Article First. On Prudence.

263. Its nature. 1. Prudence is defined as right reason of things to be done, or it is the moral virtue dictating in any business whatever what, with the circumstances considered, must be done, so that the action may be fitting to right reason.

a. Prudence is a virtue of the practical intellect, which proximately directs all virtues, both moral and theological.

b. Prudence orders man both to himself and to another, because it directs all acts whatever, both those which are referred to himself and those which are referred to another.

2. The material object of prudence is constituted by all human actions in particular, concerning which it dictates how they are to be exercised here and now, so that the honorable may be done and evil avoided. The formal object is natural honesty, which shines forth in this, that all deliberate actions be done according to right reason.

a. Because prudence pertains to all human actions (for it must impress upon all, as it were, the mean of virtue as a form), it is easily understood that there can be no virtue without prudence. For this reason prudence is rightly called the charioteer and moderator of all virtues. Thus mercy inclines a man to assist the poor, but prudence dictates how much, where, when, and how it must be given to the poor man, so that the act of mercy may be fitting to right reason in every respect.

b. Prudence itself supposes that the will is well disposed concerning the particular ends of the moral virtues, lest prudent judgment be corrupted by disordered affections: for he who wishes to judge rightly must be free from disordered affections, since each one customarily judges according as he is affected.

3. The functions or acts of prudence are numbered as three: consultation, judgment, and command. For first it must inquire into the means which are necessary for the end, i.e. so that the work may be done honestly; then it judges what and how something must be done here and now, so that the work may be done according to virtue; and finally it commands that this or that action is to be done here and now.

264. On the opposed vices. 1. The vices opposed to prudence by defect are:

a. Precipitation, by which a work is undertaken immediately without prior deliberation.

b. Inconsideration, by which an attentive inspection of the matter about which judgment must be made and of its circumstances is omitted.

c. Inconstancy, by which the opinion reached is changed without any cause, or certainly without a just cause.

d. Negligence, by which a matter deliberated and determined is not committed to execution at the opportune time.

2. The vices opposed to prudence by excess are rather vices which have a certain false appearance and likeness of prudence:

a. Prudence of the flesh, which devises means for fulfilling the motions of corrupt nature.

b. Astuteness, which devises simulated and hidden ways for deceiving one's neighbor in order to attain some end, whether good or bad; if it is committed by words, it is called deceit, if by deeds, it is called fraud.

c. Solicitude for temporal things, which is an excessive occupation of the mind in acquiring and preserving temporal goods.

d. Solicitude for future things, which is an excessive occupation concerning those things which are in future time, especially those necessary for life.

265. On the parts of prudence. 1. The integral parts of prudence are numbered as eight:

a. memory of past things, b. understanding of present things, c. docility, which acquiesces in the opinions of elders, d. shrewdness in considering future events, e. reason comparing one thing with another and promptly gathering what follows from it, f. foresight considering the end, g. circumspection attending to the circumstances of the work, h. caution in avoiding impediments.

2. The subjective parts of prudence are two: a. monastic or private prudence, by which someone rules himself, b. ruling prudence, by which someone rules others or a multitude.

This is distinguished into economic prudence, by which the family is ruled, children are well educated, goods are preserved and increased, etc.; into political prudence, by which a society of men living under the same laws is ruled and its common good is sought; into military prudence, by which soldiers are directed to attack enemies or to repel them.

3. The potential parts of the virtue of prudence are numbered as three:

a. Eubulia is the habit of finding good counsel in ambiguous and perplexed matters.

b. Synesis is the habit of bearing right judgment concerning particular operations according to common laws.

c. Gnome is the habit of judging rightly in particulars in which, on account of particular adjuncts, an exception from the common law must be made. Gnome therefore directs epikeia.