Chapter I. On the Notion of the Virtue of Prudence

626. Notion. Prudence is enumerated among both the intellectual and the moral virtues. In either sense the definition given by Aristotle can be applied to it:¹ "Prudence is right reason concerning things to be done." - In all arts and actions in which counsel is needed on account of the uncertainty of those things by which one arrives at the end, prudence is required, at least as an intellectual virtue. Hence we speak of a prudent architect, who, after deliberation has been made, is accustomed to proceed rightly in building; of a prudent robber, who perpetrates his robberies with great cunning; and Christ calls the children of this age more prudent in their generation, because with great skill and sagacity they dispose their actions toward obtaining worldly ends. But this last prudence is called by St. Paul the prudence of the flesh, which is the death of the soul.

But if we speak of prudence according as it is a true moral virtue, then it is right reason, i.e. the ordering of human acts to the true ultimate end of human life, or it is the habit of choosing means to an end morally good. But all other human prudences which are opposed to this true prudence are in fact great follies. - Prudence is defined variously by various authors.² Thus St. Augustine,³ Cicero going before him,⁴ says: "Prudence is knowledge of things to be sought and to be fled." It is defined by others: an intellective virtue by which in any business occurring we know what is honorable, what is base. This last definition is more common and signifies the same thing as the Aristotelian definition brought forward above.

Subject. Prudence is subjected in reason, and indeed in practical reason,⁵ for it is practical knowledge. Moreover the acts of prudence, or its functions, namely to take counsel, to judge, to command, are acts of reason. But the nature of prudence does not consist in the practical judgment alone, but also in the practical and efficacious motion of the powers to acts. For no one would call him prudent who indeed knows what must rightly be done, but by no means acts rightly; indeed such a man is most of all foolish. From this it follows that prudence, if it is perfect, supposes rectitude of appetite, or the assistance of the other moral virtues. In other words: since the moral virtues are connected, the virtue of prudence requires that the other moral virtues be present together with it. But conversely the other moral virtues also depend upon prudence, because no moral virtue can exist without the mean of reason, as was said above n. 463; furthermore that mean of reason in any virtue is established by prudence.

Division. The virtue of prudence is either acquired or infused. According as it is an acquired virtue, the definition given above belongs to it. But according as it is an infused virtue, it can be defined: a virtue supernaturally infused by which the practical intellect, enlightened by formed faith and stirred by the Holy Spirit, judges and commands what in individual cases is to be done as fitting for the supernatural end, or to be avoided as unfitting for that end. Those things are to be recalled which were said above n. 473 concerning infused moral virtues in general, namely concerning their relation to grace, concerning their dependence upon charity.

Supernatural prudence differs much from the natural virtue of prudence; and indeed a) by reason of the efficient cause, namely because natural prudence is acquired by repeated acts of ours, but supernatural prudence is infused into us by God with sanctifying grace; b) by reason of extension and of the motive principle. For natural prudence presupposes only the understanding of the first moral principles, which are known as if naturally, and in addition a right appetite of natural good. But infused prudence especially supposes faith, and this informed by charity. Hence St. Thomas⁶ says: "For the right reason of prudence it is much more required that a man be well disposed concerning the ultimate end, which is done by charity, than concerning other ends, which is done by the moral virtues." The supernatural virtue of prudence moreover extends itself to directing acts about the ultimate end of human life, while the natural virtue of prudence often reaches only acts about a subordinate end. Hence St. Thomas⁷ says: "Prudence is true and perfect which rightly takes counsel, judges, and commands for the good end of the whole life; and this alone is called prudence simply, which cannot be in sinners." On account of these reasons infused prudence depends intimately both upon faith and upon charity. For faith shows prudence the true ultimate end of human life, namely eternal beatitude; charity, however, efficaciously tends into God and orders the whole man to God; finally prudence, the light of faith shining before it and charity moving it, finds and commands the most suitable means for obtaining that end.

That supernatural prudence may be able to fulfill its most noble office more perfectly, there is joined to it the gift of counsel, which renders a man well docile by the Holy Spirit, who by means of this gift suggests to us the best means for obtaining the ultimate end, i.e. beatitude.⁸

Concerning the other divisions of prudence there will be speech below, n. 632, where its subjective parts will be discussed.

¹ Ethic. l. 6, c. 5, n. 4.

² You may see several definitions of prudence in William Peraldus, Summ. virtut. et vitior., de prud. c. 2.

³ Lib. 83 quaest. q. 61.

⁴ De offic. III, 47.

⁵ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 47, a. 2.

⁶ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 65, a. 2.

⁷ Ib. 2, 2, q. 47, a. 13.

⁸ Ib. q. 52, a. 2.

627. Material object of prudence is all the moral actions of man ("things to be done," says Aristotle), but not physical actions, since art is concerned with these ("things to be made," says Aristotle).

The formal object by which of prudence is the human act under the aspect of practical truth and good. Concerning this matter Billuart⁹ rightly writes: "Note that speculative truth is one thing, practical truth another. Speculative truth is considered by conformity of the intellect to the thing, namely that the intellect conceive and enunciate the thing as it is; practical truth by conformity to right appetite, namely that the intellect conceive and enunciate that which is conformed to right appetite. Therefore prudence first reaches its object under the aspect of practical truth, because, as has been said, its object is something to be done and conformed to right appetite, and therefore practically true; and under this aspect it is an intellectual virtue, beneath which the false does not lie. And because it does not know that honorable thing, or thing conformed to right appetite, in order to stand in the knowledge of it, but in order that through the other moral virtues it may operate that thing, which is good, therefore secondarily it regards its object under the aspect of good, and thus by reason of the matter and end it is a moral virtue, not indeed elicitive of morals, as the other virtues, justice, fortitude, and temperance, but directive of morals."

⁹ De prud. diss. 1, a. 1.

628. Relation between prudence, Moral Theology, and conscience. From what has been said it is licit to conclude how prudence is related to the science of Moral Theology and to conscience. The science of Moral Theology is the objective rule according to which prudence must be formed, and there is given no true prudence which is deformed from that rule. But conscience, which is a judgment or dictate of right reason concerning the liceity of an act to be done or done, is an act of prudence. This act of prudence, or conscience dictating according to prudent estimation what is to be done here and now, is the proximate subjective rule of morality, beneath which the false cannot lie, because he who follows conscience can never sin, even if conscience is invincibly erroneous. - Thus, therefore, is the genesis of prudence and of its effects: prudence has as its highest principles the theological virtues, and especially formed faith; these principles indeed are scientifically explained and illustrated in the science of Moral and Dogmatic Theology; prudence deduces the conclusions of this science as to singular and contingent things;¹⁰ finally conscience, as an act of prudence, judges and commands what in individual things is to be done or omitted.

¹⁰ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 47, a. 6.

629. Dignity and excellence of the virtue of prudence appears from what has been said. Both Sacred Scripture and the holy Fathers extol it with great praises. "Blessed is the man who finds wisdom and who abounds in prudence."¹¹ "Wisdom is better than powers, and a prudent man than a strong man."¹² But Christ admonishes: "Be prudent therefore as serpents."¹³ St. Ambrose¹⁴ says: "The first source of duty is prudence. For what is so full of duty as to offer zeal and reverence to the author [God]? Yet this source is also derived into the other virtues; for neither can justice be without prudence, since to examine what is just and what unjust is a matter of no mediocre prudence.... Since indeed fortitude also ... is full of justice, and to know by what counsel it should defend and aid, and also to seize the opportunities of times and places, belongs to prudence and modesty; and temperance itself without prudence cannot know measure."

By reason also the dignity and necessity of prudence can easily be demonstrated; for without prudence no virtue can subsist. For every moral virtue ought to consist between two extremes, that is, it ought neither to exceed nor to fall short of right reason; furthermore the office of prudence is to contain all moral virtues in the right mean. Wherefore a man destitute of prudence is deservedly compared to a ship lacking a helmsman, which by the force of winds and waves is driven here and there, and at last must necessarily perish in certain shipwreck. Prudence, however, is deservedly called the moderator and charioteer of the virtues, the orderer of affections, the teacher of morals.¹⁵ - But especially for the confessor prudence is exceedingly necessary; for the practical doubts which often occur in the confessional cannot be sufficiently solved by different moral systems, but by Christian prudence, which in each case rightly indicates what is useful or harmful to the soul of the penitent.

¹¹ Prov. 3, 13-17: "Blessed is the man who finds wisdom and who abounds in prudence. Better is the acquisition of it than the trading of silver, and of first and purest gold are its fruits. It is more precious than all riches, and all things that are desired cannot be compared to it. Length of days is in its right hand, and in its left hand riches and glory. Its ways are beautiful ways, and all its paths are peaceful."

¹² Sap. 6, 1.

¹³ Matth. 10, 16.

¹⁴ De offic. l. 1, c. 27 (Migne, Patr. lat. 16, 66).

¹⁵ William Peraldus writes ingeniously concerning the commendation of prudence, Summa virtut. et vitior., de prud. c. 4. Cf. Leo XIII in the Encyclical of Jan. 10, 1890.