Section — Marc, Institutiones Morales
§ 3. On the End
- DEFINITION. End, in general, is that for the sake of which something is done, namely whose goodness, true or judged, entices the will and determines it to operating.
DIVISION. End is distinguished by reason of origin, or source, into the end of the work or intrinsic end, and the end of the one operating or extrinsic end. The end of the work is called that to which the work is ordered from its nature, as a house to dwelling, alms to relieving the want of a poor person. This end is one and the same as the object, concerning which n. 297. The end of the one operating is called that to which the one operating himself, from his own choice, orders his work: as if someone deceitfully builds a house on another's soil so that he may acquire it for himself; likewise, if someone bestows alms on account of empty glory.
If the one operating intends only the end of the work, the act therefrom contracts a morality not diverse from the morality which it has from the object; whence discourse concerning that does not return.
- The end OF THE ONE OPERATING, concerning which here the matter is properly treated, is subdivided:
- By reason of the motion of the will, it is primary or secondary.
Primary is said of that which is esteemed before the others, and which the agent, if perhaps a collision among various ends should arise, would retain first of all. Secondary is that which is subordinated to the primary end, and, with this presupposed, is intended as annexed to the primary. Let there be as an example the twofold end of an adolescent entering Religion: his primary end is that he provide for his eternal salvation; the secondary, that he be exempted from secular cares.
The secondary end sometimes is the cause why the agent applies himself to the work, yet with subordination to the primary end: for example, if a priest not intending to celebrate determines himself to this, that he may show himself pleasing to a friend. Ordinarily then it obtains the name of impulsive cause.
By reason of coordination among themselves, it is ultimate or intermediate. The ultimate end is that on account of which we will the rest, but it for its own sake only. The intermediate end is that on account of which we will something, but which again we refer to another: as if someone afflicts the body on account of virtue, which he seeks so that he may please God: God is the ultimate end of this affliction, but virtue the intermediate end.
By reason of formal morality, it is good or evil; but there is not given an indifferent end. This is clear from the fact that the end, as such, necessarily involves the notion of some good which the agent pursues. But the pursuit of this good either is according to right reason, or not: in the first case, the end is called good, in the other evil, and thus it is clear that an indifferent end is not given.
The act by which the will bears itself toward the end is called INTENTION: which is distinguished into actual, virtual, habitual, and interpretative; explicit or implicit, according as was said above concerning the voluntary (n. 272, 6.).
- PRINCIPLES. I. The end of the one operating attributes true morality to a human act. This is clear from the things said; for the end, not otherwise than other circumstances, can say a relation of conformity or deformity to reason. Whence Christ the Lord (Matt. 6:22, 23): If thy eye shall be single, thy whole body will be lightsome. But if thy eye shall be evil, thy whole body will be dark. By the eye, however, the intention of the end is commonly understood; by the body, the action.
Hence St. Alphonsus (H. Ap., III, 5): "Every human act," he says, "whether it is elicited or commanded by the will, is specified by the end for the sake of which it is exercised. Wherefore those acts which have the same end, although materially they are diverse, nevertheless assume the same species; for example, if someone fasts, prays, preaches on account of the glory of God: all these acts are acts of charity. On the contrary, if one and the same material act is elicited by the will on account of diverse ends, it assumes diverse species": for example, if someone serves the sick from charity, from penance, from humility, etc.
The morality which is had from the extrinsic end is accidental with respect to the act to which it comes; for this act has its essential morality from the object, or from the intrinsic end: nevertheless it is called principal with respect to the agent, who primarily intends the extrinsic end, and is borne toward it with greater affection than toward the object itself. For we are denominated not from the act, but from the affection. Thus, for example, he who steals in order to commit adultery is, speaking per se, more an adulterer than a thief (Aristotle apud St. Thom., 1.2, q. 18, a. 6).
- II. The end of the one operating sometimes attributes multiple morality to an action; but from the end of the one operating and from the end of the work, sometimes only one moral quality results. For distinguishing well this diverse morality, St. Alphonsus gives the following RULES (l. V, n. XXXVIII; ed. G., II, p. 701):
- If the object is good, but the end of the one operating is evil, the human act is either simply evil, or partly good and partly evil.
a) It is simply evil, if the end is gravely evil. For the agent, by sinning mortally, totally recedes from God; for example, if someone gives alms to a needy girl in order to allure her to sin. b) Likewise, it is simply evil, if the lightly evil end is the total cause; for example, if someone gives alms solely for empty glory; for right reason disapproves that good be chosen on account of a depraved end (St. Thom., 1.2, q. 18, a. 4 and 6). c) It is partly good and partly evil, if the lightly evil end is a partial cause: for example, if someone, from a sincere affection of mercy, wishes to give alms to a poor person; but because the poor person asks publicly, there also enters in a stimulus of empty glory, which is not repelled.
This diverse morality in the same work can easily be understood from this, that about the same object there can be a multiple act of the will.
If the object is good and the end also good, the human act has a double species of moral goodness, as is giving alms in satisfaction for sins. Indeed, as many as are the good ends in the one operating, so many are the goodnesses in the act (as was said n. 305).
If the object is indifferent, a good end makes the act morally good, as is walking from obedience.
If the object is indifferent, an evil end makes the act morally evil, as is walking for a display of luxury.
If the object is evil, an evil end makes the act worse from evil, as to steal in order to support a concubine: in which act a double malice is involved, one against justice, the other against chastity.
If the object is evil, but the end of the one operating is good, the act does not lose its malice; nevertheless its deformity is less. The reason for the first is because a good end also ought to be intended well, namely through honest means. And Paul the Apostle (Rom. 3:8) condemns those who do evils that goods may come. The reason for the second is because the agent, from a good end, is borne into sin with a lesser affection: for example, if someone lies in order to free his neighbor from danger.