Article — Billuart, Summa Summae · from Schola Thomistica
What is the last end of the one sinning mortally, and of the one sinning venially?
I say 1°: The creature is the ultimate end of one sinning mortally1, according to that word of the Apostle, Philip., I, 19, of the gluttonous: Whose God is their belly. 1 Here q. 88, a. 1, ad 4, and q. 89, a. 1, ad 3.
Dico 1° : Creatura est finis ultimus peccantis mortaliter1, juxta illud Apost., Philip., I, 19, de gulosis : Quorum Deus venter est. 1 Hic q. 88, a. 1, ad 4, et q. 89, a. 1, ad 3.
It is proved 1° from Aug., who in many places places the whole perversity of human life in this, that he enjoys things to be used and uses things to be enjoyed2; but to enjoy, according to the same Aug., lib. XI de Civit., c. 25, and elsewhere, is to adhere to something as to an ultimate end. But he who sins mortally enjoys things to be used; for he does not use them on account of God, since on their account he forsakes God. Therefore. 2 « We use that thing which we refer to that from which pleasure is to be taken. All human perversion, therefore, which is also called vice, is to will to use things to be enjoyed and to enjoy things to be used. And again all ordering, by which even virtue is named, is to enjoy things to be enjoyed and to use things to be used. But things honorable are to be enjoyed, and things useful to be used. » De div. quaest. LXXXIII, q. 30.
Probatur 1° ex Aug., qui pluribus in locis totam perversitatem vitae humanae collocat in eo quod fruatur utendis et utatur fruendis2 ; frui autem, secundum eundem Aug., lib. XI de Civit., c. 25, et alibi, est alicui tamquam fini ultimo adhaerere. Atqui qui peccat mortaliter, fruitur utendis ; non enim utitur illis propter Deum, cum propter illa Deum deserat. Ergo. 2 « Utimur ea re quam referimus ad id unde voluptas capienda est. Omnis itaque humana perversio est, quod etiam vitium vocatur, fruendis uti velle, atque utendis frui. Et rursus omnis ordinatio, qua virtus etiam nominatur, fruendis frui et utendis uti. Fruendum est autem honestis, utendum vero utilibus. » De div. quaest. LXXXIII, q. 30.
It is proved 2º by reason. What man perversely loves by sinning mortally, he does not love as a means, or as an intermediate end subordinated to God, otherwise he would not sin; and moreover it is clear because, according to Scripture, Isa., I, 2, by sinning mortally he spurns3 God, and I Reg., XII, 10, forsakes4 God. Therefore he loves it as an ultimate end, or as a mean or intermediate end subordinated to another creature, and that other creature will be for him the ultimate end. 3 Hear, O heavens, and give ear, O earth, for the Lord has spoken. I have nourished and brought up children, but they have despised me. 4 They cried to the Lord and said: We have sinned, because we have forsaken the Lord and served Baalim and Astaroth.
Probatur 2º ratione. Quod homo perverse amat peccando mortaliter, non amat illud ut medium, aut ut finem intermedium Deo subordinatum, alioquin non peccaret ; et insuper patet quia, juxta Scripturam, Isa., I, 2, peccando mortaliter spernit3 Deum, et I Reg., XII, 10, derelinquit4 Deum. Ergo amat illud ut finem ultimum, vel ut medium aut finem intermedium alteri creaturae subordinatum, et illa altera creatura erit illi finis ultimus. 3 Audite coeli et auribus percipe terra, quoniam Dominus locutus est. Filios enutrivi et exaltavi, ipsi autem spreverunt me. 4 Clamaverunt ad Dominum et dixerunt : Peccavimus, quia dereliquimus Dominum et servivimus Baalim et Astaroth.
But there remains the question: what creature is the ultimate end of one sinning mortally. Concerning which
Sed restat quaestio : quae creatura sit ultimus finis peccantis mortaliter. Pro quo
I say 2º: The ultimate end of one sinning mortally is his own and private good, not in itself, but inordinately loved even to contempt of God and exclusion of grace and charity.
Dico 2º : Finis ultimus peccantis mortaliter est ejus bonum proprium et privatum, non secundum se, sed inordinate amatum usque ad contemptum Dei et exclusionem gratiae et charitatis.
The first part is proved. That is the ultimate end of one sinning mortally which he loves for its own sake, and under whose reason he loves other things. But one sinning mortally loves his own and private good for its own sake, and the other particular goods which he pursues he loves by reason of his own and private good. Therefore. — The major is the definition of the ultimate end. — Proof of the minor. In every mortal sin the sinner loves a changeable good, because in it he finds, or apprehends, or imagines some convenience and advantage for himself. For either he apprehends this good as serving him, and thus apprehends it as good for himself; or he apprehends that he ought to serve that good, as idolaters worshipped idols for gods, and thus he apprehends its serving him as convenient and advantageous, just as a friend apprehends serving his friend as convenient and good for himself. Therefore whatever particular goods one sinning mortally pursues, those he loves under the reason of his own and private good.
Probatur prima pars. Illud est finis ultimus peccantis mortaliter, quod propter se amat et sub ratione cujus caetera amat. Atqui peccans mortaliter, amat proprium et privatum bonum propter se, et caetera bona particularia quae prosequitur amat ratione proprii et privati boni. Ergo. — Major est definitio finis ultimi. — Prob. min. In omni peccato mortali peccans amat bonum commutabile, quia in eo reperit, vel apprehendit, vel imaginatur aliquam sibi convenientiam et commodum. Vel enim apprehendit istud bonum sibi deservire, et sic apprehendit ut sibi bonum; vel apprehendit se debere servire illi bono, sicut idololatrae colebant idola pro diis, et sic apprehendit illud servire ut sibi conveniens et commodum, sicut amicus apprehendit servire amico ut sibi conveniens et bonum. Ergo quaecumque bona particularia prosequitur peccans mortaliter, illa amat sub ratione boni proprii et privati.
The second part is proved. The ultimate end of one sinning mortally is opposed to God and irreferable to him. But one's own and private good in itself is not opposed to God and irreferable to him, but only cuts itself off from him; but as inordinately loved even to contempt of God and exclusion of grace, it is opposed to God and irreferable to him. Therefore.
Probatur secunda pars. Finis ultimus peccantis mortaliter est oppositus Deo et irreferibilis in ipsum. Atqui bonum proprium et privatum secundum se non est oppositum Deo et irreferibile in ipsum, sed tantum ab hoc praescindit; ut autem inordinate amatum usque ad contemptum Dei et exclusionem gratiae, est oppositum Deo et irreferibile in ipsum. Ergo.
From this you will infer that not everything the sinner does is mortal sin; nay rather, sometimes it is morally good, as honoring parents, paying debts1, etc. For although these are not actually and explicitly referred to God in the sinner, they are nevertheless not irreferable of themselves; nay they are referred virtually and implicitly, as I shall say elsewhere. Hence also you have the solution of objections that can be made. 1 This concludes against the 25th proposition of Baius condemned: « All works of infidels are sins, and the virtues of philosophers are vices. »
Ex quo inferes, non omne quod facit peccator esse peccatum mortale, quin imo quandoque esse bonum moraliter, ut colere parentes, solvere debita1, etc. Licet enim haec in peccatore actu explicite non referantur in Deum, non sunt tamen ex se irreferibilia, quin etiam virtualiter implicite referuntur, ut dicam alibi. Hinc etiam habes solutionem objectionum quae fieri possunt. 1 Hoc concludit contra 25am propositionem Baianam damnatam : « Omnia opera infidelium sunt peccata, et philosophorum virtutes sunt vitia. »
I say 3º: The ultimate end of one sinning venially, whether sinner or just man, is beatitude as such, or to be well and happy. For thus the ultimate end is had positively, and it is easily conceived how it does not exclude charity; because this most common end, since it is necessarily loved and indifferent of itself so as to be applied to a good or evil object, gives no honesty or malice to the act of itself, but abstracts from both. Consult dissert. I de Ultimo fine, a. 4 and 5.
Dico 3º : Finis ultimus peccantis venialiter, sive peccatoris sive justi, est beatitudo ut sic, seu esse bene et beate. Sic enim habetur finis ultimus positive, et facile concipitur quomodo non excludat charitatem; quia iste communissimus finis, cum sit necessario amatus et de se indifferens ut applicetur objecto bono vel malo, nullam ex se tribuit actui honestatem vel malitiam, sed ab utraque abstrahit. Consule dissert. I de Ultimo fine, a. 4 et 5.
Hence you will understand in what sense St. Thomas says in many places that venial sin is habitually referred to God. For the holy Doctor means nothing else than that venial sin in the just man is compatible with charity, and does not exclude it; because habitual relation, as I said in dissert. I de Ultimo fine, a. 5, signifies pure concomitance of some habit with an act, without any influx, whether actual or virtual. Whence, just as if a just man while sleeping were reciting prayers, he would be said to refer them habitually to God, on account of the concomitance of the habit of charity; so, while he sins venially, his sin is said to be referred habitually to God, on account of the charity concomitant, which he does not expel.
Hinc intelliges quo sensu S. Thomas multis in locis dicit peccatum veniale referri habitualiter in Deum. Nihil enim aliud vult S. Doctor, quam quod peccatum veniale in justo compatiatur charitatem, eamque non excludat; quia relatio habitualis, ut dixi dissert. I de Ultimo fine, a. 5, dicit puram concomitantiam alicujus habitus cum actu, absque ullo influxu sive actuali sive virtuali. Unde, sicut si justus dormiens recitaret preces, diceretur illas referre habitualiter in Deum, propter concomitantiam habitus charitatis; ita, dum peccat venialiter, dicitur peccatum suum referre habitualiter in Deum, propter concomitantem charitatem quam non expellit.