Treatise: On the Cardinal Virtue of Prudence and on the Annexed Virtues

3. Prudence (phronesis) in the broader sense is any cognition of the true pertaining to morals, speculative or practical, for example, faith, moral science; in the strict sense it is practical cognition ultimately directive of morals, whether in doing good, and thus a prudent virgin is spoken of (cf. Mt. X, 16; I Pet. IV, 7; Wis. VIII, 7), or even in doing evil, as when, for example, a prudent thief is spoken of (cf. Lk. XVI, 8; Rom. VIII, 6, 7). Hence good prudence, namely the acquired or natural virtue of prudence, from Aristotle, Ethics VI, chapter 5, is usually defined as right reason of things to be done (ton prakton, deeds), that is, the right notion, idea, exemplar, and dictate determining what things are to be done.

Thus it is defined in opposition to art, which is called right reason of things to be made (ton poieton, products): for human acts as such consist in the one operating and render him honorable and perfect him, whence things to be done are called those things which are done by man insofar as they remain in him, such as to will, to see, to desire, to be angry, to live chastely, to endure patiently, to move the arm, etc.; things to be made are those which are constituted by man in exterior matter, such as a house, a painting, a ship, to build, to cut, etc. In the former, namely, there is considered a change of the subject; in the latter, a transmutation of the object; in the former the end is the rectitude of the operation itself and of the one operating from the honesty impressed upon the action; in the latter the end is the very thing worked and its perfection, from the artificial form introduced not indeed into the action but into the external work. For art does not intend the good of the human appetite, but the good of artificial works.¹

¹ It should be noted that prudence and art are distinguished from the objects concerning which they are concerned per se, immediately, and formally:

1. per se, for Lessius notes, chapter 1, doubt 2, that art also is concerned with certain operations remaining in the agent, such as the art of playing the psaltery and of dancing, but this happens per accidens: for such actions are not directed by art insofar as and because they are immanent, but insofar as they are an external work of man, upon which work produced art impresses an artificial form accommodated to the uses of men; whence per se they are not action, praxeis, for from these man does not become good or evil, but they are, as it were, a work, poieton. Whence it happens to art per accidens that it leaves no external work or thing worked outside man, for since it is concerned with external action, from its genus it requires leaving some thing worked (cf. Suarez, De Virt., disp. 3, sect. 2, n. 6);

2. immediately, for mediately prudence too is concerned with external things, and conversely art is concerned with internal things. Art, namely, immediately regards the external work, but mediately the internal insofar as it has the force of moving to the work; prudence immediately regards the good will or election itself, mediately external things as to be disposed and brought through to the end intended by the one operating, insofar as moral goodness flows from the interior to external operations;

3. formally, for prudence is materially concerned with things to be made, not as such (as to dictating those things about which they are) but as to use, so that man may rightly, that is, honorably, use art (II-II, q. 47, a. 4, ad 2; I-II, q. 57, a. 3, ad 2).

4. Supernatural prudence can be defined a little more fully: A divinely infused virtue by which practical reason dictates what, all things considered, here and now is to be done as truly fitting to the supernatural ultimate end, and what is to be fled as unfitting. In this definition there is indicated:

1. the genus to which prudence pertains: an infused virtue, that is, a good habit rendering man perfect in order to the supernatural end;

2. the subject in which it inheres: practical reason. Thus it differs both from the moral virtues strictly so called, which are in the appetite, and from habits which are in the speculative intellect, such as faith and science;

3. the proper act by which it is distinguished from others: it dictates in the perfect sense, that is, from deliberation or counsel it judges at the same time by commanding and intimating. Thus it differs from the virtues annexed to it, which do not command but only inquire and deliberate, or even judge, what is to be done and commanded. A judgment of this kind is right conscience, to the formation of which the annexed virtues concur under the direction of prudence; prudence applies the judgment in fact to the action and commands its execution;

4. the material object: what, all things considered, is to be done here and now, in the concrete. Thus it is distinguished both from synderesis and moral science, which dictate what is to be done in the abstract and in general, and from art, which judges what is to be made in exterior matter;

5. the formal object, or proximate motive: as being truly fitting to the supernatural ultimate end, and thus it differs from natural, acquired, and imperfect prudence.

That this definition is real will be shown throughout the whole treatise.

5. The necessity of prudence. - The virtue of prudence is most necessary to man, because without it he cannot choose well and live honorably, as we have already shown in the treatise on Virtues, I, n. 589. It is proved:

1. Since election is concerning the means to the end, hence for choosing rightly, operating well, and living honorably, it is not sufficient that man will the good end, but it is also most especially required that he rightly order the means to the end. Therefore, just as for willing the due end man is well disposed by the moral virtues which are in the appetite, so for rightly ordering the means human reason must be well disposed by some virtue: for reason inquires about, judges, and commands the means to be chosen. But prudence disposes precisely for doing this well (I-II, q. 57, a. 5).

2. Prudence is necessary for finding, forming, and executing the judgment of right conscience. But right conscience is most necessary, because it is the proximate rule of all human actions, so that, if they are conformed to it, they will be good, and evil if they are not conformed. Therefore prudence also is most necessary.

See, therefore, how much is lacking in modern moralists, who speak so little of prudence.

6. Division of the treatise. - The treatise is divided into two parts: the first is concerning prudence itself; the other, concerning the virtues annexed to prudence.

In the first part one must treat:

1. of prudence according to itself, namely a) of its subject; b) of its object and act; c) of the habit and cause of prudence;

2. of the parts of prudence: a) integral; b) subjective; c) potential; to which is joined d) the gift of counsel;

3. of the sins opposed to prudence: a) by defect, imprudence; b) by excess, false prudence.

Nothing special is said concerning the precept of prudence, because precepts are given directly concerning moral principles, that is, concerning due ends; but prudence is concerned with the means to the end, and therefore prudence is included implicitly in all precepts, and all precepts pertain to it indirectly, according as it is directive of all virtuous and prescribed acts.²

² Concerning prudence the following can usefully be consulted: Aristotle, Ethics VI with the Commentary of St. Thomas; St. Thomas in the Summa, II-II, q. 47-56, with the Commentaries of Cajetan; likewise Fr. de Victoria, Sylvius, Billuart, and Pegues; likewise Goudin, in Philosophy. Among theologians of the Society of Jesus: de Valentia, Commentary on St. Thomas; Lessius, On Right and Justice and the Other Cardinal Virtues; and Schiffini, On Infused Virtues. Others, and especially present-day moralists, either copy out Lessius, or hand down few and not very accurate things. Nevertheless the Most Illustrious Waffelaert, On the Cardinal Virtues, deserves to be consulted.

The following are usefully read: Janvier, Christian Prudence; Sertillanges, The Moral Doctrine of St. Thomas; Gardeil, The Personal and Supernatural Government of Oneself, in Revue Thomiste, 1918; Noble, The Virtue of Prudence.