§ II. On Venial Sin

I. Existence of venial sins. There are venial¹ sins, distinct from mortal sins. Luther and Calvin taught that all sins by their nature are mortal and worthy of eternal punishment; nevertheless they are called venial: according to Luther, because they are not imputed to one having faith; according to Calvin, because they are not imputed to the predestined. Likewise Baius taught that no sin is venial by its nature, but that some are such from the mercy of God.

Concerning the stated proposition the Council of Trent has these words: "For although in this mortal life, however holy and just they may be, they sometimes fall into at least light and daily sins, which are also called venial, they do not on that account cease to be just. For that voice of the just is both humble and true: Forgive us our debts."² There is added the condemned second proposition of Baius: "No sin is by its nature venial, but every sin merits eternal punishment."

The proposition is proved from Sacred Scripture, which compares some sins to very light things, others to very grave things. Thus some are compared to a gnat, others to a camel;³ some to a mote, others to a beam;⁴ some to hay and stubble placed upon the foundation of Christ.⁵ Then Sacred Scripture declares that all men sin, although some persevere in the justice and friendship of God: "In many things we all offend";⁶ "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us."⁷

¹ It is called venial because, with the principle of spiritual life, namely grace, preserved, it inflicts upon the soul a languor easily curable, and easily obtains pardon (St. Alphonsus, V, 51).

² Session 6, chapter 11.

³ Matt. 23:23-24.

⁴ Luke 6:41.

⁵ 1 Cor. 3:12 ff.

⁶ James 3:2.

⁷ 1 John 1:8.

II. Nature of venial sin. Venial sin is not aversion, as mortal sin is, but a certain disorder from man's ultimate end. It is called a certain disorder from the ultimate end insofar as it involves an act which is not referable to God as ultimate end; nevertheless, neither is it referred to a creature as to the ultimate end, in which case it would be mortal, but it is referred to beatitude in common as to the ultimate end. Therefore such a sin does not overturn the order toward God; hence it is said to be against the integrity of the due order. "But when," says St. Thomas, "disorder takes place short of aversion from God, then there is venial sin" (I-II, q. 72, a. 5). And elsewhere: "Venial sin falls short of mortal sin in this, that it does not entirely disorder from the end. But in some way it delays from the end, while the order to the end is preserved" (In II Sent., dist. 35, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2; St. Alphonsus, V, 11).

Corollary I. From what has been said about mortal and venial sin, it is clear in what sense mortal sin is said to be against the law, while venial sin is only beside the law (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 88, a. 1, ad 1). Namely, the former is against the law, the latter beside the law, insofar as by law is understood the divine disposition which establishes the substance of order, or the order essential with respect to the ultimate end. Nevertheless, venial sin can to this extent be called against the law insofar as it is opposed to something contained in the law, or, as St. Thomas says, insofar as "it does not observe the mode of reason which the law intends" (cited place), i.e., as St. Alphonsus explains, it does not observe the mode of the law. Now the mode of the law against which venial sin strikes is the integrity of order (V, 11).

Corollary II. Sin is predicated of mortal and venial sin not univocally, but only analogically,¹ because the notion of sin, namely disorder, is altogether diverse in each. For mortal sin altogether disorders from the ultimate end, but venial sin only in some way delays from the end, while the order to the end is preserved. Hence "the division of sin into venial and mortal is not the division of a genus into species which equally participate in the notion of the genus, but of an analogue into those things of which it is predicated according to prior and posterior; and therefore the perfect notion of sin, which Augustine sets down, belongs to mortal sin. But venial sin is called sin according to an imperfect notion, and in order to mortal sin; just as accident is called being in order to substance, according to the imperfect notion of being" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 88, a. 1, ad 1). Therefore mortal and venial sin differ in the whole genus, or in theological species, as they say.

¹ Something is predicated of several things univocally if it is in them in the same mode; analogically, if in a diverse mode.

III. Division of venial sin. Venial sins are divided into venial sins from their genus and venial sins by accident.

1. Those are called venial from their genus whose proper matter is essentially light, so that mortal sin cannot be had unless malice of another species is added. Such, for example, is a lie (St. Alphonsus, V, 52).

2. There will be discussion of venial sins by accident in the scholion.

IV. Conditions of venial sin. For venial sin, imperfect or half-full advertence and consent suffice. Now:

1. The signs of imperfect advertence are: 1. if you were half-asleep or half-drunk; 2. if you adverted to the malice lightly, like one half-asleep; 3. if you were so carried away by passion, apprehension, or distraction that you hardly knew what you were doing; 4. if, after weighing the matter better, you judge that you certainly would not have acted if you had been watchful, sober, and with mind calm (St. Alphonsus, V, 54). Moreover, with regard to sins committed before the seventh year, in doubt full advertence is always presumed to have been absent.

2. He who doubts whether he fully consented can presume that he did not consent, at least not fully: 1. if one of the signs of imperfect advertence assigned above is present; 2. if he was so disposed that although he could easily have carried out the sin, nevertheless he did not carry it out; 3. if he remembers that he proceeded timidly; 4. if, immediately reflecting upon the act placed, he is terrified, saddened, and at once repels it.

And indeed these things are valid generally. But abstraction having been made from the signs set forth, in doubt about full consent, the timorous person can always presume that he did not fully consent. It is otherwise if someone has been accustomed to consent to sins. One who now consents, now does not consent, cannot resolve the doubt by the help of presumption (St. Alphonsus, V, 55; VI, 476). Besides, commonly one should abstain from direct investigation, both because for the most part it will be fruitless, and because it will rather often be a new excitation to temptation.

3. He who deliberates whether he wishes to consent to a mortal sin, supposing full advertence to the grave malice of the proposed thing, sins gravely, because he lays aside the absolute will of not sinning. Nevertheless, in practice there is often not perfect deliberation, but only a certain negligence in fighting the temptation.

V. Effects of venial sin. Venial sin: 1. diminishes fear of God and tenderness of conscience, and increases tepidity of soul. 2. It impedes special graces and renders us unworthy of that special affection with which God follows the just who are fervent in his love. 3. It disposes toward mortal sin, both directly and indirectly. Directly, by generating and increasing a depraved habit; thus small thefts dispose toward grave ones. Indirectly, insofar as they diminish the fervor of charity and actual graces. 4. It induces liability to punishment, concerning which we have spoken.