove man from sin: whence they are most grave, and are remitted only with the greatest difficulty (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 14, a. 2).

2. Sins CRYING TO HEAVEN. There are four, namely: a) homicide, b) sodomy, c) oppression of the poor, d) defrauding the wages of laborers. They are called crying, because they most vehemently provoke divine vengeance and merit most grave punishments (Voit, de Pecc., n. 316-317).

3. Irremissible sins, concerning which see Matt. XII, 31; Mark III, 28; Luke XII, 10; 2 Pet. II, 20; Heb. VI, 4; X, 26. They are so called not with respect to God, but with respect to man, who rejects the mercy of God.

339. The chief effects are the following:

1. GRAVE INJURY OF GOD. Any mortal sin is an offense of God, not effectively, because God is incapable of harm, but affectively; and it is a true injury and contempt of the divine Majesty, which is placed after the creature (H. Ap., III, n. 20). For mortal sin is aversion from God and conversion to the creature.

But this offense of God involves so great an evil in itself that it cannot be conceived by any created intellect: for objectively and extrinsically, or on the part of the one offended, it is truly infinite, because "injury is in the one injured as honor is in the one honoring" (St. Thom., III, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2).

2. PRIVATION OF SANCTIFYING GRACE, and with this privation, the loss of all merits, and inability for acquiring new merits.

3. A MOST FOUL STAIN OF THE SOUL. To the point St. Thomas says (1.2, q. 86, a. 1 and 2): "The soul of man," he says, "has a double brightness: one from the shining of the natural light of reason, by which it is directed in its acts, and another from the divine light of wisdom and grace, by which man is perfected for acting well. But when man sins, he adheres to certain things against the light of reason and of the divine law, and thus he is stained ...; the stain of the soul is so called metaphorically. This stain remains in the soul even when the act of sin passes away, insofar as it imports a defect of brightness from recession from the light of reason and of the divine law ... but after he returns to the light, which is done through grace, then the stain ceases."

4. GUILT-BOUNDNESS OF FAULT. This prior guilt-boundness, which differs from stain only according to the mode of signifying, properly says a state of culpability, which includes two things; namely: a) privation of the praiseworthy or of praise, which is owed both to the person who operates according to the order of reason and of the eternal law, and to the act which agrees with these rules ...; b) the obligation of repairing the injury inflicted upon God, through deviation from the aforesaid order of reason and of the eternal law, and therefore through contempt of God himself (1.2, q. 21, a. 2).

5. GUILT-BOUNDNESS OF PUNISHMENT, that is, the obligation or necessity of paying the punishment due to sin. As St. Thomas rightly observes, those things which are contained under some order are in a certain way one, in order to the principle of the order. Wherefore whatever rises against the order ought to be depressed by that order and the prince of the order. Therefore, since sin perverts the THREEFOLD order of reason, of the universe, and of God, hence it incurs guilt-boundness of a threefold punishment, namely remorse of conscience, vengeance of creatures (for example, through fire), and privation of God (1.2, q. 87, a. 1).

6. PUNISHMENT ITSELF. Punishment is usually defined: the privation of a due good, against the will of him who is deprived, on account of fault. Wherefore two things are to be noted: one concerning its gravity; the other concerning its bitterness.

As to gravity, it depends on the magnitude of the good of which someone is deprived. Whence the gravest of all punishments is the privation of God, who is the highest good. The second place is held by the privation of supernatural goods. From this punishment it easily results that one sin becomes per accidens the punishment of another, insofar as the sinner, despoiled of his supernatural habits and more deprived of actual graces, is drawn on to other sins, as if by the proper weight of his perverse nature. In the third place comes the privation of natural goods. By this punishment also, at least partly, the sinner is chastised; for his nature, wounded by original sin with the fourfold wound of ignorance, malice, infirmity, and concupiscence, is affected by a new wounding. St. Thomas well declares this (1.2, q. 83, a. 3).

But as to the bitterness of punishment, it must be said that it arises from contrariety of the will. And hence it often happens that in this life the greatest punishment is felt least, and the least is felt most; for "the fascination of trifling obscures goods" (Wis. IV, 12). But after death, punishment torments according to its intrinsic gravity. For man, once having entered into the house of his eternity, at last judges rightly concerning those divine goods, to the possession and enjoyment of which he was born. Whence the more excellent the goods are, the more bitterly he grieves concerning their privation. And since God is infinite good, St. Alphonsus does not doubt (Praep. ad mortem, cons. 26, punct. 3) to assert that the punishment of the damned is plainly incomprehensible and in a certain way infinite. Cf. Lessius, de Perfectionibus moribusque divinis, l. XIII, c. 12, 13, 28 seqq.