Article I. On Prudence

I. Notion of Prudence. Prudence, whose name seems to be derived from "seeing from afar" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 57, a. 5), and which is first in dignity among all moral virtues, can be defined: a moral virtue inclining man to determine rightly, by an act of command, what in individual cases is to be done or omitted in conformity with the supernatural end. It is said:

1. By an act of command. For the proper act of prudence "consists in the application of things counseled and judged" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 47, a. 8).

2. What is to be done ... in individual cases. For it belongs to prudence to assign to each individual act its conformity with right reason.

3. In conformity with the supernatural end. Thus supernatural prudence is distinguished from the virtue of natural prudence.

II. Object of Prudence. 1. Material object. The material object of prudence is all moral acts. For acts are moral insofar as here and now they are conformed to right reason; but it belongs to prudence alone to determine what in an individual case must be done or omitted in conformity with right reason. For moral virtues indeed incline man toward their objects taken in a general sense, for example temperance toward living temperately, justice toward rendering to each one his own; but for this reason they do not attain in their object the mean of reason required for an individual act. This mean must be shown in all moral acts by the virtue of prudence; and thus it is clear that all moral acts are the material object of prudence.

2. Formal object. The formal object of prudence is the conformity of practical judgment with the moral order, or with the supernatural end; for this conformity is the motive for which the act of command is placed.

III. Acts of Prudence. A virtue which brings it about that an act conformed to right reason is elicited must furnish three things: first, to investigate what means exist for placing an act honorably; then, to establish an elective judgment concerning the means found; and finally, to impose the chosen means by commanding its execution. Therefore a threefold act of prudence is distinguished: consulting, judging, and commanding. This last act is most proper to prudence; for prudence is rightly called right reason concerning things to be done. Hence the act of practical reason which applies the chosen means to the work is the proper act (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 47, a. 8). And thus it is clear that prudence, although it inheres in the intellect, is nevertheless a moral virtue, since it establishes the norm of the morally good, which is the object of the will.

IV. Connection of Prudence with the Other Moral Virtues. This connection is mutual; for prudence supposes man's relation to the due end through the other virtues, but it directs them in eliciting their acts. For the office of prudence is not to direct man to the due end, but to determine what in particular is to be done or omitted in order to the due end. Therefore if, antecedently to the act of command, man is not directed to the due end through the moral virtues, prudence will not exercise its act of commanding; but these virtues without prudence will not rightly place their acts. And thus the virtue of prudence is rightly called the charioteer of the virtues.

Therefore St. Thomas teaches: "No moral virtue can be had without prudence, because it is proper to moral virtue to make a right choice, since it is an elective habit. But for right choice there suffices not only an inclination to the due end, which is directly through the habit of moral virtue, but also that someone directly choose those things which are toward the end; this is done through prudence, which counsels, judges, and commands concerning the things which are toward the end. Similarly, prudence cannot be had unless the moral virtues are had; since prudence is right reason concerning things to be done, which, as from principles, proceeds from the ends of things to be done, toward which someone is rightly disposed through the moral virtues" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 65, a. 1).

V. Parts of Prudence. 1. Subjective parts. It belongs to prudence, as we noted above, to direct man in individual acts to the due end; but man can be considered as an individual person or as a person of a society. In either consideration, a special mediate end has been set before him, which must also be attained by special acts. Hence there is also a twofold subjective part of prudence: one is personal prudence, which is also called private, monastic, or solitary; the other is governing prudence, which is often called polyarchic or social.

a) Personal prudence is that by which someone rules himself in conformity with the supernatural end, in order to a private good.

b) Governing prudence is that by which someone rules, in conformity with the supernatural end, both a multitude and himself in order to a multitude. This differs according as multitudes differ. Hence it is distinguished as domestic, political, and military.

Domestic prudence is said to be that "which is ordered to the common good of a house or family" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 47, a. 11; cf. II-II, q. 48, single article, and q. 50, a. 8).

Political prudence is that which is ordered to the common good of the city (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 47, a. 11; cf. II-II, q. 48, single article), and in authority it is called regal, while in subjects it is simply called political (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 50, a. 1, corpus and ad 2; a. 2; q. 48, single article).

Military prudence is that which is ordered "to resisting those who attack and corrupt from without" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 50, a. 4) the common good of the city (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 48, single article).

Take care, however, lest from what has been said you conclude that every just person, because he has the supernatural virtue of prudence, is also fitted for governing, and that the holier person is by that very fact more fitted for this office. For for the office of superior there is required not only the virtue of prudence, whose act is to render acts of ruling conformed to the ultimate end, but also an art which is occupied around external governance. Hence the holier person is quite often less fit for the office of superior, because he lacks this art of ruling.

2. Potential parts of prudence are eubulia, synesis, and gnome.

a) Eubulia is the habit of consulting well. By this virtue man is directed to considering rightly the various means conducing to the end and the various ways in which the end can be attained. Hence it imports a certain inquiry of reason concerning things to be done (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 51, a. 1).

b) Synesis is the habit of judging rightly concerning those things which must be done according to common rules. Therefore this virtue brings it about that man rightly judges which, among the various means found by eubulia, with the circumstances considered, is here and now better, more useful, and more fitting according to common rules (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 51, a. 3; I-II, q. 57, a. 6).

c) Gnome is the habit of judging rightly, but concerning those things which must be done according to rules that are not common but higher, contrary indeed to the tenor of the law, but not contrary to the mind of the legislator. Therefore this virtue brings it about that in circumstances in which common rules cannot rightly be applied, we judge that means to be chosen which, with these circumstances considered, is here and now better, more useful, and more fitting according to higher rules (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 51, a. 4).

3. Integral parts of prudence are:

a) Memory, which is recollection of past things; experience of these greatly conduces to forming a prudent judgment about present or future things.

b) Understanding, which consists in full knowledge both of the action to be placed and of the principles of morality.

c) Docility, which is a disposition of soul toward learning from others, "and especially from elders, who have attained sound understanding concerning the ends of things to be done" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 49, a. 3).

d) Shrewdness, which is a certain sagacity of mind for finding a suitable means, especially in sudden matters.

e) Reasoning, which brings it about that the agent "can well apply universal principles to particulars, which are various and uncertain" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 49, a. 4).

f) Foresight, which foresees future contingents, whether good or evil, which are to follow from the action.

g) Circumspection, by which man "compares that which is ordered to an end also with the things which surround it" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 49, a. 7).

h) Caution is that by which evils are avoided which can vitiate the work of virtue.

VI. Opposed Vices. Vices opposed to prudence are some by defect, others by excess.

1. Vices by defect are called by the common name of imprudence, and they are four: precipitation, inconsideration, inconstancy, and negligence.

a) Precipitation is directly opposed to eubulia, and by it man is borne to acting by an impulse of will or passion, sufficient counsel of reason being omitted (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 53, a. 3).

b) Inconsideration is a vice by which man is inclined to contemning or neglecting those things from which right judgment proceeds; and therefore synesis and gnome are opposed to it (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 53, a. 4).

c) Inconstancy is a vice inclining one to withdraw from a defined good proposal; by it reason fails in commanding those things which right counsel and right judgment dictate must be commanded. Hence it is directly opposed to prudence (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 53, a. 5).

d) Negligence is a vice by which man is inclined to neglecting right command, through a defect of solicitude and promptness of will; for this reason it too is directly opposed to prudence (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 54, a. 2, corpus and ad 3; ibid., a. 1).

From these points it is clear that imprudence has under itself as many species as there are potential parts of the virtue of prudence (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 53, a. 2). St. Thomas alleges lust as the origin of these vices (II-II, q. 53, a. 6). But imprudence considered in this way constitutes a special sin, because it is contrarily opposed to the virtue of prudence; and just as prudence is a special virtue, so also its contrary is a special sin. But if by the name of imprudence there is indicated not so much the contrary as the lack of prudence, imprudence does not constitute a special sin, but rather a general one, insofar, namely, as it participates in the nature of the sin which is committed against that virtue for whose exercise the act of prudence was being commanded. "For just as prudence is in some way participated in all virtues, insofar as it directs them, so also imprudence is in all vices and sins; for no sin can happen unless there is a defect in some act of reason directing, which pertains to imprudence" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 53, a. 2).

2. Vices by excess have some likeness with prudence itself, but they apply its offices to an undue object, namely to a dishonorable matter; hence they bear before themselves a false species of prudence. These vices are: prudence of the flesh or of the world, craftiness, guile, fraud, excessive solicitude for temporal things, and excessive solicitude for future things.

a) Prudence of the flesh or of the world is a vice "according as someone has the goods of the flesh as the ultimate end of his life" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, a. 1); and it obtained this name because "prudence is concerned with those things which are toward the end of the whole of life" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, a. 2).

b) Craftiness is a vice by which someone, "for attaining some end, whether good or evil, uses not true ways, but simulated and apparent ones" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, a. 3).

c) Guile is the execution of those things which craftiness thinks out, whether it is done by words or by deeds; and therefore it pertains to craftiness (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, aa. 4 and 5).

d) Fraud differs from guile in this, "that guile pertains universally to the execution of craftiness, whether it is done by words or by deeds; but fraud more properly pertains to the execution of craftiness insofar as it is done by deeds" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, a. 5).

e) Excessive solicitude for temporal things is had either by seeking temporal things as an end, the spiritual end being excluded; or when superfluous effort is applied to procuring them, "on account of which man is drawn back from spiritual things, which he ought principally to serve" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, a. 6); or when "someone fears that, by doing what he ought, necessary things will fail him" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, a. 6).

f) Excessive solicitude for future things is had when someone is solicitous about future things before the opportune time (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, a. 7).

St. Thomas assigns avarice as the principal source of these vices (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 55, a. 8).