Prudence

If I am not justified, according to the foregoing principle, in performing an action which causes some evil effect, that evil effect is imputable to me though I did not intend it in itself; it is not indeed voluntary in itself, but it is voluntary in its cause, and I am bound to avoid evil even though only voluntary in its cause.

When, however, evil is not voluntary in itself, but only voluntary in its cause, a question arises concerning the degree of moral guilt which is contracted when such a cause of evil is posited unwarrantably. The case arises especially when grave evil is the result of an action which in itself is only venially sinful, as when grave harm is the result of slight negligence. Of course, great evil arising from grave negligence is seriously sinful even though only voluntary in the cause; and so a doctor who through grave negligence kills his patient is guilty of a great sin, though he did not intend the homicide.

But supposing that in passing through a gate in the country I leave it open, owing to slight negligence, and in consequence a neighbour’s crop is seriously damaged by his cows getting among the corn; do I commit a grave sin in that case¹ Of course, if owing to the circumstances I clearly foresaw that the damage was certain to follow and I could easily have closed the gate if I chose, I certainly sin grievously in not closing it; the negligence is then grave. But our case supposes circumstances to be such that the negligence is only slight, partly on account of the uncertainty of harm following, partly because I had frequently seen the gate standing open, and for other reasons. Will the neglect to close the gate after me in such circumstances be grievously sinful on account of the serious harm to my neighbour which was the consequence² ‘The answer must be ‘“‘ No.”’ For the harm did not follow necessarily and exclusively from my neglect; my action was not the immediate and necessary cause of the damage done to the crop; other agents intervened; my action was only slightly responsible for what followed. Inasmuch, then, as the malice of the cause is only slight, and this alone is voluntary in itself, the evil effect which is only voluntary in the cause will be imputed only as a venial sin.

¹ Rom. iii 8.

² Summa, 2-2, q. 64, a. 7.

Vol. I, Bk. VI, Pt. VII, Div. III, Ch. III, Section I. Damnification in General

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. II, Diss. II, Pt. I, Sect. III, Ch. II, Art. I, § II, Division, and Directive Force of Conscience Properly So Called · Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. III, Diss. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Ch. II, Article I. On Prudence · Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. III, Diss. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Ch. II, Art. IV, § IV, Point III, II. On Studiosity · Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. III, Diss. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Ch. II, Art. IV, § IV, Point III, V. On Modesty of Attire

In order that such an obligation may be imposed, certain conditions must be fulfilled which it will be well to state more explicitly.

(a) The damage must be inflicted voluntarily, with knowledge and the will to do the wrong. For a man is only responsible in the forum of conscience for his free and voluntary actions. There must be theological fault, as theologians express it, otherwise there will be no obligation in conscience to make good any damage, at any rate before lawful sentence of a judge competent to impose such an obligation. For the law sometimes imposes the obligation of making good damage which has been done, even though it was not foreseen or intended. This is especially the case when there has been legal negligence or the omission of that diligence which the law requires in the circumstances. There are three degrees in this negligence: “ Ordinary neglect has been defined to be the omission of that care which every man of common prudence, and capable of governing a family, takes of his own concerns; gross neglect is defined to be the want of that care which every man of common sense, however inattentive soever, takes of his own property; and slight neglect to be the omission of that diligence which very circumspect and thoughtful persons use in securing their own goods and chattels.”¹ In some cases the law punishes even slight neglect, in others ordinary, in others only gross neglect. The omission of that care which the law requires in the case is called juridical fault, and after sentence there will be an obligation in conscience to make good damage caused through juridical fault, for the laws prescribing this are just, inasmuch as they make men more careful and conduce to the public good.

If something has been done without foreseeing that it would cause damage to another, but this danger was noticed before the damage actually took place, there will be an obligation in justice for him who performed the action to prevent the damage as far as he can; if he does not do this, he will be bound to restitution. For as long as he can prevent the evil consequences of his action, this is under his control, and may, from the point of view of morals, be considered as continuing, and thus, unless he prevents the evil when he can do so, the agent is the voluntary cause of it. If, however, he cannot prevent the damage without relatively serious inconvenience to himself, there is just cause for excusing him. And so, if I inadvertently throw a lighted match on the ground, and then notice that it may probably cause a conflagration with loss to others, I am bound in justice to extinguish the light, otherwise I must repair the damage done.

If slight negligence caused slight damage to another, there will be an obligation of repairing it under pain of venial sin. If slight negligence caused serious loss to another, there is a difficulty as to whether before any judicial sentence there be an obligation to make restitution. Many theologians deny that there is, for no grave obligation can arise from a slight fault, and a light obligation has no proportion to serious matter; there cannot be a light obligation to avoid homicide, for example.²

(b) In order that there may be an obligation to make restitution for causing damage to another, the damage must be really and objectively unjust. If damage to another follows from the lawful exercise of my rights, I am not bound to make it good. If I dig a well in my property and thereby deprive my neighbour of his supply of water, I am not bound to make restitution for the damage. Similarly, I may sell a new machine or invention, though it may indirectly cause loss to many who had on sale machines of older pattern for which now there will be no market.

I may lawfully use persuasion to induce a rich relative to leave his money to me, though others who would have had it thereby suffer loss, If, however, I make use of unjust means such as threats, violence, or calumny, and so prevent another from getting what he otherwise would have got, I commit a sin against justice and am bound to make restitution to the injured party. This is true even though he had no strict right to what he would have got, for at least he had a right not to be balked of his expectations by unjust means, And so in a competitive examination or concursus where something of value is the prize at stake, one who secures the prize by unjust means must make restitution to him who would otherwise have secured it. If there were no certainty of his securing it, restitution as far as possible must be made according to the degree of probability of his success.

(c) The unjust action must be the cause, not merely the occasion, of damage being done to another, in order that there may be an obligation of making restitution. For we are only responsible in justice for damage which we have caused. And so if I commit theft and others are induced to do the same by my bad example, I am indeed bound to make restitution for what I have stolen, and I commit a sin against charity by giving bad example to others; but probably at least, according to many theologians, I am not bound to make restitution for what others stole through my bad example. Similarly, I am not bound to make restitution for damage which was caused accidentally by my action, when there was antecedently no probable connection between my action and the damage caused. As, for example, if I lit a fire in my property, and there was no probable danger of its causing damage to my neighbour, I am not in conscience before judicial sentence bound to make good damage which it caused him on account of an unforeseen change in the direction of the wind. Some theologians would bind the man who lit the fire to restitution in this case if he hoped for the change of wind and intended the damage. They say that the wrongful intention supplies the want of physical causation and puts him under the obligation of making restitution. This opinion is probable, but the opposite also is probable, for although the evil intention makes the man guilty of affective injustice, he is not guilty of effective injustice, for his evil intention makes no difference in the physical sequence of cause and effect, and if he was not the cause of the damage prescinding from his evil intention, that evil intention could not make him the cause.

In the same way, if the theft of one servant is wrongly imputed to another, and this one is dismissed in consequence, the thief is not bound to make restitution to the injured man unless in some way he caused the false imputation.

One who is not sure whether any harm was caused by his action is not bound to make restitution, for a certain obligation cannot arise from an uncertain source. Whether there is any obligation of making restitution for damage which was certainly caused, but it is uncertain whether the author was A or B, is a disputed point among theologians. Many teach that there is an obligation on all the probable authors in common to make good the damage, and each will be bound to make good the whole in default of the rest. This is certainly true in case of conspiracy; but if each acted independently, and it is not certain which one caused the damage, it is hard if the burden of restitution is imposed on someone who perhaps did not cause the harm.³

If an incendiary intended to set fire to the house of A, and by mistake he destroyed the house of B, it would seem that he is bound to make restitution, for all the requisite conditions are present. His action was voluntary, really, and effectively unjust. Some theologians, however, deny that the obligation of making restitution can be imposed in such cases. For the injury should be formal, and they deny that it is formal in this case. He did not intend to injure B; it was purely by mistake that his house was burnt down. Some weight must be allowed to this opinion on account of the authority of those who maintain it, but it would seem to be over-subtle and against the common sense of mankind. The injury was formal, inasmuch as it was voluntary and knowingly unjust. This is sufficient to induce the obligation of making restitution; it is not necessary that the wrongdoer should intend to injure a definite person.

¹ Chitty, The Law of Contracts, p. 412.

² St Alphonsus, 3, n. 552.

³ Bucceroni, 1, n. 1369.

Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology

Ludovicus Wouters, C.SS.R. — 9 passages

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. II, Diss. II, Pt. I, Sect. III, Ch. II, Art. I, § II, Division, and Directive Force of Conscience Properly So Called

n. 217.

I. Notion. Conscience, moral and antecedent, is a dictate of the practical intellect by which someone judges that a particular action is commanded, prohibited, or free for him (St. Alphonsus, I, 2; cf. St. Thomas, I, q. 79, a. 13; De veritate, q. 17, a. 2). It is said:

A dictate, because conscience is an act, not a faculty or a habit.
Of the practical intellect, that is, of the intellect insofar as it directs to operation what it apprehends. This belongs to the practical intellect, which "knows truth as the speculative intellect does, but orders the known truth to work" (St. Thomas, I, q. 79, a. 11, ad 2).
A particular action; for conscience is not a judgment about the morality of an act considered in general and in the abstract, but about the morality of an act viewed in particular and in the concrete (St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 17, a. 2; St. Alphonsus, I, 2).
For him, namely, conscience judges about the morality of an act insofar as it belongs to the one judging himself, or insofar as it must be placed or omitted by the one judging himself, or can be placed or omitted at will.
Commanded, etc. That is, moral conscience does not judge about the utility or pleasantness of an act, but about its morality, that is, about the moral necessity or moral liberty of placing or omitting the act.

Corollary I. Conscience is the conclusion of a syllogism, at least a virtual one. The major proposition states some law. The minor proposition compares some act with the law; for example: Theft is illicit. But the taking of this thing would be theft. Therefore the taking of this thing is illicit for me.

Corollary II. Conscience differs from synderesis, from moral science, from casuistic science, from prudence, and from the last practical judgment.¹ Synderesis (Greek synteresis, that is, preservation) is the natural habit preserving the first and general practical principles, for example: good is to be done, evil is to be fled. Moral science is an acquired habit which concerns general conclusions deduced from first principles; for example: to each person his own must be left; but theft takes away from one's neighbor what is his; therefore theft must be rejected. Casuistic science is an acquired habit which applies the conclusions of moral science to particular cases considered in the abstract. But conscience applies general conclusions to particular cases, and to these as considered in the concrete, insofar as here and now they are to be brought into practice. Prudence is a habit which directs the intellect in deducing and applying conclusions. But conscience is the very act itself of applying conclusions to particular cases considered in the concrete. Finally, the last practical judgment dictates only that something is to be done or omitted; but it does not speak about the morality of the action or omission.

¹ Judgments formed in order to operation are distinguished into speculative, speculative-practical, and practical-practical. Speculative judgments regard the truth which founds the morality of a consequent act, for example the existence of some fact, as: Today is Sunday; or the value of an act, as: A sacrament administered in this way is invalid; etc. Speculative-practical judgments regard the morality of an act, but only in common, as: Mass is to be heard on Sunday. Practical-practical judgments concern the morality of an act in particular and constitute conscience properly so called, as: Today Mass is to be heard by me.

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. III, Diss. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Ch. II, Article I. On Prudence

n. 371.

I. Notion of Prudence. Prudence, whose name seems to be derived from "seeing from afar" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 57, a. 5), and which is first in dignity among all moral virtues, can be defined: a moral virtue inclining man to determine rightly, by an act of command, what in individual cases is to be done or omitted in conformity with the supernatural end. It is said:

By an act of command. For the proper act of prudence "consists in the application of things counseled and judged" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 47, a. 8).
What is to be done ... in individual cases. For it belongs to prudence to assign to each individual act its conformity with right reason.
In conformity with the supernatural end. Thus supernatural prudence is distinguished from the virtue of natural prudence.

n. 372.

II. Object of Prudence. 1. Material object. The material object of prudence is all moral acts. For acts are moral insofar as here and now they are conformed to right reason; but it belongs to prudence alone to determine what in an individual case must be done or omitted in conformity with right reason. For moral virtues indeed incline man toward their objects taken in a general sense, for example temperance toward living temperately, justice toward rendering to each one his own; but for this reason they do not attain in their object the mean of reason required for an individual act. This mean must be shown in all moral acts by the virtue of prudence; and thus it is clear that all moral acts are the material object of prudence.

Formal object. The formal object of prudence is the conformity of practical judgment with the moral order, or with the supernatural end; for this conformity is the motive for which the act of command is placed.

n. 373.

III. Acts of Prudence. A virtue which brings it about that an act conformed to right reason is elicited must furnish three things: first, to investigate what means exist for placing an act honorably; then, to establish an elective judgment concerning the means found; and finally, to impose the chosen means by commanding its execution. Therefore a threefold act of prudence is distinguished: consulting, judging, and commanding. This last act is most proper to prudence; for prudence is rightly called right reason concerning things to be done. Hence the act of practical reason which applies the chosen means to the work is the proper act (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 47, a. 8). And thus it is clear that prudence, although it inheres in the intellect, is nevertheless a moral virtue, since it establishes the norm of the morally good, which is the object of the will.

n. 374.

IV. Connection of Prudence with the Other Moral Virtues. This connection is mutual; for prudence supposes man's relation to the due end through the other virtues, but it directs them in eliciting their acts. For the office of prudence is not to direct man to the due end, but to determine what in particular is to be done or omitted in order to the due end. Therefore if, antecedently to the act of command, man is not directed to the due end through the moral virtues, prudence will not exercise its act of commanding; but these virtues without prudence will not rightly place their acts. And thus the virtue of prudence is rightly called the charioteer of the virtues.

Therefore St. Thomas teaches: "No moral virtue can be had without prudence, because it is proper to moral virtue to make a right choice, since it is an elective habit. But for right choice there suffices not only an inclination to the due end, which is directly through the habit of moral virtue, but also that someone directly choose those things which are toward the end; this is done through prudence, which counsels, judges, and commands concerning the things which are toward the end. Similarly, prudence cannot be had unless the moral virtues are had; since prudence is right reason concerning things to be done, which, as from principles, proceeds from the ends of things to be done, toward which someone is rightly disposed through the moral virtues" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 65, a. 1).

n. 375.

V. Parts of Prudence. 1. Subjective parts. It belongs to prudence, as we noted above, to direct man in individual acts to the due end; but man can be considered as an individual person or as a person of a society. In either consideration, a special mediate end has been set before him, which must also be attained by special acts. Hence there is also a twofold subjective part of prudence: one is personal prudence, which is also called private, monastic, or solitary; the other is governing prudence, which is often called polyarchic or social.

a) Personal prudence is that by which someone rules himself in conformity with the supernatural end, in order to a private good.

b) Governing prudence is that by which someone rules, in conformity with the supernatural end, both a multitude and himself in order to a multitude. This differs according as multitudes differ. Hence it is distinguished as domestic, political, and military.

Domestic prudence is said to be that "which is ordered to the common good of a house or family" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 47, a. 11; cf. II-II, q. 48, single article, and q. 50, a. 8).

Political prudence is that which is ordered to the common good of the city (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 47, a. 11; cf. II-II, q. 48, single article), and in authority it is called regal, while in subjects it is simply called political (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 50, a. 1, corpus and ad 2; a. 2; q. 48, single article).

Military prudence is that which is ordered "to resisting those who attack and corrupt from without" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 50, a. 4) the common good of the city (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 48, single article).

Take care, however, lest from what has been said you conclude that every just person, because he has the supernatural virtue of prudence, is also fitted for governing, and that the holier person is by that very fact more fitted for this office. For for the office of superior there is required not only the virtue of prudence, whose act is to render acts of ruling conformed to the ultimate end, but also an art which is occupied around external governance. Hence the holier person is quite often less fit for the office of superior, because he lacks this art of ruling.

Potential parts of prudence are eubulia, synesis, and gnome.

a) Eubulia is the habit of consulting well. By this virtue man is directed to considering rightly the various means conducing to the end and the various ways in which the end can be attained. Hence it imports a certain inquiry of reason concerning things to be done (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 51, a. 1).

b) Synesis is the habit of judging rightly concerning those things which must be done according to common rules. Therefore this virtue brings it about that man rightly judges which, among the various means found by eubulia, with the circumstances considered, is here and now better, more useful, and more fitting according to common rules (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 51, a. 3; I-II, q. 57, a. 6).

c) Gnome is the habit of judging rightly, but concerning those things which must be done according to rules that are not common but higher, contrary indeed to the tenor of the law, but not contrary to the mind of the legislator. Therefore this virtue brings it about that in circumstances in which common rules cannot rightly be applied, we judge that means to be chosen which, with these circumstances considered, is here and now better, more useful, and more fitting according to higher rules (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 51, a. 4).

Integral parts of prudence are:

a) Memory, which is recollection of past things; experience of these greatly conduces to forming a prudent judgment about present or future things.

b) Understanding, which consists in full knowledge both of the action to be placed and of the principles of morality.

c) Docility, which is a disposition of soul toward learning from others, "and especially from elders, who have attained sound understanding concerning the ends of things to be done" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 49, a. 3).

d) Shrewdness, which is a certain sagacity of mind for finding a suitable means, especially in sudden matters.

e) Reasoning, which brings it about that the agent "can well apply universal principles to particulars, which are various and uncertain" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 49, a. 4).

f) Foresight, which foresees future contingents, whether good or evil, which are to follow from the action.

g) Circumspection, by which man "compares that which is ordered to an end also with the things which surround it" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 49, a. 7).

h) Caution is that by which evils are avoided which can vitiate the work of virtue.

n. 376.

VI. Opposed Vices. Vices opposed to prudence are some by defect, others by excess.

Vices by defect are called by the common name of imprudence, and they are four: precipitation, inconsideration, inconstancy, and negligence.

a) Precipitation is directly opposed to eubulia, and by it man is borne to acting by an impulse of will or passion, sufficient counsel of reason being omitted (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 53, a. 3).

b) Inconsideration is a vice by which man is inclined to contemning or neglecting those things from which right judgment proceeds; and therefore synesis and gnome are opposed to it (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 53, a. 4).

c) Inconstancy is a vice inclining one to withdraw from a defined good proposal; by it reason fails in commanding those things which right counsel and right judgment dictate must be commanded. Hence it is directly opposed to prudence (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 53, a. 5).

d) Negligence is a vice by which man is inclined to neglecting right command, through a defect of solicitude and promptness of will; for this reason it too is directly opposed to prudence (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 54, a. 2, corpus and ad 3; ibid., a. 1).

From these points it is clear that imprudence has under itself as many species as there are potential parts of the virtue of prudence (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 53, a. 2). St. Thomas alleges lust as the origin of these vices (II-II, q. 53, a. 6). But imprudence considered in this way constitutes a special sin, because it is contrarily opposed to the virtue of prudence; and just as prudence is a special virtue, so also its contrary is a special sin. But if by the name of imprudence there is indicated not so much the contrary as the lack of prudence, imprudence does not constitute a special sin, but rather a general one, insofar, namely, as it participates in the nature of the sin which is committed against that virtue for whose exercise the act of prudence was being commanded. "For just as prudence is in some way participated in all virtues, insofar as it directs them, so also imprudence is in all vices and sins; for no sin can happen unless there is a defect in some act of reason directing, which pertains to imprudence" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 53, a. 2).

Vices by excess have some likeness with prudence itself, but they apply its offices to an undue object, namely to a dishonorable matter; hence they bear before themselves a false species of prudence. These vices are: prudence of the flesh or of the world, craftiness, guile, fraud, excessive solicitude for temporal things, and excessive solicitude for future things.

a) Prudence of the flesh or of the world is a vice "according as someone has the goods of the flesh as the ultimate end of his life" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, a. 1); and it obtained this name because "prudence is concerned with those things which are toward the end of the whole of life" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, a. 2).

b) Craftiness is a vice by which someone, "for attaining some end, whether good or evil, uses not true ways, but simulated and apparent ones" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, a. 3).

c) Guile is the execution of those things which craftiness thinks out, whether it is done by words or by deeds; and therefore it pertains to craftiness (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, aa. 4 and 5).

d) Fraud differs from guile in this, "that guile pertains universally to the execution of craftiness, whether it is done by words or by deeds; but fraud more properly pertains to the execution of craftiness insofar as it is done by deeds" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, a. 5).

e) Excessive solicitude for temporal things is had either by seeking temporal things as an end, the spiritual end being excluded; or when superfluous effort is applied to procuring them, "on account of which man is drawn back from spiritual things, which he ought principally to serve" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, a. 6); or when "someone fears that, by doing what he ought, necessary things will fail him" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, a. 6).

f) Excessive solicitude for future things is had when someone is solicitous about future things before the opportune time (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, a. 7).

St. Thomas assigns avarice as the principal source of these vices (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, a. 8).

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. III, Diss. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Ch. II, Art. IV, § IV, Point III, II. On Studiosity

n. 459.

III. Opposed Vices. By excess, curiosity is opposed to studiosity, which inclines one to satisfy the appetite for knowing too much, by applying oneself to useless or harmful studies (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 167, a. 1). By defect, negligence, inclining one to omit or to do slackly the studies of those things which one is bound to learn and know.¹

¹ Arb. praed., n. 152 (t. 6, p. 499). Cf. Salmanticenses, Arb. praed., n. 153 (p. 499); Billuart, diss. 7, a. 4, § 3; St. Augustine, Epistula 118 (ed. G., t. 2, col. 490 sqq.), Sermo 355, c. 6, n. 6 (ibid., t. 5, col. 2041), and Epistula 218 (ibid., col. 1227 sqq.); St. Bernard, Sermo 36 on the Canticle (M.P.L. 183, col. 907 sqq.).

Vol. I, Bk. I, Tr. III, Diss. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Ch. II, Art. IV, § IV, Point III, V. On Modesty of Attire

n. 468.

III. Opposed Vices. By excess there is opposed luxury, inclining one to adornment of the body and arrangement of external things beyond the measure of right reason; by defect, negligence, by which someone in the adornment of the body and arrangement of external things remains below the measure owed to his condition (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 169, a. 1).¹

¹ Cf. Salmanticenses, cited place, n. 160 end (p. 503).

McHugh–Callan, Moral Theology

John A. McHugh, O.P., and Charles J. Callan, O.P. — 34 passages

Vol. I, Pt. I, Q. II, Art. 2. Good Habits, or Vi…, Division

n. 146.

The practical intellectual virtues are two: prudence and art.

(a) Prudence is an intellectual virtue which indicates in individual cases what is to be done or what is to be omitted, in order that one may act according to the requirements of good morals.

(b) Art is an intellectual virtue which indicates in individual cases how one must act in order to produce things that are useful or beautiful (e.g., music, painting, building, etc.).

n. 150.

There are four principal moral virtues: (a) in the intellect there is prudence, which guides all the actions and passions by directing the other moral virtues to what is good according to reason; (b) in the will there is justice, which inclines a person to make his actions accord with what he owes to others; (c) in the irascible appetite is fortitude, which subjects to reason the passions that might withdraw from good, such as fear of dangers and labors; (d) in the concupiscible appetite is temperance, which represses the motions of passions that would impel one to some sensible good opposed to reason.

These four virtues are also called cardinal virtues, because all the other moral virtues hinge on them.

Vol. I, Pt. II, Q. I, Art. 7. The Sins Against L…, Laziness

n. 1326.

Laziness, as distinct from the capital vice of sloth, is a generic name given to a number of sins or circumstances of sin, and hence it will be treated in several places.

(a) Thus, negligence is a want of prompt decision about duties to be performed. It is opposed to the virtue of diligence or solicitude, which pertains to prudence. Hence, negligence will be considered among the sins against prudence.

(b) Sluggishness (pigritia) is a tardy performance of duty, and will be considered among the sins opposed to diligence.

(c) Carelessness (torpor) is a perfunctory discharge of duties, without thought or love. It is one of the consequences of sloth given above (see 1324), and hence it is a sin against charity.

(d) Indolence is an excessive dislike of labor or exertion, caused by an inordinate love of recreation or bodily rest. It will be considered when we treat the sin of softness or delicacy, which is opposed to fortitude.

(e) Idleness is the actual omission of one’s duty on account of indolence, and hence it is considered among the sins against the various precepts. Thus, under the precepts of charity and of justice will be discussed the omission of labor to which one is bound.

Vol. II, Pt. II, Question II. The Duties of All Classes of Men (the Moral Virtues)

n. 1626.

After the theological virtues, which offer to God the services of faith, hope and charity, and which direct man to his Last End, follow the cardinal or moral virtues, which perfect the actions and passions of man, and make of them means for tending to the Last End. Of these four virtues (prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance), prudence is ranked first, as being the director of the others.

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 1. The Virtue of Prud…, Definition

n. 1627.

Definition

(Summa Theologica, II-II, qq. 47-56.)

Definition.—All the definitions of prudence are in substantial agreement, and from them we may formulate a detailed definition as follows: “Prudence is the virtue that consults well about the means to be used for leading a good life and applies the knowledge acquired through consultation to particular contingencies as they arise.”

(a) Thus, prudence consults well, for its office is to study ways and means to right conduct, and to arrive at a sound judgment in spite of various uncertainties or unknown factors. Of the two practical virtues of the intellect, namely, art and prudence, the former deals with the application of right reason to cases in which there are, for the most part, certain and determinate ways of arriving at the end in view (e.g., the rules of logic or grammar, the methods of music or sculpture); while the latter has to do with the application of right reason to cases in which the ways of obtaining the end in view are not certain or determinate (i.e., the infinitely varied questions of lawfulness or unlawfulness that present themselves in concrete and particular situations).

(b) Prudence studies the means to a good life; and hence we do not consider a man as generally prudent, if he consults well for this or that particular good end, but not for the general end of leading a good life. Nevertheless, prudence falls short of the Gift of Wisdom, for prudence is concerned with human good, wisdom with divine good.

(c) Prudence applies knowledge to the direction of conduct, for the purpose of the practical virtues of the intellect is to guide the activities and productions of man according to the light of right reason. It should be noted, however, that whereas the application of knowledge is intrinsic to prudence, it is extrinsic to art; for prudence includes in its very essence a determination of the will to goodness, but not so art. Hence, a painter is not the less skilled in his profession if he voluntarily fails to exercise it or exercises it badly, but a person skilled in moral science is imprudent if voluntarily he fails to use his knowledge or uses it amiss. The sin against art is not to know; the sin against prudence is either not to know what one should know or not to apply rightly what one does know.

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 1. The Virtue of Prud…, Objects

n. 1628.

The Objects of the Act of Prudence

The Objects of the Act of Prudence.—(a) Prudence is concerned, not with speculative truth (i.e., with those things that are known for the sake of knowledge), but with practical truth (i.e., with those things that are known for the sake of use). It aims, not to investigate and discover what is the nature of virtue, but to guide man so that he may become virtuous and practise virtue. It should be noted, however, that the acts of the speculative reason, although they do not belong to prudence itself, are like other acts subject to the direction of prudence; for in pursuing speculative studies one should use good judgment as to the subjects to be considered, the time, place, manner, etc., of study.

(b) Prudence is not concerned with necessary truths and first principles of morality, but with their application to contingent and particular cases, just as a physician is called on to cure, not a universal or abstract man, but the particular and individual man before him. But since one cannot well apply that of which one is ignorant, the prudent man must be acquainted both with the general rules of right living and with the particular things to which his knowledge is to be applied. He lacks prudence, therefore, who from vincible ignorance does not know a general principle (e.g., that too much drink is bad), or a case to which that principle should be applied (e.g., that the quantity of drink before one is too much).

n. 1629.

It is customary to distinguish a twofold object of a virtue, namely, the material object (i.e., the kind of activity the virtue perfects, whether in the field of knowledge, or of action, or of production) and the formal object (i.e., the special viewpoint of goodness from which the material object is considered).

(a) The material object of prudence embraces individual human actions performed under choice and freely (agibilia). (b) The formal object of prudence is the right deliberation, decision, and direction (recta ratio) to be given to human actions, with a view to the observance of the golden mean.

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 1. The Virtue of Prud…, Certainty of Prudence

n. 1630.

Necessity of Certitude

Necessity of Certitude.—Prudence, being an intellectual virtue, must have certainty (see on the Certain Conscience, 640 sqq.). But with regard to particular contingencies (e.g., whether Balbus ought to marry Caia) there are various kinds of certainty.

(a) There is the certainty of knowledge based on a generalization from experience of what happens in the majority of cases (e.g., that persons well mated by reason of birth, age, dispositions, etc., marry successfully). This kind of certainty belongs to moral science.

(b) There is also a certainty of knowledge based on the indications in a particular case (e.g., that Balbus and Caia appear to have congenial dispositions and a mutual affection that will make their marriage a success). This is the certainty of opinion, and while it may suffice as a rule for conscience (see the Systems of Conscience, 672 sqq.), events do not always verify its predictions. Hence it is said: “The thoughts of mortal men are fearful and our counsels uncertain” (Wis., ix. 14).

(c) There is finally the certainty of practical truth, which consists in harmony with a good will. This is the certainty that is proper to prudence, for this virtue is not a matter of reason alone. Hence, even though a matter properly decided on should not take place or should fail of the purpose intended (e.g., if the marriage of Balbus and Caia is prevented or turns out badly), it remains that prudence was not deceived in its decision, for that decision when made was according to right reason and a good will (see 578).

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 1. The Virtue of Prud…, Excellence

n. 1631.

Relation of Prudence to the Other Moral Virtues

Relation of Prudence to the Other Moral Virtues.—(a) Prudence does not direct the moral virtues to their own proper ends; for the knowledge of those ends comes from synteresis, or moral understanding (i.e., the natural perception of the first principles of right and wrong), while the inclination to those ends is from the moral virtues themselves. Prudence does not deal with first principles, nor is it an inclination towards particular ends. Hence, it is the intellectual virtue of synteresis that directs the moral virtues through the dictate that right reason must be followed, that moderation must be observed, that the passions of anger, pleasure, sorrow, etc., must be so regulated that both extremes of excess and defect will be avoided.

(b) Prudence directs the moral virtues to the ways and means by which their ends are to be attained; for the regulation of things particular and variable, such as ways and means, pertains to prudence. Synteresis is concerned with necessary principles, and the moral virtues give a uniform and steady inclination to follow the mean of right reason, but neither the one nor the other can indicate how principles are to be applied or how inclinations are to be put in practice. Hence, it is the work of moral science to determine what or how much anger, pleasure, sorrow, etc., is moderate for the average case; but prudence has to decide this for a particular case here and now (see on Conscience, 575). Without prudence bravery becomes foolhardiness, temperance degenerates into fanaticism, and mercy changes to weakness.

n. 1632.

Prudence, indeed, directs the acts of all the virtues, ruling the virtues inferior to it (i.e., art and the moral virtues), and serving the virtues that are its superiors (i.e., the speculative intellectual virtues and the theological virtues).

(a) Thus, in exercising the intellectual virtues through study, contemplation, art, etc., one would go sadly astray if one did not consult prudence as to the time, manner, and method of performing these acts. Hence, a housewife who spent too much time in meditation would neglect her domestic duties.

(b) In exercising the theological virtues, through acts of faith, hope, and charity, there is also need of prudence, for it is not possible to continue in these acts without interruption, since there are times when other acts of virtue have to be attended to, and also times for repose. Thus, a person who goes about giving alms to the poor at hours when he is supposed to be at work for which he receives pay, is not prudent in his charity, since he does not choose the right time to exercise it.

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 1. The Virtue of Prud…, Acts

n. 1633.

The Exercise of Prudence

The Exercise of Prudence.—The acts that belong to prudence are those that one needs in order to direct one’s conduct to that moderation which is the end of virtue. They are three: deliberation, decision, direction.

(a) Hence, in the first place, prudence takes counsel on, and deliberates about, the ways and means; (b) after ways and means have been discovered, it passes judgment (see 575) on their suitability (e.g., that restitution should be made at such a time, in such a way, in such an amount, etc., or that moderation in eating and drinking requires that this or that amount be taken, that this or that kind of food be avoided, etc.); (c) finally, but chiefly, prudence gives the command that what has been decided on be carried out, whether this be the quest of certain things that are advantageous or the avoidance of certain things that are dangerous.

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 1. The Virtue of Prud…, Qualities

n. 1634.

Qualities of Prudence

Qualities of Prudence.—The qualities that should characterize prudence are carefulness and confidence.

(a) Carefulness is a watchful attention given to deliberation and judgment enabling one to act with readiness and decision when the moment for action has arrived. Its necessity for prudence is clear, for one does not counsel or judge well unless one has a matter at heart, is anxious about its success, and devotes to it serious study and vigilance; nor does one direct well if there is hesitation and delay instead of promptness in performing what has been decided on. In a word, one should be quick in execution, but slow in deliberation. Hence the admonition of St. Peter to be prudent, and to be attentive to prayer as a preparation for a good life and for the judgment (I Peter, iv. 7). An example of carefulness is St. Paul, who was solicitous about all his churches (I Cor., xi. 28), ever inquiring about their condition, their progress, their needs, etc.

(b) Confidence, as a quality of prudence, is a reliance on judgments carefully formed which excludes worries and undue hesitations. This is necessary as a balance to carefulness; for while it is true that absolute certainty is not to be expected in forming decisions about courses of action (the future event and also many present things bearing on it being unknown to us), it is also true that overcarefulness blinds the judgment and paralyzes decision. In the character of Hamlet Shakespeare pictures the man who is imprudent through excess of caution.

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 1. The Virtue of Prud…, Parts

n. 1635.

The Parts or Kinds of Prudence

The Parts or Kinds of Prudence.—As the divisions of parts correspond with the divisions of wholes, we should note that there are three kinds of wholes: a subjective, an integral, and a potestative whole.

(a) A subjective whole is one that is present as to its entire essence and all its power in each of the parts. This kind of whole is found in the genus, each of whose species partakes of the entire nature and energy included in the generic concept, just as the mode of being and of acting expressed by the term “animal” is found fully in dogs, cats, horses, and so on with the other kinds of animals.

(b) An integral whole is one that is not present in all its fullness either of essence or of power in the single parts. This kind of whole is found in a finished composite made up of heterogeneous units, such as a house; for neither walls, nor roof, nor foundation, nor any other single portion of the building is a complete house or has all the uses of a house, but if any one of them is lacking the house is not integral or complete.

(c) A potestative whole is one that is present in all its essence, but not in all its power in each single part. This kind of whole is exemplified in an active principle functioning through diverse faculties, such as the soul which thinks, wills, perceives, accomplishes by means of mind, will, sense, and bodily organs. The soul is present in its entirety in each of these, since it is a simple substance, but in one it exercises one power, in another a different power, in none of them all its powers.

n. 1636.

It is customary to speak also of the integral, subjective and potestative parts of a moral virtue. (a) Thus, the quasi-integral parts of a virtue are those functions without which its act is not perfectly performed; and with which it is more perfect. (b) The subjective parts are the species into which the virtue is divided. (e) The quasi-potestative parts are certain subsidiary or annexed virtues which have to do with the secondary acts of a principal virtue, as not having the full efficacy of the latter.

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 1. The Virtue of Prud…, Integral Parts

n. 1637.

Integral Parts of Prudence

Integral Parts of Prudence.—The integral parts of prudence, considered as a cognitive virtue or as an index of the right means, are those acts which enable one to have knowledge and to acquire knowledge. (a) Thus, the acts requisite for the possession of knowledge about ways and means are the memory of the past and the understanding of the present situation. (b) The acts requisite for the acquisition of new knowledge are docility, by which one learns from others, and quickness of perception, by which one discovers for oneself.

n. 1638.

The integral parts of prudence, considered as an operative or a preceptive virtue—that is, as the counsellor and director of life and behavior—are the acts without which one cannot make good use of knowledge as applied to conduct.

(a) Thus, knowledge of general principles must be applied to particular affairs, and this supposes that one knows how to reason correctly, how to infer the particular from the general, how to put facts together. Even those who are not skilled dialecticians have a certain amount of natural logic, and are able to make good use of data or premises in drawing conclusions about their obligations, and thus to make a prudent application of what they know.

(b) Knowledge gained through deliberation has to be effectually made use of; that is, the reason must impose its judgment carefully formed, must determine the line of action to be followed, must properly dispose the means in view of the end. This requires that a person should so direct his future acts as means to the end he has in view that they will be good in themselves (foresight or providence) and in their circumstances (circumspection), and that he will be guarded against external impediments that might hinder him, steering clear of both Scylla and Charybdis (caution): “The prudent man considereth his steps” (Prov., xiv. 15). Examples: Titus wishes to help the poor, and decides on certain methods of raising the money that are dishonest and disedifying. Balbus wishes to induce Caius to go to church, and therefore shows him marks of friendship, not reflecting that these acts of friendship, on account of the character of Caius, will arouse only haughtiness or suspicion. Claudius, in order to practise mortification, resolves on a fast, but also makes up his mind to visit certain friends who will try to make him break his resolution. Sempronius resolves to provide well for his family and also for certain deserving charities, but he fails to insure his property, to invest his money well and to make a will, with the result that neither his family nor the poor are provided for as he had intended. Titus lacked foresight, Balbus was not circumspect, Claudius and Sempronius were incautious.

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 1. The Virtue of Prud…, Subjective Parts

n. 1639.

The Subjective Parts or Species of Prudence

The Subjective Parts or Species of Prudence.—Prudence in general is the right direction of human actions to their ends; and hence there will be as many different kinds of prudence as there are different kinds of ends of human actions. But the division of ends will be into the particular good of the individual and the common good of the multitude, and thus there are the two species of individual or personal prudence and social prudence.

(a) Individual prudence is the right management of his own acts by the individual, with a view to his personal uprightness.

(b) Social prudence is the right management of the acts of others or of self, with a view to the general welfare of a society.

n. 1640.

Social prudence in turn is subdivided in accordance with the two classes of society, the perfect and the imperfect, into political and domestic prudence. (a) Political prudence is the right administration of the affairs of a larger multitude, such as the State. (b) Domestic prudence is the right administration of the affairs of the family.

n. 1642.

Prudence exercised for the benefit of the nation as a whole should be found, not only in rulers, but also in private citizens. We may distinguish, then, the following kinds of prudence:

(a) in those who conduct the affairs of the nation there should be governmental prudence or statesmanship. Of rulers prudence in the highest degree is expected; for the chief function of prudence is to direct actions, and the heads of States must direct not only their own actions but those of great bodies of men. Scripture speaks of prudence and justice as the two virtues that are especially needed in a prince (Jer., xxiii. 5);

(b) in those who direct the defense of the nation against its enemies there should be military prudence, for bravery has to be guided by wisdom: “A wise man is strong, and a knowing man, stout and valiant, because war is managed by due ordering, and there shall be safety where there are many counsels” (Prov., xxiv. 5, 6);

(c) in subjects there should also be political prudence, for, as they are rational beings and members of society, they should willingly rule their acts according to the law and should fulfill their own particular offices with a view, not only to their own individual good, but to the good of the whole community.

n. 1643.

Utility of Prudence for Society

Utility of Prudence for Society.—Hence, we see that none of the virtues is selfish or concerned exclusively with the good of individuals. (a) Thus, prudence, as just said, is political and domestic as well as individual; (b) justice is legal (i.e., towards society) as well as commutative (i.e., towards individuals); (c) even temperance (e.g., avoidance of drunkenness) and courage (e.g., defense of public safety) pertain to the common good and are commanded in laws of the State.

n. 1644.

Prudence attends chiefly to good morals, but it attends also to other goods that benefit human life.

(a) Thus, personal prudence directs one, not only to seek after virtue, but also to seek after lawful conveniences and to shun such things as are embarrassing or undesirable. Hence, the prudent man acts so as to avoid offense and to gain the good will of others; he studies the dispositions of those with whom he lives, so as to live peaceably, etc.; he protects himself against the attacks and snares of the unfriendly (cfr. Acts, xxiii. 6; Matt., xxii. 17).

(b) Domestic prudence provides not only for the virtuous lives of the members of the household, but also for their health and happiness, food and clothing, and other necessities and lawful pleasures (Luke, xii. 42).

(c) Political prudence is exercised, not only in the regulation of the conduct of the people through good laws, but also in the promotion of their welfare, peace, prosperity, and contentment.

(d) Military prudence provides for religion and good morals, by appointing chaplains, giving opportunity for religious exercises, insisting on discipline and military virtues, etc.; but it also looks after the interests of the individual men, the efficiency of all branches of the service, preparedness of the fighting forces, etc.

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 1. The Virtue of Prud…, Potential Parts

n. 1646.

The Potential Parts of Prudence

The Potential Parts of Prudence.—As was explained in 1636, the potential parts of a virtue are certain annexed virtues, usually inferior ones, that have to do with the secondary acts of a virtue to which they are subordinated. The principal act of prudence is direction, its secondary acts are deliberation and decision (1633). Hence, we have the following potential parts of prudence:

(a) wise deliberation (eubulia), which is a habit of debating with oneself according to correct methods the means to be employed for virtuous choice;

(b) wise decision, which is an habitual state of the mind which makes it ready to draw right conclusions about the means to be chosen for virtuous conduct.

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 1. The Virtue of Prud…, Persons Who Possess Prudence

n. 1648.

The Persons Who Possess Prudence

The Persons Who Possess Prudence.—Political prudence, if understood of the ability to rule well, is not found in all persons, not even in all the good.

(a) Thus, those who are imprudent in their own affairs are not fitted to rule, and hence a man who is unjust, or intemperate, or cowardly, lacks political prudence: “If one knows not how to govern his own house, how will he be able to take care of the Church of God?” said St. Paul in discussing the qualifications of prelates (I Tim., iii. 5). He who does not know how to obey well does not know how to rule well.

(b) Those who have infused prudence on account of the state of grace are not necessarily fitted to govern, for even children have the grace of prudence through Baptism and there are many grown-up persons of saintly lives who are not a success in office and administration. Thus, Pope Celestine V, though a most holy man, resigned from the Papacy, because he felt himself unequal to the task of ruling in troublous times.

(c) Those who have acquired prudence through reason and experience, and who are therefore just, temperate and strong, are morally well fitted in natural endowments to rule. He who has learned to obey well is prepared to learn to rule well.

n. 1650.

The principles just given concerning political prudence will apply also, due proportion being observed, to domestic prudence.

(a) Hence, it is the duty of those who have authority over a family or a similar community to cultivate domestic prudence, without which they cannot discharge rightly the duties of their position of parent, rector, superior, manager, etc. Confessors and directors of souls need especially to be prudent; for even though a priest is thoroughly grounded in the principles of a moral system of conscience and in the teachings of ascetical theology, he will have to be guided by prudence in making use of his knowledge, so as to apply it well in the great variety of cases that will come before him, and to decide what will be most useful for the spiritual welfare of each individual subject.

(b) It is the duty of those who elect or appoint others to positions of authority (such as the positions of guardian, teacher, superintendent, etc.) to be assured beforehand of the fitness of the person chosen as regards prudence, namely, that he is devoted to the welfare of those whom he will rule, that he has acquired sufficient knowledge and experience, and that his habits are temperate, resolute, just.

n. 1651.

Relations between Prudence and Other Virtues

Relations between Prudence and Other Virtues.—In the preceding paragraphs the possession of prudence has been joined with the moral virtues. Hence the question presents itself: Can one who lacks the moral virtues possess prudence?

(a) Evil prudence, which chooses ways and means well adapted to some nefarious scheme, and imperfect prudence, which means and judges well but does not strongly resolve, are of course found in sinners. Evil prudence is called after the virtue, because it is a counterfeit of the latter’s goodness, but it is more properly named astuteness or cunning. Its sinfulness is strongly expressed in Rom., viii. 6, which declares that the prudence of the flesh is death. Imperfect prudence is also sinful, for it permits a right judgment to remain ineffectual and is thus recreant to conscience. Examples of evil prudence are the unjust steward mentioned in the Gospel (Luke, xvi. 1), who was wise enough to cheat his master and serve his own interests, and artful swindlers who know how to lure their victims and then escape without detection. Instances of imperfect prudence are persons who deliberate well on the means to overcome assaults of temptation or to escape occasions of sin, but whose resolutions never last.

(b) Indifferent prudence is resourceful in finding ways to accomplish purposes that are good, but that are not necessarily referred to moral aims. Thus, certain men seem to have an uncanny instinct in business or industry of hitting on the methods that lead to success and of acting at the right time, and a similar fact is observed in the fields of science, medicine, art, etc. This kind of ability of knowing and doing the right thing is variously described as insight, discrimination, tact, and is variously explained as luck, genius, industry, etc. But, morally speaking, it is neither virtuous nor sinful, since we find, for example, that men endowed with business acumen or a practical sense of the uses of some art or science devote their talents sometimes to good, sometimes to evil, according to the difference of their characters.

(c) Good prudence is that which in thought and in act functions well with regard to the means for leading a good life. It is only this prudence that receives the name of virtue; and, since it is clear from its concept that it supposes a good life, we must conclude that the virtue of prudence is not found in sinners. It may happen, therefore, that a man is most sagacious in managing temporal affairs, or most skillful in administering the spiritual interests of others, and withal most imprudent, because he neglects his own salvation.

n. 1654.

The Virtue of Infused Prudence in Those Who Are in the State of Grace

The Virtue of Infused Prudence in Those Who Are in the State of Grace.—(a) Infants in the state of grace through Baptism possess this virtue in an habitual, but not in an actual manner—that is, on account of their sanctification they have the power, but on account of their want of reason they have not the use of the power.

(b) All adults in the state of grace have this virtue both habitually and actually, as far as the need of salvation requires its exercise. Grace enables them either to perceive what they should do to live well, or to seek counsel from the better instructed and to distinguish between good and bad advice.

(c) Some adults in the state of grace have good judgment in a superior degree and are able to direct not only themselves but others, and to deliberate and decide rightly, not only in matters necessary for salvation, but in all kinds of affairs pertaining to the direction of human life.

n. 1655.

Can the Acquired Virtue of Prudence Exist in Young People?—(a) If there is question of a formed habit of prudence, the virtue is not in the young, but in those who are advanced in years. Acquired prudence is originated by deliberation on particular cases and by habit, and these are not had without experience and time. Hence, this virtue is to be looked for in the elderly, both because the passions that disturb calm deliberation are no longer so impetuous in them, and because their years have taught them many lessons and given them the opportunity to acquire fixed ways of acting: “In the ancient is wisdom, and in length of days prudence” (Job, xii. 12; cfr. III Kings, xii).

(b) If there is question of a formative prudence, this is found in the young, for they deliberate and decide at times with judgment and firmness, and, if such acts are frequently repeated, they will eventually proceed from a settled moral inclination. It is necessary, therefore, that the moral training of the young begin early, that instruction, counsel and direction be given them by parents and other guides, so that the way of virtue may be made more easy. The young are in duty bound to listen frequently, willingly and reverently to the admonitions of their elders, and hence the modern tendency of youth to act as critics of morals is as foolish as it is presumptuous.

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 1. The Virtue of Prudence

n. 1658.

The Gift of Counsel

The Gift of Counsel.—The Gifts of the Holy Ghost supplement the theological virtues by ministering to them; but they supplement the moral virtues, of which prudence is the first, by aiding and perfecting them. The Gift that corresponds directly to prudence is Counsel, for both are concerned with the direction of human acts, prudence directing by the standard of human reason and counsel by the Holy Ghost Himself.

n. 1659.

Definition

Definition.—Counsel is defined as “an infused habit which makes the soul prompt to receive and act upon the enlightenment offered by the Holy Ghost about the means to be chosen with a view to its own eternal salvation.”

(a) Counsel is different from the virtue of wise deliberation spoken of in 1646; for, while the virtue enables one to do good in a human manner and from one’s own motion (e.g., by seeking advice, by making inquiries, etc.), the Gift enables one to do good in a superhuman manner and under the motion of the Holy Ghost (i.e., by hearkening to the advice offered by God).

(b) Counsel is different also from the charism of good counsel, which makes certain persons remarkable as advisors or directors. Thus, Mathathias when dying said to his sons: “I know that your brother Simon is a man of counsel; give ear to him always, and he shall be a father to you” (I Mach., ii. 65). St. Antoninus of Florence was so successful in guiding those who came to him with their difficulties that he was called “Antoninus of the Counsels.” The Gift is intended to benefit its possessor, and it is therefore had by all the just; but the charism is for the benefit of others, and is freely bestowed according to the will of God only on certain individuals who have a special mission of directing or assisting their neighbors.

n. 1660.

Subject-Matter of Counsel

Subject-Matter of Counsel.—The subject-matter of the Gift of Counsel embraces all that pertains to salvation, both the things that are necessary and are commanded and the things that are not necessary and are only counselled.

n. 1661.

The Gift of Counsel may direct one at times to courses that are singular and extraordinary. But, since the Apostolic rule is that one should not believe every spirit but should prove the spirits whether they are from God (I John, iv. 1; I Thess., v. 21), persons who feel called to unusual kinds of life should submit their ideas to the judgment of the Church: “Arise and go into the city, and there it shall be told thee what thou must do” (Acts, ix. 7).

n. 1668.

The Sin of Thoughtlessness

The Sin of Thoughtlessness.—The sin of thoughtlessness or inconsideration is a neglect or contempt of the means of arriving at a wise decision. It is a failure, therefore, to make use of right understanding, which looks well at the particular case before it and studies and measures it in the light of first principles.

(a) He is guilty of thoughtlessness, then, who fails to do what he can to judge rightly about his duty; nor is he excused if he leaves the whole matter to God, for it is temptation of God to expect that He will provide when man does not do his own part (Prov., iv. 25).

(b) He is not guilty of thoughtlessness who has not the opportunity of judging, or who lacks sufficient knowledge, or who is taken unawares; nor is he guilty of temptation of God, if in such difficulties he commits all to Providence. Thus, when various nations were gathered together to fight against Juda, King Josaphat prayed: “As we know not what to do, we can only turn our eyes to Thee” (II Par., xx. 12). And Our Lord promised special help to the disciples for cases of need when they were unable to help themselves (Matt., x. 19).

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 1. The Virtue of Prud…, The Commandments of Prudence

n. 1687.

Commandments of Prudence

Commandments of Prudence.—Prudence is not expressly commanded in the Decalogue, but there are precepts concerning this virtue in other parts of Scripture.

(a) Prudence is not enjoined in the Decalogue, because the ten commandments are concerned with those ends of virtue that are manifest to all, whereas prudence is about the means to practise virtue.

(b) Prudence is commanded in many places of Scripture: “Get wisdom and with all thy possession purchase prudence” (Prov., iv. 7); “Walk in the ways of prudence” (ibid, ix. 6); “Purchase prudence, for it is more precious than silver” (ibid, xvi. 16); “Be ye prudent as serpents” (Matt., x, 16); “Speak the things that become sound doctrine, that the aged men be sober, chaste, prudent” (Tit., ii. 1, 2); “Be prudent and Watch in prayers” (I Peter, iv. 7).

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. III, Art. 2. Duties of Members …, The Duties of Superiors

n. 2635.

The Duties of Superiors and Subjects: Duties of Superiors

The Duties of Superiors and Subjects: Duties of Superiors.—Superiors both in domestic and civil society need especially prudence and justice in order to fulfill well their special duties of ruling successfully and lawfully (Jerem., xxiii. 5).

(a) Prudence.—If every individual must use wise deliberation, decision and direction to guide himself aright, much more does a ruler, whether of the home or of the State, need these qualities; and hence it is the prudent servant who is placed over his master’s household (Matt., xxiv. 45), whereas the imprudent ruler brings confusion upon his community (Is., iii. 4 sqq). Parents, guardians, executives, lawmakers and magistrates are, therefore, bound to fit themselves by competent knowledge of their duties. At the minimum, they must know what constitutes the welfare of their circle or community, and how it should be promoted. For this, in positions of subordinate importance, common sense with good will often suffices, but from those who are heads of large organizations much more is expected. A chief who has to direct a great multitude must have unusual ability and unusual knowledge or unusual quickness to learn from study and conference what measures will safeguard the interests of his body and promote the happiness and prosperity of its members (see 1640 sqq.).

(b) Justice.—In their rule superiors must be lovers of the common good; they must decree, judge and govern according to natural justice and the law; in distributions of burdens and favors they must be guided by fairness to all, avoiding partiality, bribery, peculation and every form of political corruption; in discipline they must conscientiously enforce the right; in personal life they must be a model to their subjects, showing themselves moral, religious, truthful, dignified but approachable and patient (not arrogant, stubborn, sensitive, ill-humored or revengeful), given to work and duty rather than to pleasure and display.

Bucceroni, Institutions of Moral Theology

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 4 passages

Vol. I, On Conscience, III. On Probable Conscience · Vol. I, On Sins and Virtues, VI. On Virtues

Vol. I, On Conscience, III. On Probable Conscience

n. 113.

With a practically probable conscience, which proximately directs the action really to be placed here and now, it is altogether unlawful to operate. - For only a subjectively certain conscience is the rule of morals. And in this sense that saying is consequently false: He who acts probably, acts prudently. L. 1. 1. n. 58. 69. 80. Therefore the whole question here concerns a speculatively probable conscience, which only remotely directs the action, stating the probable existence of a law: namely whether by means of some reasoning we can lawfully make the step from a speculatively probable conscience to a practically certain conscience, or, what is the same, whether, while a probable opinion stands concerning the honorableness of some action in general, we can form for ourselves a certain conscience concerning the honorableness of such an action in a particular and individual case, and thus licitly follow in practice a speculatively probable opinion. To resolve this question we establish the following propositions.

n. 119.

It is licit to follow a truly probable opinion, the safer being left aside, whether equally probable or even truly more probable, where the question concerns only the honorableness of the action, by forming for oneself a conscience not directly, but from reflex principles.

The proposition is against probabiliorists and equiprobabilists. The first part is proved. Probabiliorism and equiprobabilism are refuted.

Proof 1. The system of the probabiliorists and equiprobabilists is not practical. For it is very difficult even for the doctors themselves to establish which opinion is more probable, which notably more probable. What appears to one more probable or notably more probable appears to another less probable and notably less probable. Indeed, what to one and the same person previously appeared more probable, far more probable, afterwards, the matter having been weighed better, seems less probable and much less probable.

Proof 2. For either the probabiliorists and equiprobabilists say that it is licit to act from the immediate judgment of the more probable or notably more probable opinion; or they say that it is licit to act from a mediate judgment, namely by force of the principle: a doubtful law does not oblige; an uncertain law does not produce a certain obligation; the will without knowledge of the law cannot be bound by its obligation. The first cannot be said, for although the opinion is more probable or notably more probable, nevertheless it is not certain; and without a certain conscience it is not licit to act. But the other, as is clear, leads not into probabiliorism or into equiprobabilism, but into simple probabilism. For where there is true probability against the law, the law is already doubtful and uncertain, and knowledge of the law cannot be had.

Proof 3. For we would be bound to follow the more probable or notably more probable opinion insofar as these approach more closely to truth. But this is false; for an opinion simply probable can approach more closely to truth, and a sentence can be false which bore before itself a certain greater appearance of truth. Moreover, here the question does not concern speculative truth but practical truth; the question does not concern adhesion of the intellect simply to truth, but the obligation of the will, which is not bound by the obligation of the law unless the law is certain and knowledge of the law is had.

The second part is proved. Simple probabilism is proved.

Proof 1. The proposition established is clear from the authority of very many and very grave theologians, who not only hand it down, but also affirm it as common doctrine, such as Suarez, Lugo, Struggl, La-Croix, Pignatelli, Vasquez, Elbel, Castropalaus, Sporer, etc. Cf. these Instit. Mor. ed. 4. Hence S. Alph. in Dissert. de usu moderato opinionis probabilis in concursu probabilioris, 2nd ed., Naples 1755: "We undertake to prove the last, more benign, and most common opinion, namely that it is licit to use a probable opinion even in concurrence with a more probable one in favor of the law, whenever that opinion has a certain and grave foundation." And certainly, although many after the Jansenists defended probabiliorism, nevertheless by far the greater part of theologians embraced probabilism. But he who in practice follows a doctrine which very many and very grave theologians teach, and which the doctors commonly hand down, acts prudently; but he who acts prudently acts honorably. For this reason, in the Dissertation just cited, S. D. immediately adds: "Add to these especially the argument, namely that if the benign opinion had been false, it certainly would by no means have been commonly received everywhere by doctors as it truly was received; or at least the Church would not have tolerated it, permitting souls commonly to walk by this way of perdition, as the adversaries cry out, deceived by such blind guides." And, as the same S. Alph. has it l. 6. n. 460, par. Haec autem, "nor is it an obstacle that several opinions which are circulated are not condemned by the Church, and yet by others more commonly are reputed lax; for the Church does not condemn all opinions which regard particular cases, although it does not approve them; but opinions which regard the universality of consciences, the Church does not approve nor keep silent about, as S. Aug. said, Epist. 119: The Church of God tolerates many things, and yet those things which concern faith or good life, it neither approves nor keeps silent about." Cf. L. 1. 3. n. 669 toward the end, Hoc unum, etc.; Bouquillon Theol. Fund. de Consc. c. 2. a. 1. § 2.

Proof 2. He who in practice follows an opinion which stands within the bounds of right reason and prudence acts prudently, and consequently honorably. But he who in practice follows a truly probable opinion, the more probable and safer being left aside, follows an opinion which stands within the bounds of right reason and prudence. Therefore. - The major is clear of itself. For what is more honorable than to follow right reason and prudence, which is right reason concerning things to be done? And Benedict XIV, C. Apostolica Constitutio § 21, indeed hands down this rule of acting, namely that we should follow the opinion which reason persuades and authority confirms. Moreover, it is by no means consonant with right reason, and especially with divine goodness, to wish to oblige man to perform somehow that which remains prudently uncertain to man himself after diligent inquiry, whether it is required by the order or not; especially since doubts of this kind are very frequent because of the weakness of the human intellect itself. This would be to impose unbearable burdens. L. 58. 86; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 10 ad 1. But the minor is clear from the very nature and definition of a truly probable opinion, which is not changed by the concurrence of another opinion, although more probable and safer. And this S. Alph. himself openly affirms in the definition of the more probable opinion; for he says that its contrary is judged probable. Cf. 112. Muzzarelli Dissert. de Regul. mor. opin., Rome 1807, p. 30 seq.; L. 1. 1. n. 79.

Proof 3. S. Alph. says this in his Op. Mor. Theol., 6th ed., Rome 1767: "There are two principles on which, relying, I defend the licit use of a probable opinion. The first, that a doubtful law, in the conflict of two equally probable opinions, does not oblige, because a doubtful law is not sufficiently promulgated. The other, that an uncertain law cannot introduce a certain obligation, because the obligation of law is posterior to liberty, with which man has been endowed by God." Each of these principles is explained and proved at length by S. D. l. 1. n. 66 seq., H. A. tr. 1. n. 37 seq. But when a truly probable opinion is present, although it is in concurrence with another more probable and safer one, each principle is still verified, namely that the law is uncertain if the question concerns its existence, or that it is doubtful if the question concerns its interpretation, because it is obscure; and therefore neither does the law have the power of actually obliging, since it has not been sufficiently or certainly promulgated; "for then the doubt whether the law exists is sufficiently promulgated, but the law is not promulgated," L. 1. 1. n. 70, Turin ed. 1846; nor is man, having certain possession of his liberty, bound to reckon himself despoiled of it because of an uncertain law: for antecedently to every law, each possesses his own liberty, since man must first be conceived as free, and then the law which is imposed on man. Therefore. L. 54 seq.

Now, that the law in that hypothesis is really doubtful or uncertain, so that it may prudently be regarded as such, whence that twofold axiom flows, is clear from the very nature of probability. For where true probability is present, greater probability does not of itself destroy the lesser; and this philosophers and theologians commonly affirm, and S. Alph. expressly hands down, H. A. tr. 1. n. 29 and l. 1. n. 40, where he says that the contrary of the more probable is also judged probable. The same S. D. explains this in this way in the Dissertation ed. 1755, n. 13: Greater probability does not destroy the lesser, "unless that lesser probability is drawn from the same principle, or unless the more probable opinion has in its favor so convincing an argument that the contrary seems truly improbable, or no longer gravely and certainly probable. But otherwise it must be said if the excess is not notable, and the opposed probability receives force from diverse principles, as almost always happens in the concurrence of opinions; for then the less probable opinion is by no means deprived of its grave probability." Indeed the probability or improbability of some opinion is not the same as its truth or falsity, so that one excludes the other; but it is a worthiness of meriting prudent assent, arising from grave motives, which, although greater or lesser, do not contradict one another if they are taken from diverse principles. But if they exhibit an argument so convincing that the opposite is judged improbable, we are already outside the case of greater or lesser probability, since then one opinion will be certain or probable, the other false or improbable.

Hence S. D. l. 6. n. 604, raising the question: "Whether a penitent can be absolved who wishes to follow an opinion contrary to that which the confessor holds," responds: "The common and to-be-followed opinion teaches that the confessor not only can, but is also bound under grave sin (where the question concerns grave matter, H. A. tr. 16. n. 118), to absolve a penitent who wishes to follow a probable opinion, although the opposite seems more probable to the confessor.... This common opinion standing, strengthened by so many authorities and reasons, I do not see how a confessor can with a safe conscience deny absolution to one wishing to follow an opinion which appears probable to the penitent himself, indeed perhaps more probable, if not directly at least reflexively, as probabilist authors commonly think, who by following a probable opinion in concurrence with a more probable one judge that they embrace an opinion reflexively more probable, as being confirmed by graver foundations and by the most common authority of doctors." S. D. has the same doctrine in his last work, H. A. tr. 16. n. 118; and to this opinion he adds no limits except the following: namely that "the opinion of the penitent have some probability, so that the confessor, although he does not hold it as solidly probable, nevertheless does not repute it altogether false... evidently erroneous." Cf. also l. 1. n. 87, where S. D. after Gerson says: "Theological doctors ought not to be quick to assert that some things are mortal sins where they are not most certain about the matter: Note, WHERE THEY ARE NOT MOST CERTAIN." Lugo Resp. Mor. l. 1. d. 26. n. 3; Pignatelli Cons. Can. tom. 8. cons. 15.

Proof 4. In order that law certainly oblige, it must be sufficiently promulgated, S. Th. 1. 2. q. 90. a. 4. But sufficient promulgation of law is not had if the law is not certain and manifest. Hence in canon law it is generally established: "In these things, concerning which the law is not found expressed, proceed, equity being preserved, always inclining toward the more humane part, according as you will see persons and causes, places and times, to require." C. Ex parte tua 11 de Transact. And in civil law it is decreed: "Whenever the interpretation of liberty is doubtful, response must be made according to liberty." L. 20 de R. I. "In a doubtful matter, to follow the more benign interpretation is no less just than safe." L. 192 de R. I. But the reason is that law imposes moral necessity, and therefore must necessarily bind the will. But it cannot necessarily bind the will except through knowledge. Therefore, knowledge of the law being excluded, the will remains morally free. S. Th. De Verit. q. 17. a. 3. Now if a most probable opinion is present against the law, it is evidently clear that knowledge of the law is lacking. For certainty and evidence cannot be had with the greatest opposite probability; indeed not even with simple probability. Hence S. Alph. says: "To constitute a doubtful law, true probability to the contrary suffices." L. 1. n. 57, ed. 1762. 1763.

Confirmation 5. By the authority of S. Thomas. Law is a certain rule and measure. In order that a rule direct and a measure measure, it must be applied to the thing which must be directed and measured. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 30. a. 4. Therefore law must reach the subjects whom it directs; but it reaches them through knowledge. S. Th. De Verit. q. 17. a. 3. Accordingly law must be certain and evident. Therefore, if the law is uncertain, namely if its existence is not established, if the law is doubtful, namely if the meaning of the law is obscure, the obligation of the law ceases; a precept does not bind except through knowledge. S. Th. l. c. Hence those axioms: An uncertain law cannot introduce a certain obligation; A doubtful law does not oblige. For the effect cannot surpass the cause. These things S. Thomas says altogether generally, nor does he distinguish between a law having against it a less probable, or equally probable, or more probable opinion. Therefore the whole question from the Angelic Doctor is this: whether a law having against it a more probable, equally probable, or less probable opinion can be said to reach man through knowledge, to bind him by means of knowledge, through knowledge, through the power of knowledge. But knowledge is not given if true probability is against it. Hence every question about mortal sin is determined dangerously unless the truth is had expressly. S. Th. Quodl. 9. a. 15. And S. Alph. l. 3 after n. 139, Epist. Resp.: "But in order that some action be affirmed absolutely to be a mortal sin, a probable opinion is not enough, nor even a more probable one; for the more probable does not exclude rational fear of erring; whence it does not bring about that the law does not remain doubtful, and that the opposite cannot be true, if it is truly probable."

Confirmation 6. Innocent III allowed a spouse suffering from impotence a three-year trial, C. Laudabilem 5 de Frig., and did not prescribe that it must first be seen whether potency was more probable, or at least equally probable. In the eighteenth century, when certain Indians in the Kingdom of Paraguay who had been converted to the faith had several wives, and questions arose concerning the validity of their marriages, Urban VIII responded to John de Lugo, afterwards Cardinal: "Where the opinions of doctors concur as probable on each side, those opinions are to be followed which, for the condition of places and barbarian men, are more favorable." Urban did not say that the more probable opinions were to be followed, nor did he say where equally probable opinions concur, but absolutely where probable opinions concur. Carden. Cris. Theol. Diss. 2. § 553. E. M. 119.

Nor indeed is it of any force, in order to overturn all the aforesaid things in almost one word, to object against them that probabilism has already been condemned by Innocent XI. For Innocent XI only commanded that liberty be given to the Fathers of the Society to defend probabiliorism and to refute probabilism, if they wished. Cf. E. M.; Wirceburg. De Actib. hum. c. 4.

n. 124.

You will resolve: Therefore we make the step from a speculatively probable conscience to a practically certain conscience by the following reasoning. What is forbidden by no certain law is licit. But such or such an action, which truly probably is prohibited by no law, is by that very fact forbidden by no certain law. Therefore such an action is licit. Since the major and minor of this syllogism are certain, the conclusion too will be certain. And hence again it is clear that an opinion both tenuously and doubtfully probable is altogether excluded from probabilism. But the conclusion contains the judgment or dictate of conscience. The same transition can be made by force of another reasoning. He who acts according as prudence dictates, acts honorably. But he who acts according to this or that probable opinion acts according to the dictate of prudence. Therefore, he who acts according to this or that probable opinion acts honorably. Since again the major and minor of this syllogism are certain, the conclusion will also be certain. L. 1. 1. n. 67. 68. 69. 84; Muzzarelli Dissert. de Regul. mor. opin., Rome 1807, p. 30 seq.

Vol. I, On Sins and Virtues, VI. On Virtues

n. 346.

What is prudence, what are its parts, and what vices are opposed to it? R. To the first. It is a certain special virtue of the practical intellect, by which in any business occurring we know what is honorable, what shameful. And thus prudence is the right reason of things to be done, or the virtue rightly ordering those things which are toward the end of the whole of life. But every virtue is in the mean; the mean is to do those things which virtue commands, when one ought, where one ought, as one ought; and accordingly the office of prudence is to find a mean of this sort, which is one thing as a mean of reason, another as a mean of the thing. - The acts of prudence are: 1. To take counsel, namely by inquiring what means and what circumstances are necessary, so that the work may be done honorably. 2. To judge concerning the things found, i.e., after diligent consideration, to conclude what is to be done, in what way, in what place and time, and with what other circumstances. 3. To command, namely by prescribing what and when it is to be done, by applying to operation those things which have been counseled and judged. 4. To operate solicitously the things commanded. For solicitude is that moderated speed by which, by the cleverness and vigilance of the soul, that which has been consulted and defined is quickly committed to execution.

Hence a precept of prudence is not given by reason of itself, but only by reason of another thing, namely of a virtue to be exercised and a sin to be avoided. Therefore as all precepts pertain to prudence, because it is directive of all virtuous acts, so universal Moral Theology pertains to prudence, and especially the treatise on Conscience; since the whole of Moral Theology and the aforesaid treatise in particular hand down rules so that we may act prudently and rightly. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 64; 2. 2. q. 47; q. 56.

R. To the second. The integral parts of prudence, which concur toward its perfect act, are: 1. Memory, which is knowledge of past things. For since experience is required for prudent persons, and experience is from many memories, the memory of many things is required for prudence. 2. Understanding or intelligence, not as it is a certain power, but as it is a certain right estimation of some ultimate principle. For every deduction of reason is from some principle, and prudence is the right reason of things to be done. 3. Docility, by which someone is prompt and easy in receiving instruction from others and acquiring knowledge from them. For prudence consists about particular things to be done, which someone cannot always know all by himself alone. 4. Shrewdness, which is an easy and prompt conjecturing, by which, when something occurs unexpectedly, someone quickly by himself finds what is fitting. 5. Reason. For it belongs to a prudent man to be good at taking counsel; but counsel is a certain inquiry proceeding from certain things to others, which is the work of reason. 6. Foresight, which imports a respect of something distant, or future, to which those things which occur in the present are to be ordered. Therefore foresight is the right ordering of suitable means to the end, and accordingly includes rectitude of counsel, judgment, and command. 7. Circumspection, by which that which is ordered to the end is compared with the things which surround it, and therefore is an accurate consideration of all circumstances. For something is good in itself and fitting to the end, which nevertheless, from certain concurrent things, is rendered either evil or not opportune to the end. 8. Caution, which is consideration of evils and extrinsic impediments, through which it happens that they are avoided, lest good be impeded by evil, lest evil be mixed with good. Of these eight parts, the first five pertain to prudence according as it is cognitive; but the three later according as it is preceptive, applying knowledge to work. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 49.

The subjective parts of prudence are: 1. Prudence simply so called, which is ordered to one's own good. 2. Royal prudence, which is the prudence of the king himself, which rules a city or kingdom. For it belongs to prudence to rule and fittingly to command. And therefore to the king, to whom it pertains to rule a city or kingdom, a more special prudence belongs. For a rule is so much the more perfect, the more universal it is, extending itself to more things and reaching a further end beyond itself. 3. Political prudence, and this is that by which men rule themselves in obeying Princes in order to the common good of the city or kingdom. 4. Economic prudence, by which men direct themselves toward living well according to domestic intercourse, for the common good of the house or family. 5. Military prudence, by which harms from enemies are repelled. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 47, aa. 10, 11, 12; q. 48, 50.

The potential parts of prudence are: 1. Eubulia, or the virtue of taking counsel well, whose office is to suggest good counsel. 2. Synesis, which is the virtue of judging well concerning particular things to be done, according to common rules. 3. Gnome, which is the virtue of judging about things to be done beyond common principles; and consequently it imports a certain perspicacity of judgment. These parts are potential parts of prudence, because the principal act of prudence is to command execution, to which taking counsel well and judging well are directed. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 57, aa. 4-6; 2. 2. q. 48; q. 51.

R. To the third. Imprudence is opposed to prudence. It is either such privatively, or contrarily. "But negatively it is not properly so called, namely so that it properly imports only the lack of prudence, which can be without sin. Privatively, indeed, imprudence is so called insofar as someone lacks prudence which he is naturally apt and ought to have; and according to this, imprudence is a sin by reason of negligence, by which someone does not apply effort to having prudence. But contrarily imprudence is taken according as reason is moved or acts in a contrary mode to prudence; for instance, if the right reason of prudence acts by taking counsel, the imprudent person spurns counsel; and so concerning the other things which must be considered in the act of prudence. And in this way imprudence is sin according to the proper account of prudence. For this cannot happen, that man acts against prudence, except by turning aside from the rules by which the reason of prudence is rectified. Hence, if this happens by aversion from divine rules, it is a mortal sin; for instance when someone, as if contemning and repudiating divine documents, acts precipitately. But if he acts beside them without contempt and without detriment of those things which are of the necessity of salvation, it is a venial sin." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 53, a. 1.

Generally speaking, every sin is against prudence, as follows from the very nature of prudence and imprudence. But specifically one sins against prudence by excess and by defect. By defect: by precipitation, inconsideration, inconstancy, negligence. By excess, or rather by a certain species of prudence: by prudence of the flesh, cunning, deceit, fraud, solicitude about temporal things, solicitude about future things.

Precipitation is that which, some end having been proposed, immediately undertakes the work, or at least judges concerning the means and mode of executing it, deliberation being omitted, against the office of prudence to take counsel. It is not grave except by reason of the danger of grave sin. - Inconsideration is that which judges while diligent inspection of things from which right judgment proceeds has been omitted, against the office of prudence to judge well. Likewise it is not grave except by reason of the danger of grave sin. - Inconstancy is that by which, without just cause, one's opinion is changed, and one contemns commanding those things which according to right reason had previously been judged and proposed, against firmness of judgment. It is not grave unless from some extrinsic circumstance, e.g., of scandal, precept, vow, someone is bound to persist in the opinion. - Negligence is that which imports defect of due solicitude, and omits to commit to execution at the opportune time a thing deliberated and judged, against the vigilance of reason in executing. It is not grave except in a grave matter.

Prudence of the flesh is that which thinks out suitable means for accomplishing the works of the flesh, so that one may follow the instinct and motions of corrupted flesh. The sin is grave or light by reason of the depraved affection, grave or light, which underlies it. Under prudence of the flesh is comprehended the prudence of the age and of the world, because we also desire the exterior things of the world on account of the flesh. - Cunning generally is the manner of doing something in a hidden mode. But here it is taken specifically for knowledge of depraved means suitable for deceiving, joined with an affection of executing them. It has place in those things which regard the neighbor. For no one hides something from himself. Therefore cunning is a sin by which someone uses not true ways, but false and simulated ways, for obtaining some end, whether good or evil. It is a grave or light sin according to the account of the affection which underlies it, and the harm which follows for the neighbor. - Deceit is the execution of cunning, whether by words or deeds; for it is a general name. Therefore deceit is the assumption of ways that are not true, but simulated and apparent ways, according to the execution of the work. It differs from cunning because cunning is the assumption of ways of this sort, not in execution, but only in the thinking out of them. Fraud is the execution of cunning through deeds, as when someone spends adulterated coin, and is something more restricted than deceit. Deceit and fraud are used especially in contracts, and they are a grave or light sin according to grave or light harm of neighbor. Concerning fraud and deceit the Rules of Law are: "Fraud and deceit ought to patronize no one," C. Ex tenore 16, de Rescr.; "Fraud is not done to him who knows and consents," L. Nemo de Reg. Iur.

Solicitude about temporal things is excessive occupation of mind, proceeding from inordinate love of having, or fear of losing. For solicitude imports a certain effort applied to obtaining something. - Solicitude about future things is excessive occupation of soul concerning future things, especially so that the necessities of life may be had, joined with anxiety and little confidence in Providence. Each solicitude is a grave or light sin, according as by it someone is prepared to violate a precept in a grave or light matter. S. Th. 2. 2. qq. 53-55; Theol. Wirceb., de Virt. Card. de Prud.

Tanquerey

Adolphe Tanquerey, S.S. — 12 passages

Vol. II, On the Moral Virtues

n. 1049.

Art. I. Concerning Prudence. — I. The Genuine Notion of Prudence.

1. Definition. Prudence (in Greek, phronesis), which is often called wisdom, is a virtue directing the intellect so that, in individual operations, we may discern what is honest and conducing to the end. Accordingly here there is no question of merely human prudence, or cleverness, which pursues only the useful, but of that which orders our acts to the last end, and especially of supernatural prudence.

(a) Prudence primarily perfects the intellect, namely practical reason; and it is, as it were, the director of morals, insofar as it disposes the mind to judging rightly concerning those things which conduce to the end, by pronouncing what is honest or base: for prudence which considers only what is useful is very imperfect, from what was said above, n. 44-47. From this it is clear that its object is very broad, since it embraces all human actions capable of morality.

(b) Yet it differs from the science of morals; for the latter is concerned with universal good and the general rules of ethics, while the former applies the universal principles of morals to individual actions, pronouncing what in this or that circumstance is honest. - Nor, however, is it the same as conscience (above, n. 350-351): for conscience is considered as a faculty, or as an act by which we judge concerning the liceity of acts; while prudence is the virtue perfecting conscience itself and inclining it to judge rightly concerning the honesty of actions.

n. 1050.

1. The elements by which it is constituted. Prudence primarily supposes a natural faculty of judging rightly (bon sens, common sense), and, as regards supernatural things, the light of faith by which right reason is perfected and illuminated. It consists especially in three elements, which are necessary for rightly choosing means to the end: consultation, by which we diligently inquire concerning all the means and their utility and honesty; judgment of mind, by which practical reason, all things having been weighed, rightly pronounces concerning the honesty and opportuneness of this or that means; precept, by which reason commands those acts which it has already declared necessary or useful for the end.

n. 1051.

(A) The first act of prudence is solicitous consultation, or investigation, by which we seriously and attentively think about the various means which can conduce to the intended end, about their honesty and opportuneness, not only in general, but with all adjuncts attended to.² Toward obtaining this more efficaciously, five things especially serve:

² This indeed is done, according to St. Thomas (II-II, q. 51, a. 2), under the influence of eubulia, which is a virtue annexed to prudence.

(a) Memory of past things, insofar as these can help for judging rightly concerning present things. For since for the most part at least the same means, employed in the same circumstances, produce the same effects, from past things we can often judge how one must act in present adjuncts. Wherefore history has deservedly been called the teacher of men, and the method which they call of observation, or experience, is held by moderns as the best directress of life. Therefore the prudent man considers those things which are far off, so that from them he may learn what must be done here and now.

(b) Understanding of present things; for, past things having been considered, it is also necessary that the present operation be attentively inspected, both in its nature and in its circumstances; and not only on the surface, but intimately; and not under one respect only, but under diverse respects. For since there is question of the honesty of some action not in general, but in the concrete, all adjuncts being posited, all these things must be attended to, so that the action to be placed here and now may be good under every respect. For it belongs to prudence wisely to adapt the general principles of morals, which are immutable in themselves, to all circumstances of places, times, and persons.

(c) Providence of future things: for the honesty of an act does not depend only on its nature, but also on its effects, whether as regards the agent or as regards others; therefore these, insofar as human frailty permits, must be foreseen, so that from them the honesty or opportuneness of the action to be placed here and now may be judged.

n. 1052.

(d) Docility in taking the counsel of others: for since the judgment of very many is worth more than the judgment of one, to rely exclusively on our own wisdom is not without folly; therefore the prudent man will frequently, solicitously, and reverently take the counsels of others, especially of elders and prudent men; he will inquire with them concerning the matter to be done, will lend an attentive ear to their reasons, and will not despise their judgment: "Prudence," says St. Thomas,³ "consists about particular operable things, in which, since there are infinite diversities, all things cannot be sufficiently considered by one man, nor in a short time, but through length of time. Hence in those things which pertain to prudence, man especially needs to be instructed by others, and especially by elders, who have obtained sound understanding concerning the ends of operable things." Yet the counselor must be chosen cautiously, a prudent and upright man, who cares for the good of others, and not solely for his own advantage.⁴

³ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 49, a. 3.

⁴ Concerning which Ecclesiasticus wrote excellent things, 37:7-29.

(e) Prayer to God, according to that saying:⁵ "And in all these things beseech the Most High, that He direct thy way in truth." For, even in natural matters, it is expedient that we humbly ask from the Father of lights, who is the best counselor, what we ought to do; but in matters regarding the supernatural end, this is necessary, since only by supernatural light can we find the way of salvation.

⁵ Ecclus. 37:19.

n. 1053.

(B) The second act of prudence is judgment: for when all things have been diligently investigated, it remains that practical reason bear judgment concerning them, by pronouncing what, all things having been weighed, is honest and opportune. For this there is required first of all the faculty of judging rightly; but besides, immunity from prejudices and passions, which easily turn the mind away from the right path of truth; deliberate consideration of all motives and circumstances, so that it may be discerned which of the various means devised conduces more efficaciously to the end; finally a firm pronouncement of judgment, so that the mind not remain uncertain.⁶

⁶ For performing this, St. Thomas asserts that there are two virtues which are joined to prudence: synesis, or right sense (bon sens), by which we judge rightly concerning things to be done according to common rules; and gnome, or perspicacity, by which we judge rightly concerning the same things beyond common rules.

n. 1054.

(C) The third act of prudence is precept, by which practical reason not only pronounces what must be done, but commands it: for it is not enough to take counsel and to judge, but it is necessary to operate; but operation proceeds from the command of reason, which, after it has judged what is good and what is evil in such adjuncts, says to the will: this must be done by you.

An act of this kind is the principal one, according to St. Thomas:⁷ "And because this act is nearer to the end of practical reason, hence it is that this is the principal act of practical reason, and consequently of prudence..."

⁷ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 47, a. 8.

For rightly commanding, there is especially required solicitude, which strenuously urges the execution of those things which are to be done: for if it was necessary to deliberate slowly, it is necessary to operate quickly, nor is that to be put off until tomorrow which can and ought to be done today.

n. 1055.

1. Concerning the various species of prudence. Prudence assumes various names, and is distributed into various species, according to the various objects about which it is concerned. It is customarily called personal prudence, or monastic, by which a man governs himself; domestic, or economic, by which someone rightly orders whatever regards the good of the family; social, or political, when it regards the common good of the state; military, when it is concerned with military affairs, etc. But in all these, the same essential elements which we have described are found; but those things which are particular to each species are set forth in various treatises.

n. 1056.

1. Concerning the vices opposed to prudence. From this one is given to understand what the vices opposed to prudence are. Certain ones are directly opposed to this virtue, namely by defect; others indirectly, insofar as they have a false likeness with it.

(A) The vices which are directly opposed to this virtue are called by the common name of imprudence; but because prudence consists in three principal acts, above, n. 1050, three vices likewise are customarily distinguished: precipitation, which omits consultation; inconsideration, which harms judgment; negligence and inconstancy, which are opposed to precept.

(a) Precipitation consists in this, that a man, neglecting the various means of inquiry which are at hand, acts before he considers; wherefore he is borne toward acting, not from the dictate of reason, but from the impulse of prejudice or passion. When precipitation arises from contempt of the directing rule, it is properly called rashness, and is a graver sin.

(b) Inconsideration consists in this, that someone despises or neglects diligently to weigh all those things which are required so that he may bear an equitable judgment; for thus he exposes himself to the danger of judging badly concerning those things which are here and now to be done, and therefore of acting badly.

(c) Negligence is the defect of a prompt will in executing the judgment of reason, or in commanding those things which have been judged necessary or useful. Akin to this vice is inconstancy, which, without sufficient reason, withdraws from a good proposal already elicited: it arises for the most part from the impulse of passions which resist the good proposal, and little by little induce a man to change his counsel, and therefore to leave those things which had already been wisely begun.

In all these things, a grave sin is committed if someone acts in such a way that he contemns divine rules; but if he acts without contempt, and without detriment to those things which are of the necessity of salvation, it is a venial sin.¹

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 53, a. 1.

n. 1057.

(B) To the virtue of prudence there are opposed, by a false likeness, prudence of the flesh, craftiness, and excessive solicitude for future things.

(a) Prudence of the flesh, which seeks ways of living according to the desires of corrupt nature, and therefore tends to an end which is not truly good, but apparent. Concerning this the Apostle says:² "For the prudence of the flesh is death; but the prudence of the spirit is life and peace. Because the wisdom of the flesh is an enemy to God; for it is not subject to the law of God, neither can it be. And they who are in the flesh cannot please God."

² Rom. 8:6-8.

(b) Craftiness, which is not necessarily concerned with an evil end, but uses simulated and fallacious means for attaining the intended end, whether good or evil. It is, as it were, a practical lie, and is opposed to Christian simplicity. Exteriorly it is manifested by deceit and fraud, of which there is treatment where Contracts are discussed, n. 630.

(c) Excessive solicitude for future things, which is vicious when it preoccupies a man outside the opportune time, or in an immoderate way. Christ reproves this as a defect of trust in God:³ "Be not solicitous for your life, what you shall eat, nor for your body, what you shall put on... Behold the birds of the air, for they neither sow, nor do they reap, nor gather into barns; and your heavenly Father feedeth them. Are not you of much more value than they?" St. Thomas explains this more fully,⁴ by setting forth that this excessive solicitude is illicit in three ways: if we seek temporal things as an end, - or if we so set our heart upon temporal things that we are drawn back from spiritual things, which we ought more principally to serve, - or if we fear that, by doing what we ought, necessary things may fail us, which is opposed to divine providence: "Seek ye therefore first the kingdom of God and His justice, and all these things shall be added unto you."⁵

³ Matt. 6:25-26.

⁴ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, a. 6.

⁵ Matt. 6:33.

These sins indeed are grave when the last end is constituted in creatures, or when means gravely culpable in themselves are assumed.

n. 1058.

II. Concerning the Excellence of Prudence and the Means of Acquiring It.

1. The excellence of prudence. (A) Scripture praises prudence many times, which it often calls wisdom, especially in the books of Proverbs, Wisdom, and Ecclesiasticus.

Thus in Proverbs:⁶ "Blessed is the man that findeth wisdom, and who aboundeth in prudence. The purchasing thereof is better than the merchandise of silver, and her fruit than the first and purest gold... Possess wisdom, possess prudence... Take hold on her, and she shall exalt thee; thou shalt be glorified by her when thou shalt embrace her: she shall give to thy head increase of graces, and protect thee with a noble crown." - Likewise in Wisdom,⁷ prudence is described as the directress of our life, and the fountain of all goods, to be preferred to all riches. - Wherefore Ecclesiasticus exhorts young men that from youth they receive prudence, and cultivate the same up to old age.⁸

⁶ Prov. 3:13-14; 4:5-9.

⁷ Wis. 6-9.

⁸ Ecclus. 6:18-37.

The Fathers teach no less clearly that prudence is the charioteer and fountain of the other virtues, so that without it it is impossible to cultivate the other virtues: for it chooses the means by which the other virtues can grow.⁹

⁹ St. Ambrose, De officiis, l. I, c. 27, P.L., XVI, 60; St. Augustine, De moribus eccl., l. I, c. 15, P.L., XXXII, 1322; St. Gregory the Great, Moral., l. II, c. 49, P.L., LXXV, 592.

n. 1059.

(B) Reason shows the same thing. For prudence helps and perfects all virtues, so that without it the others cannot subsist. (a) For every moral virtue ought to hold a middle way between two extremes; thus liberality subsists as a mean between prodigality and avarice. But it belongs to prudence to prescribe to the virtues what the mean to be held between extremes is, since, from what was said, it inquires and judges concerning all things in order to the end, and solicitously determines what is honest. (b) Besides, so that a man may act well, he ought to know not only what he should do, but also how he should do it; but it belongs to prudence to define, after attentive consideration of all the circumstances, what the better means are for attaining the end, and how these can opportunely be employed.

Wherefore a man destitute of prudence is deservedly compared to a ship lacking a pilot, which is driven hither and thither by the impulse of winds and waves, and at length is forced to perish by shipwreck. On the contrary, prudence is called the moderator and charioteer of the virtues, the orderer of affections and teacher of morals, since it directs all our acts safely to the port of salvation.

n. 1060.

1. Means of progressing in prudence. These can be gathered from what was said concerning the elements in which prudence consists, n. 1050.

(a) First of all, since God is the author of all wisdom, prudence must be earnestly asked from Him: for He Himself assigned us the end, and also the means opportune for attaining it; therefore when we do not know what must be done, it is necessary to implore the divine light: "But as we know not what we ought to do, we have only this left, that we direct our eyes to Thee."¹⁰ In the book of Wisdom (IX), a very beautiful prayer is found for obtaining wisdom, or prudence.

¹⁰ 2 Par. 20:12.

(b) Since prejudices and passions, especially pleasure, cloud the mind, and hinder it from attentive and sincere consideration of motives consonant with reason, it is altogether necessary that we renounce prejudices and conquer passions; otherwise reason, disturbed and blinded, will not bear judgment according to equity and honesty, but according to the vicious propensities of corrupt nature.

(c) Before you bear judgment, attentively consider and weigh all motives, all circumstances, and the effects probably going to follow from your action, both as regards yourself and as regards others; and concerning all these things judge in order to eternity, as if you were soon to die and to render account of your action to the supreme judge. - Nor should you rely on your own prudence, but "do nothing without counsel, and after the deed thou shalt not repent"¹¹... "Always seek counsel from a wise man."¹² By these and other means of this kind, you will progress in prudence.

¹¹ Ecclus. 32:24.

¹² Tob. 4:19.

Vermeersch, Theologia Moralis

Arthur Vermeersch, S.J. — 9 passages

Vol. II, Bk. II, Treatise I: On Prudence · Vol. II, Bk. II, Tr. I, Article I: Notions

Vol. II, Bk. II, Treatise I: On Prudence

n. ¶1.

Utility. - Because the more practical questions of this treatise can also be weighed under various other heads, manuals of moral theology are accustomed scarcely to concede express mention to the cardinal virtue of prudence. Yet it is useful to possess a right and distinct notion of this virtue, and accurately to discern how it differs from human prudence, which, per se, is without merit. In these pages, insisting on the footsteps of St. Thomas, we shall attempt to furnish this.

Vol. II, Bk. II, Tr. I, Article I: Notions

n. 155.

I. Previous Notions Concerning the Practical Intellect and Intellectual Virtue. 1. The properly practical intellect is not yet that in which certain judgments concerning things to be done and omitted are made and contained. For these can present themselves speculatively to the human mind without any relation to future action. Cannot a professor propose ascetical norms without any zeal or will for pursuing perfection? Indeed it happens too often that a man acts against conscience, or a judgment of this kind. But a judgment to which a contrary action is opposed in truth does not pertain to the act, i.e. is not practical. But that intellect is called practical which, from the motion of the will wishing to act, deliberates, judges, and commands. Yet because the human will is not compelled by such deliberation and judgment of the intellect, but can deny consent and draw the intellect to another practical conclusion through the mediation of an opposite consideration, that intellect is to be called practical most especially which is mingled with action, or which, after consultation and judgment, is informed by the command of action.

And they note that, since the will is a rational appetite, it indeed lies in its power, by application of the intellect to considering diverse things, to change the ultimate judgment concerning an action to be done or omitted; but by no means can it happen that it act without a practical judgment, or disagree from some practically ultimate judgment. Therefore no free action is done without its being indicated in some way that one must so act.

This process of our actions can be narrated more distinctly thus.

From a true will of any end whatever the intellect is moved to considering, by inquiring, the means; then, at the end of the inquiry, to giving a sentence concerning suitable means; finally to proposing the execution of the means; which proposal, from the motion of the will, becomes a command, by which the proposal is prescribed to the active faculties as to be followed.

Let us suppose someone who wishes to obtain some office. He will deliberate, he will consult concerning the way. Besides conciliating to himself the benevolence of the prince or collator, which is immediately perceived to be necessary, the very mode of conciliating favor will be investigated. A sentence of this kind will impose an end upon that inquiry: this mode seems most suitable. And, from the same desire of office, the discovered mode will be proposed as to be embraced, with greater or lesser force, according to its efficacy, the estimation of the office, and the difficulties joined to its execution. The will chooses the proposed mode by approving it; and the discovered mode becomes the exemplar of execution: the act is accommodated to the intellectual reason.

Because every virtue perfects our free acts, intellectual virtue is not wholly in the intellect, but also supposes a good disposition of the will; nor can the act of such a virtue be had without motion of the will. Wherefore intellectual virtue grows together from a good disposition of will and intellect. Therefore qualities of mind, just as bodily health itself, can indeed aid virtue; yet they are not formally virtuous; and a good disposition of the intellect cannot, as such, be meritorious. Those qualities can be placed among the beginnings of virtues which the will can use for the end of virtue, and which are perfected from the use itself of virtue.

n. 156.

II. 1. Prudence, more broadly so called, is a certain art of attaining the intended end, which end can be merely human, indeed evil, so that the Lord could call the children of darkness more prudent than the children of light.

The virtue of prudence properly so called, in acting, presupposes the intention of good, and is accustomed to be defined: right reason of things to be done. Reason is the same as the representative form of the intellect presenting action as doable. - It is right insofar as it agrees with right appetite; or insofar as, after sufficient study, it says that that is to be embraced which appeared consonant with the rule of morals; and insofar as it proceeds from a good will. - Of things to be done. By this word there is assigned to prudence an object other than the object of art: art regards things to be made. But by the plural number the habit is indicated.

This right reason follows right inquiry and right judgment; and it is completed by the command of an honorable action.

Concerning eubulia. The solicitous inquiry of honesty, proceeding from the intention of the honorable, is an act of eubulia. If this solicitude is had easily and readily; if, for example, it is disturbed by no impulse of passions, it reveals in the intellect the acquired virtue of eubulia: indeed, its act is morally good, and no one uses it badly. For to inquire into the honorable from a will of acting honorably is necessarily morally good.
Concerning synesis or gnome. The sentence pronounced concerning the morality of such an action is also necessarily good, insofar as it too proceeds from zeal for the honesty of the action. If this sentence is founded in law or in a higher reason, it is ascribed to synesis or gnome. Again, if that sentence is easily sincere and firm, it will mark a virtuous habit of the same name.

n. 157.

III. Prudence, a Cardinal Virtue. The preceptive election of an action indicated as honorable, which election is composed of the practical conclusion of the intellect, that the action is to be done, and of the consent of the will, is the most proper act of prudence. This act is meritorious in the just man, for it flows from a free intention of the honorable, and by it one lives well. And if it has been prompt, ready, and efficacious, that election marks the virtuous habit of acquired prudence.

That we may set forth this process more distinctly: not otherwise than in the temporal order, so in the moral order, from the supreme judgment of synteresis, by which it is pronounced universally that the law of God is to be observed, that one must live honorably, the will freely inclines toward honesty, wishes to act honorably. - Consultation receives this intention of honorable good: what is honorable; that is, the inquiry of the honorable, which we are ordered to make solicitously, with the care which is fitting.

Judgment concerning the morality of the action completes the inquiry: this is honorable, good, or better. That judgment can be founded either in consideration of law, or in attention to a higher reason of the law. We are ordered to place a sincere judgment of this kind before our action. - Then the same judgment is offered by the intellect as to be followed practically, as if equivalently, with greater or lesser force of reasons, it had said: "Do this honorable thing."

The will assents; and there is had the election of an honorable action, which, from the motion of the will, is the command of that action imposed on the subject faculties. The honorable thing will be done according to such a command. Thus the idea of law in the Prince becomes, from the will of the prince, a precept for subjects and the exemplar of the actions of those who obey.

n. 158.

IV. Degrees of Acquired Prudence. The more vehement the intention of good will be, and the higher the good itself intended; then the more the intellect will be disposed to seek studiously, to recognize the honorable sincerely, and to discern better its lovableness in the light of reasons, the better and stronger the intellectual virtue will be.

It is necessary accurately to discern these superior dispositions of the intellect, by which it serves the will of the honorable, from qualities of mind, for example natural subtlety, which can be used for any use whatever. Thus a learned and acute man will more easily be able to find speculatively the reasons of the honorable; yet in true prudence he will yield to the duller mind of a more virtuous man, insofar as this latter is endowed with greater practical zeal for the honorable. For the moral value of the command must be estimated from the motive force of the intellect.

n. 159.

V. Corollaries. 1. A fuller description of prudence can be this: a virtue which perfects the practical intellect so that, with the will moving it, it promptly and easily commands things to be done which are apprehended as honorable and more honorable.

Prudence is not accurately described by acts of recognition or judgment. Wherefore Tanquerey, after, in II, n. 1049, he described prudence as the virtue by which the intellect is directed "so that in individual operations we may discern what is honorable and conducing to the end," is forced to correct himself, n. 1051, where he places the third and principal act of prudence as "the precept, by which reason practically not only pronounces what must be done, but commands it."
The province of prudence regards not the end itself but the things which are toward the end. For it supposes the intention of the end and ends in the election of the means.
The functions of prudence are: to consult well, or, under the respect of moral good, to investigate; to judge well, or, at the end of the investigation, to pronounce with certitude what must be done under the same respect; to command well, or efficaciously to order toward the work.

n. 160.

VI. Vices Opposed to Prudence. These vices are divided by St. Thomas, 2, 2, qq. 53, 54, 55, into two genera: imprudence, through defect either of prudence itself or of the previous acts which are required for prudence; and false prudence, which abuses the means of prudence insofar as it either pursues a disordered end, as the prudence of the flesh, or uses illicit ways, as cunning: these latter are opposed to the virtue of prudence by excess. That we may omit these latter things, defect can affect prudence in the prior acts of counsel or of judgment, or in the proper act of commanding. But counsel is impeded or vitiated by precipitation, judgment by inconsideration, right command by negligence or inconstancy (2, 2, q. 53, art. 2). Precipitation is in the impulse of will or passion, which passes over the elements of sound deliberation (*); inconstancy is defect of stability in commanding, or in a withdrawal from a good proposal previously defined; negligence is defect of solicitude or of prompt will.

(*) What precipitation is, and what mature deliberation requires, St. Thomas very beautifully explains in 2, 2, q. 52, art. 3, c.

But, just as natural gifts of mind effect a certain natural prudence which is without merit, so from defect of those gifts there results a certain imprudence which is without demerit. Blameworthy imprudence supposes a disorder of free will, as when by the impulse of passion it is carried away toward counseling, judging, or commanding badly. Yet conscious natural defect gives place to moral obligations of attention, precaution, and correction, which can be observed or violated.

In every sin a certain imprudence is committed; yet it is not a general vice, since it is concerned with special acts, i.e. acts of reason. But since it extends itself to every moral matter, it is not a special vice by reason of matter, and by accusing the sin committed, the imprudence itself is sufficiently accused, unless someone from formal contempt of prudence wished to be imprudent (cf. 2, 2, q. 53, art. 1, and 54, art. 1 c.).

n. 161.

VII. Concerning the Connected Gift of Counsel. In what way the Holy Spirit perfects our virtues through His gifts, we indicated in tome I, n. 497.

According to St. Thomas, 2, 2, q. 52, art. 2, prudence is aided and perfected by the gift of Counsel, by which we are moved by the Holy Spirit, as by a Counselor, toward inquiring rightly concerning things to be done. But why the gift of the Holy Spirit perfects the innermost act of the virtue of prudence, or consulting well, rather than the higher acts of prudence, St. Thomas brings this reason: judging and commanding, which are those higher acts, belong to one moving, not to one moved, while counsel can arise no less from another than from the one deliberating.

For since in the gifts of the Holy Spirit the human mind does not have itself as moving, but rather as moved (2, 2, q. 52, art. 2 ad 1), prudence must be perfected in that act which, from its nature, carries with itself the direction or admonition of another. But in consulting we are connaturally aided by the counsel of another. (Concerning the mode by which the gifts of the Holy Spirit act, cf. J. de Guibert, S.J., Dons du S. Esprit et vie mystique, Revue d'ascetique et de mystique, 1923, pp. 321 ff.)

n. 162.

Summary

— Prudence is to action what art is to making. Art is defined as right reason of things to be made; prudence is defined as right reason of things to be done. But this difference exists between each: art does not depend on a good will, while prudence properly so called, as every virtue, with the grace of God, lies in our power. For the rectitude of which there is question in the brief definition does not regard some human or temporal end: of this prudence, which is called prudence in a certain respect, even saints can lack or be deprived; but it is estimated in order to the good simply. Wherefore it is described more fully: a virtue which perfects the practical intellect so that, with the will moving it, it promptly and easily commands things to be done which are apprehended as honorable and more honorable. The practical intellect is that which truly, as a directive principle, is mingled with our action. It differs from the speculative intellect not in reality but in reason; the speculative intellect also can know practical things.

Furthermore, the functions of prudence are: to consult well or investigate, under the respect of moral good; to judge well, or, at the end of investigation, to pronounce with certitude what, under the same respect, must be done; to command well or efficaciously to order toward the work.

To the virtue of prudence there is opposed, by defect, imprudence, either in the prior acts of counsel, i.e. precipitation; or of judgment, i.e. inconsideration; or in the proper act of commanding, i.e. inconstancy or negligence. Yet blameworthy imprudence supposes a disordered will; and although it is special, since it affects special acts of reason, for the most part, when the sin to which the bad direction of the intellect has led has been accused, it is sufficiently accused.

Besides, the obligation either of paying more attention or of correcting a defect flows from a natural defect of prudence. To the same virtue of prudence there is opposed, by a certain excess, false prudence, which is toward an evil end, and cunning, which is materially prudent by illicit means.

Marc, Institutiones Morales

Clement Marc, C.SS.R. — 7 passages

Vol. I, Part First: On the First P…, Tr. V, Ch. II, Art. I, § 1. On Prudence and the Virtues Contained Under It

n. ¶391.

NOTION. Prudence is defined by the Angelic Doctor (2.2, q. 47, a. 2): right reason of things to be done. By others: "A habit of the practical intellect, for rightly determining, through an act of command, what is to be done in any particular case."

Hence: 1. The material object of prudence is particular human actions. But the formal object is the mean of reason, between defect and excess; or practical rectitude, as a form to be impressed upon each action (cf. n. 383, 2).

Prudence, by reason of its subject, is an intellectual virtue; for it resides in the intellect, so that it may decide what we ought to pursue and from what we ought to decline. But by reason of its object it is moral; for it is occupied about morals, all of which it directs, and over which it commands, although it does not elicit them: whence it is an essentially practical virtue (St. Thom., l. c., a. 5).

n. ¶392.

Acts of prudence. There are three acts or functions of prudence: 1. Prudence consults well, that is, it diligently and without precipitation investigates and deliberates what means, what circumstances, are necessary, so that the work may be done honestly and virtuously. 2. Prudence judges rightly, that is, after diligent deliberation, it firmly concludes and pronounces what means, among those sought and found, are good and fitting. 3. Prudence commands efficaciously, namely by moving the moral virtues to the execution of those things which have been diligently deliberated and firmly judged (Bened. XIV, de Beatif., l. 3, c. 24, n. 5).

But these acts, so that they may be done duly, must be exercised with solicitude and fitting diligence; and if someone has applied this, and has done what he could, although he speculatively errs, nevertheless the judgment will be prudent, and he will not sin (cf. n. 21). See Billuart, de Prud., Diss. 1, a. 2.

From these things you will gather: 1. Prudence, in its functions, depends much upon the moral virtues: partly because the virtues restrain the passions, which disturb reason in the consideration of the honest, and display a delectable good; partly because they so dispose the subject that the honest work exhibits itself as most congruous to him, as drink to the thirsty, food to the hungry. "For each one judges according as he is affected." And: "As each one is, so does the end appear to him."

Perfect prudence cannot exist except in upright men, who have the affection rightly disposed in every matter of virtue. For these alone, in any business that occurs, are able to judge rightly. But in men who are not upright, or who are given to some vice, only imperfect prudence can exist: namely that maimed prudence by which they only consult and judge well toward some particular good, but not toward the end of the whole of human life; or by which, although they consult and judge well as regards this whole end, they by no means bring to effect the things which they consult and judge (cf. Lessius, de Prud., c. 1, n. 30-35).

n. ¶393.

Parts of prudence. I. The integrating parts, or endowments of perfect prudence, are eight, namely:

Memory, or recollection of past things; for past things teach us; whence that worn saying: "Believe Robert, the experienced one." 2. Understanding, that is, full knowledge of the state of the matter here and now to be done, and of the moral principles which ought to concur for judging prudently. 3. Providence, which, as if seeing from afar, considers the end of the work and future events. 4. Shrewdness, that is, sudden and ready discovery of a fitting means. 5. Docility, or promptness of soul for taking hold of others' counsels. 6. Reason, that is, a certain promptness in reasoning and gathering one thing from another. 7. Circumspection, or attention to all the circumstances of the work, lest some requisite be lacking. 8. Caution, or care of avoiding evils and impediments by which, from without, the work of virtue could be vitiated or impeded (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 48 and 49).

n. ¶394.

II. The subjective parts, that is, the species of prudence, are numbered as two, namely:

Personal or monastic prudence, through which man rules himself; this alone can absolutely and simply be called prudence. 2. Governing prudence, by which man rules others. This is manifold, namely domestic, civil, pastoral, military, etc. (2.2, q. 50). It is not simply prudence, because it does not always render him who has it better (2.2, q. 47, a. 11, 12).

n. ¶395.

III. The potential parts of prudence, that is, the companion virtues which prudence uses, are numbered as three:

Eubulia, which is the habit of consulting rightly, that is, of finding good counsel in doubtful matters. 2. Synesis, or the habit of judging rightly concerning things consulted. Through this, men are called well-sensed. 3. Gnome, that is, the habit of judging rightly, when there is need, from higher principles, beyond the common rules of things to be done, yet according to the mind of the legislator. The act which corresponds to this in the will is called epikeia (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 51). Cf. n. 173 and n. 403, 3.

n. ¶396.

Vices opposed to prudence. I. Imprudence is opposed to prudence THROUGH DEFECT; under this name commonly come: 1. Precipitation, by which someone undertakes some work without sufficient deliberation. 2. Inconsideration, by which judgment concerning means is made without due attention. 3. Inconstancy of mind, that is, change of opinion on account of no cause or a slight cause. 4. Negligence, or omission of the diligence required for urging the execution of the matter deliberated (2.2, q. 53 and 54).

What kind of sin, you will ask, is imprudence? - Resp. Imprudence can be taken in three ways: 1. negatively, for the mere lack of prudence; and thus it can be without sin, as is clear in children; 2. privatively, for the lack of due prudence; and in this way it is a general sin, which is found in every theological fault; 3. contrariwise, when the counsels of prudence are positively spurned and repudiated; and in this way imprudence is a special sin, and indeed mortal, if there is grave contempt of divine rules; otherwise it will be venial.

n. ¶397.

II. Those things which have a likeness with prudence itself are opposed to prudence THROUGH EXCESS, namely:

Prudence of the flesh, which is the diligent devising of means for fulfilling the instincts of corrupt nature; and these can regard external goods, or the delectations of the senses, or one's own excellence. This prudence is of itself mortal, according to that saying (Rom. 8:6): The prudence of the flesh is death.

Indeed, moderate solicitude concerning temporal goods is not condemned, but that solicitude which is superfluous and disturbs the soul: because it imports distrust in the providence of God, and is a grave or venial sin according to the gravity of the matter (2.2, q. 55, a. 1).

Astuteness (or craftiness, or cunning), which is knowledge and use of depraved means for deceiving, with the intention of attaining what is intended, whether good or evil. Yet properly astuteness is taken in an evil sense (St. Thom., l. c., a. 3).

Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis

Dominic M. Prümmer, O.P. — 7 passages

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Cf. St. Thomas, Sum. theol. 2, 2, q. 47-56; Commentators on the Sum. theol., as e.g. Sylvius, John of St. Thomas, Billuart, etc.; Waffelaert, De virtut. card., Bruges 1889; Janvier, O.P., La prudence chretienne, Lent 1917.

n. 625.

625. Praenotamen. With the Angelic Doctor as guide, after the treatise on the theological virtues, we shall treat of the moral or cardinal virtues, namely of prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance. But because above, n. 444, enough has already been said concerning the nature of the moral virtues in general, we immediately begin to treat of these virtues individually, and first indeed of the virtue of prudence.

We divide the whole treatise on prudence into four chapters: 1. on the notion of the virtue of prudence; 2. on its functions; 3. on the parts of prudence; 4. on the vices opposed to it.

Vol. I, Pt. I, Tract X. On the Virtue of …, Chapter I. On the Notion of the Virtue of Prudence

n. 626.

626. Notion. Prudence is enumerated among both the intellectual and the moral virtues. In either sense the definition given by Aristotle can be applied to it:¹ "Prudence is right reason concerning things to be done." - In all arts and actions in which counsel is needed on account of the uncertainty of those things by which one arrives at the end, prudence is required, at least as an intellectual virtue. Hence we speak of a prudent architect, who, after deliberation has been made, is accustomed to proceed rightly in building; of a prudent robber, who perpetrates his robberies with great cunning; and Christ calls the children of this age more prudent in their generation, because with great skill and sagacity they dispose their actions toward obtaining worldly ends. But this last prudence is called by St. Paul the prudence of the flesh, which is the death of the soul.

But if we speak of prudence according as it is a true moral virtue, then it is right reason, i.e. the ordering of human acts to the true ultimate end of human life, or it is the habit of choosing means to an end morally good. But all other human prudences which are opposed to this true prudence are in fact great follies. - Prudence is defined variously by various authors.² Thus St. Augustine,³ Cicero going before him,⁴ says: "Prudence is knowledge of things to be sought and to be fled." It is defined by others: an intellective virtue by which in any business occurring we know what is honorable, what is base. This last definition is more common and signifies the same thing as the Aristotelian definition brought forward above.

Subject. Prudence is subjected in reason, and indeed in practical reason,⁵ for it is practical knowledge. Moreover the acts of prudence, or its functions, namely to take counsel, to judge, to command, are acts of reason. But the nature of prudence does not consist in the practical judgment alone, but also in the practical and efficacious motion of the powers to acts. For no one would call him prudent who indeed knows what must rightly be done, but by no means acts rightly; indeed such a man is most of all foolish. From this it follows that prudence, if it is perfect, supposes rectitude of appetite, or the assistance of the other moral virtues. In other words: since the moral virtues are connected, the virtue of prudence requires that the other moral virtues be present together with it. But conversely the other moral virtues also depend upon prudence, because no moral virtue can exist without the mean of reason, as was said above n. 463; furthermore that mean of reason in any virtue is established by prudence.

Division. The virtue of prudence is either acquired or infused. According as it is an acquired virtue, the definition given above belongs to it. But according as it is an infused virtue, it can be defined: a virtue supernaturally infused by which the practical intellect, enlightened by formed faith and stirred by the Holy Spirit, judges and commands what in individual cases is to be done as fitting for the supernatural end, or to be avoided as unfitting for that end. Those things are to be recalled which were said above n. 473 concerning infused moral virtues in general, namely concerning their relation to grace, concerning their dependence upon charity.

Supernatural prudence differs much from the natural virtue of prudence; and indeed a) by reason of the efficient cause, namely because natural prudence is acquired by repeated acts of ours, but supernatural prudence is infused into us by God with sanctifying grace; b) by reason of extension and of the motive principle. For natural prudence presupposes only the understanding of the first moral principles, which are known as if naturally, and in addition a right appetite of natural good. But infused prudence especially supposes faith, and this informed by charity. Hence St. Thomas⁶ says: "For the right reason of prudence it is much more required that a man be well disposed concerning the ultimate end, which is done by charity, than concerning other ends, which is done by the moral virtues." The supernatural virtue of prudence moreover extends itself to directing acts about the ultimate end of human life, while the natural virtue of prudence often reaches only acts about a subordinate end. Hence St. Thomas⁷ says: "Prudence is true and perfect which rightly takes counsel, judges, and commands for the good end of the whole life; and this alone is called prudence simply, which cannot be in sinners." On account of these reasons infused prudence depends intimately both upon faith and upon charity. For faith shows prudence the true ultimate end of human life, namely eternal beatitude; charity, however, efficaciously tends into God and orders the whole man to God; finally prudence, the light of faith shining before it and charity moving it, finds and commands the most suitable means for obtaining that end.

That supernatural prudence may be able to fulfill its most noble office more perfectly, there is joined to it the gift of counsel, which renders a man well docile by the Holy Spirit, who by means of this gift suggests to us the best means for obtaining the ultimate end, i.e. beatitude.⁸

Concerning the other divisions of prudence there will be speech below, n. 632, where its subjective parts will be discussed.

¹ Ethic. l. 6, c. 5, n. 4.

² You may see several definitions of prudence in William Peraldus, Summ. virtut. et vitior., de prud. c. 2.

³ Lib. 83 quaest. q. 61.

⁴ De offic. III, 47.

⁵ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 47, a. 2.

⁶ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 65, a. 2.

⁷ Ib. 2, 2, q. 47, a. 13.

⁸ Ib. q. 52, a. 2.

n. 627.

627. Material object of prudence is all the moral actions of man ("things to be done," says Aristotle), but not physical actions, since art is concerned with these ("things to be made," says Aristotle).

The formal object by which of prudence is the human act under the aspect of practical truth and good. Concerning this matter Billuart⁹ rightly writes: "Note that speculative truth is one thing, practical truth another. Speculative truth is considered by conformity of the intellect to the thing, namely that the intellect conceive and enunciate the thing as it is; practical truth by conformity to right appetite, namely that the intellect conceive and enunciate that which is conformed to right appetite. Therefore prudence first reaches its object under the aspect of practical truth, because, as has been said, its object is something to be done and conformed to right appetite, and therefore practically true; and under this aspect it is an intellectual virtue, beneath which the false does not lie. And because it does not know that honorable thing, or thing conformed to right appetite, in order to stand in the knowledge of it, but in order that through the other moral virtues it may operate that thing, which is good, therefore secondarily it regards its object under the aspect of good, and thus by reason of the matter and end it is a moral virtue, not indeed elicitive of morals, as the other virtues, justice, fortitude, and temperance, but directive of morals."

⁹ De prud. diss. 1, a. 1.

n. 628.

628. Relation between prudence, Moral Theology, and conscience. From what has been said it is licit to conclude how prudence is related to the science of Moral Theology and to conscience. The science of Moral Theology is the objective rule according to which prudence must be formed, and there is given no true prudence which is deformed from that rule. But conscience, which is a judgment or dictate of right reason concerning the liceity of an act to be done or done, is an act of prudence. This act of prudence, or conscience dictating according to prudent estimation what is to be done here and now, is the proximate subjective rule of morality, beneath which the false cannot lie, because he who follows conscience can never sin, even if conscience is invincibly erroneous. - Thus, therefore, is the genesis of prudence and of its effects: prudence has as its highest principles the theological virtues, and especially formed faith; these principles indeed are scientifically explained and illustrated in the science of Moral and Dogmatic Theology; prudence deduces the conclusions of this science as to singular and contingent things;¹⁰ finally conscience, as an act of prudence, judges and commands what in individual things is to be done or omitted.

¹⁰ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 47, a. 6.

n. 629.

629. Dignity and excellence of the virtue of prudence appears from what has been said. Both Sacred Scripture and the holy Fathers extol it with great praises. "Blessed is the man who finds wisdom and who abounds in prudence."¹¹ "Wisdom is better than powers, and a prudent man than a strong man."¹² But Christ admonishes: "Be prudent therefore as serpents."¹³ St. Ambrose¹⁴ says: "The first source of duty is prudence. For what is so full of duty as to offer zeal and reverence to the author [God]? Yet this source is also derived into the other virtues; for neither can justice be without prudence, since to examine what is just and what unjust is a matter of no mediocre prudence.... Since indeed fortitude also ... is full of justice, and to know by what counsel it should defend and aid, and also to seize the opportunities of times and places, belongs to prudence and modesty; and temperance itself without prudence cannot know measure."

By reason also the dignity and necessity of prudence can easily be demonstrated; for without prudence no virtue can subsist. For every moral virtue ought to consist between two extremes, that is, it ought neither to exceed nor to fall short of right reason; furthermore the office of prudence is to contain all moral virtues in the right mean. Wherefore a man destitute of prudence is deservedly compared to a ship lacking a helmsman, which by the force of winds and waves is driven here and there, and at last must necessarily perish in certain shipwreck. Prudence, however, is deservedly called the moderator and charioteer of the virtues, the orderer of affections, the teacher of morals.¹⁵ - But especially for the confessor prudence is exceedingly necessary; for the practical doubts which often occur in the confessional cannot be sufficiently solved by different moral systems, but by Christian prudence, which in each case rightly indicates what is useful or harmful to the soul of the penitent.

¹¹ Prov. 3, 13-17: "Blessed is the man who finds wisdom and who abounds in prudence. Better is the acquisition of it than the trading of silver, and of first and purest gold are its fruits. It is more precious than all riches, and all things that are desired cannot be compared to it. Length of days is in its right hand, and in its left hand riches and glory. Its ways are beautiful ways, and all its paths are peaceful."

¹² Sap. 6, 1.

¹³ Matth. 10, 16.

¹⁴ De offic. l. 1, c. 27 (Migne, Patr. lat. 16, 66).

¹⁵ William Peraldus writes ingeniously concerning the commendation of prudence, Summa virtut. et vitior., de prud. c. 4. Cf. Leo XIII in the Encyclical of Jan. 10, 1890.

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n. 630.

630. The acts or functions of prudence are enumerated by St. Thomas¹⁶ as three: 1. to take counsel well, 2. to judge rightly, 3. to command or prescribe.

Explanation. Prudence first takes counsel and deliberates, or seeks the means and circumstances which are necessary that the work may be done honorably and virtuously. After this consultation and deliberation there follows judgment or conclusion, what, how, and with which circumstances something is to be done, e.g. that here and now one must abstain from a work, or that one must labor more strongly. Finally prudence commands the execution of the practical judgment through the other powers. The act of commanding is the principal and proper act of prudence.¹⁷ These three acts, that they may be done well, must be exercised with solicitude and diligence, according as the condition of the person and of the business requires, because it belongs to prudence to employ all necessary means that the operation be done honorably and perfectly, which cannot be had without great diligence. Hence no one is called prudent unless in taking counsel, in judging, and in executing he has employed the diligence due according to the gravity of the business and of the person. But if he has employed that due diligence, although he erred speculatively, nevertheless he is called prudent and does not sin. That these three acts or functions of prudence may be exercised perfectly, there ought to be several other assisting habits, which are called by St. Thomas the integral and potential parts of prudence, concerning which there will be speech in the following chapter.

¹⁶ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 47, a. 8.

¹⁷ Ib.

Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis

Benedict Henry Merkelbach, O.P. — 84 passages

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Vol. II, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On the Cardinal Virtue of Prudence and on the Annexed Virtues

Introduction

3. Prudence (phronesis) in the broader sense is any cognition of the true pertaining to morals, speculative or practical, for example, faith, moral science; in the strict sense it is practical cognition ultimately directive of morals, whether in doing good, and thus a prudent virgin is spoken of (cf. Mt. X, 16; I Pet. IV, 7; Wis. VIII, 7), or even in doing evil, as when, for example, a prudent thief is spoken of (cf. Lk. XVI, 8; Rom. VIII, 6, 7). Hence good prudence, namely the acquired or natural virtue of prudence, from Aristotle, Ethics VI, chapter 5, is usually defined as right reason of things to be done (ton prakton, deeds), that is, the right notion, idea, exemplar, and dictate determining what things are to be done.

Thus it is defined in opposition to art, which is called right reason of things to be made (ton poieton, products): for human acts as such consist in the one operating and render him honorable and perfect him, whence things to be done are called those things which are done by man insofar as they remain in him, such as to will, to see, to desire, to be angry, to live chastely, to endure patiently, to move the arm, etc.; things to be made are those which are constituted by man in exterior matter, such as a house, a painting, a ship, to build, to cut, etc. In the former, namely, there is considered a change of the subject; in the latter, a transmutation of the object; in the former the end is the rectitude of the operation itself and of the one operating from the honesty impressed upon the action; in the latter the end is the very thing worked and its perfection, from the artificial form introduced not indeed into the action but into the external work. For art does not intend the good of the human appetite, but the good of artificial works.¹

¹ It should be noted that prudence and art are distinguished from the objects concerning which they are concerned per se, immediately, and formally:

per se, for Lessius notes, chapter 1, doubt 2, that art also is concerned with certain operations remaining in the agent, such as the art of playing the psaltery and of dancing, but this happens per accidens: for such actions are not directed by art insofar as and because they are immanent, but insofar as they are an external work of man, upon which work produced art impresses an artificial form accommodated to the uses of men; whence per se they are not action, praxeis, for from these man does not become good or evil, but they are, as it were, a work, poieton. Whence it happens to art per accidens that it leaves no external work or thing worked outside man, for since it is concerned with external action, from its genus it requires leaving some thing worked (cf. Suarez, De Virt., disp. 3, sect. 2, n. 6);

immediately, for mediately prudence too is concerned with external things, and conversely art is concerned with internal things. Art, namely, immediately regards the external work, but mediately the internal insofar as it has the force of moving to the work; prudence immediately regards the good will or election itself, mediately external things as to be disposed and brought through to the end intended by the one operating, insofar as moral goodness flows from the interior to external operations;

formally, for prudence is materially concerned with things to be made, not as such (as to dictating those things about which they are) but as to use, so that man may rightly, that is, honorably, use art (II-II, q. 47, a. 4, ad 2; I-II, q. 57, a. 3, ad 2).

4. Supernatural prudence can be defined a little more fully: A divinely infused virtue by which practical reason dictates what, all things considered, here and now is to be done as truly fitting to the supernatural ultimate end, and what is to be fled as unfitting. In this definition there is indicated:

the genus to which prudence pertains: an infused virtue, that is, a good habit rendering man perfect in order to the supernatural end;

the subject in which it inheres: practical reason. Thus it differs both from the moral virtues strictly so called, which are in the appetite, and from habits which are in the speculative intellect, such as faith and science;

the proper act by which it is distinguished from others: it dictates in the perfect sense, that is, from deliberation or counsel it judges at the same time by commanding and intimating. Thus it differs from the virtues annexed to it, which do not command but only inquire and deliberate, or even judge, what is to be done and commanded. A judgment of this kind is right conscience, to the formation of which the annexed virtues concur under the direction of prudence; prudence applies the judgment in fact to the action and commands its execution;

the material object: what, all things considered, is to be done here and now, in the concrete. Thus it is distinguished both from synderesis and moral science, which dictate what is to be done in the abstract and in general, and from art, which judges what is to be made in exterior matter;

the formal object, or proximate motive: as being truly fitting to the supernatural ultimate end, and thus it differs from natural, acquired, and imperfect prudence.

That this definition is real will be shown throughout the whole treatise.

5. The necessity of prudence. - The virtue of prudence is most necessary to man, because without it he cannot choose well and live honorably, as we have already shown in the treatise on Virtues, I, n. 589. It is proved:

Since election is concerning the means to the end, hence for choosing rightly, operating well, and living honorably, it is not sufficient that man will the good end, but it is also most especially required that he rightly order the means to the end. Therefore, just as for willing the due end man is well disposed by the moral virtues which are in the appetite, so for rightly ordering the means human reason must be well disposed by some virtue: for reason inquires about, judges, and commands the means to be chosen. But prudence disposes precisely for doing this well (I-II, q. 57, a. 5).

Prudence is necessary for finding, forming, and executing the judgment of right conscience. But right conscience is most necessary, because it is the proximate rule of all human actions, so that, if they are conformed to it, they will be good, and evil if they are not conformed. Therefore prudence also is most necessary.

See, therefore, how much is lacking in modern moralists, who speak so little of prudence.

6. Division of the treatise. - The treatise is divided into two parts: the first is concerning prudence itself; the other, concerning the virtues annexed to prudence.

In the first part one must treat:

of prudence according to itself, namely a) of its subject; b) of its object and act; c) of the habit and cause of prudence;

of the parts of prudence: a) integral; b) subjective; c) potential; to which is joined d) the gift of counsel;

of the sins opposed to prudence: a) by defect, imprudence; b) by excess, false prudence.

Nothing special is said concerning the precept of prudence, because precepts are given directly concerning moral principles, that is, concerning due ends; but prudence is concerned with the means to the end, and therefore prudence is included implicitly in all precepts, and all precepts pertain to it indirectly, according as it is directive of all virtuous and prescribed acts.²

² Concerning prudence the following can usefully be consulted: Aristotle, Ethics VI with the Commentary of St. Thomas; St. Thomas in the Summa, II-II, q. 47-56, with the Commentaries of Cajetan; likewise Fr. de Victoria, Sylvius, Billuart, and Pegues; likewise Goudin, in Philosophy. Among theologians of the Society of Jesus: de Valentia, Commentary on St. Thomas; Lessius, On Right and Justice and the Other Cardinal Virtues; and Schiffini, On Infused Virtues. Others, and especially present-day moralists, either copy out Lessius, or hand down few and not very accurate things. Nevertheless the Most Illustrious Waffelaert, On the Cardinal Virtues, deserves to be consulted.

The following are usefully read: Janvier, Christian Prudence; Sertillanges, The Moral Doctrine of St. Thomas; Gardeil, The Personal and Supernatural Government of Oneself, in Revue Thomiste, 1918; Noble, The Virtue of Prudence.

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n. ¶1.

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 47, a. 1, 2, 3.

7. Prudence is not in the appetite, nor in the senses, but in reason. - For a prudent man is, as it were, one seeing far ahead (verre- or vooruit-zichtigheid) or foreseeing; whence men call those prudent who, from past or present things, conjecture and judge future things to be provided for. But the appetite does not see nor judge; and the senses do not compare past things with future things, but only know present things which are offered to them. Therefore (a. 1).

Isidore, Etymologies, book 10: "Prudent is said as if seeing far ahead: for one who is perspicacious foresees even the events of uncertain things." And St. Thomas in the present question 47, a. 1.

Cicero, De divinatione, I, 49: "Prudent, that is, foreseeing?"; and frag. apud Nonius, XLI, 31: "For this belongs to the wise man, to foresee, from which prudence has been named." And St. Thomas, q. 55, a. 1, ad 1, and q. 49, a. 6.

Cf. I, q. 22, a. 1; II-II, q. 49, a. 6 and ad 1; III Sent., d. 33, q. 3, a. 1, qc. 1, and ad 3.

8. Corollaries. - Several things can be deduced from this, which are noted by St. Thomas:

The prudent man has memory of past things and conjectures future things in order to acting, namely, he "considers those things which are far off, insofar as they are ordered to helping or impeding those things which presently are to be done." Whence the things which prudence considers it orders to other things as to an end (ad 2), and it applies them to the work to be done (ad 3). Cf. III Sent., d. 33, q. 3, a. 1, qc. 1, ad 2 and 3.

Concerning those things which are to be done for the end, there are several acts, among which are counsel or deliberation in reason, and election in the will. Of these, counsel, because it is in reason, properly pertains to prudence, whence Aristotle says: The prudent man is one who deliberates well. But election presupposes counsel, and therefore to choose can also be attributed to prudence insofar as it directs election through counsel (ad 2).

Since no one takes counsel about necessary things, or about past things, which by that very fact are necessary, but only about contingent and future things which are in our power and at the same time have uncertainty (cf. q. 49, a. 6), and since it belongs to prudence to apply to the work to be done, hence it is said to know particular and singular and contingent things: for operations are concerned with particular and singular contingent things. "To providence," says St. Thomas, "there pertains not only the consideration of reason, but also application to the work, which is the end of practical reason. But no one can fittingly apply something to another unless he knows both, namely, that which is to be applied and that to which it is to be applied. But operations are in singulars. And therefore it is necessary that the prudent man know both the universal principles of reason and the singular things concerning which operations exist" (a. 3).

Cf. treatise On Human Acts, I, n. 107.

n. 9.

9. Prudence is only in practical reason. - For it belongs to the prudent man to deliberate well; but counsel is about those things which are to be done by us in order to the end. But those things which are not only to be known but to be done in order to the end pertain to reason not speculative but practical. Therefore (a. 2).

10. Observations. - 1. Since prudence is concerned with particular and singular things to be done, and the cogitative faculty knows particulars, hence prudence, while it is principally in reason, which applies universal principles to particular and singular things and therefore knows both together, nevertheless secondarily reaches to the cogitative power through a certain application: namely, in that power there is a habit (of memory and experience), which is subordinated to and serves reason and prudence for an easy estimation of particulars (a. 3, ad 3). Therefore prudence is in reason using the cogitative power, says Cajetan; and therefore secondarily and ministerially it is in the cogitative power insofar as this cooperates dispositively with the intellect.

It belongs to prudence to order other things to an end; whence according to various ends various prudence is distinguished: prudence in order to a particular end, for example, victory or good trading, is prudence in this genus and in a qualified and imperfect way; prudence simply will be that which is in order to the end of the whole human life, or to the whole of living well (a. 2, ad 1).

Prudence, simply so called, since it is concerned with things to be done for the ultimate end, is sometimes called human wisdom. For wisdom considers the highest causes; whence wisdom, simply so called, is that which considers the highest cause of every being. But in the genus of human acts the highest cause is the ultimate end. Therefore, just as wisdom, simply so called, knows the highest cause of all things, so prudence is called wisdom in human affairs because it considers the supreme good of man (a. 2, ad 1).

Prudence and art are both ordered to work; but prudence applies right reason to doing, which is the end of practical reason, not so art. For the perfection of art consists only in judging how the work is to be made; the perfection of prudence consists not only in judging how one must act, but also in acting. Whence art gives only the faculty of making a good work, but not the use; on the contrary, prudence also gives good use. And therefore an artisan who sins against art willingly is praised more than one who does so unwillingly; but he is more imprudent who sins willingly than one who sins unwillingly.

Tr. I, Disputation XX: On Prudence · Tr. I, Disputation XX: On Prudence, Question I: What prudence is · Tr. I, Disputation XX: On Prudence, Question II: Whether prudence is a virtue

Hence prudence applies itself to acting; but art must be applied to the work through the command of reason and will, for which, so that it may be done rightly, moral virtue is required, for example justice, and prudence. And therefore the operation of art (as also of science), insofar as it is voluntary, can be from prudence, not as to the species, namely as the making of such an artful work (thus it is from art), but as to exercise and use, namely so that it may also be done honorably from a good will and man may rightly and honorably use his art (a. 1, ad 3; a. 2, ad 2; a. 4, ad 2; a. 8; I-II, q. 57, a. 3 and 4).

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n. ¶1.

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 47, a. 4-10.

…and 44 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Bontempi, Palladium Theologicum V

Gaudentius Bontempi of Brescia, O.F.M. Cap. — 106 passages

Tr. I, Disputation XX: On Prudence

AFTER the Theological virtues the theologians treat of the Cardinal virtues, the first of which is reckoned to be Prudence. For this is set over the whole OEconomy of the moral virtues, and directs them, either by discerning, as Counselor, or by defining, as Commander, to their acts: it reviews things past, disposes of things present, and provides for things to come; hence it has as its subjective parts the Memory of things past, the Intelligence of things present, and the providence of things to come; moreover it holds the reins of the passions, and if ever they rise up with a sudden impulse, it restrains them at once and reduces them to concord; sometimes it is worldly, in heaping up riches; human, in pursuing the comforts of the flesh; but Divine, it is enslaved to eternal observances, as the Holy Doctor notes in the places to be noted below; its nature and quality still remain to be investigated.

Tr. I, Disputation XX: On Prudence, Question I: What prudence is

THE name of prudence is taken in various ways, as St. Bonaventure teaches, book 5 of the Compendium of Theology, chapter 34, in the Dieta, title 5, chapter 5, and in the opuscule On the four Cardinal virtues, and On the seven Journeys, Journey 7, distinction 5, and in the Pharetra, book 2, chapter 27.

First, indeed, it signifies any knowledge of truth acquired by human study; thus it is taken by St. Ambrose, book 1 on offices, chapter 24, by Tully, book 1 on offices and book 2 on Invention, cited by St. Bonaventure, in the Pharetra and part 3 of the Centiloquium, section 41, and sermon 6 of the Hexaëmeron.

SECOND, it signifies only practical knowledge of things that ought to be sought or repudiated. Thus St. Augustine takes it, book 1 on free choice, chapter 13, and book 83 questions, question 31: that Prudence is the science of things to be sought and avoided: thus it is taken also by the Holy Doctor, in the Pharetra, and by St. Isidore, in the Etymologies, book 10, under the word Prudentia: The prudent man is so called, as it were one seeing far ahead; for he is perspicacious, and foresees the chances of uncertain things. Whence in Greek it is φρόνησις. And in this way it is taken by the Holy Doctor, in the Exposition of the Terms of Theology, and in the Centiloquium, loc. cit., and by St. Gregory. But neither is this proper Prudence, which ought both to know and to provide.

THIRD, Prudence is taken for all the faculties of the practical intellect that contribute, or are even necessary, to rightly instituting the actions of human life. Thus it is frequently taken by the Philosopher, book 6 of the Ethics, chapters 5, 10 and 11.

FOURTH, Prudence, in the most proper sense, names a certain faculty of the practical intellect for rightly determining what is to be done in any particular act.

Furthermore, Aristotle defines this Prudence, book 6 of the Ethics, chapter 5: Prudence is a habit of the intellect, active with true reason, concerning those things which are good and bad for man.

The same St. Doctor wills, in On the seven Journeys, Journey 7, distinction 5, defining: Prudence is to direct all things according to the norm of reason.

And in the opuscule On the four Cardinal virtues: Prudence is the discernment of good things and bad, both with the flight of evil and the choice of good: from which proceed circumspection, docility, and caution. Circumspection is the wariness of contrary vices, by which we flee avarice and guard against prodigality, etc. Docility is the power of teaching, in this order, that you first instruct yourself, and afterward others. Caution is the prudence of discerning vices that bear the appearance of virtues.

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To this is referred also the definition of Macrobius, book 1 on the dream of Scipio: Prudence is to direct all things, which it considers, whatever it does, according to the norm of reason, and to will or do nothing besides what is right. Thus St. Bonaventure, book 6 of the Compendium of Theology, chapter 34.

It is defined also by Tully, On the repose of the mind: Prudence is the science of good things and bad, with the love of one or the other and the detestation of the rest: cited by St. Bonaventure, part 3 of the Centiloquium, section 41.

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SIMILAR is the definition of St. Augustine, On the morals of the Church, book 1, chapter 15, cited by St. Bonaventure, loc. cit. of the Centiloquium: Prudence is love, sagaciously discerning those things by which it is aided toward God from those by which it is hindered. And book 83 questions, 52, he defines: It is the knowledge of things to be sought and fled.

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He DESCRIBES, moreover, Prudence as it is a purgatorial virtue, from Macrobius, book 1 on the dream of Scipio: Prudence is to despise this world, and all things that are in the world, through the contemplation of divine things, and to direct all the knowledge of the soul to the divine alone. But Prudence, as it is the virtue of a purified mind, is defined: It is to know the divine alone, and to gaze upon it as if nothing else existed. Thus it is defined in book 5 of the Compendium of Theology, chapter 34, and in the opuscule On the four Cardinal virtues, and elsewhere.

Tr. I, Disputation XX: On Prudence, Question II: Whether prudence is a virtue

IT IS CERTAIN that Prudence is a Virtue.

IT IS PROVED by St. Bonaventure, book 1 on chapter 8 of Wisdom, and in book 3, distinction 33, questions 1 and 4, from those words: He teaches Sobriety, and Prudence, and Justice, and Virtue, that is, Fortitude. The same is proved by that verse of Proverbs 8: Prudence is mine, fortitude is mine. By me kings reign, and lawmakers decree just things.

IT IS PROVED secondly by St. Bonaventure in the Dieta, title 5, chapter 5, and by other places of Scripture, Proverbs 28: A leader lacking prudence shall oppress many, etc.

PROVERBS 6: O sluggard, go to the ant, and learn Prudence; which, though it has no guide, nor master, nor prince, prepares for itself food in the summer, and gathers in the harvest what it may eat.

PROVERBS 30. The prudent man is compared to four little animals, praised in the same place. There are four little ones of the earth, and they are wiser than the wise: The ant, a people without strength, which prepares its food in the harvest: The rabbit, a weak folk, which makes its bed in the rock: The locust has no king, and goes forth all together by its bands: The stellio supports itself on hands, and dwells in the houses of kings. These four animals are set before us as Masters of prudence, as Lyranus notes there, together with St. Bonaventure, who there excellently expounds these animals for us in mystical parallels; that we may imitate the rabbit, making our bed in the rock, which is Christ, as is said 1 Corinthians 10. The stellio, or lizard, which, having no wings, supplies by its hands the lack of nature; so too let diligent prudence supply in acting the defect of nature: the locust, which mounts on high and at once descends to the earth; for so also the prudent man mounts high through holy desires, and at once descends to the knowledge of his own infirmity, and thence acknowledges the necessity of divine help; according to Psalm 110: He ascends even to the heavens, and descends even to the abysses. And according to St. Gregory below. Lastly, let us imitate the ant, that we may prudently lay up merits for ourselves, according to John 9: Work while it is day.

Matthew 10: Be therefore prudent as serpents, to which comparison the Holy Doctor best expounds in the place cited with five parallels.

FIRST, indeed, the serpent exposes its whole body to blows, that it may save its head; so the prudent Christian exposes all things, that he may preserve the honor of Christ the Head, as is said Philippians 3: Those things that were gains to me, I have counted as loss for Christ.

SECONDLY, the serpent, among narrow and smooth rocks, strips off its old skin; so too the Christian ought to put off the old man, as the Apostle admonishes, Ephesians 4.

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THIRDLY, the serpent beguiles the charmer, as is said Psalm 57. So too prudent Saints beguile the demon, stopping one ear with the tail, that is, the memory of last things; according to Ecclesiastes 7: Remember your last things, and you shall not sin forever; and they stop the other ear, in the manner of the serpent, in the earth, by the memory of their own fragility, because it is said Genesis 4: You are dust, and into dust you shall return.

FOURTHLY, the serpent lies in wait for the heel; so prudent men conquer the desires of the flesh, attending to what the end of pleasure is, namely infernal death, according to Romans 6: The end of them is death.

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FIFTHLY, the serpent flees woman on account of the enmities, Genesis 3, declared against it; so the prudent man flees the occasions of fornication, according to the counsel of Paul, 1 Corinthians 10.

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ANOTHER prudence of the serpent the Holy Doctor expounds in the sermon on the Holy Apostles Philip and James, for when it feels itself weighed down by poison, it eats a certain herb, by whose virtue it vomits up the poison; then it hastens to a bath of water, and there washes itself, and remains fasting for many days; whence the skin is loosened from the flesh, and amid the smooth narrows of the rock it sheds its skin, that it may put on a new one. So too man, prudent, wishing to become a new man from the old, ought to wash himself with tears, eat the bitter herb of penance, and thus vomit up the poison of sins by confessing; then pass through the narrow gate of satisfaction, and thus, stripped of the spoils of faults, put on grace. See the holy Doctor there.

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The SAME comparisons he has in sermon 2 on one Holy Doctor, which is sermon 31, and sermon 33, where he speaks according to Aristotle in the book on the history of animals, book 8, chapter 17:

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IN THE sermon 2 on St. Anthony of Padua, from Job 38, he praises the prudence of the cock: Who gave the cock understanding. And in the sermon on St. Lucy he recounts many examples of prudence from sacred and profane histories. That it is a virtue, indeed, confess Aristotle, books 3 and 6 of the Ethics, chapters 5 and 13, Cicero, books 1 and 2 of the Tusculans, 99, Seneca, letter 68, Plutarch, in the book on the virtue of morals, Juvenal, Satire 10, Valerius Maximus, on prudence. See the Holy Doctor also in book 3, distinction 33, question 3, citing them.

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IT IS PROVED thirdly by the Holy Doctor, in the book cited, the Pharetra, chapter 27, from the Holy Fathers unanimously asserting it.

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ST. AUGUSTINE, book 1 on the morals of the Church, chapter 15, divides the four Cardinal virtues, as St. Bonaventure also teaches in book 3, distinction 33, question 2, to the first argument; then in the Soliloquies, book 1, chapter 14, he teaches that the perfect work is made by prudence, saying: Great care must be taken, while we act in this body, lest the feathers of our wings be impeded by any viscous thing of the senses: these must be whole and perfect, that we may fly forth to that light from these darknesses.

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ST. AMBROSE, on offices, book 1, chapter 10: The wise man, that he may speak well, first considers many things, what he may say, and to whom, in what place and time, and chapter 27, says: The first fount of duty is prudence. St. Gregory, book 2 of the Morals, chapter 36, says: The solid edifice of our mind is sustained by these four virtues, of which the first is prudence, and book 7 of the Morals, chapter 15: When the uprightness of Saints raises men to liberty of voice, consideration of one's own infirmity guards them in humility.

n. 18.

St. Bernard on the Canticle, sermon 49: Discretion is not so much a virtue as a certain moderator and charioteer of the virtues, and the orderer of affections and the directress of morals: Take this away, and virtue will be vice. In the same way speaks St. Isidore, the book On Synonyms, chapter 16: Whatever you do well with discretion is virtue; whatever you carry out without discretion is vice. For virtue without discretion is reputed as vice. And book 2 on the supreme good, chapter 25: It helps nothing, that we discern with a more prudent sense between good and evil, unless by our works we guard against ill-conceived thoughts, or carry forward good things begun.

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And St. Jerome on Hosea, book 2, chapter 7: Prudence without goodness is malice.

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And Cassian, Conference 1, chapter 23, from the opinion of Abbot Moses, on Discretion, or Prudence, says: This holds among all the virtues the citadel and primacy.

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And conference 2, chapter 2: For this is that which is named in the Gospel the eye and lamp of the body, according to that saying of the Savior: The lamp of your body is your eye; and Matthew 6, and Luke 11. Because (he says) it discerns all the thoughts and acts of man, it foresees and surveys all things that are to be done. The same the Holy Doctor has here, and on that place of Luke, though he expounds the lamp as intention. In which way also St. Gregory mingles prudence with intention, homily 22 on Ezechiel: It remains that at last we be wearied in the ministry of the word, or bestow on the needy, or tame the flesh by abstinence, or be moved by Zeal, or at times mildly bear with evil things through patience, that we ought above all to examine our intention, that whatever we do we may do not with our own, but with the Zeal of the Lord.

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He recounts OTHER places of the Holy Fathers, the Holy Doctor, in book 3, distinction 33, as of St. Jerome on chapter 8 of Wisdom, St. Augustine, book 12 on the Trinity, chapter 14, and book 14, chapter 9, Bede, in the Gloss, on chapter 26 of Exodus; and the Gloss on Genesis 1: A fountain went forth from Paradise, which is divided into four heads. Juvenal, Satire 10, closes all the Encomia of this virtue:

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No deity is absent, if prudence be present. — And this is what the Holy Fathers cited say, that prudence is the Leader and Charioteer of all the virtues.

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IT IS PROVED fourthly by the reasoning which the Holy Doctor uses in nearly all the places cited, especially in book 3 of the Sentences, distinction 33, throughout. Every habit good and fitting to man is a virtue; But that habit of prudence is of this kind: Therefore. The major is evident; for virtue is that which makes its possessor good, leading him to his end, and renders its act good, as Aristotle teaches in the Ethics, book 3, chapters 1, 8 and 12, and book 6, and Tully, book 2 on Invention, cited by St. Bonaventure, book 3, distinction 33, question 3, and St. Augustine, book 83 questions, question 31, and book 1 of the Soliloquies, chapter 6, cited by St. Bonaventure, in the place cited. The minor is proved: for it is best and most fitting to the nature of man for reason to establish and set before itself for pursuit or flight those things which according to right reason are to be sought or fled, which is the office of Prudence. The Holy Doctor confirms this, questions 1 and 3, from the contrary. For evil is that which is against prudence, which is the same as against reason, which indeed St. Dionysius confesses to be perverse, chapter 4 on the divine names, part 4.

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I ASSERT secondly, that Prudence is a rational, intellectual, and moral Virtue. It is indeed rational, because it is in reason, as the Holy Doctor observes in book 3, distinction 33, question 3, in the body, §. To make evident. For it directs in discerning, which is proper to reason, as the Holy Doctor notes from Aristotle, book 6 of the Ethics, chapter 3. The same St. Thomas teaches, part 1-2, question 57.

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THE office of reason, however, is twofold, to discern and to define. These, however, are the functions of prudence, as St. Bonaventure teaches, in the places cited above. Hence in the Dieta salutis, chapter 5, he compares it to the assessor of a judge, who by judging directs the judge, or king, yet not by commanding; so Prudence rules reason: Wherefore Valentia does not define it rightly, first point: It is a faculty of the practical intellect for rightly determining, by an act of imperium, what is to be done. For imperium is nowhere conceded to the intellect, against the Thomists, part 1-2, question 57, article 6, and Tanner, dispute 3, question 1, dubium 1, and others, refuted in part 1-2, treatise 1, Disputation on Imperium. It is truly a moral virtue extrinsically, inasmuch as the intellect is moved and stirred by the appetite rightly ordered through the inclinations of the moral virtues, that through Prudence it may follow the good to be done, consentaneous to the right appetite.

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I ASSERT thirdly, that Prudence is a Virtue distinct from the others.

…and 66 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Rickaby, Moral Philosophy

Joseph Rickaby, S.J. — 6 passages

Pt. I, Ch. V, Section VI. Of Prudence

Prudence is right reason applied to practice, or more fully it may be defined, the habit of intellectual discernment that enables one to hit upon the golden mean of moral virtue and the way to secure that mean. Thus prudence tells one what amount of punishment is proper for a particular delinquent, and how to secure his getting it. It is to be observed that prudence does not will the golden mean in question, but simply indicates it. To will and desire the mean is the work of the moral virtue concerned therewith: as in the case given it is the work of vindictive justice.

From the definition of moral virtue above given (c. v., s. iv., n. 4, p. 79), it is clear that no moral virtue can come into act without prudence: for it is the judgment of the prudent man that must define in each case the golden mean in relation to ourselves, which every moral virtue aims at. Thus, without prudence, fortitude passes into rashness, vindictive justice into harshness, clemency into weakness, religion into superstition.

But may not one with no prudence to guide him hit upon the golden mean by some happy impulse, and thus do an act of virtue? We answer, he may do a good act, and if you will, a virtuous act, but not an act of virtue, not an act proceeding from a pre-existent habit in the doer. The act is like a good stroke made by chance, not by skill; and like such a stroke, it cannot be readily repeated at the agent's pleasure. (See c. v., s. i., n. 4, p. 66; and Ar., Eth., II., iv., 2.)

Prudence in its essence is an intellectual virtue, being a habit resident in the understanding: but it deals with the subject-matter of the moral virtues, pointing out the measure of temperance, the bounds of fortitude, or the path of justice. It is the habit of intellectual discernment that must enlighten every moral virtue in its action. There is no virtue that goes blundering and stumbling in the dark.

He is a prudent man, that can give counsel to others and to himself in order to the attainment of ends that are worthy of human endeavour. If unworthy ends are intended, however sagaciously they are pursued, that is not prudence. We may call it sagacity, or shrewdness, being a habit of ready discernment and application of means to ends. Napoleon I. was conspicuous for this sagacity. It is the key to success in this world. But prudence discovers worthy ends only, and to them only does it provide means. The intellect is often blinded by passion, by desire and by fear, so as not to discern the proper end and term to make for in a particular instance and a practical case. The general rules of conduct remain in the mind, as that, "In anger be mindful of mercy:" but the propriety of mercy under the present provocation drops out of sight. The intellect does not discern the golden mean of justice and mercy in relation to the circumstances in which the agent now finds himself. In other words, the habit of prudence has failed; and it has failed because of the excess of passion. Thus prudence is dependent on the presence of the virtues that restrain passion, namely, fortitude and temperance. A like argument would hold for the virtue of justice, that rectifies inordinate action in dealing with another. The conclusion is, that as the moral virtues cannot exist without prudence, so neither can prudence exist without them: for vice corrupts the judgment of prudence.