Article — Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology
Article First. On the Theological Distinction of Sins.
291. What it is. The theological distinction is taken from the essentially diverse nature of sins; wherefore sins are theologically distinguished into grave or mortal sins and light or venial sins.
a. This distinction is called theological because it arises from consideration of sin by which sin is referred to God: for mortal sin turns man away from God, but venial sin does not turn him away from God. Wherefore these two sins differ from each other in the whole genus.
b. A sin is called mortal or venial from the effect which it produces in the order of grace; it is called grave or light from opposition to the moral order, which is violated notably by grave sins, but only lightly by light sins.
§ 1. On the Difference between Mortal and Venial Sin.
292. On the difference of each. Not all sins are mortal, but some by their nature are mortal, others venial.
The essential difference between mortal and venial sin was denied by: a. Jovinian, asserting that all sins are equal; b. the Pelagians, affirming that sanctifying grace is lost through any sin whatever; c. Wiclif, asserting that only the sins of the predestined are venial, because they are forgiven to them; d. the Protestants, asserting either with Luther that the sins of unbelievers are mortal, but the sins of believers are venial, except the sin of unbelief, or with Calvin that the sins of believers are venial, not because they do not merit death, but because they are not imputed to them; e. Baius, affirming that no sin is venial by its nature, but every sin merits eternal punishment.
The difference is proved: a. from Sacred Scripture. Some sins are compared to the lightest and smallest things, but others to the gravest and greatest things: to a gnat and a camel,1 to a mote and a beam;2 but by these comparisons it is signified that some sins by their nature are far smaller than others. Moreover, there are sins which exclude from the kingdom of God,3 and sins which are committed even by the just, without their ceasing to be just: There is not a just man on earth who does good and does not sin;4 if we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves and the truth is not in us;5 for in many things we all offend.6 But sins which exclude from the kingdom of God are mortal; but sins which do not exclude justice cannot be anything except venial.7
b. From the judgment of the Church. The Council of Trent condemned the doctrine of the Protestants;8 moreover proposition 2 among the Baian propositions was condemned: No sin is venial by its nature, but every sin merits eternal punishment. This difference is implicitly handed down, on the one side, by the dogma concerning hell, an eternal punishment for mortal sins not expiated in life; on the other, by the dogma concerning purgatory, a temporal punishment for venial sins not destroyed.
c. From reason. Certain sins by their nature are so small that it is incredible that they notably injure the moral order, dissolve divine friendship, and merit eternal punishment, as some idle word or the theft of one small coin; therefore not all sins are mortal, but there are certain sins light from their object. Therefore St. Augustine says: "What can be said more absurdly, more insanely, than that he who at some time laughed rather immoderately, and he who rather savagely burned his fatherland, should be judged to have sinned equally? ... Or if for this reason they are equal, because each is a fault, mice and elephants are equal, because both are animals; flies and eagles, because both are flying things."9
1 Matt. 23, 24.
2 Luke 6, 41 ff.
3 1 Cor. 6, 9 ff.
5 1 John 1, 8.
6 Jas. 3, 2.
7 For demonstrating this matter, the argument taken from Prov. 24, 16 is ineffective: The just man shall fall seven times; for the discussion is not about a fall into sin, but about a fall into misery, into which the just man will fall from the snares of the impious, from which nevertheless, with the help of God, he will always rise again.
9 Epist. 104, c. 4, n. 130.
293. Criteria for discerning between grave and light sins. Although it is very important that it be determined which sins objectively are grave and which light, nevertheless to define this concerning all sins is not only difficult but also impossible. Therefore in this matter one must proceed cautiously; but grave sin must never be affirmed if it is not certainly established concerning it. Some criteria are external, others internal, taken from the very nature of the thing.
a. Sacred Scripture: sins which in the sacred letters are said to exclude from the kingdom of heaven, to be abominable, to be held in hatred by God, worthy of eternal punishment or death; likewise sins which have joined to them an explicit or implicit curse, woe!, are mortal.
Where there is question of positive laws, a grave punishment sanctioned by the Church against transgressors, as excommunication, privation of ecclesiastical burial, is a sign of a law obliging under grave obligation.
b. Definitions of Roman pontiffs or general councils.
c. Doctrine of the holy fathers and theologians: for what their common sentence declares to be mortal must be held as such.
d. The very nature of the thing. But if no external criterion exists from which the gravity of the sin can be determined, attention must be given to the object and end of the obligation. If there is question of a thing or of a good of great moment, which is notably injured by sin, the sin itself must be called grave; therefore sins are grave which yield a. to grave injury of God; b. to grave harm of the human race, of the Church, of the republic; c. to grave harm of neighbor, whether spiritual or corporal; d. to grave harm of one's own salvation, whether spiritual or corporal.
294. Corollary: Three classes of sins. When account is taken of the gravity of the object, sins are divided into three classes:
- Sins grave from the whole genus are those which, with the object considered, are always grave. These do not admit smallness of matter and therefore can become light only from imperfection of the act.
There is no smallness of matter in those sins by which the divine perfection is directly injured, or a great and indivisible good. Therefore sins against the theological virtues, sins of blasphemy, simony of divine law, perjury, divination, do not admit smallness of matter, because they directly injure divine perfection. Likewise sins by which the life of man is destroyed, or a sacrament is rendered invalid, or the sacramental seal or the natural fast is injured, do not admit smallness of matter, because they injure the great and indivisible good of life, of the validity of the sacraments, of reverence owed to the sacraments.
- Sins light from the whole genus are those which, with the object considered, as long as they remain within the same species, are always light. These cannot become grave except from an erroneous conscience or from a circumstance which changes the species.
Light from the whole genus are those sins which contain excess in an action good or indifferent of itself, as excess in food, in non-inebriating drink, in sleep, in laughter, etc., or an action indeed evil in itself, which nevertheless does not gravely injure the moral order nor notably impede a moral good, as an officious lie, a vain thought.
- Sins grave from their genus are those which, with the object considered, are grave of themselves and light only in light matter. These admit smallness of matter and therefore, within their species, in grave matter they are grave, in light matter light.
a. Smallness of matter is given in those sins by which a finite divisible good is injured: for in these the matter can decrease to such a degree that it can no longer be judged grave, as in the theft of a small coin. Therefore sins against the worship owed to God admit smallness of matter, because the worship which we exhibit to God is a finite and divisible good, which can be greater and less according to the measure of the matter. Likewise sins of real and local sacrilege, because the sanctity of a thing or place is a finite and divisible good; it is greater or less according to the measure of the matter, etc.1
b. Great or small matter must be determined by prudent judgment; to form this judgment three things must be considered: a. the thing itself according to itself, whether it is something great or small; b. the thing in comparison to the whole which is commanded, whether it is notable or not; c. the thing in order to the end of the precept, whether it contributes much or little to promoting the end intended through the precept. In precepts which prescribe a determined matter under grave obligation, it can be established as a norm that the fourth part of the determined matter is notable, but a part less than the fourth is venial from smallness of matter, unless according to itself or by reason of the intended end it must be called notable.
§ 2. On Mortal Sin.
1 Sporer-Bierbaum, Theologia mor. decal. et sacram., I, tract. 1, n. 272 ff.
295. Essence of mortal sin. Mortal sin contains several notes in itself (n. 289). It is asked which of them constitutes its essence, from which the others are derived as from a common principle. Since sin can be considered subjectively and objectively, its essence must be determined in two ways.
It must be well noted that sin is a moral act which by its own nature contains a twofold element: an objective element, which is the sinful action considered in itself, namely an action repugnant to the moral law and therefore to the moral order; and a subjective element, which consists in the knowledge of the mind and the consent of the will.
- Considered subjectively, it is an act of the will by which man turns away from God, the highest good and ultimate end, and chooses the creature, a created good, for himself as ultimate end; or, what comes to the same thing, it is an act of the will by which man withdraws love above all things from God, the highest good, and transfers it to a created good.
a. The primary and essential relation by which man is ordered to God consists in this, that he constitutes God, the highest good, as his ultimate end, subjects himself to him by his own will, places him before all created goods, and by this very fact loves him above all things. Hence the appreciatively supreme love by which man embraces God, the highest good and ultimate end, constitutes the essential relation of man to God. Mortal sin is formally opposed to the love of God above all things. In all mortal sins this happens: that a created good is presented to man, to the loving and choosing of which he is solicited; the mind understands that this is absolutely prohibited, so that it cannot stand together with the love of God and his friendship; and nevertheless, with the love of God spurned, the will voluntarily chooses the love of the creature. Therefore all mortal sins primarily and essentially are opposed to the love of God above all things and separate man from his ultimate end; and since sanctifying grace in the present order is inseparably connected with this love of God, when the love is rejected, grace itself also is necessarily destroyed.
b. Man can turn himself away from God, his end, in two ways: explicitly and formally, which happens in sins of hatred of God; implicitly and virtually, when indeed he explicitly turns himself only to the creature and would not wish, if it could be done, to be turned away from God; nevertheless by the very fact that he deliberately chooses sin, knowing that it is repugnant to divine love and conjunction with God, he also implicitly and virtually chooses aversion from God.
c. The creature in which he constitutes his ultimate end is the sinner himself, or the proper good of the sinner; for the particular creature which the sinner prefers to God is diverse, but the ultimate reason on account of which he prefers it to God is his proper good, so that the sinner substitutes love of himself above God for love of God above all things.
- Objectively, mortal sin is an action which gravely injures the moral order and the divine law; or it is an action which notably injures the moral good for the protection of which the moral order has been sanctioned by law by God.
a. The divine law tends to this, that the moral order be preserved. For obtaining this end, the law absolutely exacts those things without which the moral order could not be preserved, and absolutely prohibits those things through which that same order would be disturbed. Violation of the law which is necessary for preserving the order constitutes mortal sin.
b. Since the moral order is composed of those diverse relations by which man is referred to God, to himself, and to neighbors, the divine law necessarily prohibits those things which, if they were licit, would overturn man's essential relation to God, as heresy, blasphemy, perjury, sacrilege; or his essential relation to himself, as drunkenness, softness; or his essential relation to neighbors, as homicide, theft, adultery.
296. Effects of mortal sin. 1. Loss of sanctifying grace. The just man is habitually turned toward God, the supernatural end, through sanctifying grace; by the very fact, therefore, that he turns himself away from God, he loses sanctifying grace. This loss is followed by the loss of the infused virtues and gifts, which accompany sanctifying grace as ornaments. Since the privation of sanctifying grace is called a stain, it is clear that mortal sin induces the stain of sin into the soul.
Nevertheless the infused habits of faith and hope are not destroyed by every mortal sin, which is established from the Council of Trent,1 as will be said in its own place.
Liability of fault. Since any sin whatever is an offense inflicted on God, through sin man becomes liable to undergoing the just indignation of God, which lasts so long as he has not furnished due satisfaction for the offense inflicted. Now the liability of fault consists in the necessity of bearing the just indignation of God.
Liability of punishment. Since any sin whatever is an injury inflicted on God, through sin man becomes liable to undergoing due punishment; now the liability of punishment consists in the necessity of undergoing due punishment. But the punishments inflicted or to be inflicted on account of sin are of a twofold genus: some pertain to the present life, others to the future life. The former proceed especially from the mercy of God and are all at the same time medicinal, because they all tend to this, that they either convert men from sins to God or deter them from sinning. The latter proceed from the justice of God and are all vindicative, because they tend solely to this, that the violation of order be vindicated.
a. Punishment is owed to fault: namely because man, by sinning and indulging his own will, acted against the will of God, he must suffer something against his own will from the will of God. Eternal punishment indeed is owed to mortal sin, but temporal punishment to venial sin.
b. The punishment of the future life is divided into punishment of loss and punishment of sense. The difference between the two consists in this, that the punishment of loss consists in mere privation and responds to sin insofar as it is aversion from the highest good; but the punishment of sense consists in positive pain and responds to sin insofar as it is conversion to a finite and created good. Because man, by sinning, has cast away the highest good and his beatitude with injury to God, God deprives him of this good in the other life; and because by sinning he inordinately sought pleasure in a created thing, God inflicts pains through a created thing in place of pleasure. Sacred Scripture indicates both punishments: Depart from me, the punishment of loss, into eternal fire, the punishment of sense.2
- Loss of all merits, impossibility of acquiring new merits, and special unworthiness of obtaining actual graces.
§ 3. On Venial Sin.
1 Sess. 6, can. 28. Cf. 1 Cor. 13, 2; Jas. 2, 14.
2 Matt. 25, 41.
297. Essence of venial sin. 1. Subjectively, venial sin is an act of the will by which man loves a created good against the will of God, without nevertheless preferring it to God and constituting it as ultimate end.
In every venial sin a created good is presented to man, to the loving of which he is solicited. He understands that he cannot love and choose it without acting against the will of God and displeasing him, but at the same time he understands that the love of that good does not turn him away from God and does not dissolve his friendship. But if he actually chooses it, nevertheless he is so disposed that he would never choose it if for that reason he would fall away from the ultimate end and from the love of God. Therefore he retains the essential and necessary relation to the ultimate end, since he preserves the love of God above all things.
- Objectively, venial sin is an action which violates the moral order and the divine law only lightly; or it is an action which does not notably injure the moral good for the protection of which the moral order has been sanctioned by law by God.
a. God exacts that the moral order be preserved uninjured in every respect. Now an action which indeed does not disturb this order, yet is opposed to it in some measure, or an action which does not notably but nevertheless lightly impedes the good to be obtained through exact observance of the moral order, constitutes venial sin.
b. It can happen in two ways that some action injures the moral order somewhat, and yet does not essentially disturb it: a. from the object itself, which by its nature is of such a kind that it cannot overturn the order, as a non-harmful lie, voluntary distraction in prayer; b. from smallness of matter, when an action which indeed of itself would overturn the order nevertheless is not apt to overturn it, because it turns about a matter of small moment, as a slight theft.
c. Therefore it is truly said that there are two genera of venial sins by reason of matter: some which are venial from the object itself, and others which are venial from smallness of matter. To these there is added a third genus, namely those which are venial from imperfection of the act.
Note 1. They are called venial, not because they receive pardon, for this also belongs through the mercy of God to mortal sins, but because by their nature they can receive pardon and, if they remain alone, ought to receive pardon; mortal sins, on the contrary, considered in their nature, are not remissible. For mortal sins destroy grace; but venial sins do not destroy grace. Hence it happens that man can satisfy for these, but of himself cannot satisfy for those; moreover mortal sins are worthy of eternal punishment, venial sins only of temporal punishment; hence it happens that the punishment of the latter ought to have an end.
Note 2. It is the doctrine of St. Thomas that venial sin is not against, but beside the law of God.1 To understand this rightly, it must be noted that sin can be against law in a twofold way: either only against some precept of the law, or against the precept and the end of the law. In the former sense both mortal and venial sin are against the law; but in the latter sense only mortal sin is against the law of God, because it alone extinguishes charity, which is the end of the law. But venial sin, since it does not extinguish charity, is said to be not against but beside the law of God.
Note 3. St. Thomas affirms that mortal sin turns about the ultimate end, but venial sin about those things which are for the end.2 These words cannot be understood in such a way that the proximate object of an act gravely sinful is always the ultimate end, the highest good, while the proximate object of an act lightly sinful is always some means to the ultimate end, namely a created good, since there are manifestly mortal sins which proximately turn about means to the end, as homicide, theft, and there are sins, at least venial from imperfection of the act, which proximately turn about God himself, as half-deliberate acts of unbelief, despair, hatred. Therefore the sense is this: that mortal sin is a disorder concerning the end, because it destroys the due order or conjunction with the ultimate end; venial sin is a disorder concerning means, because the will adheres too much to created things, without nevertheless withdrawing from the ultimate end.
1 De malo, q. 7, a. 1, ad 1.
2 Summa II-II, q. 24, a. 10.
298. Effects of venial sin can be considered negatively and positively.
- Negatively. a. Venial sin does not extinguish sanctifying grace: for it does not take away the due union with God; moreover, if it could extinguish it, either the last venial sin would become mortal, or from many venial sins there would arise a mortal sin. Since these things contain repugnance, venial sin, however it increases in degree or number, cannot take away sanctifying grace.
b. Nor does it diminish it: for if venial sin had the power of diminishing sanctifying grace, with venial sins multiplied, grace would finally be entirely extinguished, which cannot happen through venial sins.
But since habitual charity, the infused virtues, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit cohere with sanctifying grace by an indissoluble bond, so that they are not only acquired and lost together with grace, but are also increased with it, it is clear that these also are in no way diminished through venial sin. Finally, venial sin in no way diminishes merits already acquired or the glory corresponding to them.
c. Nor does it induce a stain into the soul: for since the stain of sin consists in the privation of sanctifying grace, venial sin, which neither takes away nor diminishes grace, cannot cause a stain. Wherefore if even venial sin is called a stain of the soul and is compared to dust and filth which, sprinkled on the face of a man, disfigure its beauty, this must be understood not of a detriment of grace caused by venial sin, but either of liability of fault or of liability of punishment.
- Positively. a. It diminishes the fervor of charity. By the fervor of charity is designated not only promptness and facility in eliciting fervent acts of charity, but also promptness and facility in exercising acts, more or less intense, of any virtue whatever: for through acts of virtues charity fervently lives in the just man. Now since venial sin impedes and diminishes the exercise of virtues, by that very fact it diminishes the fervor of charity; and since tepidity is opposed to fervor, venial sin is said to induce tepidity.
b. It induces liability of fault: for venial sin also furnishes God a just cause of displeasure and indignation, which nevertheless does not dissolve divine friendship.
c. It induces liability of punishment, not indeed the punishment of loss, which responds to sin insofar as it is aversion from God, but only the punishment of sense to be paid in purgatory and the delay of the vision of God.
d. It gradually disposes toward mortal sin, because it weakens acquired virtues, excites the motions of concupiscence more, and finally brings it about that God permits graver temptations and grants actual graces more rarely.
§ 4. On Habitual Sin.
299. On habitual mortal sin. Habitual sin is sin which remains in the soul from any mortal sin whatever until it is forgiven; but that which remains in the soul from the act of sin is: a. habitual aversion from God; b. liability of fault; c. voluntary privation of sanctifying grace; wherefore habitual sin consists in these.
- That habitual sin, which remains in the soul after the act, must be distinguished from actual sin is clear:
a. A man is actually called a sinner even when the evil action was performed long ago; but from the act of sinning alone he could not be called a sinner unless something were left in the soul by the act.
b. The same thing is indicated in many places by Sacred Scripture: And you know that he appeared that he might take away our sins;1 but not the evil act, because it has already passed, but the sin which inheres in the soul in the manner of a habit is afterward taken away. Cleanse me from my sin;2 the prophet asks to be cleansed not from the act of sin already past, but from the sin still clinging in the soul. And forgive us our debts;3 only habitual sins contracted from actual sins can be called debts.
The essence or formal nature of habitual sin consists in habitual aversion from God, the ultimate end, which remains after the act of sin: for man remains turned away from God until he returns to God through conversion. But the offense and injury inflicted on God also remains imputable to man until it is remitted; wherefore habitual sin is rightly said to consist in the liability of fault, by which, after sin, there rests upon man the necessity of having God offended and of bearing his indignation. Because in this supernatural order conversion to God, the ultimate end, consists in sanctifying grace, and therefore aversion from the ultimate end consists in voluntary privation of sanctifying grace, which voluntary privation remains until conversion, habitual sin is also said to consist in voluntary privation of sanctifying grace.
Mortal sin induces a stain into the soul: for Sacred Scripture often speaks of the stain by which the sinner is constituted unclean, defiled, filthy: Until the present day the stain of this crime remains in us.4 The stain left in the soul by mortal sin in the present order consists in the voluntary privation of the brightness of grace, which is caused by actual sin.
1 1 John 3, 5.
2 Ps. 50, 4.
3 Matt. 6, 12.
4 Josh. 22, 17. Cf. Jer. 2, 22; Eph. 5, 27; Tit. 1, 15.
300. On habitual venial sin. a. That there is habitual venial sin is established from the same reasons by which habitual mortal sin is demonstrated: for even the just call themselves sinners1 and say that they are cleansed from every sin.2
b. It consists in past actual sin still remaining, until it is revoked and remitted. Through actual sin the will is deprived of due rectitude with the moral order, since it adheres too much to a created good; now this privation induced into the will through sin remains until it is retracted through penance and the sin is remitted.
1 1 John 1, 8.
2 Ibid. 1, 7.