Article II: On the Object and Act of Prudence

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 47, a. 4-10.

11. The object of prudence is the thing to be done - conformed to the right appetite or to the due end - under the aspect of the true. In this one object three things can be considered:

1. the material object which prudence touches and effects is any human actions whatever, intrinsic to the agent himself, in any matter of the virtues;

2. the primary material object which it touches principally, per se, and by reason of itself, is precisely that actions are here and now to be dictated and commanded in order to the due end which is rightly desired (a. 5). Nevertheless, not only the actions of individuals but also the actions of the community are the object of prudence, because in these too one arrives at the due end, namely the good of the community (a. 10);

3. the formal object or proximate motive on account of which prudence commands these actions is their practical truth, that is, rectitude or conformity to right appetite and to the due end and moral law, insofar as it is perceived by the intellect: for prudence commands actions because it has it as true that they are conformed to the due end and therefore are to be done (a. 5, and ad 3).

Hence prudence regards its object first and essentially under the aspect of the true; but since it does not know that object except that man may will and operate it, consequently and secondarily it also regards it under the aspect of the good (which is the object of the will); and therefore, although by reason of motive and subject it is an intellectual virtue, nevertheless by reason of matter and end it is a moral virtue, as directive of good acts (a. 4).

"The speculative true," says Billuart, "is attended to through the conformity of the intellect to the thing, namely so that the intellect conceives and enunciates the thing as it is; the practical true, through conformity to right appetite, namely so that the intellect conceives and enunciates that which is conformed to right appetite: such an action befits a right will (cf. I-II, q. 57, a. 5, ad 3; and q. 19, a. 3, ad 2). Therefore prudence first touches its object under the aspect of the practical true, because its object is the thing to be done and conformed to right appetite, and therefore practically true; and under this aspect it is an intellectual virtue and falsity cannot be subject to it. And because it does not know that honorable thing, or that which is conformed to right appetite, in such a way as to rest in the cognition of it, but so that through the other moral virtues it may operate it, which is good, therefore secondarily it regards its object under the aspect of the good; and thus by reason of matter and end it is a moral virtue, not indeed elicitive of morals, as the other virtues, justice, fortitude, and temperance, but directive of morals."

1. Diss. I, a. 1.

12. Prudence does not pre-establish the end for the moral virtues; - but it determines the mean of reason which they must have between excess and defect.

The first part is proved: Prudence, by reasoning and concluding, applies universal principles of reason to particular operations. But in operable and moral things the end is, as it were, the principle, for example, good is to be done, justice is to be preserved, one must live temperately according to the mean or measure of reason. Therefore prudence does not pre-establish the end for the moral virtues, but only disposes concerning the means to the end, insofar as from the end it rightly concludes which particular operations are the means by which one arrives at the end.

Briefly: Reason through synderesis establishes the ends to be pursued by the moral virtues, by enunciating the universal principles of practical reason. But prudence, by reasoning, applies those practical principles of synderesis and deduces conclusions concerning those things which are to be done for the end (a. 6).

The second part is proved: Nevertheless prudence determines the mean of reason. To touch the mean of reason and to be conformed to right reason is the end of moral virtue. But prudence disposes concerning the means to the end, insofar as it determines and dictates in what way man in operating touches the mean of reason: for it determines and dictates what sort, how, where, how much, through what things, and other circumstances, as congruous means by which the other virtues are to be exercised or not exercised; and thus it indicates the mean of reason between excess (too much) and defect (not enough). Therefore (a. 7).

Therefore, although the mean of reason is the object and the very end of moral virtue, nevertheless through the right or prudent disposition of those things which are for the end, the mean is found (a. 7).

1. Moral virtue from synderesis and from its own nature tends to its end, namely the mean of reason, but considered in the abstract and in common; but what sort the end is in the concrete and in particular, what the mean is in this or in that, is determined by prudence. Whence it is understood that St. Thomas, who in the present place denies that prudence pre-establishes the end for the moral virtues, affirms the same in I-II, q. 66, a. 3, ad 3. Nor nevertheless is there a contradiction. Here he speaks properly and denies that prudence first and principally pre-establishes the end considered absolutely and in the abstract and in common; there he says that prudence pre-establishes the end not first but in application to special matter, by determining what sort it is in the concrete and in particular. Whence prudence directs the moral virtues also by pre-establishing the end in the concrete, saying: such is a temperate act; this is the mean, namely so much as is required between excess and defect. Hence Cajetan: "it looks upon the end as the principle of the means (it does not dictate it) and prepares the way for moral virtue so that it may touch the end by choosing those things which are for the end" (a. 6, ad 3).

But do not conclude from the fact that prudence does not pre-establish the end for the moral virtues, but only determines the means, that it is inferior to them since it receives the end from them. For 1) prudence pre-establishes the end for them in the concrete, and thus the moral virtues, as perfect, depend upon it as to their proper object and perfection, and it is nobler than they; 2) nor do the moral virtues per se give prudence the end in the abstract: for they tend to the end only executively, but they do not pre-establish the end, because they do not authoritatively dictate and intend it first, but have this from synderesis (a. 6, ad 3). Whence it must be concluded that synderesis, not the moral virtues, is nobler than prudence, and this conclusion is right.

Hence prudence is called the measure and rule of the moral virtues, because it determines their mean or object (from which they have that they are virtues), and therefore it is worthier than they; moreover, it is the charioteer of all the virtues: it directs the moral virtues, over which it presides as moderator; it serves the theological virtues, but directs them according to the exercise of the act, insofar as it discerns when they are to be used.

13. There is a threefold act required for prudence, or function of prudence. For it is the right reason of things to be done. But reason which is concerned with things to be done has three functions or acts:

1. to counsel or deliberate, which is to inquire for the finding of means and circumstances, so that the work may be done well;

2. to judge concerning the things found, whereby reason concludes that the means are good and suitable for the due end, or not, and therefore here and now are to be used, or omitted; of such a kind is antecedent moral conscience directing our acts;

3. to command the things judged, whereby the means found and judged are applied to operating, and the moral virtues are moved to execution (a. 8).

Counsel (délibération; raad) is discourse; judgment (jugement; oordeel) is the conclusion of discourse; command (décision; bevel, besluit) renders the conclusion effective.

This last act is the chief one, because it moves proximately to operating and thus is nearer to the end: for no one is judged prudent who knows how one must act rightly and does not act rightly, because the last effect and end of prudence is lacking. But so that this act of command may be done well, solicitude (bezorgdheid, zorgvuldigheid) or diligence (watchfulness) is necessary, which is quickness in commanding and pursuing those things which are to be done, after one has deliberated concerning them not quickly but slowly (a. 9).

1. "And the sign of this is that the perfection of art consists in judging, but not in commanding. Therefore he is reputed a better artisan who willingly sins in art, as having right judgment, than he who sins unwillingly, which seems to be from defect of judgment. But in prudence it is the contrary, as is said in Ethics VI, c. 5. For he is more imprudent who sins willingly, as deficient in the principal act, which is to command, than he who sins unwillingly" (a. 8).

2. Ethics VI, c. 9: "In counsel many things must be considered, whence one must deliberate slowly."

14. Observation. - Several authors, such as Lessius and Billuart, require solicitude or diligence for the three acts, all of which must be exercised with great attention, care, and sedulity so that they may be done rightly. This is true, but then solicitude and diligence are taken in another and diverse, broader sense than with St. Thomas in the present place. Solicitude and diligence is an unrest of mind and watchfulness concerning uncertain things, and therefore in the broader and general sense it is unrest for doing all things attentively, accurately, and sedulously (whether slowly or quickly), according as is required (nauwlettendheid), and thus it also pertains to counsel and judgment (cf. q. 49, a. 1, ad 2); but in the strict and special sense it is only agility in commanding, or prompt quickness in executing at once that which has been commanded, and thus it pertains only to command and the execution of judgment, because counsel and judgment are not to be done quickly.

2. In French a distinction is made: faire avec diligence, and faire diligence.